Re: [tor-bugs] #29691 [Core Tor/Tor]: Builds from master fail on Jenkins mingw builder

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29691: Builds from master fail on Jenkins mingw builder
-+
 Reporter:  harig|  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.4.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-jenkins  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * version:   => Tor: 0.4.0.1-alpha
 * component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins => Core Tor/Tor
 * points:   => 0.5
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
 * owner:  weasel => ahf


Comment:

 This bug is still failing jenkins. We need to fix the jenkins scripts, or
 we will not have any 0.4.0 windows binaries.

 I think ahf is the best person to fix this jenkins bug.

 When there's a patch, we can put it back in the jenkins component so that
 a service admin can apply it.

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[tor-bugs] #29812 [Applications/Tor Browser]: .mar files for 32-bit Linux are missing for 8.5a9

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29812: .mar files for 32-bit Linux are missing for 8.5a9
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
  |  TorBrowserTeam201903
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Probably due to our switch to cross-compile our Linux bundles (#26323) we
 don't have any .mar files for 32-bit Linux anymore.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27290 [Applications/Tor Browser]: WebGL is broken in Tor Browser 8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27290: WebGL is broken in Tor Browser 8
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-   |  Actual Points:
  regression, TorBrowserTeam201812R, tbb-|
  backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: randomtoruser (added)


Comment:

 #29804 is a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29804 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Changing webgl.min_capability_mode to false in about:config in Torbrowser 8.0.6 is not persistant

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29804: Changing webgl.min_capability_mode to false in about:config in 
Torbrowser
8.0.6 is not persistant
--+---
 Reporter:  randomtoruser |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * resolution:   => duplicate
 * status:  new => closed
 * component:  Webpages => Applications/Tor Browser
 * version:  Tor: unspecified =>


Comment:

 This should be fixed in the alpha series by #27290. Please test it out
 (https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en#downloads-alpha)
 and reopen the bug if not.

 Duplicate of #27290.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28925 [Core Tor/Tor]: distinguish PT vs proxy for real in bootstrap tracker

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28925: distinguish PT vs proxy for real in bootstrap tracker
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s8-bootstrap, usability, ux, tor-|  Actual Points:
  pt, tbb-needs, 040-must, network-team- |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #28018   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:11 mcs]:
 > Replying to [comment:10 catalyst]:
 > > Replying to [comment:7 mcs]:
 > > > I added tbb-needs to this ticket (which I included on #29341 when I
 filed it).
 > > Sorry for dropping the tag. Do you need this to be in 0.4.0? It might
 be easier to put in 0.4.1 because we can use the pubsub framework. It
 might be possible to put it in 0.4.0 but it might take longer, and might
 be too big a change at this stage of the release.
 >
 > I added Georg to the Cc list on this ticket.
 >
 > I looked at the Core Tor release dates on the following page:
 >
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/NetworkTeam/CoreTorReleases
 >
 > The misleading bootstrap messages are confusing, but I think that is
 acceptable in a Tor Browser alpha.  However, this seems like a bug we
 would not want to have in a stable release (at least not for a long period
 of time).

 I agree.

 > Georg can comment more accurately than I can, but we might ship tor
 0.4.0 with Tor Browser 8.5 since the browser release date will be very
 close to the 0.4.0 stable date.  That means that our users will have to
 live with this bug for 4 months or longer.  Maybe that is okay because
 experts who are called upon to help troubleshoot bootstrap problems can be
 told about this bug, and most users probably do not use a local proxy (in
 which case one can assume that "proxy" must mean "pluggable transport").
 As far as I know, we don't have any hard data about local proxy use
 though.

 While 0.4.x probably won't make it into Tor Browser 8.5 it's very likely
 that one of the point releases could pick up 0.4.x. So, yes, this is
 unfortunate. I am inclined to agree that this bug is not a hard blocker
 for you for 0.4.0, though. If we feel strongly at some point we can just
 stay on 0.3.5.x at least until the bug is fixed in a later stable release.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29593 [Core Tor/Tor]: channelpadding_timers test failed on tor-0.3.5.8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29593: channelpadding_timers test failed on tor-0.3.5.8
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  channel-padding padding unit-test|  Actual Points:
  040-must 035-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final => Tor: 0.4.0.x-final


Comment:

 We want to fix this issue in 0.4.0. (Or triage it out.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29034 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29034: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs-reachability, 035-backport,   |  Actual Points:
  postfreeze-ok, 040-must|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  dgoulet => mikeperry


Comment:

 dgoulet is on leave, assigning to Mike, because asn already has 3 tickets
 in 040-must.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17216 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make Tor Browser's updater work over Hidden Services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17216: Make Tor Browser's updater work over Hidden Services
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tbb-security,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201901, tbb-update   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  medium
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28656 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: src/feature/nodelist/nodelist.c:2501: compute_frac_paths_available : Non-fatal assertion !(f_exit > 0.0) failed.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28656: Bug: src/feature/nodelist/nodelist.c:2501: compute_frac_paths_available 
:
Non-fatal assertion !(f_exit > 0.0) failed.
-+-
 Reporter:  meejah   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consider-backport-after-2019-03-19,  |  Actual Points:  0.1
  backport-before-0359, regression, 035-rc-  |
  blocker?, 035-backport, postfreeze-ok, 040 |
  -merged-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 consider-backport-after-2019-03-19, backport-before-0359, regression,
 035-rc-blocker?, 035-backport, postfreeze-ok, 040-must
 =>
 consider-backport-after-2019-03-19, backport-before-0359, regression,
 035-rc-blocker?, 035-backport, postfreeze-ok, 040-merged-must


Comment:

 This ticket has been merged to 0.4.0.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25146 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Enable HPKP for aus1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25146: Enable HPKP for aus1
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-update   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 I think we can do better than trying to get the update check pinned in
 Firefox by making them to a .onion. However, we are not there yet (see:
 #17216). Meanwhile we patch our Tor Browser to add a static pin ourselves
 (#29811).

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[tor-bugs] #29811 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Enable static PKP for aus1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29811: Enable static PKP for aus1
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-8.5, tbb-update,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201903
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 While we have HPKP for aus1 right now, we should try to add the pin to the
 static list to make sure that our update checks are not messed with right
 from the first start. That's a stopgap until we have proper .onion support
 for those.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29641 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser fails to bootstrap on IPv6-only access networks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29641: Tor Browser fails to bootstrap on IPv6-only access networks
--+--
 Reporter:  jeremyvisser  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201903  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201903


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29810 [Webpages]: Pornhub login doesn't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29810: Pornhub login doesn't work
-+--
 Reporter:  unfcktor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  Porn Hub |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 If it's a problem with their website and not Tor, please contact them and
 not us.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28802 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Integrate PTs and bridge support into Tor Browser for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28802: Integrate PTs and bridge support into Tor Browser for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903, GeorgKoppen201903,   |
  tbb-8.5, tbb-parity|
Parent ID:  #27609   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:
 tbb-mobile, TBA-a3, TorBrowserTeam201903R, GeorgKoppen201903, tbb-8.5,
 tbb-parity
 =>
 tbb-mobile, TBA-a3, TorBrowserTeam201903, GeorgKoppen201903, tbb-8.5,
 tbb-parity
 * status:  needs_review => new
 * parent:   => #27609


Comment:

 Thanks, setting this as `new`, so we can do the right thing in the wake of
 #27609 (which means following comment:12)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29530 [Core Tor/Tor]: Some address/get_if_addrs* tests fail when the network is unreachable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29530: Some address/get_if_addrs* tests fail when the network is unreachable
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.8
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-test, regression, tor-ci, fast-  |  Actual Points:
  fix 035-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This fix has been tested in 0.4.0 and master CI for about 3 weeks.

 I just re-tested the backport to 0.3.5 on my local machine with the
 network off, and it fixes the test failure.

 Merged to 0.3.5, and merged forward (but the commit is already in later
 releases).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29665 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: circuit_expire_old_circuits_serverside() should check for RP circuits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29665: hs: circuit_expire_old_circuits_serverside() should check for RP 
circuits
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consider-backport-after-0404-alpha,  |  Actual Points:  0.1
  tor-hs, tor-relay, 029-backport,   |
  034-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 tor-hs, tor-relay, 029-backport, 034-backport, 035-backport,
 040-backport
 =>
 consider-backport-after-0404-alpha, tor-hs, tor-relay, 029-backport,
 034-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 Backport evaluation:

 This is a one-line code change that adds a single condition to a circuit
 expiry check on relays.

 We should test this change in 0.4.0.3-alpha, and then backport after
 0.4.0.4-alpha is released.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29665 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: circuit_expire_old_circuits_serverside() should check for RP circuits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29665: hs: circuit_expire_old_circuits_serverside() should check for RP 
circuits
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-relay, 029-backport, |  Actual Points:
  034-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:3 asn]:
 > For some reason appveyor on the 029 PR refuses to run even tho I
 reuploaded the branch:
 > 029 -> https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/792

 There is no Appveyor config on 0.2.9, so Appveyor does not run.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29763 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Fix 0.2.9 failures in chutney CI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29763: Fix 0.2.9 failures in chutney CI
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  chutney-ci, network-team-|  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #29729   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:  #29761 => #29729


Comment:

 Flatten tree: we might need this for #29729.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29761 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Track chutney CI failures, and tweak the allow failures settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29761: Track chutney CI failures, and tweak the allow failures settings
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  chutney-ci, network-team-|  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #29729   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19-must
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:   => #29729


Comment:

 We might need this for #29729.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20473 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Fix Chutney Nodes that don't bootstrap

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20473: Fix Chutney Nodes that don't bootstrap
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-|  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2-maybe|
Parent ID:  #29729   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  (none) => teor
 * keywords:   => network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2-maybe
 * status:  new => assigned
 * parent:   => #29729


Comment:

 We might need this for #29729.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22132 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Chutney should avoid waiting for set times: wait for conditions instead

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22132: Chutney should avoid waiting for set times: wait for conditions instead
+---
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |  Actual Points:  1.2
Parent ID:  #20647  | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  teor|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged #22132 and #28203 to master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28203 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Make chutney log the bootstrap progress for each node

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28203: Make chutney log the bootstrap progress for each node
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  test, chutney, consistency,  |  Actual Points:  0.1
  jenkins, integration-testing, continuous-  |
  integration, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2|
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged #22132 and #28203 to master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29073 [Core Tor/Tor]: shellcheck: linux-tor-prio.sh issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29073: shellcheck: linux-tor-prio.sh issues
--+
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29434| Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 I think we should remove the script, instead of maintaining it.

 Here are my reasons:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/29434#comment:6

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29434 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider removing linux-tor-prio.sh from contrib/operator-tools

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29434: Consider removing linux-tor-prio.sh from contrib/operator-tools
-+-
 Reporter:  rl1987   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, fast-fix, nickm- |  Actual Points:  0.1
  merge, asn-merge   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  juga, teor   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready
 * points:   => 0.1
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1
 * keywords:   => technical-debt, fast-fix, nickm-merge, asn-merge
 * reviewer:  juga => juga, teor
 * type:  task => enhancement


Comment:

 I have reviewed this pull request, and I think we should remove this
 script.
 (But now I can't merge it, because I have reviewed it.)

 Here is why:

 Replying to [comment:5 juga]:
 > Replying to [comment:2 rl1987]:
 > > I asked [0] and nobody replied. I think it's safe to remove it.
 >
 > i found the link [0]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 relays/2019-February/016995.html
 >
 > In a fast search i found that someone was still using it in 2015 [1].

 Our earliest supported release is 0.2.9, which was released in December
 2016:
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/NetworkTeam/CoreTorReleases#Current

 So we don't support things that were only used back in 2015.

 And we never fixed a bug in the script, where it confuses kilobits and
 kilobytes:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2015-January/036458.html

 So the script has been unmaintained for at least 4 years.

 > Just some questions:
 > Is it possible that some other application/device using Tor is using
 it?.

 If they are, they can keep a copy of the script, and maintain it
 themselves.

 > Any idea on how we could find out easy?.

 Remove the script, document the removal in the release notes, and see if
 someone complains.

 > Do you know if there's some other recommended way to achieve the same
 this script does?.

 BandwidthRate and BandwidthBurst are supported, cross-platform torrc
 options that limit Tor's bandwidth. They are integrated with the bandwidth
 weighting system.

 I would not recommend using this script instead, because large changes in
 relay bandwidth are not a good experience for Tor users. (And they lead to
 inaccurate bandwidth weights on the network.)

 > Should the script itself be removed from too?.

 This pull request removes the script from Tor's future releases.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29810 [Webpages]: Pornhub login doesn't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29810: Pornhub login doesn't work
-+--
 Reporter:  unfcktor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  Porn Hub |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by unfcktor):

 * Attachment "oslo park.jpg" added.


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[tor-bugs] #29810 [Webpages]: Pornhub login doesn't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29810: Pornhub login doesn't work
--+--
 Reporter:  unfcktor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Component:  Webpages
  Version:  Tor: unspecified  |   Severity:  Critical
 Keywords:  Porn Hub  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 Let me watch porn on pornhub, Pornhub. This isn't a problem with tor, so
 much as a problem with their awful website. Let us hope that the website
 takes notice of this bug report!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29073 [Core Tor/Tor]: shellcheck: linux-tor-prio.sh issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29073: shellcheck: linux-tor-prio.sh issues
--+
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29434| Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_information
 * parent:   => #29434


Comment:

 This ticket is not merge_ready, because it conflicts with #29434.
 We need to choose between #29434 and this ticket, then merge one of them.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18080 [Applications/Tor Browser]: CORS header 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin' missing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18080: CORS header 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin' missing
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website, ff60-esr- |  Actual Points:
  will-have  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:21 cypherpunks]:
 > Replying to [comment:20 gk]:
 > > Marking this as tentatively fixed in Tor Browser 8.
 > Check https://ipleak.net/ pls.
 Appears also when the Debug checkbox in NoScript is set:
 {{{
 01:59:42.539 Cross-Origin Request Blocked: The Same Origin Policy
 disallows reading the remote resource at
 
https://g28kyu5u1usoie1ve5ejsyuklm7dfj1lukl0smiq.ipleak.net/dnsdetect/?_=1512910712464.
 (Reason: CORS header ‘Access-Control-Allow-Origin’ missing). 1 (unknown)
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29684 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: setup a grafana server somewhere

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29684: setup a grafana server somewhere
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29681   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 only remaining things to do here, just to be clear:

 * confirm the choice of deploying using debian packages
 * deploy a better authentication system than "one big admin password"
 (maybe?)
 * deploy dashboards through puppet
 * deploy the Prometheus datasource through puppet
 * correctly configure an admin password on first install

 All of this is optional if we treat the Grafana configuration as
 "precious" data that we don't need to manage through Puppet. I'm tempted
 to do that right now and just go along with what we have.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29693 [Core Tor/Tor]: Decrease probability of stochastic failures in test-slow

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29693: Decrease probability of stochastic failures in test-slow
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor:
|  0.4.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, 040-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor2-must
+--
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  (none) => asn
 * status:  new => assigned


Comment:

 I think asn is handling this ticket with riastradh.

 (I'm sorry about all the 040-must tickets, asn. If I've got them wrong, or
 if you need some help, feel free to pass them back to me.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29593 [Core Tor/Tor]: channelpadding_timers test failed on tor-0.3.5.8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29593: channelpadding_timers test failed on tor-0.3.5.8
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  channel-padding padding unit-test|  Actual Points:
  040-must 035-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  new => assigned


Comment:

 I think nickm is the best person to work out what information we need (or
 if we can just close this ticket as a once-off failure.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28970 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_client.c:624: setup_intro_circ_auth_key: Non-fatal assertion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28970: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_client.c:624:
setup_intro_circ_auth_key: Non-fatal assertion
-+-
 Reporter:  torcrash |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, tor-hs, postfreeze-ok,   |  Actual Points:
  040-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  (none) => asn
 * status:  new => assigned


Comment:

 I think asn is the best person to do this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29500 [Core Tor/Tor]: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29500: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, 040-must|
Parent ID:  #28631   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  (none) => mikeperry
 * status:  needs_revision => assigned


Comment:

 Mike has a pull request in this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28966 [Core Tor/Tor]: HSv3 client auth insufficiently documented (was: HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient incompatible)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28966: HSv3 client auth insufficiently documented (was:
HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient incompatible)
-+-
 Reporter:  roo  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.6-rc
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, client-auth, hsv3,   |  Actual Points:
  postfreeze-ok, 040-must|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  dgoulet => asn


Comment:

 dgoulet is on leave, so I guess the next best person is asn.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29527 [Core Tor/Tor]: Division by zero: undefined behaviour in circuitpadding/circuitpadding_sample_distribution test

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29527: Division by zero: undefined behaviour in
circuitpadding/circuitpadding_sample_distribution test
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  merge-after-29298, nickm-merge,  |  Actual Points:
  teor-merge, regression, tor-ci, tor-test,  |
  040-must, 040-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_revision


Comment:

 We need to backport the minimal change to 0.4.0, then merge.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29527 [Core Tor/Tor]: Division by zero: undefined behaviour in circuitpadding/circuitpadding_sample_distribution test

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29527: Division by zero: undefined behaviour in
circuitpadding/circuitpadding_sample_distribution test
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  merge-after-29298, nickm-merge,  |  Actual Points:
  teor-merge, regression, tor-ci, tor-test,  |
  040-must, 040-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  (none) => teor
 * status:  reopened => assigned


Comment:

 I can take ownership of this backport,

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28984 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update dir-spec observed bandwidth to 5 days

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28984: Update dir-spec observed bandwidth to 5 days
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, doc, tor-spec, fast-fix,   |  Actual Points:
  postfreeze-ok, 040-must, spec  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * owner:  (none) => teor


Comment:

 I am the best person to do this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28565 [Core Tor/sbws]: Report excluded results in a relay's bandwidth line

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28565: Report excluded results in a relay's bandwidth line
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  1.1.0
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, sbws-1.0-must-   |  Actual Points:
  moved-20181128, sbws-11x-final-|
  removed-20190312, sbws-110-proposed, changes-  |
  version-minor  |
Parent ID:  #28547   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 I suggested some new names for the keys, that are easier to understand.
 You'll need to update the key names everywhere in the code.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29641 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser fails to bootstrap on IPv6-only access networks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29641: Tor Browser fails to bootstrap on IPv6-only access networks
--+--
 Reporter:  jeremyvisser  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 (I saw your comment on the pad today. Please ask questions on tickets: I
 sometimes miss pad and IRC comments.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29641 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser fails to bootstrap on IPv6-only access networks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29641: Tor Browser fails to bootstrap on IPv6-only access networks
--+--
 Reporter:  jeremyvisser  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 Just to be clear: I think you should start testing "ClientAutoIPv6ORPort
 1" in Tor Browser alpha as soon as you can.

 When we get feedback from Tor Browser alpha users on IPv6-only networks,
 we can decide when we need to do #27647.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29722 [Core Tor/sbws]: Document that authorities are not measured by default

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29722: Document that authorities are not measured by default
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:  sbws:
 |  1.0.5
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  no-changes-version, sbws-docs, easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 It looks good! Here are some minor grammatical changes (but it makes sense
 as it is):
 - {{{...by creating a two hops circuit with the relay to measure, download
 data from a destination Web Server and store the measurements.}}} -->
 {{{...by creating a two hops circuit with the relay. It then measures the
 bandwidth by downloading data from a destination Web Server and stores the
 measurements.}}}
 - {{{The generator read the measurements, aggregate, filter and scales
 them}}} --> {{{The generator reads the measurements, aggregates, filters,
 and scales them}}}

 I'll put this is in needs_revision but leave it up to you to decide
 whether you want to make the changes.

 One question: the ticket summary says the scanner does not measure
 directory authorities '''by default'''. Does that mean there is an option
 to measure them?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29036 [Core Tor/Tor]: Coverage merge failures cause test_process_slow stderr check to fail

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29036: Coverage merge failures cause test_process_slow stderr check to fail
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-accepted-20190115, regression,   |  Actual Points:
  tor-ci, 029-backport, 034-backport,|
  035-backport, 040-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Please rebase on maint-0.2.9: we need to fix the process test failure on
 master, but we also need reliable coverage stats on 0.2.9 and later. And
 we want smaller caches on all branches to speed up the build.

 Replying to [comment:13 ahf]:
 > Probably worth noting here: I use `after_script` for this after having
 read: https://blog.travis-ci.com/after_script_behavior_changes

 I think you want before_cache, it's documented to run before the cache
 phase:
 https://docs.travis-ci.com/user/caching/#before_cache-phase

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28802 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Integrate PTs and bridge support into Tor Browser for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28802: Integrate PTs and bridge support into Tor Browser for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903R, GeorgKoppen201903,  |
  tbb-8.5, tbb-parity|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 Replying to [comment:14 gk]:
 > On the build machine I used I see (after doing a `unzip -d test
 orbotservice-release.aar`):
 > {{{
 > ~/tor-browser-build/out/orbot/orbot-0b5a48d4e086-android-armv7-419eca$
 find -type f -name *.so
 > ./test/jni/armeabi-v7a/obfs4proxy.so
 > }}}

 That looks good to me. The jni directory contents of the aar will show up
 under the lib directory of the apk.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28563 [Core Tor/sbws]: Work out how sbws can report excluded relays in the bandwidth file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28563: Work out how sbws can report excluded relays in the bandwidth file
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  1.1.0
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, sbws-1.0-must-   |  Actual Points:
  moved-20181128, sbws-11x-final-|
  removed-20190312, sbws-110-proposed, changes-  |
  version-minor  |
Parent ID:  #28547   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:22 teor]:
 > Replying to [comment:16 juga]:
 > > Replying to [comment:14 teor]:
 > >
 > > > Instead, you could use "bw=0 unmeasured=1 vote=0" and patch tor so
 that it ignores relay lines with "vote=0". Can you open another ticket for
 this Tor change?
 >
 > What is the ticket number of the new ticket for the Tor patch to ignore
 vote=0?

 Oh, I see, it is #29806.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28563 [Core Tor/sbws]: Work out how sbws can report excluded relays in the bandwidth file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28563: Work out how sbws can report excluded relays in the bandwidth file
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  1.1.0
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, sbws-1.0-must-   |  Actual Points:
  moved-20181128, sbws-11x-final-|
  removed-20190312, sbws-110-proposed, changes-  |
  version-minor  |
Parent ID:  #28547   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 > Please also document the way that you make tor ignore relays.

 We'll also need a ticket to update the bandwidth file spec. It will help
 the reviewer if you update the spec at the same time as the code.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28563 [Core Tor/sbws]: Work out how sbws can report excluded relays in the bandwidth file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28563: Work out how sbws can report excluded relays in the bandwidth file
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  1.1.0
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, sbws-1.0-must-   |  Actual Points:
  moved-20181128, sbws-11x-final-|
  removed-20190312, sbws-110-proposed, changes-  |
  version-minor  |
Parent ID:  #28547   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:15 juga]:
 > Replying to [comment:14 teor]:
 >
 > > Tor ignores lines without a "bw=" key. But Tor 0.3.5 and later log an
 "Incomplete bandwidth file" warning for every incomplete line, every time
 they parse the file. That's not ok: we can not fill up authority operators
 logs with warnings.
 >
 > Sorry, i forgot about the warning.

 I only found out about the warning when I tested your design on an
 authority,

 > > Instead, you could use "bw=0 unmeasured=1 vote=0" and patch tor so
 that it ignores relay lines with "vote=0". Can you open another ticket for
 this Tor change?
 >
 > We have always say to do not give "bw=0" but "bw=1" because 0 can cause
 problems in Tor.
 > Shouldn't "bw=0" be "bw=1"?.

 Yes, I think 1 is better,

 > > Tor versions without the patch will give more 0 votes to unmeasured
 relays, so they will get lower bandwidth values in the consensus. That's
 ok.
 > >
 > > We might want to vote 0 for unmeasured relays in a future sbws or tor
 version.
 >
 > Hmm you mean to vote that the relay has 0 bandwidth?, right? (not to
 don't vote for the unmeasured relay).

 Vote 0 bandwidth for the relay. Or vote 1 bandwidth for the relay.

 > > That's why I added the "unmeasured=1" key. But it's not a change I
 want to make now, because you only have 10 paid days left. Can you open
 another ticket for this sbws change?

 What is the ticket number of the new ticket for the sbws change to vote on
 unmeasured relays?

 > Hmm, if i add "unmeasured=1" and make a Tor patch that ignores lines
 with "unmeasured=1", then we do not need to add "vote=0" and in a future
 Tor version we can still change Tor to vote on those lines, right?.

 We could p change Tor. But that takes 6-12 months from change to release
 to authority deployment.
 So I want to be able to change sbws.

 To make changing sbws easy, I want to separate reasons and actions.
 "unmeasured=1" is the reason, "vote=0" is the suggested action.
 In future, sbws might have more reasons, or sbws might suggest different
 actions.

 Replying to [comment:16 juga]:
 > Replying to [comment:14 teor]:
 >
 > > Instead, you could use "bw=0 unmeasured=1 vote=0" and patch tor so
 that it ignores relay lines with "vote=0". Can you open another ticket for
 this Tor change?

 What is the ticket number of the new ticket for the Tor patch to ignore
 vote=0?

 > Regarding the word "unmeasured", i'm not sure whether it should be named
 "excluded" or something similar, since maybe the relay was measured but
 excluded for some other reason.
 > I guess this word is not very important though.

 No, I mean "unmeasured", because that's the word we use in the consensus,
 when a relay doesn't have enough votes with measured bandwidths.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29809 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: Only ship one tor binary per apk

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29809: TBA: Only ship one tor binary per apk
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201903, tbb-mobile,|  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.5|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 This looks successful (that app installs and runs without failure):
 {{{
 03-18 22:32:58.413  1849  1898 I PackageManager: New shared user
 org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha.sharedID: id=10317
 - beginning of system
 03-18 22:32:58.449  1849  1898 I PackageManager.DexOptimizer: Running
 dexopt (dexoptNeeded=1) on: /data/app/org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha-
 F_xSBaczkBN7RRB1lZ1dFw==/base.apk pkg=org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha
 isa=x86
 dexoptFlags=boot_complete,profile_guided,public,enable_hidden_api_checks
 targetFilter=speed-profile oatDir=/data/app/org.torproject
 .torbrowser_alpha-F_xSBaczkBN7RRB1lZ1dFw==/oat
 classLoaderContext=PCL[/system/framework/org.apache.http.legacy.boot.jar]
 03-18 22:32:58.450  1707  1707 V installed: DexInv: --- BEGIN
 '/data/app/org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha-
 F_xSBaczkBN7RRB1lZ1dFw==/base.apk' ---
 03-18 22:32:58.465   889   889 W dex2oat : Unexpected CPU variant for X86
 using defaults: x86
 03-18 22:32:58.465   889   889 W dex2oat : Mismatch between dex2oat
 instruction set features (ISA: X86 Feature string:
 -ssse3,-sse4.1,-sse4.2,-avx,-avx2,-popcnt) and those of dex2oat executable
 (ISA: X86 Feature string: ssse3,-sse4.1,-sse4.2,-avx,-avx2,-popcnt) for
 the command line:
 03-18 22:32:58.465   889   889 W dex2oat : /system/bin/dex2oat --zip-fd=8
 --zip-location=base.apk --input-vdex-fd=-1 --output-vdex-fd=10 --oat-fd=9
 --oat-location=/data/app/org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha-
 F_xSBaczkBN7RRB1lZ1dFw==/oat/x86/base.odex --instruction-set=x86
 --instruction-set-variant=x86 --instruction-set-features=default
 --runtime-arg -Xms64m --runtime-arg -Xmx512m --compiler-filter=speed-
 profile --swap-fd=11 --app-image-fd=12 --image-format=lz4 --classpath-
 dir=/data/app/org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha-F_xSBaczkBN7RRB1lZ1dFw==
 --class-loader-
 context=PCL[/system/framework/org.apache.http.legacy.boot.jar] --generate-
 mini-debug-info --compact-dex-level=none --runtime-arg -Xtarget-sdk-
 version:26 --runtime-arg -Xhidden-api-checks --compilation-reason=install
 03-18 22:32:58.465   889   889 I dex2oat : /system/bin/dex2oat --input-
 vdex-fd=-1 --output-vdex-fd=10 --compiler-filter=speed-profile
 --classpath-dir=/data/app/org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha-
 F_xSBaczkBN7RRB1lZ1dFw== --class-loader-
 context=PCL[/system/framework/org.apache.http.legacy.boot.jar] --generate-
 mini-debug-info --compact-dex-level=none --compilation-reason=install
 03-18 22:32:59.176   889   889 I dex2oat : Explicit concurrent copying GC
 freed 26987(5MB) AllocSpace objects, 0(0B) LOS objects, 99% free,
 896B/1536KB, paused 15us total 3.596ms
 03-18 22:32:59.281   889   889 I dex2oat : dex2oat took 817.867ms (1.324s
 cpu) (threads: 4) arena alloc=464B (464B) java alloc=16KB (17280B) native
 alloc=7MB (8060920B) free=2MB (2949128B)
 03-18 22:32:59.287  1707  1707 V installed: DexInv: --- END
 '/data/app/org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha-
 F_xSBaczkBN7RRB1lZ1dFw==/base.apk' (success) ---
 }}}

 (We can ignore the warnings about unexpected CPU variant and mismatched
 dex instruction set features.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29036 [Core Tor/Tor]: Coverage merge failures cause test_process_slow stderr check to fail

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29036: Coverage merge failures cause test_process_slow stderr check to fail
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-accepted-20190115, regression,   |  Actual Points:
  tor-ci, 029-backport, 034-backport,|
  035-backport, 040-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ahf):

 Probably worth noting here: I use `after_script` for this after having
 read: https://blog.travis-ci.com/after_script_behavior_changes

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29809 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: Only ship one tor binary per apk

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29809: TBA: Only ship one tor binary per apk
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201903, tbb-mobile,|  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.5|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Depending on the difficulty of changing this in orbot's build, we can
 post-process the apk (or maybe orbot aar). Based on the target, something
 like:
 {{{
 $ zip -d tor-browser-8.5a9-android-x86-multi-qa.apk lib/armeabi/tor.so
 deleting: lib/armeabi/tor.so
 $ zip -d tor-browser-8.5a9-android-x86-multi-qa.apk lib/armeabi-v7a/tor.so
 deleting: lib/armeabi-v7a/tor.so
 }}}

 After this, Google Play shows:
 {{{
 Native platforms:   x86
 }}}

 Compared with the previous values:
 {{{
 Native platforms:   armeabi, armeabi-v7a, x86
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28802 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Integrate PTs and bridge support into Tor Browser for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28802: Integrate PTs and bridge support into Tor Browser for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903R, GeorgKoppen201903,  |
  tbb-8.5, tbb-parity|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 On the build machine I used I see (after doing a `unzip -d test
 orbotservice-release.aar`):
 {{{
 ~/tor-browser-build/out/orbot/orbot-0b5a48d4e086-android-armv7-419eca$
 find -type f -name *.so
 ./test/jni/armeabi-v7a/obfs4proxy.so
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28802 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Integrate PTs and bridge support into Tor Browser for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28802: Integrate PTs and bridge support into Tor Browser for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903R, GeorgKoppen201903,  |
  tbb-8.5, tbb-parity|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 I tested out orbotservice from github and I'm not seeing the *.so
 libraries showing up in the aar (only tor.so from tor-android-binary). So
 I'm a little concerned that these may not also be missing from our final
 build. If you unzip the orbotservice aar are you seeing a lib directory
 with the PT libraries in there? Is so, then I think the approach is good.
 I'm going to dig more into orbotservice and see what's going on when I
 build.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29806 [Core Tor/Tor]: Ignore bandwidth file lines with "vote=0"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29806: Ignore bandwidth file lines with "vote=0"
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, 035-backport,|  Actual Points:
  034-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  tor-bwauth, 035-backport => tor-bwauth, 035-backport,
 034-backport


Comment:

 Marking for backport to 0.3.4, some directory authorities are still
 running 0.3.4:
 https://consensus-health.torproject.org/#authorityversions
 (In general, we ask directory authorities to be on the two latest stable
 versions. At the moment, that's 0.3.4 and 0.3.5.)

 Juga, please rebase your patch on 0.3.4 before review.
 The parsing code changed between 0.3.4 and 0.3.5, so you may need a pull
 request for 0.3.4, and another pull request for 0.3.5.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29684 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: setup a grafana server somewhere

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29684: setup a grafana server somewhere
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29681   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 note that i had a discussion with ln5 about how to deploy the granafa
 package, because it's not an official debian package. ln5 had concerns
 about introducing Docker in the infrastructure for various (legitimate)
 reasons about complexity and security theater. hopefully i'm summarizing
 well, correct me if I'm wrong. :)

 in the end, I chose to deploy using the upstream debian package because
 it's a technology we all know well, but I think this is a special case (a
 webapp) where using Docker containers actually makes a lot of sense.
 things move too fast for debian packaging to catch up - just figuring out
 all those node.js dependencies would be a nightmare. plus the Docker
 environment provides *some* isolation from nasty upstream code: because
 the container runs as the "grafana" user, there are builtin protections
 (process boundaries and user isolation) in the Linux kernel that isolate
 us from possible bad code, while the Debian package runs as root during
 install. and even if the daemon actually runs as a dedicated user in
 Debian, it doesn't benefit from the namespace, pid, cgroups isolation as
 far as I know.

 but for the time being, it's a good enough solution, especially since
 deploying the docker way would have involved auditing *three* more puppet
 modules...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29684 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: setup a grafana server somewhere

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29684: setup a grafana server somewhere
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29681   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 grafana has been installed using the upstream debian packages on
 grafana.torproject.org. the admin password is in tor-passwords.git, but
 i'm thinking of setting up LDAP authentication instead to avoid having
 another source of truth for passwords.

 things seem to be already working: i configured the prometheus datasource
 and a dashboard by hand, but that could also be deployed through puppet
 (eventually).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16364 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add an option to resize the browser window to the "safe default"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16364: Add an option to resize the browser window to the "safe default"
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-fingerprinting-   |  Actual Points:
  resolution |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Using New Identity is not a good workaround for me. I often want to keep
 the current content in the window, and just change its size back.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29500 [Core Tor/Tor]: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29500: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, 040-must|
Parent ID:  #28631   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Hi Mike,

 I noticed your question during the network team meeting:

 {{{
 mikeperry: the #29500 one is annoying. I think we need another flag or
 something. I also only barely understand how this could ever happen in a
 real scenario
 mikeperry: it seems almost impossible
 nickm: mikeperry: maybe add the appropriate assertions that should never
 be hit, so that we can figure out why it would be happening sometime
 anyway?
 nickm: diagnosis is the next best thing to a fix
 }}}

 Here are two scenarios where the monotime_diff or monotime_absolute
 functions can return zero:
 (I'll use monotime_absolute below, because I think that's what you're
 using. But monotime_absolute just calls monotime_diff with the previous
 monotime value.)

 The Ratchet Returns Zero

 1. Tor is running on a platform which has monotime API bugs (Windows), or
 Tor is compiled without support for monotime functions (old Linux, old
 macOS, other platforms where we haven't implemented monotime support)
 2. Tor calls a monotime_absolute() function, and stores the last monotime
 value
 3. Any amount of time elapses
 4. Tor calls a monotime_absolute() function, and Windows experiences its
 monotime bug, or the user has changed the wall clock time backwards
 5. Tor emulates monotonic time using a ratchet. The ratchet stores an
 internal correction factor for future monotonic times, and returns the
 same value as it previously returned
 6. The monotime_absolute() function gets the same value for the previous
 and current times. It returns zero.

 Low Resolution Timers in the OS

 1. Tor is running on a platform with low-resolution timers
 2. Tor calls a monotime_absolute() function, and stores the last monotime
 value
 3. A small amount of time elapses, which is lower than the timer
 resolution
 4. Tor calls a monotime_absolute() function, which gets the same monotime
 value as the previous call to the low-resolution timer
 6. The monotime_absolute() function gets the same value for the previous
 and current times. It returns zero.

 Low Resolution Timer APIs in Tor

 1. Tor is running on any platform
 2. Tor calls a monotime_absolute() function with low-resolution units
 (seconds, milliseconds, or microseconds) and stores the last monotime
 value
 3. A small amount of time elapses, which is less than one unit
 4. Tor calls a monotime_absolute() function, which gets a monotime value
 which is greater than the previous call to the low-resolution timer, but
 less than one unit away from the previous timer.
 6. The monotime_absolute() function gets less than one unit's difference
 between the previous and current times. It divides by the unit conversion
 factor, and returns zero. (These functions truncate, rather than
 rounding.)

 I hope that explains the scenarios that Tor code needs to deal with when
 calling Tor's monotime APIs.

 If you have any more questions, please feel free to ask on this ticket.
 Sometimes I miss questions on IRC or in meetings.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29806 [Core Tor/Tor]: Ignore bandwidth file lines with "vote=0"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29806: Ignore bandwidth file lines with "vote=0"
--+
 Reporter:  juga  |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, 035-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 CI failed

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29808 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add button to return to default Tor Browser window size

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29808: Add button to return to default Tor Browser window size
---+---
 Reporter:  steph  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16364 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add an option to resize the browser window to the "safe default"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16364: Add an option to resize the browser window to the "safe default"
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-fingerprinting-   |  Actual Points:
  resolution |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: steph (added)


Comment:

 #29808 is a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29808 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add button to return to default Tor Browser window size

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29808: Add button to return to default Tor Browser window size
---+--
 Reporter:  steph  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-fingerprinting-resolution


Comment:

 Duplicate of #16364. Steph: does clicking the New Identity feature (behind
 the onion icon) provide a workaround (as suggested in #16364)?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  antonela
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, GeorgKoppen201812,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903R, tbb-8.5 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor17
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:106 antonela]:
 > Replying to [comment:105 gk]:
 > >
 > > 1) 2.2: What to do about per-site security settings and how to expose
 them to users?
 >
 > This ticket includes a 2.2 proposal in the comment:33 and per-site
 security settings has been discussed at #21034.

 What I mean is not a redesign of how per-site security settings should
 work but we thought about making site-specitic settings _as they are
 available today_ accessible. Ideas we had were outlined in section 2.2 of
 the proposal. Do we still think we should do that or something similar (I
 am not talking about redesigning our slider as you e.g. suggested in
 comment:33)? Or do we think just taking the buttons of the toolbar and
 requiring for folks to add them manually if needed is enough?

 > >
 > > 2) 3.1: Where have my extensions gone? (which is essentially the point
 about which I brought up in my last comment)
 >
 > It is tricky. We can anticipate users about this change, but it will not
 remove the question if we are stepping over the local toolbar setting.
 >
 > The proposal explains why we are removing the NoScript extension icon
 but will be useful to have a paragraph to describe it in simple words at
 our release post. Maybe, why custom settings in NoScript are discouraged
 should be the focus of this explainer and at the end, users can customize
 their toolbar by `Menu > Customize...`

 Yes, mentioning it in our release post is definitely a thing we should do.
 I was wondering whether there is more we could/should do here, though.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29809 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: Only ship one tor binary per apk

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29809: TBA: Only ship one tor binary per apk
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201903, tbb-mobile,|  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.5|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201903, tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5
 * priority:  Medium => Very High


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29807 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser requires discrete graphics on my Mac

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29807: Tor Browser requires discrete graphics on my Mac
--+---
 Reporter:  lg|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * status:  new => needs_information
 * version:  Tor: unspecified =>
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 Thank you for reporting this problem.  I am not sure what is the root
 cause; please provide some more information so we can investigate this
 problem:
 * What version of Tor Browser are you using?
 * Does the problem occur on all Facebook pages? Can you provide an URL
 where we can experience this problem ourselves? (we can log into Facebook
 if that is required)
 * Is there video content on the Facebook page?
 * Have you noticed the same problem on other websites?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29357 [Core Tor/Tor]: add an ActiveOnStartup config option

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29357: add an ActiveOnStartup config option
---+---
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement| Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-needs, 040-proposed, 040-must  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID: | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:  mikeperry  |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:6 nickm]:
 > I've done an implementation in `ticket29357_040`, PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/800

 Thanks for working on this. For the record, Kathy Brade and I believe the
 proposed `DormantCanceledByStartup` option will meet our (Tor Browser's)
 needs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29668 [Core Tor/Tor]: Drop thread_fast_rng during postfork; improve thread_fast_rng fork-safety

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29668: Drop thread_fast_rng during postfork; improve thread_fast_rng 
fork-safety
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .2
Parent ID:| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:  SponsorV
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => catalyst


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29756 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check for correct header macro guards.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29756: Check for correct header macro guards.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  cohosh|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:  catalyst => cohosh


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29683 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: install prometheus-node-exporter everywhere

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29683: install prometheus-node-exporter everywhere
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29681   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 i figured out how to fix the collector puppet module and deployed node-
 exporter everywhere. given the puppet run latency, it will take a few
 hours for the change to propagate everywhere, but we already have about 20
 out of 73 servers being scraped by the central server.

 i'll keep this ticket opened until all nodes have run correctly.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29806 [Core Tor/Tor]: Ignore bandwidth file lines with "vote=0"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29806: Ignore bandwidth file lines with "vote=0"
--+
 Reporter:  juga  |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, 035-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/805

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29756 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check for correct header macro guards.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29756: Check for correct header macro guards.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => catalyst


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29801 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add teor's suggestions for Prop#299 (referring IPv4 or IPv6 based on IP Version Failure Count)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29801: Add teor's suggestions for Prop#299 (referring IPv4 or IPv6 based on IP
Version Failure Count)
---+--
 Reporter:  neel   |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop299  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27491 | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => nickm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29722 [Core Tor/sbws]: Document that authorities are not measured by default

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29722: Document that authorities are not measured by default
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:  sbws:
 |  1.0.5
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  no-changes-version, sbws-docs, easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => cohosh


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29702 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop using configs from the local tor install when we launch tor for tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29702: Stop using configs from the local tor install when we launch tor for 
tests
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, tor-test  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:  mikeperry |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => mikeperry


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29662 [Core Tor/Tor]: Introduce assert functions that allow us to printf error message

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29662: Introduce assert functions that allow us to printf error message
--+
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => ahf


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29589 [Core Tor/sbws]: Recover a destination when it stops failing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29589: Recover a destination when it stops failing
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  changes-version-patch  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  ahf|Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => ahf


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29357 [Core Tor/Tor]: add an ActiveOnStartup config option

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29357: add an ActiveOnStartup config option
---+---
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement| Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-needs, 040-proposed, 040-must  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID: | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:  mikeperry  |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => mikeperry


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29036 [Core Tor/Tor]: Coverage merge failures cause test_process_slow stderr check to fail

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29036: Coverage merge failures cause test_process_slow stderr check to fail
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-accepted-20190115, regression,   |  Actual Points:
  tor-ci, 029-backport, 034-backport,|
  035-backport, 040-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => catalyst


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28983 [Core Tor/sbws]: Work out how long it takes sbws to measure the network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28983: Work out how long it takes sbws to measure the network
+---
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  juga
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  no-changes-version  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => asn


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28563 [Core Tor/sbws]: Work out how sbws can report excluded relays in the bandwidth file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28563: Work out how sbws can report excluded relays in the bandwidth file
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  1.1.0
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, sbws-1.0-must-   |  Actual Points:
  moved-20181128, sbws-11x-final-|
  removed-20190312, sbws-110-proposed, changes-  |
  version-minor  |
Parent ID:  #28547   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:  asn => nickm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28563 [Core Tor/sbws]: Work out how sbws can report excluded relays in the bandwidth file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28563: Work out how sbws can report excluded relays in the bandwidth file
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  1.1.0
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, sbws-1.0-must-   |  Actual Points:
  moved-20181128, sbws-11x-final-|
  removed-20190312, sbws-110-proposed, changes-  |
  version-minor  |
Parent ID:  #28547   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => asn


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28652 [Core Tor/sbws]: When sbws stops making progress, log a warning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28652: When sbws stops making progress, log a warning
+---
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  no-changes-version  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28547  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => asn


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29806 [Core Tor/Tor]: Ignore bandwidth file lines with "vote=0"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29806: Ignore bandwidth file lines with "vote=0"
--+
 Reporter:  juga  |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, 035-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by juga):

 * owner:  (none) => juga
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29389 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Set up VM for Prometheus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29389: Set up VM for Prometheus
-+-
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29681   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 the machine is now setup with puppet, and collects scrape targets thanks
 to a pull request I issued on the prometheus module here:

 https://github.com/voxpupuli/puppet-prometheus/pull/304

 i also issued a PR to fix the package-based installer:

 https://github.com/voxpupuli/puppet-prometheus/pull/303

 the code is deployed from my "deploy" branch on github, but eventually
 that should go away as my PRs are merged.

 i've rerolled both PRs and I believe this can be considered complete.
 followup in #29683 for the deployment of all the node exporters.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29389 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Set up VM for Prometheus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29389: Set up VM for Prometheus
-+-
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29681   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29732 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add full-fledged deterministic PRNG support for testing.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29732: Add full-fledged deterministic PRNG support for testing.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 I have a branch called "ticket29732", but the CI won't pass until we merge
 #29668

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28622 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Tor Browser Icon for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28622: Update Tor Browser Icon for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  pili |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-mobile, TBA-a3, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903, tbb-8.5, tbb-parity  |
Parent ID:  #27399   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by antonela):

 * parent:   => #27399


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29668 [Core Tor/Tor]: Drop thread_fast_rng during postfork; improve thread_fast_rng fork-safety

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29668: Drop thread_fast_rng during postfork; improve thread_fast_rng 
fork-safety
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .2
Parent ID:| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorV
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * reviewer:  dgoulet =>


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[tor-bugs] #29809 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: Only ship one tor binary per apk

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29809: TBA: Only ship one tor binary per apk
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Orbot bundles all the binaries into a single apk and ships that, this
 means they only produce one apk for all the platforms they support.
 Unfortunately, with fennec, we must create one apk per arch. However, we
 didn't modify orbot's build system so it only includes one binary for the
 target architecture, therefore our apks include tor binaries for armeabi,
 armeabi-v7a, and x86.

 This causes a little bloat and we can avoid this, but the more problematic
 result is it confuses Google Play such that Google Play thinks each apk
 supports all of those architectures, therefore we can't upload one apk for
 armv7-only and x86-only, because one of them will override the other.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12631 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser for ARM architecture

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12631: Tor Browser for ARM architecture
--+
 Reporter:  mttp  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by JeremyRand):

 (My current code is still at ​https://notabug.org/JeremyRand/tor-browser-
 build/src/armhf-esr60 (the armhf-esr60 branch); and docs are still at
 ​https://wiki.raptorcs.com/wiki/Porting/Tor_Browser .)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29073 [Core Tor/Tor]: shellcheck: linux-tor-prio.sh issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29073: shellcheck: linux-tor-prio.sh issues
--+
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:9 rl1987]:
 > New pull request with cleaner git history:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/804
 Thanks! Looks good!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12631 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser for ARM architecture

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12631: Tor Browser for ARM architecture
--+
 Reporter:  mttp  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by JeremyRand):

 I've updated my rbm descriptors for (32-bit) ARM.  Currently all projects
 that typically are built for GNU/Linux targets are built for linux-arm,
 with the exception of fteproxy and snowflake (and their exclusive
 dependencies).  Since fteproxy and snowflake are optional components of
 Tor Browser, my inclination is to wait until the rest of this code is
 merged by Tor before I try to make fteproxy and/or snowflake build (they
 both seem more annoying to build than most of the other projects).

 The resulting Tor Browser binaries appear to work fine in my testing on my
 Asus C201 (I connected to Tor without bridges, navigated to a JS-heavy
 website, used that website for a few minutes, and exited); I didn't try
 using the pluggable transports.  There are a couple of minor bugs in the
 shell script that launches Tor Browser (I need to patch out the SSE2 check
 and make it set LD_LIBRARY_PATH), which should be easy for me to fix.

 So, at this point, the focus is shifting from "make it run on ARM" to
 "start cleaning up the code in order to make it possible to merge".  There
 are a number of things I want to do to improve code quality; the most
 obvious ones are (1) remove all the commented out code that's leftover
 from me throwing things at the build system to see what stuck; and (2)
 improve the abstraction, so that things that apply to any GNU/Linux cross-
 compiled target are cleanly separated from things that are specific to
 32-bit ARM.  If anyone wants to start looking at my code and suggest other
 things that I should clean up prior to a merge, by all means feel free.
 Or feel free to wait a few weeks for me to get the initial stages of
 cleanup out of the way; either way works for me.

 Regarding @c6h12o6's comment: I do not see cross-compiling as a competitor
 to having non-x86 rbm hosts; I see them as orthogonal.  My ultimate goal
 here is for rbm hosts using the set of {x86, ARM, and POWER} to all be
 able to reproduce the same hashes for targets within the set of {x86, ARM,
 and POWER}.  There's no reason why that shouldn't be possible, modulo
 compiler bugs and rbm descriptor bugs that should be fixed.  I personally
 find implementing cross-compile support to be easier given my skill set,
 and it seems like a good first step (hence it's what I'm implementing),
 but I would be highly supportive of efforts to add non-x86 rbm host
 support in addition to cross-compile support.

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[tor-bugs] #29808 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add button to return to default Tor Browser window size

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29808: Add button to return to default Tor Browser window size
--+--
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 User request from social media:

 "please add a button that changes the browser window size to the default
 Tor browser size so that in case we mistakenly resize it, we can go back
 to the default size"

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29073 [Core Tor/Tor]: shellcheck: linux-tor-prio.sh issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29073: shellcheck: linux-tor-prio.sh issues
--+
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by rl1987):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 New pull request with cleaner git history:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/804

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27530 [Core Tor/Tor]: Configure: Use AC_TRY_RUN() to check that --enable-gcc-hardening works

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27530: Configure: Use AC_TRY_RUN() to check that --enable-gcc-hardening works
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, postfreeze-ok, 040-can  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28611| Points:  .2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29108 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor crypto_digest.c to have fewer ifdefs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29108: Refactor crypto_digest.c to have fewer ifdefs
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-proposed refactor technical- |  Actual Points:
  debt   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 Replying to [comment:5 rl1987]:
 > https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/752
 This had a stochastic test failure so I restarted that Travis job and will
 try to look at it if that passes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29136 [Core Tor/Tor]: PT_LOG and PT_STATUS event fields unspecifed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29136: PT_LOG and PT_STATUS event fields unspecifed
+--
 Reporter:  atagar  |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, tor-pt, 040-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  accepted => assigned
 * owner:  dgoulet => ahf


Comment:

 Taking this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29073 [Core Tor/Tor]: shellcheck: linux-tor-prio.sh issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29073: shellcheck: linux-tor-prio.sh issues
--+
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Thanks! Could you please clean up the commit history a bit instead of
 having a discrete commit to revert earlier changes? Or if you'd rather we
 cleaned it up, that is also fine but might take longer.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29805 [Core Tor/Tor]: 41 coverity defects on prob_distr.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29805: 41 coverity defects on prob_distr.c
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prob-distr coverity  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * cc: catalyst (added)


Comment:

 Replying to [ticket:29805 asn]:
 > The `DIST_BASE_TYPED` macro in `prob_distr.h` is causing us 41 new
 coverity defects. I don't think it's wrong but it's quite hacky so we
 should fix it in some way.
 It also seems dubious to me and I would need to dig to decide whether I
 think it's undefined behavior.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28226 [Core Tor/Tor]: Backend for an async publish-subcribe messaging system for cross-module communications

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28226: Backend for an async publish-subcribe messaging system for cross-module
communications
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pubsub, sponsor31-maybe, |  Actual Points:
  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  8
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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[tor-bugs] #29807 [- Select a component]: Tor Browser requires discrete graphics on my Mac

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29807: Tor Browser requires discrete graphics on my Mac
--+--
 Reporter:  lg|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:  Tor: unspecified  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 I have around 20 GUI apps running at the moment, including Firefox, Chrome
 and Safari. According to Activity Monitor, only Tor requires the discrete
 graphics card (for displaying Facebook). Why is that? It takes a lot of
 energy, causes the fan to spin etc.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29279 [Obfuscation/Obfsproxy]: Reach out to NGOs to test obfs4 reachability (was: Reach out to NGOs about obfs4)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29279: Reach out to NGOs to test obfs4 reachability
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Obfsproxy|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  NGO, community, network-team-|  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-

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