Re: [tor-bugs] #29989 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a flag to set chosen_exit_optional to false for MapAddress torrc option (and controller?) (was: MapAddress directive added to torrc doesn't work for some webs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29989: Add a flag to set chosen_exit_optional to false for MapAddress torrc 
option
(and controller?)
-+-
 Reporter:  babyfarkmcgeezaxxon  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.8
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  security-low?, tor-client, tor-exit  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * component:  - Select a component => Core Tor/Tor
 * points:   => 1
 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified
 * keywords:   => security-low?, tor-client, tor-exit
 * type:  defect => enhancement


Comment:

 Does 719FD0FA327F3CCBCDA0D4EA74C15EA110338942 allow exiting to
 ayefiles.com?

 It looks like you want chosen_exit_optional set to false, but we don't
 have a torrc option flag for that yet.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28693 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add an option to disable circuit padding

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28693: Add an option to disable circuit padding
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-must  |
Parent ID:  #28632   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell, padding, 041-proposed => wtf-
 pad, tor-relay, tor-cell, padding, 041-must


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28694 [Core Tor/sbws]: When CircuitPadding is implemented in Tor, set it to 0 in sbws

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28694: When CircuitPadding is implemented in Tor, set it to 0 in sbws
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, changes-version-patch, sbws-11x-  |
  final-removed-20190312, scanner, 041-must  |
Parent ID:  #29954   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell, padding, changes-version-patch, sbws-
 11x-final-removed-20190312, scanner
 =>
 wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell, padding, changes-version-patch, sbws-
 11x-final-removed-20190312, scanner, 041-must


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #29500, #28633, #28635, #28694, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #29500, #28633, #28635, #28694, #28778, #28779, #29821, 
#29840, #29990 by teor:
sponsor to Sponsor2

Comment:
Move all WTF-PAD tickets that do not have a sponsor into sponsor2.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29500 [Core Tor/Tor]: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29500: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:  3
  padding, 041-proposed, 040-must, tor-ci-fail-  |
  sometimes  |
Parent ID:  #28631   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_revision
 * points:   => 3
 * actualpoints:   => 3


Comment:

 I have a draft branch here, which I am checking against CI:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/885

 I guessed the points, because I don't think mikeperry has time to update
 them this week.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29990 [Core Tor/Tor]: test_circuitpadding_circuitsetup_machine() fails when monotonic time difference is zero

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29990: test_circuitpadding_circuitsetup_machine() fails when monotonic time
difference is zero
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-must  |
Parent ID:  #29500   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Here's a longer explanation of monotonic time:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/29500#comment:20

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[tor-bugs] #29990 [Core Tor/Tor]: test_circuitpadding_circuitsetup_machine() fails when monotonic time difference is zero

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29990: test_circuitpadding_circuitsetup_machine() fails when monotonic time
difference is zero
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:  Tor: unspecified
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,
 Severity:  Normal   |  padding, 041-must
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #29500
   Points:  2|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 I can reliably get the following failure on my macOS VM when its wall
 clock time is out of sync with the host time.

 Failures like this also intermittently happen when the underlying API is
 low-resolution, or not actually monotonic (for example, Windows).

 {{{
 circuitpadding/circuitpadding_circuitsetup_machine: [forking]
   FAIL ../src/test/test_circuitpadding.c:1900:
 assert(client_side->padding_info[0]->padding_scheduled_at_usec OP_NE 0): 0
 vs 0
   [circuitpadding_circuitsetup_machine FAILED]
 }}}

 I've worked around the issue in #29500 by disabling these tests, but we
 should fix them long-term.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29500 [Core Tor/Tor]: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29500: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, 040-must, tor-ci-fail-  |
  sometimes  |
Parent ID:  #28631   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 I don't know which tests fail intermittently with Mike's PR 757, and which
 succeed.
 So I'll assume that it is an improvement, and keep working on it until it
 passes.

 After we merge, we should open tickets for further failures.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29938 [Core Tor/Tor]: pubsub: coverity sees a null pointer deref in lint_message_consistency (CID 1444257)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29938: pubsub: coverity sees a null pointer deref in lint_message_consistency 
(CID
1444257)
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * points:   => 0.1
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * version:   => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 Merged to master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27207 [Core Tor/Tor]: Examples in CodingStandardsRust.md are wrong

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27207: Examples in CodingStandardsRust.md are wrong
-+-
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, doc, 035-deferred-20190115,|  Actual Points:
  041-proposed, easy |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 #29979 fixes the expect(), but not the code examples.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29979 [Core Tor/Tor]: Don't recommend expect() in CodingStandardsRust, because it panics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29979: Don't recommend expect() in CodingStandardsRust, because it panics
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, doc, asn-merge, nickm-merge  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #27207 | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  teor   |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:   => #27207


Comment:

 This ticket fixes some of the bugs in #27207

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29060 [Core Tor/Tor]: shellcheck: test-network.sh issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29060: shellcheck: test-network.sh issues
-+-
 Reporter:  rl1987   |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, regression,  |  Actual Points:
  041-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Thanks for the update.
 I like the idea of using awk, rather than messing with shell expansions.
 I left one awk question on the pull request.

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[tor-bugs] #29989 [- Select a component]: MapAddress directive added to torrc doesn't work for some websites, fails to assign specified exit node

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29989: MapAddress directive added to torrc doesn't work for some websites, 
fails
to assign specified exit node
-+--
 Reporter:  babyfarkmcgeezaxxon  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.8 |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 Please refer to this thread on the TOR Stack Exchange:
 https://tor.stackexchange.com/questions/19647/how-are-certain-websites-
 able-to-override-the-specific-exitnode-you-chose-and-c

 If I add the following to my torrc (and restart TOR):

 {{{
 MapAddress ayefiles.com
 ayefiles.com.719FD0FA327F3CCBCDA0D4EA74C15EA110338942.exit
 MapAddress duckduckgo.com
 duckduckgo.com.719FD0FA327F3CCBCDA0D4EA74C15EA110338942.exit
 }}}

 then I see that if I visit https://duckduckgo.com/, I'm correctly assigned
 to use exit node 185.220.100.252, which corresponds to the fingerptint.
 However, if I visit https://ayefiles.com, my exit node will NOT be
 185.220.100.252, but instead can be any exit node such as 176.9.53.58 or
 148.253.182.141, and will even change if I do a Ctrl+L to get a "New Tor
 circuit for this site" which should be a no-op for sites with MapAddress
 directives mapping them to a single exit node.

 How is ayefiles.com able to hack TOR and prevent it from applying the
 requested exit node?  Can we stop this from happening?

 Finally, if for some reason this is "expected behavior" (though I can't
 fathom how) please change this to a feature request to add a way to
 specify a single exit node in a similar way to MapAddress, except that
 can't be hacked.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27199 [Core Tor/Tor]: panic inside rust extern "C" function is undefined behavior

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27199: panic inside rust extern "C" function is undefined behavior
-+-
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, 034-backport, 035-backport,|  Actual Points:
  040-backport, 041-proposed, 033-backport-  |
  unreached  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * sponsor:   => SponsorV-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29913 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop assuming that /usr/bin/python3 exists

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29913: Stop assuming that /usr/bin/python3 exists
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, python3, asn-merge,|  Actual Points:  0.2
  nickm-merge|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  fast-fix, python3 => fast-fix, python3, asn-merge, nickm-merge


Comment:

 Thanks!
 We'll stop supporting python2 in 2020 when it is no longer supported (and
 when macOS moves to python3 as the default).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27199 [Core Tor/Tor]: panic inside rust extern "C" function is undefined behavior

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27199: panic inside rust extern "C" function is undefined behavior
-+-
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, 034-backport, 035-backport,|  Actual Points:
  040-backport, 041-proposed, 033-backport-  |
  unreached  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  rust, 034-backport, 041-proposed, 033-backport-unreached =>
 rust, 034-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport, 041-proposed, 033
 -backport-unreached
 * status:  needs_information => needs_review
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:9 elichai2]:
 > why not use `catch_unwind()` ?

 We would have to remember to wrap every C to Rust FFI call in
 catch_unwind(), which would make our code hard to read.
 (The codebase is meant to be panic-free, but we might have missed some
 panics.)

 Instead, we should merge the abort branch in 0.4.1 and see how we go:
 https://gitgud.io/onionk/tor/tree/rust-panic1
 (If we abort, we should get a nice backtrace.)

 We need to:
 * open a GitHub pull request so we get CI
 * review the code
 * merge it

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26460 [Core Tor/Tor]: Some? autoconf tests that include stdio.h fail with a missing ssp.h on cygwin

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26460: Some? autoconf tests that include stdio.h fail with a missing ssp.h on
cygwin
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, 034-backport,|  Actual Points:
  035-backport, 040-backport |
Parent ID:  #26356   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  regression, 033-backport => regression, 034-backport,
 035-backport, 040-backport
 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  user disappeared =>
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 Thanks for the info!

 It's going to be hard for us to reproduce this issue, because none of the
 core developers have Cygwin.
 We're probably going to need a volunteer with Cygwin to fix it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29724 [Core Tor/sbws]: Create a blog post about work done and future work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29724: Create a blog post about work done and future work
--+---
 Reporter:  juga  |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws |Version:  sbws: 1.0.5
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  no-changes-version, docs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:6 juga]:
 > i changed some of the things teor commented, still is missing the
 equilibrium goal which it seems teor will do in #28582.

 Eventually, I will turn #28582 into a pull request for the bandwidth-file-
 spec.
 But if you want text for the blog post, you should copy it from #28582 and
 rewrite it.

 > I'd still be awesome if someone else do a 2nd review

 asn, can you assign someone to do a blog post review this week?
 mikeperry probably can't do a review, because he is busy.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29724 [Core Tor/sbws]: Create a blog post about work done and future work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29724: Create a blog post about work done and future work
--+---
 Reporter:  juga  |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws |Version:  sbws: 1.0.5
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  no-changes-version, docs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by teor):

 * cc: asn (added)
 * reviewer:  teor =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29979 [Core Tor/Tor]: Don't recommend expect() in CodingStandardsRust, because it panics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29979: Don't recommend expect() in CodingStandardsRust, because it panics
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, doc, asn-merge, nickm-merge  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  teor   |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by teor):

 (We'll need to squash this branch before it merges.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29979 [Core Tor/Tor]: Don't recommend expect() in CodingStandardsRust, because it panics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29979: Don't recommend expect() in CodingStandardsRust, because it panics
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, doc, asn-merge, nickm-merge  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  teor   |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready
 * keywords:  easy, doc => easy, doc, asn-merge, nickm-merge
 * points:   => 0.1
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Old description:

> See the pull request from a GitHub contributor:
> https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/883/files

New description:

 See the pull request from a GitHub contributor:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/883

--

Comment:

 Looks good to me!

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[tor-bugs] #29988 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Add phw to sponsor19.git with RW access

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29988: Add phw to sponsor19.git with RW access
-+
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA512

 Please add phw to the sponsor19.git repository with RW access.

 This message was written for a ticket on trac.torproject.org.
 Wed Apr  3 01:16:22 UTC 2019
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

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 4gebMxZynkXDzIgJrghzQqQovqv1aFLmHdyIUHDbsSrR/tvAruw=
 =BH2P
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29816 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: replace "Tor VM hosts" spreadsheet with Grafana dashboard

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29816: replace "Tor VM hosts" spreadsheet with Grafana dashboard
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 > if I might add, given the trouble I am having figuring out how moly was
 built and what hardware it's running, I'm thinking more and more we should
 keep more details about the various devices somewhere. maybe it could be
 in LDAP, but I can't help but think this is stuff that could very well
 live in a YAML file in Hiera.

 another thing to consider here is that we don't have a clear, global view
 of which (physical) machines we have and how much they cost. we do have a
 list of machines in LDAP, but that includes limited information and does
 not include cost, so it's hard to do requirements assessment and
 depreciation evaluation.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29938 [Core Tor/Tor]: pubsub: coverity sees a null pointer deref in lint_message_consistency (CID 1444257)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29938: pubsub: coverity sees a null pointer deref in lint_message_consistency 
(CID
1444257)
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:1 nickm]:
 > Simple fix in my branch `bug29938`; PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/863
 Looks good! Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29668 [Core Tor/Tor]: Drop thread_fast_rng during postfork; improve thread_fast_rng fork-safety

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29668: Drop thread_fast_rng during postfork; improve thread_fast_rng 
fork-safety
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .2
Parent ID:| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:  SponsorV
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Medium => High


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29668 [Core Tor/Tor]: Drop thread_fast_rng during postfork; improve thread_fast_rng fork-safety

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29668: Drop thread_fast_rng during postfork; improve thread_fast_rng 
fork-safety
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .2
Parent ID:| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:  SponsorV
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * reviewer:  catalyst => ahf


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28878 [Core Tor/Tor]: WTF-PAD: Improve deterministic randomness in tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28878: WTF-PAD: Improve deterministic randomness in tests
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, tor-tests |
Parent ID:  #28631   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 See #29732 for a generic backend here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24367 [Core Tor/Tor]: Changing pluggable transports (during start-up) in Tor Browser is broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24367: Changing pluggable transports (during start-up) in Tor Browser is broken
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, tor-bridge-client,   |  Actual Points:
  033-triage-20180320, 033-removed-20180320, |
  031-unreached-backport, tbb-needs, |
  034-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport   |
Parent ID:  #29875   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19-must
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  teor => (none)
 * keywords:
 regression, tor-bridge-client, 033-triage-20180320,
 033-removed-20180320, 031-unreached-backport, tbb-needs, 034-backport,
 035-backport, 040-backport, 040-must
 =>
 regression, tor-bridge-client, 033-triage-20180320,
 033-removed-20180320, 031-unreached-backport, tbb-needs, 034-backport,
 035-backport, 040-backport
 * sponsor:  Sponsor19 => Sponsor19-must
 * parent:   => #29875
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29875 [Core Tor/Tor]: Going from obfs4 to snowflake using the Tor Network Settings from the Torbutton doesn't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29875: Going from obfs4 to snowflake using the Tor Network Settings from the
Torbutton doesn't work
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-needs, 034-backport, |  Actual Points:
  034-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19-must
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  teor => (none)
 * keywords:  tbb-needs, 040-must, 034-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport
 => tbb-needs, 034-backport, 034-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport
 * sponsor:  Sponsor19 => Sponsor19-must
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29500 [Core Tor/Tor]: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29500: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, 040-must, tor-ci-fail-  |
  sometimes  |
Parent ID:  #28631   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * reviewer:   => nickm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29034 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29034: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs-reachability, 029-backport-   |  Actual Points:
  maybe, 034-backport-maybe, 035-backport,   |
  040-backport, postfreeze-ok|
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  tor-hs-reachability, 035-backport, 040-backport, postfreeze-ok
 =>
 tor-hs-reachability, 029-backport-maybe, 034-backport-maybe,
 035-backport, 040-backport, postfreeze-ok


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29034 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29034: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs-reachability, 035-backport,   |  Actual Points:
  040-backport, postfreeze-ok|
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29500 [Core Tor/Tor]: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29500: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, 040-must, tor-ci-fail-  |
  sometimes  |
Parent ID:  #28631   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  (none) => teor


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29034 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29034: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs-reachability, 035-backport,   |  Actual Points:
  040-backport, postfreeze-ok|
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  tor-hs-reachability, 035-backport, postfreeze-ok => tor-hs-
 reachability, 035-backport, 040-backport, postfreeze-ok


Comment:

 This is not a release blocker, we can do it later and backport

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29034 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29034: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs-reachability, 035-backport,   |  Actual Points:
  postfreeze-ok  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-hs-reachability, 035-backport, postfreeze-ok, 040-must =>
 tor-hs-reachability, 035-backport, postfreeze-ok


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28223 [Core Tor/Tor]: Unparseable microdescriptor on public relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28223: Unparseable microdescriptor on public relay
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-must, 040-roadmap-proposed,  |  Actual Points:
  regression?, 035-can, postfreeze-ok,   |
  040-deferred-20190220  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  assigned => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29357 [Core Tor/Tor]: add an ActiveOnStartup config option

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29357: add an ActiveOnStartup config option
---+---
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement| Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-needs, 040-proposed, 040-must  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID: | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:  teor   |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * reviewer:   => teor


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29986 [Core Tor/Tor]: wishlist

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29986: wishlist
--+-
 Reporter:  master hong   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29357| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tbb-needs, 040-proposed, 040-must =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29527 [Core Tor/Tor]: Division by zero: undefined behaviour in circuitpadding/circuitpadding_sample_distribution test

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29527: Division by zero: undefined behaviour in
circuitpadding/circuitpadding_sample_distribution test
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  was-merged-to-041-after-29298,   |  Actual Points:
  nickm-merge, teor-merge, regression, tor-ci,   |
  tor-test, 040-must, 040-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * reviewer:   => nickm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29819 [Core Tor/Tor]: Seccomp: sandbox crash on rt_sigaction with libseccomp 0.2.4

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29819: Seccomp: sandbox crash on rt_sigaction with libseccomp 0.2.4
---+
 Reporter:  toralf |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash, linux, sandbox  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  crash, linux, sandbox, 040-must => crash, linux, sandbox


Comment:

 Removing 040-must, since this is a libseccomp bug.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29986 [Core Tor/Tor]: wishlist

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29986: wishlist
---+-
 Reporter:  master hong|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  tbb-needs, 040-proposed, 040-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29357 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29987 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: clear out unowned files on servers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29987: clear out unowned files on servers
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 The result of the run is in `alberti.torproject.org:/home/anarcat/unowned-
 files`. I haven't included it here because it's 84MB but also because it
 might contain sensitive information.

 A cleaned up version of the file is in `unowned-files-sorted`, produced
 with the following command:

 {{{
 sed -n '/^___/,$p' < unowned-files | cut -d: -f2 | sort -u  > unowned-
 files-sorted
 }}}

 The idea of the first part is the Cumin produces the output *twice*, once
 as the regular output and then as a machine-readable output. We select
 only the latter. Then the `cut` takes only the actual paths (as opposed to
 `host: path` pairs) and finally, `sort` takes the unique paths across the
 entire set. The result is still over 40MB and lists ~300,000 files.

 Many files are from removed users, but there are also "restore" runs on
 brulloi which make up a significant number. The remaining is fairly small:

 {{{
 $ sed -n '/^___/,$p' < unowned-files | grep -v -e /home/ -e /var/lib/sudo
 -e restore | wc -l
 277
 }}}

 ... and mostly consists of random tidbits, which were basically:

  * `listera:/lib/firmware`: owned by `1000:1000`, cleared out by chown'ing
 to `root:root`
  * `*:/run/xtables.lock`: owned by `root:115` (previously the munin
 group), removed
  * `brulloi:/root/etc.bak/munin/...`: one year old `/etc` backup, ignored

 The vast majority of the remaining (~277,000 files) are the `restore`
 stuff. It is mostly leftovers on `brulloi`, but there were also things in
 `/srv/restored` on `staticiforme`, I ignored both, since brulloi is going
 away and the other seemed harmless as it was readable only by root.

 Finally, the remaining ~20,000 files are stuff in `/home`. This is the
 part I am not sure what to do with. For now, I'm just ignoring those as
 well until we make up our mind about what to do with the files leftovers
 by retired users.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29682 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: remove traces munin-node everywhere

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29682: remove traces munin-node everywhere
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29681   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 To check for unowned files, I am using the magic Cumin incantation:

 {{{
 cumin -p 0 -b 5 --force -o txt '*' 'find / -ignore_readdir_race -path
 /proc -prune -nouser -o -nogroup' | tee unowned-files
 }}}

 The result is around 300,000 files spread over all the servers, the
 ''vast'' majority of which are `*/home/*` files which I'm not sure what to
 do with. The remaining ~800 files are not related to the Munin, so I'll
 just punt this problem elsewhere. :) (Specifically, in #29987.)

 (Actually, there *was* a file related to Munin, `/run/xtables.lock`, which
 I have removed where relevant but that wasn't really a problem since it
 lived in a temporary filesystem and that file would have been removed
 eventually anyways.)

 Tomorrow I'll remove the remaining Munin code in Puppet and this ticket
 will be done.

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[tor-bugs] #29987 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: clear out unowned files on servers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29987: clear out unowned files on servers
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor|   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 there is a significant number of unowned files on the servers. this is
 generally because a user was removed without the associated user being
 purged as well, but there are also odd corner cases like backup restores
 and so on.

 In #29682, I have done the following Cumin run to find such files,
 expecting to find only problems with the Munin user/group I had just
 removed, but instead found many more cases, mostly (300,000) surrounding
 deleted users:

 {{{
 cumin -p 0 -b 5 --force -o txt '*' 'find / -ignore_readdir_race -path
 /proc -prune -nouser -o -nogroup' | tee unowned-files
 }}}

 Next step is to decide what to do with the leftover files and document
 this as part of the user retirement process.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29682 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: remove traces munin-node everywhere

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29682: remove traces munin-node everywhere
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29681   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 so current status:

  1. Puppet has run everywhere
  2. Nagios looks mostly okay
  3. Munin user and group are gone, but there are leftover unowned files...
  4. ... so it's a bit early to remove the Munin code for now

 I made this magic recipe to list the last check-in times of nodes in
 PuppetDB:

 {{{
 curl -s -G http://localhost:8080/pdb/query/v4/nodes  | jq -r
 'sort_by(.report_timestamp) | .[] | "\(.certname) \(.report_timestamp)"' |
 column -s\  -t
 }}}

 ... documented in https://help.torproject.org/tsa/howto/puppet/ of course.
 :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29841 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: ipsec VPN generates gigantic logs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29841: ipsec VPN generates gigantic logs
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  tpa => weasel


Comment:

 i believe weasel fixed this this morning, in puppet commit af31efa4

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29841 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: ipsec VPN generates gigantic logs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29841: ipsec VPN generates gigantic logs
-+
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27503 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disabling accessibility on Windows breaks screen readers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27503: Disabling accessibility on Windows breaks screen readers
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903, GeorgKoppen201903,   |
  tbb-8.5-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  boklm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pospeselr):

 So after applying patches in (
 https://bug1520177.bmoattachments.org/attachment.cgi?id=9039768 ) I've a
 working (albeit hacked together) build working with NVDA on Windows 10.
 The strange thing is that Mozilla folks are reporting a crash in their
 build with the same patches applied, so I'm a bit confused.  It's possible
 there is a bug in the version of mingw they are using that I haven't hit,
 will investigate further.

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[tor-bugs] #29986 [Core Tor/Tor]: wishlist

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29986: wishlist
---+---
 Reporter:  master hong|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Component:  Core
   |  Tor/Tor
  Version: |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  tbb-needs, 040-proposed, 040-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29357 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29871 [Obfuscation/meek]: Meek-Azure Pluggable Transport Not working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29871: Meek-Azure Pluggable Transport Not working
--+---
 Reporter:  bakertaylor28 |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * severity:  Critical => Normal


Comment:

 It looks like it is still working for most people:
 https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
 transport.html?start=2019-01-02=2019-04-02=meek

 Did it work for you before, and only stop working recently? Or did it
 never work for you? How far back did you try?

 I suspect there is a problem with your local Tor Browser installation. Try
 downloading a fresh copy of Tor Browser and see if that one works.
 https://www.torproject.org/download/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29734 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Broker should receive country stats information from Proxy and Client

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29734: Broker should receive country stats information from Proxy and Client
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake, geoip, stats  |  Actual Points:  2
Parent ID:  #29207   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+-

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:19 cohosh]:
 > On the other hand, perhaps we want to collect country stats of the
 snowflake proxies? This is discussed to some extent in #21315. Do we have
 privacy concerns about proxies that are similar to those concerning
 clients?

 I think that doing it for proxies is less concerning that doing it for
 clients. I would be fine with merging code to collect stats on proxies
 right away, as I think the risk is low. We can ask the safety board if
 they can think of any dangers we missed, but I don't think we have to wait
 for that before starting.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29977 [Applications/Tor Browser]: My connection continues to timeout

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29977: My connection continues to timeout
--+--
 Reporter:  71PlymouthGTX |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by catalyst):

 * priority:  Immediate => Medium
 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  Webpages => Applications/Tor Browser
 * severity:  Major => Normal
 * keywords:  The Connection has Timed Out =>


Comment:

 #29978 seems to be a duplicate. This also doesn't seem to be a bug, but
 seems to be problems with specific websites either being down or blocking
 Tor. I expect this would be better handled as a support issue.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29978 [Applications/Tor Browser]: My connection continues to timeout

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29978: My connection continues to timeout
--+--
 Reporter:  71PlymouthGTX |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  new => closed
 * severity:  Major => Normal
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser
 * priority:  Immediate => Medium
 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Appears to be a duplicate of #29977; I haven't checked whether the screen
 shots are identical.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21304 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Sanitize snowflake.log

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21304: Sanitize snowflake.log
---+-
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  starter|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Old description:

> For starters, the timestamps are in the local timezone.  We can make that
> UTC
>
> See also #19026
>
> Known problems:
>  * When the websocket server panics (as in #29125), it writes the client
> IP address to the log:
>{{{
> 2019/01/18 18:56:29 http2: panic serving X.X.X.X:: interface
> conversion: *http2.responseWriter is not http.Hijacker: missing method
> Hijack
>}}}
>  * The broker logs the raw bytes of ICE answers:
>{{{
> 2019/03/22 06:28:32 Received answer:  [XXX XXX XXX XXX ... XXX]
>}}}

New description:

 For starters, the timestamps are in the local timezone.  We can make that
 UTC

 See also #19026

 Known problems:
  * The client logs full SDP stanzas, which include local IP addresses.
  * When the websocket server panics (as in #29125), it writes the client
 IP address to the log:
{{{
 2019/01/18 18:56:29 http2: panic serving X.X.X.X:: interface
 conversion: *http2.responseWriter is not http.Hijacker: missing method
 Hijack
}}}
  * The websocket server logs an IP address on certain connection errors.
 (These are probably automated scanners, but still...)
{{{
 2019/04/01 07:02:50 http: TLS handshake error from X.X.X.X::
 acme/autocert: missing server name
 2019/04/01 07:53:03 http: TLS handshake error from X.X.X.X:: tls:
 oversized record received with length 21536
}}}
  * The broker logs the raw bytes of ICE answers:
{{{
 2019/03/22 06:28:32 Received answer:  [XXX XXX XXX XXX ... XXX]
}}}

--

Comment:

 This looks good to me.

 I think this is ready to merge. It looks like we are not keeping permanent
 logs for snowflake-server; they are getting rotated in /var/log/tor. So we
 don't have to do anything special to purge the old logs.

 Apart from the specific client and broker changes you made
 
[https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/commit/3eb9064438ca6242f935173aed88ec29a0c16c7d
 here], do the client and broker benefit from using the same log scrubber?
 I.e., is it worth it to factor out the log scrubber into its own package
 and share it, after merging it to server?


 Replying to [comment:15 cohosh]:
 > I think for now it's okay to just have the log scrubber. Before I
 started it, I went through and looked at all of the returned errors and I
 don't recall finding any net.OpErrors anyway.

 Agreed, I think the string-based scrubbing is the way to go.

 > {{{
 > const ipv4Address = `\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}`
 > const ipv6Address = `(([0-9a-fA-F]{0,4}:){2,7}([0-9a-fA-F]{0,4})?(` +
 ipv4Address + `))` +
 > `|(([0-9a-fA-F]{0,4}:){2,7}([0-9a-fA-F]{0,4})?)`
 > const optionalPort = `(:\d{1,5})?`
 > const addressPattern = `((` + ipv4Address + `)|(\[(` + ipv6Address +
 `)\])|(` + ipv6Address + `))` + optionalPort
 > }}}
 >
 > My reason for not going with the full one was that I found it
 unnecessary after expanding my tests with the ones you used. I also found
 that this massive regexp was still scrubbing the fingerprint, meaning
 additional changes still had to be made.

 This looks good to me.

 > Go does not yet support look-ahead or look-behind, which is what we'd
 want to pass this test case. Instead I implemented a work-around that will
 find regular expressions that check for characters surrounding the
 address, but only replaces the address portion of it:

 This is a good way to do it. I'm also fine if fingerprints get scrubbed, I
 don't think that necessarily has to be a test case. On the comment "go
 does ''not yet'' support look ahead or look behind," I think as a
 philosophical matter they plan never ever to implement those.

 > > That's what the "SEND" button at
 https://snowflake.torproject.org/snowflake.html, and the
 {{{NewCopyPasteDialer}}} in client, are for. I'm okay with that mode of
 operation going away.
 > I removed this from the client logs, but if there's now unused
 functionality in the client or proxy code perhaps we should remove that
 too?

 Yes; personally I think we can remove all the fifo copy-paste code. Let's
 do that in another ticket though.

 > Also please let me know if I should be doing something different for
 attributing the code you wrote for this.

 Nothing needed in this regard.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29913 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop assuming that /usr/bin/python3 exists

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29913: Stop assuming that /usr/bin/python3 exists
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, python3  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  cohosh |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 It looks good to me. I just want to call attention to ticket #11608 as a
 reminder that wherever we're using /usr/bin/python, this can refer to
 python2 or python3 depending on how the system is set up. This should be
 fine since we're replacing /usr/bin/python3 for only scripts that work
 with both.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29859 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Playing videos on Twitter is not working and freezing the mobile browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29859: Playing videos on Twitter is not working and freezing the mobile browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, GeorgKoppen201904,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904R, tbb-8.5-must|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Okay, so, if we really can't handle HLS, be it on desktop or mobile we get
 the options to download the m3u8 file and/or open it with an external app.
 One can test that behavior with

 https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/blog/live-247-reference-streams-
 available/

 On mobile with 8.5a10 the symptoms of this bug are visible but with my
 patch one gets the desktop behavior of the external helper app dialog
 showing up. Now, why can videos on Twitter still be played?

 If there is no HSL player available you'll see something like
 {{{
 [2386:Main Thread]: D/nsMediaElement 0x61a00026a080
 CanPlayType(application/x-mpegURL) = ""
 [04-01 15:23:14] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://abs.twimg.com/k/en/15.hls11.en.7d01861d350d623607c9.js via
twitter.com:f6ce0dc9bc9687a8480179a1e5b8b7b7
 }}}
 in your logs. The first line is interesting because it shows that the
 browser is not falling back to something else via
 `DecoderTraits::CanHandleMIMEType`, because there is the empty string
 after the "=", which boils down to `CANPLAY_NO` (via
 `HTMLMediaElement::GetCanPlay()` either because `!containerType` or
 because `DecoderTraits::CanHandleConteinerType` gave it back (which itself
 called
 `CanHandleMediaType` for the check)).

 The second line is interesting because it shows that the HLS support is
 provided by Twitter via some JS file which explains why the content (both
 on desktop and mobile) is playing at all. How frequent that fallback
 mechanism is on the web I don't know but either way, I think we can live
 with the patch for now.

 Once this is fixed I'll open a follow-up bug for properly enabling HLS
 support again.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29985 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Give phw access to Snowflake infrastructure hosts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29985: Give phw access to Snowflake infrastructure hosts
---+--
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 No objections here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27850 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Provide stand-alone snowflake proxy for 32-bit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27850: Provide stand-alone snowflake proxy for 32-bit
---+--
 Reporter:  traumschule|  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  user disappeared
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => user disappeared


Comment:

 I think this is fixed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29985 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Give phw access to Snowflake infrastructure hosts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29985: Give phw access to Snowflake infrastructure hosts
---+--
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 I can do this; just want to see if there are any objections first.

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[tor-bugs] #29985 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Give phw access to Snowflake infrastructure hosts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29985: Give phw access to Snowflake infrastructure hosts
---+
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 * broker
  * bridge

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27539 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create plan for releasing on F-Droid

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27539: Create plan for releasing on F-Droid
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201903,|  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.5-must-alpha |
Parent ID:  #26318   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:25 sysrqb]:

 > {{{
 > build:
 >   - RBM_NO_DEBUG=1 make alpha-android-armv7
 >   - mv out/tor-browser/tor-browser-8.5a10-android-armv7-*/tor-
 browser-8.5a10-android-armv7-multi-qa.apk
 > tor-browser-8.5a10-android-armv7-multi.apk
 > }}}

 I think it would be better to move the file from the `alpha/` directory,
 instead of the `out/tor-browser` directory:
  - if multiple builds are made, there can be more than one `tor-
 browser-8.5a10-android-armv7-*` directory
  - the apk is removed from the directory, but the directory is not
 removed, so if the build is restarted it won't rebuilt as the directory
 still exists

 Although maybe that's not an issue at the moment if the `out/` directory
 is removed after each build.

 If you want to avoid hard coding the version numbers in the build script,
 you can get the name of the directory in `alpha/` with this command:
 {{{
 ./rbm/rbm showconf --target alpha --target torbrowser-android-armv7
 release var/publish_dir
 }}}

 And the Tor Browser version with:
 {{{
 ./rbm/rbm showconf --target alpha --target torbrowser-android-armv7 tor-
 browser var/torbrowser_version
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22029 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22029: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I have added a dirserv_load_fingerprint_file() test.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29984 [Core Tor/Tor]: Controller protocol parser can't find empty initial line

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29984: Controller protocol parser can't find empty initial line
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * actualpoints:   => .1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29984 [Core Tor/Tor]: Controller protocol parser can't find empty initial line

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29984: Controller protocol parser can't find empty initial line
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Description changed by nickm:

Old description:

> We've apparently run into this in a few places before: The code in
> control.c that extracts the command from the command line will discard
> the rest of the line too, if the line is empty.
>
> This means that the control.c code can't distinguish these cases:
> {{{
> FOO A
> B
> C
> .
> }}}
> and
> {{{
> FOO
> A
> B
> C
> }}}

New description:

 We've apparently run into this in a few places before: The code in
 control.c that extracts the command from the command line will discard the
 rest of the line too, if the line is empty.

 This means that the control.c code can't distinguish these cases:
 {{{
 +FOO A
 B
 C
 .
 }}}
 and
 {{{
 +FOO
 A
 B
 C
 }}}

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24973 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should be more gentle when launching dozens of circuits at once

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24973: Tor should be more gentle when launching dozens of circuits at once
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dos, tor-hs, performance,|  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180502  |
Parent ID:  #14006   | Points:  8
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * sponsor:  Sponsor27 => Sponsor27-must


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[tor-bugs] #29984 [Core Tor/Tor]: Controller protocol parser can't find empty initial line

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29984: Controller protocol parser can't find empty initial line
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 We've apparently run into this in a few places before: The code in
 control.c that extracts the command from the command line will discard the
 rest of the line too, if the line is empty.

 This means that the control.c code can't distinguish these cases:
 {{{
 FOO A
 B
 C
 .
 }}}
 and
 {{{
 FOO
 A
 B
 C
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29034 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29034: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs-reachability, 035-backport,   |  Actual Points:
  postfreeze-ok, 040-must|
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * points:   => 3
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor27-must


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20371 [Core Tor/Tor]: Lower HSDir query backoff delay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20371: Lower HSDir query backoff delay
-+-
 Reporter:  twim |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, research, prop224,   |  Actual Points:
  reachability   |
Parent ID:  #23300   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, research, prop224 => tor-hs, research, prop224,
 reachability
 * points:   => 2
 * sponsor:  SponsorR-can => Sponsor27-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21621 [Core Tor/Tor]: Intro points can get stuck in CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21621: Intro points can get stuck in CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, teor-was-assigned,   |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #25882   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * points:  1 => 3
 * sponsor:  SponsorR-can => Sponsor27-can
 * parent:  #21446 => #25882


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Re: [tor-bugs] #17640 [Core Tor/Tor]: Handle CREATE/CREATED cell processing gracefully under load.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17640: Handle CREATE/CREATED cell processing gracefully under load.
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, scaling, tor-dos, tor-relay  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * points:  3 => 6
 * sponsor:  SponsorU-can => Sponsor27-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16387 [Core Tor/Tor]: Improve reachability of hidden services on mobile phones

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16387: Improve reachability of hidden services on mobile phones
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, sponsor8-maybe,  |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor27-can


Comment:

 Assigning to S27 in case there is any low-hanging fruit in here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15516 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider dropping INTRODUCE2 cells when under load

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15516: Consider dropping INTRODUCE2 cells when under load
+--
 Reporter:  special |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorU-deferred, tor-dos, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  10
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor27-can
+--
Changes (by asn):

 * points:  medium => 10
 * sponsor:  SponsorV-can => Sponsor27-can


Comment:

 Stealing from V to 27 due to relation with the DoS objective.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15463 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor deals poorly with a very large number of incoming connection requests.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15463: Tor deals poorly with a very large number of incoming connection 
requests.
--+
 Reporter:  alberto   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.5.11
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, performance, tor-dos  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24298| Points:  15
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * points:   => 15
 * sponsor:  SponsorR-can => Sponsor27-can


Comment:

 Stealing from R to 27 due to relation with the DoS objective.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #6418 [Core Tor/Tor]: Drop support for older versions of the hidden service protocol

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6418: Drop support for older versions of the hidden service protocol
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs technical-debt deprecation  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  4
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor27-must
---+---
Changes (by asn):

 * points:   => 4
 * sponsor:  SponsorR-can => Sponsor27-must


Comment:

 Stealing from R to 27. Let's do this and child ticket. Assigning points.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #3733 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should abandon rendezvous circuits that cause a client request to time out

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3733: Tor should abandon rendezvous circuits that cause a client request to 
time
out
-+-
 Reporter:  rransom  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, tor-client, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #23300   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * points:   => 5
 * sponsor:  SponsorR-can => Sponsor27-must


Comment:

 Stealing from SponsorR to Sponsor27, this might be a reachability issue.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27680 [Core Tor/Tor]: Explain how to use auth cookie for onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27680: Explain how to use auth cookie for onion services
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  hs-auth   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * component:  Webpages/Website => Core Tor/Tor


Comment:

 Changing this to our component, so it gets some review next week.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27842 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider end-to-end introduction ACKs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27842: Consider end-to-end introduction ACKs
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, 034-deferred-20180602|  Actual Points:
  035-removed reachability   |
Parent ID:  #25882   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * points:   => 3


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29583 [Core Tor/Tor]: HSv3: Faulty cross-certs in introduction point keys (allows naive onionbalance for v3s)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29583: HSv3: Faulty cross-certs in introduction point keys (allows naive
onionbalance for v3s)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs scaling onionbalance  |  Actual Points:
  040-backport 035-backport needs-proposal   |
Parent ID:  #26768   | Points:  4
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * points:   => 4
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor27-must


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26768 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support onionbalance in HSv3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26768: Support onionbalance in HSv3
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs scaling onionbalance  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  20
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * points:   => 20


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26294 [Core Tor/Tor]: attacker can force intro point rotation by ddos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26294: attacker can force intro point rotation by ddos
-+--
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-dos  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  7
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
-+--
Changes (by asn):

 * points:   => 7


Comment:

 There are some easy stuff we can do here. Assigning 7 points to do the
 easy stuff and think about future stuff, if we don't get to fix this
 completely.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24973 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should be more gentle when launching dozens of circuits at once

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24973: Tor should be more gentle when launching dozens of circuits at once
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dos, tor-hs, performance,|  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180502  |
Parent ID:  #14006   | Points:  8
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * points:  3 => 8


Comment:

 We don't have a plan here. Bumping up the points.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23493 [Core Tor/Tor]: IPv6 v3 Single Onion Services fail with a bug warning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23493: IPv6 v3 Single Onion Services fail with a bug warning
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  v3-onion-service-feature-parity- |  Actual Points:  0.7
  can, prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6,  |
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  7
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * points:  1 => 7


Comment:

 Lots of children ticket here, bumping up the points.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16059 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a "rendezvous approver" control API

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16059: Add a "rendezvous approver" control API
-+-
 Reporter:  special  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-control, needs-  |  Actual Points:
  proposal, term-project-ideas   |
Parent ID:  #24298   | Points:  17
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * points:   => 17


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13739 [Core Tor/Tor]: Optimize the functions called in circuit_launch_by_extend_info()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13739: Optimize the functions called in circuit_launch_by_extend_info()
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, performance, profile,|  Actual Points:
  optimization   |
Parent ID:  #15463   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * points:   => 3


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29607 [Core Tor/Tor]: 2019 Q1: Denial of service on v2 and v3 onion service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29607: 2019 Q1: Denial of service on v2 and v3 onion service
--+---
 Reporter:  pidgin|  Owner:  pidgin
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  10
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
--+---
Changes (by asn):

 * points:   => 10


Comment:

 Any news on the logs here?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25882 [Core Tor/Tor]: clients not detecting stale onion service introduction points

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25882: clients not detecting stale onion service introduction points
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, 034-deferred-20180602|  Actual Points:
  035-removed reachability   |
Parent ID:  #22455   | Points:  16
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * points:   => 16


Comment:

 Assigning 15 points to this one. We need proper time to debug this and
 think of good solutions. This is a major reachability issue right now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28005 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Officially support onions in HTTPS-Everywhere

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28005: Officially support onions in HTTPS-Everywhere
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  legind
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs https-everywhere tor-ux   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  20
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * points:   => 20


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29982 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clicking on cog/gear icon crashes Tor Browser for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29982: Clicking on cog/gear icon crashes Tor Browser for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ux-team, TBA-a3, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904, tbb-8.5-must-alpha   |
Parent ID:  #28329   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 I tried reproducing this on an Android 6.0 emulator, emulating both x86
 and armv7 architectures. The app didn't crash when clicking on the
 settings cog during either test. It sounds like the crash is occurring
 during the transition between the bootstrapping screen (using the
 BrowserApp as the Activity) to the first preferences screen (using the
 TorPreferences Activity).

 There aren't too many places where this can crash within the app code
 (verses within system code), however we are making some assumption about
 variables and return values being non-null in the TorPreferences code.
 Maybe some of those assumptions are wrong, and the code should correctly
 handle these. I'll fix these potential issues, at least.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23764 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: No live consensus on client with a bridge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23764: hs-v3: No live consensus on client with a bridge
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, technical-debt, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * points:   => 10
 * sponsor:  Sponsor27 => Sponsor27-must


Comment:

 Assigning 10 points for this, since I imagine we might find more issues as
 we go through this, and we need to test this properly.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22893 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Make intro point per-service and not per-descriptor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22893: prop224: Make intro point per-service and not per-descriptor
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224-extra,   |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * points:  1 => 3


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28970 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_client.c:624: setup_intro_circ_auth_key: Non-fatal assertion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28970: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_client.c:624:
setup_intro_circ_auth_key: Non-fatal assertion
-+-
 Reporter:  torcrash |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, tor-hs, postfreeze-ok,   |  Actual Points:
  040-unreached-must |
Parent ID:   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * points:   => 5


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26294 [Core Tor/Tor]: attacker can force intro point rotation by ddos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26294: attacker can force intro point rotation by ddos
-+--
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-dos  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
-+--
Changes (by asn):

 * sponsor:  Sponsor27 => Sponsor27-must


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16059 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a "rendezvous approver" control API

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16059: Add a "rendezvous approver" control API
-+-
 Reporter:  special  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-control, needs-  |  Actual Points:
  proposal, term-project-ideas   |
Parent ID:  #24298   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * sponsor:  Sponsor27 => Sponsor27-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13739 [Core Tor/Tor]: Optimize the functions called in circuit_launch_by_extend_info()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13739: Optimize the functions called in circuit_launch_by_extend_info()
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, performance, profile,|  Actual Points:
  optimization   |
Parent ID:  #15463   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * sponsor:  Sponsor27 => Sponsor27-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27842 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider end-to-end introduction ACKs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27842: Consider end-to-end introduction ACKs
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, 034-deferred-20180602|  Actual Points:
  035-removed reachability   |
Parent ID:  #25882   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * sponsor:  Sponsor27 => Sponsor27-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22455 [Core Tor/Tor]: Enumerate cases where we want to retry circuits, and correctly balance retry robustness with guard discovery

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22455: Enumerate cases where we want to retry circuits, and correctly balance
retry robustness with guard discovery
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal prop224-extra needs-  |  Actual Points:
  design tor-client term-project-ideass  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor27-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22893 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Make intro point per-service and not per-descriptor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22893: prop224: Make intro point per-service and not per-descriptor
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224-extra,   |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * sponsor:  Sponsor27 => Sponsor27-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28970 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_client.c:624: setup_intro_circ_auth_key: Non-fatal assertion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28970: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_client.c:624:
setup_intro_circ_auth_key: Non-fatal assertion
-+-
 Reporter:  torcrash |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, tor-hs, postfreeze-ok,   |  Actual Points:
  040-unreached-must |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * sponsor:  Sponsor27-can => Sponsor27-must


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29652 [Metrics/Exit Scanner]: Evaluate the reusability of existing check.tpo application

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29652: Evaluate the reusability of existing check.tpo application
-+
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Exit Scanner |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  metrics-roadmap-2019-q2  |  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:  #29650   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * actualpoints:   => 1


Comment:

 The check application compiles, passes all tests and runs on a Debian
 testing system with no issues. Hopefully this is going to be entirely
 reusable and we do just need to update the exit list format. We can't move
 this service just yet as it does depend on having TorDNSEL running on the
 same machine. It seems that check will use the state file from TorDNSEL
 (which is an exit list) from the filesystem.

 I have filed #29983 to update the templates used in check to reflect the
 new URLs for the new website. We can also see what happens with this
 ticket to see if someone is looking out for things here, or if the tickets
 go unnoticed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29983 [Applications/Tor Check]: Update URLs for new Tor Project website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29983: Update URLs for new Tor Project website
+--
 Reporter:  irl |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Check  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by irl):

 * cc: arlolra (added)


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