Re: [tor-bugs] #28841 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write tool for onion service health assessment

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28841: Write tool for onion service health assessment
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs reachability research |  Actual Points:
  network-health |
Parent ID:   | Points:  23
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * points:   => 23
 * sponsor:  Sponsor27-can => Sponsor27-must


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28841 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write tool for onion service health assessment

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28841: Write tool for onion service health assessment
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs reachability research |  Actual Points:
  network-health |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor27-can


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27471 [Core Tor/Tor]: HS intermittently fails: Non-fatal assertion failed in send_introduce1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27471: HS intermittently fails: Non-fatal assertion failed in send_introduce1
+--
 Reporter:  tgragnato   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor:
|  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Minor   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, 035-backport, 034-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29995  | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  asn |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor27-must
+--
Changes (by asn):

 * parent:   => #29995
 * actualpoints:  #29995 =>


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27471 [Core Tor/Tor]: HS intermittently fails: Non-fatal assertion failed in send_introduce1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27471: HS intermittently fails: Non-fatal assertion failed in send_introduce1
+--
 Reporter:  tgragnato   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor:
|  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Minor   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, 035-backport, 034-backport  |  Actual Points:  #29995
Parent ID:  | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  asn |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor27-must
+--
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  reopened => new


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28970 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_client.c:624: setup_intro_circ_auth_key: Non-fatal assertion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28970: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_client.c:624:
setup_intro_circ_auth_key: Non-fatal assertion
-+-
 Reporter:  torcrash |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, tor-hs, postfreeze-ok,   |  Actual Points:
  040-unreached-must |
Parent ID:  #29995   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 Potentially related to #29034.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26931 [Core Tor/Tor]: Wrong service-side HSv3 hash ring for HSv3 once a day (low impact)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26931: Wrong service-side HSv3 hash ring for HSv3 once a day (low impact)
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:  tor-hs hsv3 reachability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * sponsor:  Sponsor27 => Sponsor27-can
 * parent:  #29995 =>


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23493 [Core Tor/Tor]: IPv6 v3 Single Onion Services fail with a bug warning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23493: IPv6 v3 Single Onion Services fail with a bug warning
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  v3-onion-service-feature-parity- |  Actual Points:  0.7
  can, prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6,  |
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #29995   | Points:  7
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * sponsor:  Sponsor27 => Sponsor27-must


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22893 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Make intro point per-service and not per-descriptor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22893: prop224: Make intro point per-service and not per-descriptor
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224-extra,   |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * parent:  #29995 =>


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #6418 [Core Tor/Tor]: Drop support for older versions of the hidden service protocol

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6418: Drop support for older versions of the hidden service protocol
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs technical-debt deprecation  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  4
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor27-can
---+---
Changes (by asn):

 * parent:  #29995 =>


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #6418 [Core Tor/Tor]: Drop support for older versions of the hidden service protocol

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6418: Drop support for older versions of the hidden service protocol
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs technical-debt deprecation  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29995 | Points:  4
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor27-can
---+---
Changes (by asn):

 * sponsor:  Sponsor27-must => Sponsor27-can


Comment:

 Moving this to -can because of various security discussions in child
 ticket.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27429 [Applications/Tor Browser]: add https://invidio.us/ as a alternative to YouTube

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27429: add https://invidio.us/ as a alternative to YouTube
--+--
 Reporter:  h1n1  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * cc: antonela (removed)
 * component:  UX => Applications/Tor Browser


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30200 [Core Tor/Tor]: Potential circuit timeout issues on onion service circuits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30200: Potential circuit timeout issues on onion service circuits
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs reachability timeouts  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29995| Points:  21
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * points:   => 21


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27429 [UX]: add https://invidio.us/ as a alternative to YouTube

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27429: add https://invidio.us/ as a alternative to YouTube
-+--
 Reporter:  h1n1 |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  UX   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  antonela => (none)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25882 [Core Tor/Tor]: clients not detecting stale onion service introduction points

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25882: clients not detecting stale onion service introduction points
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, 034-deferred-20180602|  Actual Points:
  035-removed reachability   |
Parent ID:  #30200   | Points:  16
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * parent:  #29995 => #30200


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #3733 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should abandon rendezvous circuits that cause a client request to time out

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3733: Tor should abandon rendezvous circuits that cause a client request to 
time
out
-+-
 Reporter:  rransom  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, tor-client, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #30200   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * parent:  #29995 => #30200


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30200 [Core Tor/Tor]: Potential circuit timeout issues on onion service circuits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30200: Potential circuit timeout issues on onion service circuits
--+--
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-hs reachability timeouts
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #29995
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 This is a master ticket to track various kinds of timeout issues we have
 with onion service circuits causing reachability issues.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27609 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: Evaluate Tor Onion Proxy Library

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27609: TBA: Evaluate Tor Onion Proxy Library
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5-must,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:60 eighthave]:
 > In my experience, it is generally a lot smoother to do these kinds of
 file management activities before everything gets packaged into the APK.
 There are lots of little hacks in the final packaging steps to support
 zipaligning, zeroing out timestamps, v1 signatures and v2/v3 signatures,
 etc.  So by manipulating the APK, it'll make all those steps harder to
 deal with.
 >
 > For example, this could be done by a gradle Task that is called after
 compile or maybe as the first step of packaging.

 I wonder if we can build a single aar for this (where it includes all the
 libs), and then make copies of it and tweak each copy so it is arch-
 specific and only includes the needed binaries. Then we only inject the
 correct arch-specific aar into the firefox build stage. I'll open another
 ticket for this.

 I opened #30199 for other review comments on tor-android-service.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30199 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor-android-service: Review 2019/04/16

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30199: tor-android-service: Review 2019/04/16
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:   => tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5, TorBrowserTeam201904


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27609 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: Evaluate Tor Onion Proxy Library

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27609: TBA: Evaluate Tor Onion Proxy Library
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5-must,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:59 sisbell]:
 > Replying to [comment:58 sysrqb]:
 > > What's the reasoning behind this changing? It is for future-proofing
 so we don't accidentally include other binaries if we add support for
 another arch? or is this for something else?
 >
 > We are bringing in multiple tor libraries from 5 different architectures
 in the latest release. So this method is more manageable.

 I see, thanks.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30199 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor-android-service: Review 2019/04/16

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30199: tor-android-service: Review 2019/04/16
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Overall, nicely done. This review is on master
 (`6a9314aff4418a4edac33ff39fae266b097cf000`):

 the initial import (`36f9873ff075253f4c1c9e394c91031fd4ba9d4a`), do you
 know the git hash of the orbot commit you used?

 `1d635a925ca1728542067ee7bf34ff532d623a3f` - The renaming is Tor Browser
 specific, so we should probably carry this as a patch in tor-browser-
 build, instead of hard coding "Tor Browser" within a general purpose "Tor
 service" library, right?

 `45244c49fbe382e97655b8f8d8f482e54f95ed07` - I wonder if we should carry a
 patch for this too. If tor-android-services+TOPL is intended as a general
 Android Tor library, then we probably shouldn't make it Tor Browser
 specific.

 `f3b3df4e66630a68c9987d52d93580549a0acaf4` - this package doesn't exist
 yet, but it will exist in a few weeks, so leaving it is probably okay.

 `1a2121e2a7ee8a6c0f3b5edd150b38eaae8bef304` - hasCookieAuthentication()
 and runAsDaemon() seem out of place in this commit

 `784919d8eb19083cf761b3e7314c49d8befc00cd` - custom tor, the binaries
 should be compiled as dependencies by tor-browser-build and injected into
 the build,  TorService.TOR_VERSION should be patched at build time

 `6a9314aff4418a4edac33ff39fae266b097cf000` - In the future, we should take
 the bridges used on desktop (currently specified in Firefox's pref format
 and injected at build time by tor-browser-build), and pre-process them for
 inclusion on Android, too.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30198 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor v8.0.8 does not launch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30198: Tor v8.0.8 does not launch
--+--
 Reporter:  Spanf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Spanf):

 my email there may not be current.
 It's wralf12...@gmail.com ... I'll try to update my profile.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30198 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor v8.0.8 does not launch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30198: Tor v8.0.8 does not launch
--+--
 Reporter:  Spanf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Spanf):

 [[Image()]]

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30198 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor v8.0.8 does not launch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30198: Tor v8.0.8 does not launch
--+--
 Reporter:  Spanf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29223 [Core Tor/Tor]: List canonical abbreviations to use in Tor functions and identifiers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29223: List canonical abbreviations to use in Tor functions and identifiers
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .7
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-must
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Replying to [comment:9 teor]:
 > I want to make comments on this file, and I'd usually do that through a
 pull request.
 > Where is it going to live?

 I don't know yet; I was undecided between doc/HACKING, the wiki, or
 something else.

 > I think I'll start by dumping it in doc/HACKING, and we can move it to
 its final location later,

 That's fine.

 > I also have a broader question:
 >
 > Are identifiers in the tor specifications in scope?
 > Juga and I spent a lot of time trying to name fields for the bandwidth
 file.
 > A set of standard abbreviations would have been very useful.

 This list does not try to cover the specification, but having a consistent
 set of abbreviations and symbols to use there would be good.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30198 [- Select a component]: Tor v8.0.8 does not launch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30198: Tor v8.0.8 does not launch
--+
 Reporter:  Spanf |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by Spanf):

 * Attachment "Tor unable to launch.png" added.

 screen grab

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30198 [- Select a component]: Tor v8.0.8 does not launch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30198: Tor v8.0.8 does not launch
+--
 Reporter:  Spanf   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:  |   Severity:  Blocker
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 Hi guys.
 I run a mid-2011 iMac with 4G RAM and OS10.13.6 High Sierra.
 I decided to try Tor again this year, but it bails immediately. In 2016
 and 2017 on this system it simply did not hide my location, but with this
 new download yesterday it's more serious. I'll try to upload a screenshot
 somewhere.[[Image()]]

 Well, THAT doesn't look possible.
 "Tor unexpectedly exited. This might be due to ."
 I presume you know the alert window.
 Que bom que eu não tentei explicar as coisas em português, hein?
 Abraços
 Jeff

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30007 [Core Tor/Tor]: refactor control.c output to be more abstract

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30007: refactor control.c output to be more abstract
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt control-port  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29210   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  technical-debt => technical-debt control-port
 * reviewer:   => nickm
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


Comment:

 FWIW, I am happy to merge_ready this once the control-cmd branch is merge-
 readied.  I want to do a final fine-grained review, but the broad strokes
 of this branch look great.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29209 [Core Tor/Tor]: Reduce visibility of more data type internals

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29209: Reduce visibility of more data type internals
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt refactoring  |  Actual Points:  3.5
Parent ID:  | Points:  15
 Reviewer:  nickm   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
+--

Comment (by nickm):

 Okay, I've read through the code.  This looks like a good start; I've got
 some suggestions before we merge.  First the minor ones:
   1. Let's open a sub-ticket for crypt_path_t, so that this ticket can
 still be about
   2. I think you're right that a bottom-up approach is better, where we
 start with low-level types like extend_info_t whose info is complex and
 exposed.  Your patch here does seem to demonstrate that to me.

 Now the major issue I have:

 I think that this "private struct" approach is not actually the best for
 the case where we want to make fields private one at a time.  It
 introduces an extra objects and an extra pointer, increasing both
 fragmentation and memory pressure.  Here are some other approaches that we
 could use that I think would create fewer code changes:
 {{{
 // Example

 struct foobar_t {
   int a;
   char *b; // let's say that we want to make this one private.
   long c;
 };


 // Option 1:

 struct foobar_t {
   int a;
   long c;
 };

 struct foobar_private_t {
   struct foobar_t base;
   char *b;
 };

 static inline foobar_private_t *
 to_private(foobar_t *obj)
 {
   char *ptr = (char *)obj;
   return (foobar_private_t *)(ptr - (OFFSET_OF(foobar_private_t, base)));
 }

 static inline foobar_t *
 to_public(foobar_private_t *obj)
 {
   return >base;
 }

 // Option 2

 // (the foobar_private macro should only be defined in C modules that are
 // allowed to see the internals.)

 #ifdef FOOBAR_T_PRIVATE
 #define PRIV(x) x
 #else
 #define PRIV(x) foobar_private_member__ ## x ## __
 #endif

 struct foobar_t {
   int a;
   char *PRIV(b);
   long c;
 };

 // option 3

 #define PRIV(x) foobar_private_member__ ## x ## __

 struct foobar_t {
   int a;
   char *PRIV(b);
   long c;
 };

 #ifdef FOOBAR_T_PRIVATE
 #define b PRIV(b)
 #endif

 // option 4

 struct foobar_t {
   int a;
   long c;
   struct {
 char *b;
   } foobar_private_members__;
 };

 #ifdef FOOBAR_T_PRIVATE
 #define pvt foobar_private_members__
 #else
 #define foobar_private_members__ "you got a syntax error because you used
 this field outside foobar."
 #endif
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30120 [Core Tor/Tor]: pre-commit.git-hook doesn't check for changes files correctly.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30120: pre-commit.git-hook doesn't check for changes files correctly.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  git-scripts shell dgoulet-merge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => git-scripts shell dgoulet-merge


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30120 [Core Tor/Tor]: pre-commit.git-hook doesn't check for changes files correctly.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30120: pre-commit.git-hook doesn't check for changes files correctly.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  git-scripts shell dgoulet-merge  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:   | Points:  0
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * actualpoints:   => 0


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30149 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix "medium" and "low" impact coverity false positives outside of tests.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30149: Fix "medium" and "low" impact coverity false positives outside of tests.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  asn-merge coverity technical-debt|  Actual Points:  .1
  defensive-programming  |
Parent ID:  #30146   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => asn-merge coverity technical-debt defensive-programming
 * actualpoints:   => .1


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26288 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop289: Implement authenticated SENDME

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26288: prop289: Implement authenticated SENDME
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop289, 035-roadmap-master, 035 |  Actual Points:
  -triaged-in-20180711, prop289-assigned-|
  sponsor-v, 041-proposed-on-roadmap, network-   |
  team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, tor-spec   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  21
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 (I've commented on the PR)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26288 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop289: Implement authenticated SENDME

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26288: prop289: Implement authenticated SENDME
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop289, 035-roadmap-master, 035 |  Actual Points:
  -triaged-in-20180711, prop289-assigned-|
  sponsor-v, 041-proposed-on-roadmap, network-   |
  team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, tor-spec   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  21
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Looks good! There are a few more changes I think we should do, mostly
 around encapsulation and efficiency.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30120 [Core Tor/Tor]: pre-commit.git-hook doesn't check for changes files correctly.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30120: pre-commit.git-hook doesn't check for changes files correctly.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Oops, good catch.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30149 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix "medium" and "low" impact coverity false positives outside of tests.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30149: Fix "medium" and "low" impact coverity false positives outside of tests.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30146| Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 LGTM.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30197 [Applications/Tor Browser]: no sound with apulse

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30197: no sound with apulse
--+---
 Reporter:  Haines|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 This ticket may be a duplicate of #27857. Can you try a Tor Browser 8.5
 alpha build, e.g., 8.5a11? Download from
 https://dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30197 [Applications/Tor Browser]: no sound with apulse

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30197: no sound with apulse
--+--
 Reporter:  Haines|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30189 [Core Tor/Tor]: ALL_BUGS_ARE_FATAL build failures in 0.3.4 and later.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30189: ALL_BUGS_ARE_FATAL build failures in 0.3.4 and later.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 On the one hand it might be worthwhile, but on the other hand it's not
 actually a configuration we recommend for anything but stress-testing,
 fuzzing, and the like.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #16364 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add an option to resize the browser window to the "safe default"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16364: Add an option to resize the browser window to the "safe default"
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-fingerprinting-   |  Actual Points:
  resolution |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Resolved #30195 as duplicate.

 In that ticket, the reporter suggested that the window should
 automatically be restored to the default size. I am not sure how that
 would work, but the general idea of making it easy to return to the
 default size seems like a good one.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30195 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Resize window to default automatically

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30195: Resize window to default automatically
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Resolving as a duplicate of #16364. Please follow the discussion there.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30197 [- Select a component]: no sound with apulse

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30197: no sound with apulse
+--
 Reporter:  Haines  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 I have used Tor for a while under 64-bit Linux Devuan Ascii and use apulse
 rather than PulseAudio. However, I never had sound. I upgraded to tor-
 browser-linux64-8.0.4_en-US without effect. I do get sound with the
 basilisk broswer. Since libxul.so is in Tor browser's browser directory, I
 suppose that $ echo $LD_LIBRARY_PATH returning nothing and ldd run on the
 tor executable returns "not a dynamic executable" are not significant.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30190 [Core Tor/Tor]: Do not warn about compatible OpenSSL upgrades

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30190: Do not warn about compatible OpenSSL upgrades
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  openssl ux usability 035-backport?   |  Actual Points:
  040-backport?  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * keywords:  openssl => openssl ux usability 035-backport? 040-backport?


Comment:

 Thanks for the patch!

 Teor is right -- I'm really glad that openssl is aiming for ABI
 compatibility now, but they are still have enough complexity going on that
 I'm not confident that they won't mess it up in the future.

 With that in mind, I'd suggest a middle-ground message. Let's log at
 NOTICE instead of INFO or WARN, and let's say something like "We compiled
 with OpenSSL X and we're running with OpenSSL Y. These two versions should
 be binary compatible."  That way if people do run into bugs some time they
 can report that message.

 Minor bookkeeping: let's base this on maint-0.3.5 rather than master so
 that we can backport it to LTS.  We'll also need a "changes" file as
 described in doc/HACKING/CodingStandards.md.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30190 [Core Tor/Tor]: Do not warn about compatible OpenSSL upgrades

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30190: Do not warn about compatible OpenSSL upgrades
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  openssl   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by bmwiedemann):

 subscribing here

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29613 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make relays into exits when ExitRelay is auto and IPv6Exit is 1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29613: Make relays into exits when ExitRelay is auto and IPv6Exit is 1
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, 041-proposed, tor-relay, tor-  |  Actual Points:  0.1
  exit   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Made the changes and pushed them.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30176 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clear memory in smartlist_remove_keeporder.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30176: Clear memory in smartlist_remove_keeporder.
-+-
 Reporter:  paldium  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport? 040-backport?  |  Actual Points:
  defense-in-depth? dgoulet-merge|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  035-backport? 040-backport? defense-in-depth? => 035-backport?
 040-backport? defense-in-depth? dgoulet-merge


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30176 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clear memory in smartlist_remove_keeporder.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30176: Clear memory in smartlist_remove_keeporder.
-+-
 Reporter:  paldium  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport? 040-backport?  |  Actual Points:
  defense-in-depth?  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 CI has passed.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30033 [Core Tor/Tor]: The pre-push hook should call the pre-commit hook on the final pushed commit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30033: The pre-push hook should call the pre-commit hook on the final pushed
commit
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  git-scripts   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29792| Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 merged to master!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29060 [Core Tor/Tor]: shellcheck: test-network.sh issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29060: shellcheck: test-network.sh issues
-+-
 Reporter:  rl1987   |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, regression,  |  implemented
  041-must   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 ok; merged to master.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30114 [Core Tor/Tor]: Also fetch tor-github when we git-pull-all.sh

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30114: Also fetch tor-github when we git-pull-all.sh
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:
  |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  git-scripts, fast-fix, asn-merge  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  git-scripts, fast-fix => git-scripts, fast-fix, asn-merge


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30179 [Core Tor/Tor]: Building with 'ALL_BUGS_ARE_FATAL' fails because of formatted assertion changes.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30179: Building with 'ALL_BUGS_ARE_FATAL' fails because of formatted assertion
changes.
-+-
 Reporter:  gvanem   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  dgoulet-merge compilation|  Actual Points:
  regression |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => dgoulet-merge compilation regression


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28223 [Core Tor/Tor]: Unparseable microdescriptor on public relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28223: Unparseable microdescriptor on public relay
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-roadmap-proposed, regression?,   |  Actual Points:  .2
  035-can, postfreeze-ok,|
  040-deferred-20190220, asn-merge   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:
 040-roadmap-proposed, regression?, 035-can, postfreeze-ok,
 040-deferred-20190220
 =>
 040-roadmap-proposed, regression?, 035-can, postfreeze-ok,
 040-deferred-20190220, asn-merge


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29566 [Applications/Tor Browser]: math.cos reveals OS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29566: math.cos reveals OS
--+---
 Reporter:  Thorin|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-os |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by Thorin):

 This is interesting: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1380031
 (FF68+)

 Actual results:
 `2.718281828459045`, `2.7182818284590455`, `false`
 Expected results:
 `2.718281828459045`, `2.718281828459045`, `true`

 Note the extra decimal place. Now look at what I've been using for
 exmp1(1)

 windows/mac/android
 `1.7182818284590455`
 linux TB32bit, 64bit, Firefox 32bit linux:
 `1.718281828459045`

 Note the extra decimal place **and** the exact same decimal data.

 So I wonder if what they did changes all the FP'ing that leaks 64/32
 builds and 64/32 OS architecture.

 Will have a play on 68 later. This doesn't affect any of the ECMAScript
 1st Edition FP'ing, but may neutralize the 6th Edition ones (I found only
 three equations that varied, the one above was one of them) - and both
 editions were required to get the extra entropy.

 Will advise - watch this space

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27609 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: Evaluate Tor Onion Proxy Library

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27609: TBA: Evaluate Tor Onion Proxy Library
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5-must,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by eighthave):

 In my experience, it is generally a lot smoother to do these kinds of file
 management activities before everything gets packaged into the APK.  There
 are lots of little hacks in the final packaging steps to support
 zipaligning, zeroing out timestamps, v1 signatures and v2/v3 signatures,
 etc.  So by manipulating the APK, it'll make all those steps harder to
 deal with.

 For example, this could be done by a gradle Task that is called after
 compile or maybe as the first step of packaging.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30194 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Change UserAgent to Chrome because Firefox ESR 60 is only 2% of internet traffic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30194: Change UserAgent to Chrome because Firefox ESR 60 is only 2% of internet
traffic
--+--
 Reporter:  easymode  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 We'll stick to the one that Firefox sends. The percentage of users with an
 ESR 60 UA does not matter to us as long as all Tor Browser users are
 sending the same User Agent.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23247 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about different padlock states for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23247: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about 
different
padlock states for .onion services
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ux-team, tor-hs, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201806R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 We are done here for months. Please open new tickets where needed.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30107 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Self-sign .onion certificate (not CA) does not have padlock icon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30107: Self-sign .onion certificate (not CA) does not have padlock icon
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 So, to keep some sanity here: If you look at the Google doc I linked to
 above then this ticket is about row two "Onion with Self-Signed HTTPS"
 without any in-browser trusted CA backing that cert up. And this is not a
 bug, as expressed more than one time. Don't reopen that ticket again.
 Otherwise I'll just ignore it and move on.

 If you think there is a different scenario that needs to get treated
 differently compared to what we are doing today, please open a new bug.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24622 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torcrazybutton can't decipher website s3.amazonaws.com

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24622: Torcrazybutton can't decipher website s3.amazonaws.com
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-linkability, GeorgKoppen201903,|
  TorBrowserTeam201904   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by acat):

 Fixed in mozilla-central:
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1542309

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30195 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Resize window to default automatically

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30195: Resize window to default automatically
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Thorin):

 And just to add to that, **if** the browser was disabled from being
 resized: that would mean that the sidebar, the toolbar, the menubar, the
 density, the findbar (and maybe a few others I missed) would also need to
 be blocked/locked at a set display/size - because they all change your
 inner window as well. And that's just chrome elements.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30001 [Core Tor/Tor]: test failure: dir_handle_get/status_vote_next_bandwidth

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30001: test failure: dir_handle_get/status_vote_next_bandwidth
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.4-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes, fast-fix, |  Actual Points:  0.1
  040-backport, 035-backport-maybe   |
Parent ID:  #21377   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 I didn't get to this ticket today, I'll do my revisions first thing
 tomorrow.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30184 [Core Tor/Tor]: release-0.2.9 doesn't compile on old rhel

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30184: release-0.2.9 doesn't compile on old rhel
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  no-mainline-merge, regression,   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  consider-backport-after-0404-alpha, fast-fix   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorQ
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_revision
 * version:   => Tor: unspecified
 * points:   => 0.1
 * sponsor:   => SponsorQ
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1
 * keywords:  regression =>
 no-mainline-merge, regression, consider-backport-after-0404-alpha,
 fast-fix


Comment:

 Marking as SponsorQ, because this bug was introduced by a SponsorQ ticket.

 Marking for backport in the current batch, because it's a trivial
 compilation fix that is already in 0.3.4 and later.

 Replying to [ticket:30184 arma]:
 > On rhel6, building release-0.2.9 (git commit ca008906), I get
 > {{{
 >   CC src/or/src_or_libtor_testing_a-rephist.o
 > src/or/rephist.c:91: error: redefinition of typedef ‘bw_array_t’
 > src/or/rephist.h:120: note: previous declaration of ‘bw_array_t’ was
 here
 > make[1]: *** [src/or/src_or_libtor_testing_a-rephist.o] Error 1
 > }}}
 >
 > Looks like when we backported some stuff, we didn't backport all of the
 subsequent fixes on the stuff.

 We merged 1da9741bca to master, but I removed the equivalent commit from
 0.2.9, because the CI failed:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23512#comment:38

 But the extern declaration is slightly different in 0.2.9 and 0.3.4, due
 to merge commit 813019cc57:
 {{{
 ++extern struct bw_array_t *write_array;
 ++#endif
 ++
 ++#ifdef REPHIST_PRIVATE
  +typedef struct bw_array_t bw_array_t;
 - extern bw_array_t *write_array;
 }}}

 I tried cherry-picking 1da9741bca, then adding the `struct` in a separate
 commit. (It was added to 0.3.4 in the merge commit.)

 Here is the pull request:
 * 0.2.9: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/957

 But that failed with:
 {{{
 src/test/test_relay.c:22:27: error: must use 'struct' tag to refer to type
   'bw_array_t'
 uint64_t find_largest_max(bw_array_t *b);
   ^
   struct
 src/test/test_relay.c:23:17: error: must use 'struct' tag to refer to type
   'bw_array_t'
 void commit_max(bw_array_t *b);
 ^
 struct
 src/test/test_relay.c:24:18: error: must use 'struct' tag to refer to type
   'bw_array_t'
 void advance_obs(bw_array_t *b);
  ^
  struct
 }}}

 So maybe I should backport the struct tags as well?

 > (My bwauth still runs on 0.2.9, since I'm under the impression that's
 the last version that works well with bwauths. That's how I noticed.)

 I'm not sure if that's true.
 You should ask the other torflow operators what they're running?

 (I wish I could tell you, but we didn't think of the tor version when we
 were doing the headers for sbws 1.0 or 1.1. We'll add it in #30196.)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30196 [Core Tor/sbws]: Add the tor version to the sbws bandwidth file header

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30196: Add the tor version to the sbws bandwidth file header
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 See #30184 for a situation where we wanted the tor version.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs