[tor-bugs] #30250 [Core Tor/Tor]: we should retire the 'rpm packaging' trac component

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30250: we should retire the 'rpm packaging' trac component
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 [I'm starting this ticket out in the Tor component, so it can get an
 opinion from the network team folks before it moves to the Trac
 component.]

 We have a trac component "Core Tor / RPM packaging", which up until
 yesterday had zero open tickets in it, and currently has one:
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted=assigned=merge_ready=needs_information=needs_review=needs_revision=new=reopened=Core+Tor%2FRPM+packaging=id=summary=status=type=priority=milestone=component=priority

 Hiviah is long gone as our RPM maintainer, meaning we don't have one -- or
 rather, meaning we are at the mercy of whatever maintainer fedora and
 centos decide, or don't decide, to have for themselves.

 Having an RPM packaging component on our trac can mislead people into
 thinking that we have people looking at our trac who might work on RPM
 packaging.

 We should move the component to the trac attic, like other components that
 have lived a happy life but now it's time for them to move on.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28655 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: If a bridge supports obfs4, don't give out its other flavors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28655: If a bridge supports obfs4, don't give out its other flavors
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+--

Comment (by phw):

 I wanted to understand how many bridges would be affected by this patch. I
 took an assignments.log file that BridgeDB created on 2019-04-19. Here's
 what the file can tell us:

 ||= Description =||= # =||= % =||= Command =||
 || All bridges || 968|| 100.0|| `wc -l assignments.log` ||
 || Bridges that have a transport protocol || 258|| 26.7|| `grep -c
 transport assignments.log` ||
 || Bridges that have obfs4 || 249|| 25.7|| `grep -c obfs4 assignments.log`
 ||
 || Bridges that have obfs4 or scramblesuit || 251|| 26.0|| `grep -c
 '\(obfs4\|scramblesuit\)' assignments.log` ||
 || Bridges with obfs or scramblesuit and obfs2, obfs3, or fte || 38||
 3.9|| `grep '\(obfs4\|scramblesuit\)' assignments.log | grep -c
 '\(obfs2\|obfs3\|fte\)'` ||

 The numbers show that we have 251 bridges that are active probing-
 resistant. 38 (15%) of these bridges ''also'' run a transport that is not
 active probing resistant---obfs2, obfs3, and/or fte. After fixing this
 ticket, we will stop handing out these transports.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30248 [Applications/TorBirdy]: 2 Bugs (possibly related) - Mozilla addon Search & Cardbook CardDav-server connection issue

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30248: 2 Bugs (possibly related) - Mozilla addon Search & Cardbook 
CardDav-server
connection issue
---+--
 Reporter:  jovi234|  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.8
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by jovi234):

 sukhbir, i have fix the issue with Cardbook. I updated the nginx server's
 TLS 1.0 to 1.2 and 1.3 and it worked. I have no idea why previously it
 didnt connect with torbirdy but without it, it connected.

 The only issue left to solve is the "Oops! We had an error. We'll get to
 fixing that soon." page, on Mozilla addons search.  That bug, as i said
 has been around for few months now.  If you can fix that, id appreciate
 it.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28269 [Core Tor/Tor]: Repeated HSFETCH queries fail with QUERY_NO_HSDIR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28269: Repeated HSFETCH queries fail with QUERY_NO_HSDIR
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-control tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Yes, looks great! Thanks!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30249 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser starts two copies of meek-client-torbrowser, immediately kills one of them

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30249: Tor Browser starts two copies of meek-client-torbrowser, immediately 
kills
one of them
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 After the first configuration with meek, Tor Browser starts one copy of
 meek-client-torbrowser, kills it within a second, then starts a second
 copy, which it actually uses.

 1. Edit Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/torrc-defaults and activate the log of
 meek-client-torbrowser.
{{{
 ## meek configuration
 ClientTransportPlugin meek exec ./TorBrowser/Tor/PluggableTransports/meek-
 client-torbrowser --log meek-client-torbrowser.log --
 ./TorBrowser/Tor/PluggableTransports/meek-client
}}}
 2. `tail -F Browser/meek-client-torbrowser.log`
 3. `start-tor-browser.desktop`
 4. '''Configure''', '''Tor is censored in my country''', '''Provide a
 bridge I know''':
{{{
 meek 0.0.2.0:5 url=https://meek.bamsoftware.com/
}}}
 5. Close the browser.
 6. Notice that on this first bootstrap, there was only one copy of meek-
 client-torbrowser (look for `running firefox command` and `sig
 terminated`).
{{{
 2019/04/19 21:00:55 running firefox command ["/home/user/tor-browser_en-
 US/Browser/firefox" "--invisible" "-no-remote" "-profile" "/home/user/tor-
 browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Browser/profile.meek-http-helper"]
 2019/04/19 21:00:55 firefox started with pid 19130
 2019/04/19 21:00:55 running meek-client command
 ["./TorBrowser/Tor/PluggableTransports/meek-client" "--helper"
 "127.0.0.1:44303"]
 2019/04/19 21:00:55 meek-client started with pid 19159
 2019/04/19 21:01:56 sig terminated
 2019/04/19 21:01:56 sending signal terminated to PID 19159
 2019/04/19 21:01:56 killing PID 19159
 2019/04/19 21:01:56 killing PID 19130
}}}
 7. `start-tor-browser.desktop` a second time, let it bootstrap, and close
 the browser.
 8. Notice that this time, there were two copies of meek-client-torbrowser,
 and the first one was killed right away. (See `running firefox command` at
 21:14:51, `sig terminated` at 21:14:52, and `running firefox command` at
 21:14:52.)
{{{
 2019/04/19 21:14:51 running firefox command ["/home/user/tor-browser_en-
 US/Browser/firefox" "--invisible" "-no-remote" "-profile" "/home/user/tor-
 browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Browser/profile.meek-http-helper"]
 2019/04/19 21:14:51 firefox started with pid 20227
 2019/04/19 21:14:51 running meek-client command
 ["./TorBrowser/Tor/PluggableTransports/meek-client" "--helper"
 "127.0.0.1:37937"]
 2019/04/19 21:14:51 meek-client started with pid 20254
 2019/04/19 21:14:52 sig terminated
 2019/04/19 21:14:52 sending signal terminated to PID 20254
 2019/04/19 21:14:52 killing PID 20254
 2019/04/19 21:14:52 killing PID 20227
 2019/04/19 21:14:52 running firefox command ["/home/user/tor-browser_en-
 US/Browser/firefox" "--invisible" "-no-remote" "-profile" "/home/user/tor-
 browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Browser/profile.meek-http-helper"]
 2019/04/19 21:14:52 firefox started with pid 20274
 2019/04/19 21:14:52 running meek-client command
 ["./TorBrowser/Tor/PluggableTransports/meek-client" "--helper"
 "127.0.0.1:40397"]
 2019/04/19 21:14:52 meek-client started with pid 20304
 2019/04/19 21:15:44 sig terminated
 2019/04/19 21:15:44 sending signal terminated to PID 20304
 2019/04/19 21:15:44 killing PID 20304
 2019/04/19 21:15:44 killing PID 20274
}}}

 I started to bisect this because I don't remember seeing it before, but I
 got back to 7.5 and it still happened. These are the versions I tested:

 ||= tor-browser-linux64-7.5_en-US =|| bad ||
 ||= tor-browser-linux64-8.0_en-US =|| bad ||
 ||= tor-browser-linux64-8.0.8_en-US =|| bad ||
 ||= torbrowser-install-win64-8.0.8_en-US =|| bad ||

 On Windows, I saw the two copies result in a "Firefox is already running"
 dialog, similar to what you get if you switch to meek while the browser is
 running (#12774).

 I did not see the same problem with obfs4 configured. In torrc-defaults I
 tried setting
 {{{
 ## obfs4proxy configuration
 ClientTransportPlugin obfs2,obfs3,obfs4,scramblesuit exec
 ./TorBrowser/Tor/PluggableTransports/obfs4proxy -enableLogging -logLevel
 DEBUG
 }}}
 and then monitoring Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/pt_state/obfs4proxy.log, I
 see only one copy being started. (Look for `[NOTICE]: obfs4proxy-0.0.5 -
 launched` and `[NOTICE]: obfs4proxy - terminated`.)

 I also did not see the problem when running tor separately from Tor
 Browser.

--
Ticket URL: 

Re: [tor-bugs] #30020 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: switch from our custom YAML implementation to Hiera

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30020: switch from our custom YAML implementation to Hiera
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29387   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 site.pp is now mostly empty. all the `has_role` constructs are gone from
 there.

 those two are gone as well:

 {{{
 HOST_ROLE_BACULA_DIRECTOR
 HOST_ROLE_BACULA_STORAGE
 }}}

 the trickiest part, surprisingly, was the little warning added to the
 motd. i've hacked something together using `update-motd.d` but i'm
 actually quite unhappy about it, because it doesn't display the same way
 that it did before. if the machines were all running buster, this wouldn't
 be a problem anymore because there's /etc/motd.d there, but we're probably
 stuck in stretch for a while.

 since this is only for *three* machines, I think we can afford the little
 ugliness for now.

 {{{
 Linux build-arm-02 4.19.0-0.bpo.4-arm64 #1 SMP Debian 4.19.28-2~bpo9+1
 (2019-03-27) aarch64

  Note that this host is _NOT_ being backed up.  If you care about your
  data, run your own backups.


 This device is for authorized users only.

 %%%

 Welcome to build-arm-02.torproject.org, used for the following services:
 buildbox
 porterbox

  If you use this as a porter/buildbox, you might find
  https://dsa.debian.org/doc/schroot/ helpful.

 %%%

 Last login: Fri Apr 19 20:44:31 2019 from 95.216.141.241
 }}}


 I have also found HOST_TPO which is basically a list of the public IP of
 all TPO hosts, as taken from LDAP
 (`modules/puppetmaster/lib/puppet/parser/functions/allnodeinfo.rb`). So we
 can keep that macro for now until we decide about the overlap between LDAP
 and Hiera. The motd is similarly extracted mostly from stuff in LDAP and
 would benefit from such a refactoring as well.

 Anyways. Next up is the roles file, which has tons more fun stuff like
 this to clear out. :)

 Note that I've had answers to my earlier questions, somehow:

  1. I don't think there's any serious security issues with exported
 resources, they way they're setup. At worst a host might be able to push
 different firewall holes than expected. If we want to fix that issue, we
 can make new defines with hardcoded definitions that, when collected on
 hosts, will only poke the holes that are expected.

  2. it's just a copy-paste historical error, that I've made myself in
 other occasions

  3. no solution to the NRPE `allowed_hosts` problem just yet, but I'm
 tempted to just use a hardcoded variable for now. this is what is used for
 `bacula::bacula_director_address` for example: it's hardcoded to
 `dictyotum.torproject.org` so there's prior art to hardcoding stuff like
 that. of course it would be hardcoded into hiera, not the class name,
 ideally...

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22664 [Applications/GetTor]: Check for existing bundles in dropbox and handle them accordingly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22664: Check for existing bundles in dropbox and handle them accordingly
-+---
 Reporter:  ilv  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28231   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => gettor-roadmap
 * owner:  ilv => (none)
 * status:  new => assigned
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor19


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20770 [Applications/GetTor]: Support Tor Browser Alpha

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20770: Support Tor Browser Alpha
-+---
 Reporter:  mrphs|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28231   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * owner:  ilv => (none)
 * status:  new => assigned
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor19
 * keywords:   => gettor-roadmap


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #17214 [Applications/GetTor]: Check integrity of uploaded files periodically

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17214: Check integrity of uploaded files periodically
-+---
 Reporter:  ilv  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28231   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => gettor-roadmap
 * owner:  ilv => (none)
 * status:  new => assigned
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor19


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #14744 [Applications/GetTor]: Automate upload of latest Tor Browser to cloud services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14744: Automate upload of latest Tor Browser to cloud services
-+---
 Reporter:  ilv  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28231   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * sponsor:  Sponsor19-can => Sponsor19


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #10692 [Applications/GetTor]: GetTor needs official two-factor-enabled dropbox and google accounts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10692: GetTor needs official two-factor-enabled dropbox and google accounts
-+---
 Reporter:  mrphs|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28231   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * sponsor:  Sponsor19-can => Sponsor19


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20116 [Applications/GetTor]: Get @get_tor twitter account verified

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20116: Get @get_tor twitter account verified
-+---
 Reporter:  mrphs|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28231   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => gettor-roadmap
 * owner:  mrphs => (none)
 * status:  reopened => assigned
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor19


Comment:

 Let's try again.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27330 [Applications/GetTor]: @get_tor on twitter not responding

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27330: @get_tor on twitter not responding
-+---
 Reporter:  steph|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28231   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * sponsor:  Sponsor19-can => Sponsor19


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28340 [Applications/GetTor]: Package gettor for Debian

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28340: Package gettor for Debian
-+--
 Reporter:  hiro |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * owner:  ilv => (none)
 * status:  new => assigned
 * parent:  #28152 =>


Comment:

 It needs more discussion.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28339 [Applications/GetTor]: Log handling in gettor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28339: Log handling in gettor
-+--
 Reporter:  hiro |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28152   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30006 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: Monitor "aliveness" of default bridges in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30006: Monitor "aliveness" of default bridges in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance and   |Version:
  Testing|
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  default bridge tbb-bridges   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30152   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19-can
-+-
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 We took gman999 up on his offer to have our default bridges monitored. The
 sysmon instance is testing the port of
 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorBrowser/DefaultBridges
 our default bridges] every five minutes.  The monitoring details are
 documented
 
[https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/AntiCensorshipTeam/InfrastructureMonitoring
 in our wiki page].

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28339 [Applications/GetTor]: Log handling in gettor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28339: Log handling in gettor
-+---
 Reporter:  hiro |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28152   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor19


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28091 [Applications/GetTor]: Port GetTor to python3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28091: Port GetTor to python3
-+
 Reporter:  traumschule  |  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28152   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  gettor => gettor-roadmap


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #3780 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: GetTor and BridgeDB should share email processing code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3780: GetTor and BridgeDB should share email processing code
--+--
 Reporter:  kaner |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * component:  Applications/GetTor => Obfuscation/BridgeDB


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #3780 [Applications/GetTor]: GetTor and BridgeDB should share email processing code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3780: GetTor and BridgeDB should share email processing code
-+--
 Reporter:  kaner|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => bridgedb
 * owner:  kaner => (none)
 * status:  new => assigned
 * parent:  #28152 =>
 * cc: gaba (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #1593 [Applications/GetTor]: Implement test (-t switch) functionality

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1593: Implement test (-t switch) functionality
-+--
 Reporter:  phobos   |  Owner:  kaner
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28152   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * cc: hiro (added)
 * keywords:   => gettor-roadmap
 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor19


Comment:

 Hiro, this one has been implemented, right? where?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30247 [Applications/GetTor]: Understand GetTor usage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30247: Understand GetTor usage
+---
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor_roadmap, statistics  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor19


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30152 [Obfuscation]: Monitor anti-censorship infrastructure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30152: Monitor anti-censorship infrastructure
+---
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => gettor-roadmap


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #17425 [Applications/GetTor]: Improve GetTor Signature Section

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17425: Improve GetTor Signature Section
-+---
 Reporter:  sukhbir  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #9036| Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => gettor-roadmap
 * owner:  ilv => (none)
 * status:  new => assigned
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor19


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30248 [Applications/TorBirdy]: 2 Bugs (possibly related) - Mozilla addon Search & Cardbook CardDav-server connection issue

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30248: 2 Bugs (possibly related) - Mozilla addon Search & Cardbook 
CardDav-server
connection issue
---+--
 Reporter:  jovi234|  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.8
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by sukhbir):

 Thanks for reporting. I will have a look over the weekend.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #3980 [Applications/GetTor]: gettor should deliver checksums of our packages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3980: gettor should deliver checksums of our packages
-+---
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #9036| Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => gettor-roadmap
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor19


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28231 [Applications/GetTor]: Provide more Gettor distribution methods

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28231: Provide more Gettor distribution methods
-+---
 Reporter:  traumschule  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28232   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19-can
-+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * owner:  ilv => (none)
 * status:  new => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #8542 [Applications/GetTor]: More options on how to get the bundles

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8542: More options on how to get the bundles
-+---
 Reporter:  mrphs|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28232   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19-can
-+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Continuing work at #28231.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28231 [Applications/GetTor]: Provide more Gettor distribution methods

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28231: Provide more Gettor distribution methods
-+---
 Reporter:  traumschule  |  Owner:  ilv
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28232   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19-can
-+---

Comment (by gaba):

 There is more discussion about this in duplicated ticket #8542.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #10692, #14744, #9071, #17212, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #10692, #14744, #9071, #17212, #17214, #20770, #22664, 
#22665, #25887, #27972, #28230, #26175 by gaba:
parent to #28231

Action: leave

Comment:
Changin the parent to the other ticket (as they were duplicated).

--
Tickets URL: 

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #9316 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: BridgeDB should export statistics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9316: BridgeDB should export statistics
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics, bridgedb, network-team- |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, prometheus  |
Parent ID:  #19332   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by phw):

 * keywords:  metrics, bridgedb, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2 => metrics,
 bridgedb, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, prometheus


Comment:

 I briefly discussed this with dgoulet and sysrqb.  dgoulet suggested that
 we may want to export these statistics to our prometheus instance.  The
 idea is to run an [https://prometheus.io/docs/instrumenting/exporters/
 exporter] on the BridgeDB host.  This exporter would only expose the
 latest BridgeDB stats.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28234 [Applications/GetTor]: Update GetTor documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28234: Update GetTor documentation
-+-
 Reporter:  traumschule  |  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28232   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  gettor => gettor-roadmap


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28284 [Applications/GetTor]: Arabic version for Gettor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28284: Arabic version for Gettor
-+---
 Reporter:  nonomous |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28233   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19-can
-+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * parent:   => #28233


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #19693 [Applications/GetTor]: Portuguese (pt_PT) translation to GetTor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19693: Portuguese (pt_PT) translation to GetTor
-+---
 Reporter:  ruicruz  |  Owner:  emmapeel
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28233   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * owner:  ilv => emmapeel
 * status:  needs_review => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #19693 [Applications/GetTor]: Portuguese (pt_PT) translation to GetTor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19693: Portuguese (pt_PT) translation to GetTor
-+--
 Reporter:  ruicruz  |  Owner:  ilv
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28233   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => gettor-roadmap
 * status:  new => needs_review
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor19


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30248 [Applications/TorBirdy]: 2 Bugs (possibly related) - Mozilla addon Search & Cardbook CardDav-server connection issue

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30248: 2 Bugs (possibly related) - Mozilla addon Search & Cardbook 
CardDav-server
connection issue
---+--
 Reporter:  jovi234|  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.8
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by arma):

 * owner:  (none) => sukhbir
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/TorBirdy
 * severity:  Critical => Normal


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28233 [Applications/GetTor]: Translate GetTor messages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28233: Translate GetTor messages
-+---
 Reporter:  traumschule  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28232   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => gettor-roadmap
 * owner:  ilv => (none)
 * status:  new => assigned
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor19


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28339 [Applications/GetTor]: Log handling in gettor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28339: Log handling in gettor
-+--
 Reporter:  hiro |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28152   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => gettor-roadmap
 * owner:  ilv => (none)
 * status:  new => assigned


Comment:

 Some discussion for logging in this closed ticket: #17588

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #17588 [Applications/GetTor]: GetTor Logging

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17588: GetTor Logging
-+---
 Reporter:  sukhbir  |  Owner:  ilv
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28232   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Closing this ticket to continue work/discussion in #28339

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #13878 [Applications/GetTor]: Use encryption to circumvent deep packet inspection and cloud service awareness

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13878: Use encryption to circumvent deep packet inspection and cloud service
awareness
-+--
 Reporter:  samurailink3 |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  encryption 7zip evasion  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  sukhbir => (none)
 * parent:  #28232 =>


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30248 [- Select a component]: 2 Bugs (possibly related) - Mozilla addon Search & Cardbook CardDav-server connection issue

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30248: 2 Bugs (possibly related) - Mozilla addon Search & Cardbook 
CardDav-server
connection issue
--+--
 Reporter:  jovi234   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.8  |   Severity:  Critical
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 When torbirdy is active and working, for the first time if you try and
 connect Cardbook to a carddav server - it fails with "validation failed"
 If you disable torbirdy - the connection to a carddav server from Cardbook
 works perfectly and connects successfully.
 Looking at the logs of Cardbook, i have filed a similar bug on Cardbook
 issue tracker.
 Please see here: https://gitlab.com/CardBook/CardBook/issues/573

 It seems as if there is a secure connection issue "Connection status :
 Failed : SecurityUnsupportedTLSVersionError"

 There is also a second bug that COULD be related to the carddav server
 bug.

 When attempting to search in the addons search for any addon such as
 "Cardbook", it returns an error on Mozilla page with "Oops! We had an
 error. We'll get to fixing that soon."  Now you would think this is a
 Mozilla issue, but its not. If you disable torbirdy it then returns search
 results successfully.  This issue has been on-going for about 4 months now

 PLEASE can you fix these two issues, especially the carddav secure
 connection issue.

 I also tried contacting you on @tor but you were not available.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #3781 [Applications/GetTor]: Write a spec for GetTor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3781: Write a spec for GetTor
-+---
 Reporter:  ioerror  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28232   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * status:  needs_review => assigned
 * owner:  kaner => (none)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30234 [Core Tor/Tor]: Get a stacktrace from tor processes launched by stem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30234: Get a stacktrace from tor processes launched by stem
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.4.8-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29437 | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by atagar):

 Oops! Apologies, I was completely wrong. Stem's tests *do* write tor's
 logs to a file...

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/tree/test/runner.py#n72

 Stem places the tor log within tor's data directory, which in turn is
 based on our 'integ.test_directory' configuration which defaults to being
 within stem's test directory itself.

 Would you like for the tor log file path to be better cusomizable? If
 you'd prefer to have it in another location we can add an option to do so.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30247 [Applications/GetTor]: Understand GetTor usage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30247: Understand GetTor usage
--+
 Reporter:  phw   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:|Version:
  Applications/GetTor |
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  gettor_roadmap, statistics
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  5 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We should get an understanding of the usage that GetTor sees:
 * How many users use GetTor per day/week/month, approximately?
 * How does this break down by country?  Is GetTor particularly popular in
 some countries?
 * How does this break down by distribution channels?  Is XMPP more popular
 than Email?

 Naturally, we will have to figure out a way to answer these questions in a
 privacy-preserving way, e.g., by
 [https://research.torproject.org/safetyboard.html#guidelines binning data
 and only collecting what's safe to publish].

 Before we dive into answering these questions, we should get a better
 understanding of what statistics we already have.  Hiro mentioned that
 there may be some data in Collector.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28152 [Applications/GetTor]: Gettor code refactor with Python Twisted

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28152: Gettor code refactor with Python Twisted
-+--
 Reporter:  ilv  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28232   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28152 [Applications/GetTor]: Gettor code refactor with Python Twisted

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28152: Gettor code refactor with Python Twisted
-+---
 Reporter:  ilv  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28232   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * cc: hiro (removed)
 * owner:  ilv => hiro


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30051 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add practracker as a pre-commit and pre-push git hook for frequent coders

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30051: Add practracker as a pre-commit and pre-push git hook for frequent 
coders
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  practracker tech-debt tor-ci git-|  Actual Points:
  scripts tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |
Parent ID:  #29792   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by rl1987):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30246 [Applications/Orbot]: Torrc settings create errors within Orbot

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30246: Torrc settings create errors within Orbot
--+
 Reporter:  untiedlaces   |  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  Applications/Orbot
  Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  torrc |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
 Following .Torrc settings create errors within Orbot:

 IsolateClientAddr
 IsolateSOCKSAuth
 IsolateClientProtocol
 IsolateDestPort
 IsolateDestAddr
 KeepAliveIsolateSOCKSAuth
 IPv6Traffic
 PreferIPv6
 NoDNSRequest


 Error messages returned:

 [warn] Failed to parse/validate config: Unknown option
 'IsolateClientAddr'. Failing.

 [warn] Failed to parse/validate config: Unknown option 'IsolateSOCKSAuth'.
 Failing.

 [warn] Failed to parse/validate config: Unknown option
 'IsolateClientProtocol'. Failing.

 [warn] Failed to parse/validate config: Unknown option 'IsolateDestPort'.
 Failing.

 [warn] Failed to parse/validate config: Unknown option
 'KeepAliveIsolateSOCKSAuth'. Failing.

 [warn] Failed to parse/validate config: Unknown option 'IPv6Traffic'.
 Failing.

 [warn] Failed to parse/validate config: Unknown option 'NoDNSRequest'.
 Failing.

 Apr 03 08:18:41.431 [err] Reading config failed--see warnings above.


 WARN: Your application (using socks5 to port 443) is giving Tor only an IP
 address. Applications that do DNS resolves themselves may leak
 information. Consider using Socks4A (e.g. via privoxy or socat) instead.
 For more information, please see
 https://wiki.torproject.org/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#SOCKSAndDNS. Rejecting.

 Without settings, Orbot functions desirably.



 As well, Orfox cannot connect to onion sites with following settings
 contained within .torrc file:


 StrictNodes

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28284 [Applications/GetTor]: Arabic version for Gettor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28284: Arabic version for Gettor
-+---
 Reporter:  nonomous |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19-can
-+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * owner:  ilv => (none)
 * status:  new => assigned
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor19-can
 * keywords:   => gettor-roadmap


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #9036 [Applications/GetTor]: Changing GetTor Message Body

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9036: Changing GetTor Message Body
-+---
 Reporter:  mrphs|  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * parent:  #28232 =>


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #8542 [Applications/GetTor]: More options on how to get the bundles

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8542: More options on how to get the bundles
-+---
 Reporter:  mrphs|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28232   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19-can
-+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * sponsor:  Sponsor8-can => Sponsor19-can


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #3781 [Applications/GetTor]: Write a spec for GetTor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3781: Write a spec for GetTor
-+--
 Reporter:  ioerror  |  Owner:  kaner
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28232   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  gettor => gettor-roadmap


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30026 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: move grafana in a docker container

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30026: move grafana in a docker container
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by hiro):

 * owner:  tpa => hiro
 * status:  new => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30026 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: move grafana in a docker container

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30026: move grafana in a docker container
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by hiro):

 Hi,
 This is something I'd be happy to tackle next week. Assigning it to me.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22029 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22029: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Sorry for yet another PR, but I have done the requested squashing (for
 your `squash`) and separating commits (for `f7b5e4c`). It is not one big
 commit like the last PR.

 The new PR is here: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/970

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28269 [Core Tor/Tor]: Repeated HSFETCH queries fail with QUERY_NO_HSDIR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28269: Repeated HSFETCH queries fail with QUERY_NO_HSDIR
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-control tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Pushed it!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28269 [Core Tor/Tor]: Repeated HSFETCH queries fail with QUERY_NO_HSDIR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28269: Repeated HSFETCH queries fail with QUERY_NO_HSDIR
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-control tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:16 neel]:
 > I made the corrections necessary.
 >

 Almost there! I meant to initialize the `rate_limited` of
 `hs_pick_hsdir()` not the other one, but again I did not clarify.

 Now, if `responsible_dirs_count` is zero, then `rate_limited` will be
 uninitialized and since it's on stack it can have garbage value, and give
 bad results to `is_rate_limited`.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28269 [Core Tor/Tor]: Repeated HSFETCH queries fail with QUERY_NO_HSDIR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28269: Repeated HSFETCH queries fail with QUERY_NO_HSDIR
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-control tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I made the corrections necessary.

 I have also fixed the bug regarding `rate_limited = rate_limited_count ==
 responsible_dirs_count;` by only setting `rate_limited` if
 `rate_limited_count` or `responsible_dirs_count` is greater than 0.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22029 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22029: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 I'm so sorry but in my previous message I meant for you to squash the
 `squash!` commits and the commits that edit other commits (like
 `d44ff1c`). And also to properly decouple the `f7b5e4c` test-related
 changes from behavior-related changes. Sorry for the confusion and for not
 clarifying properly.

 I think this is a complex enough change that I wouldn't want it to merge
 as a single commit. Can you please chop-up your latest PR into separate
 commits to make it more clear why all these changes are necessary to
 achieve the final result? Also perhaps split code-commits from test-
 commits.

 Thanks and sorry for the confusion again.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28269 [Core Tor/Tor]: Repeated HSFETCH queries fail with QUERY_NO_HSDIR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28269: Repeated HSFETCH queries fail with QUERY_NO_HSDIR
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-control tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_revision


Comment:

 That looks good but also perhaps let's initialize `rate_limited` to
 `false` just to make it clear and future-proof.

 Also, I think there might be a small bug here in the case where we go in
 `hs_pick_hsdir()` with an empty `responsible_dirs` (as indicated by the
 comment in `directory_get_from_hs_dir()`).  In that case `rate_limited`
 will get toggled to `true` because of `rate_limited = rate_limited_count
 == responsible_dirs_count;`, even tho it should be `false`because the
 issue has nothing to do with rate limiting.

 Putting this back in needs_rev.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29034 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29034: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs-reachability, 029-backport-   |  Actual Points:
  maybe, 034-backport-maybe, 035-backport,   |
  040-backport, postfreeze-ok|
Parent ID:  #29995   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 LGTM!

 I have a slight revision in https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/969,
 because I opted for not calling the new functions `hs_circ_free()` since
 `*_free()` functions have a very specific meaning in Tor (they free and
 NULL their input). Instead I hijacked `hs_circ_cleanup()` which seamed a
 better target.

 If you like, let's merge_ready.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22029 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22029: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Squashed PR with the bugfix here:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/968

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28269 [Core Tor/Tor]: Repeated HSFETCH queries fail with QUERY_NO_HSDIR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28269: Repeated HSFETCH queries fail with QUERY_NO_HSDIR
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-control tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready


Comment:

 I made `rate_limited` and `is_rate_limited` bools.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30092 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a probability-to-apply field for circuitpadidng machines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30092: Add a probability-to-apply field for circuitpadidng machines
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:  0.5
  padding, 041-proposed  |
Parent ID:  #28634   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2-can
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30092 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a probability-to-apply field for circuitpadidng machines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30092: Add a probability-to-apply field for circuitpadidng machines
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:  0.5
  padding, 041-proposed  |
Parent ID:  #28634   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2-can
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 OK this LGTM.

 I think a test would be nice tho since it has grown to non-trivial
 complexity after the last commit. Here is an easy way to test this:

 - Put the body of `if (machine->conditions.apply_with_probability > 0) {`
 into its own function which is gonna be unittested.
 - Create a mock machine and a mock circuit.
 - Call the new function a few times and check that
 `circ->padding_apply_coin_tossed` is behaving properly.

 I think this can be done without mocking `crypto_rand_double()` but you
 could also mock it so that it returns predictable stuff to make it more
 easy.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30180 [Core Tor/Tor]: CID 1444641: REVERSE_INULL in test_hs_cache.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30180: CID 1444641: REVERSE_INULL in test_hs_cache.c
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:| Points:  0
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 LGTM!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30051 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add practracker as a pre-commit and pre-push git hook for frequent coders

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30051: Add practracker as a pre-commit and pre-push git hook for frequent 
coders
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  practracker tech-debt tor-ci git-|  Actual Points:
  scripts tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |
Parent ID:  #29792   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:10 rl1987]:
 > https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/967


 pretty cool! Almost there, but it seems like the pre-push hook (which is
 the one I'd like to use) does not block the push if practracker complains.
 It does throw the practracker error but does not abort the push (at least
 in my testing with a github branch).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28269 [Core Tor/Tor]: Repeated HSFETCH queries fail with QUERY_NO_HSDIR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28269: Repeated HSFETCH queries fail with QUERY_NO_HSDIR
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-control tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_revision


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28269 [Core Tor/Tor]: Repeated HSFETCH queries fail with QUERY_NO_HSDIR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28269: Repeated HSFETCH queries fail with QUERY_NO_HSDIR
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-control tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 LGTM! Just a minor nitpick, please turn `is_rate_limited`  and
 `rate_limited` into bools to make their purpose more clear. In particular,
 it's not clear what `rate_limited` is from its name, so turning it into a
 bool will be easier to read the code.

 After that, we can put this in merge_ready. Thanks!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22029 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22029: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Thanks for the code neel.

 I pointed out a bug in your code in the PR. Also, I think it's naughty to
 non-trivially edit code in a commit named `Add add_ed25519_to_dir() and
 add_fingerprint_to_dir() tests`, ideally that would be its own commit.

 Can you please squash your branch, rebase it to master, and make a new PR
 for it?

 Thanks! :)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #5475 [Archived/Vidalia]: Vidalia torrc editor is confused by # comments

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5475: Vidalia torrc editor is confused by # comments
--+-
 Reporter:  schoen|  Owner:  chiiph
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/Vidalia  |Version:  Vidalia: 0.2.15
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  torrc comment |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by Dinectich):

 This content is [https://www.topratedessayservice.com/about-us/ about
 topratedessayservice] vidalia editor and it is confused by an error. That
 you can find from the project and the ticket may help all of them with
 these reviews.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30244 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Captcha not working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30244: Captcha not working
--+--
 Reporter:  Captcha Bug   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * points:  0 =>
 * version:  Tor: unspecified =>
 * resolution:   => invalid
 * actualpoints:  0 =>


Comment:

 We can't fix the captchas that those websites use. This would have to be
 done by the owners of those websites. You can contact them to tell them
 that it doesn't work in Tor Browser.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30242 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Impossible to change circuit for a site when its SSL certificate is invalid

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30242: Impossible to change circuit for a site when its SSL certificate is 
invalid
-+-
 Reporter:  pf.team  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ssl tbb-8.0-issues tor-circuit tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  circuit-display|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by acat):

 Thanks for reporting. This is was fixed in #22538, it should be working in
 current alpha (8.5a11) and next 8.5 release.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30218 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Add bandwidth files archiving to CollecTor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30218: Add bandwidth files archiving to CollecTor
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:
 |  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth,tor-dirauth,metrics-  |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-q2|
Parent ID:  #21378   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by irl):

 There is no current sponsor.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30245 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor will not connect

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30245: Tor will not connect
--+
 Reporter:  peterm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by peterm):

 * Attachment "Tor help .docx" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30245 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor will not connect

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30245: Tor will not connect
--+
 Reporter:  peterm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by peterm):

 * Attachment "NVIDIA System Information 04-19-2019 17-18-54.txt" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30245 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor will not connect

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30245: Tor will not connect
+--
 Reporter:  peterm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 I have used Tor for many years and six days ago it stopped.   I deleted it
 and reinstalled, i installed the newest beta, then reinstalled older
 versions.
 help tells me that webGL failed to load.   When I type a web address it
 times out.  It appears to send info but receives nothing back.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30244 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Captcha not working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30244: Captcha not working
--+--
 Reporter:  Captcha Bug   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:| Points:  0
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Captcha Bug):

 Tor browser version: 8.0.8

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30244 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Captcha not working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30244: Captcha not working
--+--
 Reporter:  Captcha Bug   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:  Tor: unspecified  |   Severity:  Critical
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:| Points:  0
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 Hello,

 Since I use Tor Browser, CAPTCHA not working on any website. Please fix
 the CAPTCHA.

 Thank you!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30051 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add practracker as a pre-commit and pre-push git hook for frequent coders

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30051: Add practracker as a pre-commit and pre-push git hook for frequent 
coders
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  practracker tech-debt tor-ci git-|  Actual Points:
  scripts tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |
Parent ID:  #29792   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by rl1987):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/967

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #15125 [Obfuscation/meek]: meek-client-torbrowser does not use signals well (was: meek-client-wrapper does not use signals well)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15125: meek-client-torbrowser does not use signals well
--+--
 Reporter:  infinity0 |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 I came around to the timer idea. #25613 rewrites the way that child
 processes are handled in a way that I think addresses this ticket.
   https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/meek.git/log/?h=bug25613=36d06b5f9a0d0c4a7aa251f33460886f68a2ab22
 Namely these commits:
 * [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 
transports/meek.git/commit/?h=bug25613=adf41cd3adf6e3884626b6b7e4c7f131660343dd
 Be more careful about terminating meek-client.]
 * [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 
transports/meek.git/commit/?h=bug25613=1b3a72f3c7208dd7c0471bb3e9077667091874c8
 Be more careful about terminating Firefox.]
 * [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 
transports/meek.git/commit/?h=bug25613=36d06b5f9a0d0c4a7aa251f33460886f68a2ab22
 Terminate firefox and meek-client simultaneously.]
 The main differences compared to what has already been discussed on this
 ticket are that there are separate `terminatePTCmd` and `terminateCmd`
 functions (`terminatePTCmd` closes stdin, `terminateCmd` does not),
 separate implementations for Windows and non-Windows (Windows doesn't send
 SIGTERM, and its `terminateCmd` kill the process immediately, without any
 timer, and the two terminations run in parallel, not in series.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25613 [Obfuscation/meek]: Close child's stdout to signal exit in meek-client-torbrowser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25613: Close child's stdout to signal exit in meek-client-torbrowser
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Branch bug25613 refactors the way that meek-client-torbrowser handles its
 client processes.
   https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/meek.git/log/?h=bug25613=36d06b5f9a0d0c4a7aa251f33460886f68a2ab22
   https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 
transports/meek.git/diff/?h=bug25613=36d06b5f9a0d0c4a7aa251f33460886f68a2ab22=29797a33ecee1c6fc4882fc2b6beabcd64f554ce

 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 
transports/meek.git/commit/?h=bug25613=adf41cd3adf6e3884626b6b7e4c7f131660343dd
 This] is the commit that touches meek-client. We get a handle to the
 child's stdin:
 {{{
 // ptCmd is a *exec.Cmd augmented with an io.WriteCloser for its stdin,
 which we
 // can close to instruct the PT subprocess to terminate.
 type ptCmd struct {
 *exec.Cmd
 StdinCloser io.WriteCloser
 }
 }}}
 then close it as the first step of terminating the process.
 {{{
 err := cmd.StdinCloser.Close()
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30235 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor hangs when asked to change DisableAllSwap over the control port

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30235: Tor hangs when asked to change DisableAllSwap over the control port
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.4.8-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  #29437 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * cc: nickm (added)


Comment:

 Nick might have some idea of what is going wrong here?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30235 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor hangs when asked to change DisableAllSwap over the control port (was: Tor hangs when asked to change User and DisableAllSwap over the control port)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30235: Tor hangs when asked to change DisableAllSwap over the control port
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.4.8-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  #29437 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * actualpoints:   => 0.2


Old description:

> {{{
> self.assertRaisesWith(stem.InvalidArguments, "DisableAllSwap, User
> cannot be changed while tor's running", controller.set_options, {'User':
> 'atagar', 'DisableAllSwap': '1'})
> }}}
>
> We don't know why, because we don't have the tor logs or backtrace
> (#30234).

New description:

 {{{
 self.assertRaisesWith(stem.InvalidArguments, "DisableAllSwap, User
 cannot be changed while tor's running", controller.set_options, {'User':
 'atagar', 'DisableAllSwap': '1'})
 }}}
 or
 {{{
   File
 "/home/travis/build/tlyu/tor/stem/test/integ/control/controller.py", line
 793, in test_set_conf_when_immutable
 self.assertRaisesWith(stem.InvalidArguments, "DisableAllSwap cannot be
 changed while tor's running", controller.set_conf, 'DisableAllSwap', '1')
 }}}

 We don't know why, because we don't have the tor logs or backtrace
 (#30234).

--

Comment:

 DisableAllSwap causes this error by itself:
 {{{
   File
 "/home/travis/build/tlyu/tor/stem/test/integ/control/controller.py", line
 793, in test_set_conf_when_immutable
 self.assertRaisesWith(stem.InvalidArguments, "DisableAllSwap cannot be
 changed while tor's running", controller.set_conf, 'DisableAllSwap', '1')
 }}}
 https://travis-ci.org/tlyu/tor/jobs/521994718#L3565

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs