Re: [tor-bugs] #30350 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Hello, in China, currently, Tor Browser 8.5a11 version can't connect to Tor network through Snowflake bridge.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30350: Hello, in China, currently, Tor Browser 8.5a11 version can't connect to 
Tor
network through Snowflake bridge.
---+--
 Reporter:  amiableclarity2011 |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by amiableclarity2011):

 Hello, currently, in China, I can't connect to Tor network through
 Snowflake bridge.
 Below are Tor log messages.


 5/7/19, 05:27:29.138 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 5/7/19, 05:28:00.158 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 5/7/19, 05:28:00.158 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 5/7/19, 05:28:00.158 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 5/7/19, 05:28:00.158 [NOTICE] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 5/7/19, 05:28:00.158 [NOTICE] Opened Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 5/7/19, 05:28:01.150 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 1% (conn_pt): Connecting to
 pluggable transport
 5/7/19, 05:28:01.152 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 2% (conn_done_pt): Connected to
 pluggable transport
 5/7/19, 05:28:03.957 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 10% (conn_done): Connected to a
 relay
 5/7/19, 05:28:05.828 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 14% (handshake): Handshaking
 with a relay
 5/7/19, 05:28:06.182 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 15% (handshake_done): Handshake
 with a relay done
 5/7/19, 05:28:06.184 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 20% (onehop_create):
 Establishing an encrypted directory connection
 5/7/19, 05:28:06.537 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 25% (requesting_status): Asking
 for networkstatus consensus
 5/7/19, 05:28:06.901 [NOTICE] new bridge descriptor 'flakey' (fresh):
 $2B280B23E1107BB62ABFC40DDCC8824814F80A72~flakey at 0.0.3.0
 5/7/19, 05:28:07.584 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 30% (loading_status): Loading
 networkstatus consensus
 5/7/19, 05:28:13.370 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 75% (enough_dirinfo): Loaded
 enough directory info to build circuits
 5/7/19, 05:28:14.211 [NOTICE] Delaying directory fetches: No running
 bridges
 5/7/19, 05:30:08.670 [NOTICE] Closing no-longer-configured Socks listener
 on 127.0.0.1:9150
 5/7/19, 05:30:08.670 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 5/7/19, 05:30:08.670 [WARN] Pluggable Transport process terminated with
 status code 0

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[tor-bugs] #30421 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Loading extension 'null': Reading manifest: Error processing background.persistent...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30421: Loading extension 'null': Reading manifest: Error processing
background.persistent...
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 in 8.0.9, new warning logged in the console:

 addons.webextension.WARNLoading extension 'null':
 Reading manifest: Error processing background.persistent: Event pages are
 not currently supported. This will run as a persistent background page.

 also:

 addons.webextension.{73a6fe31-595d-460b-a920-fcc0f8843232}  WARN
 Loading extension '{73a6fe31-595d-460b-a920-fcc0f8843232}': Reading
 manifest: Error processing background.persistent: Event pages are not
 currently supported. This will run as a persistent background page.

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[tor-bugs] #30420 [Core Tor/Tor]: Should we recommend that relay operators turn on tcp bbr?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30420: Should we recommend that relay operators turn on tcp bbr?
--+-
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  network-health, performance
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 The internet seems to have a growing number of howto's for switching your
 kernel to use the "bbr" congestion control mode of tcp:
 https://github.com/google/bbr
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCP_congestion_control#TCP_BBR

 Thought 1: doing an experiment where various fractions of Tor relays
 switch to this congestion control mode would be neat. Maybe it's the sort
 of thing that Shadow could help with, since switching the real Tor network
 is both cumbersome and dangerous.

 (Though, since Shadow builds its own tcp implementation, it would need to
 have an implementation of the bbr variation in order to do a test with it.
 And it would need to have realistic *non* Tor background flows to test the
 comparison. What a great use case for driving forward Shadow innovation to
 be able to capture this test. Cc'ing Rob.)

 Thought 2: If God wanted us to be using tcp bbr, we'd be using it by
 default already. And we're not, so we should learn why that is. For
 example, the wikipedia page indicates that it's not good at fairness in
 some situations -- and since Tor relays are often guests on their network,
 we might not want to give people more reasons to get angry at them.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30419 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Apache's server-status page accessible via TPO onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30419: Apache's server-status page accessible via TPO onion services
-+-
 Reporter:  Parckwart|  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 Thanks Parckwart! Good find.

 We believe anarcat fixed it -- if you find anyplace in Tor infrastructure
 land that still has the issue, please reopen this ticket.

 It looks like we added in the problem on March 19, during an apache config
 file update for apache 2.4.

 We've begun the process of trying to figure out if we can learn whether
 people exploited this issue much in the past six weeks. Our webservers
 don't really keep logs that help much here (which is a feature in other
 circumstances: #20928) so it's not straightforward.

 anarcat: this seems like the sort of security audit we should want to set
 up an automated check for, so that it can squeal if some future
 configuration ever starts revealing this content again. And while I'm
 thinking of follow-up steps, take a look at
 https://riseup.net/en/security/network-security/tor/onionservices-best-
 practices#be-careful-of-localhost-bypasses

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30419 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Apache's server-status page accessible via TPO onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30419: Apache's server-status page accessible via TPO onion services
-+-
 Reporter:  Parckwart|  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 The problem was fixed at around midnight UTC. More details might follow.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30173 [Core Tor/Tor]: Ensure circuit padding can be safely disabled from consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30173: Ensure circuit padding can be safely disabled from consensus
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:  0.33
  padding, 041-proposed  |
Parent ID:  #28634   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2-can
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1003 - had to make a new PR due to
 practracker conflicts. I fixed the CI issue and the naming issue, but left
 the is_network_dormant() check separate, since it requires its own log
 line and is a different mechanism that causes it to happen.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30419 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Apache's server-status page accessible via TPO onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30419: Apache's server-status page accessible via TPO onion services
-+-
 Reporter:  Parckwart|  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  tpa => anarcat


Comment:

 taking a look

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29231 [Core Tor/Tor]: Relays vastly underreport write-total in padding-counts line in extrainfo descriptor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29231: Relays vastly underreport write-total in padding-counts line in 
extrainfo
descriptor
---+---
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay padding wtf-pad  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28634 | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet|Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Replying to [comment:8 dgoulet]:
 > lgtm;
 >
 > Just to clarify Mike, in `write_packed_cell()`, we count the cell only
 if the cell was successfully put in the connection buffer. Any error there
 will not count the cell.
 >
 > That it OK? As I recall some stats we want to count every cell, not just
 the ones that succeeded.

 Yes, this is what we want here -- we want to know the actual written cell
 counts and actual written padding counts, so we can measure what the
 overhead is on the wire and make sure the actual overhead is reasonable
 for the current network conditions.

 The patch also relocates the circuitpadding stat accounting to behave
 similarly -- if the #29204 fix causes us to not pad because the queue is
 full, we should not count those cells in our statistics.

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[tor-bugs] #30419 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Apache's server-status page accessible via TPO onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30419: Apache's server-status page accessible via TPO onion services
-+-
 Reporter:  Parckwart|  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin
 |  Team
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
 The following Apache ''server-status'' pages are accessible, leaking IP
 addresses of TPO website visitors:

 2d5quh2deowe4kpd.onion/server-status
 2iqyjmvrkrq5h5mg.onion/server-status
 4bflp2c4tnynnbes.onion/server-status
 52g5y5karruvc7bz.onion/server-status
 54nujbl4qohb5qdp.onion/server-status
 bn6kma5cpxill4pe.onion/server-status
 bo7uextohjpuqvrh.onion/server-status
 bogdyardcfurxcle.onion/server-status
 buqlpzbbcyat2jiy.onion/server-status
 c5qrls2slxqz6vdw.onion/server-status
 dgvdmophvhunawds.onion/server-status
 ea5faa5po25cf7fb.onion/server-status
 ebxqgaz3dwywcoxl.onion/server-status
 expyuzz4wqqyqhjn.onion/server-status
 fhny6b7b6sbslc2b.onion/server-status
 fqnqc7zix2wblwex.onion/server-status
 fr6scuhdp5dqvy7d.onion/server-status
 fylvgu5r6gcdadeo.onion/server-status
 hzmun3rnnxjhkyhg.onion/server-status
 icxe4yp32mq6gm6n.onion/server-status
 jqs44zhtxl2uo6gk.onion/server-status
 klbl4glo2btuwyok.onion/server-status
 krkzagd5yo4bvypt.onion/server-status
 kzcx36ytbsm5iogs.onion/server-status
 l3xrunzkfufzvw2c.onion/server-status
 lfdhmyq24uacliu5.onion/server-status
 llhb3u5h3q66ha62.onion/server-status
 n46o4uxsej2icp5l.onion/server-status
 ngp5wfw5z6ms3ynx.onion/server-status
 nraswjtnyrvywxk7.onion/server-status
 nwoyhtkk4tloji3j.onion/server-status
 qigcb4g4xxbh5ho6.onion/server-status
 qrmfuxwgyzk5jdjz.onion/server-status
 rqef5a5mebgq46y5.onion/server-status
 s2bweojt5vg52e5i.onion/server-status
 sbe5fi5cka5l3fqe.onion/server-status
 sdscoq7snqtznauu.onion/server-status
 tgnv2pssfumdedyw.onion/server-status
 tngjm3owsslo3wgo.onion/server-status
 vhbbidwvzwhahsrg.onion/server-status
 vijs2fmpd72nbqok.onion/server-status
 vt5hknv6sblkgf22.onion/server-status
 wcgqzqyfi7a6iu62.onion/server-status
 x3nelbld33llasqv.onion/server-status
 y7pm6of53hzeb7u2.onion/server-status
 yabd3wlpvybdnvzg.onion/server-status
 yjuwkcxlgo7f7o6s.onion/server-status
 yz7lpwfhhzcdyc5y.onion/server-status

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[tor-bugs] #30418 [- Select a component]: Denial of Service on Hidden Service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30418: Denial of Service on Hidden Service
+--
 Reporter:  hsadm1  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 The tor process gets up to 100% cpu usage and GETINFO circuit-status shows
 thousands of new circuits created per second. Most new HTTP connections
 timeout but if a user manages to create a circuit he may be able to stay
 on that circuit for a long time without issues.

 Maybe related to #25066 ?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28152 [Applications/GetTor]: Gettor code refactor with Python Twisted

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28152: Gettor code refactor with Python Twisted
-+--
 Reporter:  ilv  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28232   | Points:
 Reviewer:  phw  |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+--

Comment (by phw):

 I had a look at the branch and here are my thoughts:

 * I find it a bit difficult to understand what some of the commits are
 trying to accomplish.  For example,
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/hiro/gettor.git/commit/?h=refactoring&id=9f5394e7b32c502f1a0e4d294605996ace50ceaa
 9f5394e7] says "Start with main task" but I'm not quite sure what that
 means.  Another example: commit
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/hiro/gettor.git/commit/?h=refactoring&id=5271b12c105ae394a870936dab9ba634e1af4014
 5271b12c] says "Update script".  A more descriptive commit message would
 be "Use Python 3-style format message." Here's a page that provides an
 excellent overview of crisp and useful commit messages: https://git-
 scm.com/book/en/v2/Distributed-Git-Contributing-to-a-Project

 * Several commits seem to group unrelated changes together, in a single
 commit.  For example,
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/hiro/gettor.git/commit/?h=refactoring&id=309e4e384385d45a1db5d0da336837a56472acc8
 309e4e38] says "Create script to add links to db" but it also adds and
 modifies code comments.  The modification of comments should be a separate
 commit.

 * The last line in
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/hiro/gettor.git/commit/?h=refactoring&id=61973769729691082d197caa8e07a0a0cd55fa27
 61973769] should probably be `print_footer()` and not `print_footer`.

 * Nitpick: Do we really need spaces in between the `\n` in
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/hiro/gettor.git/commit/?h=refactoring&id=d4777d66c7cd528bdc4e903de4bea5482eff5d29
 d4777d66]?

 * For substantial changes, it's helpful to provide more than just a one-
 line summary in the git commit message.  For example, I was curious what
 the purpose of the restructuring in
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/hiro/gettor.git/commit/?h=refactoring&id=ba19003400fe11a68444bbb585fcdb12a93c100f
 ba190034] was. Does it make maintenance easier? A short paragraph under
 the one-line summary wouldn't leave me guessing :)  Commit
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/hiro/gettor.git/commit/?h=refactoring&id=02ae46d0ea3224c041b343832c5f30e8c072c3db
 02ae46d0] is another example.  It changes several hundred lines of code,
 yet the commit message only says "Update structure and code".

 * What's the purpose of the giant TAGS file that was added in commit
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/hiro/gettor.git/commit/?h=refactoring&id=c953136225ea9f959f94d9257b606973bbad421b
 c9531362]?

 Hiro, do you mind cleaning up the commit messages to make them more
 descriptive? Please let me know if I can help. Also, let me know if
 there's any code that you want me to pay particular attention to.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28152 [Applications/GetTor]: Gettor code refactor with Python Twisted

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28152: Gettor code refactor with Python Twisted
-+--
 Reporter:  ilv  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28232   | Points:
 Reviewer:  phw  |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * cc: gaba (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30109 [Core Tor/Tor]: Document that MapAddress is automatically strict, but does not handle redirects

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30109: Document that MapAddress is automatically strict, but does not handle
redirects
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.8
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  easy, doc, security-low, tor-|  Actual Points:  0.3
  client, tor-exit, 040-backport |
Parent ID:  #29989   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged to master; not planning to backport.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29274 [Obfuscation/Pluggable transport]: Get developers using new PT alphas

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29274: Get developers using new PT alphas
-+---
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Pluggable transport  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-2019 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => anti-censorship-roadmap-2019


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28651 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Prepare all pieces of the snowflake pipeline for a second snowflake bridge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28651: Prepare all pieces of the snowflake pipeline for a second snowflake 
bridge
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-2019  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => anti-censorship-roadmap-2019


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21314 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: snowflake-client needs to stop using my network when I'm not giving it requests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21314: snowflake-client needs to stop using my network when I'm not giving it
requests
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt  anti-censorship- |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  tor-pt snowflake => tor-pt  anti-censorship-roadmap-2019


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[tor-bugs] #30417 [Core Tor/Tor]: Quicken CBT latency on updated/restarted nodes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30417: Quicken CBT latency on updated/restarted nodes
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:  Tor: unspecified  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 With probability of choosing path selection from consensus, we could guess
 and build preemptively inter-relay connections.

 If we cannot simple preconnect orcon to any node. May something like this
 could still benefit in lower latency after bootstrapping. for very
 uptodate nodes and nonstable.

 Exit: build preemptively inter-relay connections to middle (non guard
 flag, non exit flag) but low probability of connection coming from guard
 directly (guard have low middle  probability)
 Guard: build preemptively inter-relay connections to suspected middle
 relays
 Middle:  build preemptively inter-relay connections to approximately
 anything?

 The idea is of having benefits from the way of clients do build circuits
 preemptively. Guess it, build it and leave it open in idle state for
 future use without building on the fly without TCP/tls rtt.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15404 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: BridgeDB's email localisation isn't working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15404: BridgeDB's email localisation isn't working
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb-ui, localization, anti- |  Actual Points:
  censorship-roadmap-2019|
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  bridgedb-ui, localization => bridgedb-ui, localization, anti-
 censorship-roadmap-2019


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26348 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Guard against large reads

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26348: Guard against large reads
---+---
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy anti-censorship-roadmap-2019  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  easy => easy anti-censorship-roadmap-2019


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Re: [tor-bugs] #11330 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Create a Hash Ring For Each Allowed Domain in the Email Distributor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11330: Create a Hash Ring For Each Allowed Domain in the Email Distributor
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb-email, bridgedb-dist,   |  Actual Points:
  anti-censorship-roadmap-2019   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  bridgedb-email, bridgedb-dist => bridgedb-email, bridgedb-
 dist, anti-censorship-roadmap-2019


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21314 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: snowflake-client needs to stop using my network when I'm not giving it requests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21314: snowflake-client needs to stop using my network when I'm not giving it
requests
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt  anti-censorship- |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019 from-network-team-roadmap |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  tor-pt  anti-censorship-roadmap-2019 => tor-pt  anti-
 censorship-roadmap-2019 from-network-team-roadmap


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10831 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Captchas are not accessible for blind users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10831: Captchas are not accessible for blind users
-+-
 Reporter:  PZajda   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb-reportbug, bridgedb-ui, |  Actual Points:
  anti-censorship-roadmap-2019   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  bridgedb-reportbug, bridgedb-ui => bridgedb-reportbug,
 bridgedb-ui, anti-censorship-roadmap-2019


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16682 [Core Tor/Tor]: Deploy TCP Fast Open at exits (and maybe inter-node?)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16682: Deploy TCP Fast Open at exits (and maybe inter-node?)
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  performance tor-relay exit needs-|  Actual Points:
  analysis term-project  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:2 mikeperry]:
 > Yawning and I discussed briefly on IRC that we *might* be able to get
 away with doing TFO just for exit traffic destined to port 443, since TLS
 should be fine with issues in section 6, and sketch non-TLS 443 servers
 shouldn't be advertising/accepting TFO.
 >
 > Reopening while we ponder that case.

 hello, i suggest split this work to get it done quicker.

 1. while concerning about privacy, this decisions may need review first.
 Why not open a child ticket for this maybe?

 2. implementation in inter-relay and client=>guard connection seems to be
 without any possible privacy impacts yet. why don't just enable TFO(TCP
 Fast Open) in alpha testing branch for this TLS only connections?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25595 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Test suite for Snowflake on various NAT topologies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25595: Test suite for Snowflake on various NAT topologies
--+---
 Reporter:  arlolra   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-2019  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => anti-censorship-roadmap-2019


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25681 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Defend against flooding of the broker by low bandwidth snowflakes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25681: Defend against flooding of the broker by low bandwidth snowflakes
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-2019  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => anti-censorship-roadmap-2019


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29217 [Core Tor/Tor]: Script to add new tor files and modules in rust and/or C

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29217: Script to add new tor files and modules in rust and/or C
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Partial implementation here in my branch `add_c_file`, which I am
 currently using. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24607 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: CAPTCHAs on BridgeDB seem to be getting more difficult

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24607: CAPTCHAs on BridgeDB seem to be getting more difficult
--+---
 Reporter:  alison|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-2019  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => anti-censorship-roadmap-2019


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29296 [Obfuscation/Pluggable transport]: Look into alternatives for distributing bridge info to clients

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29296: Look into alternatives for distributing bridge info to clients
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Pluggable transport  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  PT spec, design, anti-censorship-|  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019   |
Parent ID:  #29285   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  PT spec, design => PT spec, design, anti-censorship-
   roadmap-2019


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26542 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Distribute IPv6 bridges though bridges.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26542: Distribute IPv6 bridges though bridges.torproject.org
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-2019  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24264| Points:  3
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => anti-censorship-roadmap-2019


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26543 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Provide a language switcher menu on BridgeDB

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26543: Provide a language switcher menu on BridgeDB
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-2019  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => anti-censorship-roadmap-2019


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28496 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Consider dropping yahoo from the bridgedb email domains

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28496: Consider dropping yahoo from the bridgedb email domains
--+---
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-2019  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  bridgedb => anti-censorship-roadmap-2019


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20813 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Start producing snowflakes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20813: Start producing snowflakes
--+---
 Reporter:  arlolra   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-2019  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  3
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap => anti-censorship-roadmap-2019


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20813 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Start producing snowflakes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20813: Start producing snowflakes
-+---
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  snowflake tor-pt => anti-censorship-roadmap


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29279 [Obfuscation/Obfsproxy]: Test obfs4 reachability

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29279: Test obfs4 reachability
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Obfsproxy|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  NGO, community, anti-censorship- |  Actual Points:
  roadmap|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  NGO, community => NGO, community, anti-censorship-roadmap


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[tor-bugs] #30416 [Community]: Enforce cooperation sanity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30416: Enforce cooperation sanity
--+---
 Reporter:  krichter  |  Owner:  alison
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Component:  Community
  Version:|   Severity:  Minor
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
 Please develop a guideline for dealing with tickets like
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30407. They should not
 remain in the tracker for 13 hours (closed or not), but be deleted at
 first sight. No one of the project maintainers should comment on such a
 ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30414 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move relay periodic events out of mainloop.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30414: Move relay periodic events out of mainloop.c
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30292| Points:  1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30414 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move relay periodic events out of mainloop.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30414: Move relay periodic events out of mainloop.c
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30292| Points:  1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 See branch `more_subsystems` with PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1002 . I'm going to step away from
 subsystem stuff for a little while now, at least until I have a bunch more
 S19 stuff finished.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30415 [Metrics/Website]: broken url in metrics.tpo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30415: broken url in metrics.tpo
-+--
 Reporter:  gaba |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Description changed by gaba:

Old description:

> There is a broken url that needs to be replaced.
>
> {{{
> Broken url:
> https://www.torproject.org/about/overview#thesolution
> (linked from
> https://metrics.torproject.org/exonerator.html)
>
> It should be replaced by:
> https://2019.www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en#thesolution
>
> }}}

New description:

 There is a broken url that needs to be replaced.

 Broken url: !https://www.torproject.org/about/overview#thesolution

 (linked from https://metrics.torproject.org/exonerator.html)

 It should be replaced by:
 https://2019.www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en#thesolution

 Thanks

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[tor-bugs] #30415 [Metrics/Website]: broken url in metrics.tpo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30415: broken url in metrics.tpo
-+--
 Reporter:  gaba |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 There is a broken url that needs to be replaced.

 {{{
 Broken url:
 https://www.torproject.org/about/overview#thesolution
 (linked from
 https://metrics.torproject.org/exonerator.html)

 It should be replaced by:
 https://2019.www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en#thesolution

 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #30414 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move relay periodic events out of mainloop.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30414: Move relay periodic events out of mainloop.c
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #30292
   Points:  1  |   Reviewer:  dgoulet
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30309 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rename tor_mem_is_zero to fast_mem_is_zero; use it consistently

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30309: Rename tor_mem_is_zero to fast_mem_is_zero; use it consistently
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt easy dgoulet-merge  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID: | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  mikeperry  |Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor31-can
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  technical-debt easy => technical-debt easy dgoulet-merge


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30309 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rename tor_mem_is_zero to fast_mem_is_zero; use it consistently

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30309: Rename tor_mem_is_zero to fast_mem_is_zero; use it consistently
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt easy  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 This looks good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30404 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove Orbot Project

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30404: Remove Orbot Project
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5-must,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904   |
Parent ID:  #30168   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 hi, iam looking for tor-android-service compile instructions?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29034 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29034: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs-reachability, 029-backport-   |  Actual Points:
  maybe, 034-backport-maybe, 035-backport,   |
  040-backport, postfreeze-ok, network-team- |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #29995   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by mikeperry):

 >  dgoulet: what do you think about what I did earlier in that
 case?
 
(https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/931/commits/bee7979e87d51735d2d5f746d69761d89d7dd928)
 >  mikeperry: yeah something like that but it needs to  call
 hs_circ_cleanup() for v3 only and the v2 stuff needs to ideally not be
 done there... so I think the place it needs to go is hs_common.c and then
 call the v2 or v3 specialized calls

 Hrmm, I am not sure how to differentiate the v2 vs v3 calls+data. What is
 the convention for that?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30413 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Notification Bar to warn about xpinstall.signatures.required set to false (was: Notification Bar to warn about)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30413: Notification Bar to warn about xpinstall.signatures.required set to 
false
--+--
 Reporter:  flowerpt  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30388| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30388 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript and all user-installed add-ons got deactivated! (armagadd-on-2.0)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30388: NoScript and all user-installed add-ons got deactivated! 
(armagadd-on-2.0)
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, TorBrowserTeam201905R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by Crissy2):

 BTW. Each solution is better than doing nothing and leaving a faulty
 online version. STILL faulty version is available!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30413 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Notification Bar to warn about

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30413: Notification Bar to warn about
--+--
 Reporter:  flowerpt  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30388| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by flowerpt):

 nuts, the title should be:

 **Notification Bar to warn about xpinstall.signatures.required set to
 false**

 and I don't see how to modify it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29263 [Core Tor/Chutney]: prop289: add bidirectional data transfers to chutney

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29263: prop289: add bidirectional data transfers to chutney
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop289, network-team-   |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * sponsor:  SponsorV => Sponsor19


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30388 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript and all user-installed add-ons got deactivated! (armagadd-on-2.0)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30388: NoScript and all user-installed add-ons got deactivated! 
(armagadd-on-2.0)
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, TorBrowserTeam201905R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by torlove):

 So glad that I still have old Orfox installed right now. NoScript still
 works in Orfox, it must've been "baked in", yes?

 Cypherpunks, yes. I considered simply disabling JS but the other things
 NoScript does, including protecting against XSS made me rethink that.
 Fingerprinting included.

 Yes, can somone please do a commit to show a warning about
 xpinstall.signatures.required set to false on startup?

 (SOLUTION THAT WON'T WORK: I did some research at Mozilla, mostly to
 determine the scale of the problem. Its pretty bad. Especially for users
 who depend on password management addons. One (bad?) idea someone
 suggested was to turn the clock back. I'm quite certain that this is not
 an option for Tor users for good reason, Tor complains about an out of
 sync clock at startup and will not even connect to the Tor network, let
 along a website. Also SSL requires clocks to be relatively in-sync, if my
 understanding/memory is correct.)

 Once the commit is made please tell us to allay concerns about future
 security.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27104 [Core Tor/Tor]: report intermediate status when building application circuits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27104: report intermediate status when building application circuits
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  usability, ux, ux-team, bootstrap,   |  Actual Points:
  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2 |
Parent ID:  #28018   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19-can
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:
 usability, ux, ux-team, bootstrap, 035-roadmap-subtask, 035-triaged-
 in-20180711, s8-bootstrap, 040-deferred-20190220
 => usability, ux, ux-team, bootstrap, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28018 [Core Tor/Tor]: Improve accuracy and usefulness of information reported to controllers about bootstrap status

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28018: Improve accuracy and usefulness of information reported to controllers
about bootstrap status
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor19-can
+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  ex-sponsor8, 040-deferred-20190220 => network-team-
 roadmap-2019-Q1Q2
 * sponsor:  Sponsor19-must => Sponsor19-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29285 [Obfuscation/Pluggable transport]: Improve the PT spec and how PTs interface with Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29285: Improve the PT spec and how PTs interface with Tor
-+---
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Pluggable transport  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30388 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript and all user-installed add-ons got deactivated! (armagadd-on-2.0)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30388: NoScript and all user-installed add-ons got deactivated! 
(armagadd-on-2.0)
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, TorBrowserTeam201905R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:39 gk]:

 >
 > Thus, the deployed fix from Mozilla is essentially not compatible with
 `security.nocertdb` being enabled. I've filed
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1549344 for that.

 It looks like this new patch would solve that:
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1549249#c42

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27691 [Core Tor/Tor]: reset bootstrap progress when enough things change

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27691: reset bootstrap progress when enough things change
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  usability, ux, ux-team, bootstrap,   |  Actual Points:
  bootstrap-arch, network-team-  |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #28018   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19-can
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:
 usability, ux, ux-team, bootstrap, 035-roadmap-master, 035-triaged-
 in-20180711, s8-bootstrap, 035-deferred-20180930, bootstrap-arch,
 040-deferred-201915
 =>
 usability, ux, ux-team, bootstrap, bootstrap-arch, network-team-
 roadmap-2019-Q1Q2
 * sponsor:  Sponsor19 => Sponsor19-can


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[tor-bugs] #30413 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Notification Bar to warn about

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30413: Notification Bar to warn about
-+--
 Reporter:  flowerpt |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30388   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 Please warn with a notification bar if xpinstall.signatures.required is
 set to false.

 This setting was recommended by the blog for users affected by #30388 .
 Such users are somewhat likely to forget to toggle it back to true, which
 could be a potential attack vector.

 Quoted from comment 43 there:

 > > Since the blog asked people to "Please remember to" re-enable
 security, and that's the kind of thing which is the bane of security when
 it comes to ordinary users, can a subsequent release please force this
 back to 'false' and alert the user if the flip is made?
 > >
 > > It's better to have people need to toggle it again than to leave
 people unintentionally unguarded. I realize both options are sub-optimal,
 but "fail safe" is better than "fail dangerous". Without such a change,
 it's very likely that some users will go on forever set to not validate
 addons - the typical user pattern is "fix it and forget it".
 > >
 > >
 > >
 > Replying to flowerpt:
 >
 > I don't think we can do that as our decisions don't overwrite user
 prefs. We could think about showing a notification bar, though, reminding
 the users of that problem and allow them to flip the pref back easily that
 way.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30311 [Core Tor/Tor]: Maybe add HeaderLine to the bandwidth file specification

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30311: Maybe add HeaderLine to the bandwidth file specification
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bandwidth-file-spec, tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by nickm):

 I don't understand how this interacts with RelayLine -- RelayLine doesn't
 always match HeaderLine, but I think that RelayLine fields might be
 allowed?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30311 [Core Tor/Tor]: Maybe add HeaderLine to the bandwidth file specification

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30311: Maybe add HeaderLine to the bandwidth file specification
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bandwidth-file-spec, tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Also I left a note on the PR.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29267 [Obfuscation]: CI for pluggable transports

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29267: CI for pluggable transports
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  CI, PTs, network-team-   |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  13
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  CI, PTs => CI, PTs, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30388 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript and all user-installed add-ons got deactivated! (armagadd-on-2.0)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30388: NoScript and all user-installed add-ons got deactivated! 
(armagadd-on-2.0)
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, TorBrowserTeam201905R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by flowerpt):

 Replying to [comment:43 gk]:

 > We could think about showing a notification bar, though, reminding the
 users of that problem and allow them to flip the pref back easily that
 way.

 Good idea.  I've filed #30413 to request that, so this ticket can stay
 focused on the certificate work.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29034 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29034: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs-reachability, 029-backport-   |  Actual Points:
  maybe, 034-backport-maybe, 035-backport,   |
  040-backport, postfreeze-ok, network-team- |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #29995   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_revision


Comment:

 Commented on PR. The approach is not correct I believe if we are serious
 about the v2 and v3 code separation.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30288 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: Tor Relay Guide

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30288: Tor Relay Guide
---+-
 Reporter:  siggi  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  project| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30281 [Core Tor/Tor]: Sponsor27 master ticket

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30281: Sponsor27 master ticket
--+--
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * component:  Core Tor => Core Tor/Tor


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30316 [Core Tor/Tor]: Vote's 'bandwidth-file-headers' is in wrong order

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30316: Vote's 'bandwidth-file-headers' is in wrong order
+--
 Reporter:  atagar  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport dgoulet-merge  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  035-backport => 035-backport dgoulet-merge


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30352 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor fails to recover if it was started with incorrect date settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30352: Tor fails to recover if it was started with incorrect date settings
--+
 Reporter:  Vort  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.0.3-alpha
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:   => tor-guard
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


Comment:

 There was a clock correction:

 {{{
 May 02 01:57:31.000 [warn] Your system clock just jumped 7430399 seconds
 forward; assuming established circuits no longer work.
 }}}

 Now what I wonder if why tor never was able to pick a Guard after the
 clock correction... ?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30344 [Core Tor/Tor]: conn_read_callback is called on connections that are marked for closed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30344: conn_read_callback is called on connections that are marked for closed
+
 Reporter:  robgjansen  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.8
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-conn, 035-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:   => tor-conn, 035-backport
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30349 [Core Tor/Tor]: Document member-hiding conventions for structs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30349: Document member-hiding conventions for structs
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, refactoring  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29209   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30373 [Core Tor/Tor]: Most headers non-compliant with spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30373: Most headers non-compliant with spec
---+---
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bandwidth-file-spec, tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30387 [Core Tor/Tor]: open 20 onion bookmarks in tabs. tails, tor browser, onion circuits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30387: open 20 onion bookmarks in tabs. tails, tor browser, onion circuits
-+--
 Reporter:  anon52569|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.8
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:  ddos tails open-all-in-tabs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 This won't affect the network much. However, we are exploring rate-
 limiting options in #15516.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30410 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Chromium

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30410: Chromium
--+--
 Reporter:  ovidio_mainardi   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  Core Tor/Tor => Applications/Tor Browser


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30388 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript and all user-installed add-ons got deactivated! (armagadd-on-2.0)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30388: NoScript and all user-installed add-ons got deactivated! 
(armagadd-on-2.0)
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, TorBrowserTeam201905R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by Crissy2):

 Replying to [comment:45 cyberpunks]:
 > I now think that [comment:42] is the best solution, i.e. users should
 follow the instruction in the [https://blog.torproject.org/noscript-
 temporarily-disabled-tor-browser blog post], while future tor browser
 versions should warn about `xpinstall.signatures.required` being set to
 `false`.

 If it is best solution for this time, there should be disabled update for
 all plugins (for secure pupose). If plugins / addons are not verified
 during downloading, changes should be blocked.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30162 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser bootstrap process got stuck after interrupting it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30162: Tor Browser bootstrap process got stuck after interrupting it
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5-must,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904   |
Parent ID:  #27609   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 The behavior that causes problem on restart (from branch 0505)

  1. Tor starts bootstrap
  1. User clicks icon and exits settings screen
  1. App tells TorService to shutdown
  1. TorService sends TERM to tor process and begins shutdown
  1. User clicks connect
  1. TorService reuses tor process (since it hasn't finished shutdown) and
 opens new connection
  1. TorService reloads, causing second tor bootstrap (the shutdown is also
 still in process)
  1. Tor shuts down and the connect button is not reset

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30304 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Browser locale can be obtained via DTD strings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30304: Browser locale can be obtained via DTD strings
--+--
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by acat):

 Updated patch: https://github.com/acatarineu/tor-browser/commit/30304+1.
 Took `PrincipalAllowsL10n` function from the checks for new localization
 system (Fluent) https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-
 
central/file/c6d806b496845985516cc04342c04988aa1817dd/dom/base/Document.cpp#l1995,
 and applied to DTD URI loads.

 Still, in central applying this will require fixing some things breaking
 due to some internal UI changes, but in ESR60 I did not see anything break
 so far. I think it would be ok to apply, but not sure if we want to wait
 for some progress on the bugzilla before.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30162 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser bootstrap process got stuck after interrupting it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30162: Tor Browser bootstrap process got stuck after interrupting it
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5-must,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904   |
Parent ID:  #27609   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 The default torrc file includes ControlPort auto. We also re-add another
 ControlPort auto when we save the config file. Having two entries will
 cause two control ports to open. It won't affect anything but I'll track
 this for a fix.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30404 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove Orbot Project

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30404: Remove Orbot Project
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5-must,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904   |
Parent ID:  #30168   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 Replying to [comment:2 gk]:


 > Could you remove
 > `# Move orbot files so they will be included in the apk during the
 build`
 > as well?

 Made change in branch 0506

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30388 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript and all user-installed add-ons got deactivated! (armagadd-on-2.0)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30388: NoScript and all user-installed add-ons got deactivated! 
(armagadd-on-2.0)
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, TorBrowserTeam201905R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cyberpunks):

 I'm the commenter on [comment:27]. I've changed my mind.

 According to [comment:36], setting `javascript.enabled` to `false` still
 enables web fonts and audio/video media, which probably gives a different
 fingerprint than noscript-enabled users. This is bad for anti-
 fingerprinting.

 I now think that [comment:42] is the best solution, i.e. users should
 follow the instruction in the [https://blog.torproject.org/noscript-
 temporarily-disabled-tor-browser blog post], while future tor browser
 versions should warn about `xpinstall.signatures.required` being set to
 `false`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29231 [Core Tor/Tor]: Relays vastly underreport write-total in padding-counts line in extrainfo descriptor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29231: Relays vastly underreport write-total in padding-counts line in 
extrainfo
descriptor
---+---
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay padding wtf-pad  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28634 | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet|Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 lgtm;

 Just to clarify Mike, in `write_packed_cell()`, we count the cell only if
 the cell was successfully put in the connection buffer. Any error there
 will not count the cell.

 That it OK? As I recall some stats we want to count every cell, not just
 the ones that succeeded.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30402 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Expired Certificate and "Explore Privately"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30402: Expired Certificate and "Explore Privately"
--+--
 Reporter:  Crissy2   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 +1

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30410 [Core Tor/Tor]: Chromium

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30410: Chromium
-+
 Reporter:  ovidio_mainardi  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 See [wiki:doc/ImportantGoogleChromeBugs] for blockers about Chromium-based
 browsers.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30361 [Core Tor/Tor]: CID 1444908: MISSING_LOCK / CID 1444769: TAINTED_SCALAR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30361: CID 1444908: MISSING_LOCK / CID 1444769: TAINTED_SCALAR
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  coverity  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by rl1987):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1001

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30401 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser for Android Control port file not created

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30401: Tor Browser for Android Control port file not created
--+---
 Reporter:  echaskaris|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-mobile
 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Duplicate of #30284. echaskaris, can you hop on that ticket and help us
 figuring out what is going wrong?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30284 [Applications/Tor Browser]: start fails with "Control port file not created"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30284: start fails with "Control port file not created"
+--
 Reporter:  belm0   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-must, TorBrowserTeam201904  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: echaskaris (added)


Comment:

 #30401 is a duplicate. echaskaris: can you help us out with debugging if
 we give you instructions? We would need some logcat output...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30381 [Core Tor/Tor]: Provide control port commands to ADD/REMOVE/VIEW v3 client-auth

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30381: Provide control port commands to ADD/REMOVE/VIEW v3 client-auth
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tbb-usability, ux-team, hs-  |  Actual Points:
  auth   |
Parent ID:  #14389   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 An initial torspec draft: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 dev/2019-May/013798.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30316 [Core Tor/Tor]: Vote's 'bandwidth-file-headers' is in wrong order

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30316: Vote's 'bandwidth-file-headers' is in wrong order
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks good.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30275 [Internal Services/Service - sandstorm]: Wekan not loading in Storm

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30275: Wekan not loading in Storm
-+-
 Reporter:  gaba |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service -  |Version:
  sandstorm  |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  storm wekan  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This is a bug from Wekan and has this workaround:

 {{{
 https://github.com/sandstorm-
 io/sandstorm/issues/3132#issuecomment-485948463
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30368 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Run some tests to check reachability of snowflake proxies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30368: Run some tests to check reachability of snowflake proxies
---+--
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * Attachment "snowflake-reachability-2019-05-06.pdf" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30368 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Run some tests to check reachability of snowflake proxies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30368: Run some tests to check reachability of snowflake proxies
---+--
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * Attachment "snowflake-reachability-2019-05-06.pdf" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30368 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Run some tests to check reachability of snowflake proxies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30368: Run some tests to check reachability of snowflake proxies
---+--
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 Added a plot of snowflake reachability from the VPS in China.

 Connections at or above the green line (at bootstrap = 11%) indicate that
 the snowflake proxy IP address was reachable. Connections below the green
 line indicate they were blocked. As mentioned above, the timeout for
 bootstrapping is set very low (90s) so not all connections through a
 reachable proxy were able to bootstrap fully.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30388 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript and all user-installed add-ons got deactivated! (armagadd-on-2.0)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30388: NoScript and all user-installed add-ons got deactivated! 
(armagadd-on-2.0)
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, TorBrowserTeam201905R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by Crissy2):

 > "fail safe" is better than "fail dangerous"

 But what mean fail safe and fail dangerous? It is `double epic_fail[]`!

 if certs are disabled, the add-on can't be checked... (security fail!)
 If certs are enabled and add-on becomes invalid, NoScript is disabled and
 additional user data is transmitted. Disabling JS also is not a full
 solution (`javascript.enable`). , ForeShadow, Spectree and Meltdown
 can be used here (security fail).

 Only one correct long term solution is: **we must have our version of
 NoScript fingerprinted by TorProject!**

 It looks like biggest TorBrowser fail.

 More: #30402

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18867 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ship auto-updates for Tor Browser nightly channel

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18867: Ship auto-updates for Tor Browser nightly channel
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, boklm201811, tbb-update,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pili):

 * cc: pili (added)


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[tor-bugs] #30412 [Webpages/Website]: Update Sponsors page with "Google Season of Docs" entry

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30412: Update Sponsors page with "Google Season of Docs" entry
--+--
 Reporter:  pili  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Can we have Google Season of docs added as a sponsor here:
 https://www.torproject.org/about/sponsors/?

 Logo should come from this page: https://developers.google.com/season-of-
 docs/docs/press
 Link should point to https://developers.google.com/season-of-docs/
 Text for sponsor can be taken from the "Email template for inviting
 technical writers to apply for Season of Docs" in the Promotion and press
 page (https://developers.google.com/season-of-docs/docs/press), e.g:

 "Season of Docs (g.co/seasonofdocs) is Google's annual program that
 fosters collaboration between open source projects and technical writers.

 Season of Docs is a unique program that pairs technical writers with open
 source mentors to introduce the technical writer to an open source
 community and provide guidance while the writer works on a real world open
 source project. The technical writer in turn provides documentation
 expertise to the open source organization."

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[tor-bugs] #30411 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider rewriting git hooks in Python

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30411: Consider rewriting git hooks in Python
--+
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  idea
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 In #30286 we're looking into fixing pre-push hook to inspect only the
 commits that originate from the branch being pushed and that seems to be
 pretty complicated to do with shell scripting alone. As our git hook
 complexity grows, it may become worthwhile to write them in Python and use
 some Python module (e.g. GitPython) to have deeper integration with git
 repository.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30373 [Core Tor/Tor]: Most headers non-compliant with spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30373: Most headers non-compliant with spec
---+---
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bandwidth-file-spec, tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by irl):

 Replying to [comment:4 juga]:
 > Replying to [comment:3 irl]:
 > > Replying to [comment:1 juga]:
 > > > Does it sounds fine that we just re-define `Keyword` and
 `KeywordChar` in the bandwidth file to include `_`?.
 > > >
 > > > I think we would need to increment the version though.
 > >
 > > I don't think the version needs changing, this is a "typo fix" in my
 mind. Anyone that has an implementation that works with the current sbws
 files is already complying with the change that we haven't made yet.
 >
 > A complying version is 1.0.0. A parser that is ignoring anything (as it
 should) that contains `_` will still parse the timestamp, which is the
 only required thing in 1.0.0.

 The finite state automaton that I derived from the spec is shown here:

 [[Image(graphviz-c87f837aa8efe0a4df10bd6fa2ac8ca0b38a7e0d.png​)]]

 The spec requires that Keywords have only KeywordChar in them, so
 basically any file with headers *fails* to parse. Where Keywords are
 expected, they are not found. So no, the files with headers are not
 compliant with 1.0.0.

 I think we fix this by fixing the spec though. Clearly everyone managed
 just fine until now with having _ in the headers, and people wrote parsers
 that handle them. The parsers I'm adding to bushel are just super strict,
 and designed to catch issues like this.

 > > Keyword and KeywordChar are already defined, so I wouldn't want to
 cause confusion be re-defining them, even though it's a different spec
 people have ideas in their heads about what these mean.
 > >
 > > Maybe just a new `Key`:
 > >
 > > {{{Key ::= (KeywordChar | "_")+}}}
 >
 > I agree and that sounds good, for some reason i thought we were
 redefining something else, but checked and i don't think so.

 Can you come up with a patch for the spec that replaces Keyword with Key?
 We're essentially just pretending this is the way it was all along,
 because no one implemented the spec as it's defined.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30373 [Core Tor/Tor]: Most headers non-compliant with spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30373: Most headers non-compliant with spec
---+---
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bandwidth-file-spec, tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by irl):

 * Attachment "graphviz-c87f837aa8efe0a4df10bd6fa2ac8ca0b38a7e0d.png"
 added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30388 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript and all user-installed add-ons got deactivated! (armagadd-on-2.0)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30388: NoScript and all user-installed add-ons got deactivated! 
(armagadd-on-2.0)
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, TorBrowserTeam201905R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:42 flowerpt]:
 > Since the blog asked people to "Please remember to" re-enable security,
 and that's the kind of thing which is the bane of security when it comes
 to ordinary users, can a subsequent release please force this back to
 'false' and alert the user if the flip is made?
 >
 > It's better to have people need to toggle it again than to leave people
 unintentionally unguarded.  I realize both options are sub-optimal, but
 "fail safe" is better than "fail dangerous".  Without such a change, it's
 very likely that some users will go on forever set to not validate addons
 - the typical user pattern is "fix it and forget it".

 I don't think we can do that as our decisions don't overwrite user prefs.
 We could think about showing a notification bar, though, reminding the
 users of that problem and allow them to flip the pref back easily that
 way.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30409 [Core Tor/Tor]: Some of our tests require internet connectivity / an IPv4 stack

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30409: Some of our tests require internet connectivity / an IPv4 stack
---+---
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ipv6 tor-hs tor-tests  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by rl1987):

 * cc: rl1987 (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30286 [Core Tor/Tor]: pre-push git hook will warn about fixups for no reason

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30286: pre-push git hook will warn about fixups for no reason
+
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci git-scripts  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by rl1987):

 From IRC: let's hardcode a default remote name of upstream and let it be
 overridden through environment variable (that we could set in e.g.
 .bashrc).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30373 [Core Tor/Tor]: Most headers non-compliant with spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30373: Most headers non-compliant with spec
---+---
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bandwidth-file-spec, tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by juga):

 Replying to [comment:3 irl]:
 > Replying to [comment:1 juga]:
 > > Does it sounds fine that we just re-define `Keyword` and `KeywordChar`
 in the bandwidth file to include `_`?.
 > >
 > > I think we would need to increment the version though.
 >
 > I don't think the version needs changing, this is a "typo fix" in my
 mind. Anyone that has an implementation that works with the current sbws
 files is already complying with the change that we haven't made yet.

 A complying version is 1.0.0. A parser that is ignoring anything (as it
 should) that contains `_` will still parse the timestamp, which is the
 only required thing in 1.0.0.

 >
 > Keyword and KeywordChar are already defined, so I wouldn't want to cause
 confusion be re-defining them, even though it's a different spec people
 have ideas in their heads about what these mean.
 >
 > Maybe just a new `Key`:
 >
 > {{{Key ::= (KeywordChar | "_")+}}}

 I agree and that sounds good, for some reason i thought we were redefining
 something else, but checked and i don't think so.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30394 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript should fail closed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30394: NoScript should fail closed
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:6 cypherpunks]:
 > Reopening as requested enhancement.
 >
 > The current software is like an OS that opens all the TCP ports into a
 root shell, if the kernel firewall fails to load. No exaggeration: The
 browser runs executable code from untrusted network sites.
 >
 > Tor Browser should start with `javascript.enabled` set to `false` by
 default, and only set it to `true` upon successful load of NoScript.
 >
 > Thanks to other cypherpunks, ticket:30394#comment:4
 >
 > In the rare event of NoScript failure, is better to have some users
 complain "why did the web break?" than expose ''all'' users to risk
 covered by a false sense of security.

 I doubt it would be just "some". But let's assume that for the sake of
 argument. If they'd just complain I'd be up for that idea at once.
 However, what I rather expect to happen is users just ditching Tor Browser
 as it is broken for them: they can't reach Google, Twitter etc. anymore
 and therefore can't check mails nor interact on social media. And thus,
 they will happily turn to a browser without Tor to reach their sites and
 boom!!! (This is _not_ happening for them with armagadd-on 2.0)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30406 [Core Tor/sbws]: Refactor bandwidth file header constants

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30406: Refactor bandwidth file header constants
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30255 | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn|Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => asn


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30316 [Core Tor/Tor]: Vote's 'bandwidth-file-headers' is in wrong order

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30316: Vote's 'bandwidth-file-headers' is in wrong order
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => ahf


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