Re: [tor-bugs] #26294 [Core Tor/Tor]: attacker can force intro point rotation by ddos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26294: attacker can force intro point rotation by ddos
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-dos, network-team-   |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #2   | Points:  7
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 I like 'a' as a short term plan.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30521 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: add gaba and pili to speaking@

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30521: add gaba and pili to speaking@
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 |  implemented
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 It is done.

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[tor-bugs] #30521 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: add gaba and pili to speaking@

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30521: add gaba and pili to speaking@
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We need some fresh blood on the speaking@ alias, which is our internal
 alias to coordinate speaking requests (see #23162).

 I'm going to add Gaba and Pili, on the theory that they know external
 people, they know internal people, they know capacities. And they are more
 organized than the average Tor person. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26348 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Guard against large reads

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26348: Guard against large reads
---+---
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake|Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy anti-censorship-roadmap-2019  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Okay, this looks fine to me.

 I thought of a potentially better way to write `limitedRead`: pass
 `limit+1` bytes to `io.LimitedReader`, and then return an error if either
 `io.ReadAll` returns an error, or `len(p) == limit+1`. Basically, roll the
 second read of 1 byte into the original read. If that works and it looks
 better to you, that's good to merge as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30368 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Run some tests to check reachability of snowflake proxies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30368: Run some tests to check reachability of snowflake proxies
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:8 cohosh]:
 > There are some very long periods of time where snowflake-bridge is
 unreachable, and it's strange that snowflake-proxy-3 seems to be
 unreachable this entire time.

 Ok, I agree, it looks like a qualitative difference between snowflake-
 bridge and snowflake-cohosh.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19315 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Include libwebrtc license files in bundle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19315: Include libwebrtc license files in bundle
-+
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  starter  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19001   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Old description:

> There are a ton of licenses for all the chromium files; maybe we can copy
> from the [http://metadata.ftp-master.debian.org/changelogs//main/c
> /chromium-browser/chromium-browser_51.0.2704.79-1~deb8u1_copyright Debian
> copyright file].

New description:

 There are a ton of licenses for all the chromium files; maybe we can copy
 from the [https://web.archive.org/web/20190516032310/https://metadata.ftp-
 master.debian.org/changelogs/main/c/chromium/chromium_74.0.3729.108-1_copyright
 Debian copyright file].

--

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:3 phw]:
 > I'm having troubles finding out what license files we need to include.
 Glancing at the diffs in #19001, it looks like we include at least webrtc
 and chromium's depot_tools. Is there an authoritative list of packages
 that snowflake includes, so we can figure out what license files we need?

 depot_tools isn't needed because that it's only a build tool and not
 distributed. This ticket is really only about the libwebrtc licenses, but
 as for other software used by the Snowflake client, I think it's just go-
 webrtc and its libwebrtc dependency, and https://github.com/dchest/uniuri
 which is public domain.

 The [https://webrtc.googlesource.com/src/+/refs/heads/master/LICENSE
 LICENSE] file in the WebRTC source code is needed, at least. But it
 doesn't mention the many other third-party licenses that exist in the
 source code. There's also https://webrtc.org/license/, but likewise it
 only has the WebRTC license. The
 [https://web.archive.org/web/20190516032310/https://metadata.ftp-
 master.debian.org/changelogs/main/c/chromium/chromium_74.0.3729.108-1_copyright
 Debian copyright file] for chromium is a huge list of evidently
 mechanically identified licenses. I don't know how best to handle it. But
 at least, we need the WebRTC LICENSE file.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30350 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Hello, in China, currently, Tor Browser 8.5a11 version can't connect to Tor network through Snowflake bridge.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30350: Hello, in China, currently, Tor Browser 8.5a11 version can't connect to 
Tor
network through Snowflake bridge.
-+---
 Reporter:  amiableclarity2011   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by amiableclarity2011):

 Today, currently, in China, I can't connect to the Tor network through
 snowflake bridge.

 Below are Tor log messages.


 5/16/19, 03:13:39.510 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 5/16/19, 03:13:45.446 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 5/16/19, 03:13:45.446 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 5/16/19, 03:13:45.446 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 5/16/19, 03:13:45.446 [NOTICE] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 5/16/19, 03:13:45.446 [NOTICE] Opened Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 5/16/19, 03:13:45.913 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 1% (conn_pt): Connecting to
 pluggable transport
 5/16/19, 03:13:45.915 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 2% (conn_done_pt): Connected
 to pluggable transport
 5/16/19, 03:14:28.280 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 10% (conn_done): Connected to
 a relay
 5/16/19, 03:14:58.324 [WARN] Problem bootstrapping. Stuck at 10%
 (conn_done): Connected to a relay. (DONE; DONE; count 1; recommendation
 warn; host 2B280B23E1107BB62ABFC40DDCC8824814F80A72 at 0.0.3.0:1)
 5/16/19, 03:14:58.325 [WARN] 1 connections have failed:
 5/16/19, 03:14:58.325 [WARN]  1 connections died in state handshaking
 (TLS) with SSL state SSLv2/v3 read server hello A in HANDSHAKE
 5/16/19, 03:14:58.353 [NOTICE] Closing no-longer-configured Socks listener
 on 127.0.0.1:9150
 5/16/19, 03:14:58.353 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 5/16/19, 03:14:58.353 [NOTICE] Delaying directory fetches: DisableNetwork
 is set.
 5/16/19, 03:14:58.353 [WARN] Pluggable Transport process terminated with
 status code 0

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30512 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Enable cache for ACME certificates in broker

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30512: Enable cache for ACME certificates in broker
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  arlolra cohosh dcf phw   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:3 phw]:
 > Yes, good point. I amended my patch:
 
https://github.com/NullHypothesis/snowflake/commit/0744b2930e88daf02b039e636e989d60c2467913

 I'm fine with the general approach. I was wondering if `autocert.DirCache`
 would log itself in that situation or something, but it looks like it
 doesn't provide any function like that.

 I think
 
[https://github.com/NullHypothesis/snowflake/commit/0744b2930e88daf02b039e636e989d60c2467913
 #diff-79897051d7aac1f314600a930afebe9aR227 createCertCacheDir] doesn't
 need to distinguish between the directory already existing and being newly
 created. It only needs to report an error if any.

 I would prefer if the logging happened at the top level. Have
 `createCertCacheDir` only return an error and not log, and log the error
 message in `main`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28849 [Core Tor/Tor]: Handle dormant mode in process library and for PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28849: Handle dormant mode in process library and for PT's
--+
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  dcf   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+

Comment (by dcf):

 Thanks, I think we can work with this design.

 * "If no feature extensions are supported by the parent process this
 variable SHOULD be left empty."\\
   "The PT proxy SHOULD announce its own set of supported feature
 extensions ..., but only if the `TOR_PT_FEATURES` environment variable is
 present."
   * I don't understand the reason for forbidding the PT proxy from sending
 `FEATURES` when `TOR_PT_FEATURES` is not set/present. I think the PT proxy
 should always be free to send `FEATURES`. 3.3 already says "The parent
 process MUST ignore lines received from PT proxies with unknown keywords,"
 so it's safe.
   * There's an ambiguity with the terms "empty" and "present". They could
 mean "the environment variable is unset" or "the environment variable is
 set to an empty string." IMO it's best if both of those possibilities have
 the same meaning.
 * "less resource conserving"
   * Should be "more resource conserving".
 * "The PT proxy MUST only write the `FEATURES` message once during the
 lifetime of the PT proxy process."
   * IMO it's better to specify what should happens if this is violated;
 e.g., the parent process must ignore any `FEATURES` line after the first.

 I can live without it, but because messages from the parent process to the
 PT proxy on stdin are a major change to the spec, it would be good to have
 something analogous to 3.3 (or make 3.3 more general) that says what those
 messages look like, what should happen if there's an unknown message
 (ignore), etc.

 You should invite the author of
 [https://github.com/twisteroidambassador/ptadapter ptadapter] to comment
 on the changes, because they will have to implement the parent process
 half.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30000 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Objective 2, Activity 1: Integrating client-side authorization to onion services v3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3: Objective 2, Activity 1: Integrating client-side authorization to onion
services v3
--+
 Reporter:  pili  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30281| Points:  30
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+
Changes (by gaba):

 * points:  network-team: 12-22 => 30


Comment:

 We need this ticket to have estimation for all of them. For the network-
 team work is 12-22

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Re: [tor-bugs] #14389 [Core Tor/Tor]: little-t-tor: Provide support for better TBB UI of hidden service client authorization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14389: little-t-tor: Provide support for better TBB UI of hidden service client
authorization
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tbb-usability, ux-team, hs-  |  Actual Points:
  auth, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2   |
Parent ID:  #3   | Points:  24
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * points:  14-24 => 24


Comment:

 Let's set estimation to the worst case.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30284 [Applications/Tor Browser]: start fails with "Control port file not created"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30284: start fails with "Control port file not created"
+--
 Reporter:  belm0   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-must, TorBrowserTeam201905  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by sisbell):

 This problem occurs around the environmental variable ${user.home}. When
 this is set, we use it to tell tor where to place the DataDirectory. This
 is intended to be used for the desktop, as its an unsupported property on
 Android. If it is not set, then we pick a default location on the device
 that the user has access to. This is expected on an Android device.

 On KitKat devices the system property ${user.home} is set to system root
 "/". Since the user doesn't have permission to access the root directory,
 startup fails. On other Android platforms the ${user.home} property value
 is null and tor starts up correctly.

 I'll get in a fix for testing.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #30294, #30309, #29756

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #30294, #30309, #29756 by gaba:
points to 0.1

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29212 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create more modularity inside src/core

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29212: Create more modularity inside src/core
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  15
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by gaba):

 * points:  15? => 15


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Re: [tor-bugs] #5304 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Obfsproxy should respect OutboundBindAddress in torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5304: Obfsproxy should respect OutboundBindAddress in torrc
-+-
 Reporter:  korobkov |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-spec-change needs-tor- |  Actual Points:
  change,sponsor19-can   |
Parent ID:  #30471   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-

Comment (by ahf):

 Replying to [comment:13 phw]:
 > I don't follow: isn't "use this address for an outgoing connection" also
 called "binding"? And that's why we call it `OutboundBindAddress` in tor?

 You are right. I think I thought we had another option similar to this
 that didn't have Bind in its name. It looks like we don't.

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[tor-bugs] #30520 [Core Tor/Tor]: Onion Service (v2) hosting Tor instance reporting under high load: Failed to find node for hop #1 of our path. Discarding this circuit.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30520: Onion Service (v2) hosting Tor instance reporting under high load: 
Failed
to find node for hop #1 of our path. Discarding this circuit.
--+
 Reporter:  s7r   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-hs
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 An onion hosting Tor instance is reporting strange stuff for the last 3
 days. The server was attacked (DOS / SYN Flood last days), so maybe this
 could have triggered some network connection changes but the connection
 remained active / online. The torrc is very simple:
 {{{
 SocksPort 127.0.0.1:9050
 ControlPort 0
 HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/tor_hs
 HiddenServiceVersion 2
 HiddenServicePort  127.0.0.1:
 }}}


 #1
 {{{
 May 12 11:16:08.000 [notice] Your network connection speed appears to have
 changed. Resetting timeout to 60s after 18 timeouts and 362 buildtimes.
 May 12 22:20:32.000 [notice] No circuits are opened. Relaxed timeout for
 circuit 398807 (a Hidden service: Connecting to rendezvous point 4-hop
 circuit in state doing handshakes with channel state open) to 106324ms.
 However, it appears the circuit has timed out anyway. [16 similar
 message(s) suppressed in last 3600 seconds]
 }}}

 #2
 {{{
 May 13 11:05:36.000 [notice] No circuits are opened. Relaxed timeout for
 circuit 399137 (a General-purpose client 3-hop circuit in state waiting to
 see how other guards perform with channel state open) to 106324ms.
 However, it appears the circuit has timed out anyway. [27 similar
 message(s) suppressed in last 3600 seconds]
 }}}

 #3
 {{{
 May 14 21:27:36.000 [warn] Failed to find node for hop #1 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 May 14 21:27:36.000 [notice] Our circuit 0 (id: 400112) died due to an
 invalid selected path, purpose General-purpose client. This may be a torrc
 configuration issue, or a bug. [8 similar message(s) suppressed in last
 3600 seconds]
 }}}

 I wish I could reproduce the last one. Could this be a bug that occurs
 when our primary #1 Guard is in consensus but not reachable just for a
 certain machine / IP?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30428 [Core Tor/Tor]: sendme: Failure to validate authenticated SENDMEs client side

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30428: sendme: Failure to validate authenticated SENDMEs client side
---+---
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-circuit, sendme, 041-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26288 | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:  SponsorV
---+---

Comment (by nickm):

 Left some questions on the PR.  IIUC, dgoulet is waiting for roger to
 comment more here. Let me know if that's wrong and I should move forward.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30519 [Core Tor/Tor]: Deterministic coverage on 0.4.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30519: Deterministic coverage on 0.4.1
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 I have a start here in a branch called `coverage-fixes` but I'll need to
 wait till #28878 is merged before I make it needs_review.

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[tor-bugs] #30519 [Core Tor/Tor]: Deterministic coverage on 0.4.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30519: Deterministic coverage on 0.4.1
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 I'd like us to have useful coverage diffs again.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12547 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Get analysed data from bridge reachability tests to tor-devs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12547: Get analysed data from bridge reachability tests to tor-devs
---+---
 Reporter:  hellais|  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  task   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ooni, bridge-reachability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by phw):

 * cc: phw (added)
 * parent:  #12544 =>


Comment:

 hellais, is this something we should still be pursuing?

 (Removing the closed parent ID because otherwise trac won't let me
 comment.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19315 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Include libwebrtc license files in bundle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19315: Include libwebrtc license files in bundle
-+
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  starter  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19001   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by phw):

 * cc: phw (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19315 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Include libwebrtc license files in bundle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19315: Include libwebrtc license files in bundle
-+
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  starter  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19001   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by phw):

 I'm having troubles finding out what license files we need to include.
 Glancing at the diffs in #19001, it looks like we include at least webrtc
 and chromium's depot_tools. Is there an authoritative list of packages
 that snowflake includes, so we can figure out what license files we need?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30518 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Android - Add missing command line options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30518: Android - Add missing command line options
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sisbell):

 IPv6Traffic PreferIPv6 KeepAliveIsolateSOCKSAuth are socks port flags in
 the config file, so that's probably where we want to add them.

 Android is using CookieAuthentication, we'd need another issue opened if
 we want to support HashedControlPassword.

 GeoIpFile and GeoIPv6File are already supported in torrc config file.
 DataDirectory is not currently supported so would need to be added.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30414 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move relay periodic events out of mainloop.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30414: Move relay periodic events out of mainloop.c
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  refactoring, tor-subsys, tor-relay,  |  Actual Points:
  asn-merge  |
Parent ID:  #30292   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29128 [Core Tor/Tor]: Place complete obfs4 bridge line in accessible location

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29128: Place complete obfs4 bridge line in accessible location
-+-
 Reporter:  phoul|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, tor-doc, |  Actual Points:
  040-deferred-20190220  |
Parent ID:  #30471   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by phw):

 * cc: phw (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30512 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Enable cache for ACME certificates in broker

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30512: Enable cache for ACME certificates in broker
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  arlolra cohosh dcf phw   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29128 [Core Tor/Tor]: Place complete obfs4 bridge line in accessible location

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29128: Place complete obfs4 bridge line in accessible location
-+-
 Reporter:  phoul|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, tor-doc, |  Actual Points:
  040-deferred-20190220  |
Parent ID:  #30471   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by phw):

 Over in #30331, it was suggested to either log the full bridge line, or
 write it to something like $DATADIR/pt_state/bridgelines.txt, along with
 all other PTs that the bridge runs. The problem with a log message is that
 bridge operators may accidentally publish their bridge when they paste
 their logs, e.g., here on trac.

 I suppose a bridge could write to bridgelines.txt before it publishes its
 descriptor because that's when all the necessary information is available?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30368 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Run some tests to check reachability of snowflake proxies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30368: Run some tests to check reachability of snowflake proxies
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 Starting this afternoon (it may have been happening before but I was
 unaware), access to `stun.l.google.com:19302` was blocked.

 Simply changing the client line to use
 {{{-ice stun:stunserver.org}}}
 resulted in a full bootstrap.

 I'm going to refine the snowflake tests to tell us more information about
 precisely where the blocking is occurring because this appears to be
 changing. The candidates for blocking I can think of are:
 - At the ICE Gathering stage (the connection to the client's STUN server)*
 - At the signaling stage (the connection to the domain-fronted broker)
 - At the Connectivity checking stage (the UDP connection to the snowflake
 proxy)*
 - At the connected stage (the TCP connection to the snowflake proxy)

 The stages with asterisks (*) are where we've seen blocking occur so far

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30452 [Core Tor/Tor]: List which compile-time modules are enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30452: List which compile-time modules are enabled
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-backport? 035-backport?  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final => Tor: 0.4.0.x-final


Comment:

 Merged! Moving to the 040 milestone for possible backport.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30454 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: INTRODUCE1 trunnel code doensn't handle HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_CANT_RELAY

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30454: hs-v3: INTRODUCE1 trunnel code doensn't handle
HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_CANT_RELAY
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, 034-backport, 035-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  040-backport, 041-must, nickm-merge, network-  |
  team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I've pushed the requested fix which I agree. I've also pushed a new commit
 that unifies the onion key type ABI there to the trunnel one.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30452 [Core Tor/Tor]: List which compile-time modules are enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30452: List which compile-time modules are enabled
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-backport? 035-backport?  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Thanks! The "v3" pull requests look good. (I had to restart a Travis build
 and an AppVeyor build due to transient failures.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30364 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop289: Add consensus param to use or not SENDME v1 for one-hop directory download

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30364: prop289: Add consensus param to use or not SENDME v1 for one-hop 
directory
download
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop289, sendme  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  #26288   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => 0.2


Comment:

 PR: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1027
 Branch: `ticket30364_041_01`

 The "onehop" concept was dropped because it is actually not reliable to
 figure that out but also it doesn't matter if we have a 3 hop or 1 hop I
 believe.

 In the end, any directory requests on a circuit will result in honoring
 this SENDME version from the consensus param. It is actually hard to
 associate a circuit to a hidden service directory request at the server
 side. Not impossible but hard.

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[tor-bugs] #30518 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Android - Add missing command line options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30518: Android - Add missing command line options
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-8.5-must
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 After looking at #30284 and talking with sisbell, I noticed there are some
 more differences between how tor is launched on Linux and how it is
 launched on Android. Tor isn't given geoip DBs, but that's not a problem
 right now (we can add that later). More concerning is that on desktop we
 set `IPv6Traffic` `PreferIPv6` and `KeepAliveIsolateSOCKSAuth`. The first
 two are a distinguisher at the exit node (in theory, there shouldn't be
 many ways an exit node can identify different Tor Browser platforms if the
 connection between the exit node and destination server uses TLS). We
 should set these tor config options for both consistency but also because
 not being consistent is bad for anonymity.

 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-launcher.git/tree/src/components/tl-
 process.js#n456 Where Tor Launcher sets the args]. I currently see this on
 Linux when running Tor Browser:
 {{{
 /home/user/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor
 --defaults-torrc /home/user/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor
 /torrc-defaults
 -f /home/user/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/torrc
 DataDirectory /home/user/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor
 GeoIPFile /home/user/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/geoip
 GeoIPv6File /home/user/tor-browser_en-
 US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/geoip6 HashedControlPassword 16:$hash
 127.0.0.1:9150
 IPv6Traffic PreferIPv6 KeepAliveIsolateSOCKSAuth __OwningControllerProcess
 666
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28229 [Core Tor/Tor]: Possible race condition opening SOCKS Port in test_rebind.py

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28229: Possible race condition opening SOCKS Port in test_rebind.py
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, rare?, 035-backport, |  Actual Points:
  040-backport, tor-ci-fail-sometimes|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * keywords:  tor-ci, rare?, 035-backport, 040-backport => tor-ci, rare?,
 035-backport, 040-backport, tor-ci-fail-sometimes


Comment:

 Got another failure on Travis on macOS:

 {{{
 FAIL: src/test/test_rebind.sh
 =
 ++uname -s
 ++cut -d_ -f1
 +UNAME_OS=Darwin
 +test Darwin = CYGWIN
 +test Darwin = MSYS
 +test Darwin = MINGW
 +exitcode=0
 +tmpdir=
 +trap clean EXIT HUP INT TERM
 ++mktemp -d -t tor_rebind_test.XX
 
+tmpdir=/var/folders/nz/vv4_9tw56nv9k3tkvyszvwg8gn/T/tor_rebind_test.XX.wLtKk8iu
 +'[' -z
 
/var/folders/nz/vv4_9tw56nv9k3tkvyszvwg8gn/T/tor_rebind_test.XX.wLtKk8iu
 ']'
 +'[' '!' -d
 
/var/folders/nz/vv4_9tw56nv9k3tkvyszvwg8gn/T/tor_rebind_test.XX.wLtKk8iu
 ']'
 +python3 /Users/travis/build/torproject/tor/src/test/test_rebind.py
 ./src/app/tor
 
/var/folders/nz/vv4_9tw56nv9k3tkvyszvwg8gn/T/tor_rebind_test.XX.wLtKk8iu
 2019-05-15 00:25:42.573 Tor logged: "May 15 00:25:42.561 [notice] Tor
 0.4.1.0-alpha-dev (git-cef1fd32f6ca00b3) running on Darwin with Libevent
 2.1.8-stable, OpenSSL 1.0.2o, Zlib 1.2.11, Liblzma 5.2.4, and Libzstd
 1.3.4.", waiting for "Opened Control listener on"
 2019-05-15 00:25:42.573 Tor logged: "May 15 00:25:42.563 [notice] Tor
 can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn how to be safe at
 https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning;, waiting for "Opened
 Control listener on"
 2019-05-15 00:25:42.573 Tor logged: "May 15 00:25:42.563 [notice] This
 version is not a stable Tor release. Expect more bugs than usual.",
 waiting for "Opened Control listener on"
 2019-05-15 00:25:42.574 Tor logged: "May 15 00:25:42.563 [notice] Tor is
 running with Rust integration. Please report any bugs you encounter.",
 waiting for "Opened Control listener on"
 2019-05-15 00:25:42.574 Tor logged: "May 15 00:25:42.563 [notice]
 Configuration file "/usr/local/etc/tor/torrc" not present, using
 reasonable defaults.", waiting for "Opened Control listener on"
 2019-05-15 00:25:42.574 Tor logged: "May 15 00:25:42.570 [warn]
 ControlPort is open, but no authentication method has been configured.
 This means that any program on your computer can reconfigure your Tor.
 That's bad!  You should upgrade your Tor controller as soon as possible.",
 waiting for "Opened Control listener on"
 2019-05-15 00:25:42.574 Tor logged: "May 15 00:25:42.572 [notice] Opening
 Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:35673", waiting for "Opened Control listener
 on"
 2019-05-15 00:25:42.574 Tor logged: "May 15 00:25:42.573 [notice] Opened
 Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:35673", waiting for "Opened Control listener
 on"
 2019-05-15 00:25:42.574 Tor logged: "May 15 00:25:42.573 [notice] Opening
 Control listener on 127.0.0.1:44218", waiting for "Opened Control listener
 on"
 2019-05-15 00:25:42.574 Tor logged: "May 15 00:25:42.573 [notice] Opened
 Control listener on 127.0.0.1:44218"
 2019-05-15 00:25:42.575 Tor logged: "May 15 00:25:42.573 [warn] Your log
 may contain sensitive information - you're logging more than "notice".
 Don't log unless it serves an important reason. Overwrite the log
 afterwards.", waiting for "Opened Socks listener"
 2019-05-15 00:25:42.575 Tor logged: "May 15 00:25:42.573 [info]
 options_act_reversible: Recomputed OOS thresholds: ConnLimit 1000,
 ConnLimit_ 10176, ConnLimit_high_thresh 10112, ConnLimit_low_thresh 7632",
 waiting for "Opened Socks listener"
 2019-05-15 00:25:42.575 Tor logged: "May 15 00:25:42.573 [debug]
 tor_disable_debugger_attach: Attemping to disable debugger attachment to
 Tor for unprivileged users.", waiting for "Opened Socks listener"
 2019-05-15 00:25:42.576 Tor logged: "May 15 00:25:42.573 [info]
 tor_lockfile_lock: Locking
 
"/var/folders/nz/vv4_9tw56nv9k3tkvyszvwg8gn/T/tor_rebind_test.XX.wLtKk8iu/lock"",
 waiting for "Opened Socks listener"
 2019-05-15 00:25:42.576 Tor logged: "May 15 00:25:42.576 [debug]
 parse_dir_authority_line: Trusted 100 dirserver at 128.31.0.39:9131
 (9695)", waiting for "Opened Socks listener"
 

Re: [tor-bugs] #26846 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop289: Leave unused random bytes in relay cell payload

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26846: prop289: Leave unused random bytes in relay cell payload
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop289, 035-roadmap-subtask,|  Actual Points:
  prop289-assigned-sponsor-v, 041-proposed-on-   |
  roadmap|
Parent ID:  #26288   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  implemented =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30451 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: snowflake-client has executable stack

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30451: snowflake-client has executable stack
-+---
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905R|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by cohosh):

 * Attachment "0001-Compile-go-webrtc-with-a-non-executable-stack.2.patch"
 added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30451 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: snowflake-client has executable stack

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30451: snowflake-client has executable stack
-+--
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905R|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:6 gk]:
 > This seems to be something to review for us? Setting the respective
 keyword. So, *is* this just a Linux issue or not? comment:4 seems to
 suggest so, but the patch touches non-Linux parts as well (like in the
 `go` config file) which confuses me.

 That was my bad, I forgot to make the environment variable change for
 linux only. I uploaded a new version of the patch that should fix this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #5304 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Obfsproxy should respect OutboundBindAddress in torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5304: Obfsproxy should respect OutboundBindAddress in torrc
-+-
 Reporter:  korobkov |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-spec-change needs-tor- |  Actual Points:
  change,sponsor19-can   |
Parent ID:  #30471   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-

Comment (by phw):

 Replying to [comment:11 ahf]:
 > But it's not just for binding it is also for being used as source
 address for outgoing connections. Maybe `TOR_PT_OUTBOUND_ADDRESS` ?

 I don't follow: isn't "use this address for an outgoing connection" also
 called "binding"? And that's why we call it `OutboundBindAddress` in tor?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #5304 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Obfsproxy should respect OutboundBindAddress in torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5304: Obfsproxy should respect OutboundBindAddress in torrc
-+-
 Reporter:  korobkov |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-spec-change needs-tor- |  Actual Points:
  change,sponsor19-can   |
Parent ID:  #30471   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by phw):

 * parent:   => #30471


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20943 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Clarify documentation for obfs4 setup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20943: Clarify documentation for obfs4 setup
-+
 Reporter:  kaie |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30471   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 My take-aways from this are:
 * `ExtORPort` is poorly named and therefore sometimes misunderstood. We
 try to address this confusion in our
 
[https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/PluggableTransports/obfs4proxy
 obfs4 setup guide].
 * It's not clear what hash should be used for a client's bridge line.
 #29128 will result in an easy-to-copy bridge line.
 * There was some confusion with the host's multiple IP addresses. #5304
 will address this issue.

 I'm closing this because we already have tickets for the remaining obfs4
 UX issues.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30350 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Hello, in China, currently, Tor Browser 8.5a11 version can't connect to Tor network through Snowflake bridge.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30350: Hello, in China, currently, Tor Browser 8.5a11 version can't connect to 
Tor
network through Snowflake bridge.
-+---
 Reporter:  amiableclarity2011   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:27 amiableclarity2011]:
 > A moment ago, in China, I can establish a Tor circuit through Snowflake
 bridge. But there is a warning in the Tor log messages.
 >
 > Below are Tor log messages.
 >
 >
 > 5/15/19, 15:55:40.969 [NOTICE] new bridge descriptor 'flakey' (fresh):
 $2B280B23E1107BB62ABFC40DDCC8824814F80A72~flakey at 0.0.3.0
 > 5/15/19, 15:55:50.471 [NOTICE] Guard
 $2B280B23E1107BB62ABFC40DDCC8824814F80A72
 ($2B280B23E1107BB62ABFC40DDCC8824814F80A72) is failing more circuits than
 usual. Most likely this means the Tor network is overloaded. Success
 counts are 144/287. Use counts are 62/68. 279 circuits completed, 0 were
 unusable, 134 collapsed, and 10 timed out. For reference, your timeout
 cutoff is 60 seconds.
 > 5/15/19, 15:55:50.475 [WARN] Guard
 $2B280B23E1107BB62ABFC40DDCC8824814F80A72
 ($2B280B23E1107BB62ABFC40DDCC8824814F80A72) is failing a very large amount
 of circuits. Most likely this means the Tor network is overloaded, but it
 could also mean an attack against you or potentially the guard itself.
 Success counts are 144/289. Use counts are 62/68. 279 circuits completed,
 0 were unusable, 134 collapsed, and 10 timed out. For reference, your
 timeout cutoff is 60 seconds.

 I'm glad you're able to connect :)

 There's no need to worry about this warning at the moment. We believe it
 occurs because of the frequent blocking or unreliability of snowflake
 proxies.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30350 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Hello, in China, currently, Tor Browser 8.5a11 version can't connect to Tor network through Snowflake bridge.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30350: Hello, in China, currently, Tor Browser 8.5a11 version can't connect to 
Tor
network through Snowflake bridge.
-+---
 Reporter:  amiableclarity2011   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by amiableclarity2011):

 A moment ago, in China, I can establish a Tor circuit through Snowflake
 bridge. But there is a warning in the Tor log messages.

 Below are Tor log messages.


 5/15/19, 15:55:21.426 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 5/15/19, 15:55:32.914 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 5/15/19, 15:55:32.914 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 5/15/19, 15:55:32.915 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 5/15/19, 15:55:32.915 [NOTICE] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 5/15/19, 15:55:32.915 [NOTICE] Opened Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 5/15/19, 15:55:33.381 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 1% (conn_pt): Connecting to
 pluggable transport
 5/15/19, 15:55:33.384 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 2% (conn_done_pt): Connected
 to pluggable transport
 5/15/19, 15:55:36.540 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 10% (conn_done): Connected to
 a relay
 5/15/19, 15:55:37.707 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 14% (handshake): Handshaking
 with a relay
 5/15/19, 15:55:38.290 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 15% (handshake_done):
 Handshake with a relay done
 5/15/19, 15:55:38.290 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 75% (enough_dirinfo): Loaded
 enough directory info to build circuits
 5/15/19, 15:55:38.300 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 95% (circuit_create):
 Establishing a Tor circuit
 5/15/19, 15:55:40.969 [NOTICE] new bridge descriptor 'flakey' (fresh):
 $2B280B23E1107BB62ABFC40DDCC8824814F80A72~flakey at 0.0.3.0
 5/15/19, 15:55:50.471 [NOTICE] Guard
 $2B280B23E1107BB62ABFC40DDCC8824814F80A72
 ($2B280B23E1107BB62ABFC40DDCC8824814F80A72) is failing more circuits than
 usual. Most likely this means the Tor network is overloaded. Success
 counts are 144/287. Use counts are 62/68. 279 circuits completed, 0 were
 unusable, 134 collapsed, and 10 timed out. For reference, your timeout
 cutoff is 60 seconds.
 5/15/19, 15:55:50.475 [WARN] Guard
 $2B280B23E1107BB62ABFC40DDCC8824814F80A72
 ($2B280B23E1107BB62ABFC40DDCC8824814F80A72) is failing a very large amount
 of circuits. Most likely this means the Tor network is overloaded, but it
 could also mean an attack against you or potentially the guard itself.
 Success counts are 144/289. Use counts are 62/68. 279 circuits completed,
 0 were unusable, 134 collapsed, and 10 timed out. For reference, your
 timeout cutoff is 60 seconds.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28780 [Core Tor/Tor]: circpadding: Add machine flag for not closing circuit if machine is active

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28780: circpadding: Add machine flag for not closing circuit if machine is 
active
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:  6
  padding, 041-proposed, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #28634   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged the PR above! Onwards!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29734 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Broker should receive country stats information from Proxy and Client

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29734: Broker should receive country stats information from Proxy and Client
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake, geoip, stats  |  Actual Points:  2
Parent ID:  #29207   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+-

Comment (by cohosh):

 Okay finally provisionally deployed the geoip updates and merged the
 changes to master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30428 [Core Tor/Tor]: sendme: Failure to validate authenticated SENDMEs client side

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30428: sendme: Failure to validate authenticated SENDMEs client side
---+---
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-circuit, sendme, 041-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26288 | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:  SponsorV
---+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Finally pushed the revision. I had to rebase on latest master since the
 cpath layer was refactored to hide the `relay_crypto_t` object which
 basically made this branch _not_ work and complicated conflict to resolve.
 Thus the new PR.

 With the chutney bidi branch from nickm, I confirm that this works
 properly now (the `TIMEOUT = 3` needed to be changed to be able to
 transfer more than 5MB).

 The SENDME v0 also still works properly. And I've tested with a network
 supporting and emitting only v1 with a client that only supports v0. And
 vice versa with a network only v0 with a client doing v1.

 PR: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1026
 Branch: `ticket30428_041_02`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30507 [Metrics/Website]: Update CollecTor page to include bandwidth files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30507: Update CollecTor page to include bandwidth files
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21378   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This was a smaller change than expected. Merged and deployed. Closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28634 [Core Tor/Tor]: Design a first useful padding machine (hiding client-side intro/rend circuits)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28634: Design a first useful padding machine (hiding client-side intro/rend
circuits)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  8
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 Replying to [comment:28 mikeperry]:
 > Replying to [comment:26 asn]:
 > > Looks good to me! I also successfuly tested that the rate limiting
 rules apply correctly, and also cannot trigger on the current machines.
 > >
 > > One last thing we might want to fix is that I've been getting spammed
 by this log message in chutney even for machines were RTT is not enabled
 (like these ones):
 > > {{{
 > > May 14 12:25:18.162 [notice] Got two cells back to back on a circuit
 before estimating RTT.
 > > }}}
 >
 > I believe this should be fixed by #29085. While optimizing to avoid
 monotime, I added a fast-path that also has the effect of avoiding the
 branch that contains this log message if the feature is disabled.
 >

 Hm, I don't think that's the case. At least in my testing I got both the
 above msg and `Circuit sent two cells back to back before estimating RTT`
 with the branch from comment:24, plus the latest #28780 and #29085.

 > Which chutney tests are you testing with and how are you doing
 verification?
 >

 I've been testing with chutney hs-v3 template. Here are some useful
 queries:
 `grep -R relay_ip net/nodes/*/*log` to find which relay got the relay-side
 IP machine
 `$ grep marked net/nodes/008c/info.log` to check that the circuits get
 closed as intended. For example:
 {{{
 $ grep marked net/nodes/008c/info.log
 May 15 17:11:34.411 [warn] Circuit 10 is not marked for close because of a
 pending padding machine.
 ...
 May 15 17:14:53.195 [info] circuit_mark_for_close_(): Circuit 3868216775
 (id: 10) marked for close at src/core/or/circuituse.c:1509 (orig reason:
 9, new reason: 0)
 }}}
 where the above is with `MaxCircuitDirtiness 3 minutes` on the client-
 side.

 > Do you think we could add something simple to the chutney tests to check
 for any obvious weirdness automatically?

 I doubt we can test this feature automatically with chutney with a simple
 mod, but I don't know chutney enough to give a comprehensive answer.

 Mike this whole thing looks good to me, apart from the annoying RTT log
 messages. Can you fix the RTT log messages, and give it a test on chutney,
 and then we can mark as merge_ready? I will check-in online at night.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28780 [Core Tor/Tor]: circpadding: Add machine flag for not closing circuit if machine is active

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28780: circpadding: Add machine flag for not closing circuit if machine is 
active
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:  6
  padding, 041-proposed, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #28634   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 There were some conflicts on the latest branch here and the newly merged
 #29085 because of `010779176b` and `5638d65f79`. I made a new PR that we
 can merge as soon as it's green:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1025

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[tor-bugs] #30517 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Please create tor-android-service user repo for gk

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30517: Please create tor-android-service user repo for gk
-+
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 Please create a user/gk/tor-android-service repository. Read access for
 everyone,
 push access for gk.

 Description: "Georg's tor-android-service repo"

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[tor-bugs] #30516 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Please hook tor-android-service and tor-browser-bundle-testsuite commits to tbb-commits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30516: Please hook tor-android-service and tor-browser-bundle-testsuite 
commits to
tbb-commits
-+
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 We have the tbb-commits mailing list to keep easier track of all Tor
 Browser related commits that get pushed. Please hook `tor-android-service`
 and `tor-browser-bundle-testsuite` commits so subscribers to `tbb-commits`
 get emails for commits to those repos as well. The testsuite repo to track
 for now is boklm's respective user repo.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30462 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Orbot, Tor Browser for Android (Alpha), Orfox don't work on Chrome OS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30462: Orbot, Tor Browser for Android (Alpha), Orfox don't work on Chrome OS
--+---
 Reporter:  softwdensky   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * owner:  n8fr8 => tbb-team
 * component:  Applications/Orbot => Applications/Tor Browser
 * keywords:   => tbb-mobile


Comment:

 Could you give us some steps to reproduce your problem? If you have Tor
 Browser for Android there is no need to have Orfox running as well, for
 what it is worth.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30451 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: snowflake-client has executable stack

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30451: snowflake-client has executable stack
-+---
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905R|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information
 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201905R


Comment:

 This seems to be something to review for us? Setting the respective
 keyword. So, *is* this just a Linux issue or not? comment:4 seems to
 suggest so, but the patch touches non-Linux parts as well (like in the
 `go` config file) which confuses me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30414 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move relay periodic events out of mainloop.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30414: Move relay periodic events out of mainloop.c
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  refactoring, tor-subsys, tor-relay,  |  Actual Points:
  asn-merge  |
Parent ID:  #30292   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  refactoring, tor-subsys, tor-relay => refactoring, tor-subsys,
 tor-relay, asn-merge


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30414 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move relay periodic events out of mainloop.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30414: Move relay periodic events out of mainloop.c
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement | Status:
|  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  refactoring, tor-subsys, tor-relay  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30292  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor31-can
+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * cc: dgoulet (removed)
 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * keywords:   => refactoring, tor-subsys, tor-relay


Comment:

 ACK!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29085 [Core Tor/Tor]: WTF-PAD: Reduce monotime usage because of performance issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29085: WTF-PAD: Reduce monotime usage because of performance issues
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, asn-merge   |
Parent ID:  #28634   | Points:  4
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged! Thanks everyone!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28878 [Core Tor/Tor]: WTF-PAD: Improve deterministic randomness in tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28878: WTF-PAD: Improve deterministic randomness in tests
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:  .2
  padding, tor-tests |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 (I've rebased this branch on master, now that #30475 is merged)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30475 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs_service.c: compile-time warning with GCC 9.1.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30475: hs_service.c: compile-time warning with GCC 9.1.1
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  040-must 035-backport  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID: | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet|Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


Comment:

 Merged to 0.3.5 as well, to prevent us from accumulating too many branches
 I can't build at home :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29085 [Core Tor/Tor]: WTF-PAD: Reduce monotime usage because of performance issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29085: WTF-PAD: Reduce monotime usage because of performance issues
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, asn-merge   |
Parent ID:  #28634   | Points:  4
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:
 wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell, padding, 041-proposed, network-team-
 roadmap-2019-Q1Q2
 =>
 wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell, padding, 041-proposed, network-team-
 roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, asn-merge
 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 I think this is okay now -- at least, I'm out of issues. I'm going to pass
 it on to asn for a final look before squash

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30029 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Objective 2, Activity 5: POC for Human-memorable addresses for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30029: Objective 2, Activity 5: POC for Human-memorable addresses for .onion
services
--+
 Reporter:  pili  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30281| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+

Comment (by asn):

 I think the mailing list is the right place for these discussions FWIW.
 Also see this https://blog.torproject.org/cooking-onions-names-your-onions
 blog post.

 IMO anyone who advocates for a petname solution (which is just a generic
 term at this point) should provide a precise specification/design plan
 with clear explanation of why it's superior to browser bookmarks or other
 systems. Everything can be considered a petname-like solution, including
 the https-e plan of #28005.

 I'd suggest you take further discussion to the [tor-dev] mailing list, and
 I welcome any concrete proposals on things we can do here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30514 [UX]: Review advice on VPN use during onboarding

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30514: Review advice on VPN use during onboarding
-+--
 Reporter:  dunqan   |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  UX   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by dunqan):

 For reference, the onboarding flow currently discusses VPNs in the third
 slide here:

 [[Image(https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/raw-
 attachment/ticket/30514/tb-onboarding-privacy.png, 700px)]]

 However either first-time users are not reading this or it is not explicit
 enough in its advice.

 We have a short but direct bit of advice on support.tpo.org:
 https://support.torproject.org/faq/faq-5/

 And the General FAQ in our docs has a slightly longer explanation:
 https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#IsTorLikeAVPN

 So we probably need to:

 a. Update the onboarding with more direct language
 b. Link out to a more definitive explanation on support or docs (i.e. the
 new text Wayward is working on)
 c. Consider increasing the exposure of this topic in the onboarding if
 necessary, e.g. by featuring it in the slide title, using a text-highlight
 effect or creating a new slide entirely dedicated to this topic.

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30475 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs_service.c: compile-time warning with GCC 9.1.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30475: hs_service.c: compile-time warning with GCC 9.1.1
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-must 035-backport  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID: | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet|Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by asn):

 * keywords:  040-must 035-backport asn-merge => 040-must 035-backport


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30475 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs_service.c: compile-time warning with GCC 9.1.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30475: hs_service.c: compile-time warning with GCC 9.1.1
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-must 035-backport asn-merge  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 Merged 040 and onwards. Keeping it open for the backports.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30514 [UX]: Review advice on VPN use during onboarding

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30514: Review advice on VPN use during onboarding
-+--
 Reporter:  dunqan   |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  UX   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by dunqan):

 * Attachment "tb-onboarding-privacy.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30350 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Hello, in China, currently, Tor Browser 8.5a11 version can't connect to Tor network through Snowflake bridge.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30350: Hello, in China, currently, Tor Browser 8.5a11 version can't connect to 
Tor
network through Snowflake bridge.
-+---
 Reporter:  amiableclarity2011   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by amiableclarity2011):

 Today, in China, at first I can connect to Tor network through snowflake
 bridge. But after about 40 minutes or 50 minutes, I can't open any webpage
 in Tor browser. Currently, I can't connect to Tor network through
 snowflake bridge. It seems that China's firewall can automatically detect
 the snowflake proxies and automatically block the snowflake proxies that I
 use.

 Below are the Tor log messages.

 5/15/19, 10:45:56.392 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 5/15/19, 10:45:56.392 [NOTICE] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 5/15/19, 10:45:56.392 [NOTICE] Opened Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 5/15/19, 10:45:57.331 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 1% (conn_pt): Connecting to
 pluggable transport
 5/15/19, 10:45:57.332 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 2% (conn_done_pt): Connected
 to pluggable transport
 5/15/19, 10:46:00.237 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 10% (conn_done): Connected to
 a relay
 5/15/19, 10:46:30.266 [WARN] Problem bootstrapping. Stuck at 10%
 (conn_done): Connected to a relay. (DONE; DONE; count 1; recommendation
 warn; host 2B280B23E1107BB62ABFC40DDCC8824814F80A72 at 0.0.3.0:1)
 5/15/19, 10:46:30.267 [WARN] 1 connections have failed:
 5/15/19, 10:46:30.268 [WARN]  1 connections died in state handshaking
 (TLS) with SSL state SSLv2/v3 read server hello A in HANDSHAKE
 5/15/19, 10:46:30.305 [NOTICE] Closing no-longer-configured Socks listener
 on 127.0.0.1:9150
 5/15/19, 10:46:30.305 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 5/15/19, 10:46:30.305 [NOTICE] Delaying directory fetches: DisableNetwork
 is set.
 5/15/19, 10:46:30.306 [WARN] Pluggable Transport process terminated with
 status code 0

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[tor-bugs] #30515 [Community/Tor Support]: support portal: update confguration examples with current config

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30515: support portal: update confguration examples with current config
-+-
 Reporter:  emmapeel |  Owner:  wayward
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor|Version:
  Support|   Keywords:  documentation, torrc,
 Severity:  Normal   |  support portal
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 the examples of configuration found at:

 https://support.torproject.org/#operators

 need to be updated to the current default configuration for torrc

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[tor-bugs] #30514 [UX]: Review advice on VPN use during onboarding

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30514: Review advice on VPN use during onboarding
-+--
 Reporter:  dunqan   |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  UX
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 Many first-time users are attempting to configure VPNs on Tor Browser,
 some of whom mistakenly believe VPN usage is critical to protecting their
 privacy.

 This ticket is to review the existing onboarding flow as an education
 opportunity, and amend as required to provide up to date advice on VPN
 use.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30392 [Applications/Tor Browser]: CSS features allow real-time tracking

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30392: CSS features allow real-time tracking
--+--
 Reporter:  davywtf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30162 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser bootstrap process got stuck after interrupting it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30162: Tor Browser bootstrap process got stuck after interrupting it
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5-must,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905   |
Parent ID:  #27609   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Okay, testing the 0505 branch I think the situation improved, so I picked
 this up for the 8.5 release. It seems we still have issues, though, right?
 (e.g. the one in comment:14) sisbell: Do you want to use this ticket for
 fixing those (as it seems the scenario in comment:14 is still impeding
 proper bootstrapping) or do you want to open a new one? (I am fine with
 either option)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30166 [Applications/Tor Browser]: If custom bridges are specified, only use those bridges for connecting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30166: If custom bridges are specified, only use those bridges for connecting
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5-must,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905   |
Parent ID:  #27609   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_revision => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks! Merged to `master` (commit
 9276f194da86c48792c8ebee23dd4e7056d01eae) and cherry-picked to `maint-8.5`
 (commit 05c9f970270441c071dc66b51034f4343a83c7de).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30404 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove Orbot Project

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30404: Remove Orbot Project
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5-must,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905R, tbb-backport|
Parent ID:  #30168   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5-must, TorBrowserTeam201905R => tbb-mobile,
 tbb-8.5-must, TorBrowserTeam201905R, tbb-backport


Comment:

 Marking for possible backport or a -build3 if we do that one.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30415 [Metrics/Website]: broken url in metrics.tpo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30415: broken url in metrics.tpo
-+--
 Reporter:  gaba |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 ExoneraTor 4.1.0 is released, metrics-web is updated. This fixes the
 issue! Closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30495 [Metrics/ExoneraTor]: Release ExoneraTor 4.1.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30495: Release ExoneraTor 4.1.0
+-
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/ExoneraTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks for checking!

 Release: https://dist.torproject.org/exonerator/4.1.0/

 Closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30489 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove Unused Resources from tor-android-service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30489: Remove Unused Resources from tor-android-service
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tor-android-service, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_revision => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Okay, this looks mostly good to me. Merged to `master` with commit
 7da84f3e1f23edf26fbd8183a61ba4aedfe364fe. To save another roundtrip I
 pushed a fixup commit (28cc173eed552521a02b8edd94f4b7be8df7897f) to remove
 superfluous whitespace that suddenly showed up.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29982 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clicking on cog/gear icon crashes Tor Browser for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29982: Clicking on cog/gear icon crashes Tor Browser for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3, tbb-8.5-must,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:8 sysrqb]:
 > Indeed. This was a simple and silly bug. When using an older Android
 versions on a tablet (or other large-screen device), Android tries
 creating a preference "flow", where it first shows a panel containing only
 headers (title and summary), then the user selects one of the headers and
 Android shows the real preference screen. We didn't implement the initial
 headers screen because it wasn't part of our goal (we really only targeted
 smaller devices, too).
 >
 > On newer versions of Android, the preferences are shown regardless of
 whether the headers are defined (so it handles our implementation well
 enough). On older versions of Android, I assume the user is shown all the
 defined headers - in our case, there are zero headers and therefore a
 blank screen is shown. This patch tells Android it should skip the headers
 and go straight to the fragment we define on the line above it.
 >
 > Branch `bug29982` in my repo.

 Nice find! The change looks good to me and I applied it tor `tor-
 browser-60.6.1esr-8.5-1` (commit 6a6052976627429027602a3b6871f0ae37aaa36d)
 and `tor-browser-60.6.1esr-9.0-1` (commit
 b914bb89ff0d07765c29a11ead947315f1e6d054).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30489 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove Unused Resources from tor-android-service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30489: Remove Unused Resources from tor-android-service
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tor-android-service, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nobell):

 What's wrong with you, sisbell? Set `TorBrowserTeam201905R` and
 `needs_review` appropriately.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29982 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clicking on cog/gear icon crashes Tor Browser for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29982: Clicking on cog/gear icon crashes Tor Browser for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3, tbb-8.5-must,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nobell):

 Replying to [comment:8 sysrqb]:
 > Branch `bug29982` in my repo.
 BTW, if you want to get a review from the Tor Browser team, you should set
 `TorBrowserTeam201905R` keyword.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28780 [Core Tor/Tor]: circpadding: Add machine flag for not closing circuit if machine is active

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28780: circpadding: Add machine flag for not closing circuit if machine is 
active
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:  6
  padding, 041-proposed, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #28634   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Thanks Nick! I replied with the specific fixup commit hashes on your
 review in the old PR, but I had to open a new PR due to merge/practracker
 conflicts: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1023

 (I think we should make a new ticket for figuring out a good pattern to
 refactor circuit build timeout, circuit idle expiry, circuit dirty expiry,
 normal circuit close, cannibalization, purpose/ownership changes, and
 error-driven close into a new module/design pattern, and then that one
 could support some kind of API for stuff like this, but I still think this
 approach is pretty narrow and controlled given all of the other snakes in
 this pile).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29085 [Core Tor/Tor]: WTF-PAD: Reduce monotime usage because of performance issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29085: WTF-PAD: Reduce monotime usage because of performance issues
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #28634   | Points:  4
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Thanks Nick, your review found 1 bug and prompted new unit tests that
 found 2 more!

 I had to open a new PR again because of merge/practracker conflicts.

 New PR is at https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1024

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