Re: [tor-bugs] #30424 [Webpages/Support]: Suggestions for better wording in Tor-support-portal

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30424: Suggestions for better wording in Tor-support-portal
--+
 Reporter:  sveinki   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30423| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by emmapeel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 thanks for the corrections sveinki! they should be up now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30423 [Webpages/Support]: Typos in Tor-support-portal

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30423: Typos in Tor-support-portal
--+
 Reporter:  sveinki   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by emmapeel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 thanks for the corrections sveinki! they should be up now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30237 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30237: Tor Browser: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization
--+---
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #3| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 Hah, almost the same idea I had tonight. :) Yes, I think we should try to
 use that one and style it so nobody thinks it is a browser
 username/password prompt. And I think we should make it modal. That should
 give another hint about the dialog being not a usual username/password
 prompt. "modal" not in the sense of the HTTP authentication dialog which
 pops up if you load a page but need to wait and get bored switching to a
 different tab and suddenly an authentication prompt pops up out of
 nowhere. We should not do that. But "modal" in the sense that you can't
 click it away if you are on the page unless you either press Cancel or
 Done.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30067 [Core Tor/sbws]: Update sbws' travis config, based on chutney's travis config

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30067: Update sbws' travis config, based on chutney's travis config
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  sbws: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-ci|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29729 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * priority:  Medium => High
 * type:  defect => enhancement
 * severity:  Normal => Major


Comment:

 Bumping up the priority here. It doesn't take very long to rewrite a
 travis config, but it helped us find a whole bunch of issues in chutney
 (#29729) and stem (#28170).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30235 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor hangs when asked to change DisableAllSwap over the control port

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30235: Tor hangs when asked to change DisableAllSwap over the control port
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.4.8-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  #29437 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by teor):

 Do you think we should change tor so it rejects DisableAllSwap over the
 control port?

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[tor-bugs] #30598 [Core Tor/Stem]: test_relay_cell fails on pypy 3.5

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30598: test_relay_cell fails on pypy 3.5
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  ci, travis
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #28170
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 {{{
 test_relay_cell  [FAILURE]
 test_unimplemented_cell_methods1 ms  [SUCCESS]
 test_unpack_for_new_link   3 ms  [SUCCESS]
 test_versions_cell 3 ms  [SUCCESS]
 test_vpadding_cell 3 ms  [SUCCESS]
 ==
 ERROR: test_relay_cell
 --
 Traceback (most recent call last):
   File "/home/travis/build/teor2345/stem/test/unit/client/cell.py", line
 212, in test_relay_cell
 self.assertEqual(3257622417, RelayCell(5, 'RELAY_BEGIN_DIR', '',
 digest, 564346860).digest)
   File "/home/travis/build/teor2345/stem/stem/client/cell.py", line 363,
 in __init__
 raise ValueError('RELAY cell digest must be a hash, string, or int but
 was a %s' % type(digest).__name__)
 ValueError: RELAY cell digest must be a hash, string, or int but was a
 Hash
 --
 Ran 16 tests in 0.056s
 FAILED (errors=1)
 }}}
 https://travis-ci.org/teor2345/stem/jobs/536613181#L1526

 It looks like hash and Hash are different classes in pypy.
 Maybe they're the same in C python?

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[tor-bugs] #30597 [Core Tor/Stem]: bandwidth_file test_version_position fails on python 3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30597: bandwidth_file test_version_position fails on python 3
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  ci, travis
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #28170
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 {{{
   descriptor.bandwidth_file... failed (0.02s)
 test_content_example   0 ms  [SUCCESS]
 test_format_v1_0   3 ms  [SUCCESS]
 test_format_v1_2   3 ms  [SUCCESS]
 test_from_str  0 ms  [SUCCESS]
 test_header_alternate_div  2 ms  [SUCCESS]
 test_header_for_v1 0 ms  [SUCCESS]
 test_invalid_timestamp 1 ms  [SUCCESS]
 test_minimal_bandwidth_file0 ms  [SUCCESS]
 test_new_header_attribute  0 ms  [SUCCESS]
 test_version_position[FAILURE]
 ==
 FAIL: test_version_position
 --
 Traceback (most recent call last):
   File
 "/home/travis/build/teor2345/stem/test/unit/descriptor/bandwidth_file.py",
 line 215, in test_version_position
 self.assertEqual(RIGHT_VERSION_POSITION, content)
 AssertionError:
 '1410723598\nversion=1.1.0\nfile_created=2019-01-14T05:35:06\n=' !=
 b'1410723598\nversion=1.1.0\nfile_created=2019-01-14T05:35:06\n='
 --
 Ran 10 tests in 0.014s
 FAILED (failures=1)
 }}}
 https://travis-ci.org/teor2345/stem/jobs/536613177#L1463

 Looks like bytes/string confusion to me.

 This error happens on python 3.6 and 3.7, and pypy 3.5.
 The python 3.8 builds fail before this test.

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[tor-bugs] #30596 [Core Tor/Stem]: stem tests expect platform.linux_distribution, which does not exist in python 3.8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30596: stem tests expect platform.linux_distribution, which does not exist in
python 3.8
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  ci, travis
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #28170
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 {{{
   python version...  3.8.0a3+
   operating system...failed
 module 'platform' has no attribute 'linux_distribution'
 The command "./run_tests.py --unit" exited with 1.
 }}}
 https://travis-ci.org/teor2345/stem/jobs/536613179#L1529

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[tor-bugs] #30595 [Core Tor/Stem]: Stem unit tests hang after doctest on macOS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30595: Stem unit tests hang after doctest on macOS
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  ci, travis
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #28170
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 {{{
   doctest...   success (0.08s)
 No output has been received in the last 10m0s, this potentially indicates
 a stalled build or something wrong with the build itself.
 Check the details on how to adjust your build configuration on:
 https://docs.travis-ci.com/user/common-build-problems/#Build-times-out-
 because-no-output-was-received
 The build has been terminated
 }}}
 https://travis-ci.org/teor2345/stem/jobs/536613170#L364

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[tor-bugs] #30594 [Core Tor/Stem]: stem unit tests fail on Tor 0.2.9, which is still supported until 1 January 2020

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30594: stem unit tests fail on Tor 0.2.9, which is still supported until 1 
January
2020
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  ci, travis, stem
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #28170
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+--
 {{{
   client.connection... failed (0.05s)
 test_connection_time  25 ms  [SUCCESS]
 test_established [FAILURE]
 test_invalid_arguments 1 ms  [SUCCESS]
 test_no_common_link_protocol   9 ms  [SUCCESS]
 test_not_orport1 ms  [SUCCESS]
 ==
 FAIL: test_established
 --
 Traceback (most recent call last):
   File "/home/travis/build/teor2345/stem/test/integ/client/connection.py",
 line 66, in test_established
 self.assertEqual(5, int(conn.link_protocol))
 AssertionError: 5 != 4
 --
 Ran 5 tests in 0.042s
 FAILED (failures=1)
 }}}
 https://travis-ci.org/teor2345/stem/jobs/536613171#L1865

 Link protocol 4 is supported by 0.2.9, and 5 is supported by 0.3.1.1-alpha
 and later:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/tor-spec.txt#n1984

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28170 [Core Tor/Stem]: Test stem pull requests against all supported tor versions, and tor nightly builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28170: Test stem pull requests against all supported tor versions, and tor 
nightly
builds
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ci, travis |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  #29729 | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 ci, travis, 035-deferred-20190115, 041-proposed, teor-
 unreached-2019-03-08
 => ci, travis
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28170 [Core Tor/Stem]: Test stem pull requests against all supported tor versions, and tor nightly builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28170: Test stem pull requests against all supported tor versions, and tor 
nightly
builds
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Stem|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ci, travis, 035-deferred-20190115,   |  Actual Points:  0.2
  041-proposed, teor-unreached-2019-03-08|
Parent ID:  #29729   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * points:   => 0.2
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor31-can
 * actualpoints:   => 0.2


Comment:

 This ticket can be sponsor 31, because working stem tests help us refactor
 tor.

 I used the chutney Travis config from #30279, with some minor edits based
 on the old stem Travis config.

 See my pull request:
 https://github.com/torproject/stem/pull/14

 Or the build for the original branch:
 https://travis-ci.org/teor2345/stem/builds/536613169

 We're seeing the hangs from #29437 here, as well as a bunch of other
 issues. I'll open child tickets for them.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30593 [Core Tor/Stem]: Fix argument passing in docs/republish

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30593: Fix argument passing in docs/republish
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ci, travis |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #28170 | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 This ticket can be sponsor 31, because working stem tests help us refactor
 tor.

 I put the changes in a separate commit in my #28170 branch.

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[tor-bugs] #30593 [Core Tor/Stem]: Fix argument passing in docs/republish

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30593: Fix argument passing in docs/republish
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  ci, travis
Actual Points:  0.1|  Parent ID:  #28170
   Points:  0.1|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 shellcheck complains of quoting issues with `$*`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30591 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make Travis stem log at info level, and tail the log

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30591: Make Travis stem log at info level, and tail the log
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #29437 | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * component:  Core Tor/Stem => Core Tor/Tor


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[tor-bugs] #30592 [Core Tor/Stem]: How do I make stem log info-level to test/data/tor_log?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30592: How do I make stem log info-level to test/data/tor_log?
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #30591
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 I ran the stem tests with `--log info`, but that just makes stem log info-
 level errors to the terminal. It doesn't change test/data/tor_log.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30591 [Core Tor/Stem]: Make Travis stem log at info level, and tail the log

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30591: Make Travis stem log at info level, and tail the log
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #29437 | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:1 teor]:
 > I based these branches on #30234, because it hasn't been backported to
 0.3.5 yet.
 >
 > See my pull requests:
 > * 0.3.5: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1044
 > * master: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1045
 >   * clean merge
 > * fail test: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1046

 Ok, that didn't work. `--log info` just makes stem log info-level errors
 to the terminal. It doesn't change test/data/tor_log.

 I'll open a child ticket to sort this out.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30565 [Applications/Tor Browser]: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after tor browser bundle upgrade (8.5)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30565: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after 
tor
browser bundle upgrade (8.5)
-+-
 Reporter:  rollback-question|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 There is a lot to analyze here... thanks for sharing so much data. Two
 questions come to mind right now:

 Can you extract all of the `app.update` prefs from
 Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Browser/profile.default/prefs.js and attach the
 values to this ticket? (for both browsers)

 Please tell us what happens to the broken browser if you exit, move the
 following two directories aside, and then restart (please keep the
 contents of the directories because they may be useful in the future for
 debugging the cause of this problem).
  Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Browser/profile.default/startupCache/
  Browser/TorBrowser/UpdateInfo/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30591 [Core Tor/Stem]: Make Travis stem log at info level, and tail the log

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30591: Make Travis stem log at info level, and tail the log
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #29437 | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * version:  Tor: 0.2.4.8-alpha => Tor: 0.3.5.1-alpha
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 I based these branches on #30234, because it hasn't been backported to
 0.3.5 yet.

 See my pull requests:
 * 0.3.5: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1044
 * master: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1045
   * clean merge
 * fail test: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1046

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[tor-bugs] #30591 [Core Tor/Stem]: Make Travis stem log at info level, and tail the log

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30591: Make Travis stem log at info level, and tail the log
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.4.8-alpha
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #29437
   Points:  0.1|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 Diagnostics for #29437.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30522 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update to May GeoIP2 database

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30522: Update to May GeoIP2 database
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, tor-relay, tor-dirauth,  |  implemented
  029-backport, 034-backport, 035-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  040-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 tor-client, tor-relay, 029-backport, 032-backport, 033-backport,
 035-must, 035-rc-must, 034-backport, 035-backport
 =>
 tor-client, tor-relay, tor-dirauth, 029-backport, 034-backport,
 035-backport, 040-backport


Comment:

 Fix backport tags.

 Karsten, I can put the right release tags on future GeoIP update tickets.
 Just assign me as the reviewer.

 Nick, can we put these tickets through the same merge and backport process
 as other tickets?
 They're low-risk, but a bad GeoIP config could break the build (I think we
 have GeoIP tests?) or break a release.

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[tor-bugs] #30590 [Core Tor/Tor]: Ubuntu packages for 0.4.0.5 unavailable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30590: Ubuntu packages for 0.4.0.5 unavailable
--+--
 Reporter:  highflux7 |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:  Tor: 0.4.0.5  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 Packages for Ubuntu 18.04 (bionic) not updated to current 0.4.0.5 release.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30565 [Applications/Tor Browser]: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after tor browser bundle upgrade (8.5)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30565: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after 
tor
browser bundle upgrade (8.5)
-+-
 Reporter:  rollback-question|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by rollback-question):

 * Attachment "update.log" added.

 modification time: may 21 20:15 (file edited to remove paths)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30565 [Applications/Tor Browser]: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after tor browser bundle upgrade (8.5)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30565: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after 
tor
browser bundle upgrade (8.5)
-+-
 Reporter:  rollback-question|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by rollback-question):

 i've set app.update.log to true but unlike with the second TBB that works
 fine and shows the console i can't open the browser console with
 Ctrl+Shift+J on the first TBB that is broken. it does not appear  in Tools
 - Web Developer either, i only see Page Source there and nothing else.
 i've searched for update logs and found the following in
 Browser/TorBrowser/UpdateInfo/updates/0/

 - TBB 1 (first upgraded, the broken one, left screen capture)

 $ ls -al Browser/TorBrowser/UpdateInfo/updates/0
 total 6
 drwxr-xr-x 2 4096 may 24 01:08 .
 drwxr-xr-x 3 4096 may  7 15:18 ..
 -rw-r--r-- 1 7597 may 24 00:05 update.log
 -rw--- 1 11146198 may 21 16:23 update.mar
 -rwxr-xr-x 1   177592 may 21 20:15 updater
 -rw-r--r-- 1  689 may 21 20:15 updater.ini
 -rw-r--r-- 1 2153 may 21 20:15 updater.png
 -rw-r--r-- 1   10 may 21 20:15 update.status
 -rw-r--r-- 14 may 21 16:23 update.version

 $ cat Browser/TorBrowser/UpdateInfo/updates/0/update.status
 succeeded

 update.log - does not show any errors, but i'll attach it anyway since
 it's the only log i can find


 - TBB 2 (last upgraded, the working one, right screen capture)

 $ ls -al Browser/TorBrowser/UpdateInfo/updates/0
 total 11108
 drwxr-xr-x 2 4096 may 21 21:41 .
 drwxr-xr-x 3 4096 may 20 20:27 ..
 -rw--- 1 11146198 may 21 21:26 update.mar
 -rwxr-xr-x 1   177592 may 21 21:41 updater
 -rw-r--r-- 1  689 may 21 21:41 updater.ini
 -rw-r--r-- 1 2153 may 21 21:41 updater.png
 -rw-r--r-- 18 may 21 21:41 update.status
 -rw-r--r-- 14 may 21 21:26 update.version

 $ cat Browser/TorBrowser/UpdateInfo/updates/0/update.status
 applying

 there is no update.log

 somehow the broken one says "succeded" and the working one "applying". i
 don't know what else to look for or how to make the browser console appear
 in the broken one :/

 if i close the browser manually and open it again it is still the same,
 only the "About Tor" tab appears (as shown in the screen capture from
 yesterday) but it doesn't fix it. i've tried deleting all /tmp files, just
 in case, and rebooting, but it's still the same

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28230 [Applications/GetTor]: Link to new github repo from torproject/gettor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28230: Link to new github repo from torproject/gettor
-+
 Reporter:  traumschule  |  Owner:  ilv
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28231   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by gaba):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This seems to be resolved now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28513 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Change SessionStore so it doesn't violate disk avoidence goal

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28513: Change SessionStore so it doesn't violate disk avoidence goal
---+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-disk-leak  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Okay, the SessionStore does not write private tab data on disk, it only
 saves normal tabs. We used #28507 as a mitigation for normal tabs being
 restored when the app is restarted. This brings us back to #24920 because
 Fennec doesn't have an easy `browser.privatebrowsing.autostart` pref like
 we have on desktop.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30573 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: open with Tor Browser does not work if Tor Browser is not open already

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30573: TBA: open with Tor Browser does not work if Tor Browser is not open 
already
--+--
 Reporter:  emmapeel  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 I'm going to approach this problem from ticket:28513#comment:4, and we'll
 see how well that goes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28513 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Change SessionStore so it doesn't violate disk avoidence goal

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28513: Change SessionStore so it doesn't violate disk avoidence goal
---+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-disk-leak  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 I think we can modify SessionStore so it doesn't write the state on disk,
 and then we can try reverting the patch for #28507 where we sanitize the
 tabs during startup. This should solve part of the problem with #30573.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30237 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30237: Tor Browser: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization
--+---
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #3| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+---

Comment (by mcs):

 Kathy and I have been exploring whether we can use Mozilla's notifications
 module (`toolkit/modules/PopupNotifications.jsm`) to implement the onion
 services authentication prompt. This would produce a doorhanger and would
 look a lot like the password manager's prompts. Here is a mockup:

 [[Image(https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/raw-
 attachment/ticket/30237/client-auth-notification-mockup-1.png, 646px)]]

 Antonela, Georg, and others: do you think this is an acceptable approach?

 A side note: if it is important, we can move the "Learn more…" link up
 near "Onion Authentication"; we get it "for free" in the location shown
 because that is how Mozilla positions it within their other prompts.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30237 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30237: Tor Browser: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization
--+---
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #3| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * Attachment "client-auth-notification-mockup-1.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30573 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: open with Tor Browser does not work if Tor Browser is not open already

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30573: TBA: open with Tor Browser does not work if Tor Browser is not open 
already
--+--
 Reporter:  emmapeel  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 It seems this is solved after disabling "Clear private data on exit"
 entries (Settings -> Privacy -> Clear private data on exit -> (uncheck
 Open tabs)).

 The new behavior is interesting. After bootstrapping completes, I see an
 error page (because the initial page load failed...because tor wasn't
 bootstrapped). Next, the page reload automatically because we force this
 after bootstrapping completes.

 1. I think we should re-consider our decision on implementing this hack at
 startup from #28507
 1. The UX is a little ugly because it tries loading the page when tor
 isn't running. I wonder if we can easily delay the load until after
 bootstrap completes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30284 [Applications/Tor Browser]: start fails with "Control port file not created"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30284: start fails with "Control port file not created"
-+-
 Reporter:  belm0|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-must, TorBrowserTeam201905R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by echaskaris):

 It's fixed

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27903 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8 does not respect gtk3 settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27903: Tor Browser 8 does not respect gtk3 settings
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by califuture):

 Thanks for the workaround script.
 On Ubuntu 19.04 I had to drop an "=" to get it to work.
 I kept getting an error like https://superuser.com/questions/376242/bash-
 script-while-loop-if-variable-is-true
 This fixed it.
 {{{
 if [ $VAL = "false" ]; then
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30572 [Applications/Tor Browser]: [BUG] Tor Browser Android custom tab needs Tor connected beforehand.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30572: [BUG] Tor Browser Android custom tab needs Tor connected beforehand.
--+--
 Reporter:  clash |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 This is an interesting problem. I wonder what we should do. I'm guessing
 we should (somehow) show the bootstrapping screen. At this point, we won't
 automatically connect to tor, so it seems like we need to give the person
 a button they can press that starts the process. I'll need to dig into the
 custom tabs code and see what we can do.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30573 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: open with Tor Browser does not work if Tor Browser is not open already

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30573: TBA: open with Tor Browser does not work if Tor Browser is not open 
already
--+--
 Reporter:  emmapeel  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:4 sysrqb]:
 > hmm. I'm guessing the requested webpage isn't opened in another tab
 during the first part, correct? The homepage is loaded and displayed, but
 i wonder if the requested webpage is available in another tab.

 Nope. This looks like it's a race condition (where I'm guessing we almost
 always lose). The requested URL should be opened in a new tab during
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/tree/mobile/android/base/java/org/mozilla/gecko/GeckoApp.java?h
 =tor-browser-60.7.0esr-8.5-1#n1525 startup], but then we
 "[https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/tree/mobile/android/base/java/org/mozilla/gecko/GeckoApp.java?h
 =tor-browser-60.7.0esr-8.5-1#n1138 sanitize]" all tabs around the same
 time as a way of "cleaning up" the previous session in case the app was
 killed (or crashed) for some reason. I'll test this and confirm our clean-
 up code is causing this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30382 [Core Tor/Tor]: Provide control port event for when we are missing v3 client auth for an onion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30382: Provide control port event for when we are missing v3 client auth for an
onion
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tbb-usability, hs-auth,  |  Actual Points:
  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, tor-spec   |
Parent ID:  #14389   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 To follow up on the conversation we had on IRC, the Tor Browser code
 (Firefox 60esr) translates unknown SOCKS5 error codes to
 `PR_CONNECT_REFUSED_ERROR`, aka connection refused. Examples:
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/tree/netwerk/socket/nsSOCKSIOLayer.cpp?h=tor-
 browser-60.7.0esr-9.0-1-build1#n836
 nsSOCKSSocketInfo::ReadV5UsernameResponse()] and
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/tree/netwerk/socket/nsSOCKSIOLayer.cpp?h=tor-
 browser-60.7.0esr-9.0-1-build1#n947
 nsSOCKSSocketInfo::ReadV5ConnectResponseTop()].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30584 [Applications]: interaction avec l'application Gmail sur Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30584: interaction avec l'application Gmail sur Android
--+--
 Reporter:  boullu|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 [https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android
 Orbot]
 [https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.torbrowser
 Tor Browser]
 [https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha
 Tor Browser (Alpha)]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30584 [Applications]: interaction avec l'application Gmail sur Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30584: interaction avec l'application Gmail sur Android
--+--
 Reporter:  boullu|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Hello, thank you for reporting this issue. Can you provide more
 information? Can you confirm that your device has Android version 8.0.0?
 When you say "Tor on Android" which app did you install? Did you install
 Orbot or Tor Browser?

 Thank you.


 --


 Bonjour, merci d'avoir signalé ce problème. Pouvez-vous fournir plus
 d'informations? Pouvez-vous confirmer que votre appareil dispose de la
 version Android 8.0.0? Quand vous dites "Tor sur Android", quelle
 application avez-vous installée? Avez-vous installé Orbot ou Tor Browser?

 Je vous remercie.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30520 [Core Tor/Tor]: Onion Service (v2) hosting Tor instance reporting under high load: Failed to find node for hop #1 of our path. Discarding this circuit.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30520: Onion Service (v2) hosting Tor instance reporting under high load: 
Failed
to find node for hop #1 of our path. Discarding this circuit.
+
 Reporter:  s7r |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.4.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:  tor-hs tor-dos  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 This is often due to a service not being able to reach its Guard... and
 thus everything circuit construction related stops...

 Not much can be done apart from letting tor pick a new Guard or deleting
 your state file and restarting Tor...

 External factors are making the service not being able to join the network
 :S.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26846 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop289: Leave unused random bytes in relay cell payload

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26846: prop289: Leave unused random bytes in relay cell payload
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop289, 035-roadmap-subtask,|  Actual Points:  .3
  prop289-assigned-sponsor-v, 041-proposed-on-   |
  roadmap, security, 041-should, postfreeze-ok   |
Parent ID:  #26288   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Okay, I'm fine with CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT.  I'll make that change.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30589 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser on Windows does not support Hindi or Tamil.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30589: Tor Browser on Windows does not support Hindi or Tamil.
-+-
 Reporter:  clash|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-fonts, tbb-   |  Actual Points:
  fingerprinting-os  |
Parent ID:  #18097   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by clash):

 https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q135595#sitelinks-wikipedia

 you can view this in Tor Browser to see which ones aren't supported. All
 of them work in Firefox.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26846 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop289: Leave unused random bytes in relay cell payload

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26846: prop289: Leave unused random bytes in relay cell payload
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop289, 035-roadmap-subtask,|  Actual Points:  .3
  prop289-assigned-sponsor-v, 041-proposed-on-   |
  roadmap, security, 041-should, postfreeze-ok   |
Parent ID:  #26288   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Left a response about `CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT` which I think it is a good
 idea.

 Rest if lgtm;

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[tor-bugs] #30589 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser on Windows does not support Hindi or Tamil.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30589: Tor Browser on Windows does not support Hindi or Tamil.
-+-
 Reporter:  clash|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Applications/Tor
 |  Browser
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-  |  Actual Points:
  fonts, tbb-fingerprinting-os   |
Parent ID:  #18097   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
 Works on the Android app.

 Hindi and Tamil fonts fail to render as seen on Wikipedia, might be other
 common languages may not be supported as well but I haven't looked further
 into it.

 [[Image(https://i.imgur.com/KhpCUyp.png)]]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26846 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop289: Leave unused random bytes in relay cell payload

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26846: prop289: Leave unused random bytes in relay cell payload
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop289, 035-roadmap-subtask,|  Actual Points:  .3
  prop289-assigned-sponsor-v, 041-proposed-on-   |
  roadmap, security, 041-should, postfreeze-ok   |
Parent ID:  #26288   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


Comment:

 I've tried to answer those; please let me know what you think.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30580 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor rejects all POSTDESCRIPTOR controller requests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30580: Tor rejects all POSTDESCRIPTOR controller requests
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-must, regression,|  Actual Points:  0.1
  041-regression, asn-merge  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  041-must, regression, 041-regression => 041-must, regression,
 041-regression, asn-merge


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30150 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix coverity warnings in tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30150: Fix coverity warnings in tests
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-should|  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  #30146| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


Comment:

 Right, but the issue there is that coverity can't tell that
 `hs_free_all()` frees that one, so we have tons of false positives.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29365 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Add digests and sizes to index.xml

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29365: Add digests and sizes to index.xml
---+--
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * sponsor:  Sponsor13 =>


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[tor-bugs] #30588 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Move tgen servers to port 443

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30588: Move tgen servers to port 443
---+--
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 So we can use http challenge for certbot

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30587 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Saving a file in Tor Browser resets Gnome Files (Naultilus) sort-directoires-first setting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30587: Saving a file in Tor Browser resets Gnome Files (Naultilus) sort-
directoires-first setting
--+---
 Reporter:  califuture|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * resolution:   => duplicate
 * status:  new => closed
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 Duplicate of #27903. See there for a workaround.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27903 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8 does not respect gtk3 settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27903: Tor Browser 8 does not respect gtk3 settings
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: califuture (added)


Comment:

 #30587 is a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27601 [Applications/Tor Browser]: browser notifications are not working anymore with Tor Browser 8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27601: browser notifications are not working anymore with Tor Browser 8
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.0.1-can, TorBrowserTeam201901|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:
 tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression, tbb-8.0.1-can, TorBrowserTeam201901,
 ff68-esr-will-have
 => tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression, tbb-8.0.1-can, TorBrowserTeam201901


Comment:

 Got backed out.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30587 [- Select a component]: Saving a file in Tor Browser resets Gnome Files (Naultilus) sort-directoires-first setting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30587: Saving a file in Tor Browser resets Gnome Files (Naultilus) sort-
directoires-first setting
--+
 Reporter:  califuture|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by califuture):

 I forgot to add that regular Firefox (66.0.5) doesn't have this issue.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20967 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Show security level in Torbutton icon or make it more visible in general

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20967: Show security level in Torbutton icon or make it more visible in  
general
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-security-slider,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-usability  |
Parent ID:  #20843   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Yes, thanks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30451 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: snowflake-client has executable stack

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30451: snowflake-client has executable stack
-+
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905R|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:9 cohosh]:
 > It turns out there's an easier way to handle this by putting the cgo
 directives into an environment variable. I attached a new version of the
 patch to this ticket.
 >
 > My reasoning for putting this in `projects/go/config` as opposed to just
 `projects/go-webrtc/config` is that this problem will occur in all go
 projects that use cgo, and it also allows us to use the template build
 script `projects/go/var/build_go_lib` in `go-webrtc`.

 Nice! Looks good to me. Applied to `tor-browser-build`'s `master` (commit
 24f585bf1851bfa022128a5b587b7c0940ec775c).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30451 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: snowflake-client has executable stack

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30451: snowflake-client has executable stack
+
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905R, tbb-rbm  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905R => TorBrowserTeam201905R, tbb-rbm


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[tor-bugs] #30587 [- Select a component]: Saving a file in Tor Browser resets Gnome Files (Naultilus) sort-directoires-first setting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30587: Saving a file in Tor Browser resets Gnome Files (Naultilus) sort-
directoires-first setting
+--
 Reporter:  califuture  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 I have Gnome Files' Preferences set to *not* "Sort folder before files".

 When I save a file using Tor Browser it resets that setting.

 Steps to reproduce
 In Gnome Files' Preferences un-tick the "Sort folder before files" option.
 Launch Tor Browser and save a file using it (e.g. an image from Wikipedia)

 You can see the change happening live if you keep the Gnome Files'
 Preferences dialogue open. The box gets re-ticked.

 You can see similar using  dconf Editor if you open it on this
 /org/gtk/settings/file-chooser/sort-directories-first

 This bug might be specific to Wayland?

 Strictly this might not be Gnome Files but that's where the issue becomes
 apparent (it actually seems to be something called  gtk file chooser?)


 Ubuntu 19.04
 Wayland
 Tor Browser 8.5 (it also happened with the previous version)
 Gnome Files 3.32.0-stable

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30382 [Core Tor/Tor]: Provide control port event for when we are missing v3 client auth for an onion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30382: Provide control port event for when we are missing v3 client auth for an
onion
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tbb-usability, hs-auth,  |  Actual Points:
  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, tor-spec   |
Parent ID:  #14389   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:13 dgoulet]:
 > Hmmm `SocksPort` flag could be an option. The other way is to create a
 new authentication method like prop229 does and thus the new error code
 are only returned if TB authenticated with this method. Former is simple,
 later is more involving but probably more portable for future compat?

 I don't know what the right answer is, but on the browser side we could
 accommodate either solution. A new SOCKS5 auth method would be more work
 for us, but should be do-able. But maybe other SOCKS5 clients won't care
 if they receive new error codes? I don't know.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20967 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Show security level in Torbutton icon or make it more visible in general

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20967: Show security level in Torbutton icon or make it more visible in  
general
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-security-slider,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-usability  |
Parent ID:  #20843   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by califuture):

 This should be closed? Seems to be fixed in Tor Browser 8.5?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30451 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: snowflake-client has executable stack

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30451: snowflake-client has executable stack
-+--
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905R|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905 => TorBrowserTeam201905R


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30382 [Core Tor/Tor]: Provide control port event for when we are missing v3 client auth for an onion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30382: Provide control port event for when we are missing v3 client auth for an
onion
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tbb-usability, hs-auth,  |  Actual Points:
  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, tor-spec   |
Parent ID:  #14389   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Replying to [comment:12 mcs]:
 > Replying to [comment:11 dgoulet]:
 > > In my torspec repo:
 https://git.torproject.org/user/dgoulet/torspec.git
 > >
 > > Branch: `ticket30382_01`
 > >
 > > I think there are too many codes there for what we need here but I
 wanted to at least get the basic errors implemented as well. The last two
 are the one TB needs for this.
 >
 > Kathy and I think the proposal looks good. Just a couple of comments:
 > - I had trouble understanding the note near the beginning. Maybe reword
 to: "When Tor Browser supports HTTPCONNECT, we plan to stop using these
 SOCKS5 extensions."

 Was mostly a "future warning" for us to only extend SOCKS5 error code
 because it is a "bandaid" and ultimately `HTTPCONNECT` is the way forward.
 I'll rephrase.

 > - Regarding compatibility, it seems like it would be safer for tor to
 not emit these new error codes unless enabled via a config option (maybe a
 SocksPort flag). Otherwise, non Tor Browser clients that use the SocksPort
 may be unhappy. Or maybe enable by default but provide an "escape hatch"
 that allows them to be disabled somehow.

 Hmmm `SocksPort` flag could be an option. The other way is to create a new
 authentication method like prop229 does and thus the new error code are
 only returned if TB authenticated with this method. Former is simple,
 later is more involving but probably more portable for future compat?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30560 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Onboarding toolbar graphic doesn't match actual toolbar after upgrade

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30560: Onboarding toolbar graphic doesn't match actual toolbar after upgrade
+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-onboarding, tbb-8.5-issues  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:9 gk]:
 > Looking over the images I think we should do the same update for the
 security slider image? There the icons are shown next to the hamburger
 menu as well.

 Agreed.

 > Do we know whether the @2x image is actually picked up in the onboarding
 context? So far, we only had the "normal" .png one.

 Until we fix #27357, we cannot use @2x images.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30580 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor rejects all POSTDESCRIPTOR controller requests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30580: Tor rejects all POSTDESCRIPTOR controller requests
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-must, regression,|  Actual Points:  0.1
  041-regression |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26846 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop289: Leave unused random bytes in relay cell payload

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26846: prop289: Leave unused random bytes in relay cell payload
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop289, 035-roadmap-subtask,|  Actual Points:  .3
  prop289-assigned-sponsor-v, 041-proposed-on-   |
  roadmap, security, 041-should, postfreeze-ok   |
Parent ID:  #26288   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_information
 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26846 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop289: Leave unused random bytes in relay cell payload

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26846: prop289: Leave unused random bytes in relay cell payload
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop289, 035-roadmap-subtask,|  Actual Points:  .3
  prop289-assigned-sponsor-v, 041-proposed-on-   |
  roadmap, security, 041-should, postfreeze-ok   |
Parent ID:  #26288   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Couple questions on the PR.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30575 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "unable to connect" if Firefox GPOs configure proxy settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30575: "unable to connect" if Firefox GPOs configure proxy settings
-+-
 Reporter:  kT3Ycp9jwm   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905,|  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201905, tbb-proxy-bypass|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Okay, I tried for a while to set up a testing environment on my local
 computer and have the group policy editor used to lock down the proxy
 configurations in Firefox. However, this policy is neither applied to
 Firefox nor Tor Browser for me. I took the policy templates from
 https://github.com/mozilla/policy-templates/releases and copied them over
 to C:\Windows\PolicyDefinitions and then started the policy editor and
 activated the proxy option. What else do I need to do to get this going?
 Do I need some other tool making sure the respective users are under that
 policy or what am I missing here?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30150 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix coverity warnings in tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30150: Fix coverity warnings in tests
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-should|  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  #30146| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 This seems to mostly fix this pattern:

 {{{
 +  if (service) {
 +remove_service(get_hs_service_map(), service);
 +hs_service_free(service);
 +  }
hs_free_all
 }}}

 But `hs_free_all` goes over the service map and frees every entry so it is
 really not necessary to do so. The `helper_create_service()` in the HS
 tests always register the service to the global map.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28878 [Core Tor/Tor]: WTF-PAD: Improve deterministic randomness in tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28878: WTF-PAD: Improve deterministic randomness in tests
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:  .2
  padding, tor-tests, dgoulet-merge, 041-should  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29617 [Core Tor/Tor]: OOM manger wipes entire DNS cache

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29617: OOM manger wipes entire DNS cache
-+-
 Reporter:  pulls|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport, 040-backport, fast-|  Actual Points:  0
  fix, easy, 041-should, dgoulet-merge   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final => Tor: 0.4.0.x-final


Comment:

 Merged in 041! Moving to 040 for backport.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30316 [Core Tor/Tor]: Vote's 'bandwidth-file-headers' is in wrong order

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30316: Vote's 'bandwidth-file-headers' is in wrong order
-+-
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport, 040-backport,  |  Actual Points:  0
  dgoulet-merge  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  035-backport dgoulet-merge => 035-backport, 040-backport,
 dgoulet-merge


Comment:

 Merged into 041! Keeping it in 040 for backport!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26846 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop289: Leave unused random bytes in relay cell payload

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26846: prop289: Leave unused random bytes in relay cell payload
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop289, 035-roadmap-subtask,|  Actual Points:  .3
  prop289-assigned-sponsor-v, 041-proposed-on-   |
  roadmap, security, 041-should, postfreeze-ok   |
Parent ID:  #26288   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * actualpoints:  .1 => .3


Comment:

 Okay, I've force-pushed a new #26846, with a PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1043

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10632 [Applications/Tor Browser]: add environment variable that causes the "Open Network Settings" menu item to be hidden or disabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10632: add environment variable that causes the "Open Network Settings" menu 
item
to be hidden or disabled
--+---
 Reporter:  proper|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
  Sponsor:|
--+---

Comment (by JosefinaKuhic):

 Adding environment variable in a program seems like adding calendar
 variable in any project. I have done similar project with [[https://essay-
 writing-services.reviews/essayshark-com-review/|essayshark]] help which
 was quite interesting. If you need this, I can share it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30580 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor rejects all POSTDESCRIPTOR controller requests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30580: Tor rejects all POSTDESCRIPTOR controller requests
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-must, regression,|  Actual Points:  0.1
  041-regression |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * actualpoints:  0.2 => 0.1


Comment:

 Fixed in `ticket30580`; PR at https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1042

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30580 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor rejects all POSTDESCRIPTOR controller requests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30580: Tor rejects all POSTDESCRIPTOR controller requests
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-must, regression,|  Actual Points:  0.2
  041-regression |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  041-must, regression => 041-must, regression, 041-regression


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30585 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Provide standalone clang 8 project usable across all platforms

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30585: Provide standalone clang 8 project usable across all platforms
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201905R,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201905, ff68-esr|
Parent ID:  #28716   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201905, GeorgKoppen201905, ff68-esr =>
 tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201905R, GeorgKoppen201905, ff68-esr
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 `bug_30585` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_30585&id=6af8cc6de4010ff0011a55dcefb4927e9e389872)
 in my `tor-browser-build` repo has a patch for review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30571 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Point to https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings/ for slider details

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30571: Point to https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings/ for slider
details
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905R, GeorgKoppen201905   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks. Merged to `tor-browser-60.7.0esr-9.0-1` (commit
 eb5d5dfaae93805baee9e84039e95fca74f9cce2) and cherry-picked to `tor-
 browser-60.7.0esr-8.5-1` (commit
 c5b2b350afae8d917550951ef9acc201429d0ac7).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30571 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Point to https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings/ for slider details

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30571: Point to https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings/ for slider
details
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905R, GeorgKoppen201905   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:2 gk]:
 > `bug_30571` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_30571&id=eb5d5dfaae93805baee9e84039e95fca74f9cce2)
 in my `tor-browser` repository has a fix for this issue.

 This patch looks good to me.

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[tor-bugs] #30586 [Metrics/Onionperf]: requirements are not included in setup.py

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30586: requirements are not included in setup.py
---+--
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 The requirements are not listed in setup.py which complicates installation
 a bit. The requirements in requirements.txt are not in sync with the
 actual project requirements.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29415 [Internal Services/Service - nextcloud]: Evaluating NextCloud as replacement for Sandstorm and SVN

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29415: Evaluating NextCloud as replacement for Sandstorm and SVN
-+-
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service -  |Version:
  nextcloud  |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:11 gaba]:
 > Sounds good gk! That was exactly the question.
 >
 > It is not possible to import boards in deck unless the API is
 available. And we have a few boards in storm/wekan right now that would
 be good not to have to migrate by hand.
 >
 >
 > Can we have the API available for deck?
 !https://deck.readthedocs.io/en/latest/API

 Do you mean for the current NextCloud testing environment or for our own
 instance later on? For the former to get those things already working
 today (and in case we don't have the API available yet which I don't have
 chekced) we'd ask micah. For our own instance, yes, I think that would be
 smart unless there will be strong security concerns that speak against it
 (which I currently doubt to be the case).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30560 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Onboarding toolbar graphic doesn't match actual toolbar after upgrade

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30560: Onboarding toolbar graphic doesn't match actual toolbar after upgrade
+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-onboarding, tbb-8.5-issues  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by Thorin):

 Or insert the star at the end of the urlbar

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28716 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create a mingw-w64-clang project

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28716: Create a mingw-w64-clang project
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201905,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201905  |
Parent ID:  #28238   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:43 gk]:
 > Another thing is we can probably break the `mingw-w64-clang` project a
 bit more up. I guess we could factor out the llvm/clang/lld compilation
 which would make it easier to reuse that part in other projects and we
 would not need to recompile it if we, say, change some `mingw-w64` commit.
 But I am not so sure about the benefits for doing the same with libcxx*
 etc.

 I opened #30585 for that.

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[tor-bugs] #30585 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Provide standalone clang 8 project usable across all platforms

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30585: Provide standalone clang 8 project usable across all platforms
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201905,
 |  GeorgKoppen201905, ff68-esr
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #28716
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We plan to ship to clang 8 where a clang is needed in Firefox 68. We
 should create a separate project for it and retire the llvm one we have
 later on as the consensus seems to be to use "clang" instead of "llvm".
 This ticket is motivated as well by comment:43:ticket:28716.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30336 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser for Android Alpha

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30336: Tor Browser for Android Alpha
--+---
 Reporter:  WinXAnd511|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by WinXAnd511):

 @sysrqb, @gk

 Indeed - in the "old" version I had restricted the exit nodes. In the new
 version this is not possible :-(

 Strange thing is when I reinstalled Orbot no problem - it connects. Using
 Orfox however doesn't work anymore - keeps searching and doesn't find a
 thing (not even wikipedia). Uninstall after Tor for Android and reinstall
 Orfox did solve the problem. It is now __extremely__ slow, quite unusable
 in fact (1 min loading time for wikipedia on high speed !WiFi).

 The new situation is that only Tor Browser for Android works and I can't
 set my exit node restrictions (or preferences as it is in Orbot), making
 it not that useful :-/ Changing identity is impossible too :-(and I get
 the impression it is using a lot of battery power (online with nearby high
 speed WiFi, measured Tor vs Firefox focus, connecting both to wikipedia).

 Sadly the documentation on torproject.org is outdated - only Orbot and
 Orfox is available.
 I couldn't find the torrc file to edit on Android either.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30560 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Onboarding toolbar graphic doesn't match actual toolbar after upgrade

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30560: Onboarding toolbar graphic doesn't match actual toolbar after upgrade
+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-onboarding, tbb-8.5-issues  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by gk):

 Looking over the images I think we should do the same update for the
 security slider image? There the icons are shown next to the hamburger
 menu as well. Do we know whether the @2x image is actually picked up in
 the onboarding context? So far, we only had the "normal" .png one.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30571 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Point to https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings/ for slider details

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30571: Point to https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings/ for slider
details
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905R, GeorgKoppen201905   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues => tbb-8.5-issues, TorBrowserTeam201905R,
 GeorgKoppen201905


Comment:

 `bug_30571` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_30571&id=eb5d5dfaae93805baee9e84039e95fca74f9cce2)
 in my `tor-browser` repository has a fix for this issue.

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[tor-bugs] #30584 [Applications]: interaction avec l'application Gmail sur Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30584: interaction avec l'application Gmail sur Android
--+--
 Reporter:  boullu|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  Applications
  Version:  Tor: unspecified  |   Severity:  Blocker
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 Tor sur Android, version 8.0.0 empêche l'application native de gestion
 Gmail de fonctionner.

 Désintaller Tor résoud immédiatement le problème.

 -

 Tor on Android, version 8.0.0 prevents the native Gmail management
 application from working.

 Uninstalling Tor immediately solves the problem.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30565 [Applications/Tor Browser]: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after tor browser bundle upgrade (8.5)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30565: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after 
tor
browser bundle upgrade (8.5)
-+-
 Reporter:  rollback-question|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:15 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:13 rollback-question]:
 > > i found a difference between them,
 > >
 > > the first TBB i upgraded that doesn't recover tabs (left screenshot)
 is now on version 8.5 but based on firefox version 60.6.1esr - it shows a
 "Restart to update Tor Browser" button, when pressed the tor browser gets
 restarted but with the same version and still showing the same button
 again
 >
 > Huh, yes. That looks broken. You should not be on Tor Browser 8.5 and
 Firefox 60.6.1esr at the same time. If you open `about:config` and set
 `app.update.log` to `true` and check your browser console (Ctrl+Shift+J)
 while doing the update are there any error messages showing up that could
 give some clues about what is going on?

 Another question: what happens if you just close the browser manually and
 then open it again. Does that change things?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29787 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Enumerate possible failure cases and include failure information in .tpf output

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29787: Enumerate possible failure cases and include failure information in .tpf
output
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Alright, I extended metrics-lib to parse these fields and metrics-web to
 import them into the database. Everything looks fine!

 What's the plan for merging things into OnionPerf? And where would I find
 the code/patch for reprocessing logs? Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30583 [Webpages]: "Sponsors" not localized

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30583: "Sponsors" not localized
--+
 Reporter:  sveinki   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by sveinki):

 The title "Sponsors" in the row "History People Sponsors Reports Jobs" is
 not localized on any of the pages (both on production site and lektor),
 yet the string is in the .PO files and has been translated. Did check
 several languages, some may use the same word, but even languages with
 other alphabets are also affected, so I presume it's a global defect.

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[tor-bugs] #30583 [Webpages]: "Sponsors" not localized

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30583: "Sponsors" not localized
-+--
 Reporter:  sveinki  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Webpages
  Version:   |   Severity:  Major
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30582 [Webpages/Styleguide]: styleguide: no hardcoded capitalization - uppercase rules on css

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30582: styleguide: no hardcoded capitalization - uppercase rules on css
-+--
 Reporter:  emmapeel |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Styleguide  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30027   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by sveinki):

 On the Donate-page there's a CSS-style for the first heading "Tor:
 Strength in numbers", FF-inspector marks it as coming from index.css
 .header h1 text-transform: capitalize;

 This is a no-go in my language and probably some others too.

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[tor-bugs] #30582 [Webpages/Styleguide]: styleguide: no hardcoded capitalization - uppercase rules on css

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30582: styleguide: no hardcoded capitalization - uppercase rules on css
-+
 Reporter:  emmapeel |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Styleguide  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #30027
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 we need to change our styleguida with this rule, otherwise we will have to
 correct it each time.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30575 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "unable to connect" if Firefox GPOs configure proxy settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30575: "unable to connect" if Firefox GPOs configure proxy settings
-+-
 Reporter:  kT3Ycp9jwm   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905,|  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201905, tbb-proxy-bypass|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by kT3Ycp9jwm):

 Replying to [comment:6 gk]:
 > But either way, I think the underlying bug is that Tor Browser is
 affected by this Firefox policy at all and its proxy settings can get
 changed that way
 Yes, I think this is the point

 Using a local account, who does NOT receive the GPO, Tor Browser works.
 Using a domain user, who receives the GPO, Tor Browser does NOT work.

 Tor network settings (behind the onion button) are the same in both cases,
 so I think they are ok.
 The difference is in the connection settings (Menu --> Options --> Network
 proxy --> Settings): when the GPO applies, proxy settings are hijacked and
 I cannot revert them because they're locked.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30423 [Webpages/Support]: Typos in Tor-support-portal

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30423: Typos in Tor-support-portal
--+--
 Reporter:  sveinki   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sveinki):

 String #197: "To view and adjust your Security Settings, click the
 'Advanced Security
 Settings...' button in the shield menu."

 There's no menuitem marked 'Advanced Security Settings...' --> just
 'Security Settings...'

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29174 [Core Tor/Tor]: Guard Node can eclipse the hidden service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29174: Guard Node can eclipse the hidden service
-+-
 Reporter:  TBD.Chen |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  guard, hidden, service, security,|  Actual Points:
  041-longterm   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by TBD.Chen):

 Although this is a tradeoff, we can just add the circular detection to
 prevent that.
 The hidden service can just send a requestion to itself and check whether
 it can receive the requestion.

 Replying to [comment:11 asn]:
 > I've been thinking of closing this ticket, mainly because this is a
 ticket we are aware of, and a tradeoff we took on purpose. I'm leaving it
 open just because it could be relevant to #25754.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30575 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "unable to connect" if Firefox GPOs configure proxy settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30575: "unable to connect" if Firefox GPOs configure proxy settings
-+-
 Reporter:  kT3Ycp9jwm   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905,|  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201905, tbb-proxy-bypass|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201905, GeorgKoppen201905, tbb-proxy-bypass
 * priority:  Medium => High
 * status:  needs_information => new


Comment:

 I suspect that did not work? I guess you could try selecting the SOCKS
 proxy option (instead of the HTTP/HTTPS one) in that case.

 But either way, I think the underlying bug is that Tor Browser is affected
 by this Firefox policy at all and its proxy settings can get changed that
 way (even if it seems to fail closed). I try to figure out what's up here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29969 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Drag-and-drop search causes NoScript XSS warning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29969: Drag-and-drop search causes NoScript XSS warning
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript, TorBrowserTeam201905R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  noscript, TorBrowserTeam201905 => noscript,
 TorBrowserTeam201905R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 okay, this works for me. `bug_29969`
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_29969&id=ffc98d9108cc6b420ec4cd17de475631013eecfe)
 has a fix for this bug (by bumping NoScript) for review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29969 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Drag-and-drop search causes NoScript XSS warning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29969: Drag-and-drop search causes NoScript XSS warning
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript, TorBrowserTeam201905  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:8 ma1]:
 > Replying to [comment:7 gk]:
 > > Yes, that's perfectly fine, thanks.
 > Sorry, I'm confused: did you already release yesterday after all?
 > Which buildID should I look for the fix? >= "20190416010130" (per
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1532530#c19 ) or something
 else (the 8.5 I've just been updated to has buildID="20190307010101")?
 > And I've just noticed https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla
 /Add-ons/WebExtensions/API/runtime/getBrowserInfo now exposes an
 isTorBrowser info property, apparently because of us (look at the
 "reference" link). Since when (not in 8.5 yet, apparently)?

 We have a different buildID due to our reproducible builds. So, yes 8.5 is
 the one that needs to get out and that got out. The `isTorBrowser`
 property was wrong on MDN. Someone just added that to the wiki. Thanks for
 tjr for correcting that.

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