Re: [tor-bugs] #30631 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Blurry Tor Browser icon on macOS app switcher

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30631: Blurry Tor Browser icon on macOS app switcher
--+--
 Reporter:  vjur  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  icon, tor browser, macos  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by vjur):

 * Attachment "tor-browser-icon-blur-macos.png" added.

 macOS app wsitcher with blurred icon

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[tor-bugs] #30631 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Blurry Tor Browser icon on macOS app switcher

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30631: Blurry Tor Browser icon on macOS app switcher
-+-
 Reporter:  vjur |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Applications/Tor
 |  Browser
  Version:   |   Severity:  Trivial
 Keywords:  icon, tor browser,   |  Actual Points:
  macos  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
 Hello,

 Tor Browser's icon is blurred (not enough resolution) in macOS app
 switcher (⌘+Tab). I think it's most noticeable on Retina displays.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30594 [Core Tor/Stem]: stem unit tests fail on Tor 0.2.9, which is still supported until 1 January 2020

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30594: stem unit tests fail on Tor 0.2.9, which is still supported until 1 
January
2020
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  ci, travis, stem  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28170| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+---

Comment (by teor):

 Thanks. Looks like I used an old master for my branch.

 The merge to the current master passed this test, but hung later on:
 https://travis-ci.org/torproject/stem/jobs/536620928

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28170 [Core Tor/Stem]: Test stem pull requests against all supported tor versions, and tor nightly builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28170: Test stem pull requests against all supported tor versions, and tor 
nightly
builds
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ci, travis |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  #29729 | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
---+---

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:11 atagar]:
 > Before resolving this I'd like to check - does it make sense for the
 travis config to live in this repository? I use
 [https://jenkins.torproject.org/job/stem-tor-ci/ Jenkins] for my CI. I
 don't use this configuration, and as such don't have an opinion about
 what's in it or know if it breaks.
 >
 > I'd be happy to merge changes if you'd like to keep it here, but I'm
 unsure if there's value in requiring me to be in the loop on its
 maintenance.

 If the Travis CI config is in the Stem repository, then anyone can run
 Travis CI on their Stem pull requests. That's the standard config for CIs
 like Travis and Appveyor.

 Using git for the CI config also allows different CI config for different
 release branches. That isn't as important for Stem, because your backports
 are usually pretty small.

 Replying to [comment:12 atagar]:
 > Oh! And to be clear, if you'd care to suggest that I use Travis rather
 than Jenkins for my CI I'd be open to discussing that too. Personally I
 don't have any strong opinions at the moment about what kind of CI Stem
 uses for itself.

 The network team uses Travis and Appveyor to check our Tor branches. Our
 Travis and Appveyor tests are more comprehensive, because they run
 different build options, Windows, Stem, and soon Chutney. Travis and
 Jenkins also let us run CI on our branches before we merge them.

 We use Jenkins to test rarer architectures, and build binary packages.

 Tor's CI runs a Stem job. To avoid breaking Tor's CI, we need all of
 Stem's changes to pass Stem's CI. (And we need Stem's CI tests to be
 roughly equivalent to Tor's CI tests.) So we would really like to have
 Stem's Travis and Jenkins CIs pass all the time.

 I don't know if you want to check both Travis and Jenkins after you merge,
 or if you want to standardise on one of them. (Checking multiple CI
 platforms adds more work.)  But we'll check Stem's CI when Tor's Stem job
 fails, so we can work out if it was Tor or Stem that broke first.

 We can also use Stem's Travis CI to check our Stem branches, but we don't
 write very many of them.

 So it's totally up to you.

 Let's try it for a while and see how it goes?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30593 [Core Tor/Stem]: Fix argument passing in docs/republish

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30593: Fix argument passing in docs/republish
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ci, travis |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #28170 | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
---+---

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:3 atagar]:
 > Actually, on reflection I don't think republish is even used for that.
 Iirc I wrote that long ago but have since transitioned to a cron job with
 a local republication script.
 >
 > I might simply drop this and the associated script but first I need to
 check - how did this get on your radar?

 We use shellcheck as a standard part of tor's CI and chutney's CI. So when
 I rewrote stem's Travis CI, I added a shellcheck step.

 If you delete this script, that's fine with me. I think it's the last
 shell script, so I'll also remove the shellcheck step from Stem's CI.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30455 [Core Tor/Tor]: Improve documentation for chutney warnings in "make test-network-all" (was: Does "make test-network-all" test every network twice?)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30455: Improve documentation for chutney warnings in "make test-network-all"
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  chutney, easy, doc, tor-ci,  |  Actual Points:
  041-should |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  035-backport?, 040-backport?, chutney, easy, tor-ci,
 041-should => chutney, easy, doc, tor-ci, 041-should
 * points:   => 0.1
 * type:  defect => enhancement


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:4 nickm]:
 > Findings so far:
 >   * This bug was new in 0.3.0.4.
 >   * We are indeed trying to run everything twice.
 >   * We are not actually running everything twice, since
 TEST_NETWORK_WARNING_FLAGS seems to be broken: it uses `--only-warnings`,
 which appears to prevent the test from running entirely.

 This is not a bug.

 The extra line logs chutney warnings to the terminal. Before this change,
 tor's warnings were only logged to a file. And if chutney succeeded, no-
 one would read that file. So we would miss any warnings that tor had
 logged.

 For more details, see #21570 or the changes file in commit
 fb32c522320430f.

 > Any other fixes here should probably come after we merge our other "use
 chutney for CI" tickets, since they are likely to touch this part of the
 makefile as well.

 We could change the variable name so it is move obvious:
 TEST_NETWORK_SHOW_LAST_WARNINGS_FLAGS
 And we could add a comment above the makefile block.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30592 [Core Tor/Stem]: How do I make stem log info-level to test/data/tor_log?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30592: How do I make stem log info-level to test/data/tor_log?
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30591 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by teor):

 Does stem have a way to log all it's control messages?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30599 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Cloudflare alt-svc onions cause a different exit to be used at each request

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30599: Cloudflare alt-svc onions cause a different exit to be used at each 
request
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks2  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30024| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:3 teor]:
 > So this is a request for Tor Browser to prioritise "the same onion you
 used last time"?
 > This could get interesting: we don't want to leak preferred onions
 between URL bar domains.

 In the same way that the same exit is preferred for a given domain.

 Building a new circuit for each and every request as is currently done in
 this situation is a waste of resources and a fingerprinting risk. There's
 no reason that one refresh uses one circuit and the next refresh 6 seconds
 later gives another.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30592 [Core Tor/Stem]: How do I make stem log info-level to test/data/tor_log?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30592: How do I make stem log info-level to test/data/tor_log?
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30591 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:1 atagar]:
 > * Provide a config option to add arbitrary torrc lines (this way you
 could add 'Log info /my/path' or customize the test torrc in any way you'd
 like).

 I just talked with nickm on IRC. We want to capture all the controller
 messages from tor.

 So that means we'd like "Log [control]debug /path/to/file", or any other
 arbitrary torrc line.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30235 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor hangs when asked to change DisableAllSwap over the control port

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30235: Tor hangs when asked to change DisableAllSwap over the control port
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.4.8-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  #29437 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by nickm):

 To be specific, Tor rejects all changes to DisableAllSwap while it is
 running.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30599 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Cloudflare alt-svc onions cause a different exit to be used at each request

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30599: Cloudflare alt-svc onions cause a different exit to be used at each 
request
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks2  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30024| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
--+---

Comment (by teor):

 So this is a request for Tor Browser to prioritise "the same onion you
 used last time"?
 This could get interesting: we don't want to leak preferred onions between
 URL bar domains.

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[tor-bugs] #30630 [Core Tor/Tor]: Put CI URLs in ReleasingTor.md

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30630: Put CI URLs in ReleasingTor.md
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  easy, doc
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.1|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+--
 arma asked us where the CI builders are.

 The list is in ReleasingTor.md and on the wiki, but only the wiki has the
 URLs:
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/NetworkTeam/CIFailures#CIBuilders

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27502 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Prioritize .onion hosts in AltSvc?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27502: Prioritize .onion hosts in AltSvc?
--+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30024| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 I think this should be delayed until #30599 is dealt with.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30599 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Cloudflare alt-svc onions cause a different exit to be used at each request

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30599: Cloudflare alt-svc onions cause a different exit to be used at each 
request
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks2  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30024| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 I think this is a pretty nasty issue, especially now that a lot of sites
 are doing this.

 Another way to test this is to use the demo site
 https://perfectoid.space/test.php mentioned in #27502. Nearly every time
 it is reloaded, the entire circuit path changes. This is not unique to
 Cloudflare.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30235 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor hangs when asked to change DisableAllSwap over the control port

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30235: Tor hangs when asked to change DisableAllSwap over the control port
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.4.8-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  #29437 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:7 teor]:
 > Do you think we should change tor so it rejects DisableAllSwap over the
 control port?

 Tor already rejects DisableAllSwap over the control port.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30591 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make Travis stem log at info level, and tail the log

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30591: Make Travis stem log at info level, and tail the log
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #29437 | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_revision


Comment:

 We'll need to revise this after #30592 merges into stem.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30592 [Core Tor/Stem]: How do I make stem log info-level to test/data/tor_log?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30592: How do I make stem log info-level to test/data/tor_log?
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30591 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:1 atagar]:
 > * Provide a config option or environment variable to customize the
 runlevel.

 Let's provide a way to customise the log level in the file.

 If we ever need arbitrary torrc lines, we can do that change later.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30629 [Core Tor/Tor]: We seem to be reading some freed events on exit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30629: We seem to be reading some freed events on exit
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-must, tor-events, regression,|  Actual Points:
  memory-safety, 041-regression, valgrind|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  041-must, tor-events, regression, memory-safety =>
 041-must, tor-events, regression, memory-safety, 041-regression,
 valgrind


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30629 [Core Tor/Tor]: We seem to be reading some freed events on exit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30629: We seem to be reading some freed events on exit
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-must, tor-events, regression,|  Actual Points:
  memory-safety  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * severity:  Normal => Major
 * cc: nickm, dgoulet (added)
 * priority:  Medium => High
 * points:   => 1
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor31-can
 * keywords:   => 041-must, tor-events, regression, memory-safety


Comment:

 This is a memory safety bug, so we must fix it before the 0.4.1 stable
 release.

 It was caused by code for sponsor 31, so we can fix it under that sponsor.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30624 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable NoScript's XSS protection to avoid the whole computer freezing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30624: Disable NoScript's XSS protection to avoid the whole computer freezing
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905,|  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201905  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ma1):

 Please check https://github.com/hackademix/noscript/releases/tag/10.6.3rc3

 This should prevent any freeze, even on the heaviest payload.
 Tested on 8.5 and 9.0a1.

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[tor-bugs] #30629 [Core Tor/Tor]: We seem to be reading some freed events on exit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30629: We seem to be reading some freed events on exit
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Run your Tor master as a client under valgrind:
 {{{
 $ valgrind --leak-check=full src/app/tor
 }}}
 and wait for it to bootstrap to 100%. Then ctrl-c it.

 On exit, valgrind will give you a pile of complaints like
 {{{
 ==4119== Invalid read of size 8
 ==4119==at 0x4C1DB9C: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libevent-2.1.so.6.0.2)
 ==4119==by 0x4C21A78: event_free (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libevent-2.1.so.6.0.2)
 ==4119==by 0x2ADA19: tor_event_free_ (compat_libevent.c:76)
 ==4119==by 0x2ADA19: mainloop_event_free_ (compat_libevent.c:461)
 ==4119==by 0x17748B: tor_mainloop_free_all (mainloop.c:2523)
 ==4119==by 0x1665FB: subsystems_shutdown_downto (subsysmgr.c:185)
 ==4119==by 0x165FB4: tor_free_all (shutdown.c:162)
 ==4119==by 0x164B54: tor_run_main (main.c:1360)
 ==4119==by 0x1620F9: tor_main (tor_api.c:164)
 ==4119==by 0x161CB8: main (tor_main.c:32)
 ==4119==  Address 0x5489ec0 is 432 bytes inside a block of size 664 free'd
 ==4119==at 0x48369AB: free (vg_replace_malloc.c:530)
 ==4119==by 0x2ADB20: tor_libevent_free_all (compat_libevent.c:490)
 ==4119==by 0x165FAF: tor_free_all (shutdown.c:160)
 ==4119==by 0x164B54: tor_run_main (main.c:1360)
 ==4119==by 0x1620F9: tor_main (tor_api.c:164)
 ==4119==by 0x161CB8: main (tor_main.c:32)
 ==4119==  Block was alloc'd at
 ==4119==at 0x483577F: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:299)
 ==4119==by 0x310F47: tor_malloc_ (malloc.c:45)
 ==4119==by 0x4C1E9B3: event_mm_calloc_ (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libevent-2.1.so.6.0.2)
 ==4119==by 0x4C224D9: event_base_new_with_config (in /usr/lib/x86_64
 -linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.6.0.2)
 ==4119==by 0x2AD284: tor_libevent_initialize (compat_libevent.c:158)
 ==4119==by 0x28E879: init_libevent (config.c:8031)
 ==4119==by 0x28E879: options_act_reversible (config.c:1466)
 ==4119==by 0x28E879: set_options (config.c:934)
 ==4119==by 0x290721: options_init_from_string (config.c:5529)
 ==4119==by 0x290CA9: options_init_from_torrc (config.c:5293)
 ==4119==by 0x1632A6: tor_init (main.c:619)
 ==4119==by 0x163B13: tor_run_main (main.c:1297)
 ==4119==by 0x1620F9: tor_main (tor_api.c:164)
 ==4119==by 0x161CB8: main (tor_main.c:32)
 }}}

 maint-0.4.0 does not have this bug, and tor-0.4.1.1-alpha does.

 A git bisect brought me to commit 6eb1b8da0ab2, which is about periodic
 events so it looks promising. It's from #30293.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30628 [Core Tor/Tor]: sendme closes client connections

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30628: sendme closes client connections
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by traumschule):

 Replying to [comment:3 arma]:
 > traumschule: does this happen on every stream, or just very rarely?
 >
 > And, are you mostly uploading, or mostly downloading, on these streams?

 It seems to be quite reproducible both ways typing into remote shells and
 receiving files with rsync:

 {{{
 $ torsocks rsync -aP server:some.tar.xz .
 some.tar.xz
   4,456,448  10%  507.68kB/s0:01:13  Connection to ... closed by
 remote host.

 rsync: connection unexpectedly closed (4587634 bytes received so far)
 [receiver]
 rsync error: error in rsync protocol data stream (code 12) at io.c(235)
 [receiver=3.1.3]
 rsync: connection unexpectedly closed (51 bytes received so far)
 [generator]
 rsync error: error in rsync protocol data stream (code 12) at io.c(235)
 [generator=3.1.3]
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30628 [Core Tor/Tor]: sendme closes client connections

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30628: sendme closes client connections
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 traumschule: does this happen on every stream, or just very rarely?

 And, are you mostly uploading, or mostly downloading, on these streams?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30628 [Core Tor/Tor]: sendme closes client connections

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30628: sendme closes client connections
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by arma):

 * cc: dgoulet (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30628 [Core Tor/Tor]: sendme closes client connections

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30628: sendme closes client connections
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by arma):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


Comment:

 I suspect the new prop#289 work.

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[tor-bugs] #30628 [Core Tor/Tor]: sendme closes client connections

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30628: sendme closes client connections
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Since upgrade to nightly (0.4.1.1-alpha-dev-
 20190523T134010Z-1~d90.stretch) connections are closed regularly after
 short data transfers (even irssi via ssh):

 >Connection to ... closed by remote host.

 {{{
 [info] sendme_process_stream_level(): Unexpected stream sendme cell.
 Closing circ (window 500).
 [info] command_process_relay_cell(): circuit_receive_relay_cell (backward)
 failed. Closing.
 }}}

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/core/or/sendme.c#n468

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27270 [Core Tor/Stem]: Pycodestyle "invalid escape sequence" warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27270: Pycodestyle "invalid escape sequence" warnings
---+
 Reporter:  atagar |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fix pushed: https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=1451ee9

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27270 [Core Tor/Stem]: Pycodestyle "invalid escape sequence" warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27270: Pycodestyle "invalid escape sequence" warnings
---+
 Reporter:  atagar |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by atagar):

 Got it. This didn't repro for me with pycodestyle 2.4.0, but it does with
 2.5.0. Fix forthcoming.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30625 [Applications/Tor Browser]: (without toolbar) the window size is not exact multiple of 100 pixels

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30625: (without toolbar) the window size is not exact multiple of 100 pixels
---+--
 Reporter:  Rick   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by Thorin):

 I have Windows 7 right here, and cannot replicate. What's your display at:
 Control Panel\Appearance and Personalization\Display

 Older versions are here: https://archive.torproject.org/tor-package-
 archive/torbrowser/
 When testing, just unpack/install it to a temp directory each time. e.g
 - c:/tortest/756
 - c:/tortest/801

 You could try a 7.5.6: https://archive.torproject.org/tor-package-
 archive/torbrowser/7.5.6/
 Or a 9.0a1

 Just run one at a time. See if existed last ESR (7.5.6), and the next ESR
 (9.)

 What happens if you do a new clean install of 8.5, e.g to c:tortest/85/ ?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30627 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: document how to map a service back to an underlying host

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30627: document how to map a service back to an underlying host
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 Two resources that will be helpful for documenting this process:

 weasel points me to https://nagios.torproject.org/cgi-
 bin/icinga/statusmap.cgi?host=all (though nobody can log in to our nagios
 to see this page unless somebody has explained to them how simple it is to
 log in.)

 And to figure out which service runs on which host (which will help you
 look for that host on the nagios tree), there's
 https://db.torproject.org/machines.cgi

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27479 [Core Tor/Stem]: Integ failure with ss

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27479: Integ failure with ss
---+
 Reporter:  atagar |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  testing|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by atagar):

 * keywords:   => testing


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28502 [Core Tor/Stem]: Add the ability to add annotations to descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28502: Add the ability to add annotations to descriptors
---+---
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 Closing this again. Feel free to reopen if there becomes something to be
 done on stem's side.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28503 [Core Tor/Stem]: Move annotation handling to the base Descriptor class

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28503: Move annotation handling to the base Descriptor class
---+---
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 Think I'm gonna resolve this. Feel free to reopen if there's something to
 be done on stem's side.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30282 [Core Tor/Stem]: bandwidth_file_headers doesn't seem to be working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30282: bandwidth_file_headers doesn't seem to be working
---+---
 Reporter:  tom|  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Resolving this in favor of #30316.

 If you'd like I can provide a workaround code snippet. This data **is**
 available within the descriptor object, but through the
 `get_unrecognized_lines()` method of the authority.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30625 [Applications/Tor Browser]: (without toolbar) the window size is not exact multiple of 100 pixels

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30625: (without toolbar) the window size is not exact multiple of 100 pixels
---+--
 Reporter:  Rick   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by Rick):

 Win7
 default theme
 default density
 no menu bar

 Switching to either "Compact" or "Touch" density changes the value to
 **1004x802**.
 Switching the theme has no impact.

 Version:
 I've been using, and auto-updating, the browser for a long time. I cannot
 say when the problem started (which is part of my panic).
 My memories on browser version for this week are actually very strange and
 confusing.
 But I think the most logical assumption would be, that the update to 8.5
 "motivated" me to do the first test (changes to UI). In which case I did
 not test with 8.0.9.


 If I had access to installs of older versions, I'd gladly test them all.

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[tor-bugs] #30627 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: document how to map a service back to an underlying host

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30627: document how to map a service back to an underlying host
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Let's say check.tpo goes down, and is unpingable. That means something has
 probably gone wrong with the underlying host. How do I learn what
 underlying server is serving check.tpo?

 It would be great to have that process, of mapping a service back to which
 host it's on, written down, either on https://help.torproject.org/tsa/ or
 pointed to from there.

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30623 [Core Tor/Tor]: may prop 110 + 292 making hs discovery easier?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30623: may prop 110 + 292 making hs discovery easier?
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-review  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: mikeperry (added)
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.2.x-final


Comment:

 Mike, can you have a look here?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30624 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable NoScript's XSS protection to avoid the whole computer freezing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30624: Disable NoScript's XSS protection to avoid the whole computer freezing
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905,|  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201905  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ma1):

 Replying to [comment:5 cypherpunks]:

 > > The proposed fix should work either way, though.
 > Did you test that in TB?

 No I couldn't, I'm sorry: I was paralyzed in awe of the grace and the
 usefulness of your comments.
 Not nearly as useful, and maybe exceedingly mundane, but would you by
 chance have also any patch (or idea for a fix) to contribute?
 Thanks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30626 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Noscript not appearing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30626: Noscript not appearing
--+--
 Reporter:  danisuba10|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript, https   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by danisuba10):

 Thank you!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30626 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Noscript not appearing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30626: Noscript not appearing
--+--
 Reporter:  danisuba10|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript, https   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Thorin):

 They were removed from the toolbar by design (to discourage users from
 making changes). If you want them, customize and drag them back.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30625 [Applications/Tor Browser]: (without toolbar) the window size is not exact multiple of 100 pixels

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30625: (without toolbar) the window size is not exact multiple of 100 pixels
---+--
 Reporter:  Rick   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by Thorin):

 > Any further info you need

 What is your OS. What is your theme (did you change it to dark or light)?
 What is your density?

 I've been tracking this since FF57, and have a lot of setups here. I will
 see if I can replicate (both TB and ESR60.0.7)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30626 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Noscript not appearing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30626: Noscript not appearing
--+--
 Reporter:  danisuba10|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript, https   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by danisuba10):

 * Attachment "tor.png" added.


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[tor-bugs] #30626 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Noscript not appearing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30626: Noscript not appearing
--+--
 Reporter:  danisuba10|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:  Tor: unspecified  |   Severity:  Blocker
 Keywords:  noscript, https   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 Noscript, and HTTPS everywhere not appearing where they should. If I go to
 the addons menu, I can see them.

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[tor-bugs] #30625 [Applications/Tor Browser]: (without toolbar) the window size is not exact multiple of 100 pixels

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30625: (without toolbar) the window size is not exact multiple of 100 pixels
-+-
 Reporter:  Rick |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Applications/Tor
 |  Browser
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-  |  Actual Points:
  resolution |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
 I read the other tickets, which all relate to enabling the toolbar.
 But my Tor Browser also deviates at default, so I decided to post it as
 well.

 I have verified these results with a fresh install of Tor Browser 8.5
 The detected resolution is **1004x801**. (with toolbar it's 1004x796)
 Any further info you need?


 I would like to know, if this is "normal" (given the toolbar/resize bug),
 and all users have it. Or if not, I wonder what the cause might be (what I
 can do to fix this). Obviously I am in a bit of a panic, afraid this makes
 my fingerprint unique among Tor users, and has been potentially doing so
 for a long time.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30624 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable NoScript's XSS protection to avoid the whole computer freezing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30624: Disable NoScript's XSS protection to avoid the whole computer freezing
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905,|  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201905  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:4 ma1]:
 > Replying to [comment:3 cypherpunks]:
 > > ma1, if you just try to search the correct pref, you can get what you
 want:
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/search?q=extensions.webextensions.remote
 >
 > No, the info was not there.
 Oh, you mean the absence of other tickets is not the obvious proof for
 you. Then only https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/tree/browser/app/profile/firefox.js?h=tor-
 browser-60.7.0esr-9.0-1#n78
 > However I've installed 9.0a1,
 o_0 Hey folks! Maone installed TB!
 > and extensions.webextensions.remote is still false like in 8.5.
 Trust no one.
 > The proposed fix should work either way, though.
 Did you test that in TB?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30624 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable NoScript's XSS protection to avoid the whole computer freezing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30624: Disable NoScript's XSS protection to avoid the whole computer freezing
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905,|  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201905  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ma1):

 Replying to [comment:3 cypherpunks]:
 > ma1, if you just try to search the correct pref, you can get what you
 want:
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/search?q=extensions.webextensions.remote

 No, the info was not there. However I've installed 9.0a1, and
 extensions.webextensions.remote is still false like in 8.5.
 The proposed fix should work either way, though.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30624 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable NoScript's XSS protection to avoid the whole computer freezing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30624: Disable NoScript's XSS protection to avoid the whole computer freezing
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905,|  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201905  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 ma1, if you just try to search the correct pref, you can get what you
 want:
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/search?q=extensions.webextensions.remote

 Also see #29043.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29043 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript freezes the whole Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29043: NoScript freezes the whole Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  worksforme =>


Comment:

 Try Safer level ;)
 (BTW, it uses 12 GB before XSS protection warning for
 ​https://facebook.com/tr is shown.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30624 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable NoScript's XSS protection to avoid the whole computer freezing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30624: Disable NoScript's XSS protection to avoid the whole computer freezing
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905,|  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201905  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ma1):

 NVM, I managed to reproduce. It freezes the browser for a few seconds on
 8.5 (where browser.webextensions.remote is false) while the firefox.real
 process gets 100% CPU.
 What's more annoying, it appears to affect more than just the browser on
 my Ubuntu box if I turn browser.webextensions.remote to true, which is
 counterintuitive (the extension should be doing its thing in its own
 process while the facebook HTTP subrequest is suspended) but might be due
 to some kind of IPC bug: this time nothing really freeze, but again for a
 few seconds other application become sluggish as well while a
 WebExtensions process takes 100% CPU.
 Do Tor Browser 9.0 have browser.webextensions.remote set to false or true?
 Either way, since it's already executed asyncronously, I wanna try
 breaking the main InjectionChecker loop into time-capped chunks (e.g.
 100ms max) which give the CPU back periodically on these very costly to
 analyze payload, and possibly (but it might not be necessary) move the
 whole in a dedicated worker.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30624 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable NoScript's XSS protection to avoid the whole computer freezing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30624: Disable NoScript's XSS protection to avoid the whole computer freezing
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905,|  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201905  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ma1):

 I doubt it's the same defect, or even similar, as the implementation of
 the filter has radically changed with WebExtensions, and now it runs
 asynchronously in its own process and shouldn't be able to block the
 browser, let alone the whole computer.
 Could you please provide me steps to reproduce reliably?
 Is it Tor Browser specific or does it affect Firefox too.
 Might it be related to the pseudo-modal warning dialog (which must go away
 anyway anyway, with the UI redesign), rather than the filter itself?
 Thanks.

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[tor-bugs] #30624 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable NoScript's XSS protection to avoid the whole computer freezing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30624: Disable NoScript's XSS protection to avoid the whole computer freezing
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905,
 Severity:  Normal   |  GeorgKoppen201905
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We've had it numerous times now (see e.g. #25315, #24125, #22362) that Tor
 Browser freezes the whole computer due to NoScript's XSS protection. This
 is currently visible on https://zeit.de again cause by an embedded
 https://facebook.com/tr.

 I'd finally like to stop playing this whack-a-mole game and come to a
 better solution. Meanwhile, we can stop enabling XSS protection given that
 those experiences seriously risk users abandoning Tor Browser, claiming it
 is broken, and moving on to a much worse solution for their privacy
 requirements.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29043 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript freezes the whole Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29043: NoScript freezes the whole Tor Browser
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 Works for me now.

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