[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #30429, #30585, #24920, #26861, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #30429, #30585, #24920, #26861, #27045, #27265, #29187, 
#30469, #30573 by gk:


Comment:
Moving reviews over to June.

--
Tickets URL: 

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30636 [Metrics/Analysis]: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 400K

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30636: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 
400K
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ir|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 It now seems that 1/4 of the users in the Tor network are in Iran:
 https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-
 table.html?start=2019-05-30&end=2019-06-03

 I looked at some relay extrainfo descriptors, to see if this is a fluke or
 what, and it looks like many relays are seeing not just a huge number of
 v3 consensus fetches from Iran, but also a huge variety of IP addresses
 fetching these consensus documents. So my current thought is that these
 really are a bunch of different Tor clients running in different places in
 Iran.

 The shape of the growth makes me think it isn't many hundreds of thousands
 of people each one at a time deciding to install Tor Browser though. I
 wonder if Tor is now bundled in some software that many of them already
 had, and when it upgraded, they became Tor users? See for example how this
 happened in Ukraine two years ago, where the FreeU browser bundled a Tor
 client: #22369.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30636 [Metrics/Analysis]: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 400K

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30636: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 
400K
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ir|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 https://metrics.torproject.org/dirbytes.html makes it look like the
 directory load is growing with the recent pattern of Russian users, but
 not growing with the recent pattern of Iranian users. I wonder why that
 is.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30736 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure we have Yasm >= 1.2.0 available on Linux 64bit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30736: Make sure we have Yasm >= 1.2.0 available on Linux 64bit
--+---
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #30321
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 Similar to #18831 we now need Yasm >= 1.2.0 available as the 64bit build
 breaks without it otherwise:
 {{{
  8:23.07 /usr/bin/yasm -o jccolor-avx2.o -f elf64 -rnasm -pnasm -g dwarf2
 -D__x86_64__ -DPIC -DELF -I/var/tmp/build/firefox-
 8ba4752bc100/media/libjpeg/simd/nasm/ -I/var/tmp/build/firefox-
 8ba4752bc100/media/libjpeg/simd/x86_64/   /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 8ba4752bc100/media/libjpeg/simd/x86_64/jccolor-avx2.asm
  8:23.07 media/libjpeg/jccolor-sse2.o
  8:23.09 /var/tmp/build/firefox-8ba4752bc100/media/libjpeg/simd/x86_64
 /jccolext-avx2.asm:56: error: undefined symbol
 `jsimd_rgb_ycc_convert_avx2.return' (first use)
 }}}
 and similar errors.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30321 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Adapt Linux toolchain for Firefox 68 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30321: Adapt Linux toolchain for Firefox 68 ESR
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30320| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Okay, I think I have all prerequisites in place. Now on to get the whole
 thing actually compiled. Right now it is at least failing during Stylo
 compilation with the following backtrace:
 {{{
 27:59.16 thread 'stack backtrace:
 27:59.320: 0x557146665c03 -
 std::sys::unix::backtrace::tracing::imp::unwind_backtrace::h28991c1d2d7fb0bc
 27:59.35at
 src/libstd/sys/unix/backtrace/tracing/gcc_s.rs:39
 27:59.351: 0x5571466608ab -
 std::sys_common::backtrace::_print::hdb8f9a6bc6550c73
 27:59.35at
 src/libstd/sys_common/backtrace.rs:70
 27:59.352: 0x557146663986 -
 std::panicking::default_hook::{{closure}}::hf5bd0e166d7070c2
 27:59.35at
 src/libstd/sys_common/backtrace.rs:58
 27:59.35at src/libstd/panicking.rs:200
 27:59.353: 0x557146663704 -
 std::panicking::default_hook::h551580c4307ee3ab
 27:59.35at src/libstd/panicking.rs:215
 27:59.354: 0x55714666408f -
 std::panicking::rust_panic_with_hook::h3b41ee611369f0b1
 27:59.35at src/libstd/panicking.rs:478
 27:59.355: 0x557146663c11 -
 std::panicking::continue_panic_fmt::h86542a6b075513dd
 27:59.35at src/libstd/panicking.rs:385
 27:59.356: 0x557146663b5e -
 std::panicking::begin_panic_fmt::hd511eaf3357d07a6
 27:59.35at src/libstd/panicking.rs:340
 27:59.357: 0x557146658103 -
 std::io::stdio::_print::h9035f66296b9efd1
 27:59.35at src/libstd/io/stdio.rs:735
 27:59.35at src/libstd/io/stdio.rs:744
 27:59.358: 0x557146251c08 -
 cargo::core::compiler::job_queue::JobQueue::drain_the_queue::hd94276b883027b45
 27:59.359: 0x55714611bc94 -
 std::panicking::try::do_call::h5f91376082cf7b1e
 27:59.35   10: 0x55714666fb79 - __rust_maybe_catch_panic
 27:59.35at src/libpanic_unwind/lib.rs:87
 27:59.35   11: 0x5571462196c1 -
 cargo::core::compiler::context::Context::compile::hd97932f2c980d56c
 27:59.35   12: 0x5571462c5bb7 -
 cargo::ops::cargo_compile::compile_ws::h63581a7f0cd1f2ed
 27:59.35   13: 0x5571462c3a9e -
 cargo::ops::cargo_compile::compile::h632a606c9260ae50
 27:59.35   14: 0x5571460bdceb -
 cargo::commands::rustc::exec::h614f2a41cf15f27d
 27:59.35   15: 0x5571460c27d1 - cargo::main::hca1a1dbe3739f08f
 27:59.35   16: 0x557146085fc2 -
 std::rt::lang_start::{{closure}}::he6e482ffcf9ae8a6
 27:59.35   17: 0x557146663a92 -
 std::panicking::try::do_call::hdb24dd18b35dbd0e
 27:59.35at src/libstd/rt.rs:49
 27:59.35at src/libstd/panicking.rs:297
 27:59.36   18: 0x55714666fb79 - __rust_maybe_catch_panic
 27:59.36at src/libpanic_unwind/lib.rs:87
 27:59.36   19: 0x55714666465c -
 std::rt::lang_start_internal::hc9e10b9bd186777b
 27:59.36at src/libstd/panicking.rs:276
 27:59.36at src/libstd/panic.rs:388
 27:59.36at src/libstd/rt.rs:48
 27:59.36   20: 0x5571460c5dc1 - main
 27:59.36   21: 0x2b2fb08e4eac - __libc_start_main
 27:59.36   22: 0x557146082d68 - 
 }}}
 There are a bunch of warnings but no errors shown besides
 {{{
 28:03.67 make[4]: *** [force-cargo-library-build] Error 101
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30615 [Core Tor/Tor]: Factor random_uniform_01 into nondeterministic and deterministic parts, and automatically test the deterministic part

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30615: Factor random_uniform_01 into nondeterministic and deterministic parts, 
and
automatically test the deterministic part
-+-
 Reporter:  riastradh|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-test, 041-deferred-20190530  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Can we have some more comments on what the test actually does, in
 particular what is this supposed to do in the loop:
 `double y = sample_uniform_01(e, hi ^ (hihi << 31), lo ^ lolo);`

 Thanks!

 I also opened a PR so that the CI runs:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1069

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29034 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29034: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs-reachability, 029-backport-   |  Actual Points:
  maybe, 034-backport-maybe, 035-backport,   |
  040-backport, postfreeze-ok, network-team- |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, 041-should  |
Parent ID:  #28634   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 Unittest LGTM, but has this been tested on the real network as well, to
 see if it works as intended? IMO, it should be tested before we merge.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30730 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Can't access right click menu for noscript w/o readding icon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30730: Can't access right click menu for noscript w/o readding icon
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 Yes, the NoScript icon in the context menu is a bug which we did not get
 fixed for 8.5. Removing it is tracked in #30730.

 Regarding your anonymity concerns: well, as far as we know there is no way
 to detect the NoScript icon presence on the toolbar from websites.
 Remember as well that we still have a lot of users that have the search
 bar visible on their toolbar and probably a lot of other old things due to
 updating from older Tor Browser versions (even before esr52-based ones).
 Thus, the length of the urlbar is not helping here.

 Yes, if you take screenshots you have to be careful and that's not in
 particular related to toolbar layout. It's OS details that leak e.g. or
 potentially a different theme or your toolbar layout or...
 Dealing with NoScript settings is dangerous for a number of reasons (see:
 e.g. #26517) and not recommended unless you know what you are doing. This
 holds as well for making exceptions to the default security settings
 because that comes with a risk for fingerprinting users might
 underestimate (due to the pattern of whitelisted sites that are
 whitelisted for the whole browser session). I think if you are confident
 handling that risk dealing with re-adding the NoScript button to the
 toolbar (and potentially removing it if you really need to post a
 screenshot with your toolbar that already leaks details because it's a
 toolbar on a particular OS etc.) is in scope as well.

 Thus, I am not convinced doing the right-click workaround you suggested.
 We should rather fix #30730 and work on #30570.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23384 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Configure VM for Tor Browser builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23384: Configure VM for Tor Browser builds
--+
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201709  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by boklm):

 Commit `67e4879c13a082372fa34f76b49c99781dee3768` installs fail2ban on
 build-sunet-a.torproject.net.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30600 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Restore NoScript control widget icon to the Tor Browser toolbar

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30600: Restore NoScript control widget icon to the Tor Browser toolbar
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:10 cypherpunks]:
 > Replying to [comment:7 gk]:
 > > It's sad that folks think they need to resort to ad hominem attacks,
 but that's not the level of interaction we think is appropriate. Please
 leave this ticket closed, otherwise I'll just ignore it like all the other
 ones where some cypherpunk thought they should just ignore my requests of
 leaving the tickets closed.
 >
 > Excuse me, I made a comment earlier (comment 4) and am a different user
 of the nym.
 >
 > Please don't ignore my polite post just because someone else used a bad
 word later in the thread.
 >
 > It's frustrating to try to contribute to an open source project and told
 "well, someone else on the thread annoyed me, so your feedback will be
 ignored".

 I think nobody intended to ignore your feedback. If that's your impression
 then I am sorry for that.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30712 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport patch for Mozilla's 1552993 to Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30712: Backport patch for Mozilla's 1552993 to Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201906R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201906 => TorBrowserTeam201906R


Comment:

 `bug_30712` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_30712&id=4f998a1c15a84441d0f81eec59dc774ec5dc1127)
 in my public `tor-browser` repo has a backport of https://hg.mozilla.org
 /mozilla-central/rev/0ab7cdd09404. It applies cleanly on esr60 and should
 be not overly risky.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30732 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "Your Firefox is critically out of date" banner

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30732: "Your Firefox is critically out of date" banner
--+---
 Reporter:  hellomebois   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 What makes you believe this is a piece of Firefox code? I rather think
 that's something on the website that is alarming you (see that the
 notification bar is overlapping the underlying content), because it is not
 expecting to see a Firefox 60 anymore (which Tor Browser is based upon).
 While one could argue that the ESR series is less secure than the default
 release I think it is wrong to say it is critically out of date.
 Nevertheless, I think there is not much we can do unless we switch to
 mozilla-release. We plan to tackle that problem at least for mobile after
 Tor Browser 9 gets out I think.

 Closing this as "not a bug" as this is strictly speaking a website issue
 and not a Tor Browser bug.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30737 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor daemon unusable after resuming from suspend on Linux

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30737: Tor daemon unusable after resuming from suspend on Linux
--+--
 Reporter:  Parckwart |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.8  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 When resuming after having suspended to RAM on Linux (Debian Stretch), the
 Tor daemon won't build any circuits for minutes. After waiting for some
 minutes, it works again. Restarting the daemon makes it work immediately
 again. All newly built circuits fail with "Failed: timeout". Onion
 Circuits screenshot attached. Also, Tor often switches the bridge relay
 when this happens, probably because for some reason it cannot reach the
 bridge.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30737 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor daemon unusable after resuming from suspend on Linux

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30737: Tor daemon unusable after resuming from suspend on Linux
--+--
 Reporter:  Parckwart |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.8
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by Parckwart):

 * Attachment "onioncircuits.png" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30469 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ship romanian Tor Browser in alpha series

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30469: Ship romanian Tor Browser in alpha series
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  GeorgKoppen201905,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201906R  |
Parent ID:  #29935   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by acat):

 Looks good to me, although I didn't build the browser and test. Can do
 that if needed.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30737 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor daemon unusable after resuming from suspend on Linux

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30737: Tor daemon unusable after resuming from suspend on Linux
--+--
 Reporter:  Parckwart |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.8
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Parckwart):

 Edit: I meant that it picks a new GUARD relay, NOT a new bridge.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30712 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport patch for Mozilla's 1552993 to Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30712: Backport patch for Mozilla's 1552993 to Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201906R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by acat):

 Looks good to me.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30712 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport patch for Mozilla's 1552993 to Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30712: Backport patch for Mozilla's 1552993 to Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201906R, tbb-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201906R => TorBrowserTeam201906R, tbb-backport
 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks, merged to `tor-browser-60.7.0esr-9.0-1` (commit
 4f998a1c15a84441d0f81eec59dc774ec5dc1127). Marking for possible backport.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30738 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Reset Noscript temporary permissions after clicking New Identity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30738: Reset Noscript temporary permissions after clicking New Identity
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 Reset Noscript temporary permissions after clicking New Identity

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30469 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ship romanian Tor Browser in alpha series

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30469: Ship romanian Tor Browser in alpha series
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  GeorgKoppen201905,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201906R  |
Parent ID:  #29935   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Okay, well, I've spent quite some time building so we should be good here.
 :) If disaster strikes we'll see it in tomorrow's nightly.

 I merged the Torbutton patch to `master` (commit
 534a42c9d8c57730dab0df9a1f77b2b5cc1d0b43), the Tor Launcher patch to
 `master` (commit e46bf3bf9f589bd48e13d39054be55f5dabd8842), and the `tor-
 browser-build` one to `master` (commit
 919a7b230f0a88b600b02cd0d654cae1f69f0efb) (in the respective
 repositories).

 Additionally, I picked up the Torbutton changes on `tor-
 browser-60.7.0esr-9.0-1` for our nightly builds.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27732 [Applications/Tor Browser]: New Identity does not reset NoScript's Temporarily Trusted settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27732: New Identity does not reset NoScript's Temporarily Trusted settings
-+-
 Reporter:  Yael |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-newnym, tbb-8.0-issues, tbb- |  Actual Points:
  regression, tbb-8.0.1-can, noscript|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 #30738 is a duplicate.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30738 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Reset Noscript temporary permissions after clicking New Identity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30738: Reset Noscript temporary permissions after clicking New Identity
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Duplicate of #27732.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30321 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Adapt Linux toolchain for Firefox 68 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30321: Adapt Linux toolchain for Firefox 68 ESR
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30320| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > If you depend on software rasterization, image decoding, or color space
 conversion and compile Skia with GCC, MSVC or another compiler, you will
 see dramatically worse performance than if you use Clang.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30739 [HTTPS Everywhere]: Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30739: Tor
-+-
 Reporter:  Hariom9165   |  Owner:  legind
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  HTTPS
 |  Everywhere
  Version:  Tor: 0.4.0.5 |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  orbot-14.0.3.1, orbot-14.0.4,|  Actual Points:
  software-engineering   |
Parent ID:  #12412   | Points:  100
 Reviewer:  Hariom   |Sponsor:
-+-
 sghgdhcjdwfzuswyudcdxdfxgdg

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30613 [UX]: Noscript button disappeared in 8.5

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30613: Noscript button disappeared in 8.5
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  UX   |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by speedtester):

 I have to agree with cypherpunks, that removing NoScript buttons (for new
 installations) is not a great idea before implementing #30570, as it
 allowed better controls for exceptions.

 And worth mentioning, that I (as an old user of tor) spent some time
 finding the cause of the missing buttons, I was about to open a bugreport,
 then I found this article. (didn't find the explanation in changelogs, or
 in the about:tbbtab)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30736 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure we have Yasm >= 1.2.0 available on Linux 64bit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30736: Make sure we have Yasm >= 1.2.0 available on Linux 64bit
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30321| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Please, read https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1501796
 carefully. It shouldn't ask for `yasm` on systems, where proper `nasm` is
 available.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30381 [Core Tor/Tor]: Provide control port commands to ADD/REMOVE/VIEW v3 client-auth

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30381: Provide control port commands to ADD/REMOVE/VIEW v3 client-auth
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tbb-usability, ux-team, hs-  |  Actual Points:
  auth, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2   |
Parent ID:  #14389   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Pushed branch here: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1070

 It's based on david's #30382 branch so that I can use his 'decrypt pending
 descriptors upon add' functionality. That's also the only part that is not
 unittested.

 I also pushed a fixup commit to my spec patch based on the latest
 implementation:
 
https://github.com/torproject/torspec/pull/81/commits/dafda3944241e4ab6dfe0fee90d2e97979ac8f94

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #10760 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Integrate TorButton to TorBrowser core to prevent users from disabling it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10760: Integrate TorButton to TorBrowser core to prevent users from disabling 
it
-+-
 Reporter:  Rezonansowy  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, tbb-parity,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905, GeorgKoppen201905, ux-   |
  team   |
Parent ID:  #24855   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by acat):

 I replaced the duplicated strings
 {{{
 securityLevel.securityLevel
 securityLevel.standard.level
 securityLevel.standard.summary
 securityLevel.safer.level
 securityLevel.safer.summary
 securityLevel.safer.description1
 securityLevel.safer.description2
 securityLevel.safer.description3
 securityLevel.safest.level
 securityLevel.safest.summary
 securityLevel.safest.description1
 securityLevel.safest.description2
 securityLevel.safest.description3
 securityLevel.learnMore
 }}}
 with the corresponding ones from DTD in securityLevel.js
 (https://github.com/acatarineu/tor-browser/commit/30429+1).

 Are these the only duplicated ones? My understanding is that we should
 remove these from the translations repository and then update the
 torbutton strings with the script, is this right?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #10760 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Integrate TorButton to TorBrowser core to prevent users from disabling it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10760: Integrate TorButton to TorBrowser core to prevent users from disabling 
it
-+-
 Reporter:  Rezonansowy  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, tbb-parity,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905, GeorgKoppen201905, ux-   |
  team, TorBrowserTeam201906R|
Parent ID:  #24855   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by acat):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * keywords:
 AffectsTails, tbb-parity, TorBrowserTeam201905, GeorgKoppen201905, ux-
 team
 =>
 AffectsTails, tbb-parity, TorBrowserTeam201905, GeorgKoppen201905, ux-
 team, TorBrowserTeam201906R


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30321 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Adapt Linux toolchain for Firefox 68 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30321: Adapt Linux toolchain for Firefox 68 ESR
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30320| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by tom):

 Yeah; we switched our linux builds to clang. Sorry I didn't see this
 earlier. One of the factors to that was Skia becoming much slower (I never
 got an idea of the numbers) with gcc.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29670 [Core Tor/Tor]: Could not create SOCKS args string

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29670: Could not create SOCKS args string
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport, 040-backport, ux,  |  Actual Points:  .2
  regression?, 041-should,   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => catalyst


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24367 [Core Tor/Tor]: Changing pluggable transports (during start-up) in Tor Browser is broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24367: Changing pluggable transports (during start-up) in Tor Browser is broken
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, tor-bridge-client,   |  Actual Points:
  033-triage-20180320, 033-removed-20180320, |
  031-unreached-backport, tbb-needs, |
  034-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport,  |
  041-should, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2 |
Parent ID:  #29875   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => ahf


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22619 [Core Tor/Tor]: SessionGroup = Reading config failed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22619: SessionGroup = Reading config failed
-+-
 Reporter:  acceleraTor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SessionGroup configuration   |  Actual Points:  0
  SocksPort option 032-unreached 035-backport|
  040-backport 041-can   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => mikeperry


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27530 [Core Tor/Tor]: Configure: Use AC_TRY_RUN() to check that --enable-gcc-hardening works

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27530: Configure: Use AC_TRY_RUN() to check that --enable-gcc-hardening works
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, postfreeze-ok, 041-can,|  Actual Points:  .1
  041-should |
Parent ID:  #28611   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => teor


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29875 [Core Tor/Tor]: Going from obfs4 to snowflake using the Tor Network Settings from the Torbutton doesn't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29875: Going from obfs4 to snowflake using the Tor Network Settings from the
Torbutton doesn't work
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-needs, 035-backport, |  Actual Points:  .5
  040-backport, 041-should, network-team-|
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => ahf


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30630 [Core Tor/Tor]: Put CI URLs in ReleasingTor.md

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30630: Put CI URLs in ReleasingTor.md
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, doc, 041-can  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  teor|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
+
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => teor


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30381 [Core Tor/Tor]: Provide control port commands to ADD/REMOVE/VIEW v3 client-auth

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30381: Provide control port commands to ADD/REMOVE/VIEW v3 client-auth
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tbb-usability, ux-team, hs-  |  Actual Points:
  auth, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2   |
Parent ID:  #14389   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30686 [Core Tor/Tor]: Better warnings when minherit/madvise fails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30686: Better warnings when minherit/madvise fails
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-should diagnostic  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID: | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  mikeperry  |Sponsor:  Sponsor2
---+
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => mikeperry


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30694 [Core Tor/Tor]: Restrict the tor CI stem job to tests that actually use tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30694: Restrict the tor CI stem job to tests that actually use tor
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #30591 | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
---+
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => nickm


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30721 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_addr_port_lookup() is overly permissive

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30721: tor_addr_port_lookup() is overly permissive
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, tor-addr, refactor,  |  Actual Points:  0.5
  practracker-improvement|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => catalyst


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28453 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create a EndOfLifeTor.md document

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28453: Create a EndOfLifeTor.md document
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-doc, release-management, |  Actual Points:
  postfreeze-ok, 041-should  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28970 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_client.c:624: setup_intro_circ_auth_key: Non-fatal assertion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28970: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_client.c:624:
setup_intro_circ_auth_key: Non-fatal assertion
-+-
 Reporter:  torcrash |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, tor-hs, postfreeze-ok,   |  Actual Points:
  040-unreached-must, network-team-  |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, regression?, 041-must   |
Parent ID:  #29995   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * owner:  asn => (none)
 * status:  needs_information => assigned


Comment:

 We are hoping that #29034 will fix this issue, but I don't have capacity
 to fix this in 041 if that doesn't do it.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30689 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Release CollecTor 1.9.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30689: Release CollecTor 1.9.1
---+-
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl|Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by karsten):

 Deployed on colchicifolium, and nothing broke so far!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28966 [Core Tor/Tor]: HSv3 client auth insufficiently documented (was: HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient incompatible)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28966: HSv3 client auth insufficiently documented (was:
HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient incompatible)
-+-
 Reporter:  roo  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.6-rc
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, client-auth, hsv3,   |  Actual Points:
  postfreeze-ok, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #14389   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * keywords:
 tor-hs, client-auth, hsv3, postfreeze-ok, network-team-
 roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, 041-should
 =>
 tor-hs, client-auth, hsv3, postfreeze-ok, network-team-
 roadmap-2019-Q1Q2
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final => Tor: 0.4.2.x-final


Comment:

 Moving to 042. This is not roadmapped for 041 as part of s27. We will do
 it later.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30381 [Core Tor/Tor]: Provide control port commands to ADD/REMOVE/VIEW v3 client-auth

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30381: Provide control port commands to ADD/REMOVE/VIEW v3 client-auth
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tbb-usability, ux-team, hs-  |  Actual Points:  4.5
  auth, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2   |
Parent ID:  #14389   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * actualpoints:   => 4.5


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30740 [Webpages/Website]: link.tl skip button is not working with tor browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30740: link.tl skip button is not working with tor browser
--+--
 Reporter:  dmgmurat  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  Webpages/Website
  Version:  Tor: unspecified  |   Severity:  Blocker
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 i tried many times and can not see any link on this site. you can see what
 happen .i am using windows 10 pro and last tor browser version
 8.5 (based on Mozilla Firefox 60.7.0esr) (64-bit)

 https://gyazo.com/87a411437830c727d8a126acaaa0ed89

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30740 [Webpages/Website]: link.tl skip button is not working with tor browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30740: link.tl skip button is not working with tor browser
--+--
 Reporter:  dmgmurat  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dmgmurat):

 * Attachment "87a411437830c727d8a126acaaa0ed89.png" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30741 [- Select a component]: link.tl skip button is not working with tor browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30741: link.tl skip button is not working with tor browser
--+--
 Reporter:  dmgmurat  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:  Tor: unspecified  |   Severity:  Blocker
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 i tried many times and can not see any link on this site. you can see what
 happen .i am using windows 10 pro and last tor browser version
 8.5 (based on Mozilla Firefox 60.7.0esr) (64-bit)

 https://gyazo.com/87a411437830c727d8a126acaaa0ed89

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30566 [Webpages/Website]: Update Sponsors page with "Craig Newmark Philanthropies" entry

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30566: Update Sponsors page with "Craig Newmark Philanthropies" entry
--+--
 Reporter:  bekeela   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Description changed by bekeela:

Old description:

> Please add "Craig Newmark Philanthropies" to the sponsors list here
> https://www.torproject.org/about/sponsors/
>
> Logo should come from this page:
> https://craignewmarkphilanthropies.org/newsroom/
>
> Link should point to https://craignewmarkphilanthropies.org/
>
> For the description, please use this text:
>
> Craig Newmark Philanthropies was created by craigslist founder Craig
> Newmark to support and connect people and drive broad civic engagement.
> The organization works to advance people and grassroots organizations
> that are getting stuff done in areas that include trustworthy journalism,
> voter protection, gender diversity in technology, and veterans and
> military families. The organization has provided Tor Project with an
> unrestricted gift.

New description:

 Please add "Craig Newmark Philanthropies" to the sponsors list here
 https://www.torproject.org/about/sponsors/

 Logo should come from this page:
 https://craignewmarkphilanthropies.org/newsroom/ the "download logo"
 button

 Link should point to https://craignewmarkphilanthropies.org/

 For the description, please use this text:

 Craig Newmark Philanthropies was created by craigslist founder Craig
 Newmark to support and connect people and drive broad civic engagement.
 The organization works to advance people and grassroots organizations that
 are getting stuff done in areas that include trustworthy journalism, voter
 protection, gender diversity in technology, and veterans and military
 families. The organization has provided Tor Project with an unrestricted
 gift.

--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30740 [Webpages/Website]: link.tl skip button is not working with tor browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30740: link.tl skip button is not working with tor browser
--+--
 Reporter:  dmgmurat  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Here is what I get in the background:

 Access Denied
 You don't have permission to access "http://www.gearbest.com/promotion-
 Life-Essentials-Gadgets-special-2811.html?" on this server.

 Reference #18.1f012417.1559574086.16cab286

 So, it seems the service is blocking Tor exit nodes. There's not much we
 can do here. :(

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30741 [- Select a component]: link.tl skip button is not working with tor browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30741: link.tl skip button is not working with tor browser
--+--
 Reporter:  dmgmurat  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Duplicate of #30740.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30740 [Webpages/Website]: link.tl skip button is not working with tor browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30740: link.tl skip button is not working with tor browser
--+--
 Reporter:  dmgmurat  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 But maybe I don't understand the bug report correctly. What do you want to
 say with the red arrows?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30740 [Webpages/Website]: link.tl skip button is not working with tor browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30740: link.tl skip button is not working with tor browser
--+---
 Reporter:  dmgmurat  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30736 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure we have Yasm >= 1.2.0 available on Linux 64bit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30736: Make sure we have Yasm >= 1.2.0 available on Linux 64bit
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30321| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:1 cypherpunks]:
 > Please, read https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1501796
 carefully. It shouldn't ask for `yasm` on systems, where proper `nasm` is
 available.

 But it does explicitly and fails if none is available:
 {{{
 ERROR: Yasm is required to build with ffvpx, jpeg, libav and vpx, but you
 do not appear to have Yasm installed.
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30736 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure we have Yasm >= 1.2.0 available on Linux 64bit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30736: Make sure we have Yasm >= 1.2.0 available on Linux 64bit
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30321| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:2 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:1 cypherpunks]:
 > > Please, read https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1501796
 carefully. It shouldn't ask for `yasm` on systems, where proper `nasm` is
 available.
 >
 > But it does explicitly and fails if none is available:
 > {{{
 > ERROR: Yasm is required to build with ffvpx, jpeg, libav and vpx, but
 you do not appear to have Yasm installed.
 > }}}

 Oh, and this comes from https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-
 central/rev/2c4de7449db2 which landed after the fix for bug 1501796.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30628 [Core Tor/Tor]: sendme closes client connections

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30628: sendme closes client connections
-+-
 Reporter:  traumschule  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sendme, tor-flowctrl, 041-must   |  Actual Points:
  041-regression regression  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Awesome information! I'm still unable to reproduce here :(

 @pege: So the logs you provided unfortunately have a missing piece that I
 really need. The SIGUSR2 was sent to get the debug on. Client side I have
 everything but on service side I'm missing almost 2 minutes that are very
 important.

 You think you can reproduce with the debug logs from startup?

 Huge thanks!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30742 [Core Tor/Tor]: sendme: Better logging overall

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30742: sendme: Better logging overall
--+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-flowctrl, sendme
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 This ticket is for various logging improvements for the SENDME subsystem.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30737 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor daemon unusable after resuming from suspend on Linux

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30737: Tor daemon unusable after resuming from suspend on Linux
--+--
 Reporter:  Parckwart |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.8
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28970 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_client.c:624: setup_intro_circ_auth_key: Non-fatal assertion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28970: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_client.c:624:
setup_intro_circ_auth_key: Non-fatal assertion
-+-
 Reporter:  torcrash |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, tor-hs, postfreeze-ok,   |  Actual Points:
  040-unreached-must, network-team-  |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, regression?, 041-must   |
Parent ID:  #29995   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * cc: dgoulet (removed)
 * status:  assigned => new


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30737 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor daemon unusable after resuming from suspend on Linux

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30737: Tor daemon unusable after resuming from suspend on Linux
--+--
 Reporter:  Parckwart |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.8
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29670 [Core Tor/Tor]: Could not create SOCKS args string

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29670: Could not create SOCKS args string
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport, 040-backport, ux,  |  Actual Points:  .2
  regression?, 041-should,   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 OK this looks like an concrete instance of a theoretical bug I was worried
 about in existing code when I noticed some quirks when working on
 bootstrap reporting.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29670 [Core Tor/Tor]: Could not create SOCKS args string

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29670: Could not create SOCKS args string
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport, 040-backport, ux,  |  Actual Points:  .2
  regression?, 041-should,   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 Replying to [comment:23 catalyst]:
 > OK this looks like an concrete instance of a theoretical bug I was
 worried about in existing code when I noticed some quirks when working on
 bootstrap reporting.
 That would be #29876.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30429 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches for Firefox ESR 68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30429: Rebase Tor Browser patches for Firefox ESR 68
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201906R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by acat):

 >>Onion security expectations: a couple of patches, depending on
 availability, perhaps pospeselr could work on these?
 >What are the issues here? Could you file a new bug to track that work?

 I left them for the end after a quick look, but I just tried again and it
 seems not so much work. So I can work on these after working on
 onboarding.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29876 [Core Tor/Tor]: get_proxy_type() may be wrong when unused PT configured

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29876: get_proxy_type() may be wrong when unused PT configured
+--
 Reporter:  catalyst|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, tor-pt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29670  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor19-can
+--
Changes (by catalyst):

 * parent:   => #29670


Comment:

 This looks like the cause of #29670.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29670 [Core Tor/Tor]: Could not create SOCKS args string

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29670: Could not create SOCKS args string
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport, 040-backport, ux,  |  Actual Points:  .2
  regression?, 041-should,   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 Replying to [comment:24 catalyst]:
 > Replying to [comment:23 catalyst]:
 > > OK this looks like an concrete instance of a theoretical bug I was
 worried about in existing code when I noticed some quirks when working on
 bootstrap reporting.
 > That would be #29876.
 Made that ticket a child of this one. We can close them at the same time.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #15279 [Applications/Tor Browser]: uMatrix & uBlock to Replace NoScript

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15279: uMatrix & uBlock to Replace NoScript
--+--
 Reporter:  johnakabean   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 umatrix is not ublock. And noscript is shit. it doesn't block tracking
 pixels.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30608 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Have a SMTP out only server

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30608: Have a SMTP out only server
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 > Anyone able to impersonate a @tpo is a _serious_ problem imo and we have
 *no* defenses in place against that. They won't be perfect but it would at
 least be a start...

 If you're not talking about DKIM/SPF, then I'm not sure this is an
 argument - anyone can still impersonate @tpo if you enable SMTP-AUTH.

 > But for now I would _just_ simply want my email to STOP BEING DROPPED by
 email servers that check the origin server of the From: address (which
 honestly I can't blame them to do).

 I would love to help with that. I would need details about email
 configuration and the emails delivered.

 For now we don't know why/when/who and how do those emails get dropped,
 because I have no information on when that happens and to who.

 I have already asked people here to provide concrete reports of email
 delivery failure, and I'm still waiting for that proper bug report.

 Come on people, you are developers, I'm sure you understand the value of a
 good bug report! :) I understand this is a feature request, but for now, I
 need you to help me help you and give me information I can work with.

 I have made a short guide to detail the kind of information we need for
 failure reports:

 https://help.torproject.org/tsa/doc/reporting-email-problems/

 > And whatever Gmail/Facebook do, at this point, I honestly do not care, I
 just want, by all means necessary, to be able to use my @tpo without
 ending up in SPAM or being silently dropped... This is not happening to
 only me and it will get worsts as big providers tighten their email rules
 over time.

 I agree! We all want email to work.

 But "just do SMTP-AUTH" is not necessarily a solution here. For example,
 we had troubles delivering to gmail.com from mailing lists as well, and
 that, as far as I know, would not necessarily have been solved by SMTP-
 AUTH.

 > For LDAP password usage I do agree that I don't think it's good to re-
 use the same password everywhere, but there must be some solution to that?
 If I recall correctly, Postfix's authentication system is _very_ flexible
 and we should be able to find a solution to that problem if we think it's
 a blocker.

 It's definitely a blocker, and there's a solution (#6367). But there's
 more to SMTP-AUTH than just hooking it into Postfix...

 > In a fit of desperation, I set up my mail client to use an SSH
 LocalForward to iranicum as a SMTP server. Preliminary testing indicates
 that my emails aren't going into SPAM folders of MIT and gmail anymore.

 For those wishing to send email over SSH, which is an ... interesting
 solution, to say the least, you might want to review the notes I have made
 for my personal use in https://gitlab.com/anarcat/rsendmail It details,
 among other things, how to setup a passwordless, but restricted, SSH key
 to ensure unattended delivery works, along with integration with normal,
 local MTAs.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30732 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "Your Firefox is critically out of date" banner

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30732: "Your Firefox is critically out of date" banner
--+--
 Reporter:  hellomebois   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  not a bug =>


Comment:

 So, looking at https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/rate-your-firefox-
 experience-heartbeat this actually seems to be legit. However, it's not
 clear where the banner text is actually coming from. Do you have your Tor
 Browser modified somehow that could explain this kind of banner? Your bug
 report is the first one of this kind I think which makes me wonder. Do you
 know when these banners are showing up?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30732 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "Your Firefox is critically out of date" banner

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30732: "Your Firefox is critically out of date" banner
--+---
 Reporter:  hellomebois   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  reopened => needs_information


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29670 [Core Tor/Tor]: Could not create SOCKS args string

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29670: Could not create SOCKS args string
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport, 040-backport, ux,  |  Actual Points:  .2
  regression?, 041-should,   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:21 nickm]:
 > I have a possible fix in a branch called `bug29670_035` with a PR in
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1056
 >
 > I have run a couple of experiments with it, but I do not have the right
 kind of local socks proxy to try this out.  If somebody else could see
 whether it fixes the bug, that would help greatly.
 Thanks! Look reasonable by visual inspection. The practracker exceptions
 need updating though, which is why the tests seem to be failing.

 I'm going to try to manually test it on Tor Browser.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30736 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure we have Yasm >= 1.2.0 available on Linux 64bit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30736: Make sure we have Yasm >= 1.2.0 available on Linux 64bit
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30321| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 It seems just using wheezy-backports is what Mozilla is doing:
 https://searchfox.org/mozilla-beta/source/taskcluster/docker/debian-
 build/Dockerfile#61. I guess that's an option here too.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30628 [Core Tor/Tor]: sendme closes client connections

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30628: sendme closes client connections
-+-
 Reporter:  traumschule  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sendme, tor-flowctrl, 041-must   |  Actual Points:  0.6
  041-regression regression  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => nickm
 * actualpoints:   => 0.6


Comment:

 Ok finally found the problem and figured out WHY this would
 never happen with debug logs on. Problem is in this function that is
 responsible for decrementing the flow control package window, can you spot
 it? :

 {{{
 int
 sendme_note_stream_data_packaged(edge_connection_t *conn)
 {
   tor_assert(conn);
   log_debug(LD_APP, "Stream package_window now %d.",
 --conn->package_window);
   return conn->package_window;
 }
 }}}

 Now imagine yourself with a tor with debug logs turned *off*, you know
 like 99.% of the tor daemon out there ;).

 Answer to the quiz is: `package_window` does NOT get decremented if
 `log_debug` is off ;)...

 I get the `commit hat of shame` for at least a full week there ;)

 Introduced in commit `3835a3acf57426f692a787e7729de929b40dc62e`.

 Branch: `ticket30628_041_01`
 PR: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1071

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30736 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure we have Yasm >= 1.2.0 available on Linux 64bit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30736: Make sure we have Yasm >= 1.2.0 available on Linux 64bit
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30321| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Yes. And who knows what they meant then by
 > OK. I don't get any warnings anymore when only having nasm installed.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28804 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add circuit padding to padding-spec.txt and write a doc for researchers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28804: Add circuit padding to padding-spec.txt and write a doc for researchers
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, tor-spec, 041-proposed, network-  |
  team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-

Comment (by mikeperry):

 One more thing to cover in the research doc: We should explain how we will
 accept and deploy changes to the padding machine featureset itself (one
 potentially useful change is for all state transitions have a probability
 associated with them, to explicitly support HMM representations).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30628 [Core Tor/Tor]: sendme closes client connections

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30628: sendme closes client connections
-+-
 Reporter:  traumschule  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sendme, tor-flowctrl, 041-must   |  Actual Points:  0.6
  041-regression regression, asn-merge   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * keywords:  sendme, tor-flowctrl, 041-must 041-regression regression =>
 sendme, tor-flowctrl, 041-must 041-regression regression, asn-merge


Comment:

 LGTM!

 Did you check to make sure that the other increment/decrement functions
 don't have this bug?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30743 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write a coccinelle script to catch increment/decrement calls inside log_debug().

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30743: Write a coccinelle script to catch increment/decrement calls inside
log_debug().
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 See #30628 for motivation

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30744 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow failures in the Travis test-stem job

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30744: Allow failures in the Travis test-stem job
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:  Tor: 0.2.4.8-alpha
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes,
 Severity:  Normal   |  035-backport, 040-backport, 041-backport
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #29437
   Points:  0.1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30713 [Core Tor/Tor]: Disable or allow_fail test_rebind.py in macOS Travis

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30713: Disable or allow_fail test_rebind.py in macOS Travis
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, rare?, 035-backport, |  Actual Points:
  040-backport, tor-ci-fail-sometimes,   |
  041-should |
Parent ID:  #28229   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  (none) => teor
 * status:  new => assigned


Comment:

 We decided to disable it on macOS.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30732 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "Your Firefox is critically out of date" banner

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30732: "Your Firefox is critically out of date" banner
--+---
 Reporter:  hellomebois   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by mcs):

 #28978 is probably a duplicate.
 Some time after we fixed #19047, the shield add-on was converted into a
 bundled component (see
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1436113). Kathy and I are out
 of time for research today, but probably we need to set
 `app.normandy.enabled` to false. We could also clear the
 `app.normandy.api_url` pref as a "defense in depth" measure.

 The questions from comment:2 are still worth seeking answers to though.
 Here is one more question: if you look in about:config, what is your value
 for `toolkit.telemetry.enabled`?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30745 [Core Tor/Tor]: Document disabled CI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30745: Document disabled CI
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.2   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Add a section to our CI status page for disabled CI

 Add a section to doc/HACKING/ReleasingTor.md reminding releasers to
 manually check the status of whatever the disabled CI would have
 checked.

 CI person should periodically look at these jobs.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30713 [Core Tor/Tor]: Disable or allow_fail test_rebind.py in macOS Travis

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30713: Disable or allow_fail test_rebind.py in macOS Travis
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, rare?, 035-backport, |  Actual Points:
  040-backport, tor-ci-fail-sometimes,   |
  041-should |
Parent ID:  #28229   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 03:25 nickm: I'd just add an environment variable for disabling
 test_rebind.py, and add it to the relevant entries in the travis file

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30591 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make tor's Travis stem job log controller messages from stem and tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30591: Make tor's Travis stem job log controller messages from stem and tor
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes, stem, |  Actual Points:  0.4
  041-should |
Parent ID:  #29437   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:17 teor]:
 > Replying to [comment:6 teor]:
 > > Replying to [comment:1 teor]:
 > > > I based these branches on #30234, because it hasn't been backported
 to 0.3.5 yet.
 > > >
 > > > See my pull requests:
 > > > * 0.3.5: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1044
 > > > * master: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1045
 > > >   * clean merge
 > > > * fail test: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1046
 > >
 > > I have updated these branches with TRACE, and force-pushed.
 >
 > I have updated these branches so they only use the stem tests that run
 tor (#30694), and force-pushed.
 >
 > This should reduce the TRACE output, but maybe not by enough (we might
 need to tail the output once #30675 is implemented).
 It looks like the repetitive log messages are still quite numerous, and
 might obscure useful information. Maybe we want to do the `grep -v` for
 now?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30636 [Metrics/Analysis]: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 400K

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30636: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 
400K
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ir|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mrphs):

 I wonder how many of these are Orbot installations which were sitting on
 Android devices and now are suddenly connecting back to the network.
 Iranian users do have a habit of having all the censorship circumvention
 tools installed and try to see which one works everyday they pick up their
 phones. I asked Nathan to see if he can give us any statistics on how many
 active installation (through Google play store) we currently have in IR.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30746 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor bootstrap hangs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30746: Tor bootstrap hangs
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Hi network team. Stem's integ tests impose a 90 second timeout when
 bootstrapping. The vast majority of time it succeeds without issue, but
 sometimes bootstrapping hangs, exceeding this.

 I have debug level logs available but it's pretty big so attaching info
 level logs instead. If debug logging would be useful just let me know.

 {{{
 % du -h ~/Desktop/tor_hang_debug_log.txt
 13M /home/atagar/Desktop/tor_hang_debug_log.txt
 }}}

 Notice runlevel logs are as follows...

 {{{
 Jun 03 18:10:04.000 [notice] Tor 0.4.1.1-alpha-dev (git-180048e013c06ee6)
 opening new log file.
 Jun 03 18:10:04.131 [notice] Tor 0.4.1.1-alpha-dev (git-180048e013c06ee6)
 running on Linux with Libevent 2.0.21-stable, OpenSSL 1.0.2g, Zlib 1.2.8,
 Liblzma N/A, and Libzstd N/A.
 Jun 03 18:10:04.132 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn
 how to be safe at https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning
 Jun 03 18:10:04.132 [notice] This version is not a stable Tor release.
 Expect more bugs than usual.
 Jun 03 18:10:04.132 [notice] Read configuration file
 "/home/atagar/Desktop/stem/test/data/torrc".
 Jun 03 18:10:04.136 [notice] Your ContactInfo config option is not set.
 Please consider setting it, so we can contact you if your server is
 misconfigured or something else goes wrong.
 Jun 03 18:10:04.137 [notice] Based on detected system memory,
 MaxMemInQueues is set to 5917 MB. You can override this by setting
 MaxMemInQueues by hand.
 Jun 03 18:10:04.137 [warn] ControlPort is open, but no authentication
 method has been configured.  This means that any program on your computer
 can reconfigure your Tor.  That's bad!  You should upgrade your Tor
 controller as soon as possible.
 Jun 03 18:10:04.138 [notice] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:1112
 Jun 03 18:10:04.138 [notice] Opened Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:1112
 Jun 03 18:10:04.138 [notice] Opening Control listener on 127.0.0.1:
 Jun 03 18:10:04.139 [notice] Opened Control listener on 127.0.0.1:
 Jun 03 18:10:04.139 [notice] Opening OR listener on 0.0.0.0:1113
 Jun 03 18:10:04.139 [notice] Opened OR listener on 0.0.0.0:1113
 Jun 03 18:10:04.139 [warn] Fixing permissions on directory
 /home/atagar/Desktop/stem/test/data
 Jun 03 18:10:04.000 [warn] Your log may contain sensitive information -
 you're logging more than "notice". Don't log unless it serves an important
 reason. Overwrite the log afterwards.
 Jun 03 18:10:04.000 [notice] Configured to measure directory request
 statistics, but no GeoIP database found. Please specify a GeoIP database
 using the GeoIPFile option.
 Jun 03 18:10:04.000 [notice] You are running a new relay. Thanks for
 helping the Tor network! If you wish to know what will happen in the
 upcoming weeks regarding its usage, have a look at
 https://blog.torproject.org/blog/lifecycle-of-a-new-relay
 Jun 03 18:10:04.000 [notice] It looks like I need to generate and sign a
 new medium-term signing key, because I don't have one. To do that, I need
 to load (or create) the permanent master identity key. If the master
 identity key was not moved or encrypted with a passphrase, this will be
 done automatically and no further action is required. Otherwise, provide
 the necessary data using 'tor --keygen' to do it manually.
 Jun 03 18:10:04.000 [notice] Your Tor server's identity key fingerprint is
 'Unnamed D65E957D19700A27C67D89C314DE822B0CA6CD7D'
 Jun 03 18:10:04.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 0% (starting): Starting
 Jun 03 18:10:04.000 [notice] Starting with guard context "default"
 Jun 03 18:10:04.000 [notice] Guessed our IP address as 71.231.87.208
 (source: 86.59.21.38).
 Jun 03 18:10:06.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no usable consensus.
 Jun 03 18:10:07.000 [notice] The current consensus has no exit nodes. Tor
 can only build internal paths, such as paths to onion services.
 Jun 03 18:10:07.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We need more microdescriptors: we have
 0/6563, and can only build 0% of likely paths. (We have 0% of guards bw,
 0% of midpoint bw, and 0% of end bw (no exits in consensus, using mid) =
 0% of path bw.)
 Jun 03 18:10:07.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 5% (conn): Connecting to a relay
 Jun 03 18:10:07.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 10% (conn_done): Connected to a
 relay
 Jun 03 18:10:07.000 [notice] The current consensus contains exit nodes.
 Tor can build exit and internal paths.
 Jun 03 18:10:08.000 [notice] Boot

Re: [tor-bugs] #30746 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor bootstrap hangs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30746: Tor bootstrap hangs
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by atagar):

 * Attachment "tor_hang_info_log.txt" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30733 [Core Tor/sbws]: SBWS is using max advertised bandwidth from 5 day old descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30733: SBWS is using max advertised bandwidth from 5 day old descriptors
---+---
 Reporter:  starlight  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.1.0
 Severity:  Critical   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-majority-blocker  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by starlight):

 Stand by it; still true:

 "BWS longclaw never recognized the change"

 {{{
 desc_bw_avg=1073741824
 nick=powerlay
 node_id=$C381468CDA4A90664F0889A6AE334547AEE4D9B4
 time=2019-06-03T05:50:32
 }}}

 What the scanner did was--after the protracted delay of five days--detect
 lower available bandwidth which resulted as a consequence of the reduced
 configured maximum, because BandwidthBurst was used to establish it rather
 than MaxAdvertisedBandwidth.

 The raw data is all here https://collector.torproject.org/archive/relay-
 descriptors/bandwidths/

 A one-line perl script extracted the attachment data such that it is
 comprehensible in the context of the issue.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30733 [Core Tor/sbws]: SBWS does not detect some changes in max advertised bandwidth (was: SBWS is using max advertised bandwidth from 5 day old descriptors)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30733: SBWS does not detect some changes in max advertised bandwidth
---+---
 Reporter:  starlight  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.1.0
 Severity:  Critical   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-majority-blocker  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30733 [Core Tor/sbws]: SBWS does not detect some changes in max advertised bandwidth

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30733: SBWS does not detect some changes in max advertised bandwidth
---+---
 Reporter:  starlight  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.1.0
 Severity:  Critical   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-majority-blocker  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Description changed by teor:

Old description:

> See attached files.  Relay powerlay lowered max advertised bandwidth late
> 5/23.  SBWS longclaw ~~never recognized the change~~ only recognised the
> change after 5 days.  SBWS bastet saw the value but was started after the
> change.  Torflow recognized the change instantly.
>
> ~~ Have observed that SBWS, when it makes note of max advertised
> bandwidth, averages the value.  This value should not be averaged, the
> current value whatever it is apples. ~~

New description:

 See attached files.  Relay powerlay lowered max advertised bandwidth late
 5/23.  SBWS longclaw never recognized the change.  SBWS bastet saw the
 value but was started after the change.  Torflow recognized the change
 instantly.

 ~~ Have observed that SBWS, when it makes note of max advertised
 bandwidth, averages the value.  This value should not be averaged, the
 current value whatever it is apples. ~~

--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30747 [Core Tor/sbws]: Unclear check for skipping scaling due to missing bandwidths or missing descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30747: Unclear check for skipping scaling due to missing bandwidths or missing
descriptors
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.1.0
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #30733
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 We skip old results when scaling, but there are a few things wrong with
 this check:
 1. It is hard to tell what this line does, because it mixes "and" and "or"
 without brackets: l.desc_bw_obs_last or l.desc_bw_obs_mean and
 l.desc_bw_avg
 2. We skip scaling if any input is missing, but then we check
 desc_bw_obs_type and ignore some inputs
 3. If we are missing a descriptor for long enough, we stop generating
 results for a relay. We could use a substitute value instead.
 {{{
 if not(l.desc_bw_obs_last or l.desc_bw_obs_mean and
 l.desc_bw_avg):
 log.debug("Skipping %s from scaling, because there were
 not "
   "descriptor bandwidths.", l.nick)
 continue
 if desc_bw_obs_type == TORFLOW_OBS_LAST:
 desc_bw_obs = l.desc_bw_obs_last
 elif desc_bw_obs_type == TORFLOW_OBS_MEAN:
 desc_bw_obs = l.desc_bw_obs_mean
 }}}
 
https://github.com/torproject/sbws/blob/9065848247e49330560a2f73b044fb8c02338b48/sbws/lib/v3bwfile.py#L1244

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30733 [Core Tor/sbws]: SBWS does not detect some changes in max advertised bandwidth

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30733: SBWS does not detect some changes in max advertised bandwidth
---+---
 Reporter:  starlight  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.1.0
 Severity:  Critical   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-majority-blocker  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by teor):

 We have already tried to implement this feature twice, in #28588 and
 GItHub ticket 155.

 We need to create better tests for this feature, so we can be sure it is
 working correctly.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30187 [Core Tor/Tor]: 100% cpu usage in winthreads tor_cond_wait

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30187: 100% cpu usage in winthreads tor_cond_wait
---+---
 Reporter:  bolvan |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.5.8
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  windows 035-backport 042-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 its a win32 builds code bug (x64 too)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30748 [Webpages/Website]: torproject onion sites unreliable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30748: torproject onion sites unreliable
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low |  Component:  Webpages/Website
  Version:   |   Severity:  Trivial
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 rougmnvswfsmd4dq.onion
 Our services aren't available right nowWe're working to
 restore all services as soon as possible. Please check back soon.
 

 what is this base64 similar looking strange string in the end? any
 signature to make sure I'am talking to tpo?
 I'am worried. because in another torbrowser session i can reach the sites
 fine. how can come such difference behavior?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30544 [Metrics/Library]: Using try-with-resources or close resource

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30544: Using try-with-resources or close resource
-+--
 Reporter:  fava |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by fava):

 * Attachment "patch-fix-resource-leak.zip" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30544 [Metrics/Library]: Using try-with-resources or close resource

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30544: Using try-with-resources or close resource
-+--
 Reporter:  fava |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by fava):

 Replying to [comment:1 karsten]:
 > Would you be able to submit a patch that fixes one instance of this
 issue? It could be a GitHub branch or a patch created with `git format-
 patch`.

 Replying to [comment:2 irl]:
 > GitHub mirror is here if you want to fork it:
 ​https://github.com/torproject/metrics-lib

 Please find in attachment my patch files [[attachment:patch-fix-resource-
 leak.zip]]
 There is also a specific github branch https://github.com/f-a-v-a/metrics-
 lib/tree/30544-try-with-resources .

 Please let me know your code review,
 Best Regards

 Let me kn

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs