[tor-bugs] #30807 [- Select a component]: WTH with mingw-w64?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30807: WTH with mingw-w64?
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 https://sourceforge.net/p/mingw-w64/mailman/message/36685049/

 
https://sourceforge.net/p/mingw-w64/mingw-w64/ci/d8f91451dcb4e099d56d3d71ad20340af633d0fe/

 and in general:
 https://sourceforge.net/p/mingw-w64/mailman/mingw-w64-public/thread
 /651313ff-87e3-d409-4b6c-1dc2a5276772%40codeweavers.com/#msg36674462

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27503 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disabling accessibility on Windows breaks screen readers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27503: Disabling accessibility on Windows breaks screen readers
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201903, tbb-8.5-must,   |
  TorBrowserTeam201906R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  boklm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Reader's questions (will be removed soon):

 Can `nullptr` be used?

 
https://github.com/pospeselr/wine/commit/b7aec156edc46528e90338bf56bfef0ceaca4217
 Different Wine-Bug?

 
https://github.com/pospeselr/wine/commit/7a77bb55dff25254b26309a56575f93586eb0203
 " inline" instead of "inline "?
 /* FIXME: do we need to handle call_as? */

 
https://github.com/pospeselr/wine/commit/c2d320d79644536ad988bda863b6f689451ee4e0
 {{{
 if (name && (t = find_type(name, namespace, tsENUM)))
 return t;
 }}}
 Is that coding style acceptable?
 Also
 
https://github.com/pospeselr/wine/blob/2bf54a0f57566ad7b27194c5f45ccb895cb275ac/tools/widl/header.c#L506

 
https://github.com/pospeselr/wine/commit/8e043b2f955d76fbf11285e5477d97d89f5065c4
 #diff-e75b8f9447cd0082fdc2e72d13b6f240R36
 No need to move `*`?

 
https://github.com/pospeselr/wine/commit/a901af46040902d43d8ed0f70702d0a2f589fb15
 #diff-8905c813ddc5a5cf9d568bae351c24e5R2401
 `element` here, but `elem` in all other places? Maybe, some better names?

 
https://github.com/pospeselr/wine/commit/2bf54a0f57566ad7b27194c5f45ccb895cb275ac
 #diff-8d894b6473d010f03261aa6855bc65fdR64
 Better naming than adding `2`?

 
https://github.com/pospeselr/wine/commit/26df75e01e1313fd6f8d3fc8cb91ddd5678068dd
 #diff-e75b8f9447cd0082fdc2e72d13b6f240L56
 Fixed?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30631 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Blurry Tor Browser icon on macOS app switcher

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30631: Blurry Tor Browser icon on macOS app switcher
-+-
 Reporter:  vjur |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-8.5-issues, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201906R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * keywords:  ux-team, tbb-8.5-issues => ux-team, tbb-8.5-issues,
 TorBrowserTeam201906R


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30806 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make a subsystem for evloop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30806: Make a subsystem for evloop
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by gaba):

 wow! I saw the .1 and was quite suspicious but it was really .1 estimation
 :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27503 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disabling accessibility on Windows breaks screen readers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27503: Disabling accessibility on Windows breaks screen readers
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201903, tbb-8.5-must,   |
  TorBrowserTeam201906R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  boklm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Can confirm, NVDA reliably crashes Tor Browser (both 32 and 64-bit
 flavors) on 64-bit windows. An interesting puzzle... for next week.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30806 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make a subsystem for evloop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30806: Make a subsystem for evloop
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => .1
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.2.x-final


Comment:

 See branch `libevent_subsystem` with PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1089

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[tor-bugs] #30806 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make a subsystem for evloop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30806: Make a subsystem for evloop
---+--
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+--
 The evloop module should use the subsystem mechanism.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27503 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disabling accessibility on Windows breaks screen readers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27503: Disabling accessibility on Windows breaks screen readers
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201903, tbb-8.5-must,   |
  TorBrowserTeam201906R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  boklm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by Rastislav Kiss):

 I have tried the amd 64 test build. When I launch it, a connection is
 being established and when it's finished, program crashes without any
 error.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30702 [Core Tor/Stem]: Add arbitrary torrc lines to stem's tor configuration

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30702: Add arbitrary torrc lines to stem's tor configuration
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30695 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
---+---
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Hi teor, support for additional torrc options (or overwriting any internal
 configuration value) added. See the following for usage...

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=394852c

 Feel free to reopen if you need additional macros, or anything else.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #2628 [Core Tor/Tor]: Be smarter about launching connections to authorities to learn about clock skew

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#2628: Be smarter about launching connections to authorities to learn about 
clock
skew
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client clock-skew AffectsTails  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  tor-client clock-skew AffectTails => tor-client clock-skew
 AffectsTails


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Re: [tor-bugs] #12600 [Core Tor/Tor]: Save retrieved bridge information in our state file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12600: Save retrieved bridge information in our state file
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, tor-pt,|  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  4.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorM
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:
 tor-bridge, tails-wants, tor-pt, 034-triage-20180328,
 034-removed-20180328
 => AffectsTails, tor-pt, 034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328


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Re: [tor-bugs] #2628 [Core Tor/Tor]: Be smarter about launching connections to authorities to learn about clock skew

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#2628: Be smarter about launching connections to authorities to learn about 
clock
skew
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client clock-skew AffectTails  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  tor-client clock-skew tails => tor-client clock-skew
   AffectTails


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Re: [tor-bugs] #2628 [Core Tor/Tor]: Be smarter about launching connections to authorities to learn about clock skew

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#2628: Be smarter about launching connections to authorities to learn about 
clock
skew
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client clock-skew tails  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  tor-client SponsorZ clock-skew => tor-client clock-skew tails


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27503 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disabling accessibility on Windows breaks screen readers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27503: Disabling accessibility on Windows breaks screen readers
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201903, tbb-8.5-must,   |
  TorBrowserTeam201906R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  boklm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * keywords:
 tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression, GeorgKoppen201903, tbb-8.5-must,
 TorBrowserTeam201905
 =>
 tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression, GeorgKoppen201903, tbb-8.5-must,
 TorBrowserTeam201906R


Comment:

 Ok for better reviewability, here is the widl changes that fix the various
 bugs, as well as a change to widl.c that mingw applies when building to
 handle mingw's default include directories.

 wine: https://github.com/pospeselr/wine/commits/bug_27503

 Once my current build finishes, I'll amend the tor-browser-build branch
 for mingw to remove the changes to VERSION and configure as they only
 update the version string to 4.9 from 3.20 but doesn't functionally alter
 any of the compiler output (apart from version strings)

 To generate the mingw-w64 patch in the bug_27503 tor-browser-build branch
 for yourself, you will need to first build wine (to generate the parser
 source from the yacc grammar file), then copy all of the *.c, *.h, *.l,
 and *.y files from the `wine/tools/widl` directory to
 `mingw-w64/mingw-w64-tools/widl/src` directory and do a `git diff`. This
 should generate the same 27503.patch file in `tor-browser-
 build/projects/mingw-w64`

 NOTE: To build widl, from the wine root do a `./configure --without-x
 --without-freetype` and the usual `make`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30795 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "BROWSER NOT ON TOR NETWORK"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30795: "BROWSER NOT ON TOR NETWORK"
--+--
 Reporter:  pam-e86   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 pam-e86: Could you test

 ​https://people.torproject.org/~gk/testbuilds/torbrowser-install-win64
 -30575_en-US.exe
 https://people.torproject.org/~gk/testbuilds/torbrowser-install-win64
 -30575_en-US.exe.asc

 and whether that bundle works for you?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30575 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "unable to connect" if Firefox GPOs configure proxy settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30575: "unable to connect" if Firefox GPOs configure proxy settings
-+-
 Reporter:  kT3Ycp9jwm   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905,|  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201905, tbb-proxy-bypass|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 kT3Ycp9jwm: Could you test whether the following bundle fixes the problem
 for you? It should just disable looking for any GPO and loading associated
 policies:

 https://people.torproject.org/~gk/testbuilds/torbrowser-install-win64
 -30575_en-US.exe
 https://people.torproject.org/~gk/testbuilds/torbrowser-install-win64
 -30575_en-US.exe.asc

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30700 [Core Tor/Stem]: Tor's Travis stem job shows debug logs from 10 minutes after the hang

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30700: Tor's Travis stem job shows debug logs from 10 minutes after the hang
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29437 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Hi teor. The tor log file should contain debug logs for the whole run. If
 we need logs from ten minutes ago that should be fine - just gotta look
 for the timestamp.

 What in particular are we hoping for here on stem's end?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29819 [Core Tor/Tor]: Seccomp: sandbox crash on rt_sigaction with libseccomp 0.2.4

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29819: Seccomp: sandbox crash on rt_sigaction with libseccomp 0.2.4
---+
 Reporter:  toralf |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash, linux, sandbox  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  2-10
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by pege):

 pege -- the EPERM idea seems plausible, if it works. Do you have time to
 try it out?

 I should have some time to try this this weekend. I'll let you know how it
 is going.

Otherwise, the only workable idea I can think of is to rearchitect how
 we handle filesystem interactions in the sandbox. We should really have an
 trusted unsandboxed process whose job it is to open files for the main
 process, and pass them back over a pipe. This would let us support more
 sandboxing techniques, and allow us to throw out our immutable-string
 hacks. It would be a lot of work though, and I don't see where we have
 time to do it in our current roadmap.

 Moving file handling to some kind of broker running in an unsandboxed
 process is the proper solution here I'd say but that'll take some time.
 Let's see how EPERM works out first. The only issue I can see with the
 sandbox is that `mmap()`ing files to save memory will no longer be
 possible. Consider the security benefit, it's probably a minor issue
 though.

 I wonder if there isn't some third party library for creating a broker,
 handling permissions and passing content to the sandboxed process. If not,
 I'm thinking this could make a good project for introducing some more
 Rust. I guess the broker itself could be written in Rust completely.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30235 [Core Tor/Stem]: Stem hangs waiting for control port data

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30235: Stem hangs waiting for control port data
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:  #29437 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
---+---
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  assigned => needs_information


Comment:

 Hi teor, is this still occurring? If so, could I get a fresh instance with
 the '--log-file' output we recently added with trace logs?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30805 [- Select a component]: Please HELP me - Need Tor Browser working please

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30805: Please HELP me - Need Tor Browser working please
--+
 Reporter:  David Delves  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by David Delves):

 * Attachment "David Delves Tor Browser Not Working.txt" added.

 Please HELP me - TOR Browser Not working

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[tor-bugs] #30805 [- Select a component]: Please HELP me - Need Tor Browser working please

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30805: Please HELP me - Need Tor Browser working please
--+--
 Reporter:  David Delves  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:|   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 6/7/19, 19:47:07.127 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 6/7/19, 19:47:12.810 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 6/7/19, 19:47:12.810 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 6/7/19, 19:47:12.810 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 6/7/19, 19:47:12.810 [NOTICE] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 6/7/19, 19:47:12.810 [NOTICE] Opened Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 6/7/19, 19:47:12.810 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 5%: Connecting to directory
 server
 6/7/19, 19:47:12.811 [NOTICE] Renaming old configuration file to
 "C:\Users\Comp\Desktop\Tor
 Browser\Browser\TorBrowser\Data\Tor\torrc.orig.2"
 6/7/19, 19:47:42.750 [WARN] Problem bootstrapping. Stuck at 5%: Connecting
 to directory server. (Permission denied [WSAEACCES ]; RESOURCELIMIT; count
 10; recommendation warn; host BAE10387321FDD3279EA44320720B919777FE640 at
 144.76.91.184:9001)
 6/7/19, 19:47:42.751 [WARN] 9 connections have failed:
 6/7/19, 19:47:42.751 [WARN]  9 connections died in state connect()ing with
 SSL state (No SSL object)
 6/7/19, 19:47:42.823 [WARN] Problem bootstrapping. Stuck at 5%: Connecting
 to directory server. (Permission denied [WSAEACCES ]; RESOURCELIMIT; count
 11; recommendation warn; host CE3FE883C6C9EF475EA097DC3E33A6F32B852DA1 at
 78.129.218.56:443)
 6/7/19, 19:47:42.823 [WARN] 10 connections have failed:
 6/7/19, 19:47:42.823 [WARN]  10 connections died in state connect()ing
 with SSL state (No SSL object)
 6/7/19, 19:47:42.824 [WARN] Problem bootstrapping. Stuck at 5%: Connecting
 to directory server. (Permission denied [WSAEACCES ]; RESOURCELIMIT; count
 12; recommendation warn; host 20386D9A32BECBE602375E015FC70117955653F1 at
 192.44.30.40:443)
 6/7/19, 19:47:42.824 [WARN] 11 connections have failed:
 6/7/19, 19:47:42.824 [WARN]  11 connections died in state connect()ing
 with SSL state (No SSL object)
 6/7/19, 19:47:42.825 [WARN] Problem bootstrapping. Stuck at 5%: Connecting
 to directory server. (Permission denied [WSAEACCES ]; RESOURCELIMIT; count
 13; recommendation warn; host D27208881BBDB5EA56EFD1D1799187519591E325 at
 54.38.73.17:20001)
 6/7/19, 19:47:42.825 [WARN] 12 connections have failed:
 6/7/19, 19:47:42.825 [WARN]  12 connections died in state connect()ing
 with SSL state (No SSL object)
 6/7/19, 19:47:42.829 [NOTICE] Closing no-longer-configured Socks listener
 on 127.0.0.1:9150
 6/7/19, 19:47:42.829 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 6/7/19, 19:48:17.279 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 6/7/19, 19:48:17.279 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 6/7/19, 19:48:17.279 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 6/7/19, 19:48:17.279 [NOTICE] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 6/7/19, 19:48:17.279 [NOTICE] Opened Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 6/7/19, 19:48:17.279 [WARN] Problem bootstrapping. Stuck at 5%: Connecting
 to directory server. (Permission denied [WSAEACCES ]; RESOURCELIMIT; count
 14; recommendation warn; host AF0EB01F2F8263C9ADEDCAA5641A287B7C8CB986 at
 163.172.211.118:9001)
 6/7/19, 19:48:17.279 [WARN] 13 connections have failed:
 6/7/19, 19:48:17.279 [WARN]  13 connections died in state connect()ing
 with SSL state (No SSL object)
 6/7/19, 19:48:17.300 [WARN] Problem bootstrapping. Stuck at 5%: Connecting
 to directory server. (Permission denied [WSAEACCES ]; RESOURCELIMIT; count
 15; recommendation warn; host 3CAE19138E4E025CFB42770075DAAAF8FA0A1439 at
 51.75.144.67:443)
 6/7/19, 19:48:17.300 [WARN] 14 connections have failed:
 6/7/19, 19:48:17.300 [WARN]  14 connections died in state connect()ing
 with SSL state (No SSL object)
 6/7/19, 19:48:17.301 [WARN] Problem bootstrapping. Stuck at 5%: Connecting
 to directory server. (Permission denied [WSAEACCES ]; RESOURCELIMIT; coun

Re: [tor-bugs] #30676 [Core Tor/Tor]: From test-stem coverage, infer which events and commands are not getting covered

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30676: From test-stem coverage, infer which events and commands are not getting
covered
--+--
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-should|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  atagar|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30676 [Core Tor/Tor]: From test-stem coverage, infer which events and commands are not getting covered

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30676: From test-stem coverage, infer which events and commands are not getting
covered
--+--
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-should|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  atagar|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  needs_review => new


Comment:

 Yup! None of those commands have tests at present. Test scenarios welcome.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30664 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser for Android icon scaling on device

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30664: Tor Browser for Android icon scaling on device
--+--
 Reporter:  clash |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-mobile   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by clash):

 As far as I can tell, this issue exists on desktop too. Which makes sense
 since even desktop icons are relatively low-res.

 I've attached my taskbar and the left shadow is not visible at all—the
 whole icon looks smooth.

 [[Image(https://i.imgur.com/M2gSXez.png)]]

 So in that case I think it might be an improvement to modify the actual
 icon to something like the fix I proposed above and maybe we could keep
 using the current one on the web and other high-res places.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29220 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update review guidelines to list best practices

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29220: Update review guidelines to list best practices
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor31-can
+--
Changes (by catalyst):

 * owner:  (none) => catalyst
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29219 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write (more) guidelines for Tor coding best practices

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29219: Write (more) guidelines for Tor coding best practices
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  3
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * owner:  (none) => catalyst
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27987 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add setting for enabling/disabling flag_secure in Android browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27987: Add setting for enabling/disabling flag_secure in Android browser
--+---
 Reporter:  carbuncleo|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile => tbb-mobile, ux-team
 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 We'll need some UX help on this, too. Currently, I'm thinking we can add a
 menu item (in the main menu) for "Allow screenshots" or something like
 this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30409 [Core Tor/Tor]: Some of our tests require internet connectivity / an IPv4 stack

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30409: Some of our tests require internet connectivity / an IPv4 stack
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ipv6, tor-hs, tor-tests, tor-|  Actual Points:
  ci, 041-should |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I managed to repro a failure in util/socketpair_ersatz using `unshare`,
 and so made a child ticket to fix it.  Everything else in ./src/test/test
 worked fine.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30804 [Core Tor/Tor]: util/socketpair_ersatz test requires configured network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30804: util/socketpair_ersatz test requires configured network
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-tests, tor-ci, 041-should  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  #30409 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * actualpoints:   => .1


Comment:

 See branch `bug30804` with PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1088 .

 I vote "no backport" on this, since it only occurs when running the tests
 with the network disabled.

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[tor-bugs] #30804 [Core Tor/Tor]: util/socketpair_ersatz test requires configured network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30804: util/socketpair_ersatz test requires configured network
--+---
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  < default nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-tests, tor-ci, 041-should
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #30409
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 When I use `unshare -r -n ./src/test/test` to try to reproduce #30409, I
 get this error:

 {{{
 util/socketpair_ersatz: [forking]
   FAIL src/test/test_util.c:5402: assert(0 OP_EQ socketpair_result): 0 vs
 -101
   [socketpair_ersatz FAILED]
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30804 [Core Tor/Tor]: util/socketpair_ersatz test requires configured network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30804: util/socketpair_ersatz test requires configured network
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-tests, tor-ci, 041-should  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30409 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  < default nickm => nickm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28496 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Consider dropping yahoo from the bridgedb email domains

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28496: Consider dropping yahoo from the bridgedb email domains
--+---
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB|Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-2019  |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:  sysrqb|Sponsor:  Sponsor30-can
--+---
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * actualpoints:   => 0.5


Comment:

 Thanks for the review, sysrqb! Merged and deployed in
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git/commit/?id=7a42b973828dcab95a8d952ac0d549f2b3e99dea
 7a42b9].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30769 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rename one of the two sendme.h files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30769: Rename one of the two sendme.h files
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-should asn-merge  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  041-should => 041-should asn-merge


Comment:

 LGTM.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10760 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Integrate TorButton to TorBrowser core to prevent users from disabling it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10760: Integrate TorButton to TorBrowser core to prevent users from disabling 
it
-+-
 Reporter:  Rezonansowy  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, tbb-parity,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905, GeorgKoppen201905, ux-   |
  team, TorBrowserTeam201906R|
Parent ID:  #24855   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by acat):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 > with the corresponding ones from DTD in securityLevel.js
 (​https://github.com/acatarineu/tor-browser/commit/30429+1).
 Sorry, this was not the right commit implementing this. The duplicated
 translations removal is https://github.com/acatarineu/tor-
 browser/commit/6647e87dc1ed59c5b39e8618bf8753d1d8423343, and the rest of
 the torbutton work in tor-browser is in https://github.com/acatarineu/tor-
 browser/commit/8f841e5ccd0af5b1f73f5f9c74bb0fd866ba4c33.

 The torbutton branch with the changes is
 https://github.com/acatarineu/torbutton/commits/10760.

 Should we do the review of this in #30429 or here? And should we wait for
 reviewing until the next steps of this torbutton integration are done?
 (moving current torbutton code to tor-browser, refactoring, etc.)?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30769 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rename one of the two sendme.h files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30769: Rename one of the two sendme.h files
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-should|  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready


Comment:

 Done!

 Funny! I thought for some weird reasons that `run_trunnel.sh` would take
 trunnel in the git path "../trunnel". No idea why I thought that.

 Everything is up to date now! Good to know.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30769 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rename one of the two sendme.h files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30769: Rename one of the two sendme.h files
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-should|  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * reviewer:   => nickm


Comment:

 This uses an older version of Trunnel, which would cause openbsd
 regressions.  Please rebuild with trunnel >= 1.5.3, then call it
 merge_ready?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30631 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Blurry Tor Browser icon on macOS app switcher

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30631: Blurry Tor Browser icon on macOS app switcher
--+--
 Reporter:  vjur  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-8.5-issues   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30631 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Blurry Tor Browser icon on macOS app switcher

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30631: Blurry Tor Browser icon on macOS app switcher
--+---
 Reporter:  vjur  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-8.5-issues   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Updated the icns files in this branch:

 tor-browser: https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/richard/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_30631&id=defe73e8c1969c02f137e8b474d85a66b9605427

 antonela: I'll upload a macOS build with the updated icons later for your
 review

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26081 [Metrics/Analysis]: Unusual increase in unique .onion v2 services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26081: Unusual increase in unique .onion v2 services
--+--
 Reporter:  computerfreak |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by dcf):

 The count went back to normal around 2018-07-02, then went back to
 previous high levels between about 2018-07-20 and 2019-05-02.
 [[Image(hidserv-dir-onions-seen-2018-03-01-2019-06-07.png​,100%)]]
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-dir-onions-
 seen.html?start=2018-03-01&end=2019-06-07 link]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26081 [Metrics/Analysis]: Unusual increase in unique .onion v2 services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26081: Unusual increase in unique .onion v2 services
--+--
 Reporter:  computerfreak |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "hidserv-dir-onions-seen-2018-03-01-2019-06-07.png" added.

 https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-dir-onions-
 seen.png?start=2018-03-01&end=2019-06-07

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28496 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Consider dropping yahoo from the bridgedb email domains

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28496: Consider dropping yahoo from the bridgedb email domains
--+---
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB|Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-2019  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:  sysrqb|Sponsor:  Sponsor30-can
--+---
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Those are some nice hard-coded strings (for something that is considered
 configurable). That said, it all looks good.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27437 [Applications/Tor Browser]: search.disconnect.me don't work for a long time now

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27437: search.disconnect.me don't work for a long time now
--+---
 Reporter:  h1n1  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by sysrqb):

 I just found this too (while comparing desktop and mobile patches). I
 wonder if it's the missing SearchForm in disconnect.xml. DuckDuckGo is the
 (logical) fallback search engine, so I assume this is why disconnect.me
 redirects to duckduckgo.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27503 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disabling accessibility on Windows breaks screen readers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27503: Disabling accessibility on Windows breaks screen readers
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201903, tbb-8.5-must,   |
  TorBrowserTeam201905   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  boklm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 BTW, if you want to get a review from the Tor Browser team, you should set
 `TorBrowserTeam201906R` keyword.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30706 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Do some simple BridgeDB housekeeping

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30706: Do some simple BridgeDB housekeeping
+
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:  0.25
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  sysrqb  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * actualpoints:   => 0.25


Comment:

 Thanks, sysrqb! Merged and deployed in
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git/commit/?h=develop&id=41162543a936f258abc4903f98ccd2e705f0f47b
 411625].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30157 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: please update translations on bridgesdb

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30157: please update translations on bridgesdb
+
 Reporter:  emmapeel|  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  localization|  Actual Points:  0.25
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  sysrqb  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * actualpoints:   => 0.25


Comment:

 Thanks, sysrqb! Merged and deployed in
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git/commit/?h=develop&id=5b0a9b2765de21a61c4ad233ad1a2ffa6d9b6da1
 5b0a9b].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30219 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Add Tom's bandwidth file archive to CollecTor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30219: Add Tom's bandwidth file archive to CollecTor
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:
 |  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth,tor-dirauth,metrics-  |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-q2|
Parent ID:  #21378   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by karsten):

 Okay, good to know. This solves the "annotations" problem, but it doesn't
 yet solve the "source" problem. Still h.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30219 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Add Tom's bandwidth file archive to CollecTor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30219: Add Tom's bandwidth file archive to CollecTor
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:
 |  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth,tor-dirauth,metrics-  |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-q2|
Parent ID:  #21378   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by tom):

 You should disregard all of the maatuska-* directories and only use the
 maatuska directory. All the others were a parallel bwauth running
 experiments.

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[tor-bugs] #30803 [Applications/Tor Browser]: torrc NoOnionTraffic is not working under Tor Browser 8.5.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30803: torrc NoOnionTraffic is not working under Tor Browser 8.5.1
--+--
 Reporter:  philmbrt  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:  Tor: unspecified  |   Severity:  Critical
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 * Clean install of Tor Browser 8.5.1
 * Modified \Tor Browser\Browser\TorBrowser\Data\Tor\torrc
* SocksPort 9050 NoOnionTraffic
 * Started up Tor Browser
 * Browse to DuckDuckGo onion site (https://3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion/) and
 received webpage.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28113 [Core Tor/Tor]: notify systemd if shutdown will be longer than 30 seconds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28113: notify systemd if shutdown will be longer than 30 seconds
-+-
 Reporter:  Hello71  |  Owner:  Hello71
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.6.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-systemd, 029-backport-maybe, |  Actual Points:
  033-backport-maybe, 034-backport-maybe, 035|
  -backport-maybe, 033-backport-unreached,   |
  reviewer-was-teor-20190422 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by Hello71):

 well the code was committed, and as far as I can tell it just doesn't
 work. I haven't had time to figure out why, and I doubt I'll have time in
 the near to medium term future.

 I think the systemd service doesn't require any (more) fixing. as far as I
 know, the TimeoutStopSec is sufficient in all distributions now. the
 problem is just that if you increase ShutdownWaitLength (in tor), you may
 need to also increase TimeoutStopSec in systemd. this is really a nice-to-
 have though; the code can be removed and this ticket closed if nobody
 wants to work on it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29830 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer when the UBSan configure checks pass, rather than the ASan configure checks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29830: Use UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer when the UBSan configure checks pass, 
rather
than the ASan configure checks
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, 041-proposed,  |  Actual Points:  0.1
  041-should |
Parent ID:  #29528   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29830 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer when the UBSan configure checks pass, rather than the ASan configure checks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29830: Use UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer when the UBSan configure checks pass, 
rather
than the ASan configure checks
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, 041-proposed,  |  Actual Points:  0.1
  041-should |
Parent ID:  #29528   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  nickm => (none)
 * status:  accepted => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30676 [Core Tor/Tor]: From test-stem coverage, infer which events and commands are not getting covered

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30676: From test-stem coverage, infer which events and commands are not getting
covered
--+--
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-should|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  atagar|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => atagar


Comment:

 Atagar, if you can confirm that the list above is right, I can start
 opening new tickets for test scenarios.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30676 [Core Tor/Tor]: From test-stem coverage, infer which events and commands are not getting covered

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30676: From test-stem coverage, infer which events and commands are not getting
covered
--+--
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-should|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nickm):

 Okay, I have a shorter list now, based on "make test-stem-full", which
 includes the ONLINE tests.

 {{{
 dropguards
 dropownership
 hspost
 mapaddress
 postdescriptor
 redirectstream
 resolve
 }}}

 If this list is accurate, we can start sketching how how to do integration
 tests for these commands (in another ticket).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25483 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Windows reproducible build of snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25483: Windows reproducible build of snowflake
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201805, ex-sponsor-19  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19001   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-can
-+-

Comment (by cohosh):

 Ah I looked in the $GOPATH and it turns out these missing libraries are
 also mentioned in
 {{{
 Binary file ./dist/webrtc/lib/libwebrtc-windows-amd64-magic.lib matches
 }}}
 which is why we need them.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30157 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: please update translations on bridgesdb

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30157: please update translations on bridgesdb
+-
 Reporter:  emmapeel|  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  localization|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  sysrqb  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Sure! :) All changes are in `.po` files except the unit test. I'll assume
 all of the localization changes are good.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30802 [Applications/Tor Browser]: DOMParser errors leak locale

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30802: DOMParser errors leak locale
---+---
 Reporter:  acat   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-locale  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > #30683 is a duplicate.
 No. This ticket is a duplicate of #30683 ;)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30706 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Do some simple BridgeDB housekeeping

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30706: Do some simple BridgeDB housekeeping
+-
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  sysrqb  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 They all look good.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30219 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Add Tom's bandwidth file archive to CollecTor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30219: Add Tom's bandwidth file archive to CollecTor
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:
 |  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth,tor-dirauth,metrics-  |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-q2|
Parent ID:  #21378   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by karsten):

 Okay, I ''finally'' got around to trying a local import with CollecTor. At
 least importing a small sample of these bandwidth files worked okay.

 However, I'm wondering if we need to make an enhancement before import
 these bandwidth files into CollecTor. Consider these subdirectories in
 Tom's tarball:

 {{{
  24Gbastet
 8.2Gfaravahar
  22Ggabelmoo
  29Gmaatuska
 2.2Gmaatuska-21697
 1.9Gmaatuska-fastly
 616Mmaatuska-nodns
  58Mmaatuska-nofasthop
 3.5Gmaatuska-vanilla
  26Gmoria1
 }}}

 As of now, when we import these files into CollecTor we're losing meta
 data like ''source'' and human-readable ''annotations'' like whether DNS
 was broken or which bandwidth file server was used. We could provide those
 annotations via some timeline (e.g., by saying when maatuska switched to
 Fastly), but there's no good way to retain source information in these
 files.

 Note that we're facing the same issue with current bandwidth files. We
 just said that they'll be referenced from votes which provides source
 information indirectly.

 Also note that we briefly discussed including source information in the
 file name. But even if we do that, we should consider adding something to
 the file contents, most likely as an annotation in order to keep the
 digest unchanged. We should not put relevant information ''only'' in the
 file name.

 Hmmm.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30776 [Core Tor/Tor]: Circpad circuits do not expire as intended

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30776: Circpad circuits do not expire as intended
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-must wtf-pad  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by asn):

 This seems to be a not bug. The relay-side was running an old version of
 the #28634 branch that was causing the circuits to not expire. Will update
 ticket as soon as I do some more testing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28970 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_client.c:624: setup_intro_circ_auth_key: Non-fatal assertion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28970: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_client.c:624:
setup_intro_circ_auth_key: Non-fatal assertion
-+-
 Reporter:  torcrash |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, tor-hs, postfreeze-ok,   |  Actual Points:
  040-unreached-must, network-team-  |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, regression?, 041|
  -unreached-must|
Parent ID:  #29995   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 IMO before closing this issue we need at least an explanation of why we
 think that #29034 might affect this ticket. On all the rest, I agree.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25483 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Windows reproducible build of snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25483: Windows reproducible build of snowflake
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201805, ex-sponsor-19  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19001   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-can
-+-

Comment (by cohosh):

 I'm currently looking at compiling go-webrtc with mingw-w64/clang and I'm
 getting the following linking error:
 {{{
 # github.com/keroserene/go-webrtc
 lld-link: error: could not open liblibcmtd.a: No such file or directory
 lld-link: error: could not open liboldnames.a: No such file or directory
 lld-link: error: could not open liblibcpmtd.a: No such file or directory
 clang-8: error: linker command failed with exit code 1 (use -v to see
 invocation)
 }}}
 It looks like we're trying to link some windows sdk libraries we don't
 have. But upon searching for these libraries, the only references I can
 find are in the following files:
 {{{
 $ grep -r "oldnames" .
 Binary file ./mingw-w64-clang/bin/clang-refactor matches
 Binary file ./mingw-w64-clang/bin/x86_64-w64-mingw32-widl matches
 Binary file ./mingw-w64-clang/bin/clang-rename matches
 Binary file ./mingw-w64-clang/bin/clang-check matches
 Binary file ./mingw-w64-clang/bin/clang-8 matches
 Binary file ./mingw-w64-clang/bin/diagtool matches
 Binary file ./mingw-w64-clang/bin/c-index-test matches
 Binary file ./mingw-w64-clang/bin/clang-func-mapping matches
 Binary file ./mingw-w64-clang/lib/libclang.so.8 matches
 Binary file ./mingw-w64-clang/lib/libclangDriver.a matches
 }}}
 with lines like {{{--dependent-lib=oldnames}}}.

 Is this a bug in mingw-w64/clang? I can't find `oldnames.a` anywhere,
 though found `oldnames.lib` in the project `win_sdk`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30802 [Applications/Tor Browser]: DOMParser errors leak locale

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30802: DOMParser errors leak locale
---+---
 Reporter:  acat   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-locale  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by acat):

 #30683 is a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30802 [Applications/Tor Browser]: DOMParser errors leak locale

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30802: DOMParser errors leak locale
---+---
 Reporter:  acat   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-locale  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by acat):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Oh, how embarrassing, did not see that one :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28970 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_client.c:624: setup_intro_circ_auth_key: Non-fatal assertion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28970: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_client.c:624:
setup_intro_circ_auth_key: Non-fatal assertion
-+-
 Reporter:  torcrash |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, tor-hs, postfreeze-ok,   |  Actual Points:
  040-unreached-must, network-team-  |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, regression?, 041|
  -unreached-must|
Parent ID:  #29995   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:
 tor-client, tor-hs, postfreeze-ok, 040-unreached-must, network-team-
 roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, regression?, 041-must
 =>
 tor-client, tor-hs, postfreeze-ok, 040-unreached-must, network-team-
 roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, regression?, 041-unreached-must
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final => Tor: 0.4.2.x-final


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:21 asn]:
 > Unclear if the fix from #29034 helped this issue. We managed to
 reproduce #29034 with HS circuits but need more investigation.

 Honestly, I spent a lot of time trying to find out why this bug can still
 happen. My approach here would be to "think" it is fixed since #29034 (new
 version of it) was merged and released. No more occurrence of this would
 mean for me it is gone (after some time).

 We could go back into investigating everything but I'm not sure this would
 be the best time investment for now.

 For the above reasons, I'm moving it to the 042 milestone so we can re-
 visit it before 042 release. Change this if you disagree, I'll be fine
 with it :).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30802 [Applications/Tor Browser]: DOMParser errors leak locale

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30802: DOMParser errors leak locale
---+--
 Reporter:  acat   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-locale  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by gk):

 Is that a duplicate of #30683? (See:
 https://people.torproject.org/~gk/tests/tor_domparser_locale_leak.html and
 the second example on the ticket)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30802 [Applications/Tor Browser]: DOMParser errors leak locale

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30802: DOMParser errors leak locale
---+--
 Reporter:  acat   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-locale  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by acat):

 Starting to think there are might be too many of these that we still don't
 know of. Perhaps apart from fixing the remaining `tbb-fingerprinting-
 locale` issues, we could investigate a bit to see if we can find more
 localized errors/properties exposed to web content.

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[tor-bugs] #30802 [Applications/Tor Browser]: DOMParser errors leak locale

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30802: DOMParser errors leak locale
-+-
 Reporter:  acat |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-
 Severity:  Normal   |  locale
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 While writing a test for #30304 I found (yet) another way to get browser
 locale:

 {{{
 const doc = (new DOMParser).parseFromString('getyourlocale',
 'application/xhtml+xml');
 alert(doc.getElementsByTagName('parsererror')[0].firstChild.textContent);
 }}}

 test: https://acatarineu.github.io/fp/locale_domparser_error.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30674 [Core Tor/Tor]: Find out why ubsan/asan CI didn't catch #30629

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30674: Find out why ubsan/asan CI didn't catch #30629
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-should,  memory-safety,  |  implemented
  valgrind   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 I've opened #30801 to take action in response to the above actions and
 ideas; the goal of this ticket is complete.

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[tor-bugs] #30801 [Core Tor/Tor]: Investigate running CI with hardened dependencies vs running CI with valgrind

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30801: Investigate running CI with hardened dependencies vs running CI with
valgrind
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-ci
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 In #30674, we investigated why running with --enable-fragile-hardening had
 missed a memory leak that valgrind could successfully catch.  The answer
 turned out to be that we had not compiled our dependencies with sanitizers
 enabled -- so they didn't catch memory leaks that happened inside our
 dependencies.

 Assuming we want CI to catch this kind of bug (and we do!) the
 alternatives seem to be: build our dependencies with sanitizers, or run
 with valgrind.

 Teor made the following notes about deployment and evaluations:

 > Hardened dependencies:
 > 1. We know we can harden dependencies
 > 2. Hardened dependencies may cause CI failures due to bugs in
 dependencies
 > 3. Hardened dependencies may be slower
 > 4. We probably won't rebuild libc and other large libraries in hardened
 mode
 > 5. We don't know if valgrind or hardened builds provide better coverage
 of the kinds of coding errors we typically make
 > 6. It might be complicated to configure builds for all our dependencies
 > 7. We can't harden our chutney, stem, and sbws CIs, because they use
 pre-built binaries
 >
 > Valgrind:
 > 1. We don't know if valgrind runs well in Travis CI
 > 2. Valgrind may cause CI failures due to bugs in dependencies
 > 3. Valgrind may be slower
 > 4. Valgrind instruments all the code, no matter which library it's in
 > 5. We don't know if valgrind or hardened builds provide better coverage
 of the kinds of coding errors we typically make
 > 6. Valgrind is simple to configure
 > 7. We can run valgrind on the pre-built binaries in our chutney, stem,
 and sbws CIs

 We should come to a decision here and take action.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30799 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix a small memory leak in nt_service_install() in ntmain.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30799: Fix a small memory leak in nt_service_install() in ntmain.c
--+
 Reporter:  xiaoyinl  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ???-backport 041-can  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => ???-backport 041-can
 * status:  new => needs_review
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22331 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor needs to stop trying to read directories before it changes users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22331: Tor needs to stop trying to read directories before it changes users
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  032-unreached, apparmor usability|  Actual Points:
  042-proposed   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  032-unreached, apparmor => 032-unreached, apparmor usability
 042-proposed
 * priority:  Medium => High


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13928 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor Authorities reachability testing is predictable and sequential

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13928: Tor Authorities reachability testing is predictable and sequential
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.6.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth reachable testing|  Actual Points:
  rotation   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Sounds good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15563 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ServiceWorkers violate first party isolation, probably

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15563: ServiceWorkers violate first party isolation, probably
---+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, ff68-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1557596 :(((

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30730 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Can't access right click menu for noscript w/o readding icon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30730: Can't access right click menu for noscript w/o readding icon
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 cyberpunks]:

 [snip]

 > Based on what you say, I'd agree it's not a huge deal if ppl add the
 icon in short term. (I'd love to see some kind of "factory reset" option,
 since at least in macOS it's a bit hard and takes some terminal doings to
 completely reset tor's appearance to default but that's a separate issue
 sorry to wander)
 >
 > In long term, I'd prefer to be able to use the context menu rather than
 modify my browser.

 I totally agree with you that those that don't have the icon but need it
 can add it back in the short term while that it is not a long-term
 solution to modify the browser in the long term. Using the context menu as
 you describe would be one option. However, that would get users back to
 NoScript's UI which can be confusing. We think we can do something better
 with #30570. Thus, I close this ticket as WONTFIX in favor of our plan.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30800 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ftp:// on Windows can be used to leak the system time zone

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30800: ftp:// on Windows can be used to leak the system time zone
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:1 Thorin]:
 > duplicate of #30427 ?

 I don't think so. The time zone is *not* leaking on non-Windows platforms
 while the UI locale is leaking on all we support.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30795 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "BROWSER NOT ON TOR NETWORK"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30795: "BROWSER NOT ON TOR NETWORK"
--+--
 Reporter:  pam-e86   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Regarding the policies popup, that is interesting. I think that comes from
 {{{
 function maybeDisplayPoliciesNotice() {
   if (Services.policies.status == Services.policies.ACTIVE) {
 document.getElementById("policies-
 container").removeAttribute("hidden");
   }
 }
 }}}
 And that gets only activated if for some reason a configured entperprise
 policy is found on the machine, strange. Let my try giving you a test
 build that might fix #30757 as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30624 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable NoScript's XSS protection to avoid the whole computer freezing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30624: Disable NoScript's XSS protection to avoid the whole computer freezing
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905,|  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201905  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:10 ma1]:
 > Sadly, it looks like my first asynchronous work around attempt is not
 doing as good as it could, because apparently the resistFingerprinting
 clamping of Date.now() affects not just web content but WebExtensions too,
 causing the CPU to be relinquished every 100ms (which is the artificially
 imposed resolution), rather than 10ms as intended, therefore making long-
 running checks 10 times more sluggish than they should :(
 @gk: You should probably raise this with Mozilla, WebExt have now their
 own process in moz-central so it should theoretically be easy to let
 resistFingerprinting conquer almost everything except the WebExt process.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17438 [Core Tor/Tor]: if HSDir is set then report a (blurred) uptime of > 96h

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17438: if HSDir is set then report a (blurred) uptime of > 96h
+--
 Reporter:  toralf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very Low|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.2.7.4-rc
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  tor-relay needs-design  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30795 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "BROWSER NOT ON TOR NETWORK"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30795: "BROWSER NOT ON TOR NETWORK"
--+--
 Reporter:  pam-e86   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Can you surf the web, like https://torproject.org or do you get errors?
 Did you have other Tor Browser versions on that system previously that
 worked?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30320 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Adapt Tor Browser toolchains for Firefox 68 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30320: Adapt Tor Browser toolchains for Firefox 68 ESR
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905, GeorgKoppen201905|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by acat):

 Not sure if this belongs here, but I could build current rebased Tor
 Browser branch (https://github.com/acatarineu/tor-browser/tree/30429+1)
 with tor-browser-build linux_esr68_v6 gk branch and some minor changes:
 https://github.com/acatarineu/tor-browser-build/commit/linux_esr68_v6_tmp.
 Note that the tor-launcher has some UI problems (I guess it's expected),
 but it was able to bootstrap Tor and proceed to launch the browser.

 For the `searchplugins` lines I commented, the path does not seem to be
 there anymore. Are these needed for localized builds? Besides, I could not
 do localized builds (non testbuild builds), my understanding is that we
 are not ready for that yet, but please correct me if I'm wrong.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30768 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add hashed fingerprints to torrc when configuring bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30768: Add hashed fingerprints to torrc when configuring bridges
--+---
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor30-can
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: mcs, brade (added)


Comment:

 I am not sure about the `torrc` feature as I think we don't do anything
 here but let `tor` do all the "write-things-to-torrc"-magic. If I am right
 about that I am somewhat skeptical to implement the torrc feature in the
 browser.

 That said, yes, we could improve the situation somewhere else
 (first/instead) that is more in browser scope like on the circuit display.
 Sounds like a good idea to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30754 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Unresponsive NoScript prompt in mobile

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30754: Unresponsive NoScript prompt in mobile
--+---
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:4 acat]:
 > I tried with 10.6.3rc4 and I could not reproduce. Functionality wise not
 sure if it should be possible to stop scripts from NoScript webextension
 if they are too slow, but hopefully this will not happen again after the
 fixes.
 >
 > Something I'm curious about: I did not see the common XSS popup on
 Android, is the XSS protection from NoScript doing anything there?

 Good question. I'd assume, yes, it is doing something given that you hit
 the issue and rrc4 is fixing it. But I have not looked closer. Duping this
 over to #30624.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30624 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable NoScript's XSS protection to avoid the whole computer freezing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30624: Disable NoScript's XSS protection to avoid the whole computer freezing
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905,|  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201905  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: acat (added)


Comment:

 #30754 is a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30800 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ftp:// on Windows can be used to leak the system time zone

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30800: ftp:// on Windows can be used to leak the system time zone
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Thorin):

 duplicate of #30427 ?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30577 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add Fundraising Banner with next TBB security update

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30577: Add Fundraising Banner with next TBB security update
--+--
 Reporter:  pili  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:1 antonela]:
 > I wonder if we can re-use the code/implementation from the end of year
 banner. If yes, I'll prepare some versions based on it.

 I guess that depends on how the fundraising banner should look like and
 behave. If it should be essentially the same functionality/look, then yes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24920 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA has tabs and private tabs, we only want private tabs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24920: TBA has tabs and private tabs, we only want private tabs
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201906,|  Actual Points:
  ux-team|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:17 antonela]:
 > Some comments:
 >
 > +1 on keeping consistency between desktop and mobile. If the light theme
 is the default in desktop, we want to have the same default in mobile.
 Which of those themes (or even a custom one) are the default is a long
 discussion happening at #10399. So, for the TBA release could we have the
 same UX you got in the latest nightly but with the light/default theme?
 >
 >
 > >Following Mozilla's lead on this and using the dark theme with private
 tabs, like Fennec does, is the easy solution and tells the user "you are
 currently using private tabs". But, this should be the default in Tor
 Browser, so maybe that visual indicator isn't needed.
 >
 > I agree. The default in Tor Browser is a private tab + a lot of other
 things. Yesterday we talked about having or not the word "private" at the
 label menu items. Maybe, is redundant (and not accurate) to have `New
 Private Tab` in the Tor Browser. Just `New Tab` seems better. Could re-
 name `New Private Tab` to `New Tab` on the kebab menu?

 #25660 might be relevant here. Where we had been thinking about "New
 Private Window" vs. "New Window".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30565 [Applications/Tor Browser]: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after tor browser bundle upgrade (8.5)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30565: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after 
tor
browser bundle upgrade (8.5)
-+-
 Reporter:  rollback-question|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905, user-feedback, blog  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks so much. In case you come to to the CCC camp this year, there will
 be a bunch of Tor folks around. Let's close this ticket. Please open a new
 one if this is happening again (ideally with the output mcs asked about in
 the previous comments).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15563 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ServiceWorkers violate first party isolation, probably

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15563: ServiceWorkers violate first party isolation, probably
---+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, ff68-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by gk):

 Still disabled in Firefox ESR 68 on desktop but *not* mobile. See:
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1557565.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30798 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Develop and deploy tgen model resembling ping

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30798: Develop and deploy tgen model resembling ping
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by irl):

 This model would be looking at modeling something close to ICMP ping, but
 it's quite an approximation. In Internet Engineering, where you're dealing
 with packet switched networks, ping can be useful to determine both round
 trip times (average, min, max, jitter) and packet loss. In our case we are
 dealing with virtual circuits overlaid onto a packet switched network.
 This means that we're only going to get round trip times, as if there is
 packet loss we will just see the circuit go down and won't be able to
 probe further.

 We can still do all the round trip time metrics:

 * average - how long does it typically take to get a reply?
 * min - upper bound for latency when network is unloaded
 * max - lower bound for latency when network is loaded
 * max minus min - lower bound for maximum load induced queuing delay
 * jitter - variation in latency

 The second probe does depend on the first probe in a way that is not the
 case for ICMP. Being part of the same stream means that various counters
 and timers are going to be linked between probes. We should explicitly
 acknowledge this, work out what those counters/timers are (somewhere in
 the rate limiting code) and decide if we are affected by them or not.

 If there is something like Nagle's algorithm going on then we should
 ensure that we're getting all the right flushes in and that we're not
 ending up batching our requests.

 From discussion with Ana this should be relatively easy to implement the
 model, and all the data would be captured in the tgen log for analysis.
 I'm not sure if it is easier to hack something together, or to use the
 existing framework, which could be flexible enough to be modified simply.

 If we're getting numbers that look reasonable then this is probably enough
 for the upcoming meeting but I'd want to make sure we're not confusing
 what these numbers mean. This work may also be useful for scaling in
 general to better understand what counters/timers exist. Maybe we can work
 with a network team person to understand this.

 In the future it may also be interesting to port
 [https://www.bufferbloat.net/projects/codel/wiki/RRUL_test_suite/ RRUL] to
 a tgen model. That's not a cheap test to run though.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18101 [Applications/Tor Browser]: IP leak from Windows/macOS UI dialog with URI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18101: IP leak from Windows/macOS UI dialog with URI
-+-
 Reporter:  uileak   |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak, tbb-proxy-bypass, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201906R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 FWIW: .url files are affected here as well and should be tested (thanks
 for that point to pisarenko via HackerOne). Additionally, not only the
 file dialog for saving files but for opening ones should be tested as
 well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30575 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "unable to connect" if Firefox GPOs configure proxy settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30575: "unable to connect" if Firefox GPOs configure proxy settings
-+-
 Reporter:  kT3Ycp9jwm   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905,|  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201905, tbb-proxy-bypass|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Some cypherpunks mentioned that comment:13:ticket:18101 could be promising
 her.

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[tor-bugs] #30800 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ftp:// on Windows can be used to leak the system time zone

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30800: ftp:// on Windows can be used to leak the system time zone
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 z3t reported via HackerOne that the system time zone on Windows can get
 leaked by using ftp://.
 {{{
 When using the ftp:// protocol, directory listings contain timestamps
 converted to the system timezone.. These timestamps can be extracted by a
 script on a same-origin FTP hosted HTML page, allowing detection of a
 user's system timezone.
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #30799 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix a small memory leak in nt_service_install() in ntmain.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30799: Fix a small memory leak in nt_service_install() in ntmain.c
--+--
 Reporter:  xiaoyinl  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:  Tor: unspecified  |   Severity:  Minor
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 A string buffer `command` is allocated on L559, but it's not freed if
 `service_fns.LookupAccountNameA_fn` returns FALSE. The patch I attached
 adds `tor_free(command);` in this `else if` branch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30799 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix a small memory leak in nt_service_install() in ntmain.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30799: Fix a small memory leak in nt_service_install() in ntmain.c
--+--
 Reporter:  xiaoyinl  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by xiaoyinl):

 * Attachment "0001-Free-a-string-buffer-in-nt_service_install.patch"
 added.

 patch

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30779 [Applications/Tor Browser]: OpenSSL 1.1.1c is not built reproducibly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30779: OpenSSL 1.1.1c is not built reproducibly
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201906R, tbb-rbm  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fixed with commit 3d5f652a3ec9fb44c41e79174f2de28f14ffdbe0 on `master` (I
 silently corrected a typo in the commit message to save a round trip).

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[tor-bugs] #30798 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Develop and deploy tgen model resembling ping

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30798: Develop and deploy tgen model resembling ping
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 At last week's tor-scaling meeting we discussed developing a second tgen
 model that resembles a ping service and deploying an OnionPerf instance
 with that model.

 The current default tgen model in OnionPerf makes a new download every
 five minutes. That's a tiny request with a response of 50 KiB or 1 MiB or
 5 MiB.

 This new model would send a tiny request once per second for, say, five
 minutes, and receive a tiny response back to each of these requests.

 We wouldn't have to write analysis code that produces something like a
 .tpf file right now but could start with analyzing the raw logs for this
 experiment and extract some hopefully useful visualizations.

 I could deploy this new model on my local machine (if it uses an onion
 service).

 Raising priority to high, because it would be great to ideally get this
 deployed before All Hands.

 Thoughts?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30793 [Metrics/Website]: Date format is not specified on graph arguments

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30793: Date format is not specified on graph arguments
-+--
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Not sure whether an HTML placeholder would work here. The input field
 already contains default values that the user can edit. I guess the ask is
 to explain the date format when people edit the dates.

 A tooltip might work. What's the HTML for adding one, again?

 Another option could be to write "Start date (-MM-DD):" as field
 label.

 Yet another option would be use a date selector as on the
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/exonerator.html ExoneraTor page].

 Please choose one! :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30789 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Fallback details changed for FC9AC8EA0160D88BCCFDE066940D7DD9FA45495B and ACD889D86E02EDDAB1AFD81F598C0936238DC6D0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30789: Fallback details changed for FC9AC8EA0160D88BCCFDE066940D7DD9FA45495B 
and
ACD889D86E02EDDAB1AFD81F598C0936238DC6D0
---+---
 Reporter:  ph3x   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback-change|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28793 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by ph3x):

 FC9AC8EA0160D88BCCFDE066940D7DD9FA45495B changed to ph3x
 57F273716C5310EEEC6B945E634FAEE2F5F7B04D

 ACD889D86E02EDDAB1AFD81F598C0936238DC6D0 changed to ph3x
 57F273716C5310EEEC6B945E634FAEE2F5F7B04D

 Cheers,
 Christian

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