Re: [tor-bugs] #25850 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Eval error on content include via iframe

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25850: Eval error on content include via iframe
--+--
 Reporter:  geb   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  worksforme =>


Comment:

 // fucking trac...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25850 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Eval error on content include via iframe

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25850: Eval error on content include via iframe
--+
 Reporter:  geb   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 WTF?
 {{{
 loadMapDom@https://framindmap.org/js/jquery.js line 2 > eval:4052:30
 ///configure trac properly!
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29697 [Internal Services]: archive.tpo is soon running out of space

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29697: archive.tpo is soon running out of space
---+--
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  budget_needed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by anarcat):

 This makes me think: as we grant other people access to those resources,
 it would be great if we could keep an audit trail of what goes where and
 how.

 For example, if we know we have a copy of the source code of X on IA and
 archive.tpo, but the latter goes down, how do we know it's safe to restore
 from IA or even that the copy is there at all? There's historical knowlege
 in people's brains, but that's not good enough.

 That's exactly the kind of stuff i use git-annex for. I know it's not the
 easiest software to use, but by storing everything in git, we keep an
 audit trail of who does what. It also keeps track of where stuff is, and
 keeps a checksum of everything. By wrapping this into (signed) git tags,
 we also get verifiability.

 But maybe the tradeoffs are not right?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29697 [Internal Services]: archive.tpo is soon running out of space

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29697: archive.tpo is soon running out of space
---+--
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  budget_needed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by anarcat):

 > > @dcf i made archivebot crawl that page of yours
 >
 > Do you mean https://people.torproject.org/~dcf/?

 I do!

 > Most of what I have to archive is no longer there--admins make us delete
 large files from that host after a while.

 Those damn admins heh? ;) Good thinking to keep a copy!

 > But I kept a local copy of everything I had to delete, which is what I
 want to archive now. But anyway thanks, there's other stuff under there
 that it's good to have a copy of.

 Excellent. I see you have successfully uploaded this item:

 https://archive.org/details/tor-pluggable-transports-
 browser-2.4.11-alpha-2

 And it wasn't darked, so that's great! I sent an email to our contact at
 IA to thank them for the assistance.

 I've also added you to the archive group and email alias, as agreed.
 Thanks for your work and welcome onboard! :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27604 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Relocating the Tor Browser directory is broken with Tor Browser 8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27604: Relocating the Tor Browser directory is broken with Tor Browser 8
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.0.1-can  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teconmoon):

 A more permanent workaround for me was to delete extensions.json, create
 an empty 0 KB file in its place, and mark it as read-only. That forced the
 browser to use a temporary extensions.json for each session, and kept me
 from having to delete the file every time the directory changed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30716 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Improve the obfs4 obfuscation protocol

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30716: Improve the obfs4 obfuscation protocol
+--
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4 |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sponsor28, anti-censorship-roadmap  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  20
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor28-must
+--
Description changed by phw:

Old description:

> As part of our work for Sponsor 28, we will evaluate and improve the
> obfs4 obfuscation protocol.
>
> Roger started the discussion [https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail
> /anti-censorship-team/2019-May/15.html on our anti-censorship-team
> mailing list]. Relevant reading is the CCS'15 paper
> [https://censorbib.nymity.ch/#Wang2015a Seeing through Network-Protocol
> Obfuscation] and the S&P'16 paper
> [https://censorbib.nymity.ch/#Tschantz2016a SoK: Towards Grounding
> CensorshipCircumvention in Empiricism].
>
> Let's use this ticket to keep track of this effort.

New description:

 As part of our work for Sponsor 28, we will evaluate and improve the obfs4
 obfuscation protocol.

 Roger started the discussion [https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/anti-
 censorship-team/2019-May/15.html on our anti-censorship-team mailing
 list]. Relevant reading is the CCS'15 paper
 [https://censorbib.nymity.ch/#Wang2015a Seeing through Network-Protocol
 Obfuscation] and the S&P'16 paper
 [https://censorbib.nymity.ch/#Tschantz2016a SoK: Towards Grounding
 CensorshipCircumvention in Empiricism].

 Let's use this ticket to keep track of this effort.

 Suggestions for improvement:
 * [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30716#comment:1 yawning
 writes] that obfs4 doesn't easily support backward incompatible protocol
 alterations.
 * [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30716#comment:3 yawning
 writes] that the framing could use better cryptography.
 * [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30716#comment:2 dcf
 writes] that during the handshake, the client needs to wait for the server
 before it can send more data. A [https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail
 /tor-dev/2017-June/012310.html tor-dev@] post has more detail.
 * Each obfs4 server has a unique flow signature. Can we make packet
 payload unique to each server too? For example, can we automatically
 derive a formal language, so not all obfs4 instances send high-entropy
 data?

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #5915 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write patch to make socks handshakes succeed instantly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5915: Write patch to make socks handshakes succeed instantly
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal tor-client intro  |  Actual Points:
  performance application experiment |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 In theory, as a further step, Tor Browser could watch the stream events on
 the controller, and learn what the socks error would actually have been,
 and could tailor its error page by how the stream actually failed. If we
 wanted to recover the ability for Tor Browser to give an accurate error.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25555 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Reimplement Optimistic SOCKS feature

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#2: Reimplement Optimistic SOCKS feature
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-performance, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201811   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by tom):

 We're probably/hopefully going to do this in #5915 so this bug could just
 be for using it in Tor Browser.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #5915 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write patch to make socks handshakes succeed instantly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5915: Write patch to make socks handshakes succeed instantly
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal tor-client intro  |  Actual Points:
  performance application experiment |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by tom):

 * cc: tom (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #5915 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write patch to make socks handshakes succeed instantly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5915: Write patch to make socks handshakes succeed instantly
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal tor-client intro  |  Actual Points:
  performance application experiment |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by tom):

 We talked about this at All Hands. At the browser level we are not really
 concerned about the error handling. It's not bad as is without
 modification and we think we can make it better with relatively little
 effort.

 So the path forward we like for this is to implement it in tor with an
 option on SocksPort that Tor Browser can set.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30887 [Internal Services/Service - lists]: Make new network-hea...@lists.tpo list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30887: Make new network-hea...@lists.tpo list
---+
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by qbi):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I created a public list with default settings. PLease change the settings
 according to your needs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30607 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Support Tor Running on Android Q

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30607: Support Tor Running on Android Q
--+--
 Reporter:  sisbell   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sisbell):

 I've gone through more testing on this issue. Nothing specific to this
 problem shows up in the logcat. We don't have any Tor specific issue,
 everything is loading and running. The about:tor page is blank on start so
 I think this is some sort of rendering issue within the gecko view.

 I downloaded Firefox 66 for Android and installed on a Android Q device.
 Firefox 66 does not work. Version 67 works fine, however. So it looks like
 we will need to wait until we integrate against at least version 67 before
 we can get Tor Browser working on Android Q.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23719 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure WebExtensions are spared from JIT disabling in higher security settings (Medium-High)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23719: Make sure WebExtensions are spared from JIT disabling in higher security
settings (Medium-High)
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-performance   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by tom):

 the flag for enabling wasm is on the JSContext

 ​https://searchfox.org/mozilla-
 
central/rev/c0ca77697c6868482f30af873ec8069f2c080a34/js/public/ContextOptions.h#24

 We would need to push it down to CompartmentOptions. And then we can
 enable it per-Compartment, and enable it for Chrome but not Content.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30912 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Investigate stunnel outage on crm-ext-01

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30912: Investigate stunnel outage on crm-ext-01
-+-
 Reporter:  peterh   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 FWIW, I've rebooted everything today -- including the two CRM-* hosts --
 and everything still seems to be up. Now that might be because the two
 hosts were rebooted at around the same time and they just happened to
 reset correctly, but that's one data point.

 I'll look into this again next week, especially at your recommendations
 (thanks!).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21549 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Investigate wasm for linkability/fingerprintability/disk avoidance issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21549: Investigate wasm for linkability/fingerprintability/disk avoidance 
issues
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201809  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by tom):

 the flag for enabling wasm is on the JSContext

 https://searchfox.org/mozilla-
 
central/rev/c0ca77697c6868482f30af873ec8069f2c080a34/js/public/ContextOptions.h#24

 We would need to push it down to CompartmentOptions. And then we can
 enable it per-Compartment, and enable it for Chrome but not Content.

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[tor-bugs] #30944 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA - IllegalStateException: Not allowed to start service Intent

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30944: TBA - IllegalStateException: Not allowed to start service Intent
---+--
 Reporter:  mikehardy  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version: |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
 Hi there, it appears that if the Tor Browser for Android is set as the
 default WebView, it may be called upon as the system's default
 "CustomTabs" implementation, and be liable to respond to the
 "CustomTabsClient.warmup" API call, which starts it in the background.

 Apparently there are cases where Tor Browser for Android will then take an
 Intent, and attempt to start a service Intent (instead of using Android 8+
 APIs) which then causes an IllegalStateException to be thrown, which
 crashes the app that tried to call warmup

 Corresponding issue: https://github.com/ankidroid/Anki-Android/issues/5337

 Links are in there including a stack trace

 I think this is the most relevant though, there's an upstream patch from
 Mozilla that may or may not be integrated, and may or may not need to be
 adapted into other areas:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/29238#comment:3

 Unfortunately I couldn't actually find a link to just look at the git repo
 source code for TBA, so I can't point deeper into to the issue

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25850 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Eval error on content include via iframe

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25850: Eval error on content include via iframe
--+
 Reporter:  geb   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 WFM.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25155 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Blank page in sandboxed 8.0a1, sandbox 0.0.16, linux x86_64

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25155: Blank page in sandboxed 8.0a1, sandbox 0.0.16, linux x86_64
--+
 Reporter:  ln5   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 WFM now, they probably redesigned the website.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30683 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Properties in dom/locales/$lang/chrome/ allow detecting user locale

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30683: Properties in dom/locales/$lang/chrome/ allow detecting user locale
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-locale|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201906R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by acat):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-locale => tbb-fingerprinting-locale
 TorBrowserTeam201906R


Comment:

 Here is a small patch for review: https://www.github.com/acatarineu/tor-
 browser/commit/30683. I checked htmlparser.properties just in case, but it
 seems only being used in `view-source:*` pages, which should not be
 accessible from web content.

 Do we want all these `tbb-fingerprinting-locale` fixed just for next esr68
 or also for current esr60? I did the patch based on current alpha, but it
 should not be difficult to adapt for esr68.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23888 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Creating a Snowflake WebExtension addon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23888: Creating a Snowflake WebExtension addon
-+-
 Reporter:  oarel|  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tor-pt, ex-sponsor-19   |  implemented
  ,anti-censorship-roadmap, snowflake-   |  Actual Points:
  webextension   |
Parent ID:  #30931   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-must
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Please publish it on Mozilla's AMO, if it's functional please let us know
 so I can start publicizing it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30943 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Show Tor Browser version on Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30943: Show Tor Browser version on Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-parity, tbb- |  Actual Points:
  torbutton  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:1 gk]:
 > We have
 > {{{
 > 
 >   
 >   &aboutTor.viewChangelog.label;
 > 
 > }}}
 > in `aboutTor.xhtml` and
 > {{{
 > body[mobile] #torbrowser-info,
 > body[mobile] .searchbox,
 > body[mobile] .top .heading2,
 > body[mobile] #manual,
 > body[mobile] #mission {
 >   display: none;
 > }
 > }}}
 > Which is presumably why the version number is not shown on mobile. It's
 not clear why we decided to not show all the things in `torbrowser-info`
 on mobile but sysrqb thinks that might be due to `about:tbupdate` not be
 available there. I guess we could just set `display:none;` on mobile for
 `torbrowser-changelog-link` instead?

 I think so, yes.
 Most of the hidden items were added during the #27111 work (commit
 61deb44d0c07eb1ec1d71eac2f0a7aeca87ea054). Kathy and I introduced
 #torbrowser-info during our work on #29440 (commit
 82a5f8665a6b5a7f5d4c78f0a526dfa16834ec7f).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30939 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use Firefox's Enhanced Tracking Protection as a means for performance improvements

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30939: Use Firefox's Enhanced Tracking Protection as a means for performance
improvements
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-performance, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by antonela):

 UX/UI specs ->
 https://mozilla.invisionapp.com/share/38S2U6FPFKD#/screens/359913354

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30943 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Show Tor Browser version on Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30943: Show Tor Browser version on Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-parity, tbb- |  Actual Points:
  torbutton  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-parity => tbb-mobile, tbb-parity, tbb-
   torbutton
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 We have
 {{{
 
   
   &aboutTor.viewChangelog.label;
 
 }}}
 in `aboutTor.xhtml` and
 {{{
 body[mobile] #torbrowser-info,
 body[mobile] .searchbox,
 body[mobile] .top .heading2,
 body[mobile] #manual,
 body[mobile] #mission {
   display: none;
 }
 }}}
 Which is presumably why the version number is not shown on mobile. It's
 not clear why we decided to not show all the things in `torbrowser-info`
 on mobile but sysrqb thinks that might be due to `about:tbupdate` not be
 available there. I guess we could just set `display:none;` on mobile for
 `torbrowser-changelog-link` instead?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15035 [Applications/Orbot]: URI format for bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15035: URI format for bridges
+---
 Reporter:  eighthave   |  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  uri, url, bridge|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28015  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * cc: gaba (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30456 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA - Provide bridges with a magic link

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30456: TBA - Provide bridges with a magic link
--+---
 Reporter:  antonela  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor30-can
--+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * cc: gaba (added)
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor30-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30941 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Need better instructions for requesting bridges via email

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30941: Need better instructions for requesting bridges via email
+---
 Reporter:  pili|  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor30
+---

Comment (by antonela):

 Yes, requesting bridges is painful right now. I suggested a usable
 solution for it in #30456.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23888 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Creating a Snowflake WebExtension addon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23888: Creating a Snowflake WebExtension addon
-+-
 Reporter:  oarel|  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tor-pt, ex-sponsor-19   |  implemented
  ,anti-censorship-roadmap, snowflake-   |  Actual Points:
  webextension   |
Parent ID:  #30931   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-must
-+-

Comment (by gaba):

 Thanks antonela! Please file a new ticket with all this issues.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23888 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Creating a Snowflake WebExtension addon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23888: Creating a Snowflake WebExtension addon
-+-
 Reporter:  oarel|  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tor-pt, ex-sponsor-19   |  implemented
  ,anti-censorship-roadmap, snowflake-   |  Actual Points:
  webextension   |
Parent ID:  #30931   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-must
-+-

Comment (by antonela):

 Thanks phw!

 Some comments:

 - The icon is a great way to offer visual feedback to users. I remember we
 discussed it a bit at
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/27385#comment:8. Using the
 states described at the comment:35, we have:
 1. Gray icon for disabled
 2. Purple icon for enabled (waiting)
 3. Rotating purple icon for proxying (enabled + transferring). I did the
 animation with CSS here https://snowfl4k3.glitch.me/.

 - The doorhanger can be narrower. 320px is fair enough.
 - Could we use the system font? In that way, it will use the client's
 default. Now, it is loading Times New Roman.
 - The copy is great. Although, I think we can iterate over the technical
 terms in the future.

 I'm not sure if re-open this ticket or file a new one.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30935 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move variable definition code out of confparse.c, and refactor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30935: Move variable definition code out of confparse.c, and refactor
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30935 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move variable definition code out of confparse.c, and refactor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30935: Move variable definition code out of confparse.c, and refactor
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * actualpoints:   => 0.5


Comment:

 See branch `ticket30935` with PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1126 .

 It is based on #30914, so the earlier commits in this branch should be
 reviewed there.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23888 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Creating a Snowflake WebExtension addon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23888: Creating a Snowflake WebExtension addon
-+-
 Reporter:  oarel|  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tor-pt, ex-sponsor-19   |  implemented
  ,anti-censorship-roadmap, snowflake-   |  Actual Points:
  webextension   |
Parent ID:  #30931   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-must
-+-

Comment (by phw):

 Replying to [comment:38 antonela]:
 > hi! could I have an extension build to review the UI?
 [[br]]
 I sent you the current build over email.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30027 [Webpages]: lektor portals: Titles should not be capitalized in the CSS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30027: lektor portals: Titles should not be capitalized in the CSS
--+--
 Reporter:  emmapeel  |  Owner:  emmapeel
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by catalyst):

 * cc: catalyst (added)


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[tor-bugs] #30943 [- Select a component]: Show Tor Browser version on Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30943: Show Tor Browser version on Android
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-parity
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 It's is currently not easy to check the Tor Browser version on mobile. The
 `about:tor` page on desktop has the version number on the upper right
 corner but there is no equivalent for mobile yet.

 The second piece that is confusing here is mentioned in
 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/282625#comment-282625 where the
 Firefox version is shown in about -> Tor Browser on the Settings menu. I
 guess we should keep the Firefox version as we do on the about Tor Browser
 dialog on desktop but amend it with the Tor Browser version (which we do
 as well). Might be a good child ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30126 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make Tor Browser on macOS compatible with Apple's notarization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30126: Make Tor Browser on macOS compatible with Apple's notarization
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201906  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by gk):

 FWIW: It seems the updater is one of the first victims here:
 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/282619#comment-282619 and
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1556733.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30126 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make Tor Browser on macOS compatible with Apple's notarization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30126: Make Tor Browser on macOS compatible with Apple's notarization
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201906  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-security => tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201906
 * priority:  Medium => Very High
 * cc: boklm (added)


Comment:

 It seems the future is getting faster to us than we hoped:
 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/282597#comment-282597 :(

 We might not have all the Firefox code pieces ready to have this properly
 working but we should look pretty soon into making our signing
 infrastructure ready.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30936 [Webpages/Website]: clean up pronoun display in people page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30936: clean up pronoun display in people page
--+--
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  hiro  |Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * owner:  hiro => (none)
 * status:  needs_review => assigned
 * reviewer:   => hiro


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30936 [Webpages/Website]: clean up pronoun display in people page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30936: clean up pronoun display in people page
--+--
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Oops I should have set this to needs_review

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23888 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Creating a Snowflake WebExtension addon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23888: Creating a Snowflake WebExtension addon
-+-
 Reporter:  oarel|  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tor-pt, ex-sponsor-19   |  implemented
  ,anti-censorship-roadmap, snowflake-   |  Actual Points:
  webextension   |
Parent ID:  #30931   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-must
-+-

Comment (by antonela):

 hi! could I have an extension build to review the UI?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30942 [Core Tor/Tor]: [warn] Unexpected INTRODUCE_ACK on circuit 3944288021.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30942: [warn] Unexpected INTRODUCE_ACK on circuit 3944288021.
-+
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-padding  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * cc: mikeperry, asn (added)
 * keywords:   => tor-hs, tor-padding
 * points:   => 0.2
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.2.x-final


Comment:

 Ahhh that re-purpose feature :) ... We'll have to build in a way to ignore
 any unrecognized cell on a "padding circuit" and not warn + close I
 believe...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22029 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22029: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 I have added the commits to PR#970.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30928 [Core Tor/Chutney]: macOS Travis Homebrew cache has expired, failing some builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30928: macOS Travis Homebrew cache has expired, failing some builds
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney   |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-must, chutney-ci-fail  |  Actual Points:  0.25
Parent ID: | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * points:  0.2 => 0.25
 * actualpoints:  0.2 => 0.25


Comment:

 I think I have added the right guards around the shellcheck-tests.sh now.
 Thanks for review!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30941 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Need better instructions for requesting bridges via email

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30941: Need better instructions for requesting bridges via email
+---
 Reporter:  pili|  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor30
+---

Comment (by pili):

 P.s I finally figured out that the body content has to be empty apart from
 the command... (previously I was just replying to the original email,
 keeping the conversation history in the body)

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[tor-bugs] #30942 [Core Tor/Tor]: [warn] Unexpected INTRODUCE_ACK on circuit 3944288021.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30942: [warn] Unexpected INTRODUCE_ACK on circuit 3944288021.
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Running
 {{{
 Jun 19 01:26:41.987 [notice] Tor 0.4.2.0-alpha-dev (git-438b7eec856b0cac)
 running on Linux with Libevent 2.1.8-stable, OpenSSL 1.1.1c, Zlib 1.2.11,
 Liblzma N/A, and Libzstd N/A.
 }}}

 Looking at my debug-level logs, here are some lines that look relevant:
 {{{
 Jun 20 14:42:15.423 [info] rend_client_introduction_acked(): Received ack.
 Telling rend circ...
 Jun 20 14:42:15.423 [debug] circuit_change_purpose(): changing purpose of
 origin circ 87 from "Hidden service client: Pending rendezvous point" (10)
 to "Hidden service client: Pending rendezvous point (ack received)" (11)
 Jun 20 14:42:15.423 [debug] circuit_change_purpose(): changing purpose of
 origin circ 88 from "Hidden service client: Waiting for ack from intro
 point" (7) to "Hidden service client: Received ack from intro point" (8)
 Jun 20 14:42:15.423 [debug] circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl():
 circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl() returning circuit 0x562673bfdc90 for
 circ_id 2983373670, channel ID 29 (0x562674553c80)
 Jun 20 14:42:15.423 [info] circuit_mark_for_close_(): Circuit 2983373670
 (id: 88) marked for close at src/feature/rend/rendclient.c:418 (orig
 reason: 9, new reason: 0)
 Jun 20 14:42:15.423 [info] rend_client_close_other_intros(): Closing
 introduction circuit 90 that we built in parallel (Purpose 7).
 Jun 20 14:42:15.423 [debug] circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl():
 circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl() returning circuit 0x562673c1d930 for
 circ_id 3944288021, channel ID 29 (0x562674553c80)
 Jun 20 14:42:15.423 [info] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Circuit
 90 is not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine.
 Jun 20 14:42:15.423 [debug] circuit_change_purpose(): changing purpose of
 origin circ 90 from "Hidden service client: Waiting for ack from intro
 point" (7) to "Circuit kept open for padding" (15)
 [...]
 Jun 20 14:42:15.470 [debug] connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(): 13:
 starting, inbuf_datalen 514 (0 pending in tls object).
 Jun 20 14:42:15.470 [debug] channel_process_cell(): Processing incoming
 cell_t 0x7ffc169e5030 for channel 0x562674553c80 (global ID 29)
 Jun 20 14:42:15.470 [debug] circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl():
 circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl() returning circuit 0x562673c1d930 for
 circ_id 3944288021, channel ID 29 (0x562674553c80)
 Jun 20 14:42:15.470 [debug] circuit_receive_relay_cell(): Sending to
 origin.
 Jun 20 14:42:15.470 [debug] connection_edge_process_relay_cell(): Now seen
 205318 relay cells here (command 40, stream 0).
 Jun 20 14:42:15.470 [warn] Unexpected INTRODUCE_ACK on circuit 3944288021.
 Jun 20 14:42:15.470 [debug] circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl():
 circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl() returning circuit 0x562673c1d930 for
 circ_id 3944288021, channel ID 29 (0x562674553c80)
 Jun 20 14:42:15.470 [info] pathbias_should_count(): Circuit 90 is not
 being counted by pathbias because it was ignored in the past. Purpose is
 Circuit kept open for padding, path state is new
 Jun 20 14:42:15.471 [info] circuit_mark_for_close_(): Circuit 3944288021
 (id: 90) marked for close at src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:1770 (orig reason:
 1, new reason: 0)
 }}}

 I.e. it looks like we built two parallel intro circuits, one of them
 worked, so we closed the other, but we didn't actually close it, we put it
 into an "open for padding" state, and then the intro ack arrived on it
 after a while, which surprised us.

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[tor-bugs] #30941 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Need better instructions for requesting bridges via email

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#30941: Need better instructions for requesting bridges via email
+-
 Reporter:  pili|  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:  ux-team
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor30   |
+-
 For bridges obtained via email by emailing bridges@ it's not clear
 how/where to request bridges via email.

 E.g the bridges.tpo website simply says to email bridges@ to get bridges

 Emailing that address gives you a number of commands but doesn't specify
 where to send the commands (email subject, body...) I tried both and
 wasn't able to get it to work.

 It also specifies that you can combine commands but it doesn't give any
 examples or indication of how to do so.

 This was raised by a user and I also couldn't figure it out after trying
 for about 5 minutes :/

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