Re: [tor-bugs] #30949 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add the source= line to the dir list spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30949: Add the source= line to the dir list spec
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, 041-should, tor-spec  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #28793  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * type:  defect => enhancement
 * component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts => Core Tor/Tor
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.2.x-final


Comment:

 See my pull request:
 https://github.com/torproject/torspec/pull/84

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[tor-bugs] #30949 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Add the source= line to the dir list spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30949: Add the source= line to the dir list spec
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback|Version:
  Scripts|   Keywords:  fallback, 041-should,
 Severity:  Normal   |  tor-spec
Actual Points:  0.1  |  Parent ID:  #28793
   Points:  0.1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 In #30947, we added a source line to the fallback file header.

 Now we need to update the spec.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30948 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Copy the relevant parts of .gitignore to fallback-scripts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30948: Copy the relevant parts of .gitignore to fallback-scripts
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  fallback   |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #29100 | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Let's deal with this in the #29100 branch.

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[tor-bugs] #30948 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Copy the relevant parts of .gitignore to fallback-scripts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30948: Copy the relevant parts of .gitignore to fallback-scripts
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  fallback
Actual Points:  0.1|  Parent ID:  #29100
   Points:  0.1|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30947 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Add a source line to the header, because type must always be fallback

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30947: Add a source line to the header, because type must always be fallback
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  fallback, 041-should   |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #29100 | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * parent:  #28793 => #29100


Comment:

 Let's deal with this in the #29100 branch.

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[tor-bugs] #30947 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Add a source line to the header, because type must always be fallback

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30947: Add a source line to the header, because type must always be fallback
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  fallback,
   |  041-should
Actual Points:  0.1|  Parent ID:  #28793
   Points:  0.1|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 The dir list spec says that fallback files start with:
 `/* type=fallback */`
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-list-spec.txt#n140

 But in #24953, we change type to whitelist by default. This might cause
 some parsers to break.

 Instead, we should add a new `/* source=whitelist|fallback*/` line.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24620 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Can't see chat on wm.exchanger.ru

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24620: Can't see chat on wm.exchanger.ru
--+--
 Reporter:  Ilya_SpongeBob2   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 {{{
 06:11:58.462 TypeError: document.cookie is undefined moz-
 extension://{NoScriptGUID}/content/staticNS.js:58:13
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24579 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Download- and Play-button are not visible on https://songs.pk

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24579: Download- and Play-button are not visible on https://songs.pk
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  wontfix =>


Comment:

 WTF?
 Just open any other similar page, e.g. https://songspk.mobi/dar-at-the-
 mall-2014-mp3-songs-app27.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23453 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Unable to Handle Google Groups page with 5000 Discussion Threads

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23453: Unable to Handle Google Groups page with 5000 Discussion Threads
--+--
 Reporter:  grassgreen|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  user disappeared
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Nobody cares.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29001 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No video with supported format and MIME type found

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29001: No video with supported format and MIME type found
--+--
 Reporter:  clide |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  user disappeared =>


Comment:

 > ​https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/relays.html.en
 {{{
 15:57:43.319 Content Security Policy: The page’s settings blocked the
 loading of a resource at
 https://media.torproject.org/video/2012-03-04-BuildingBridges.ogv
 (“default-src”). 1 (unknown)
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29001 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No video with supported format and MIME type found

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29001: No video with supported format and MIME type found
--+--
 Reporter:  clide |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  user disappeared
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:2 cypherpunks2]:
 > They don't give a fuck. Forget.
 Indeed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29120 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Default value of media.cache_size (0) causes some media to load extremely slowly or become unplayable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29120: Default value of media.cache_size (0) causes some media to load 
extremely
slowly or become unplayable
-+-
 Reporter:  QZw2aBQoPyuEVXYVlBps |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak, tbb-usability-|  Actual Points:
  website, TorBrowserTeam201903R |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  user disappeared =>


Comment:

 `user disappeared`, but the bug didn't.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23111 [Applications/Tor Browser]: A web page is slowing down your browser.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23111: A web page is slowing down your browser.
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  worksforme =>


Comment:

 WTF?
 It is fucking your CPU on Safer!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30636 [Metrics/Analysis]: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 1M+

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30636: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 
1M+
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ir|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 Two more data points here:

 (A) I am coming to believe that our user count numbers are based on
 counting requests, not on counting successful deliveries of the consensus.
 So if a client gets far enough through the process to request a
 connection, but then has their connection cut, (1) we will count them as a
 user, and (2) they will come back somewhere else soon after to retry, and
 we'll count that next one as a new user. I am beginning to suspect that a
 factor in what's happening here. But that still doesn't explain why the
 number keeps going up -- it's not like clients start asking more and more
 frequently as they fail more often.

 (B) We do have a count of successful consensus deliveries, vs delivery
 attempts that time out. Dir mirrors can't tell whether the client receives
 all the bytes, but because the consensus takes more than one stream window
 worth of cells to deliver, the dir mirrors can tell that all but the last
 stream window (250KB) of cells were acknowledged by the client. *But*,
 with the advent of consensus diffs, the entire diff fits within a single
 stream window, so every time a client asks for a diff, we're going to
 count that delivery as a success, even if no bytes actually make it to the
 client.

 (B') And while we're on that topic, there actually *is* a way to learn
 whether the client received the last part -- see the concern in
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30926#comment:3 where we
 get a stream-level sendme for an unknown streamid. That happens when we've
 finished sending all of the consensus bytes, and then we send the end
 cell, and then we close the stream on our side, and we get a sendme with
 an unknown streamid because we've already forgotten about the stream. But
 all of the data is there for us to be able to confirm that the client has
 received (nearly all of) the bytes, if we want to.

 We should probably make a bunch of tickets out of these various bugs and
 feature ideas, but I wanted to get them written up somewhere first.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28794 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Run an opt-in process for relay operators to become fallbacks in 2019

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28794: Run an opt-in process for relay operators to become fallbacks in 2019
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28793 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by teor):

 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30789#comment:2

 FC9AC8EA0160D88BCCFDE066940D7DD9FA45495B changed to ph3x
 57F273716C5310EEEC6B945E634FAEE2F5F7B04D

 ACD889D86E02EDDAB1AFD81F598C0936238DC6D0 changed to ph3x
 AFFA85820D6796BECDD81E2DA88B0DBA696278E3

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30789 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Fallback details changed for FC9AC8EA0160D88BCCFDE066940D7DD9FA45495B and ACD889D86E02EDDAB1AFD81F598C0936238DC6D0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30789: Fallback details changed for FC9AC8EA0160D88BCCFDE066940D7DD9FA45495B 
and
ACD889D86E02EDDAB1AFD81F598C0936238DC6D0
---+
 Reporter:  ph3x   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  fallback-change|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28794 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * type:  defect => task
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30789 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Fallback details changed for FC9AC8EA0160D88BCCFDE066940D7DD9FA45495B and ACD889D86E02EDDAB1AFD81F598C0936238DC6D0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30789: Fallback details changed for FC9AC8EA0160D88BCCFDE066940D7DD9FA45495B 
and
ACD889D86E02EDDAB1AFD81F598C0936238DC6D0
---+
 Reporter:  ph3x   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback-change|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28794 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:  #28793 => #28794


Comment:

 We'll deal with this change in #28794.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28794 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Run an opt-in process for relay operators to become fallbacks in 2019

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28794: Run an opt-in process for relay operators to become fallbacks in 2019
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28793 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by teor):

 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2019-June/017393.html

 A85FF376759C994A8A1168D8D8219C8C43F6C5E1

 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2019-June/017394.html

 A850B6A31ED83FB92B34FB3AE0513902D053A1C8

 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2019-June/017395.html

 E8D114B3C78D8E6E7FEB1004650DD632C2143C9E

 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2019-June/017398.html

 C6B656BA6BC16E31115A1B2D56396A53165F3408

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28794 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Run an opt-in process for relay operators to become fallbacks in 2019

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28794: Run an opt-in process for relay operators to become fallbacks in 2019
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28793 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:14 phoul]:
 > Replying to [comment:13 teor]:
 > > fallback directory mirror armbrust:
 E781F4EC69671B3F1864AE2753E0890351506329 is going down soon. It should be
 removed from the whitelist.
 > >
 > > https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 relays/2019-January/016878.html
 > The list has now been migrated to the fallback-scripts repo, and this
 change has been made at https://github.com/Phoul/fallback-
 scripts/commit/30dc6bd347860a3df42f6c205550f2f0766e2151

 I made a pull request for this change, and merged it:
 https://github.com/torproject/fallback-scripts/pull/1

 But there are still a lot of other changes in this ticket, and on the
 mailing list.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30679 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ask Mozilla to support Web Extensions for its upcoming mobile browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30679: Ask Mozilla to support Web Extensions for its upcoming mobile browser
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Thanks gk.

 If you can clarify, does that mean that Web Extensions will work on Fenix
 based Tor Browser just as they are now or will special changes need to be
 made to the Web Extensions for them to work properly on Fenix based Tor
 Browser?

 Did they give you any timeline on when they estimate Web Extensions to be
 implemented in Fenix and when they expect to first deploy Fenix as
 Firefox?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30920 [Core Tor/Tor]: Detect uint64 overflow in config_parse_units()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30920: Detect uint64 overflow in config_parse_units()
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy overflow  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:6 guigom]:
 > Is the unit test expected to be inside `test_confparse.c` testing
 `config_parse_units()` ?

 I think Nick will do that test in #30893 and #30864.

 > Or create a separate test file that just tests the new multiplication
 in, for example, `test_muldiv.c`

 Just the new function is fine.

 The addsub tests are in test_util.c, so the muldiv tests can go in there
 as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30938 [Core Tor/Stem]: Force-update expired Homebrew cache in stem's CI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30938: Force-update expired Homebrew cache in stem's CI
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  041-must, stem-ci-fail  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks teor, thanks ahf. Merged.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30679 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ask Mozilla to support Web Extensions for its upcoming mobile browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30679: Ask Mozilla to support Web Extensions for its upcoming mobile browser
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 Yes, we asked. We'll be able to bundle our WebExtensions.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30930 [Core Tor/Stem]: Vote Fetching Broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30930: Vote Fetching Broken
---+
 Reporter:  tom|  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks Tom! Fixed...

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=0d0f6e3

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30679 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ask Mozilla to support Web Extensions for its upcoming mobile browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30679: Ask Mozilla to support Web Extensions for its upcoming mobile browser
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 gk, were you able to get an answer about this from Mozilla?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27539 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create plan for releasing on F-Droid

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27539: Create plan for releasing on F-Droid
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201906   |
Parent ID:  #26318   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by vegansalad):

 FYI - someone just updated
 https://gitlab.com/fdroid/fdroiddata/merge_requests/4676 with some links
 to tor trac and gitweb.torproject.org/

 What are the remaining blockers on this?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30920 [Core Tor/Tor]: Detect uint64 overflow in config_parse_units()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30920: Detect uint64 overflow in config_parse_units()
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy overflow  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by guigom):

 Is the unit test expected to be inside `test_confparse.c` testing
 `config_parse_units()` ?

 Or create a separate test file that just tests the new multiplication in,
 for example, `test_muldiv.c`

 Or both?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30940 [Core Tor/DocTor]: Limit fallback directory DocTor IRC list to 5 relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30940: Limit fallback directory DocTor IRC list to 5 relays
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/DocTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Hi teor, [https://gitweb.torproject.org/doctor.git/commit/?id=352d5de7
 done]. IRC notifications should now look like the following...

 {{{
 [fallback-directories] 157/157 (100%) fallback directories have become
 slow or unresponsive...
 [fallback-directories] 8FA37B93397015B2BC5A525C908485260BE9F422 => ORPort
 is unreachable (81.7.11.96:9001)
 [fallback-directories] 36B9E7AC1E36B62A9D6F330ABEB6012BA7F0D400 => ORPort
 is unreachable (37.187.22.87:9001)
 [fallback-directories] 230A8B2A8BA861210D9B4BA97745AEC217A94207 => ORPort
 is unreachable (163.172.176.167:443)
 [fallback-directories] 823AA81E277F366505545522CEDC2F529CE4DC3F => ORPort
 is unreachable (192.160.102.164:9001)
 [fallback-directories] ... and 153 more
 }}}

 Feel free to reopen if there's any other adjustments that would be
 helpful.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30441 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Stop BridgeDB from handing out offline bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30441: Stop BridgeDB from handing out offline bridges
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB   |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  user-feedback, blog, anti-   |  Actual Points:
  censorship-roadmap |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by phw):

 Replying to [comment:13 teor]:
 > Replying to [comment:10 phw]:
 > > I believe one problem is that Serge's cached-extrainfo and cached-
 extrainfo.new do not contain ''all'' bridges that are in networkstatus-
 bridges, so the results only represent a lower bound of unreachable obfs4
 bridges.
 >
 > In tor, extrainfo descriptors are only created when statistics are on.
 > But we could change that so we create extrainfo descriptors that just
 contain the PT lines, even when statistics are off.
 [[br]]
 Does this mean that when a, say, obfs4 bridge turns off its statistics, we
 wouldn't know that it runs obfs4 because we never received the transport
 line in its extrainfo document? If so, this seems worth fixing.

 Also, what config option controls these statistics?

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[tor-bugs] #30946 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Port BridgeDB to Python 3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30946: Port BridgeDB to Python 3
+--
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:  python
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  10  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+--
 BridgeDB is written in Python 2.7, which will no longer be maintained past
 2020. We should port BridgeDB to Python 3. This may involve quite some
 work given BridgeDB's large code base and the libraries it depends on.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30939 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use Firefox's Enhanced Tracking Protection as a means for performance improvements

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30939: Use Firefox's Enhanced Tracking Protection as a means for performance
improvements
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-performance, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:1 gk]:
 > To start the discussion here is how I currently think we could answer
 the above questions:
 >
 > a) No, we don't want to do that but rather we should make sure that ETP
 is only used and perceived as a performance improvement. That might mean
 getting ETP out of the privacy part of the preferences and changing the
 respective text if it is talking about privacy. I think we could keep all
 non-UI things, though, like the preferences governing this.

 Oh, and as a reminder, all the UI showing different state on the URL bar
 and behind the "i" icon should go as well: there is just one state for
 fingerprinting reasons which is "enabled".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21969 [Core Tor/Tor]: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21969: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal, tor-guard, tor-  |  Actual Points:
  bridge, tor-client, tbb-needs, |
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #30817   | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:
 needs-proposal, tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client, tbb-usability-
 website, tbb-needs, 034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328
 =>
 needs-proposal, tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client, tbb-needs,
 034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23111 [Applications/Tor Browser]: A web page is slowing down your browser.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23111: A web page is slowing down your browser.
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 Works for me in Safest mode.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23141 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Cloudflare breaks loading the chat on http://www.goftesh.com/

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23141: Cloudflare breaks loading the chat on http://www.goftesh.com/
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 Work for me in 8.5.3.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23142 [Applications/Tor Browser]: HTML elements are broken on goftesh.com in Tor Browsr

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23142: HTML  elements are broken on goftesh.com in Tor Browsr
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 We don't have a content policy filter anymore after the fix landed in
 Firefox and the scrolling does indeed working now on the chat website.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27880 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Sinhala Unicode error on Windows 10 (was: Unicode error)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27880: Sinhala Unicode error on Windows 10
--+--
 Reporter:  roosjr|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18097| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29120 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Default value of media.cache_size (0) causes some media to load extremely slowly or become unplayable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29120: Default value of media.cache_size (0) causes some media to load 
extremely
slowly or become unplayable
-+-
 Reporter:  QZw2aBQoPyuEVXYVlBps |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  user
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak, tbb-usability-|  disappeared
  website, TorBrowserTeam201903R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => user disappeared


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29362 [Applications/Tor Browser]: getting video error message

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29362: getting video error message
--+--
 Reporter:  releasetheclowns  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  user disappeared
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => user disappeared


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29001 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No video with supported format and MIME type found

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29001: No video with supported format and MIME type found
--+--
 Reporter:  clide |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  user disappeared
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => user disappeared


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23453 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Unable to Handle Google Groups page with 5000 Discussion Threads

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23453: Unable to Handle Google Groups page with 5000 Discussion Threads
--+--
 Reporter:  grassgreen|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  user disappeared
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => user disappeared


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24579 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Download- and Play-button are not visible on https://songs.pk

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24579: Download- and Play-button are not visible on https://songs.pk
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 The website just gives a 404 and archive.org does not have a snapshot of
 the actual content anymore either. So, nothing we can do here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24620 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Can't see chat on wm.exchanger.ru

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24620: Can't see chat on wm.exchanger.ru
--+--
 Reporter:  Ilya_SpongeBob2   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Still reproducible in Tor Browser alpha 9.0a2 but not with Firefox
 60.7.2esr and FPI and Resist Fingerprinting enabled.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24871 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When trying to make an account in GitBook it always redirects back to the signup page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24871: When trying to make an account in GitBook it always redirects back to 
the
signup page
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 Works for me. Sometimes I can even create an account without jumping
 through the hoops of CAPTCHA solving and SMS verification.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30911 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: sending email to unknown recipient @tpo gets transient error instead of permanent?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30911: sending email to unknown recipient @tpo gets transient error instead of
permanent?
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 First off, I want to confirm that I have also suffered the same fate:
 you're not alone! :) I found it weird that my mail didn't get through
 first, then realized my mistake when looking at the headers, then wondered
 why the message didn't bounce, then resent the message, and *then*
 received the bounce, a week later. It's rather strange. ;)

 I think I found out why this happens. In the Postfix server, we use the
 [http://www.postfix.org/postconf.5.html#reject_unverified_recipient
 reject_unverified_recipient]
 [http://www.postfix.org/postconf.5.html#smtpd_recipient_restrictions
 smtpd_recipient_restrictions], which, by default, will fail with a
 temporary error code (450) at first, which means it will stay in the queue
 for 7 days.

 I believe there are two possible fixes for this problem:

 1. add [http://www.postfix.org/postconf.5.html#reject_unlisted_recipient
 reject_unlisted_recipient] to the list of restrictions, which will
 immediately refuse emails with an unknown recipient, on submission,
 without queuing it

 2. change the
 [http://www.postfix.org/postconf.5.html#unverified_recipient_reject_code
 unverified_recipient_reject_code] to 550, but that says: "Do not change
 this unless you have a complete understanding of
 [https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5321 RFC 5321]." ... which I'm not sure
 *anyone* can truly claim to have.

 I'm running with the former at home. I'll check with my colleagues to
 validate the former is the right approach and we should be able to deploy
 this fix shortly. I won't do that today, unfortunately, because it's the
 weekend and I want to have tomorrow off. ;) But soon next week, hopefully.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30911 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: sending email to unknown recipient @tpo gets transient error instead of permanent?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30911: sending email to unknown recipient @tpo gets transient error instead of
permanent?
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * owner:  tpa => anarcat
 * status:  new => assigned


Comment:

 thanks for the detailed report cohosh! I'm looking into this now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7164 [Core Tor/Tor]: microdesc.c:378: Bug: microdesc_free() called, but md was still referenced 1 node(s); held_by_nodes == 1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7164: microdesc.c:378: Bug: microdesc_free() called, but md was still 
referenced
1 node(s); held_by_nodes == 1
-+-
 Reporter:  jaj123   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.4.19
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, 025-backport, nickm- |  Actual Points:
  should-review, review-group-24,|
  033-triage-20180320, 033-removed-20180320  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by starlight):

 {{{
 Jun 22: microdesc_cache_clean(): Bug: Microdescriptor seemed very old
 (last listed 168 hours ago vs 168 hour cutoff), but is still marked as
 being held by 1 node(s). I found 1 node(s) holding it. Current
 networkstatus is 0 hours old. Hashtable badness is 0. (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 Jun 22: microdesc_cache_clean(): Bug:   [0]:
 ID=1C70C2AA7F3772CE07C4EF6B18A6E330150372EE. md=0x0b55df0,
 rs=0x3fb8440, ri=0x2fd2120. Microdesc digest in RS does match. RS
 okay in networkstatus. (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 Jun 22: microdesc_cache_clean(): Bug: Microdescriptor seemed very old
 (last listed 168 hours ago vs 168 hour cutoff), but is still marked as
 being held by 1 node(s). I found 1 node(s) holding it. Current
 networkstatus is 0 hours old. Hashtable badness is 0. (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 Jun 22: microdesc_cache_clean(): Bug:   [0]:
 ID=95D0B345ECC84FD2BF27A33B2765DF5E077ACDBD. md=0xXXXYdaee5c90,
 rs=0xbf2b470, ri=0x3548090. Microdesc digest in RS does match. RS
 okay in networkstatus. (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 Jun 22: microdesc_cache_clean(): Bug: Microdescriptor seemed very old
 (last listed 168 hours ago vs 168 hour cutoff), but is still marked as
 being held by 1 node(s). I found 1 node(s) holding it. Current
 networkstatus is 0 hours old. Hashtable badness is 0. (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 Jun 22: microdesc_cache_clean(): Bug:   [0]:
 ID=98EF3981F766F9F87D7C399E6DD0FFC3867711AF. md=0x064d6d0,
 rs=0x0142900, ri=0x2d96bf0. Microdesc digest in RS does match. RS
 okay in networkstatus. (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 Jun 22: microdesc_cache_clean(): Bug: Microdescriptor seemed very old
 (last listed 168 hours ago vs 168 hour cutoff), but is still marked as
 being held by 1 node(s). I found 1 node(s) holding it. Current
 networkstatus is 0 hours old. Hashtable badness is 0. (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 Jun 22: microdesc_cache_clean(): Bug:   [0]:
 ID=12F8A0468A77B5BC588780BFC5010C1E43421B0D. md=0x6f79c50,
 rs=0xXXXYdf5073a0, ri=0x53e6090. Microdesc digest in RS does match. RS
 okay in networkstatus. (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 Jun 22: microdesc_cache_clean(): Bug: Microdescriptor seemed very old
 (last listed 168 hours ago vs 168 hour cutoff), but is still marked as
 being held by 1 node(s). I found 1 node(s) holding it. Current
 networkstatus is 0 hours old. Hashtable badness is 0. (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 Jun 22: microdesc_cache_clean(): Bug:   [0]:
 ID=DC2E059C157322DF555F2041601EDF7E69655E04. md=0xXXXYdfcfe930,
 rs=0xXXXYda55d4d0, ri=0xXXXYdc5e5210. Microdesc digest in RS does match.
 RS okay in networkstatus. (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 Jun 22: microdesc_cache_clean(): Bug: Microdescriptor seemed very old
 (last listed 168 hours ago vs 168 hour cutoff), but is still marked as
 being held by 1 node(s). I found 1 node(s) holding it. Current
 networkstatus is 0 hours old. Hashtable badness is 0. (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 Jun 22: microdesc_cache_clean(): Bug:   [0]:
 ID=D8B16FB9CDFF228C03B1A628B3B45620F93E320A. md=0x094df80,
 rs=0x56f2f90, ri=0xXXXYdaa472a0. Microdesc digest in RS does match. RS
 okay in networkstatus. (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #5915 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write patch to make socks handshakes succeed instantly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5915: Write patch to make socks handshakes succeed instantly
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal tor-client intro  |  Actual Points:
  performance application experiment |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 the provided example patch in daily usage, gave me better latency feeling
 in interactive sessions, it's not bad as it is without modification of Tor
 Browser actually. works for me.

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[tor-bugs] #30945 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Port Letterboxing to TB for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30945: Port Letterboxing to TB for Android
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 I'm not sure what exactly you want to do here; but the following patch
 should get you some/most of the way once you figure it out...


 {{{
 diff --git a/mobile/android/chrome/content/browser.js
 b/mobile/android/chrome/content/browser.js
 --- a/mobile/android/chrome/content/browser.js
 +++ b/mobile/android/chrome/content/browser.js
 @@ -6735,16 +6735,21 @@ var Tabs = {
case "pageshow":
  // Clear the domain cache whenever a page is loaded into any
 browser.
  this._domains.clear();

  break;
case "TabOpen":
  // Use opening a new tab as a trigger to expire the most stale
 tab.
  this.expireLruTab();
 +
 +let tab = aEvent.target;
 +//tab.clientWidth
 +//tab.clientHeight
 +tab.style.margin = "50px";
  break;
  }
},

// Manage the most-recently-used list of tabs. Each tab has a timestamp
// associated with it that indicates when it was last touched.
expireLruTab: function() {
  if (!this._enableTabExpiration) {
 }}}


 This is way more simple than Desktop. I'm not sure what cases we are
 not handling here; but since there's no resizing that makes it simpler.
 Rotating seems to work. It doesn't exempt privileged URLs like
 about:config but if we did do that then we would need to handle other
 events besides TabOpen and then add/remove the margin... It doesn't affect
 the new tab page.  Anyway - it needs playing with and testing (as well as
 deciding how you want to letterbox) but at least we found the 'where'.


 You can fiddle with this code using the Remote Debugging feature. (At
 least I can do it with Fennec in esr68.)  If you haven't used it before:

 Using Nightly (or Dev Edition) go to about:debugging on your desktop FF.
 Then in Fennec go to Settings -> Advanced -> Enable Remote Debugging via
 USB.  Go back to about:debugging on the desktop, and you should be able to
 connect to Fennec on the left hand side.  Scroll down to main processes
 and choose inspect. In the new tab that opens, go to Debugger, Control+P
 and find browser/content/browser.js and scroll down to line 6744-ish, and
 place your breakpoint. Now when you open a tab you should hit the
 breakpoint and can inspect the tab variable in the Console section.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30055 [Applications/Tor Browser]: cant log in to playstion network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30055: cant log in to playstion network
--+--
 Reporter:  i_am_noob_hunter  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => new


Comment:

 I see this on a vanilla Firefox ESR just with FPI enabled as well after
 going to https://www.playstation.com/en-us/network/store/, clicking on the
 Sign In button and entering my credenteials

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21549 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Investigate wasm for linkability/fingerprintability/disk avoidance issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21549: Investigate wasm for linkability/fingerprintability/disk avoidance 
issues
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201907  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201809 => ff68-esr,
   TorBrowserTeam201907


Comment:

 We have #23719 for the slider related things and this bug for the general
 enabling. Talking to Luke I think we are in good shape (surprise!) and
 nothing stood out. One thing that remains to test is whether New Identity
 is actually blowing away WASM related cache in case someone used Tor
 Browser outside of Private Browsing Mode (there are no WASM cache entries
 written to disk in that mode).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30683 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Properties in dom/locales/$lang/chrome/ allow detecting user locale

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30683: Properties in dom/locales/$lang/chrome/ allow detecting user locale
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-locale|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201906R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:2 acat]:
 > Here is a small patch for review: https://www.github.com/acatarineu/tor-
 browser/commit/30683. I checked htmlparser.properties just in case, but it
 seems only being used in `view-source:*` pages, which should not be
 accessible from web content.
 >
 > Do we want all these `tbb-fingerprinting-locale` fixed just for next
 esr68 or also for current esr60? I did the patch based on current alpha,
 but it should not be difficult to adapt for esr68.

 We need a patch for esr68 as well be it now or when we rebase, so having
 one version for esr68 (even though we start testing with an esr60 alpha)
 seems good. Ideally, while you are at it you'd file a ticket at bugzilla
 and get the patch upstreamed (and with some luck we can include it that
 way in the esr68 without needing to ship the patch ourselves).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25305 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser refuses to start / XDG_CONFIG_DIRS environment variable segfaults Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25305: Tor Browser refuses to start / XDG_CONFIG_DIRS environment variable
segfaults Tor Browser
--+
 Reporter:  adrelanos |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25305 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser refuses to start / XDG_CONFIG_DIRS environment variable segfaults Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25305: Tor Browser refuses to start / XDG_CONFIG_DIRS environment variable
segfaults Tor Browser
--+---
 Reporter:  adrelanos |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by adrelanos):

 Not happening anymore on Debian buster. Closeable.

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