Re: [tor-bugs] #30547 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: Install python cryptography for stem's Jenkins jobs

2019-06-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30547: Install python cryptography for stem's Jenkins jobs
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 It seems the current build scripts use python2, so I added python-
 cryptography.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30547 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: Install python cryptography for stem's Jenkins jobs

2019-06-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30547: Install python cryptography for stem's Jenkins jobs
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:1 weasel]:
 > There are two (well, three, but two that might matter here) jobs related
 to stem:  stem-ci-linux and stem-tor-ci.

 We would like the package added to both.

 > So, once we know which package(s) you want, we can just add them there.

 The library is called "cryptography", installed using "pip install
 cryptography" or "apt get python3-cryptography".
 It's also compatible with python 2, if we are still using legacy python.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31032 [Internal Services/Service - deb.tpo]: Use narrowly-scoped signing keys in instructions for using torproject apt repository

2019-06-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31032: Use narrowly-scoped signing keys in instructions for using torproject 
apt
repository
-+
 Reporter:  dkg  |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - deb.tpo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by weasel):

 Do you have any suggestions on how to migrate existing setups, in
 particular wrt to the deb.torproject.org-keyring package?  I'm all for no
 longer shipping (or installing) ```/etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/deb.torproject
 .org-keyring.gpg```.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30547 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: Install python cryptography for stem's Jenkins jobs

2019-06-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30547: Install python cryptography for stem's Jenkins jobs
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by weasel):

 There are two (well, three, but two that might matter here) jobs related
 to stem:  stem-ci-linux and stem-tor-ci.

 See
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/project/jenkins/tools.git/tree/slaves/linux
 /stem-ci-linux/build
 and
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/project/jenkins/tools.git/tree/slaves/linux
 /stem-tor-ci/build
 for the build scripts.

 The list of Debian packages we install on top of a minbase for each are at
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/project/jenkins/tools.git/tree/slaves/linux
 /stem-ci-linux/etc/build-depends
 and
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/project/jenkins/tools.git/tree/slaves/linux
 /stem-tor-ci/etc/build-depends

 So, once we know which package(s) you want, we can just add them there.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30989 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: intermittent jenkins failures for tor-ci

2019-06-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30989: intermittent jenkins failures for tor-ci
-+
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes, jenkins   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 It's not clear what exactly is going on here, and unfortunately most of
 the context is gone already.  My guess is that this happened on the rethem
 builders.  I have made a change to the chroot's apt to prefer ipv4 since
 IPv6 there is not the best.  Hopefully that fixes this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30997 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: Rust/Cargo problem on Jenkins sid-armhf?

2019-06-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30997: Rust/Cargo problem on Jenkins sid-armhf?
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 |  worksforme
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 The two most recent builds seem to have finished successfully.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30860 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a chutney job that runs on macOS, so that IPv6 chutney tests work

2019-06-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30860: Add a chutney job that runs on macOS, so that IPv6 chutney tests work
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  CI, PTs, sponsor-28-maybe,   |  Actual Points:
  029-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport,  |
  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, tor-ci |
Parent ID:  #29267   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 CI, PTs, 029-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport, network-team-
 roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, tor-ci
 =>
 CI, PTs, sponsor-28-maybe, 029-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport,
 network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, tor-ci
 * cc: gaba (added)
 * sponsor:  Sponsor28-can =>


Comment:

 Hi Gaba, I put this task in sponsor 28-can because it is related to
 #29280, PTs, and chutney.

 It should be a quick fix, please put it back in if you think it is
 important.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29280 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use Chutney in Tor's CI

2019-06-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29280: Use Chutney in Tor's CI
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  CI, PTs, 029-backport,   |  Actual Points:  2
  035-backport, 040-backport, network-team-  |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, reviewer-was-   |
  teor-20190422, tor-ci, 041-deferred-20190530   |
Parent ID:  #29267   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * actualpoints:  1.5 => 2


Comment:

 See my pull requests:
 * 0.2.9: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1155
 * 0.3.5: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1156
   * merge chutney job from 0.2.9 and stem job from 0.3.5
   * adds a commit that uses SKIP_MAKE_CHECK for stem
 * 0.4.0: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1157
   * merge removes an incorrect comment about the stem version script

 Clean merges:
 * 0.4.1: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1158
 * master: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1159

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31009 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor lets transports advertise private IP addresses in descriptor

2019-06-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31009: Tor lets transports advertise private IP addresses in descriptor
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, tor-bridge, 029-backport,|  Actual Points:
  035-backport, 040-backport, 041-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-can
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 For a related ticket, check out #7875: the issue there is that if you want
 to listen on a low-numbered port (<1024), e.g. by doing port forwarding in
 iptables, there's no way to tell your Tor bridge to advertise that low-
 numbered port in your extrainfo descriptor. So you can listen there, but
 clients won't know to connect there.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30928 [Core Tor/Chutney]: macOS Travis Homebrew cache has expired, failing some builds

2019-06-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30928: macOS Travis Homebrew cache has expired, failing some builds
---+-
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney   |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-must, chutney-ci-fail  |  Actual Points:  0.25
Parent ID: | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks good to me!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30979 [Core Tor/Tor]: pre-push hook runs practracker unconditionally

2019-06-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30979: pre-push hook runs practracker unconditionally
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  git-scripts   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [ticket:30979 nickm]:
 > Our pre-push hook script runs practracker whenever it exists.  But we
 only want to run practracker on branches that are targeted for master.
 >
 > I think perhaps we should change it to try making check-local?  Or
 perhaps it could check for the existence of some other file that we could
 use to indicate whether we want practracker to run.

 Checking another file would be nice: I don't run configure to generate a
 Makefile in my upstream push directories, but I still want practracker to
 run on them.

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[tor-bugs] #31040 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop showing git scripts changes, unless the base is master

2019-06-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31040: Stop showing git scripts changes, unless the base is master
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  041-should?
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.5   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 In #29588, we made the pre-merge script log changes to the git scripts.

 But it logs (the wrong) changes when I'm merging into maint-0.4.1 or
 earlier.

 Let's just make it log changes when it's merging into master?

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[tor-bugs] #31039 [Core Tor/Tor]: Review proposal 306: IPv6 "Happy Eyeballs" for Tor clients

2019-06-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31039: Review proposal 306: IPv6 "Happy Eyeballs" for Tor clients
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ipv6, prop299
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #29801
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Hi review assigners,

 Please assign a network team member to review proposal 306: IPv6 "Happy
 Eyeballs" for Tor clients

 Here is the pull request:
 https://github.com/torproject/torspec/pull/86

 Here is the mailing list thread, and my initial review:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2019-June/013907.html

 Neel has pushed my suggested changes as fixups.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30901 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add control port trace logging to tor

2019-06-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30901: Add control port trace logging to tor
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29437 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
---+

Comment (by teor):

 Hi catalyst,

 I'd like to make progress on this ticket today or tomorrow:

 Replying to [comment:1 nickm]:
 > For outgoing responses and events, I'd like catalyst's POV: they are
 actively refactoring that code right now, and probably have a better idea
 of how to hook it than I do.

 Here's one way we could move forward:

 I write a patch, and then you refactor it so that it fits in the new
 control code.

 Let me know if you'd like me to do it another way.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30700 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor's Travis stem job shows debug logs from 10 minutes after the hang

2019-06-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30700: Tor's Travis stem job shows debug logs from 10 minutes after the hang
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30591| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:  #29437 => #30591


Comment:

 I think #30591 fixes this issue by excluding SocketClosed from the stem
 logs.

 If not, we should see if we can tail the last 5000 lines.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30591 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make tor's Travis stem job log controller messages from stem and tor

2019-06-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30591: Make tor's Travis stem job log controller messages from stem and tor
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes, stem, |  Actual Points:  0.8
  041-should |
Parent ID:  #29437   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:30 atagar]:
 > Hi teor. Why are you trying to use grep for this? We added a --log-file
 argument specifically to avoid this.
 >
 > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30591
 > https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=d92936c

 I was trying to keep logging progress during the tests.

 But you're right, we should log to a file, then use grep on the log file.
 (Because there's a limit to how much output Travis will store, even on
 failure.)

 I updated all these pull requests:

 > * 0.3.5: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1044
 >
 > And test requests:
 > * 0.4.0: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1110
 > * 0.4.1: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/
 > * master: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1045
 >
 > And a deliberate fail:
 > * master: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1112

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13828 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_dir and rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client to avoid duplicate code

2019-06-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#13828: Refactor rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_dir and
rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client to avoid duplicate code
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tor-hs, easy, refactor, technical-   |  Actual Points:
  debt   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31011 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make the bridge authority reject private PT addresses when DirAllowPrivateAddresses is 0

2019-06-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31011: Make the bridge authority reject private PT addresses when
DirAllowPrivateAddresses is 0
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31009| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor28-can
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor28-can


Comment:

 Gaba set #31009 to Sponsor 28 can, making this related ticket match.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31023 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add tests for tor-print-ed-signing-cert and other tools, and run them in CI

2019-06-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31023: Add tests for tor-print-ed-signing-cert and other tools, and run them 
in CI
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31012  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by teor):

 Thanks - no particular hurry.

 It would be nice to test two certificate files:
 * a generated file containing cert
 * a file committed to the repository containing a cert

 Then we know the tool works on old and new files. (And that the generating
 tool hasn't broken.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21642 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prop275: Eliminate "published" times from microdescriptor consensus

2019-06-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21642: Prop275: Eliminate "published" times from microdescriptor consensus
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:  .5
  034-removed-20180328, prop275, dir-bandwidth,  |
  needs-analysis, 035-removed-20180711   |
Parent ID:  #25503   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Actually, it looks like the required router change is made in 0.4.0.1-as
 well: routers use prop293 to know when to publish, and _do_ recognize
 StaleSesc and so they will tolerate the change to publication time in
 consensus directories.

 The remaining change is for authorities to set the published date in
 consensuses to the far future.  They shouldn't do that, however, until a
 majority of the network is on 0.4.0.1-alpha or later, or until we backport
 the relay part of #26770.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31038 [Core Tor]: Multiple project trying to creating services & including Tor - make this easier?

2019-06-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31038: Multiple project trying to creating services & including Tor - make this
easier?
-+--
 Reporter:  Diagon   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  hidden_services  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by Diagon):

 Never mind - I just discovered "ephemeral onion services".  /Thx.

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[tor-bugs] #31038 [Core Tor]: Multiple project trying to creating services & including Tor - make this easier?

2019-06-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31038: Multiple project trying to creating services & including Tor - make this
easier?
--+--
 Reporter:  Diagon|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  Core Tor
  Version:  Tor: unspecified  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  hidden_services   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 I see multiple services, like [ricochet](https://github.com/ricochet-
 im/ricochet/), [onionshare](https://github.com/micahflee/onionshare),
 [onionize](https://github.com/nogoegst/onionize), and probably others, all
 creating services for Tor and including Tor with them, which: (1) causes
 them to become rapidly obsolete, (2) limits our ability to run Tor on one
 machine and the service on another and (3) results in multiple Tor
 services running.

 In the interests of the development of the Tor ecosystem, and with the
 caveat that I am not much of a developer, wouldn't it make sense to have a
 simple Tor API, authenticated with a token generated by Tor, via which a
 new service may be offered/plugged in?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31036 [Core Tor/Tor]: Logfile grow upto 2GB tor fails and refuse to start

2019-06-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31036: Logfile grow upto 2GB tor fails and refuse to start
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Oh, also: what operating system are you using?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31035 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor leaking info?

2019-06-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31035: Tor leaking info?
--+--
 Reporter:  TorUser777|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31036 [Core Tor/Tor]: Logfile grow upto 2GB tor fails and refuse to start

2019-06-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31036: Logfile grow upto 2GB tor fails and refuse to start
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 What version of tor?  What kind of messages?  Does deleting the log file
 help?

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[tor-bugs] #31037 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add 'Quit' action button in Tor Browser for Android persistent notification.

2019-06-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31037: Add 'Quit' action button in Tor Browser for Android persistent
notification.
-+--
 Reporter:  clash|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 If you press the back button in Tor Browser for Android, while you exit
 out of the application you don't actually quit it. So then you need to go
 back, click on the kebab menu, scroll all the way down to quit and then
 you finally quit Tor Browser.

 An enhancement would be to add the 'Quit' action button in the persistent
 notification next to the 'New Identity' button so you can quit directly
 from the notification area. Something similar exists for the Incognito
 mode in Chrome where you tap on the notification to close all Incognito
 tabs.

 I think it would be more intuitive and easier in terms of user experience.

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[tor-bugs] #31036 [Core Tor/Tor]: Logfile grow upto 2GB tor fails and refuse to start

2019-06-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31036: Logfile grow upto 2GB tor fails and refuse to start
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 i have enabled logging to file by log-level warning. there showed up
 repeatedly messages. once logfilesize >2GByte tor crash and cannot start
 again with logging enabled to this file.

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