Re: [tor-bugs] #30934 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Add a "Turn Off/On" toggle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30934: Add a "Turn Off/On" toggle
-+
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  arlolra  |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 > Thanks, modified as per feedback.

 There was one gotcha about that, see the pull.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30454 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: INTRODUCE1 trunnel code doensn't handle HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_CANT_RELAY

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30454: hs-v3: INTRODUCE1 trunnel code doensn't handle
HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_CANT_RELAY
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, 035-backport, 040-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  nickm-merge, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2,   |
  0411-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * status:  assigned => merge_ready


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30454 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: INTRODUCE1 trunnel code doensn't handle HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_CANT_RELAY

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30454: hs-v3: INTRODUCE1 trunnel code doensn't handle
HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_CANT_RELAY
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, 035-backport, 040-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  nickm-merge, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2,   |
  0411-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * owner:  (none) => dgoulet
 * status:  merge_ready => assigned


Comment:

 Right. This ticket should not change. Thanks for pointing it out.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30999 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Spruce up the product pages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30999: Spruce up the product pages
-+--
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by arlolra):

 > Looks like it got published \o/

 \o/

 > Still needs the newer version and some new screenshots

 It seems to be displaying the manifest description.  Here's an attempt to
 clean that up,
 
https://github.com/keroserene/snowflake/commit/1ce8402ef4cf907c5c5c0f6dbe2b35af8e44f2fe

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30901 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add control port trace logging to tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30901: Add control port trace logging to tor
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29437 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
---+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:5 catalyst]:
 > It occurs to me that if we capture async control event output in these
 log messages, we will have to exclude log events that are sent as async
 control events, to prevent loops.

 Since we want to debug a controller hang, I'd like to avoid modifying the
 control messages entirely.
 Because additional log messages could break or modify the deadlock.

 There's also a module include layering issue: the logging code calls the
 async control code, so the async control code can't include the log
 functions.

 I'd like a set of signal safe logs at debug level, like the error sigsafe
 logs from
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/blob/master/src/lib/err/torerr.c
 But I also need a set of domains for each of those fds.
 At this stage, I don't think we'll need any levels other than debug and
 error, so it's not worth making the code fully generic.

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[tor-bugs] #31081 [Core Tor/Tor]: GETCONF allows zero arguments, contrary to spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31081: GETCONF allows zero arguments, contrary to spec
---+---
 Reporter:  catalyst   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  tor-control, tor-spec
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+---
 `control-spec.txt` says `GETCONF` takes at least one argument. Tor
 currently allows there to be zero arguments for `GETCONF`. If there are
 zero arguments, it replies with `250 OK`. A reply with a keyword and no
 `=` can mean that a configuration variable has its default value. We've
 therefore committed to having no configuration variables named `OK`. I
 suppose that's OK.

 Probably the easiest thing to do is to document the existing behavior.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26113 [Core Tor/Tor]: Control spec is ambiguous whether a GETCONF error message is specified

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26113: Control spec is ambiguous whether a GETCONF error message is specified
-+-
 Reporter:  dmr  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, easy,  |  Actual Points:
  035-removed-20180711, tor-control  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * cc: catalyst (added)
 * keywords:  tor-spec, easy, 035-removed-20180711 => tor-spec, easy,
 035-removed-20180711, tor-control


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[tor-bugs] #31080 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop using the same value for LD_NO_MOCK and LD_MESG

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31080: Stop using the same value for LD_NO_MOCK and LD_MESG
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:  041-must
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.5 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-must  |
+
 LD_NO_MOCK and LD_MESG have the same value, which is a bug in
 0.4.1.1-alpha and later.

 We'll need to make log_domain_mask_t into a u64, and change the values of
 the domain flags so they go down from 63 (not 31).

 We'll also need to change the corresponding type in Rust to u64. Maybe we
 should define a type, rather than using u64 everywhere.

 This is a bug on #28226, which is Sponsor 31 must, so I'm marking this
 ticket as sponsor 31 must.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30901 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add control port trace logging to tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30901: Add control port trace logging to tor
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29437 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
---+

Comment (by catalyst):

 It occurs to me that if we capture async control event output in these log
 messages, we will have to exclude log events that are sent as async
 control events, to prevent loops.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31079 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Mozilla gpg key

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31079: Update Mozilla gpg key
+--
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Immediate   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201907R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201907 => tbb-rbm,
   TorBrowserTeam201907R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 There is a patch for review in branch `bug_31079`:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_31079=702bb68507a94fb3aaf2a145188428a0f72a1de0

 At the same time as we add the new subkey `F1A6668FBB7D572E`, we remove
 the expired subkeys that we don't need anymore.

 This is the diff from the output of `./tools/keyring/list-all-keyrings`:
 {{{
 --- tmp/bug_31079.before2019-07-04 02:07:25.30700 +0200
 +++ tmp/bug_31079.after 2019-07-04 02:07:16.88300 +0200
 @@ -20,8 +20,7 @@
  pub   rsa4096/61B7B526D98F0353 2015-07-17 [SC]
14F26682D0916CDD81E37B6D61B7B526D98F0353
  uid [ unknown] Mozilla Software Releases
 
 -sub   rsa4096/1C69C4E55E9905DB 2015-07-17 [S] [expired: 2017-07-16]
 -sub   rsa4096/BBBEBDBB24C6F355 2017-06-22 [S] [expired: 2019-06-22]
 +sub   rsa4096/F1A6668FBB7D572E 2019-05-30 [S] [expires: 2021-05-29]

  ./keyring/goptlib.gpg
  -
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30454 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: INTRODUCE1 trunnel code doensn't handle HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_CANT_RELAY

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30454: hs-v3: INTRODUCE1 trunnel code doensn't handle
HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_CANT_RELAY
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, 035-backport, 040-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  nickm-merge, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2,   |
  0411-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:19 gaba]:
 > dgoulet will assign himself to the ones he is working on right now.

 Gaba, this ticket was in merge_ready, but it changed to assigned when you
 changed the owner.
 Please don't change the owner on tickets that are in needs_review,
 merge_ready, or closed.
 And please be careful of needs_revision tickets.

 Can you please fix all the tickets that were in needs_review,
 needs_revision, merge_ready, and closed?

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[tor-bugs] #31079 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Mozilla gpg key

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31079: Update Mozilla gpg key
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201907
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 The build of `tbb-8.5.4-build1` fails with the error:
 {{{
 Error: File SHA512SUMS-60.8.0esr-build1 is not signed with a valid key
 }}}

 We need to update the key in `keyring/firefox.gpg` to add the new subkey.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30454 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: INTRODUCE1 trunnel code doensn't handle HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_CANT_RELAY

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30454: hs-v3: INTRODUCE1 trunnel code doensn't handle
HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_CANT_RELAY
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, 035-backport, 040-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  nickm-merge, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2,   |
  0411-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => merge_ready


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24964 [Core Tor/Tor]: dos: Block single hop client at the HSDir

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24964: dos: Block single hop client at the HSDir
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dos, tor2web, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:  0.4
Parent ID:  #24962| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Do we need to check for "marked for close" on the circuit or channel as
 well?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31039 [Core Tor/Tor]: Review proposal 306: IPv6 "Happy Eyeballs" for Tor clients

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31039: Review proposal 306: IPv6 "Happy Eyeballs" for Tor clients
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop299  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29801 | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet|Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


Comment:

 It looks like dgoulet has the connection, circuit, and IPv6 knowledge
 needed to review this proposal.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30649 [Core Tor/Tor]: Every few hours, relays [warn] Received circuit padding stop command for unknown machine.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30649: Every few hours, relays [warn] Received circuit padding stop command for
unknown machine.
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-backport, tor-relay, |  Actual Points:
  circuitpadding, wtf-pad, 041-must  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  tor-relay, circuitpadding, wtf-pad, 041-must => 040-backport,
 tor-relay, circuitpadding, wtf-pad, 041-must
 * status:  reopened => needs_revision
 * version:  Tor: 0.4.1.1-alpha => Tor: 0.4.0.1-alpha
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final => Tor: 0.4.0.x-final


Comment:

 Please remember to add actual points :-)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30864 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move variable manipulation code out of confparse.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30864: Move variable manipulation code out of confparse.c
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  dgoulet-merge  |  Actual Points:  3
Parent ID:  #29211 | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  catalyst   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => dgoulet-merge
 * actualpoints:  2.5 => 3


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31074 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use tor_queue.h macros in config_line_t

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31074: Use tor_queue.h macros in config_line_t
--+--
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  refactor teschnical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+--

Comment (by catalyst):

 Replying to [ticket:31074 nickm]:
 > The config_line_t linked list could be refactored to use the TOR_SLIST
 macros in tor_queue.h
 I would suggest using the `TOR_SIMPLEQ` macros instead. There are places
 where it would be helpful to have an O(1) append.
 (`config_get_lines_aux()` explicitly works around this by temporarily
 creating a `list_last` pointer and mentions O(n^2^) performance as an
 issue.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31070 [Community/Relays]: Add information about SELinux boolean tor_can_network_relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31070: Add information about SELinux boolean tor_can_network_relay
---+
 Reporter:  crimson_king   |  Owner:  Nusenu
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  selinux, capabilities  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by crimson_king):

 In addition, for exit relays we often serve a page explaining what Tor is.
 In order for the Tor process to have read access to this file and be able
 to serve it, we must setup the SELinux context for such file.

 This is how we do this. The flag ''-a'' means ''add''. The flag ''-e''
 copies the context from the torrc file and assigns it to the html file.
 {{{
 # semanage fcontext -a -e /etc/tor/torrc /etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html
 }}}

 But in order for that to have any effect, ''restorecon'' needs to be
 executed on the html file. It will save the changes permanently.
 {{{
 # restorecon -v /etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html
 }}}

 Then the Tor service needs to be restarted/reloaded.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30984 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make a key-value line abstraction to output control replies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30984: Make a key-value line abstraction to output control replies
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29210| Points:  5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  assigned => accepted


Comment:

 Oops should have moved this to "accepted".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30934 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Add a "Turn Off/On" toggle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30934: Add a "Turn Off/On" toggle
-+--
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  arlolra  |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:24 arlolra]:
 > > I'm going to put this back into needs_review because of the last 2
 commits.
 >
 > I left some review on the pull.
 Thanks, modified as per feedback.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28942 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Evaluate pion WebRTC

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28942: Evaluate pion WebRTC
-+---
 Reporter:  backkem  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ex-sponsor-19|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28-can
-+---

Comment (by cohosh):

 I just modified my PRs to pion/webrtc after listening to their feedback.
 They linked an interesting article [https://lgrahl.de/articles
 /demystifying-webrtc-dc-size-limit.html] about message size limits in
 different implementations of WebRTC (which was the root of our problem).
 Looks like no implementations handle this particularly well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31067 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Warn the user when WebRTC is detected as being disabled in the browser in the Snowflake WebExtension

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31067: Warn the user when WebRTC is detected as being disabled in the browser 
in
the Snowflake WebExtension
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Here's a patch for this,
 
https://github.com/keroserene/snowflake/commit/c6b766546c13c4b184fe44fa6e4907b303c36174

 Might want to wait on resolving #30934 since the popup's onMessage handler
 could use some refactoring.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25066 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rendezvous points should return signed proof of the established rend point

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25066: Rendezvous points should return signed proof of the established rend 
point
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal,  |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #2   | Points:  15
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 To set expectations here: I think adding a proof-of-rendezvous-point to
 the design is a wild and crazy idea. It would be great to have a simpler
 and cleaner idea that helps solve the problem instead.

 (And to respond to cypherbits's point, yes it can potentially help with
 future DoS issues, but we should also remember that it would not help with
 the current DoS issues, because as far as I know they really are
 establishing rendezvous points and otherwise following the protocol.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30934 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Add a "Turn Off/On" toggle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30934: Add a "Turn Off/On" toggle
-+
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  arlolra  |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 > I'm going to put this back into needs_review because of the last 2
 commits.

 I left some review on the pull.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27503 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disabling accessibility on Windows breaks screen readers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27503: Disabling accessibility on Windows breaks screen readers
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201903, tbb-8.5,|
  TorBrowserTeam201907R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  boklm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Ok here's everything  you should need to review gk:

 **wine**: https://github.com/pospeselr/wine/commits/winedev2

 This wine branch is my review dev branch as of yesterday. I have one more
 piece of feedback to work on (commit
 `8baf184001c6bcdc3ec1867c6bb6fa82b5ffed15` ) before it's again submitted
 for review. I'm be switching over to a new winedev3 branch to make sure
 everything stays lined up on our end.

 **mingw-w64**: https://github.com/pospeselr/mingw-w64/commits/bug_27503

 This branch has two commits on top of commit
 `2d4e517ad0c7a9f0bd7001c42e6c131b977c15d9` used in tor-browser-build.

 The first is a copy of widl's .c, .h, .l and .y files from the last commit
 in my winedev2 wine branch (commit
 `0922d3d66976f7185ea81b797fa1081e097e71f8` ). Note this does include the
 sources generated from parser.y and parser.l as the mingw build system
 does not include widl's yacc and bison step and just has their outputs
 checked into the mingw source tree.

 The second applies the mingw `0001-relocatable.patch` which adds extra
 logic for finding mingw's header directories .
 **
 tor-browser-build**: https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/richard/tor-
 browser-build.git/commit/?h=bug_27503

 This change adds a patch step to the mingw-w64 project. The included
 `27503.patch` can be generated from the above mingw-w64 branch via `git
 diff bug_27503~2`

 

 I believe that covers everything. I'm doing a few test nightly builds with
 the latest tor-browser-build patch set to verify things still work.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28407 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Host Name text area contains verified and unverified names on the same line

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28407: Host Name text area contains verified and unverified names on the same 
line
--+--
 Reporter:  karsten   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by karsten):

 I just closed #31077 as duplicate of this ticket, but I'm mentioning it
 here, because maybe there's something useful in that other ticket to fix
 this one.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31077 [Metrics/Relay Search]: relay-search mushes together two hostnames?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31077: relay-search mushes together two hostnames?
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 This looks like a duplicate of #28407. Leaving a comment there and closing
 this one. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30864 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move variable manipulation code out of confparse.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30864: Move variable manipulation code out of confparse.c
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  2.5
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  1
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by catalyst):

 Replying to [comment:14 catalyst]:
 > Replying to [comment:13 nickm]:
 > > Thanks for opening a ticket about naming/documentation.
 > I haven't done this yet, but plan to do so soon.
 This is now #31078.

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[tor-bugs] #31078 [Core Tor/Tor]: improve docs for config var abstraction

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31078: improve docs for config var abstraction
---+--
 Reporter:  catalyst   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  2  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+--
 In ticket:30864#comment:11, I commented on some vagueness in the code
 comments that made it difficult for me to understand some of what's going
 on.

 We should revise those comments to use improved terminology to help other
 developers understand what's going on. This might need to wait until the
 other refactoring on that branch is done.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31077 [Metrics/Relay Search]: relay-search mushes together two hostnames?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31077: relay-search mushes together two hostnames?
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Description changed by arma:

Old description:

> On
> https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/B5FA928B04798A873AB8F265EF786FDF6A2C1616
> there is a section called "Host Name" which lists
> "h-70-14.A785.priv.bahnhof.sestilat.nu*" at the hostname.
>
> Now, this is really two addresses -- one at bahnhof.se and the other at
> stilat.nu.
>
> But at the least there should be some sort of whitespace or newline or
> something between them. And it's also possible there is some sort of
> other bug happening, since we're listing two hostnames when we say we'll
> list one.
>
> Thanks!

New description:

 On
 
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/B5FA928B04798A873AB8F265EF786FDF6A2C1616
 there is a section called "Host Name" which lists
 "h-70-14.A785.priv.bahnhof.sestilat.nu*" as the hostname.

 Now, this is really two addresses -- one at bahnhof.se and the other at
 stilat.nu.

 But at the least there should be some sort of whitespace or newline or
 something between them. And it's also possible there is some sort of other
 bug happening, since we're listing two hostnames when we say we'll list
 one.

 Thanks!

--

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[tor-bugs] #31077 [Metrics/Relay Search]: relay-search mushes together two hostnames?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31077: relay-search mushes together two hostnames?
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 On
 
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/B5FA928B04798A873AB8F265EF786FDF6A2C1616
 there is a section called "Host Name" which lists
 "h-70-14.A785.priv.bahnhof.sestilat.nu*" at the hostname.

 Now, this is really two addresses -- one at bahnhof.se and the other at
 stilat.nu.

 But at the least there should be some sort of whitespace or newline or
 something between them. And it's also possible there is some sort of other
 bug happening, since we're listing two hostnames when we say we'll list
 one.

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30864 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move variable manipulation code out of confparse.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30864: Move variable manipulation code out of confparse.c
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  2.5
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  1
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:13 nickm]:
 > I think I've resolved the issues here with new commits on `ticket30864`;
 once you ack, we can merge, and move on to #30914.
 This looks good to me now. Thanks for the revisions and for opening a new
 ticket on the tech debt issue.
 > Thanks for opening a ticket about naming/documentation.
 I haven't done this yet, but plan to do so soon.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30649 [Core Tor/Tor]: Every few hours, relays [warn] Received circuit padding stop command for unknown machine.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30649: Every few hours, relays [warn] Received circuit padding stop command for
unknown machine.
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, circuitpadding, wtf-pad,  |  Actual Points:
  041-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 A relay operator (strelnikov) reports getting this message on their
 0.4.0.5 relay.

 It looks like commit 9aaf72ea went into 0.4.0.1-alpha?

 So (a) the bug *is* in our stable, and here is a user reporting it like
 teor predicted, and (b) we only pushed the fix into 0.4.1 above, right?

 Reopening so it can get more eyes. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30573 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: open with Tor Browser does not work if Tor Browser is not open already

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30573: TBA: open with Tor Browser does not work if Tor Browser is not open 
already
--+
 Reporter:  emmapeel  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201907  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I pushed `bug30573_9.0_02` for `9.0`. The difference between this branch
 and the `8.5` branch are avoiding a race between loading the tab and the
 Gecko profile loading, and correcting a bug caused by incorrectly checking
 if sanitizing is enabled.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30934 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Add a "Turn Off/On" toggle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30934: Add a "Turn Off/On" toggle
-+--
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  arlolra  |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_review


Comment:

 It looks like the ICE server error with the Firefox addon is a different
 issue and applies to both the currently published version and these
 changes.

 I'm going to put this back into needs_review because of the last 2
 commits.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30934 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Add a "Turn Off/On" toggle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30934: Add a "Turn Off/On" toggle
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  arlolra  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:21 cohosh]:
 > Replying to [comment:19 dcf]:
 > > Replying to [comment:17 cohosh]:
 > > > Hrm I'm seeing what looks like an infinite loop that the extension
 eventually goes into.
 > >
 > > Could it be if `broker.getClientOffer` (first HTTP request to broker)
 succeeds, but then ProxyPair.receiveOffer fails (JSON parsing and second
 HTTP request to broker). In that case, the ProxyPair is neither closed nor
 set inactive? Formerly, the ProxyPair was only set `active` after
 receiving the client offer, compared to now where it is set `active`
 immediately and made inactive when there's an error. Forgive me, I might
 be misinterpreting the code.
 > Yeah that's what I'm looking into, I'll add a fix to cover that case but
 it actually seems that the WebRTC might not be closing correctly. My
 snowflake has been green (active) for well over an hour now. Usually the
 connection times out during a browsing session before then.
 
[https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/commit/501c26b64d320a3e173a80f68eb256012ddc968d
 This commit] should put us back at the state we were at before the
 refactor in terms of error checking and returning the pair to inactive.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31076 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Temporarily disable emails on the tor-browser-bundle-testsuite.git repository for initial push

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31076: Temporarily disable emails on the tor-browser-bundle-testsuite.git
repository for initial push
-+
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:1 nickm]:
 > I believe that pushing a new branch does not cause emails.

 Thanks. I did the push, and indeed it didn't cause emails.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31076 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Temporarily disable emails on the tor-browser-bundle-testsuite.git repository for initial push

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31076: Temporarily disable emails on the tor-browser-bundle-testsuite.git
repository for initial push
-+
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 I believe that pushing a new branch does not cause emails.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30934 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Add a "Turn Off/On" toggle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30934: Add a "Turn Off/On" toggle
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  arlolra  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:19 dcf]:
 > Replying to [comment:17 cohosh]:
 > > Hrm I'm seeing what looks like an infinite loop that the extension
 eventually goes into.
 >
 > Could it be if `broker.getClientOffer` (first HTTP request to broker)
 succeeds, but then ProxyPair.receiveOffer fails (JSON parsing and second
 HTTP request to broker). In that case, the ProxyPair is neither closed nor
 set inactive? Formerly, the ProxyPair was only set `active` after
 receiving the client offer, compared to now where it is set `active`
 immediately and made inactive when there's an error. Forgive me, I might
 be misinterpreting the code.
 Yeah that's what I'm looking into, I'll add a fix to cover that case but
 it actually seems that the WebRTC might not be closing correctly. My
 snowflake has been green (active) for well over an hour now. Usually the
 connection times out during a browsing session before then.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30934 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Add a "Turn Off/On" toggle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30934: Add a "Turn Off/On" toggle
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  arlolra  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:18 dcf]:
 > Replying to [comment:13 arlolra]:
 > > > This is the same case as the current webpage
 snowflake.torproject.org. We could perhaps add some more obvious
 instructions to enable it if it's a usability problem.
 > >
 > > I agree with the cypherpunk that it should default to "on" since this
 isn't the same as browsing to a webpage that potentially has a snowflake
 embed and could start proxying traffic against the user's will; here we
 have explicit interaction of installing the extension.
 >
 > I think so too. The way I see it, installing the extension is opting in
 (equivalent to setting a cookie on the web page), and the on/off toggle is
 for the convenience of not having to dig into the browser's extension
 settings if you want to disable it temporarily.
 Cool, added
 
[https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/pull/5/commits/f85316f474ea1ce43fa1c4e9e3f01be228e2b958
 here]

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[tor-bugs] #31076 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Temporarily disable emails on the tor-browser-bundle-testsuite.git repository for initial push

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31076: Temporarily disable emails on the tor-browser-bundle-testsuite.git
repository for initial push
-+
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 I am about to the initial push on the `tor-browser-bundle-testsuite.git`
 repository that was created with #30516. However, this push includes 805
 commits, and I'm not sure we should send 805 emails to the tor-commits and
 tbb-commits mailing lists.

 Can we temporarily disable the email hook for the initial push? Or does
 this hook already avoids sending emails when pushing a new branch on an
 empty repository?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31074 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use tor_queue.h macros in config_line_t

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31074: Use tor_queue.h macros in config_line_t
--+--
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  refactor teschnical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+--
Changes (by catalyst):

 * cc: catalyst (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30870 [Applications/Orbot]: Default obfs4 bridges are all offline

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30870: Default obfs4 bridges are all offline
+--
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-bridges |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by phw):

 FWIW, I updated and force-pushed my patch because Linus' obfs4 bridges
 have been removed in the meanwhile.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30984 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make a key-value line abstraction to output control replies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30984: Make a key-value line abstraction to output control replies
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29210| Points:  5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Thanks for explaining this to me; it makes a lot more sense to me now.
 Based on what you've said above, I think you should go with whatever
 approach seems best to you based on your analysis.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30934 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Add a "Turn Off/On" toggle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30934: Add a "Turn Off/On" toggle
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  arlolra  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:17 cohosh]:
 > Hrm I'm seeing what looks like an infinite loop that the extension
 eventually goes into.

 Could it be if `broker.getClientOffer` (first HTTP request to broker)
 succeeds, but then ProxyPair.receiveOffer fails (JSON parsing and second
 HTTP request to broker). In that case, the ProxyPair is neither closed nor
 set inactive? Formerly, the ProxyPair was only set `active` after
 receiving the client offer, compared to now where it is set `active`
 immediately and made inactive when there's an error. Forgive me, I might
 be misinterpreting the code.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31071 [Metrics/ExoneraTor]: Add a notice if we're missing data for a lookup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31071: Add a notice if we're missing data for a lookup
+--
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/ExoneraTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Replying to [comment:3 irl]:
 > Understanding how often this has happened would be a good start, maybe
 we don't need to have the importer do this if it's not happening that
 often, we can just detect it and manually add rows to the table.

 Here are the gaps of 4 hours or more that I found in existing data:

 {{{
 Gap of  19 hours between 2011-09-10T00:05 and 2011-09-10T19:28:46.
 Gap of  10 hours between 2011-09-10T22:30:22 and 2011-09-11T09:27:05.
 Gap of  23 hours between 2011-12-21T01:21:19 and 2011-12-22T00:23:36.
 Gap of   4 hours between 2012-01-10T03:16:24 and 2012-01-10T07:20:03.
 Gap of 111 hours between 2012-02-07T02:33:16 and 2012-02-11T18:07:47.
 Gap of  12 hours between 2012-11-09T05:06:32 and 2012-11-09T17:44:08.
 Gap of   6 hours between 2013-03-07T06:14:23 and 2013-03-07T13:03:51.
 Gap of  26 hours between 2013-03-07T15:16:50 and 2013-03-08T17:17:55.
 Gap of 156 hours between 2013-03-14T09:29:25 and 2013-03-20T22:03:41.
 Gap of   6 hours between 2013-08-08T20:07:23 and 2013-08-09T02:57:34.
 Gap of   7 hours between 2013-09-29T01:01:11 and 2013-09-29T08:04:56.
 Gap of  12 hours between 2013-10-05T14:13:06 and 2013-10-06T03:11:26.
 Gap of  11 hours between 2013-11-03T15:06:38 and 2013-11-04T02:31:19.
 Gap of   4 hours between 2013-12-24T08:33:57 and 2013-12-24T13:04:42.
 Gap of   7 hours between 2014-01-21T10:38:42 and 2014-01-21T18:14:20.
 Gap of  19 hours between 2015-10-09T14:13:37 and 2015-10-10T09:57:26.
 Gap of   8 hours between 2016-09-18T03:16:31 and 2016-09-18T12:11:46.
 Gap of  14 hours between 2017-11-19T17:12:04 and 2017-11-20T07:54:34.
 Gap of   9 hours between 2018-01-21T22:12:34 and 2018-01-22T08:10:15.
 Gap of   6 hours between 2018-01-26T16:11:36 and 2018-01-26T23:02:35.
 Gap of   5 hours between 2018-01-27T04:21:42 and 2018-01-27T09:28:47.
 Gap of   5 hours between 2018-01-27T14:53:18 and 2018-01-27T20:24:21.
 Gap of  18 hours between 2018-02-02T18:27:54 and 2018-02-03T13:06:09.
 Gap of   9 hours between 2018-02-25T00:16:21 and 2018-02-25T10:12:04.
 Gap of   5 hours between 2018-03-03T15:54:17 and 2018-03-03T21:09:07.
 Gap of   5 hours between 2018-09-24T15:11:07 and 2018-09-24T21:09:27.
 Gap of   9 hours between 2018-12-30T23:22:06 and 2018-12-31T08:57:55.
 Gap of  13 hours between 2019-01-12T18:30:24 and 2019-01-13T08:18:33.
 Gap of 122 hours between 2019-04-25T13:13:19 and 2019-04-30T15:40:21.
 Gap of  21 hours between 2019-05-25T19:04:43 and 2019-05-26T16:09:23.
 Gap of   9 hours between 2019-06-21T21:14:21 and 2019-06-22T07:06:06.
 }}}

 Note that a 4 hour downtime wouldn't be an issue for ExoneraTor. It
 considers a previously scanned exit IP address valid for 24 hours. We
 would probably be looking for gaps 18 hours or longer.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30984 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make a key-value line abstraction to output control replies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30984: Make a key-value line abstraction to output control replies
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29210| Points:  5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by catalyst):

 Replying to [comment:4 nickm]:
 > I'm not sure that wrapping config_line_t and putting the results in a
 smartlist_t is the route I would recommend here: config_line_t expects to
 be in a linked list.
 I was thinking that each smartlist element would be a length-one linked
 list of `config_line_t`, under most circumstances. Exceptions would be
 reply lines with multiple machine-parsable key-value elements, like many
 of the async event control replies. For these, it would be nice to use
 `kvline_encode()`.

 There are three main categories of reply lines that I see (ignoring the
 difference between a `MidReplyLine` and `EndReplyLine` for now -- part of
 the goal of this is to automatically figure out which to generate):
 * Entire line after the numeric code and separator is meant to be human
 readable, and not generally machine-parsed
 * Entire line after the numeric code and separator is a single `key=value`
 pair
 * Line is a `DataReplyLine`, followed by multi-line `CmdData`
 * After numeric code and separator, a list of machine-parsable keywords or
 `key=value` pairs. These are mostly async control events, but there are
 some synchronous replies that are like this, including `PROTOCOLINFO`.
 These are the reply formats that would benefit most from
 `kvline_encode()`.

 Or maybe I should start by making a new structure for control replies,
 starting with reply code numbers and flat strings? Then stuff that could
 benefit by building up `key=value` argument lists could still use
 `kvline_encode()` explicitly, at least at first. Some of the existing
 control replies like `GETINFO` and `GETCONF` don't quote things the way
 `kvline_encode()` would like to.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28403 [Metrics/Consensus Health]: Link to bandwidth files from Consensus Health

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28403: Link to bandwidth files from Consensus Health
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Consensus Health  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25925| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by tom):

 * status:  needs_revision => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Updated!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27604 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Relocating the Tor Browser directory is broken with Tor Browser 8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27604: Relocating the Tor Browser directory is broken with Tor Browser 8
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.0.1-can, TorBrowserTeam201906|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by tom):

 I hadn't seen John's reply - I also reached out to him on Twitter:

 https://twitter.com/JohnTHaller/status/1142630151873859586
 https://twitter.com/JohnTHaller/status/1142630329028612096

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30934 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Add a "Turn Off/On" toggle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30934: Add a "Turn Off/On" toggle
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  arlolra  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:13 arlolra]:
 > > This is the same case as the current webpage snowflake.torproject.org.
 We could perhaps add some more obvious instructions to enable it if it's a
 usability problem.
 >
 > I agree with the cypherpunk that it should default to "on" since this
 isn't the same as browsing to a webpage that potentially has a snowflake
 embed and could start proxying traffic against the user's will; here we
 have explicit interaction of installing the extension.

 I think so too. The way I see it, installing the extension is opting in
 (equivalent to setting a cookie on the web page), and the on/off toggle is
 for the convenience of not having to dig into the browser's extension
 settings if you want to disable it temporarily.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31071 [Metrics/ExoneraTor]: Add a notice if we're missing data for a lookup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31071: Add a notice if we're missing data for a lookup
+--
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/ExoneraTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by irl):

 How do we plan to detect incomplete data? Perhaps the simplest option is
 to have a table that keeps track of events, and return those events along
 with the result instead of making the query more complex. i.e. do two SQL
 queries, one for the data and a second one for any events that might give
 context.

 When the importer fails to find a new exit list, it can just add an entry
 to the events table. If there are not enough addresses in it, or no
 address was recently checked, it could do the same.

 Understanding how often this has happened would be a good start, maybe we
 don't need to have the importer do this if it's not happening that often,
 we can just detect it and manually add rows to the table.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #5304 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Obfsproxy should respect OutboundBindAddress in torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5304: Obfsproxy should respect OutboundBindAddress in torrc
-+-
 Reporter:  korobkov |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-spec-change needs-tor-change,  |  Actual Points:  1.25
  anti-censorship-roadmap|
Parent ID:  #30471   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  phw  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-must
-+-

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:31 teor]:
 > Tor doesn't support binding to outbound port, and neither does a lot of
 other software, because it's error-prone.
 > Best to let the OS assign the port.

 I'm sorry, I misunderstood what this was about, especially regarding
 address versus port. I should not have commented.

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[tor-bugs] #31075 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider dropping browser patch for 26353

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31075: Consider dropping browser patch for 26353
--+--
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ff68-esr
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 I think the patch for #26353 is not strictly needed, since the speculative
 connections are blocked when a proxy is configured (here:
 https://github.com/mozilla/gecko-
 dev/blob/esr60/netwerk/base/nsIOService.cpp#L1621, and same in 68). So
 while the speculative requests can be seen in torbutton domain-isolator,
 they should be dropped before they reach tor client.

 I tested by changing the torbutton code to not put all these to the
 `--unknown--` catch-all circuit so that they could be tracked, and while I
 can see these in logs coming from the domain isolator, there are no
 corresponding open circuits in the `Torbutton INFO: controlPort << getinfo
 circuit-status` logs.


 It's always possible that this might change in the future (according to
 the comments in that file, the reason why the speculative connections are
 not performed when there is a proxy do not seem so strong). So we might
 still want the current patch for #26353 just in case, I'm not sure.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26294 [Core Tor/Tor]: attacker can force intro point rotation by ddos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26294: attacker can force intro point rotation by ddos
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-dos, network-team-   |  Actual Points:  6
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #2   | Points:  7
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Two tiny comments. Else, this is solid! Put it in `merge_ready` once
 teor's and my comments have been addressed.

 LGTM!

 I'm currently running this on our test bed. We'll let you know if anything
 comes up but so far so good for upstream merge!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30984 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make a key-value line abstraction to output control replies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30984: Make a key-value line abstraction to output control replies
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29210| Points:  5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 I'm not sure that wrapping config_line_t and putting the results in a
 smartlist_t is the route I would recommend here: config_line_t expects to
 be in a linked list.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31008 [Core Tor/Tor]: Typographical error on tor man pages help command

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31008: Typographical error on tor man pages help command
-+-
 Reporter:  clash|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  035-backport, 040-backport,  |  Actual Points:  0.1
  041-backport, trivial, asn-merge   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I believe that it gets rebuilt as part of the website rebuild when the old
 website is told about a new tor version.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31040 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop showing git scripts changes, unless the base is master

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31040: Stop showing git scripts changes, unless the base is master
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-should?   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.2.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30934 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Add a "Turn Off/On" toggle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30934: Add a "Turn Off/On" toggle
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  arlolra  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cohosh):

 Hrm I'm seeing what looks like an infinite loop that the extension
 eventually goes into.

 On Firefox:
 {{{
 Snowflake: At client capacity. snowflake.js:1186:13
 XML Parsing Error: no element found
 Location: https://snowflake-broker.bamsoftware.com/answer
 Line Number 1, Column 1: answer:1:1
 XML Parsing Error: no element found
 Location: https://snowflake-broker.bamsoftware.com/proxy
 Line Number 1, Column 1: proxy:1:1
 Snowflake: At client capacity.
 snowflake.js:1186:13
 ICE failed, add a STUN server and see about:webrtc for more details
 }}}

 On Chrome:
 {{{
 POST https://snowflake-broker.bamsoftware.com/proxy 504
 2snowflake.js:1186 Snowflake: At client capacity.
 proxy:1 POST https://snowflake-broker.bamsoftware.com/proxy 504
 35snowflake.js:1186 Snowflake: At client capacity.
 }}}

 It doesn't seem to happen with the currently published version 0.0.1, so
 I'll look into whether the refactoring changes might have caused it

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30864 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move variable manipulation code out of confparse.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30864: Move variable manipulation code out of confparse.c
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  2.5
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  1
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I think I've resolved the issues here with new commits on `ticket30864`;
 once you ack, we can merge, and move on to #30914.

 Thanks for opening a ticket about naming/documentation.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31073 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please add Sue to fundrais...@torproject.org alias

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31073: Please add Sue to fundrais...@torproject.org alias
-+
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30054 [Community/Translations]: Special characters are not escaped in translations and break the build

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30054: Special characters are not escaped in translations and break the build
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  emmapeel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Translations   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201904,|  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201904  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: pili (added)
 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 emmapeel: what do we need to get this bug resolved/unblocked? Luckily, I
 ran a test build before starting the build for 8.5.4 in order to figure
 whether we could use the latest translations for mobile. But it turns out
 we can't as 21677307d87d3216eede51a6ad36bf26e7937667 is the last good
 commit before `'`'s get added unescaped to `ca`. That alone is unfortunate
 but it's even more so that this blocks other unaffected locales from
 getting the latest translations.

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[tor-bugs] #31074 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use tor_queue.h macros in config_line_t

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31074: Use tor_queue.h macros in config_line_t
---+--
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  refactor teschnical-debt
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+--
 The config_line_t linked list could be refactored to use the TOR_SLIST
 macros in tor_queue.h

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[tor-bugs] #31073 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please add Sue to fundrais...@torproject.org alias

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31073: Please add Sue to fundrais...@torproject.org alias
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 I would like to add Sue (CFO) to our fundrais...@torproject.org alias so
 she can follow our updates and discussions.

 thanks!
 isabela

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30999 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Spruce up the product pages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30999: Spruce up the product pages
-+--
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 Looks like it got published \o/

 Still needs the newer version and some new screenshots

 
[https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/snowflake/mafpmfcccpbjnhfhjnllmmalhifmlcie]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31072 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: State clearly that the snowflake proxy only connects to a bridge and does not make outcoming traffic to the internet

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31072: State clearly that the snowflake proxy only connects to a bridge and 
does
not make outcoming traffic to the internet
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by cohosh):

 Thanks cypherpunks!

 I already added a better description in the recent updates to our
 extension on the Chrome Webstore:
 
[https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/snowflake/mafpmfcccpbjnhfhjnllmmalhifmlcie]

 Let me know what you think of the phrasing there. We'll also update the
 description for the Mozilla addon as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30934 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Add a "Turn Off/On" toggle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30934: Add a "Turn Off/On" toggle
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  arlolra  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:14 arlolra]:
 > I pushed a small fixup in,
 > https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/commit/?id=526e42a443d81b121ac14c125a2a85e0170b8cff

 Good catch, thanks. I'll merge this in with the rest of the changes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30934 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Add a "Turn Off/On" toggle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30934: Add a "Turn Off/On" toggle
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  arlolra  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:13 arlolra]:
 > I agree with the cypherpunk that it should default to "on" since this
 isn't the same as browsing to a webpage that potentially has a snowflake
 embed and could start proxying traffic against the user's will; here we
 have explicit interaction of installing the extension.

 Sounds good. I made the suggested fixes and also enabled it by default
 with the latest commit:
 https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/pull/5#pullrequestreview-257382200

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30934 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Add a "Turn Off/On" toggle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30934: Add a "Turn Off/On" toggle
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  arlolra  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arlolra):

 I pushed a small fixup in,
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/commit/?id=526e42a443d81b121ac14c125a2a85e0170b8cff

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31025 [Core Tor/Tor]: Coverity is confused by switch statement in siphash24 implementation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31025: Coverity is confused by switch statement in siphash24 implementation
+
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  coverity dgoulet-merge  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  coverity => coverity dgoulet-merge


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[tor-bugs] #31072 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: State clearly that the snowflake proxy only connects to a bridge and does not make outcoming traffic to the internet

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31072: State clearly that the snowflake proxy only connects to a bridge and 
does
not make outcoming traffic to the internet
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  snowflake-   |  Actual Points:
  webextension   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
 it's clear that this misconception may make several people wary of
 installing the addon, and clearly emphasizing that in the text will be
 necessary

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31067 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Warn the user when WebRTC is detected as being disabled in the browser in the Snowflake WebExtension

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31067: Warn the user when WebRTC is detected as being disabled in the browser 
in
the Snowflake WebExtension
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by arlolra):

 * owner:  (none) => arlolra
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24963 [Core Tor/Tor]: dos: Block single hop clients at the intro point

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24963: dos: Block single hop clients at the intro point
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dos, tor2web, tor-hs,|  Actual Points:  0.1
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #24962   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Unit tests fixed and added one also to actually test the feature ;).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24964 [Core Tor/Tor]: dos: Block single hop client at the HSDir

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24964: dos: Block single hop client at the HSDir
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dos, tor2web, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:  0.4
Parent ID:  #24962| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * actualpoints:  0.1 => 0.4


Comment:

 Thanks teor!

 I've almost redid the entire branch so I just rebased-squashed to latest
 master and force push the PR. It needs the review to start from the
 beginning. Unit tests and chutney tests pass.

 Branch: `ticket24964_042_01`
 PR: ​https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1122

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30915 [Community/Translations]: make sure new banner is localized

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30915: make sure new banner is localized
---+--
 Reporter:  emmapeel   |  Owner:  emmapeel
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Translations |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201906  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * component:  Applications/Tor Browser => Community/Translations


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30800 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ftp:// on Windows can be used to leak the system time zone

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30800: ftp:// on Windows can be used to leak the system time zone
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201907R, GeorgKoppen201907   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting => tbb-fingerprinting,
 TorBrowserTeam201907R, GeorgKoppen201907
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 `bug_30800` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_30800=b21da86362c76a231901e6733adee7512579ff06)
 has the backport to esr60 of Gary's patch. It fixes the problem for me,
 nice work! I am still not sure about why only Windows is affected to begin
 with, though, but did not dig deeper into the code yet.

 I guess we could try to test what we have in the alpha, provided the patch
 looks good to us?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25066 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rendezvous points should return signed proof of the established rend point

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25066: Rendezvous points should return signed proof of the established rend 
point
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal,  |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #2   | Points:  15
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * parent:  #15516 => #2


Comment:

 Re-parenting properly.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31009 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor lets transports advertise private IP addresses in descriptor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31009: Tor lets transports advertise private IP addresses in descriptor
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, tor-bridge, 029-backport,|  Actual Points:
  035-backport, 040-backport, 041-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-can
-+-
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Requested Github PR on IRC. The patch looks fine.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31025 [Core Tor/Tor]: Coverity is confused by switch statement in siphash24 implementation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31025: Coverity is confused by switch statement in siphash24 implementation
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  coverity  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 LGTM! And the siphash unittest  also seem to pass if I toggle the coverity
 flag.

 Let's get this merged and see if it fixes our coverity false positives.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30126 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make Tor Browser on macOS compatible with Apple's notarization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30126: Make Tor Browser on macOS compatible with Apple's notarization
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201906  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:3 gk]:
 > FWIW: It seems the updater is one of the first victims here:
 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/282619#comment-282619 and
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1556733.

 That particular issue got fixed on Mozilla's side and backported to all
 relevant branches including esr60. Thus, we are good for that issue at
 least.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30934 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Add a "Turn Off/On" toggle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30934: Add a "Turn Off/On" toggle
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  arlolra  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 > Okay here are two more commits for ...

 On the whole, these changes seem fine.  I left two comments on the pull.

 > This is the same case as the current webpage snowflake.torproject.org.
 We could perhaps add some more obvious instructions to enable it if it's a
 usability problem.

 I agree with the cypherpunk that it should default to "on" since this
 isn't the same as browsing to a webpage that potentially has a snowflake
 embed and could start proxying traffic against the user's will; here we
 have explicit interaction of installing the extension.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15516 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider rate-limiting INTRODUCE2 cells when under load

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15516: Consider rate-limiting INTRODUCE2 cells when under load
-+-
 Reporter:  special  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorU-deferred, tor-dos, tor-hs,  |  Actual Points:
  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2 |
Parent ID:  #2   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Fixes and ticket looks good to me.

 Let's get the tor-dev thread going and we can move forward here.

 I'm marking this as needs_revision until we get the tor-dev thread so that
 it does not clobber my review queue.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31071 [Metrics/ExoneraTor]: Add a notice if we're missing data for a lookup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31071: Add a notice if we're missing data for a lookup
+--
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/ExoneraTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by karsten):

 And let's add a step zero: look through the archives when this situation
 has happened before and post all those time intervals to tor-relays@ with
 an explanation how this affects ExoneraTor results. I'll start with this
 now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31069 [Webpages/Support]: Create onion auth entry help in support.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31069: Create onion auth entry help in support.torproject.org
--+---
 Reporter:  antonela  |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #3| Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela, stephw  |Sponsor:  Sponsor27
--+---
Changes (by pili):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor27


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27602 [Applications/Tor Browser]: iis windows authentication prompt not showing up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27602: iis windows authentication prompt not showing up
--+--
 Reporter:  Schnuffles|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-usability-website => tbb-usability-website


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 gk]:
 > Before enabling authentication here again we should be sure to double-
 check https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1261591 which blocks
 the fixed bug.

 Yeah, this is still an issue. Thus, we need to keep this disabled for now,
 alas. :( (Or we fix it up ourselves which could be considerable work)

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[tor-bugs] #31071 [Metrics/ExoneraTor]: Add a notice if we're missing data for a lookup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31071: Add a notice if we're missing data for a lookup
+--
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/ExoneraTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+--
 Turns out the the exit scanner had an issue between April 25 and 29, 2019.
 If somebody looks up their exit IP address during that time, they won't be
 listed in the results. I know of one case where this is now potentially an
 issue.

 Let's think about adding a notice if we're missing data for part of a
 lookup period, including exit lists and maybe also consensuses. This is
 different from having no data at all, it's about missing some data only.

 First step will be to refine the (already quite complex) query to return
 whether we have sufficient or insufficient data, possibly but not
 necessarily with exact timestamps of available data.

 Second step will be to include the notice in the website, first in English
 and then in translated languages.

 Third step will be to release and deploy all this.

 I'll work on this, but I'm putting it into needs_review to discuss the
 idea first.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31071 [Metrics/ExoneraTor]: Add a notice if we're missing data for a lookup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31071: Add a notice if we're missing data for a lookup
+--
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/ExoneraTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * cc: metrics-team (added)
 * reviewer:   => irl
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30931 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Setup accounts for publishing the webextension

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30931: Setup accounts for publishing the webextension
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arlolra):

 > I've created a Firefox account under the address d...@torproject.org.

 You've now been added as a co-owner.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30404 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove Orbot Project

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30404: Remove Orbot Project
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5-must,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905R  |
Parent ID:  #30168   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5-must, TorBrowserTeam201905R, tbb-backport
 => tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5-must, TorBrowserTeam201905R


Comment:

 Nothing to backport here. This shipped in 8.5.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30712 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport patch for Mozilla's 1552993 to Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30712: Backport patch for Mozilla's 1552993 to Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam01906R, tbb-   |  Actual Points:
  backported |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201906R, tbb-backport => TorBrowserTeam01906R,
 tbb-backported


Comment:

 Cherry-picked to `tor-browser-60.7.0esr-8.5-1` (commit
 40a9182ba78975d5b5d4b0125cb8fbfc66afe3f0) for 8.5.4.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29697 [Internal Services]: archive.tpo is soon running out of space

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29697: archive.tpo is soon running out of space
---+--
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  budget_needed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:36 weasel]:
 > I did a final sync of arlgirdense's /srv/archive to archive-01, enabled
 *your* cronjobs on archive-01 and disabled them on arlgirdense.

 Ok, I looked at the cronjobs on archive-01 and that looks good.

 >
 > Will switch DNS later in the day, and then shut off arlgirdense.

 That sounds good.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29045 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ask tor to leave dormant mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29045: ask tor to leave dormant mode
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201905R,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-backported |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201905R, tbb-backport => tbb-rbm,
 TorBrowserTeam201905R, tbb-backported


Comment:

 Cherry-picked to `maint-8.5` (commit
 7818024b9c0af7b53623cf1dd4b493f8146ff9bb) for 8.5.4.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29697 [Internal Services]: archive.tpo is soon running out of space

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29697: archive.tpo is soon running out of space
---+--
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  budget_needed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by weasel):

 updating dns for archive and rsync.tpo

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29697 [Internal Services]: archive.tpo is soon running out of space

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29697: archive.tpo is soon running out of space
---+--
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  budget_needed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by weasel):

 * cc: boklm (added)


Comment:

 I did a final sync of arlgirdense's /srv/archive to archive-01, enabled
 *your* cronjobs on archive-01 and disabled them on arlgirdense.

 Will switch DNS later in the day, and then shut off arlgirdense.

 If you care about your service, please have a look and provide feedback
 (ack or nak).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29697 [Internal Services]: archive.tpo is soon running out of space

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29697: archive.tpo is soon running out of space
---+--
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  budget_needed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by weasel):

 * cc: anarcat (added)


Comment:

 re archive-01:  cleaned (removed) /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key* and edited
 the remaining .pub files to correctly have the hostname.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31051 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: bungei running out of space

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31051: bungei running out of space
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by weasel):

 manually, and behind bacula's back, removed one of arlgirdense's old
 fulls.  We can reconsider growing things once we have migrated properly to
 the new archive host.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30199 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor-android-service: Review 2019/04/16

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30199: tor-android-service: Review 2019/04/16
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201906   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 sisbell: you get the hashes if you clone our `tor-android-service` repo.
 You might need to add sysrqb's user repo as well
 (https://github.com/sysrqb/tor-android-service/).
 1a2121e2a7ee8a6c0f3b5edd150b38eaae8bef304 is a typo and should be
 a2121e2a7ee8a6c0f3b5edd150b38eaae8bef304.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31050 [Applications/Tor Browser]: vertaling van webpagina's (zoals mogelijk is in chrome)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31050: vertaling van webpagina's (zoals mogelijk is in chrome)
--+---
 Reporter:  Starsister 56 |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 I don't think there is a similar feature in Firefox (which Tor Browser is
 based on) by default. But you might be able to customize your Tor Browser
 to do so: https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/how-add-translate-feature-
 firefox (Note, though, that additional extensions installed might make it
 possible to fingerprint you better which is why this is not recommended).
 Anyway, this is not a bug.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30540 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Give TBA alpha users a link to stable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30540: Give TBA alpha users a link to stable
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:3 clash]:
 > Do you just want to target developers with the alpha or anyone who wants
 to try out the newest features/fixes before they're added to the stable
 version and give feedback? If users who want to live on the bleeding edge
 and are happy to provide early feedback are a target too then just the
 'developer' terminology may not be as apt.

 It's anyone that wants to help us find issues in features/fixes that might
 make it to the (next) stable release. At least until we have a proper
 nightly channel set up. Once we are there we could think about splitting
 up that group further and tailor the series even better.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30573 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: open with Tor Browser does not work if Tor Browser is not open already

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30573: TBA: open with Tor Browser does not work if Tor Browser is not open 
already
--+
 Reporter:  emmapeel  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201907  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201907R => tbb-mobile,
 TorBrowserTeam201907


Comment:

 I think we want to test this in an alpha first. I am bit wary pushing too
 much directly to stable in particular as we want to avoid doing another
 point release next week to fixup things if possible. Marking that ticket
 for revision for now.

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