Re: [tor-bugs] #13737 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move circuit building crypto to worker

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13737: Move circuit building crypto to worker
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, tor-hs, multicore,   |  Actual Points:
  performance, tor-dos, term-project-ideas   |
  intro  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-can
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 will this help saturate our cpu limited nodes 10g line better?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #3145 [Core Tor/Tor]: excludeexitnodes by ip misleading when exit relay uses outboundbindaddress

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3145: excludeexitnodes by ip misleading when exit relay uses 
outboundbindaddress
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-design tor-client  |  Actual Points:
  excludenodes tor-doc   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 still worth doing., this also applies to exitnodes, that do reroute
 through other exitnode :( example:

 
[http://rougmnvswfsmd4dq.onion/rs.html#details/471142D96FC7EECA21C55637B2F00F065BEF655F]

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #4696 [Core Tor/Tor]: add OutboundBindInterface option to torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#4696: add OutboundBindInterface option to torrc
-+--
 Reporter:  mr-4 |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.2.34
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay network intro  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 without this option, clients have no option to bind to IPv6 privacy
 address

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30558 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30558: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser
--+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  JeremyRand
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by JeremyRand):

 Early branch: https://notabug.org/JeremyRand/tor-browser-
 build/src/namecoin (you want the namecoin branch).

 The 3 most major shortcomings in its current state are:

 1. ncprop279 isn't built locally, but instead is pulled from a binary
 release on namecoin.org.  This is because ncprop279 currently needs a
 different version of the Go compiler than tor-browser-build uses, so it
 needs to be built in its own tree.  The binary that's being pulled in is
 (in theory) reproducible with rbm (via the ncdns-repro repository), so
 it's not a security issue, but it makes the build workflow a lot more
 annoying than it should be.  I'm in the process of getting a patch merged
 to Namecoin that will fix this issue; I expect it to be resolved in less
 than a month.
 2. Electrum-NMC is pulled in via the Python source code tarball on
 namecoin.org.  That tarball contains source code from various Python
 dependencies of Electrum.  It would be a lot better to pull in those
 dependencies from their upstream source (either Git or tarballs), and then
 combine them with Electrum-NMC's source (from Git).  I'm in the process of
 implementing this; I expect it to be resolved in less than 2 months.
 3. This branch uses an official Electrum-NMC release rather than the
 Electrum-NMC branch I used in the live demo.  The live demo branch has
 some patches that make initial syncup much faster (nearly instant),
 whereas the official release will probably take about 5 minutes to do
 initial syncup.  Most of the patches for faster syncup are now undergoing
 review by upstream Electrum; this has already yielded much better code
 quality than the live demo branch (shocking, I know -- the Electrum devs
 know their own codebase better than I do!), but it does mean there's some
 delay in getting everything merged.  I think it's likely that a lot of
 this code will be merged upstream in the next 2-3 months.

 Anyway, while this isn't production-ready in any way, I figure it's a good
 idea to post it here for transparency purposes.  If anyone wants to play
 around with it, build a nightly of Tor Browser (must be 64-bit Linux), and
 set the environment variable TOR_ENABLE_NAMECOIN=1 before you run Tor
 Browser.  .bit and .bit.onion sites should "just work" (modulo the initial
 syncup time, see above).  Right now .bit sites can point to IP address or
 onion services, and Namecoin TLS is not part of this patch.  Prior to a
 release, I intend to disable IP addresses, so .bit can only point to a
 .onion, and we can evaluate how to do IP+TLS securely at a later date.  Be
 sure to check out the awesome circuit display when you're viewing a
 Namecoin onion service!  (Kudos to Arthur for the Torbutton patch that
 does this.)

 Cheers!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #9208 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow node operator to avoid Guard flag

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9208: Allow node operator to avoid Guard flag
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  guard tor-relay needs-proposal  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 quick workaround to become a guard, is to optout for becoming DirCache
 {{{
 DirCache 0
 [warn] DirCache is disabled and we are configured as a relay. We will not
 become a Guard.
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #9208 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow node operator to avoid Guard flag

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9208: Allow node operator to avoid Guard flag
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  guard tor-relay needs-proposal  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:3 hsn]:
 > turn off relay for half day. its enough to loose guard and stable flag.

 this is BADRELAY really bad! for running realy just paste in telnet =>
 controlport:

 {{{
 SETCONF DirCache=0
 }}}

 Replying to [comment:6 hsn]:
 > why BadGuard flag will be helpful:
 quick workaround to never become a guard or stop to be one, is to optout
 for becoming DirCache
 {{{
 DirCache 0
 [warn] DirCache is disabled and we are configured as a relay. We will not
 become a Guard.
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #9729 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make bridges publish additional ORPort addresses in their descriptor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9729: Make bridges publish additional ORPort addresses in their descriptor
-+-
 Reporter:  sqrt2|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ORPort, censorship, pt, multiple,|  Actual Points:
  addresses, andrea-review, tor-bridge   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorS-can
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 until done, just provide one up to TWO possible tor instance per ORPort
 address please.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #13908 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make it safe to set NumDirectoryGuards=1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13908: Make it safe to set NumDirectoryGuards=1
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal, tor-client, needs-   |  Actual Points:
  design guards client-enumeration research- |
  program|
Parent ID:  #21006   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 suggests until there is 2-hop circuits fallbacks for dirfetch, setting
 NumDirectoryGuards=2 in consensus to get further this issues?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #15998 [Core Tor/Tor]: suggestion: distributed captcha mechanism for hidden service DDOS defense

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15998: suggestion:  distributed captcha mechanism for hidden service DDOS 
defense
---+-
 Reporter:  hdqdak8v32aor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: very long term
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
  Sponsor: |
---+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 captcha is horrible user experience solution. this is no solution. please
 no.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #17768 [Core Tor/Tor]: Measure Hidden Service Rendezvous Path Lengths

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17768: Measure Hidden Service Rendezvous Path Lengths
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs measurement needs-analysis  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  medium
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 at least no longer valid for Tor2Web was removed with fire :-(

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #17591 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use channel padding to obscure circuit setup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17591: Use channel padding to obscure circuit setup
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  mike-can, term-project-ideas,|  Actual Points:
  padding, intersection-attack   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 it is important to pad the RELAY_EARLY cells count. because using
 vanguards would make you stand out else!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20212 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor can be forced to open too many circuits by embedding .onion resources

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20212: Tor can be forced to open too many circuits by embedding .onion 
resources
-+-
 Reporter:  gacar|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  guard-discovery, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201803, 034-roadmap-proposed,|
  security, tor-hs   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 since dosmitigtion system, with this happening, dosmitigtion will make
 your clientip unuseable for your guard for atleast one hour.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #19959 [Core Tor/Tor]: have a flag for Tor relay location, if a relay is hosted in a data center, cloud or physically secured

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19959: have a flag for Tor relay location, if a relay is hosted in a data 
center,
cloud or physically secured
-+-
 Reporter:  adrelanos|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-spec tor-relay directory easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [ticket:19959 adrelanos]:
 this "flag" could be deployed as contactinfo param:

 [https://github.com/nusenu/ContactInfo-Information-Sharing-Specification]

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21989 [Core Tor/Tor]: Should we tell Exits to reject all traffic if DNS fails?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21989: Should we tell Exits to reject all traffic if DNS fails?
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  dns, tor-exit, reliability self- |  Actual Points:
  test   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 relays with Exit flag are still useful as Exits for IP destination
 traffic.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26691 [Core Tor/Tor]: add 'working DNS' to the list of mandatory requirements for the 'exit' flag

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26691: add 'working DNS' to the list of mandatory requirements for the 'exit' 
flag
-+-
 Reporter:  nusenu   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal, tor-exit, tor-   |  Actual Points:
  dirauth, tbb-needs |
Parent ID:  #24014   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 would it somehow possible to use relays without exit flag but exitpolicy
 set? so that we still can make use of them while dns is broken for some
 reason. (can be forced by 3rd party adversary to loose exit flag than by
 making it timeout dns requests) so that all exit connection streams with
 IP as Destination still can extend through brokendns relay without "DNS-
 Exit" flag?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30430 [UX]: Create Tor Personas

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30430: Create Tor Personas
--+--
 Reporter:  antonela  |  Owner:  dunqan
 Type:  project   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  UX|Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela  |Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dunqan):

 * Attachment "2.1-tor-personas.pdf" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30430 [UX]: Create Tor Personas

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30430: Create Tor Personas
--+--
 Reporter:  antonela  |  Owner:  dunqan
 Type:  project   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  UX|Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela  |Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by dunqan):

 Thanks both!

 Updated personas here:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/30430/2.1-tor-
 personas.pdf

 Notes as follows —

 > awareness misspelt as awarness

 Fixed (plus a bunch of other typos).

 > Journey could be simplified. "I want to do X So I can get Y" implies the
 user has not done X yet but wants to do it, in that case they haven't had
 that positive/meh/negative experience yet.

 Yep, I totally see your point – but I'm not sure what the best solution
 is. I think I'll leave the journeys as-is for the dev meeting and see what
 the wider team thinks.

 > Onion misspelt as Onoin in Aleisha's Journey

 Also fixed.

 > In the "Fernanda" persona, right pane "Censorship" is red ("Tor
 completely blocked"). Nothing in her user story implies Tor is censored.
 And, being the stories something that track what happens in the real
 world, I understand Colombia does not implement Tor blocking.

 Good spot! This was an error, it should have been "Unrestricted" (i.e. all
 green) as per the Airtable spreadsheet.

 > Also, for Fernanda's journey → Awareness → "So I can" has no real text
 (lorem ipsum dolor sit amet...)

 Have updated that too.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30430 [UX]: Create Tor Personas

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30430: Create Tor Personas
--+--
 Reporter:  antonela  |  Owner:  dunqan
 Type:  project   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  UX|Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela  |Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dunqan):

 * Attachment "2.1-tor-personas.pdf" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30430 [UX]: Create Tor Personas

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30430: Create Tor Personas
--+--
 Reporter:  antonela  |  Owner:  dunqan
 Type:  project   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  UX|Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela  |Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dunqan):

 * Attachment "2.1-tor-personas.pdf" removed.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23278 [Core Tor/Tor]: Give user option to use non-Exit Guards only

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23278: Give user option to use non-Exit Guards only
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, tor-config  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:8 dgoulet]:
 > Because of #23318, it seems that a "paranoid mode" option would be what
 the reporter of this bug wants that is an option that makes tor never pick
 a Guard that has a non empty exit policy

 actually the consensus weight for exitguards is nearly ZERO for guard
 probability. your client shouldn't pick and use it as guard. well at least
 it have the exit flag.

 Replying to [comment:9 cypherpunks]:

 > Tor client can to pick Guard with "accept *:443; reject *:*" exit
 policy, which is not enough for relay to get Exit flag but enough to use
 it as exit relay. Actually there are many real non-Exit (flag) Guards with
 more complex exit policies that can be used as exits too (there many
 protocols nasty people can do nasty things).
 is there a easy way to find such relays? without searching through whole
 consensus desciptors like a metrics relay search pattern? flag:!exit ... i
 tried find them through https://check.torproject.org/cgi-
 bin/TorBulkExitList.py but had no luck yet.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31083 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: kvm5 uses unexpected IP address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31083: kvm5 uses unexpected IP address
-+-
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 kvm5 uses an unexpected IPv6 address for outgoing traffic (among others,
 to db.tpo), at least on the ipsec tunnel to other tor hosts (note: routing
 table 220).

 It uses the one on the brpub bridge to KVM guests instead of the one
 assigned to its public interface.

 Maybe this is because brpub gets brought up before eth0?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21989 [Core Tor/Tor]: Should we tell Exits to reject all traffic if DNS fails?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21989: Should we tell Exits to reject all traffic if DNS fails?
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  dns, tor-exit, reliability self- |  Actual Points:
  test   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by micah):

 Replying to [comment:9 cypherpunks]:
 > relays with Exit flag are still useful as Exits for IP destination
 traffic.

 That is undeniable, however what is at issue is how useful is that for the
 network, when the other pieces do not work.

 Consider a relay with an Exit flag that only resolves DNS, but doesn't
 pass traffic. That doesn't seem particularly useful to the network, but it
 does resolve DNS queries.

 I don't think anyone is thinking, "What I'd like is a anonymity network
 that will only pass IP traffic, and not resolve DNS in any meaningful way"

 I think the network is only useful if it works for people who want to have
 functioning DNS resolution, but also those who are fine not having it, but
 not one at the expense of the other.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24694 [Core Tor/Tor]: sched: Use the socket RTT in KIST to compute a more accurate extra space

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24694: sched: Use the socket RTT in KIST to compute a more accurate extra space
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-sched, kist, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 you recommend to reduce both the same multiplier so something like:

 {{{
 # KISTSchedRunInterval KISTSchedRunInterval __NUM__ msec
 # If KIST or KISTLite is used in the Schedulers option, this controls
 at which
 # interval the scheduler tick is. If the value is 0 msec, the value is
 taken
 # from the consensus if possible else it will fallback to the default
 10
 # msec. Maximum possible value is 100 msec. (Default: 0 msec)
 KISTSchedRunInterval1 msec
 # KISTSockBufSizeFactor KISTSockBufSizeFactor __NUM__
 # If KIST is used in Schedulers, this is a multiplier of the per-
 socket
 # limit calculation of the KIST algorithm. (Default: 1.0)
 KISTSockBufSizeFactor   0.1
 }}}


 ?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24833 [Core Tor/Tor]: DNS not reliably returning AAAA records

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24833: DNS not reliably returning  records
-+-
 Reporter:  Zakhar   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.14
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, tor-client, tor-exit, tor- |  Actual Points:
  dns, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 it is still an issue since  are supported. many exits give you
 nxdomain by mistake

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24797 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add an option that makes Tor use fewer connections

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24797: Add an option that makes Tor use fewer connections
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, tor-dos,  |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328, |
  035-removed-20180711   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 you can also use  ReducedConnectionPadding 1
 # ReducedConnectionPadding 0|1
 # If set to 1, Tor will not not hold OR connections open for very
 long,
 # and will send less padding on these connections. Only clients may
 set
 # this option. This option should be offered via the UI to mobile
 users
 # for use where bandwidth may be expensive. (Default: 0)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23378 [Core Tor/Tor]: Call "Sandbox 1" no longer an experimental feature?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23378: Call "Sandbox 1" no longer an experimental feature?
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 i compile debian tor from source. i cannot use i get:
 {{{
 This version of Tor was built without support for sandboxing. To build
 with support for sandboxing on Linux, you must have libseccomp and its
 necessary header files (e.g. seccomp.h).
 apt install libseccomp-dev libseccomp2 seccomp
 }}}
 just missing needed libs. But starting fails? (Sandbox) Caught a bad
 syscall attempt (syscall 289)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21989 [Core Tor/Tor]: Should we tell Exits to reject all traffic if DNS fails?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21989: Should we tell Exits to reject all traffic if DNS fails?
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  dns, tor-exit, reliability self- |  Actual Points:
  test   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 If i pass traffic to a
 {{{
  SocksPort IPv4Traffic IPv6Traffic OnionTraffic NoDNSRequest
 }}}
 user can expect still use this relay? they are still providing rare exit
 bandwidth. make use of it as far as possible?

 client needs somehow know, the exit cant resolve dns. so that it does not
 choose to attach a stream with hostname to it. just like it checks
 exitpolicy to see if it would with usually  Support connection target
 address:port

 it would be nice to mark this exit as BadDNS or something. to let client
 know, not to choose it while using hostname targets. but in any other
 case.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31084 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable gyroscope

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31084: Disable gyroscope
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 I think Fennec exposes this (possibly without a pref to control it).  It's
 conceivable the desktop browser might also.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #13694 [Core Tor/Tor]: Ship with native build instructions for windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13694: Ship with native build instructions for windows
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  win32, build, lorax tor-build-doc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26376 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 i use msys2 because i fail  to building-tor-msvc

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28673 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make private_nets aware of Carrier Grade NAT (RFC 6598)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28673: Make private_nets aware of Carrier Grade NAT (RFC 6598)
--+--
 Reporter:  neel  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 please stop RFC 6598 addresses also by reporting as "your ip" #30084 this
 will not work in a descriptor anyway

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31084 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable gyroscope

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31084: Disable gyroscope
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 #21609?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30999 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Spruce up the product pages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30999: Spruce up the product pages
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks good.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20212 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor can be forced to open too many circuits by embedding .onion resources

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20212: Tor can be forced to open too many circuits by embedding .onion 
resources
-+-
 Reporter:  gacar|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  guard-discovery, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201803, 034-roadmap-proposed,|
  security, tor-hs   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:19 cypherpunks]:
 > since dosmitigtion system, with this happening, dosmitigtion will make
 your clientip unuseable for your guard for atleast one hour.
 IMHO the naive dos mitigation should be disabled since the DDOS stopped.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30999 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Spruce up the product pages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30999: Spruce up the product pages
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 BTW can you guys publish it to the Android addons section in AMO as well?
 https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/android/search/?q=snowflake I guess it
 will work on Firefox for Android without any problems, isn't it?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30549 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add script to remove expired sub-keys from a keyring file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30549: Add script to remove expired sub-keys from a keyring file
+--
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201907R, tbb-rbm  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30548  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  reopened => needs_review
 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201907, tbb-rbm => TorBrowserTeam201907R, tbb-
   rbm


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:13 boklm]:
 > I think we should update the script to keep the keyring in the old
 format, to keep compatibility with older versions of gpg.

 There is a patch fixing this in branch `bug_30549_v6`:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_30549_v6&id=cd6555af118fa06a30d54a491618b50c5d463c5d

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31067 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Warn the user when WebRTC is detected as being disabled in the browser in the Snowflake WebExtension

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31067: Warn the user when WebRTC is detected as being disabled in the browser 
in
the Snowflake WebExtension
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Wow this is a lot cleaner, thanks for doing this. It looks good to me!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31072 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: State clearly that the snowflake proxy only connects to a bridge and does not make outcoming traffic to the internet

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31072: State clearly that the snowflake proxy only connects to a bridge and 
does
not make outcoming traffic to the internet
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30999   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  new => needs_revision
 * parent:   => #30999


Comment:

 Putting this in needs_revision because of product page changes

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30548 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clean up keyring files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30548: Clean up keyring files
+--
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201907R, tbb-rbm  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905, tbb-rbm => TorBrowserTeam201907R, tbb-
   rbm
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 There is a patch doing some cleanup of the keyring files in branch
 `bug_30548_v2`:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_30548_v2&id=5a5a25f01d22d23308da66072f4d63f1cf6c3268

 This branch is based on the fixup patch for #30549, which is not merged
 yet.

 The diff from the output of `list-all-keyrings` is:

 {{{
 --- 1.txt   2019-07-05 19:32:49.84900 +0200
 +++ 2.txt   2019-07-05 19:32:41.7 +0200
 @@ -12,8 +12,8 @@
  uid [ unknown] Brad King
  uid [ unknown] Brad King 
  uid [ unknown] [jpeg image of size 4005]
 -sub   rsa4096/9C3A05C82A58B985 2010-02-16 [E] [expired: 2016-08-12]
 -sub   rsa4096/2D2CEF1034921684 2015-08-13 [S] [expired: 2016-08-12]
 +sub   rsa4096/9C3A05C82A58B985 2010-02-16 [E] [expires: 2019-08-12]
 +sub   rsa4096/2D2CEF1034921684 2015-08-13 [S] [expires: 2019-08-12]

  ./keyring/firefox.gpg
  -
 @@ -98,132 +98,48 @@

  ./keyring/tor.gpg
  -
 -pub   rsa4096/FE43009C4607B1FB 2016-09-21 [C] [expires: 2019-09-21]
 +pub   rsa4096/FE43009C4607B1FB 2016-09-21 [C] [expires: 2020-09-16]
2133BC600AB133E1D826D173FE43009C4607B1FB
  uid [ unknown] Nick Mathewson 
  uid [ unknown] Nick Mathewson 
  uid [ unknown] Nick Mathewson 
  uid [ unknown] Nick Mathewson 
 -sub   rsa4096/6AFEE6D49E92B601 2016-09-23 [S] [expired: 2018-09-23]
 -sub   rsa4096/91DDED0286AC8BFF 2016-09-23 [E] [expired: 2018-09-23]
 +sub   rsa4096/6AFEE6D49E92B601 2016-09-23 [S] [expires: 2020-09-16]
 +sub   rsa4096/91DDED0286AC8BFF 2016-09-23 [E] [expires: 2020-09-16]

  pub   rsa4096/C218525819F78451 2010-05-07 [SC]
F65CE37F04BA5B360AE6EE17C218525819F78451
  uid [ unknown] Roger Dingledine 
  uid [ unknown] Roger Dingledine 
  uid [ unknown] Roger Dingledine 
 -sub   rsa4096/F05501B4C931269D 2010-05-07 [E] [expired: 2011-05-07]
 -sub   rsa4096/900BD5E8BA694D6A 2011-04-26 [E] [expired: 2012-05-08]
 -sub   rsa4096/366705089B11185C 2012-05-02 [E] [expired: 2013-05-02]
 -sub   rsa4096/690234AC0DCC0FE1 2013-05-09 [E] [expired: 2014-05-09]
 -sub   rsa4096/BA4F93601E7DA77B 2014-06-02 [E] [expired: 2015-06-02]
 -sub   rsa4096/923513C6B0E5067D 2015-06-10 [E] [expired: 2016-06-09]
 -sub   rsa4096/505002551A604C9F 2016-06-09 [E] [expired: 2018-06-09]
 +sub   rsa4096/514465B3293BCA59 2019-06-14 [E] [expires: 2021-06-13]

  ./keyring/torbrowser.gpg
  
  pub   rsa4096/4E2C6E8793298290 2014-12-15 [C] [expires: 2020-08-24]
EF6E286DDA85EA2A4BA7DE684E2C6E8793298290
  uid [ unknown] Tor Browser Developers (signing key)
 
 -sub   rsa4096/2E1AC68ED40814E0 2014-12-15 [S] [expired: 2017-08-25]
 -sub   rsa4096/7017ADCEF65C2036 2014-12-15 [S] [expired: 2017-08-25]
 -sub   rsa4096/2D000988589839A3 2014-12-15 [S] [revoked: 2015-08-26]
 -sub   rsa4096/D1483FA6C3C07136 2016-08-24 [S] [expired: 2018-08-24]
  sub   rsa4096/EB774491D9FF06E2 2018-05-26 [S] [expires: 2020-09-12]

  ./keyring/torbutton.gpg
  ---
 -pub   dsa1024/1B0CA30CDDC6C0AD 2006-07-26 [SC]
 -  BECD90EDD1EE87367980ECF81B0CA30CDDC6C0AD
 -uid [ unknown] Mike Perry 
 -uid [ unknown] Mike Perry 
 -sub   elg4096/8DBC790AAF0A91D7 2006-07-26 [E]
 -
 -pub   rsa8192/29846B3C683686CC 2013-09-11 [SC]
 -  C963C21D63564E2B10BB335B29846B3C683686CC
 -uid [ unknown] Mike Perry 
 -uid [ unknown] Mike Perry (Regular use key)
 
 -uid [ unknown] Mike Perry (Regular use key)
 
 -uid [ unknown] Mike Perry 
 -sub   rsa4096/717F1F130E3A92E4 2013-09-11 [S] [expired: 2014-09-11]
 -sub   rsa4096/A3BD8153BC40FFA0 2013-09-11 [E] [expired: 2014-09-11]
 -sub   rsa4096/4102F895D2F1E186 2014-09-08 [S] [expired: 2015-09-08]
 -sub   rsa4096/6A98BF5993125AD5 2014-09-08 [E] [expired: 2015-09-08]
 -sub   rsa4096/E23BB32C0F129402 2015-09-07 [S] [expired: 2016-09-11]
 -sub   rsa4096/B0D1CB47ACC0A961 2015-09-07 [E] [expired: 2016-09-11]
 -
 -pub   rsa4

[tor-bugs] #31085 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Publish the Snowflake WebExtension on AMO for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31085: Publish the Snowflake WebExtension on AMO for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  snowflake-   |  Actual Points:
  webextension   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
 https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/android/

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28917 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Delete the proxy opt-in cookie, don't set it to 0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28917: Delete the proxy opt-in cookie, don't set it to 0
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27385   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * cc: cohosh, phw (added)
 * parent:   => #27385
 * owner:  (none) => cohosh


Comment:

 We refactored the proxy implementation in the process of adding a
 webextension (#23888, #30934). A part of this refactor was to not rely on
 the use of cookies for the webextension. We can probably just apply that
 refactor here, along with other changes to spruce up the look of the
 snowflake badge.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31086 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add instructions for adding new locales to the download page, in the ReleaseProcess documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31086: Add instructions for adding new locales to the download page, in the
ReleaseProcess documentation
--+
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
  |  TorBrowserTeam201907
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We should add instructions for adding a new Tor Browser locale to the
 download page, in the Tor Browser ReleaseProcess documentation.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31086 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add instructions for adding new locales to the download page, in the ReleaseProcess documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31086: Add instructions for adding new locales to the download page, in the
ReleaseProcess documentation
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201907  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * Attachment "0001-Bug-31086-Add-instructions-for-adding-new-locales-
 to.patch" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31086 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add instructions for adding new locales to the download page, in the ReleaseProcess documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31086: Add instructions for adding new locales to the download page, in the
ReleaseProcess documentation
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201907R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201907 => TorBrowserTeam201907R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 I attached a patch adding instructions for adding new locales to the
 download page.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28917 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Delete the proxy opt-in cookie, don't set it to 0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28917: Delete the proxy opt-in cookie, don't set it to 0
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27385   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:2 cohosh]:
 > We refactored the proxy implementation in the process of adding a
 webextension (#23888, #30934). A part of this refactor was to not rely on
 the use of cookies for the webextension. We can probably just apply that
 refactor here,

 The original idea behind the badge (and why it's called a "badge") was
 that would be an unobtrusive iframe posted on various web pages that you
 would just activate incidentally while browsing. In that model, I don't
 see how you can dispense with a cookie. You would have to click and
 reactivate something on every page the badge might be on.

 But I'm also fully prepared to believe that the many-sites "badge" model,
 while it may have made sense for the opt-out flash proxy, doesn't make
 sense for the opt-in Snowflake. The number of third-party sites hosting
 the Snowflake badge is approximately zero, and if you intersect that with
 the number of users who have (1) opted in and (2) are currently
 incidentally browsing one of those sites, the number is not even
 approximately zero. Therefore I don't think there's a problem with hosting
 a single web page with a toggle (and removing the iframe instructions),
 and instructing people to visit the page and click the toggle. Just
 pointing out that it's a change from how the system has been assumed to
 work until now.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28917 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Delete the proxy opt-in cookie, don't set it to 0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28917: Delete the proxy opt-in cookie, don't set it to 0
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27385   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:3 dcf]:
 > Replying to [comment:2 cohosh]:
 > > We refactored the proxy implementation in the process of adding a
 webextension (#23888, #30934). A part of this refactor was to not rely on
 the use of cookies for the webextension. We can probably just apply that
 refactor here,
 >
 > The original idea behind the badge (and why it's called a "badge") was
 that would be an unobtrusive iframe posted on various web pages that you
 would just activate incidentally while browsing. In that model, I don't
 see how you can dispense with a cookie. You would have to click and
 reactivate something on every page the badge might be on.
 >
 > But I'm also fully prepared to believe that the many-sites "badge"
 model, while it may have made sense for the opt-out flash proxy, doesn't
 make sense for the opt-in Snowflake. The number of third-party sites
 hosting the Snowflake badge is approximately zero, and if you intersect
 that with the number of users who have (1) opted in and (2) are currently
 incidentally browsing one of those sites, the number is not even
 approximately zero. Therefore I don't think there's a problem with hosting
 a single web page with a toggle (and removing the iframe instructions),
 and instructing people to visit the page and click the toggle. Just
 pointing out that it's a change from how the system has been assumed to
 work until now.

 Ah that explains a few things. I'm happy to leave the badge as a cookie-
 based "opt-in once for everywhere" way of participating in snowflake. I
 think the UI changes in #27384 would help users remain reasonably informed
 by their participation across various sites.

 Overall though, the webextension seems to have a lot more potential for
 longer-lived, more stable, and more informed user participation... do we
 even want to keep the badge around?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28917 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Delete the proxy opt-in cookie, don't set it to 0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28917: Delete the proxy opt-in cookie, don't set it to 0
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27385   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:4 cohosh]:
 > Ah that explains a few things. I'm happy to leave the badge as a cookie-
 based "opt-in once for everywhere" way of participating in snowflake. I
 think the UI changes in #27384 would help users remain reasonably informed
 by their participation across various sites.
 >
 > Overall though, the webextension seems to have a lot more potential for
 longer-lived, more stable, and more informed user participation... do we
 even want to keep the badge around?

 I think there's value in having a web page that people can visit to become
 a proxy without having to install an extension. The distributed-badge
 thing is comparatively much less useful. I agree that of the
 possibilities, the WebExtension has the most promise and should be
 prioritized.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28917 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Delete the proxy opt-in cookie, don't set it to 0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28917: Delete the proxy opt-in cookie, don't set it to 0
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27385   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:5 dcf]:
 > I think there's value in having a web page that people can visit to
 become a proxy without having to install an extension. The distributed-
 badge thing is comparatively much less useful. I agree that of the
 possibilities, the WebExtension has the most promise and should be
 prioritized.

 Okay after looking at this a bit, I'm not sure we can use `local.storage`
 outside of the extension context so we'll probably have to use cookies
 anyway. I'll see what I can do to apply the refactors that were used in
 the webextension implementation to the badge with the only difference
 being checking the cookies instead of storage.

 And then the next steps are:
 - UI overhaul of the badge (#27385) using the design decisions made in the
 webextension
 - UI overhaul of the [snowflake.torproject.org] site

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31067 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Warn the user when WebRTC is detected as being disabled in the browser in the Snowflake WebExtension

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31067: Warn the user when WebRTC is detected as being disabled in the browser 
in
the Snowflake WebExtension
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 > Wow this is a lot cleaner, thanks for doing this. It looks good to me!

 It went in as,
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/commit/?id=453bf0611cadfc9f85240d3424b04a638b4604f3

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30999 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Spruce up the product pages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30999: Spruce up the product pages
-+--
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  merge_ready => assigned


Comment:

 > Looks good.

 This went in as,
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/commit/?id=e6f9211d133f7d7bef3127421f7e8109365383fd

 > BTW can you guys publish it to the Android addons section in AMO as
 well?

 I guess you filed #31085 for that; we can discuss it there.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30999 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Spruce up the product pages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30999: Spruce up the product pages
-+--
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 Messed up the tag a bit and tagged it as webext-0.0.2 before updating
 manifest.json with the new version number -_-. Any way to fix this easily?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30999 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Spruce up the product pages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30999: Spruce up the product pages
-+--
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by arlolra):

 > Any way to fix this easily?

 In order to delete a tag you've already pushed you have a file a request
 against `Internal Services > Services - git`.  Not sure what kind of
 response time you'd get on that.

 Maybe just go for `webext-0.0.3`?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31085 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Publish the Snowflake WebExtension on AMO for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31085: Publish the Snowflake WebExtension on AMO for Android
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 IIRC this only involves changing a setting in the AMO page.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27503 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disabling accessibility on Windows breaks screen readers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27503: Disabling accessibility on Windows breaks screen readers
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201903, tbb-8.5,|
  TorBrowserTeam201907R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  boklm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Replying to [comment:94 gk]:
 > Okay, here is the status so far. I double-checked all the `widl` sources
 files and it seems only some debugging leftovers slipped into the `tor-
 browser-build` patch (not sure how, though):
 >

 Yeah sorry, I generated the patch from my working winedev3 branch rather
 than winedev2. I've committed a FIXUP patch to my tor-browser-build branch
 with the correct patch :

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/richard/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_27503&id=ce6bc2621c79c3a66cff6f91c0ac38854190e1b0

 And I've rebased my mingw-w64 tree with the correct winedev2 sources:

 https://github.com/pospeselr/mingw-w64/tree/bug_27503


 > Where is `0001-relocatable.patch` is coming from? Is that a custom patch
 you needed to write?

 0001-reloctable.patch lives in /mingw-w64/mingw-w64-tools/widl/patches/ .
 It is not applied at build time during the mingw build process, but is
 instead applied to the widl sources when the latest version is ported
 over, with the resulting patched sources committed to the mingw tree.

 > I still need to figure out what to do with the parser.tab.c,
 parser.tab.h, and parser.yy.c diff.

 Those are generated when building widl within wine.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31087 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: v0.0.3 is missing icons/

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31087: v0.0.3 is missing icons/
-+
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by arlolra):

 * keywords:  snowflake-webext => snowflake-webextension


Old description:

> It doesn't seem to be present in the xpi.

New description:

 It doesn't seem to be present in the xpi downloaded from AMO.

--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31087 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: v0.0.3 is missing icons/

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31087: v0.0.3 is missing icons/
-+--
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  snowflake-webext
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 It doesn't seem to be present in the xpi.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31087 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: v0.0.3 is missing icons/

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31087: v0.0.3 is missing icons/
-+
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by cohosh):

 Yep, didn't do `zip -r`. Working on fixing it...

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31087 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: v0.0.3 is missing icons/

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31087: v0.0.3 is missing icons/
-+
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by cohosh):

 Should be fixed now with version `0.0.4` for Mozilla, I'll need to wait
 until the Chrome extension is validated before editing it again. I
 probably made the same mistake there.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31087 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: v0.0.3 is missing icons/

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31087: v0.0.3 is missing icons/
-+
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by arlolra):

 > Should be fixed now with version 0.0.4 for Mozilla

 Yes, thanks :)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29607 [Core Tor/Tor]: 2019 Q1: Denial of service on v2 and v3 onion service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29607: 2019 Q1: Denial of service on v2 and v3 onion service
-+-
 Reporter:  pidgin   |  Owner:  pidgin
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-dos, network-team-   |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, security, 041-longterm, |
  041-deferred-20190530  |
Parent ID:  #2   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by rckthe):

 Replying to [comment:58 pidgin]:
 > Any updates on this problem ??

 Please confirm sam-*-*- discussed by WC is official?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28673 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make private_nets aware of Carrier Grade NAT (RFC 6598)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28673: Make private_nets aware of Carrier Grade NAT (RFC 6598)
--+--
 Reporter:  neel  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:2 cypherpunks]:
 > please stop RFC 6598 addresses also by reporting as "your ip" #30084
 this will not work in a descriptor anyway

 I think we did that in #28525. It should be in the latest 0.4.1 alpha and
 th3 latest 0.4.0.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28673 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make private_nets aware of Carrier Grade NAT (RFC 6598)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28673: Make private_nets aware of Carrier Grade NAT (RFC 6598)
--+--
 Reporter:  neel  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 my comment offtopic
 i have quick look over it, seems tor_addr_is_internal_
 
[https://github.com/neelchauhan/tor/blob/4aa3490fc9bec0a71bb25e3590cd44c2eec02118/src/lib/net/address.c#L246]
 handles it here already. can't see change for "reporting as "your ip"" but
 it makes it aware of the "new" 100.64/10.

 so this is not this issue.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs