Re: [tor-bugs] #18080 [Applications/Tor Browser]: CORS header 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin' missing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18080: CORS header 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin' missing
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website, ff60-esr- |  Actual Points:
  will-have  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521953

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25598 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Let the broker inform proxies how often to poll

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25598: Let the broker inform proxies how often to poll
-+
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  starter  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by serna):

 I can do this.
 \\

 > The broker could instead tell each proxy how long to wait before polling
 again. The broker could even dynamically adjust the rate based on an
 estimate of supply and demand.
 \\
 What information would you use to determine the time dynamically? I was
 thinking in using {{{clientDeniedCount}}} and {{{proxyIdleCount}}} from
 the metrics but it resets every 24 hours which can be a bit misleading.
 \\

 > One way to do this would be a custom header in responses to /proxy
 requests:
 > {{{
 > Snowflake-Next-Poll: Thu, 22 Mar 2018 18:05:47 GMT
 > }}}
 > Or using a relative time offset:
 > {{{
 > Snowflake-Next-Poll: 600
 > }}}
 \\
 The second one seems like the best option. A timestamp can be confusing to
 read and would depend on the operating system clock which can be offset.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31430 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor is running in Task Manager but not opening

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31430: Tor is running in Task Manager but not opening
--+--
 Reporter:  SuryaDilip|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Thorin):

 What happens if you install Tor Browser to e.g. `C:/TorBrowser/`
 - ? https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/26381#comment:22

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[tor-bugs] #31440 [Applications/Tor Browser]: consider using Hardened Malloc for better security in TBB

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31440: consider using Hardened Malloc for better security in TBB
-+--
 Reporter:  adrelanos|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 Could Hardened Malloc be useful for better security?

 https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc

 In my experience, the developer of Hardened Malloc is very responsive.

 previous ticket:
 #10281

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[tor-bugs] #31439 [Metrics/Analysis]: Identify poorly performing relays from historical OnionPerf data

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31439: Identify poorly performing relays from historical OnionPerf data
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 This closes the loop on #31435 to help us validate that the poorly
 performing relays have indeed been excluded as we would hope, and then we
 can check that we're not excluding so much performance that it would
 degrade the experience for everyone.

 This task does not depend on #31435 however and can be progressed
 independently.

 Some questions to answer:

 1) Low hanging fruit: are there some trends we should be aware of before
 we dive into this data, for example are there some "peak hours" where
 things are slower, or do things get slower on weekdays/weekends.
 2) How much data do we have to look at to identify with some certainty
 that a relay is slow? (1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 1 year?)
 3) What is our metric for "poorly performing"?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31306 [Core Tor/Stem]: getinfo circuit-status misses entries

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31306: getinfo circuit-status misses entries
---+--
 Reporter:  blister_green  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.0.5
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  user disappeared
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => user disappeared


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[tor-bugs] #31438 [Metrics/Analysis]: Provide a Java application to exclude "impossible" paths from OnionPerf results given an alternate consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31438: Provide a Java application to exclude "impossible" paths from OnionPerf
results given an alternate consensus
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #31435
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Given an alternate consensus, exclude OnionPerf results that have paths
 that would not have been chosen by typical tor clients, e.g. a non-guard
 in the first hop.

 Ideally this application would also produce aggregate statistics from the
 remaining OnionPerf results in a way that is comparable to other subsets
 of the same data.

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[tor-bugs] #31437 [Metrics/Analysis]: Provide a tunable Java implementation of consensus generation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31437: Provide a tunable Java implementation of consensus generation
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #31435
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Using the latest consensus method, provide a tunable Java implementation
 for generating consensuses from votes.

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[tor-bugs] #31436 [Metrics/Analysis]: Provide a tunable Java implementation of vote generation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31436: Provide a tunable Java implementation of vote generation
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #31435
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 This would take server descriptors as input and synthesize a vote
 according to dir-spec, with tunables for all configurable parameters
 (including those not implemented in tor) and possibly with hooks for
 custom logic.

 Initial focus is on assignment of fast/guard flags but should later be
 extended to all flags.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31434 [Metrics/Library]: Write ANTLR parsers for dir-spec descriptors and benchmark

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31434: Write ANTLR parsers for dir-spec descriptors and benchmark
-+--
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31435   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by irl):

 * parent:   => #31435


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[tor-bugs] #31435 [Metrics]: Emulate different Fast/Guard cutoffs in historical consensuses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31435: Emulate different Fast/Guard cutoffs in historical consensuses
-+--
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 There are many things that we can tune in producing votes and consensuses
 that will affect the ways that clients use the network, that might result
 in better load balancing.

 We need tools for simulating what happens when we make those changes,
 using data (either historical or live) for the public Tor network.

 We can consider the MVP for this complete once we have a tool that allows
 us to take server descriptors and simulate votes and consensus generation
 using alternate Fast/Guard cutoffs.

 Extensions to this would be allowing alternative consensus methods, or
 other tunables.

 By reducing the cost of performing these simulations we can allow faster
 iteration on ideas that will hopefully allow for better user experience.

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[tor-bugs] #31434 [Metrics/Library]: Write ANTLR parsers for dir-spec descriptors and benchmark

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31434: Write ANTLR parsers for dir-spec descriptors and benchmark
-+--
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 We may need to reprocess large numbers of descriptors quickly in order to
 perform analysis of historical data. Using ANTLR for parsing may result in
 a more efficient solution than we currently have.

 1) Pick a descriptor type and write a grammar for it
 2) Benchmark the parser against metrics-lib's current parsers

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30827 [Core Tor/Stem]: Stem CI: remove 0.3.4 builds; add 0.4.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30827: Stem CI: remove 0.3.4 builds; add 0.4.1
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #30835 | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
---+---
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Hi teor, sorry about the long delay! Really wanted to finish my CollecTor
 branch first. :P

 Merged.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31315 [Core Tor/Stem]: Please update the fallback cache in stem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31315: Please update the fallback cache in stem
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Hi teor, cache refreshed as part of my recently merged CollecTor branch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31235 [Core Tor/Stem]: Shipping an sqlite database as a part of stem distribution is considered to be a backdoor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31235: Shipping an sqlite database as a part of stem distribution is 
considered to
be a backdoor
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  user disappeared
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => user disappeared


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[tor-bugs] #31433 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Non-blocking Jenkins hooks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31433: Non-blocking Jenkins hooks
-+
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 Hi lovely sysadmins! Today a 'git push' of mine hung for quite a while on
 a jenkins hook which eventually failed...

 {{{
 remote:  create mode 100644 test/unit/descriptor/data/collector/index.py
 remote:  create mode 100644
 test/unit/descriptor/data/collector/microdescs-2019-05-cropped.tar
 remote:  create mode 100644 test/unit/descriptor/data/collector/server-
 descriptors-2005-12-cropped.tar
 remote:  create mode 100644 test/unit/descriptor/data/compressed_bz2
 remote: == xx-jenkins-trigger ==
 remote: [hook[10397]] Triggering jenkins build for
 (https://git.torproject.org/stem.git, master,
 97c9a58eab40ce32256afbb02a4f8c6c84045bb1).

 remote: 
 remote: 
 remote: 502 Proxy Error
 remote: 
 remote: Proxy Error
 remote: The proxy server received an invalid
 remote: response from an upstream server.
 remote: The proxy server could not handle the request GET /git/notifyCommit.
 remote: Reason: Error reading from remote server
 remote: 
 remote: Apache Server at jenkins.torproject.org Port
 443
 remote: 
 remote: [hook[10397]] Jenkins triggers done.
 To ssh://torgit/stem.git
4357e54..97c9a58  master -> master
 }}}

 Is there a reason this hook cannot be a post-push background process? It
 seems like a mistake for it to cause developer pushes to hang.

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17979 [Core Tor/Stem]: CollecTor downloader module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17979: CollecTor downloader module
+-
 Reporter:  atagar  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem   |Version:
 Severity:  Major   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  descriptor project  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Finally done! Just launched.

 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-project/2019-August/002433.html
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=97c9a58

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29207 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: New design for broker -- proxy protocol for snowflakes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29207: New design for broker -- proxy protocol for snowflakes
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake, design, ex-sponsor-19,|  Actual Points:
  anti-censorship-roadmap|
Parent ID:   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-must
-+-

Comment (by serna):

 Replying to [comment:5 cohosh]:
 > As referenced in #29426, the broker currently gives proxies a 504
 message if no client is available which is a questionable design

 I suggest changing the status to 204 No Content, it would represent that
 there's no error but it also no one to connect to.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31100 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Firefox addon not reporting any users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31100: Firefox addon not reporting any users
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension anti- |  Actual Points:
  censorship-roadmap-august  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  dcf  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 I'd propose to revert this patch and make another release until #31385 is
 resolved (currently snowflake is basically unusable unless one ends up
 being hooked up with a Chrome WebExt user/proxy-go instance).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31432 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser do not start after update to 8.5.4

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31432: Tor Browser do not start after update to 8.5.4
--+--
 Reporter:  phplearner|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by phplearner):

 I am newbie to computer programming and NOT a native English speaker. So
 if there is any detailed needed to find the solution, please do not
 hesitate to ask me for and excuse me for poor English.

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[tor-bugs] #31432 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser do not start after update to 8.5.4

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31432: Tor Browser do not start after update to 8.5.4
--+--
 Reporter:  phplearner|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:  Tor: unspecified  |   Severity:  Critical
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 Some days ago, my tor Browser updated automatically to 8.5.4 version from
 its previous version. after that tor browser does not starts. I tried many
 guides from the web, but no success.
 I have had Tor Browser previous versions tar.xz file on my computer, I
 deleted 8.5.4 version folder and extracted previous version (5.5.2) and it
 worked properly.
 But after automatic update, it did not started again. So I deleted "tor-
 browser_en-US" folder and extracted it again from tor-browser-linux64-5.5
 .2_en-US.tar.xz file. But it did not started!!
 I have to use another previous version, i.e. 5.5.4, and after automatic
 update to 8.5.4 version it did not started again and I have to use another
 previous version, i.e. 6.0, so I disabled automatic update of tor to work
 around the problem. Who can find the reason of this problem and guide me
 to solve it?

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[tor-bugs] #31431 [Webpages/Support]: Update or deprecate verifying-signatures.html.en

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31431: Update or deprecate verifying-signatures.html.en
+--
 Reporter:  shrike  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  Webpages/Support
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 The documentation for verifying signatures located here -
 https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/verifying-signatures.html.en has not
 been updated to reflect the process required since the key was poisoned.
 The docs here - https://support.torproject.org/#how-to-verify-signature
 have been.

 Specifically the process for importing the key needs to be -
 `gpg --auto-key-locate nodefault,wkd --locate-keys
 torbrow...@torproject.org`
 `gpg --output ./tor.keyring --export
 0xEF6E286DDA85EA2A4BA7DE684E2C6E8793298290`

 and verifying the key -
 `gpg --fingerprint EF6E286DDA85EA2A4BA7DE684E2C6E8793298290`

 Alternatively the page should be a link to the currently accurate
 documentation.

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[tor-bugs] #31430 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor is running in Task Manager but not opening

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31430: Tor is running in Task Manager but not opening
--+--
 Reporter:  SuryaDilip|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:  Tor: unspecified  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 Tor Version - 8.5.4 win64-8.5.4_en-US
 OS Name - Microsoft Windows 10 Enterprise Insider Preview 10.0.18922

 After installing the tor browser opens and runs fine, when i close and
 reopen it will run in task manager but wont open.

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[tor-bugs] #31429 [Core Tor/Stem]: enhance _static/example/relay_connections.py field "Inbound to our ORPort"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31429: enhance _static/example/relay_connections.py field "Inbound to our 
ORPort"
-+---
 Reporter:  toralf   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Core Tor/Stem
  Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.4-rc  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
 would be cool if it could be divided further into 2 values: "from known
 relay" and "other"

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30910 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Warning when pushing to tor.git: "disabling bitmap writing, as some objects are not being packed."

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30910: Warning when pushing to tor.git: "disabling bitmap writing, as some 
objects
are not being packed."
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by emmapeel):

 I also it again in several branches of the translation git, as already
 stated at #28456

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30126 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make Tor Browser on macOS compatible with Apple's notarization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30126: Make Tor Browser on macOS compatible with Apple's notarization
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201908  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:32 mcs]:
 > Replying to [comment:31 gk]:
 > > Alright: mcs/brade how does:
 > >
 > > https://people.torproject.org/~gk/testbuilds/TorBrowser-tbb-nightly-
 30126_4-osx64_en-US.dmg
 > > https://people.torproject.org/~gk/testbuilds/TorBrowser-tbb-nightly-
 30126_4-osx64_en-US.dmg.asc
 >
 > That build fixes the problem with `tor.real`. With tor working, we could
 test further on macOS 10.9. Unfortunately, meek is not working. Trying to
 exec `meek-client-torbrowser` shows:
 > {{{
 >  dyld: Symbol not found: _unlinkat
 >   Referenced from: .../Tor
 Browser.app/Contents/MacOS/./Tor/PluggableTransports/meek-client-
 torbrowser
 >   Expected in: flat namespace
 > }}}
 >
 > According to the unlink/unlinkat man page on macOS 10.14, "The
 unlinkat() system call appeared in OS X 10.10."

 Okay, I am not convinced yet this is caused by the potential changes
 making notarization possible. mcs/brade: If I am reading your comments
 right, you did _not_ test whether `meek` as we ship it in 9.0a4 works on
 your 10.9 system? If so, could you do that just to be sure whether the
 above problem is actually a new bug caused by my patch?

 I suspect the underlying problem is a change in Go 1.12 where Go is
 starting to use `libSystem.dylib` etc. for syscalls:
 https://github.com/golang/go/issues/17490. But in that case we should hit
 the issue in our already existing bundles. (The mac-ports folks had to
 work around that e.g. in https://trac.macports.org/ticket/58138).

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[tor-bugs] #31428 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript doesn't work again on Windows 7

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31428: NoScript doesn't work again on Windows 7
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  noscript |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 https://www.sample-
 videos.com/video123/mp4/720/big_buck_bunny_720p_10mb.mp4

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