Re: [tor-bugs] #31506 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Write up comprehensive advice to "Tor unexpectedly exited", and link to it from inside Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31506: Write up comprehensive advice to "Tor unexpectedly exited", and link to 
it
from inside Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 My first step here, rather than asking the tor browser devs to become tech
 writers, is to ask the tor browser devs: what should users actually do in
 these situations? Like, imagine one of us is on Windows and has this
 problem: what has gone wrong? What should they do?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27284 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check IPv6 exit policies on microdescs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27284: Check IPv6 exit policies on microdescs
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consider-backport-after-042-stable,  |  Actual Points:
  029-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport,  |
  041-backport, 042-backport, ipv6,  |
  040-deferred-20190220, teor-   |
  unreached-2019-03-08   |
Parent ID:  #27248   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:16 neel]:
 > The statement `policy == NULL` exists because a pure `!policy` doesn't
 work (I believe it's a pointer) and fails the existing tests. It may also
 be a bug.
 >
 > I will add tests tomorrow and then set as needs review.

 policy == NULL  and !policy should be equivalent?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27284 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check IPv6 exit policies on microdescs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27284: Check IPv6 exit policies on microdescs
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consider-backport-after-042-stable,  |  Actual Points:
  029-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport,  |
  041-backport, 042-backport, ipv6,  |
  040-deferred-20190220, teor-   |
  unreached-2019-03-08   |
Parent ID:  #27248   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Nevermind, I have added tests as they were trivial. Setting as needs
 review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27284 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check IPv6 exit policies on microdescs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27284: Check IPv6 exit policies on microdescs
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consider-backport-after-042-stable,  |  Actual Points:
  029-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport,  |
  041-backport, 042-backport, ipv6,  |
  040-deferred-20190220, teor-   |
  unreached-2019-03-08   |
Parent ID:  #27248   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 The statement `policy == NULL` exists because a pure `!policy` doesn't
 work (I believe it's a pointer) and fails the existing tests. It may also
 be a bug.

 I will add tests tomorrow and then set as needs review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27284 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check IPv6 exit policies on microdescs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27284: Check IPv6 exit policies on microdescs
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consider-backport-after-042-stable,  |  Actual Points:
  029-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport,  |
  041-backport, 042-backport, ipv6,  |
  040-deferred-20190220, teor-   |
  unreached-2019-03-08   |
Parent ID:  #27248   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  ipv6, 040-deferred-20190220, teor-unreached-2019-03-08 =>
 consider-backport-after-042-stable, 029-backport, 035-backport,
 040-backport, 041-backport, 042-backport, ipv6, 040-deferred-20190220,
 teor-unreached-2019-03-08
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * version:   => Tor: 0.2.3.1-alpha
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.2.x-final


Comment:

 This code has bugs, and it has no unit tests.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27284 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check IPv6 exit policies on microdescs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27284: Check IPv6 exit policies on microdescs
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, 040-deferred-20190220, teor-   |  Actual Points:
  unreached-2019-03-08   |
Parent ID:  #27248   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Setting as needs review. PR is in Comment 13.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27284 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check IPv6 exit policies on microdescs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27284: Check IPv6 exit policies on microdescs
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, 040-deferred-20190220, teor-   |  Actual Points:
  unreached-2019-03-08   |
Parent ID:  #27248   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1261

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29211 [Core Tor/Tor]: Distribute config.c functionality across more modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29211: Distribute config.c functionality across more modules
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  23
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 I am collecting a list of tasks for future branches as child tickets of
 this ticket. They all start with the prefix "config refactor:".

 These tasks should not block reviews for any code that is already in
 commits or branches.

 But they should block reviews for any new commits.

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[tor-bugs] #31511 [Core Tor/Tor]: config refactor: split mass change commits into automated and manual steps

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31511: config refactor: split mass change commits into automated and manual 
steps
--+-
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #29211
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 In future, please split mass change commits into at least two commits:
 * automated changes using sed or coccinelle scripts
 * manual cleanup changes

 This does not block reviews for code that is already in commits or
 branches. But it should block reviews for any new commits.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31240 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make confparse able to handle multiple config_format_t objects at once

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31240: Make confparse able to handle multiple config_format_t objects at once
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:  3
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 On PR 1260, "make test-stem" passes all the tor tests, but fails due to
 bugs in stem that are unrelated to tor (#31510).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31509 [Core Tor/Tor]: config refactor: make test-stem should pass

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31509: config refactor: make test-stem should pass
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-must
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 On master, "make test-stem" passes all the tor tests, but fails due to
 bugs in stem that are unrelated to tor (#31510).

 On #31240, "make test-stem" passes all the tor tests, but fails due to
 bugs in stem that are unrelated to tor (#31510).

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[tor-bugs] #31510 [Core Tor/Stem]: Stem install test errors: cached_tor_manual and arm.* image

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31510: Stem install test errors: cached_tor_manual and arm.* image
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 {{{
   installation...  failed (0.00s)
 test_install [FAILURE]
 test_sdist   [FAILURE]

 ==
 FAIL: test_install
 --
 Traceback (most recent call last):
   File "/Users/base/stem/stem/util/test_tools.py", line 152, in 
 self.method = lambda test: self.result(test)  # method that can be
 mixed into TestCases
   File "/Users/base/stem/stem/util/test_tools.py", line 225, in result
 test.fail(self._result.msg)
 AssertionError: The following files were expected to be in our
 installation but weren't. Maybe our setup.py needs to be updated?

 stem/cached_tor_manual.cfg

 ==
 FAIL: test_sdist
 --
 Traceback (most recent call last):
   File "/Users/base/stem/stem/util/test_tools.py", line 152, in 
 self.method = lambda test: self.result(test)  # method that can be
 mixed into TestCases
   File "/Users/base/stem/stem/util/test_tools.py", line 225, in result
 test.fail(self._result.msg)
 AssertionError: Running 'python setup.py sdist' doesn't match our git
 contents in the following way. The manifest in our setup.py may need to be
 updated...

   * docs/_static/arm.png isn't expected in our release tarball
   * docs/_static/label/arm.png isn't expected in our release tarball
   * docs/_static/label/resources/arm.xcf isn't expected in our release
 tarball

 --
 Ran 2 tests in 0.000s

 FAILED (failures=2)
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31494 [Core Tor/Tor]: config refactoring: follow-ups from merged commits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31494: config refactoring: follow-ups from merged commits
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:7 teor]:
 > From #31495, also affects every other refactor ticket:
 >
 > Stem should check a lot of useful option combinations.
 > But the stem CI job is current set to allow_failure, because of #29437.
 > So we should check that the stem CI job passes, or fails due to a
 timeout.

 I created a separate ticket #31509.

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[tor-bugs] #31509 [Core Tor/Tor]: config refactor: make test-stem should pass

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31509: config refactor: make test-stem should pass
+-
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:  #29211
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-must  |
+-
 Stem should check a lot of useful option combinations.

 But the stem CI job is current set to allow_failure, because of #29437.

 So we should check that the stem CI job passes, or fails due to a timeout.
 Or we should run "make test-stem" manually on each PR.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29430 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use uTLS for meek TLS camouflage in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29430: Use uTLS for meek TLS camouflage in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  meek, utls, ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-  |  Actual Points:
  nightly, TorBrowserTeam201908  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:23 mcs]:
 > Replying to [comment:20 mcs]:
 > > Since things are broken in an ESR68-based Tor Browser without this (or
 #29430), I added our ff68-esr and tbb-9.0-must-nightly keywords to this
 ticket.
 >
 > I think I meant to refer to #29347 in the above comment.
 > Regardless, our approach for the ESR68-based Tor Browser is to switch to
 obfs4proxy's meek_lite.

 I'll go ahead and merge #29347 (port to WebExtension) then, since Tor
 Browser no longer depends on the the legacy add-on.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25598 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Let the broker inform proxies how often to poll

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25598: Let the broker inform proxies how often to poll
-+
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  starter  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by serna):

 Replying to [comment:6 dcf]:

 Thank you for the suggestions, since it's my first contribution I was
 missing out a lot of things.

 Will make the suggested changes!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31384 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: localize snowflake website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31384: localize snowflake website
-+-
 Reporter:  emmapeel |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  l10n, anti-censorship-roadmap-   |  Actual Points:
  september  |
Parent ID:  #30310   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28
-+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * keywords:  l10n, snowflake-webextension, anti-censorship-roadmap-
 september => l10n, anti-censorship-roadmap-september
 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 emmapeel]:
 > Please let me know if you can use them to provide a localized version of
 the webpage.

 I have some process-related questions.

 How do we know which language to use? In comment:2 you mentioned adding a
 menu to the page. I see such a menu at https://tb-manual.torproject.org/,
 defaulting(?) to English. Should we also look at the `Accept-Language`
 HTTP header (i.e., the user's in-browser configured language)? Do other
 Tor Project pages do that?

 What is the process for handling revisions to the source text? Will the
 translation.git repository periodically get a revised index.html, then
 make changes in that repository? Then we import those changes back into
 snowflake.git? Is there some way to notify each group about when updates
 are ready from the other side?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31494 [Core Tor/Tor]: config refactoring: follow-ups from merged commits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31494: config refactoring: follow-ups from merged commits
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 From #31495, also affects every other refactor ticket:

 Stem should check a lot of useful option combinations.
 But the stem CI job is current set to allow_failure, because of #29437.
 So we should check that the stem CI job passes, or fails due to a timeout.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31495 [Core Tor/Tor]: cannot configure bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31495: cannot configure bridges
--+
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:2 teor]:
 > I wonder how this bug got past our unit tests?
 >
 > We might have 100% test coverage, but there are obviously some tests
 missing.
 > How can we make sure that we aren't breaking other combinations of
 options?

 Stem should check a lot of useful option combinations.
 But the stem CI job is current set to allow_failure, because of #29437.
 So we should check that the stem CI job passes, or fails due to a timeout.

 I'll add this task to #31494.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31494 [Core Tor/Tor]: config refactoring: follow-ups from merged commits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31494: config refactoring: follow-ups from merged commits
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 From #30914, now a separate ticket #31508:
 * write a quick summary of each refactor before review
 * write a summary of the ideal state after all the refactors
   * since we're refactoring modules and types, we might need several ideal
 hierarchies

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31240 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make confparse able to handle multiple config_format_t objects at once

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31240: Make confparse able to handle multiple config_format_t objects at once
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:  3
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Here's what I think this change is doing to the config type hierarchy:

 Initial state:
 * config_format_t
   * (existing config types)

 Final state:
 * configuration manager
   * multiple config_format_t
 * (existing config types)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31285 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Browsers accumulate permanently open UDP sockets over time

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31285: Browsers accumulate permanently open UDP sockets over time
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by dcf):

 In Firefox, go to `about:networking#sockets` and see if the open sockets
 are listed there. Is it clear what they are used for / related to? I
 suppose it can only be ICE related.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31494 [Core Tor/Tor]: config refactoring: follow-ups from merged commits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31494: config refactoring: follow-ups from merged commits
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Move confparse.ch into lib/confmgt.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31288 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Add an option to be able to run the Snowflake WebExt as a background app in Chrome

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31288: Add an option to be able to run the Snowflake WebExt as a background 
app in
Chrome
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dcf):

 * type:  defect => enhancement


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[tor-bugs] #31508 [Core Tor/Tor]: config refactor: create simple summaries for each refactor step

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31508: config refactor: create simple summaries for each refactor step
---+-
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #29211
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+-
 It would be helpful to have a quick summary showing the ideal state, and
 where we are in the refactor.

 For example, the #30914 original state was:
 * confparse
   * typed_var

 And the final state was:
 * confparse
   * struct_var
 * typed_var

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31495 [Core Tor/Tor]: cannot configure bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31495: cannot configure bridges
--+
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 I wonder how this bug got past our unit tests?

 We might have 100% test coverage, but there are obviously some tests
 missing.
 How can we make sure that we aren't breaking other combinations of
 options?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31494 [Core Tor/Tor]: config refactoring: follow-ups from merged commits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31494: config refactoring: follow-ups from merged commits
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 At the higher level, we could use is_derived() rather than is_contained().

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27284 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check IPv6 exit policies on microdescs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27284: Check IPv6 exit policies on microdescs
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, 040-deferred-20190220, teor-   |  Actual Points:
  unreached-2019-03-08   |
Parent ID:  #27248   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * owner:  (none) => neel


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27284 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check IPv6 exit policies on microdescs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27284: Check IPv6 exit policies on microdescs
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, 040-deferred-20190220, teor-   |  Actual Points:
  unreached-2019-03-08   |
Parent ID:  #27248   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * cc: neel (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25598 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Let the broker inform proxies how often to poll

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25598: Let the broker inform proxies how often to poll
-+
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  starter  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  new => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:5 serna]:
 > Here's how it would work with a hardcoded 20sec poll rate:
 https://github.com/BubuAnabelas/snowflake/pull/1

 Thanks for this patch.

 https://github.com/BubuAnabelas/snowflake/pull/1/files#diff-
 ba4bd8a4477426567c409d66c2cf8a28R175-R176

 {{{
 +   nextPoll, _ := strconv.Atoi(resp.Header.Get
 ("Snowflake-Next-Poll"))
 +   pollInterval = time.Duration(nextPoll) *
 time.Second
 }}}

 The `Atoi` needs an error check. Otherwise a parse error or missing header
 may return a value of 0 and make the proxy start trying to DoS the broker
 :)

 There should also be a safety minimum, so the proxy will not obey if the
 broker asks it to go ''too'' fast. Cf.
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/flashproxy.git/tree/proxy/flashproxy.js?id=0c5ea1b04c4725fccc5a98a25bede5c419e07fcd#n545
 the corresponding code in flashproxy].

 I propose factoring out a separate function that takes a `string` and
 returns a `time.Duration`. It parses the string and enforces a minimum. In
 case of a parse error, it returns a default.

 https://github.com/BubuAnabelas/snowflake/pull/1/files#diff-
 ba4bd8a4477426567c409d66c2cf8a28L29-R30

 {{{
 -const pollInterval = 5 * time.Second
 +var pollInterval = 20 * time.Second
 }}}

 Now that this is variable, it is better to limit its scope to the context
 in which it is used (not a global variable if possible). The constant
 default value can remain global.

 https://github.com/BubuAnabelas/snowflake/pull/1/files#diff-
 177f47700613253ab3ba906035e86714R49

 {{{
 snowflake.config.brokerPollInterval = xhr.getResponseHeader
 ('Snowflake-Next-Poll') * 1000 || snowflake.config.brokerPollInterval;
 }}}

 It looks like the check for a missing header needs to go before the
 multiplication by 1000, not after. Here too I recommend factoring out a
 function that checks the syntax and enforces a minimum. (Think of the
 proxy trying to defend itself from a malfunctioning broker.)

 It's better if the code doesn't modify things in the global `Config`
 object. The more you can localize the poll interval, the better.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28716 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create a mingw-w64-clang project

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28716: Create a mingw-w64-clang project
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-9.0-must-nightly,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201908R, GeorgKoppen201908   |
Parent ID:  #28238   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-9.0-must-nightly, TorBrowserTeam201908,
 GeorgKoppen201908 =>
 tbb-rbm, tbb-9.0-must-nightly, TorBrowserTeam201908R,
 GeorgKoppen201908
 * priority:  High => Very High


Comment:

 Okay, I updated the toolchain to something close we'll get with ESR68. The
 result is up for review in `bug_28716_v11`
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/log/?h=bug_28716_v11). It contains two commits, one for the
 toolchain (dd62fd43af8f9a49135e600708dd2ee7f7c3d9aa) and one for the first
 reproducible builds issue we fixed
 (b81028c143cb5f869d20a267730a334155737063). Please look for further
 details at the commit messages.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30935 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move variable definition code out of confparse.c, and refactor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30935: Move variable definition code out of confparse.c, and refactor
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  dgoulet-merge asn-merge  |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => dgoulet-merge asn-merge


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:10 teor]:
 > That's fine, but let's try to avoid this process issue in future.

 Agreed; we need to not get so far ahead, and we need reviews to stay in
 step with coding.  FWIW, I have stopped working on new code for #29211
 while we catch up, so I hope that #31241 will be and #31242 will be the
 last queued-up branches.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31494 [Core Tor/Tor]: config refactoring: follow-ups from merged commits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31494: config refactoring: follow-ups from merged commits
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 From #30935:

   * Convert the "contained" flag to something more like "NOCOPY NOCHECK
 NODUMP".
   * Make the "invisible" flag more like "NODUMP NOREAD".
   * Make sure that all low-level flags are orthogonal.
   * Make sure that "invisible" vs "hidden" is more clear.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31494 [Core Tor/Tor]: config refactoring: follow-ups from merged commits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31494: config refactoring: follow-ups from merged commits
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * owner:  (none) => nickm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31240 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make confparse able to handle multiple config_format_t objects at once

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31240: Make confparse able to handle multiple config_format_t objects at once
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:  3
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I've made a fresh PR here as https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1260

 Until #30935 is merged, the best way to review this may be at
 https://github.com/nmathewson/tor/pull/3 , which is a PR for only the
 stuff that changed since #30935.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31507 [Core Tor/Tor]: Change the client default to AvoidDiskWrites 1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31507: Change the client default to AvoidDiskWrites 1
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  security-low, 042-should  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 Another approach here would be to tune the "delays before writing the file
 to disk", so that the default is good for the default situation, and the
 parameter set by AvoidDiskWrites is now much bigger.

 Looking through the code, here's what AvoidDiskWrites influences:

 * In save_transport_to_state(), where we've picked an addr:port to listen
 on for our pluggable transport (when we're being a bridge I guess), we
 schedule our state file for a checkpoint ("or_state_mark_dirty()") but
 only if AvoidDiskWrites is 0.

 * In circuit_build_times_add_time(), where we just got another data point
 in how long it takes to successfully build a circuit (used in tuning the
 circuit build timeout feature), we call or_state_mark_dirty() every 10
 circuits, but only if AvoidDiskWrites is 0.

 * Similarly in circuit_build_times_update_state(), we call
 or_state_mark_dirty() but only if AvoidDiskWrites is 0. This one seems
 redundant since we only call circuit_build_times_update_state() from
 or_state_save() with the comment near it "Call everything else that might
 dirty the state even more, in order to avoid redundant writes."

 * In entry_guards_changed_for_guard_selection(), when our entry guards
 list has changed, we schedule a flushing of the state file to disk for
 either "within 30 seconds" (default) or "within 10 minutes"
 (AvoidDiskWrites).

 * In entry_guards_update_state(), with the same story as
 circuit_build_times_update_state() above.

 * In accounting_record_bandwidth_usage(), where we checkpoint our
 accountingmax style bandwidth usage. It's called every 10 minutes or every
 20 megabytes (whichever comes first), plus also when we change hibernation
 state, and it schedules a flushing of the state file to disk for either
 "within one minute" (default) or "within two hours" (AvoidDiskWrites).

 * In hibernate_begin(), where either we began hibernation or somebody sent
 us a SIGINT signal to shut down, we schedule a flushing of the state file
 to disk for either "now" (default) or "within 10 minutes"
 (AvoidDiskWrites).

 * Same story (now or 10 minutes) in hibernate_go_dormant(), which happens
 when we hit our hard accountingmax and close all connections.

 * In rotate_onion_key(), if we just replaced our onion key, we write the
 new onion key to disk right then, and also we schedule a flushing of the
 state file to disk, for either "now" or "within an hour from now", to
 store the new value of state->LastRotatedOnionKey. Seems like that would
 be a sad one to lose, and it happens rarely, so the best fix would to
 uniformly pick "now".

 * In init_keys() at startup, if we just read the state file and
 LastRotatedOnionKey is 0 or in the past, we set it to now, and also
 schedule a flushing of the state file for "now" or "within an hour from
 now". Probably also a poor choice to wait here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31369 [Core Tor/Stem]: HSv3 descriptor support in stem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31369: HSv3 descriptor support in stem
-+---
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs onionbalance scaling  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
-+---

Comment (by atagar):

 Sounds great! I'd be happy to help, but patches to do the crypto would
 absolutely be appreciated. I gave signature verification a quick try
 yesterday but no dice. Tips welcome. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31476 [Core Tor/Tor]: Practracker: document new features

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31476: Practracker: document new features
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  practracker, tech-debt,  |  Actual Points:  .1
  refactoring, easy, 041-deferred-20190530,  |
  network-team-roadmap-july, dgoulet-merge   |
Parent ID:  #29746   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 (I took a quick  look: I see that the README finishes incomplete.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31369 [Core Tor/Stem]: HSv3 descriptor support in stem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31369: HSv3 descriptor support in stem
-+---
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs onionbalance scaling  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
-+---
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  implemented =>


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:1 atagar]:
 > Hi asn, [https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=6790035
 hidden service v3 descriptor support pushed]. It only includes the outer
 later, and does not validate signatures. If this doesn't do the trick for
 your use case please let me know. :)

 Wow atagar! This is great! I'm returning from camp tomorrow and I will be
 able to look at the code here.

 For onionbalance we will need to decode/encode also the inner-layer since
 that's where the introduction points are. We will also need to generate
 valid signatures, and I'm pretty sure we will also need to verify them
 (but I will double check to make sure).

 Are you interested in doing the above, or should I start doing them using
 your code as skeleton? I'm reopening the ticket for this reason, or I can
 make new one.

 Thanks again! :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31385 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Snowflake client fails after bootstrap

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31385: Snowflake client fails after bootstrap
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arlolra):

 > I added a fix for both of these comments to the same branch.

 Looks good

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[tor-bugs] #31507 [Core Tor/Tor]: Change the client default to AvoidDiskWrites 1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31507: Change the client default to AvoidDiskWrites 1
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  security-low, 042-should
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.2   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Since 2007, we've seen some significant technological changes:
 * More devices with batteries
 * More devices with SSDs
 * Better disk forensics techniques

 So it might be a good idea to change the client default to AvoidDiskWrites
 1.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31064 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Why is letterboxing enabled when viewing PDFs and with view-source:?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31064: Why is letterboxing enabled when viewing PDFs and with view-source:?
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Resizing on every banner update in a frame, many times on every add-on's
 menu opening, boring...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29430 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use uTLS for meek TLS camouflage in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29430: Use uTLS for meek TLS camouflage in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  meek, utls, ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-  |  Actual Points:
  nightly, TorBrowserTeam201908  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  meek, utls, ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-nightly,
 TorBrowserTeam201908R => meek, utls, ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-nightly,
 TorBrowserTeam201908
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Alright, this looks mostly good to me. However, it seems selecting `meek`
 breaks the circuit display now:
 {{{
 nodeData[i].ip is undefined tor-circuit-display.js:298
 updateCircuitDisplay chrome://torbutton/content/tor-circuit-
 display.js:298
 onLocationChange chrome://torbutton/content/tor-circuit-display.js:327
 callListeners chrome://browser/content/tabbrowser.js:841
 _callProgressListeners chrome://browser/content/tabbrowser.js:861
 _callProgressListeners chrome://browser/content/tabbrowser.js:5499
 onLocationChange chrome://browser/content/tabbrowser.js:5919
 _callProgressListeners
 resource://gre/modules/RemoteWebProgress.jsm:119
 onLocationChange resource://gre/modules/RemoteWebProgress.jsm:161
 receiveMessage resource://gre/modules/RemoteWebProgress.jsm:286
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29614 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use SHA-256 algorithm for Windows authenticode timestamping

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29614: Use SHA-256 algorithm for Windows authenticode timestamping
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, tbb-8.5,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201907, TorBrowserTeam201907|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 https://sourceforge.net/p/osslsigncode/patches/10/#98d2/d522

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23719 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure WebExtensions are spared from JIT disabling in higher security settings (Medium-High)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23719: Make sure WebExtensions are spared from JIT disabling in higher security
settings (Medium-High)
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-performance   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by tom):

 The wasm aspect of this work is happening in
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1576254

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18288 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Sign Tor Browser binaries on Windows (not just the setup executable)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18288: Sign Tor Browser binaries on Windows (not just the setup executable)
-+---
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  erinn
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, tbb-usability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 NSIS sign binaries on Linux, hrm...
 https://github.com/electron-userland/electron-
 builder/commit/17c0a821355ef717312dbd79dffe88f9ca217bee

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[tor-bugs] #31506 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Write up comprehensive advice to "Tor unexpectedly exited", and link to it from inside Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31506: Write up comprehensive advice to "Tor unexpectedly exited", and link to 
it
from inside Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 We've been getting a steady stream of people who fail to run Tor Browser,
 who get the "Tor unexpectedly exited" error and they have no ideas what to
 do.

 The internets are full of weird advices about what to do in this situation
 back in 2014, few of which apply now, so people hunting in google are
 unlikely to solve this on their own.

 I think the advice differs depending on the OS -- on Windows, the first
 step is about disabling antivirus and firewall; on OS X, the advice
 is...about finding the old tor process and killing it? Or something else?

 We should write up a comprehensive "what the error means, what to do, in
 what order" explanation, and stick it on support.torproject.org so people
 can find it and so we can point people to it. And then we should link to
 it from inside Tor Browser, when the thing goes wrong, so there is a
 canonical place for users to read what they should do.

 (And longer term, we should improve the automated handling of this error
 inside Tor Browser, but that can come later.)

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[tor-bugs] #31505 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove "Show update history" button and contained history.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31505: Remove "Show update history" button and contained history.
+--
 Reporter:  cyperpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High   |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:  |   Severity:  Critical
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 Options - "Keep Tor Browser up to date for the best performance,
 stability, and security."

 Remove "Show update history" button and contained history.
 What is the point if this browser keep update history?!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31504 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31504: Disable
--+--
 Reporter:  cyperpunks|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cyperpunks):

 Ugh forgot to edit title

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[tor-bugs] #31504 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31504: Disable
+--
 Reporter:  cyperpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate   |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:  |   Severity:  Critical
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 about:preferences#general - "Choose your preferred language for displaying
 pages"

 There's a checkbox "Request English versions of web pages for enhanced
 privacy".

 If you select it the language field become en-US,en while other Tor user
 have en,en-US. This makes this person unique than other users.

 So please remove this option or force every Tor Browser user share same
 value.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31503 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Hello, currently, in China, I can't open any webpage in 9.0a4 version Tor browser through snowflake bridge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31503: Hello, currently, in China, I can't open any webpage in 9.0a4 version 
Tor
browser through snowflake bridge
-+
 Reporter:  amiableclarity2011   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 This is currently due to #31385, my advice would be to wait until it gets
 fixed and then you can try again. (For what it's worth I'm not even in
 China and snowflake doesn't work/stalls after some point)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29415 [Internal Services/Service - nextcloud]: Evaluating NextCloud as replacement for Sandstorm and SVN

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29415: Evaluating NextCloud as replacement for Sandstorm and SVN
-+-
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service -  |Version:
  nextcloud  |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Hey folks! They know about you! Do you know about them?
 https://github.com/xwiki-labs/cryptpad

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31503 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Hello, currently, in China, I can't open any webpage in 9.0a4 version Tor browser through snowflake bridge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31503: Hello, currently, in China, I can't open any webpage in 9.0a4 version 
Tor
browser through snowflake bridge
-+
 Reporter:  amiableclarity2011   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by amiableclarity2011):

 I also upload my cached-descriptors file.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31503 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Hello, currently, in China, I can't open any webpage in 9.0a4 version Tor browser through snowflake bridge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31503: Hello, currently, in China, I can't open any webpage in 9.0a4 version 
Tor
browser through snowflake bridge
-+
 Reporter:  amiableclarity2011   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by amiableclarity2011):

 * Attachment "cached-descriptors" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31503 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Hello, currently, in China, I can't open any webpage in 9.0a4 version Tor browser through snowflake bridge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31503: Hello, currently, in China, I can't open any webpage in 9.0a4 version 
Tor
browser through snowflake bridge
-+
 Reporter:  amiableclarity2011   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by amiableclarity2011):

 * Attachment "state" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31503 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Hello, currently, in China, I can't open any webpage in 9.0a4 version Tor browser through snowflake bridge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31503: Hello, currently, in China, I can't open any webpage in 9.0a4 version 
Tor
browser through snowflake bridge
-+
 Reporter:  amiableclarity2011   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by amiableclarity2011):

 * Attachment "torrc" added.


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[tor-bugs] #31503 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Hello, currently, in China, I can't open any webpage in 9.0a4 version Tor browser through snowflake bridge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31503: Hello, currently, in China, I can't open any webpage in 9.0a4 version 
Tor
browser through snowflake bridge
+-
 Reporter:  amiableclarity2011  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
 Hello, currently, in China, I can't open any webpage in 9.0a4 version Tor
 browser through snowflake bridge. I can connect to Tor network through
 snowflake bridge. But I can't open any webpage in 9.0a4 version Tor
 browser. I upload my torrc-defaults file, my torrc file and my state file.
 Thank you so much for your help. I really appreciate it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31503 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Hello, currently, in China, I can't open any webpage in 9.0a4 version Tor browser through snowflake bridge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31503: Hello, currently, in China, I can't open any webpage in 9.0a4 version 
Tor
browser through snowflake bridge
-+
 Reporter:  amiableclarity2011   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by amiableclarity2011):

 * Attachment "torrc-defaults" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31380 [Applications/Tor Browser]: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6: version `CXXABI_1.3.11' not found (required by ./TorBrowser/Tor/PluggableTransports/snowflake-client)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31380: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6: version `CXXABI_1.3.11' not 
found
(required by ./TorBrowser/Tor/PluggableTransports/snowflake-client)
--+---
 Reporter:  xhdix |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake, tbb-rbm|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by xhdix):

 I installed it with `debian-9.8.0-amd64-netinst.iso`.


 {{{
 $ cat /etc/debian_version
 9.9
 $ uname -a
 Linux oonimk 4.9.0-9-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 4.9.168-1+deb9u4 (2019-07-19)
 x86_64 GNU/Linux
 $ dpkg -s libstdc++6 | grep ^Version
 Version: 6.3.0-18+deb9u1
 $ Desktop/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/PluggableTransports/snowflake-client -h
 Desktop/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/PluggableTransports/snowflake-client:
 /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6: version `CXXABI_1.3.11' not
 found (required by Desktop/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/PluggableTransports
 /snowflake-client)
 }}}

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