Re: [tor-bugs] #30901 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add control port trace logging to tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30901: Add control port trace logging to tor
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes network-team-  |  Actual Points:  1.8
  roadmap-august |
Parent ID:  #29437   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => nickm


Comment:

 I started this branch based on #31854, assuming that it will merge as-is.
 (There was a small merge conflict between #31854 and master, which I have
 fixed.)

 Here is a revised design:

 1. Add a LD_SKIP_CB log flag, which skips callback loggers when sending
 the log message, and:
   a) rename other flags to avoid ambiguity
   b) write unit tests for all the log flags
 3. Implement a log_debug_control_trace() macro, which:
   a) uses the domain `LD_CONTROL|LD_SKIP_CB`
   b) escapes user-controlled data, and raw data from tor
   c) formats the trace log using a key="quoted value" grammar
   d) logs the trace message using log_debug()

 Here is my initial branch, at step 1. a)
 * master: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1386
 It also includes the commits from #31854.

 I'm looking for a design review at this stage.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31705 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add sufficient coccinelle tooling to run coccinelle without stress

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31705: Add sufficient coccinelle tooling to run coccinelle without stress
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-can   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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[tor-bugs] #31925 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Submit Request to Update Apktool For Buster

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31925: Submit Request to Update Apktool For Buster
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,
 Severity:  Normal   |  tbb-9.0-must-alpha,
 |  TorBrowserTeam201910
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #30324
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Need Apktool 2.4 for buster

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[tor-bugs] #31924 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Build to Use Buster

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31924: Update Build to Use Buster
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,
 Severity:  Normal   |  tbb-9.0-must-alpha,
 |  TorBrowserTeam201910
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #30324
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31920 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Resizing TorBrowser 9.0a7 to its smallest size and back causes the shield button to stop working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31920: Resizing TorBrowser 9.0a7 to its smallest size and back causes the 
shield
button to stop working
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Thorin):

 Its the width. I think I've seen before this in Firefox as well. If the
 button/icon moves into the overflow menu (its around the 400px mark), when
 you bring it back its popup action is broken - maybe Dão Gottwald at
 Mozilla has heard of this. I just tested FF Nightly with a uMatrix button
 and that worked just fine.

 PS: As soon as you open a new window, it fixes it for all windows.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31923 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix a typo in log.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31923: Fix a typo in log.c
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  comment-only  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:| Points:  0
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged directly to master, based on our comment typo merge policy.

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[tor-bugs] #31923 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix a typo in log.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31923: Fix a typo in log.c
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  comment-only
Actual Points:  0 |  Parent ID:
   Points:  0 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 log_fn_() says "calling functions" not "calling function".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31705 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add sufficient coccinelle tooling to run coccinelle without stress

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31705: Add sufficient coccinelle tooling to run coccinelle without stress
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-can   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 (Does this still belong in needs_revision?)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30860 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a chutney job that runs on macOS, so that IPv6 chutney tests work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30860: Add a chutney job that runs on macOS, so that IPv6 chutney tests work
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  CI, PTs, sponsor-28-maybe,   |  Actual Points:  1.0
  consider-backport-after-ci-passes, |
  029-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport,  |
  041-backport, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2,  |
  tor-ci, teor-backlog-ci,   |
  042-deferred-20190918  |
Parent ID:  #31851   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Here are the CI wallclock build time improvements, in minutes.

 || '''Release''' || '''Current Speed''' || '''PR Speed''' ||
 '''Improvement''' ||
 || 0.2.9 || 16 || 9 || 44% ||
 || 0.3.5 || 11 || 30 || 63% ||
 || 0.4.0 || 13 || 20 || 35% ||
 || 0.4.1 || 20 || 32 || 38% ||
 || master || 13 || 35 || 63% ||

 These times vary depending on server load, but they are clearly better.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31922 [Core Tor/Tor]: Recommend systemd

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31922: Recommend systemd
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-should, regression, doc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28993   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  Nusenu => teor
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31922 [Core Tor/Tor]: Recommend pkg-config when systemd fails (was: Recommend systemd)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31922: Recommend pkg-config when systemd fails
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-should, regression, doc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28993   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31922 [Core Tor/Tor]: Recommend systemd

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31922: Recommend systemd
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  Nusenu
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-should, regression, doc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28993   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * component:  Community/Relays => Core Tor/Tor


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28993 [Community/Relays]: Document pkg-config is required to compile tor with --enable-systemd on debian

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28993: Document pkg-config is required to compile tor with --enable-systemd on
debian
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  Nusenu
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Thanks, I split the Tor parts off in to #31922.

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[tor-bugs] #31922 [Community/Relays]: Recommend systemd

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31922: Recommend systemd
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  Nusenu
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:   |Version:  Tor: 0.4.0.1-alpha
  Community/Relays   |
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  042-should, regression, doc
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #28993
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We used to show an error like this when configure failed to find systemd:

 {{{
 configure: error: Package requirements (systemd >= 209) were not met:
 No package 'systemd' found
 Consider adjusting the PKG_CONFIG_PATH environment variable if you
 installed software in a non-standard prefix.
 Alternatively, you may set the environment variables SYSTEMD209_CFLAGS and
 SYSTEMD209_LIBS to avoid the need to call pkg-config. See the pkg-config
 man page for more details.
 }}}

 But now we don't:
 {{{
 checking for SYSTEMD... no
 configure: Okay, checking for systemd a different way...
 checking for SYSTEMD... no
 configure: error: Explicitly requested systemd support, but systemd not
 found
 }}}

 This issue also affects lzma, and any other package that requires pkg-
 config.

 In fact, lzma silently fails:

   ./configure --enable-lzma silently fails if pkg-config is not installed:
 ​  https://gitlab.com/eighthave/tor/pipelines/85811623

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28993 [Community/Relays]: Document pkg-config is required to compile tor with --enable-systemd on debian

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28993: Document pkg-config is required to compile tor with --enable-systemd on
debian
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  Nusenu
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  (none) => Nusenu
 * component:  Webpages => Community/Relays


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[tor-bugs] #31921 [Core Tor/Tor]: Wrap our Travis commands with travis_retry, to mitigate network timeouts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31921: Wrap our Travis commands with travis_retry, to mitigate network timeouts
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-rarely, 029-backport,
 Severity:  Normal   |  035-backport, 040-backport, 041-backport,
 |  042-backport
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.5  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 If we see a lot of timeouts, we should start putting travis_retry before
 all our network commands:
 https://docs.travis-ci.com/user/common-build-problems/#travis_retry

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31107 [Core Tor/Tor]: channel: channel_tls_handle_cell() CELL_VERSIONS code reached

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31107: channel: channel_tls_handle_cell() CELL_VERSIONS code reached
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.4.4-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, tor-channel 042-must  |  Actual Points:  .1
  consider-backport-after-0423 029-backport  |
  035-backport 040-backport 041-backport |
  BugSmashFund   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 tor-relay, tor-channel 042-must consider-backport-after-0433
 029-backport? 035-backport 040-backport 041-backport BugSmashFund
 =>
 tor-relay, tor-channel 042-must consider-backport-after-0423
 029-backport 035-backport 040-backport 041-backport BugSmashFund


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30916 [Core Tor/Tor]: assert in dimap_add_entry()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30916: assert in dimap_add_entry()
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.4.8-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash, 042-should consider-  |  Actual Points:  .1
  backport-after-0423 035-backport 040-backport  |
  041-backport BugSmashFund  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 crash, 042-should consider-backport-after-0433 035-backport
 040-backport 041-backport BugSmashFund
 =>
 crash, 042-should consider-backport-after-0423 035-backport
 040-backport 041-backport BugSmashFund


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30917 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add instructions for making a new maint branch to EndOfLifeTor.md, and rename the file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30917: Add instructions for making a new maint branch to EndOfLifeTor.md, and
rename the file
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-should, sponsor31-maybe, |  Actual Points:
  network-team-roadmap-september |
Parent ID:  #30839   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * type:  defect => enhancement


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30917 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add instructions for making a new maint branch to EndOfLifeTor.md, and rename the file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30917: Add instructions for making a new maint branch to EndOfLifeTor.md, and
rename the file
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-should, sponsor31-maybe, |  Actual Points:
  network-team-roadmap-september |
Parent ID:  #30839   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final => Tor: 0.4.2.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30745 [Core Tor/Tor]: Document disabled CI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30745: Document disabled CI
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-can process network-team-|  Actual Points:
  roadmap?   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * type:  defect => enhancement
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final => Tor: 0.4.2.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22893 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Make intro point per-service and not per-descriptor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22893: prop224: Make intro point per-service and not per-descriptor
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-september,  |  Actual Points:
  tor-hs, prop224-extra, 034-triage-20180328,|
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:  #29995   | Points:  7
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31920 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Resizing TorBrowser 9.0a7 to its smallest size and back causes the shield button to stop working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31920: Resizing TorBrowser 9.0a7 to its smallest size and back causes the 
shield
button to stop working
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 Video showing the bug occur. https://streamable.com/tw3pc

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30745 [Core Tor/Tor]: Document disabled CI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30745: Document disabled CI
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-can process network-team-|  Actual Points:
  roadmap?   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  041-can process => 041-can process network-team-roadmap?


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[tor-bugs] #31920 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Resizing TorBrowser 9.0a7 to its smallest size and back causes the shield button to stop working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31920: Resizing TorBrowser 9.0a7 to its smallest size and back causes the 
shield
button to stop working
---+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version: |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
 If I resize TorBrowser 9.0a7 to its smallest size and back to its original
 size, this causes the shield button to do nothing when clicked on. I made
 a video showing the bug occur.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31705 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add sufficient coccinelle tooling to run coccinelle without stress

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31705: Add sufficient coccinelle tooling to run coccinelle without stress
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-can   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by teor):

 The make check is now #31919

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[tor-bugs] #31919 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a check-local target that runs our coccinelle parsing problems script

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31919: Add a check-local target that runs our coccinelle parsing problems 
script
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  042-can
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #31705
   Points:  0.5   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 In #31705, we add a script that detects coccinelle parsing problems. We
 should run it when we run "make check", if coccinelle is installed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30991 [Core Tor/Tor]: Auto-tabify makefiles? complain about mistabbed makefiles?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30991: Auto-tabify makefiles? complain about mistabbed makefiles?
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-can   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31713| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:   => #31713


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30860 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a chutney job that runs on macOS, so that IPv6 chutney tests work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30860: Add a chutney job that runs on macOS, so that IPv6 chutney tests work
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  CI, PTs, sponsor-28-maybe,   |  Actual Points:  1.0
  consider-backport-after-ci-passes, |
  029-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport,  |
  041-backport, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2,  |
  tor-ci, teor-backlog-ci,   |
  042-deferred-20190918  |
Parent ID:  #31851   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 CI, PTs, sponsor-28-maybe, 029-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport,
 network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, tor-ci, teor-backlog-ci,
 042-deferred-20190918
 =>
 CI, PTs, sponsor-28-maybe, consider-backport-after-ci-passes,
 029-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport, 041-backport, network-team-
 roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, tor-ci, teor-backlog-ci, 042-deferred-20190918
 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * actualpoints:  0.4 => 1.0


Comment:

 Please review my PRs:
 * 0.2.9: ​https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1369
 * 0.3.5: ​https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1370
 * 0.4.1: ​https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1372
 * master: ​https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1373

 Clean merges - testing only:
 * 0.4.0: ​https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1371

 macOS chutney and Rust are really slow, so I use fast_finish and
 allow_failure to let the job finish before they are done. Unfortunately,
 that means we don't see failures for those jobs in the build summary or
 IRC notifications. But we have enough fast tests, so I expect failures to
 be rare.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29864 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: consider replacing nagios with prometheus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29864: consider replacing nagios with prometheus
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 the magic formula is, according to @bbrazil on #prometheus:

 {{{
 avg_over_time(up{job="node"}[7d])
 }}}

 [[Image(https://paste.anarc.at/publish/2019-08-19-VRTQYG6TD1s/magic.gif)]]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31898 [Core Tor/Tor]: Occasional crash during shutdown when using Tor API

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31898: Occasional crash during shutdown when using Tor API
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash, 042-must 041-backport |  Actual Points:  .3
  consider-backport-after-0423, 041-regression   |
  asn-merge  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:
 crash, 042-must 041-backport consider-backport-after-0423,
 041-regression
 =>
 crash, 042-must 041-backport consider-backport-after-0423,
 041-regression asn-merge


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31918 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase and squash mobile/android patches into desktop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31918: Rebase and squash mobile/android patches into desktop
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Making a note here:
 `ed7faf1c2b88cd025596151f2ad97892891965a4` contains:
 {{{
 diff --git a/toolkit/modules/AppConstants.jsm
 b/toolkit/modules/AppConstants.jsm
 index 109f1f94e3d3..bc679fb6f9f0 100644
 --- a/toolkit/modules/AppConstants.jsm
 +++ b/toolkit/modules/AppConstants.jsm
 @@ -387,4 +387,11 @@ this.AppConstants = Object.freeze({
  #else
  false,
  #endif
 +
 +  TOR_BROWSER_UPDATE:
 +#ifdef TOR_BROWSER_UPDATE
 +true,
 +#else
 +false,
 +#endif
 }}}

 But `TOR_BROWSER_UPDATE` is used earlier in
 `14df73ecfdd88db89f196cecfb934dab7e552969`. We should move this code block
 into the earlier patch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31898 [Core Tor/Tor]: Occasional crash during shutdown when using Tor API

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31898: Occasional crash during shutdown when using Tor API
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash, 042-must 041-backport |  Actual Points:  .3
  consider-backport-after-0423, 041-regression   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  crash, 042-must 041-backport 041-regression =>
 crash, 042-must 041-backport consider-backport-after-0423,
 041-regression
 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * version:  Tor: 0.4.2.1-alpha => Tor: 0.4.1.1-alpha
 * reviewer:   => teor


Comment:

 Looks fine to me.

 The actual fix is small, this PR is mostly tests and test refactoring.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31078 [Core Tor/Tor]: improve docs for config var abstraction

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31078: improve docs for config var abstraction
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-should|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by teor):

 I am happy moving forward with the architecture and documentation as you
 describe.

 I have some opinions about naming. Naming is hard. There are lots of good
 options. And different people may prefer different options.

 We are parsing a config. I wonder if it would help to use standard parsing
 jargon.

 Replying to [comment:8 nickm]:
 >
 > On renaming:
 >
 > typed_var_t could be "c data", a "c object", an "encodeable", a
 "manipulatable".

 This isn't quite a token, because it has a type.
 But it's also doesn't quite feel like a variable, because it can be part
 of a config option's value (rather than the entire value).
 It's implemented as a string and its (possibly binary) equivalent.

 I'd like to consider "field" or "element" or some other term here.
 If there's another appropriate word from parsing, codecs, or protocol
 design, I'd happily use that.

 > struct_member_t could probably become an implementation detail of
 config_var_t.

 +1

 > config_var_t could be an "option", "field", "setting", "member",
 "entry".

 option is the term we use in the rest of the code, so let's stick with
 that, unless you think it will cause confusion.

 > var_type_def_t could be "encoder", "encoding", "codec", "manipulator",
 "manip".

 I think "codec" is close, but it's usually used for binary.
 We're doing serialisation and deserialisation to text - is there a more
 precise term?
 How about "format"?

 > Do any of these sound like good changes?
 >
 > ''Edited to add: left to my own devices, I would rename typed_var to
 c_data, make struct_member more hidden, leave var_type_def alone or rename
 it to c_cfg_codec, and leave config_var alone or rename it to
 cfg_option.''

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29864 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: consider replacing nagios with prometheus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29864: consider replacing nagios with prometheus
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 one thing i couldn't figure out what to do with prometheus so far is the
 "availability report" from nagios, which shows which percentage of time
 hosts are available over a given period. i was able to use:

 {{{
 sum(count(up==1))/sum(count(up)) by (alias)
 }}}

 which shows which percentage '''of hosts''' (not '''of time''') are
 available at each point in time. but it doesn't give me which percentage
 '''of time''' ''each'' host is available '''over the entire period'''.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31405 [Community/Mirrors]: Download links of Tor mirrors should not point to torproject.org domain

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31405: Download links of Tor mirrors should not point to torproject.org domain
---+
 Reporter:  anadahz|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Mirrors  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by ggus):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Main mirrors like tor.eff.org are working again. Thanks, Hiro!

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[tor-bugs] #31918 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase and squash mobile/android patches into desktop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31918: Rebase and squash mobile/android patches into desktop
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 The patches for `mobile/android` are separate from the patches for
 desktop. Some of these patches are similar, such as adding a mozconfig and
 overriding prefs. Now that Android is a first-class supported platform, we
 can squash some of these patches so we reduce the number of patches we
 need carry on top of Firefox.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31881 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Enabling bundled fonts does not work anymore on Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31881: Enabling bundled fonts does not work anymore on Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must- |  Actual Points:
  alpha, TorBrowserTeam201910R   |
Parent ID:  #30324   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Done. #31917

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31917 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Investigate shipping bundled fonts on Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31917: Investigate shipping bundled fonts on Android
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18097| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Copying from ticket:31881#comment:1
 > It seems like we should take note of
 [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=998844#c8 comment 8]:
 > {{{
 > This is already possible on Android and Firefox OS, where font files in
 the "font"
 > sub-dir of a profile are loaded on startup:
 > http://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-
 central/source/gfx/thebes/gfxFT2FontList.cpp#1266
 > }}}
 >
 > [https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-
 central/source/gfx/thebes/gfxFT2FontList.cpp#1115
 gfxFT2FontList::FindFontsInOmnijar] is a slightly more helpful function
 (from FF32). This was implemented in
 [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=878674 Bug 878674].
 >
 > This is the current location: https://searchfox.org/mozilla-
 esr68/source/gfx/thebes/gfxFT2FontList.cpp#1079
 >
 > {{{
 >   static const char* sJarSearchPaths[] = {
 >   "res/fonts/*.ttf$",
 >   };
 >   RefPtr reader = Omnijar::GetReader(Omnijar::Type::GRE);
 >   for (unsigned i = 0; i < ArrayLength(sJarSearchPaths); i++) {
 > nsZipFind* find;
 > if (NS_SUCCEEDED(reader->FindInit(sJarSearchPaths[i], ))) {
 >   const char* path;
 >   uint16_t len;
 >   while (NS_SUCCEEDED(find->FindNext(, ))) {
 > nsCString entryName(path, len);
 > AppendFacesFromOmnijarEntry(reader, entryName, aCache,
 jarChanged);
 >   }
 >   delete find;
 > }
 >   }
 > }}}

 We can use this as a defense against font fingerprinting.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31244 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: long term prometheus metrics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31244: long term prometheus metrics
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 i originally thought of pushing this out faster to remove the load on the
 original prometheus server, but it seems the problem with that one is not
 necessarily due to load but more to network issues, see #31916 for
 details.

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[tor-bugs] #31917 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Investigate shipping bundled fonts on Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31917: Investigate shipping bundled fonts on Android
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #18097
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 In #31881 we found the correct method for shipping bundled fonts in Tor
 Browser on Android.

 1. Do we need to ship bundled fonts?
 1. Which fonts should be ship?
 1. How do these impact apk size?
 1. How does this impact language support?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31537 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: snowflake.tp.o could use a favicon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31537: snowflake.tp.o could use a favicon
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arlolra):

 > However, maybe it's worth adding a snowflake favicon to
 ​https://snowflake.torproject.org/embed.html that gets updated with state,
 similar to the extension's browserAction.setIcon, so that you can use a
 pinned tab in situations where installing an extension is not feasible.

 Here's a patch for that if you like the idea,
 
https://github.com/keroserene/snowflake/commit/621fc59dc6e7548420806dd29f1c4813e5e47009

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31916 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: reliability issues with hetzner-nbg1-01

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31916: reliability issues with hetzner-nbg1-01
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Description changed by anarcat:

Old description:

> The new Prometheus monitoring server (hetzner-nbg1-01.torproject.org) is
> seeing intermittent networking issues. It's proving very difficult to get
> reliable metrics out of it, in any case. From its perspective, random
> hosts blink in and out of existence unreliably, with almost *all* hosts
> (63 of the ~80 monitored) are affected over a period of a week. This
> leads me to believe the problem is not with *all* hosts, but with the
> monitoring server itself. The attached screenshot (tpo-overview.png)
> shows the randomness of the problem, as seen from hetzner-
> nbg1-01.torproject.org during the last 7 days.
>
> [[Image(tpo-overview.png​, 700)]]
>
> We have another monitoring server hosted in the Hetzner cloud (hetzner-
> hel1-01.torproject.org) which doesn't seem to suffer from the same
> problems. From its perspective, most hosts are healthy over the same
> period, with an average availability of 99.876% over all hosts, which
> includes at least one outlier at 88%. The other (nagios) monitoring
> server sees the new monitoring server with only a 99.728% availbility,
> with a total 30 minutes downtime over the last 7 days. Note that those
> statistics have a large margin of error as the Nagios checks are much
> less frequent than the Prometheus ones, with a granularity ranging in
> tens of minutes instead of seconds.
>
> The alert history graph (second attachment,  histogram.cgi-nbg1-01.png)
> shows more clearly the problem, especially when compared to a similar
> host in the vincinity (hetzner-nbg01-02, third attachement, histogram
> .cgi-nbg1-02.png).
>
> [[Image(histogram.cgi-nbg1-01.png​, 700)]]
> [[Image(histogram.cgi-nbg1-02.png​, 700)]]
>
> I would therefore conclude there is a severe and intermittent routing
> issue with this server.

New description:

 The new Prometheus monitoring server (hetzner-nbg1-01.torproject.org) is
 seeing intermittent networking issues. It's proving very difficult to get
 reliable metrics out of it, in any case. From its perspective, random
 hosts blink in and out of existence unreliably, with almost *all* hosts
 (63 of the ~80 monitored) are affected over a period of a week. This leads
 me to believe the problem is not with *all* hosts, but with the monitoring
 server itself. The attached screenshot (tpo-overview.png) shows the
 randomness of the problem, as seen from hetzner-nbg1-01.torproject.org
 during the last 7 days.

 [[Image(tpo-overview.png​, 700)]]

 We have another monitoring server hosted in the Hetzner cloud (hetzner-
 hel1-01.torproject.org) which doesn't seem to suffer from the same
 problems. From its perspective, most hosts are healthy over the same
 period, with an average availability of 99.876% over all hosts, which
 includes at least one outlier at 88%. The other (nagios) monitoring server
 sees the new monitoring server with only a 99.728% availbility, with a
 total 30 minutes downtime over the last 7 days. Note that those statistics
 have a large margin of error as the Nagios checks are much less frequent
 than the Prometheus ones, with a granularity ranging in tens of minutes
 instead of seconds.

 The alert history graph (second attachment,  histogram.cgi-nbg1-01.png)
 shows more clearly the problem, especially when compared to a similar host
 in the vincinity (hetzner-nbg01-02, third attachement, histogram.cgi-
 nbg1-02.png).

 [[Image(histogram.cgi-nbg1-01.png​, 700)]]
 [[Image(histogram.cgi-nbg1-02.png​, 700)]]

 I would therefore conclude there is a severe and intermittent routing
 issue with this server.

 I filed this as an issue in the Hetzner "cloud" web interface and am
 waiting for feedback.

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31916 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: reliability issues with hetzner-nbg1-01

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31916: reliability issues with hetzner-nbg1-01
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Description changed by anarcat:

Old description:

> The new Prometheus monitoring server (hetzner-nbg1-01.torproject.org) is
> seeing intermittent networking issues. It's proving very difficult to get
> reliable metrics out of it, in any case. From its perspective, random
> hosts blink in and out of existence unreliably, with almost *all* hosts
> (63 of the ~80 monitored) are affected over a period of a week. This
> leads me to believe the problem is not with *all* hosts, but with the
> monitoring server itself. The attached screenshot (tpo-overview.png)
> shows the randomness of the problem, as seen from hetzner-
> nbg1-01.torproject.org during the last 7 days.
>
> We have another monitoring server hosted in the Hetzner cloud (hetzner-
> hel1-01.torproject.org) which doesn't seem to suffer from the same
> problems. From its perspective, most hosts are healthy over the same
> period, with an average availability of 99.876% over all hosts, which
> includes at least one outlier at 88%. The other (nagios) monitoring
> server sees the new monitoring server with only a 99.728% availbility,
> with a total 30 minutes downtime over the last 7 days. Note that those
> statistics have a large margin of error as the Nagios checks are much
> less frequent than the Prometheus ones, with a granularity ranging in
> tens of minutes instead of seconds.
>
> The alert history graph (second attachment,  histogram.cgi-nbg1-01.png)
> shows more clearly the problem, especially when compared to a similar
> host in the vincinity (hetzner-nbg01-02, third attachement, histogram
> .cgi-nbg1-02.png).
>
> I would therefore conclude there is a severe and intermittent routing
> issue with this server.

New description:

 The new Prometheus monitoring server (hetzner-nbg1-01.torproject.org) is
 seeing intermittent networking issues. It's proving very difficult to get
 reliable metrics out of it, in any case. From its perspective, random
 hosts blink in and out of existence unreliably, with almost *all* hosts
 (63 of the ~80 monitored) are affected over a period of a week. This leads
 me to believe the problem is not with *all* hosts, but with the monitoring
 server itself. The attached screenshot (tpo-overview.png) shows the
 randomness of the problem, as seen from hetzner-nbg1-01.torproject.org
 during the last 7 days.

 [[Image(tpo-overview.png​, 700)]]

 We have another monitoring server hosted in the Hetzner cloud (hetzner-
 hel1-01.torproject.org) which doesn't seem to suffer from the same
 problems. From its perspective, most hosts are healthy over the same
 period, with an average availability of 99.876% over all hosts, which
 includes at least one outlier at 88%. The other (nagios) monitoring server
 sees the new monitoring server with only a 99.728% availbility, with a
 total 30 minutes downtime over the last 7 days. Note that those statistics
 have a large margin of error as the Nagios checks are much less frequent
 than the Prometheus ones, with a granularity ranging in tens of minutes
 instead of seconds.

 The alert history graph (second attachment,  histogram.cgi-nbg1-01.png)
 shows more clearly the problem, especially when compared to a similar host
 in the vincinity (hetzner-nbg01-02, third attachement, histogram.cgi-
 nbg1-02.png).

 [[Image(histogram.cgi-nbg1-01.png​, 700)]]
 [[Image(histogram.cgi-nbg1-02.png​, 700)]]

 I would therefore conclude there is a severe and intermittent routing
 issue with this server.

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31916 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: reliability issues with hetzner-nbg1-01

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31916: reliability issues with hetzner-nbg1-01
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * Attachment "tpo-overview.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31916 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: reliability issues with hetzner-nbg1-01

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31916: reliability issues with hetzner-nbg1-01
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * Attachment "histogram.cgi-nbg1-02.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31916 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: reliability issues with hetzner-nbg1-01

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31916: reliability issues with hetzner-nbg1-01
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * Attachment "histogram.cgi-nbg1-01.png" added.


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[tor-bugs] #31916 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: reliability issues with hetzner-nbg1-01

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31916: reliability issues with hetzner-nbg1-01
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin   |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Blocker  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 The new Prometheus monitoring server (hetzner-nbg1-01.torproject.org) is
 seeing intermittent networking issues. It's proving very difficult to get
 reliable metrics out of it, in any case. From its perspective, random
 hosts blink in and out of existence unreliably, with almost *all* hosts
 (63 of the ~80 monitored) are affected over a period of a week. This leads
 me to believe the problem is not with *all* hosts, but with the monitoring
 server itself. The attached screenshot (tpo-overview.png) shows the
 randomness of the problem, as seen from hetzner-nbg1-01.torproject.org
 during the last 7 days.

 We have another monitoring server hosted in the Hetzner cloud (hetzner-
 hel1-01.torproject.org) which doesn't seem to suffer from the same
 problems. From its perspective, most hosts are healthy over the same
 period, with an average availability of 99.876% over all hosts, which
 includes at least one outlier at 88%. The other (nagios) monitoring server
 sees the new monitoring server with only a 99.728% availbility, with a
 total 30 minutes downtime over the last 7 days. Note that those statistics
 have a large margin of error as the Nagios checks are much less frequent
 than the Prometheus ones, with a granularity ranging in tens of minutes
 instead of seconds.

 The alert history graph (second attachment,  histogram.cgi-nbg1-01.png)
 shows more clearly the problem, especially when compared to a similar host
 in the vincinity (hetzner-nbg01-02, third attachement, histogram.cgi-
 nbg1-02.png).

 I would therefore conclude there is a severe and intermittent routing
 issue with this server.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31915 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Uplift libvpx/libaom patch for cpu-features.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31915: Uplift libvpx/libaom patch for cpu-features.c
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201910  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile => tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201910


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31286 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Include bridge configuration into about:preferences

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31286: Include bridge configuration into about:preferences
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-must-alpha, ff68-esr, ux-|  Actual Points:
  team, TorBrowserTeam201910R|
Parent ID:  #10760   | Points:  15
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-

Comment (by acat):

 While I finish a first pass + testing: I think it would be good for new
 code to follow mozilla style rules. Especially since now it's quite easy
 to automatically fix these: `./mach lint -l eslint --fix
 browser/components/tornetworksettings browser/components/torstrings` (fix
 in #31914 is needed).

 There are still a few remaining errors that have to be fixed manually, but
 I think this should not be very difficult. Many should be solved with `/*
 import-globals-from [...].js */`, I think. Or trivial changes like
 `ChromeUtils.import("resource://gre/modules/XPCOMUtils.jsm"); -> const {
 XPCOMUtils } =
 ChromeUtils.import("resource://gre/modules/XPCOMUtils.jsm");`. Or adding a
 missing import.

 Unless there are some concerns, I plan to review the result of running the
 above style-fixing command but without fixing manual errors (this is the
 result for me: https://github.com/acatarineu/tor-
 browser/commits/bug_31286_review_eslint).

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[tor-bugs] #31915 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Uplift libvpx/libaom patch for cpu-features.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31915: Uplift libvpx/libaom patch for cpu-features.c
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 `cpu-features.c` from the Android NDK is included twice when webrtc is
 disabled.

 https://searchfox.org/mozilla-central/source/media/libaom/moz.build#92
 https://searchfox.org/mozilla-central/source/media/libvpx/moz.build#102

 This results in a build failure due to `multiple definitions`.

 {{{
 36:05.43 /home/android/.mozbuild/android-ndk-r15c/toolchains/arm-linux-
 androideabi-4.9/prebuilt/linux-x86_64/lib/gcc/arm-linux-androideabi/4.9.x
 /../../../../arm-linux-androideabi/bin/ld: error: /home/andr
 oid/tor-browser/obj-arm-linux-
 androideabi/toolkit/library/../../media/libaom/cpu-features.o: multiple
 definition of 'android_getCpuCount'
 36:05.43 /home/android/.mozbuild/android-ndk-r15c/toolchains/arm-linux-
 androideabi-4.9/prebuilt/linux-x86_64/lib/gcc/arm-linux-androideabi/4.9.x
 /../../../../arm-linux-androideabi/bin/ld: /home/android/tor
 -browser/obj-arm-linux-androideabi/toolkit/library/../../media/libvpx/cpu-
 features.o: previous definition here
 36:05.43 /home/android/.mozbuild/android-ndk-r15c/toolchains/arm-linux-
 androideabi-4.9/prebuilt/linux-x86_64/lib/gcc/arm-linux-androideabi/4.9.x
 /../../../../arm-linux-androideabi/bin/ld: error: /home/and$
 oid/tor-browser/obj-arm-linux-
 androideabi/toolkit/library/../../media/libaom/cpu-features.o: multiple
 definition of 'android_getCpuFamily'
 36:05.43 /home/android/.mozbuild/android-ndk-r15c/toolchains/arm-linux-
 androideabi-4.9/prebuilt/linux-x86_64/lib/gcc/arm-linux-androideabi/4.9.x
 /../../../../arm-linux-androideabi/bin/ld: /home/android/tor
 -browser/obj-arm-linux-androideabi/toolkit/library/../../media/libvpx/cpu-
 features.o: previous definition here
 36:05.43 /home/android/.mozbuild/android-ndk-r15c/toolchains/arm-linux-
 androideabi-4.9/prebuilt/linux-x86_64/lib/gcc/arm-linux-androideabi/4.9.x
 /../../../../arm-linux-androideabi/bin/ld: error: /home/andr
 oid/tor-browser/obj-arm-linux-
 androideabi/toolkit/library/../../media/libaom/cpu-features.o: multiple
 definition of 'android_getCpuFeatures'
 36:05.44 /home/android/.mozbuild/android-ndk-r15c/toolchains/arm-linux-
 androideabi-4.9/prebuilt/linux-x86_64/lib/gcc/arm-linux-androideabi/4.9.x
 /../../../../arm-linux-androideabi/bin/ld: /home/android/tor
 -browser/obj-arm-linux-androideabi/toolkit/library/../../media/libvpx/cpu-
 features.o: previous definition here
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31915 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Uplift libvpx/libaom patch for cpu-features.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31915: Uplift libvpx/libaom patch for cpu-features.c
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1585470

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31914 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix eslint linter error

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31914: Fix eslint linter error
--+--
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by acat):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Patch for review in https://github.com/acatarineu/tor-
 browser/commit/31914.

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[tor-bugs] #31914 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix eslint linter error

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31914: Fix eslint linter error
--+
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
  |  TorBrowserTeam201910R
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Right now command `./mach lint -l eslint --fix` is broken. This is useful
 to fix/display JS style issues in a similar way as `clang-format` does for
 C++. The reason seems to be some missing paths for torbutton files that
 are loaded in `browser.xul`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31686 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: retire textile

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31686: retire textile
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 saxatile removed from ldap, disks queued for removal in 7 days, removed
 from puppet, nothing left in DNS, entry removed from spreadsheet, nagios,
 tor-passwords, and scheduled backup deletion in 30 days.

 saxatile is done.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31898 [Core Tor/Tor]: Occasional crash during shutdown when using Tor API

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31898: Occasional crash during shutdown when using Tor API
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash, 042-must 041-backport |  Actual Points:  .3
  041-regression |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  042-regression, crash, 042-must 041-backport? 041-regression?
 => crash, 042-must 041-backport 041-regression
 * actualpoints:   => .3


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31898 [Core Tor/Tor]: Occasional crash during shutdown when using Tor API

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31898: Occasional crash during shutdown when using Tor API
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-regression, crash, 042-must  |  Actual Points:
  041-backport? 041-regression?  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by eighthave):

 * cc: hans@… (added)
 * keywords:  crash, 042-must 041-backport 041-regression? =>
 042-regression, crash, 042-must 041-backport? 041-regression?
 * actualpoints:  .3 =>
 * priority:  High => Medium


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28993 [Webpages]: Document pkg-config is required to compile tor with --enable-systemd on debian

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28993: Document pkg-config is required to compile tor with --enable-systemd on
debian
-+
 Reporter:  traumschule  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by eighthave):

 On a related note, `./configure --enable-lzma` silently fails if ''pkg-
 config'' is not installed:
 https://gitlab.com/eighthave/tor/pipelines/85811623

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26294 [Core Tor/Tor]: attacker can force intro point rotation by ddos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26294: attacker can force intro point rotation by ddos
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-dos, network-team-   |  Actual Points:  6
  roadmap-august, security   |
Parent ID:  #2   | Points:  7
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 Hello team,

 how should we proceed here? I hear two explicit "yes" from me and dgoulet,
 a few valid concerns and discussion, and zero "no" so far. In this case,
 should we proceed with merging this?

 I can also make tickets for various future improvements here like:
 - Investigate bloom filters for replay cache to increase them to much
 bigger sizes.
 - Investigate reinstalling a timestamp of some sorts to the INTRO cell to
 avoid replays?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30830 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Clean up snowflake broker logs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30830: Clean up snowflake broker logs
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  logs, stats anti-censorship- |  Actual Points:  .3
  roadmap-july   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  phw  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28
-+-
Changes (by cohosh):

 * actualpoints:   => .3


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31843 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Make safelogger thread safe

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31843: Make safelogger thread safe
-+
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:  .2
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  phw  |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by cohosh):

 * actualpoints:   => .2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30344 [Core Tor/Tor]: conn_read_callback is called on connections that are marked for closed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30344: conn_read_callback is called on connections that are marked for closed
-+-
 Reporter:  robgjansen   |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.8
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-conn, 035-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  041-deferred-20190530, 042-should  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 Thanks Rob and pastly. Let me know what you find and I will act
 accordingly.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31794 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Errors swallowed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31794: Errors swallowed
-+--
 Reporter:  sah  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31903 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Update translations and push translation requests to Transifex

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31903: Update translations and push translation requests to Transifex
+
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  task| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s30-o22a3   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31279  | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  emmapeel|Sponsor:  Sponsor30-must
+
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => emmapeel


Comment:

 Here's a branch that fixes this:
 https://github.com/NullHypothesis/bridgedb/compare/develop...task/31903

 emmapeel, is this all we need from BridgeDB's side to request new
 translations?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29013 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Provide stack smashing protection for mingw-clang builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29013: Provide stack smashing protection for mingw-clang builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, GeorgKoppen201910,  |  Actual Points:  1.5
  tbb-9.0, TorBrowserTeam201910R |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, GeorgKoppen201910, tbb-9.0, TorBrowserTeam201910 =>
 tbb-rbm, GeorgKoppen201910, tbb-9.0, TorBrowserTeam201910R
 * status:  new => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => 1.5


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:27 gk]:
 > So, not adding `libssp.dll.a` solves actually both issues I had (the
 dynamically linking and the crashes). I might be tempted to pick this up
 to get it still into 9.0 or 9.5a1 if the former is too risky. :) (thanks
 again, Martin)

 Here we are. `bug_29013_v5` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_29013_v5=562fe8f1df0de8912c9eaf7ff8c3b4d989d4aa01)
 in my `tor-browser-build` repo and `bug_29013_v2`
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_29013_v2=cb5ccc9e3b50e9d37a4c7a34a0c81418df38adfe)
 in my `tor-browser` one.

 The first patch is using our own `mingw-w64` which we build anyway and is
 just copying the .a libs over. The `tor-browser` patch essentially backs
 out the special treatment of mingw-w64-clang.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31685 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Snowflake : ON/OFF switch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31685: Snowflake : ON/OFF switch
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-ux |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by arlolra):

 Merged as https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/commit/?id=36eb07a6fc1026b8b96471b72a17f578a2caff35

 > I thought we were moving forward with Status.

 Sorry, I took a liberty here from when you said, "what if we use Status or
 something close to it?"

 It's a 1-line change at this point. So, happy to make it if you prefer
 that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31898 [Core Tor/Tor]: Occasional crash during shutdown when using Tor API

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31898: Occasional crash during shutdown when using Tor API
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash, 042-must 041-backport |  Actual Points:  .3
  041-regression?|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31685 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Snowflake : ON/OFF switch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31685: Snowflake : ON/OFF switch
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  snowflake-ux |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29484 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Update the requirements.txt and freeze them on release

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29484: Update the requirements.txt and freeze them on release
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb, anti-censorship-roadmap-   |  Actual Points:
  september  |
Parent ID:  #31280   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-can
-+-
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * reviewer:  sysrqb => cohosh


Comment:

 Phew, that was more work than I anticipated. I just pushed a patch set
 that updates all of BridgeDB's requirements to their latest respective
 versions:
 https://github.com/NullHypothesis/bridgedb/compare/develop...fix/29484

 [https://travis-ci.org/NullHypothesis/bridgedb/builds/592164619 All unit
 tests pass] and the code works in production.

 I also added a script, `check-for-new-dependencies`, which goes over our
 dependencies and checks for new versions. We should run it before each
 release. Is this reasonable? Or are we better off doing a `pip freeze`?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31685 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Snowflake : ON/OFF switch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31685: Snowflake : ON/OFF switch
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-ux |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by antonela):

 I thought we were moving forward with `Status`.

 Anyways, I'm good merging arlolra's commit from comment:8. Thanks for this
 patch!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31912 [Core Tor/Tor]: Port miscellaneous scripts to Python 3.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31912: Port miscellaneous scripts to Python 3.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by asn):

 Please see my `python3_all` branch for a commit that completely ports
 `ed25519_exts_ref.py` and `slow_ed25519.py` to python3. The selftest
 passes and I checked that the generated test vectors are identical to the
 python2 ones.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31911 [Applications/Tor Browser]: disk filled on up savii

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31911: disk filled on up savii
--+--
 Reporter:  anarcat   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910R |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * points:   => 0.1
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 Looks good to me, thanks! Merged to `tor-browser-spec`'s `master` (commit
 aff3780c19d235bc98ff6b765f0eeb5e52a98535).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31898 [Core Tor/Tor]: Occasional crash during shutdown when using Tor API

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31898: Occasional crash during shutdown when using Tor API
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash, 042-must 041-backport |  Actual Points:  .3
  041-regression?|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  042-regression, crash, 042-must 041-backport? 041-regression?
 => crash, 042-must 041-backport 041-regression?
 * priority:  Medium => High
 * actualpoints:   => .3


Comment:

 Branch is `bug31898_041`; PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1385 .  See the commit messages for
 an explanation of why the bug took us so long to hit in practice.

 I'll put this in needs_review once the tests pass.

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[tor-bugs] #31913 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add more robust Tor API documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31913: Add more robust Tor API documentation
--+
 Reporter:  chelseakomlo  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  api
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Currently, Tor's API is not well-documented- adding more rich
 documentation (and ideally a separate how-to technical guide) would be
 helpful for external applications to learn how to embed tor.

 For example, tor_control_socket_t needs documentation.
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/feature/api/tor_api.h#n60

 Furthermore, it isn't clear what are the tradeoffs between embedding Tor
 or running it as an executable:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/feature/api/tor_api.h#n11

 Also, it would be helpful to add additional documentation about how to
 interface with tor once it has been invoked (e.g, reading/writing from the
 control port via SOCKS).
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/feature/api/tor_api.h#n26

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31898 [Core Tor/Tor]: Occasional crash during shutdown when using Tor API

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31898: Occasional crash during shutdown when using Tor API
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-regression, crash, 042-must  |  Actual Points:
  041-backport? 041-regression?  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Okay, I think I found the bug: max_in_sl() is implemented incorrectly.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31755 [Metrics/Website]: Separate update pings and update requests graphs for Tor Browser alpha and release users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31755: Separate update pings and update requests graphs for Tor Browser alpha 
and
release users
-+--
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by boklm):

 Thanks!

 Yes, I expect the alpha numbers to be very small compared to the stable
 ones. Would it be possible to have separate graphs for alpha and stable,
 with a different scale, so that we can better see the alpha numbers?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31898 [Core Tor/Tor]: Occasional crash during shutdown when using Tor API

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31898: Occasional crash during shutdown when using Tor API
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-regression, crash, 042-must  |  Actual Points:
  041-backport? 041-regression?  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 > Is reusing a tor_main_configuration_t with different args a supported
 use case?

 Hm. I hadn't planned for that.  I'm not sure why it wouldn't work, though.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31912 [Core Tor/Tor]: Port miscellaneous scripts to Python 3.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31912: Port miscellaneous scripts to Python 3.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 I've started work here in a branch called `python3_all`.

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[tor-bugs] #31912 [Core Tor/Tor]: Port miscellaneous scripts to Python 3.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31912: Port miscellaneous scripts to Python 3.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 There are a few scripts in our build repo that do not build or work under
 python 3.  We should fix that, even though they are not ones that we run
 regularly.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31755 [Metrics/Website]: Separate update pings and update requests graphs for Tor Browser alpha and release users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31755: Separate update pings and update requests graphs for Tor Browser alpha 
and
release users
-+--
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by karsten):

 I made a very quick graph:

 [[Image(webstats-tb-channel.png​, 700px)]]

 Does this very roughly match your expectation? I'll cross-check this
 result by myself, and irl is going to review the code once it's available.
 But did you expect the numbers to look roughly like this or very different
 from this?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31755 [Metrics/Website]: Separate update pings and update requests graphs for Tor Browser alpha and release users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31755: Separate update pings and update requests graphs for Tor Browser alpha 
and
release users
-+--
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * Attachment "webstats-tb-channel.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31911 [Applications/Tor Browser]: disk filled on up savii

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31911: disk filled on up savii
--+--
 Reporter:  anarcat   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201910R


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 anarcat]:
 > assuming you have shell access, of course, you can use `df -h` to see
 the immediate disk usage. :)
 >
 > otherwise, grafana.torproject.org can show you long-term metrics. there
 you need to find the "node exporter full" dashboard
 ([https://grafana.torproject.org/d/Z7T7Cfemz/node-exporter-full direct
 link]) and select `savii.torproject.org` in the host drop-down (you can
 type it to avoid scrolling all the way down). you can also change the time
 range on the top right.

 Thanks!

 I think we can add this information to our release process doc, so I
 attached a patch for gk to review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31911 [Applications/Tor Browser]: disk filled on up savii

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31911: disk filled on up savii
--+--
 Reporter:  anarcat   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * Attachment "0001-Bug-31911-Add-information-about-monitoring-disk-
 spac.patch" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31763 [Metrics/Relay Search]: relay-search lists flakey as down for an hour or two, when it's never been reachable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31763: relay-search lists flakey as down for an hour or two, when it's never 
been
reachable
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Thanks for reporting this. It's a known issue tracked under #11430. Maybe
 it's time to fix this now. Closing this one as duplicate after pasting the
 description to that other ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #11430 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Add new field last_running for "seen in a network status with the Running flag" in addition to last_seen for "seen in a network status"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11430: Add new field last_running for "seen in a network status with the 
Running
flag" in addition to last_seen for "seen in a network status"
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * cc: metrics-team, cohosh, phw (added)


Comment:

 Pasting the description from #31763 here as a concrete instance of this
 issue:

 >
 
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/5481936581E23D2D178105D44DB6915AB06BFB7F
 > is marked as offline, and the "downtime" section varies over time but it
 always seems to be more than one hour and less than two hours.
 >
 > That's because the bridge firewalled its ORPort, so it never gets the
 Running flag from Serge, so bridgedb won't give it out. Makes sense -- it
 is the snowflake bridge, so it receives its connections via the bridge-
 side snowflake proxy, not direct to the ORPort.
 >
 > But metrics seems to have hit an edge case: it does something weird when
 it has no known "time it was last up" value.
 >
 > (Not a big deal, but it's been sitting in a tab for some days now and I
 figured I should file the ticket.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31911 [Applications/Tor Browser]: disk filled on up savii

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31911: disk filled on up savii
--+--
 Reporter:  anarcat   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by anarcat):

 assuming you have shell access, of course, you can use `df -h` to see the
 immediate disk usage. :)

 otherwise, grafana.torproject.org can show you long-term metrics. there
 you need to find the "node exporter full" dashboard
 ([https://grafana.torproject.org/d/Z7T7Cfemz/node-exporter-full direct
 link]) and select `savii.torproject.org` in the host drop-down (you can
 type it to avoid scrolling all the way down). you can also change the time
 range on the top right.

 good luck!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31911 [Applications/Tor Browser]: disk filled on up savii

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31911: disk filled on up savii
--+--
 Reporter:  anarcat   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 > It might also be possible that TBB releases have grown too big that we
 need more disk space on that server. We don't have much wiggle room on
 that right now, but we do have some: let me know if that's something you
 need.

 I think we are still good for now (if we remember to keep only two
 versions), but we'll probably need to increase the disk space at some
 point as we're frequently adding new Tor Browser locales, so I'm
 interested to see how to monitor disk space on this server.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31911 [Applications/Tor Browser]: disk filled on up savii

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31911: disk filled on up savii
--+--
 Reporter:  anarcat   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 > It seems there are three 9.0 alpha releases on there, maybe one too
 many?

 Yes, I forgot to remove 9.0a4 before uploading 9.0a7. I have removed it
 now.

 To save some space we could also remove 6.5.2 and 8.0a9, which we have
 been keeping for updating older releases due to updater changes in those
 versions, but this was two years ago for 6.5.2 and one year for 8.0a9 so
 most users should have updated now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31078 [Core Tor/Tor]: improve docs for config var abstraction

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31078: improve docs for config var abstraction
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-should|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: catalyst (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31078 [Core Tor/Tor]: improve docs for config var abstraction

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31078: improve docs for config var abstraction
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-should|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 On documentation:

 I think the best place to document all this is probably in the top-level
 doxygen comments in lib/conf/conftypes.h and lib/confparse/confmgt.h (to
 be renamed from confparse.h), and that the right way to do so is probably
 by copying/adapting the text above.

 Does that sound like a good way to do this?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31901 [Metrics/Website]: webstats-tb.html graph too eager to include today's stats

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31901: webstats-tb.html graph too eager to include today's stats
-+--
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Here's the long version of what I think has happened: one log file for
 dist.tp.o is written at around 12am every day whereas four others are
 written at around 7am. That first log file is sanitized by CollecTor at
 4am and the others at 10am. The metrics-web cronjob runs at 9am, so it
 only sees that first log file and not the four others. All this should not
 be an issue, because we're delaying sanitization for three days. We
 shouldn't be looking at log file timestamps but contained request
 timestamps. I'm not sure why we're not doing this. This might be a bug.

 For now, I changed the timing of sanitizing web logs from running at
 4:21am, 10:21am, etc. to 7:41am, 1:41pm, etc. This should better sync with
 our metrics-web cronjob. And in theory it shouldn't break anything. Let's
 see how it works over the next few days.

 The real fix is described in the first paragraph. This is a bit harder to
 fix, though.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31078 [Core Tor/Tor]: improve docs for config var abstraction

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31078: improve docs for config var abstraction
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-should|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 On renaming:

 typed_var_t could be "c data", a "c object", an "encodeable", a
 "manipulatable".

 struct_member_t could probably become an implementation detail of
 config_var_t.

 config_var_t could be an "option", "field", "setting", "member", "entry".

 var_type_def_t could be "encoder", "encoding", "codec", "manipulator",
 "manip".

 Do any of these sound like good changes?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31078 [Core Tor/Tor]: improve docs for config var abstraction

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31078: improve docs for config var abstraction
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-should|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 I've been trying to figure out which concrete steps would help the most
 here.  I think that clarity on the final API, and clarity on the words
 "type" and "variable" are the biggest requests.

 -

 The '''variables''' here might also be called "options" or "fields" or
 "settables" or "configurables".  Each one is a C value that maps to a
 named option in a configuration or state file.  I'm okay renaming these
 from "variables" to one of the other things if we have a good "other
 thing" to rename them to.

 In the C code, each "variable" is a member of a some configuration object.
 Each module can have its own configuration object.  These objects are
 registered at startup with a central "configuration manager", which is
 responsible for parsing configurations, telling modules about new
 configurations, and so on.

 The implementation for these variables comes in 4 layers:

 1. The lowest level is the "typed_var" layer, which views the C value as a
 void *, and views the configuration value as a string.  This is the layer
 that knows how to encode, decode, copy, etc.  The set of functions that
 does the encoding/decoding/copying/etc defines the '''type''' of the
 variable.  "Codec" or "manipulator" might be another good name for this.

 2. One level higher is the "struct_member" layer, which views the C value
 as stored at a given offset within a structure.

 3. One level higher is the "config_var" layer.  This layer knows the
 _names_ of different configuration values, and knows that some values may
 be obsolete, deprecated.

 4. At the highest level is the "managed_var" layer.  It is an internal
 object used by the configmgr code to keep track of which variables
 correspond to which objects.

 Each layer is consumed by the layer above it.  Additionally, layer 1 is
 the layer at which you can declare new "types" (codecs? manipulators?).
 Layer 3 is the layer at which modules declare their variables.

 -

 Here's what I have in mind for the final artchitecture.

 There are three main users of the configuration system.

 1. There is '''type''' code, which wants to declare new "types" (codecs?
 manipulators?) that modules can use for their data.   (This kind of user
 #includes var_type_def_st.h, and defines a new var_type_def_t.)

 2. There are '''modules''' which want to declare configuration or state
 variables, and learn what their values are, and learn when those values
 change.  They declare a structure for their configuration and/or state,
 and a table of config_var_t mapping configuration/state variables to the
 fields of that structure.  They expose this information via the subsystem
 API.  (There is not yet a separate example of this; all users of
 get_options() are currently taking this role, as is the variable-
 declaration part of config.c.)

 3. There is the '''application''' code, which wants to load, reload,
 change, or dump configuration values, and make sure that the right modules
 find out about it.  (This kind of user uses the "confmgr.h" API to combine
 the mapping tables from multiple modules, and to manipulate the correct
 fields in their configuration/state objects.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31898 [Core Tor/Tor]: Occasional crash during shutdown when using Tor API

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31898: Occasional crash during shutdown when using Tor API
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-regression, crash, 042-must  |  Actual Points:
  041-backport? 041-regression?  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:4 nickm]:
 > A smaller test case might help here, or maybe a link to the RunMain
 source.

 I rebased the branch I used for testing the API on top of current master.
 The configuration is handled
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/sysrqb/tor.git/tree/src/tools/jverify_config.java?h=testing_26653_02#n16
 here] and
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/sysrqb/tor.git/tree/src/feature/api/TorApi.c?h=testing_26653_02#n173
 RunMain] is there.

 This is basically a thin wrapper around the API.

 >
 > One thing to note is that the stack trace that you're describing seems
 to be happening inside the initialization code, before Tor is actually
 running.  Maybe this is something that happens on a second initialization
 and not a first?

 Yes, that is what this code is doing. On the Java-side, it takes in
 commandline args which are passed into tor for configuration, but it
 configures and runs tor twice. The first time the program inserts
 `--verify-config` as the second argument, and then after `tor_run_main`
 returns, it calls `tor_main_configuration_set_command_line` again except
 this time with the original args (without `--verify-config`) and then
 calls `tor_run_main` again.

 Is reusing a `tor_main_configuration_t` with different args a supported
 use case? I haven't looked at the code yet. I don't see this crash during
 every execution, I usually run the program in a `while` loop until it
 crashes (which usually takes between 5 and 30 iterations).

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[tor-bugs] #31911 [Applications/Tor Browser]: disk filled on up savii

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31911: disk filled on up savii
--+--
 Reporter:  anarcat   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 the source for the TBB releases is full:

 {{{
 FilesystemSize  Used Avail Use% Mounted on
 /dev/mapper/vg_savii-srv   98G   93G   40M 100% /srv
 }}}

 That's 40MB free! While we could change the reserved space here to get an
 extra 5GB, it would not allow us to cut another TBB release anyways, so I
 figured I might let you know. :)

 It seems there are three 9.0 alpha releases on there, maybe one too many?

 {{{
 root@savii:/srv# ls -l
 static.torproject.org/mirrors/cdn.torproject.org/tree-*/aus1/torbrowser
 static.torproject.org/mirrors/cdn.torproject.org/tree-a/aus1/torbrowser:
 total 200
 drwxr-xr-x 2 mirroradm mirroradm 12288 Apr 19  2017 6.5.2
 -rw-r--r-- 2 mirroradm mirroradm   138 Apr 19  2017 6.5.2-do-not-
 remove.txt
 drwxr-xr-x 2 mirroradm mirroradm 16384 Sep  4  2018 8.0
 -rw-r--r-- 2 mirroradm mirroradm11 Sep  4  2018 8.0-do-not-remove.txt
 drwxr-xr-x 2 mirroradm mirroradm 20480 Jun 27  2018 8.0a9
 -rw-r--r-- 2 mirroradm mirroradm11 Aug 20  2018 8.0a9-do-not-
 remove.txt
 drwxr-xr-x 2 mirroradm mirroradm 20480 Jul  8 22:01 8.5.4
 drwxr-xr-x 2 mirroradm mirroradm 28672 Sep  3 13:40 8.5.5
 drwxr-xr-x 2 mirroradm mirroradm 28672 Jul  9 22:12 9.0a4
 drwxr-xr-x 2 mirroradm mirroradm 28672 Sep  4 17:54 9.0a6
 drwxr-xr-x 2 mirroradm mirroradm 24576 Oct  1 13:09 9.0a7
 drwxr-xr-x 2 mirroradm mirroradm  4096 Oct  1 12:41 bug_20814
 -rw-r--r-- 2 mirroradm mirroradm   165 May 20  2016 moo

 static.torproject.org/mirrors/cdn.torproject.org/tree-b/aus1/torbrowser:
 total 176
 drwxr-xr-x 2 mirroradm mirroradm 12288 Apr 19  2017 6.5.2
 -rw-r--r-- 2 mirroradm mirroradm   138 Apr 19  2017 6.5.2-do-not-
 remove.txt
 drwxr-xr-x 2 mirroradm mirroradm 16384 Sep  4  2018 8.0
 -rw-r--r-- 2 mirroradm mirroradm11 Sep  4  2018 8.0-do-not-remove.txt
 drwxr-xr-x 2 mirroradm mirroradm 20480 Jun 27  2018 8.0a9
 -rw-r--r-- 2 mirroradm mirroradm11 Aug 20  2018 8.0a9-do-not-
 remove.txt
 drwxr-xr-x 2 mirroradm mirroradm 20480 Jul  8 22:01 8.5.4
 drwxr-xr-x 2 mirroradm mirroradm 28672 Sep  3 13:40 8.5.5
 drwxr-xr-x 2 mirroradm mirroradm 28672 Jul  9 22:12 9.0a4
 drwxr-xr-x 2 mirroradm mirroradm 28672 Sep  4 17:54 9.0a6
 drwxr-xr-x 2 mirroradm mirroradm  4096 Apr 20  2017 bug_20814
 -rw-r--r-- 2 mirroradm mirroradm   165 May 20  2016 moo
 }}}

 It might also be possible that TBB releases have grown too big that we
 need more disk space on that server. We don't have much wiggle room on
 that right now, but we do have some: let me know if that's something you
 need.

 I can also show you the different tools we have to monitor disk space on
 that server.

 let me know if you need any further help!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31909 [Core Tor/Stem]: Write a stem test to detect #31495 regression

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31909: Write a stem test to detect #31495 regression
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-should |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_information


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31910 [Applications/Tor Browser]: replace meek_lite with meek in circuit display

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31910: replace meek_lite with meek in circuit display
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  meek, tbb-9.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201910   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Yes, let's do that. (That's been one of the tickets I meant to file after
 all the reviewing. Glad you beat me to it)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31910 [Applications/Tor Browser]: replace meek_lite with meek in circuit display

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31910: replace meek_lite with meek in circuit display
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  meek, tbb-9.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201910   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * points:   => 0.1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31705 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add sufficient coccinelle tooling to run coccinelle without stress

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31705: Add sufficient coccinelle tooling to run coccinelle without stress
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-can   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 > Is that a separate ticket?

 I think/hope that's a separate ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31907 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add comments to prevent recurrence of #31495

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31907: Add comments to prevent recurrence of #31495
+
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  042-should comment  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:  | Points:  0
 Reviewer:  teor|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good to me.

 Since this is a comment-only change, I merged it directly to master.

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