[tor-bugs] #32253 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Zooming and letterboxing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32253: Zooming and letterboxing
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version: |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  letterboxing zoom  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
 Zooming changes reported window size, so letterboxing should be applied.
 This does not work at the moment or is buggy:

 1. does not letterbox on zoom event, only after resizing the window
 2. resizing the window on a zoomed tab applies proper letterboxing
 (multiples of 100) only after resizing the window back to its
 standard/default size
 3. when resizing the window back to its default size, the letterboxing is
 still applied to all other non-zoomed tabs, making their size smaller than
 standard despite the available space for default size

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32220 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Change letterboxing color when dark theme is enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32220: Change letterboxing color when dark theme is enabled
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can, ux-   |  Actual Points:
  team   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 This and other features relating to letterboxing should be made a bigger
 priority. Most people don't know what letterboxing is and many think it is
 a bug introduced in the new browser version. The current letterboxing
 affects the browsing experience more than you would expect and will make
 users search for the preference to turn off the feature completely which
 is not a good outcome.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30625 [Applications/Tor Browser]: (without toolbar) the window size is not exact multiple of 100 pixels

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30625: (without toolbar) the window size is not exact multiple of 100 pixels
---+--
 Reporter:  Rick   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by Thorin):

 upstream: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1414311

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32221 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor launcher extension intergation into browser is not for everyone

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32221: tor launcher extension intergation into browser is not for everyone
--+--
 Reporter:  mfD1TuzasD32GvaI3mh6  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  laucher browser   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mfD1TuzasD32GvaI3mh6):

 @gk first, i'd like to thank you for taking a time to answer my ticket.

 i have followed your instructions by exporting listed values in tor-
 browser shortcut. this disables launcher and browser connects to running
 proxy as expected, however I am greeted with red welcome screen "something
 went wrong".
 I could ignore this, but main issue is that CPU gets pinned at max with
 process firefox.real
 I am on Ubuntu variant 16.04.

 @cypherpunks, please be nice, we both want the same here, but there is no
 need for insults and threats;

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32252 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser does not display correctly in VMWare Fusion on macOS (mojave)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32252: Tor Browser does not display correctly in VMWare Fusion on macOS 
(mojave)
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ff78-esr-will-have
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 A user reported on IRC that Tor Browser in VMWare Fusion on macOS sluggish
 and would only work at all if Retina displays were enabled.

 It seems that this got fixed "by accident" when rewriting parts of the
 graphics stack. See:

 https://mozillagfx.wordpress.com/2019/10/22/dramatically-reduced-power-
 usage-in-firefox-70-on-macos-with-core-animation/
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1305656

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32246 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ubunutu, Tor icon won't launch Browser after update

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32246: Ubunutu, Tor icon won't launch Browser after update
--+---
 Reporter:  MrPaz |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 So, the forum link you posted suggested this is an issue related to Tor
 Browser on 18.04 but not one to the update to Tor Browser 9. Is that
 correct? Or did Tor Browser work for you before on 18.04 and just the
 update broke that now?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30678 [Webpages/Website]: remove hardcoded capitalization from tpo css and templates

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30678: remove hardcoded capitalization from tpo css and templates
--+--
 Reporter:  emmapeel  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30027| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Old description:

> this does not work well in many languages. capitalization should be on
> the string itself.

New description:

 this does not work well in many languages. capitalization should be on the
 string itself.

 here some examples submitted by ecron (thanks!):

 [[Image(Captura0.cleaned.PNG​)]]

 [[Image(Captura1.cleaned.PNG​)]]

 [[Image(Captura2.cleaned.PNG​)]]

 [[Image(Captura3.cleaned.PNG​)]]

--

Comment (by emmapeel):

 [[Image(Captura3.cleaned.PNG​)]]

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30678 [Webpages/Website]: remove hardcoded capitalization from tpo css and templates

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30678: remove hardcoded capitalization from tpo css and templates
--+--
 Reporter:  emmapeel  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30027| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by emmapeel):

 * Attachment "Captura3.cleaned.PNG" added.

 submitted by translator

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30678 [Webpages/Website]: remove hardcoded capitalization from tpo css and templates

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30678: remove hardcoded capitalization from tpo css and templates
--+--
 Reporter:  emmapeel  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30027| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by emmapeel):

 * Attachment "Captura2.cleaned.PNG" added.

 submitted by translator

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30678 [Webpages/Website]: remove hardcoded capitalization from tpo css and templates

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30678: remove hardcoded capitalization from tpo css and templates
--+--
 Reporter:  emmapeel  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30027| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by emmapeel):

 * Attachment "Captura1.cleaned.PNG" added.

 submitted by translator

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30678 [Webpages/Website]: remove hardcoded capitalization from tpo css and templates

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30678: remove hardcoded capitalization from tpo css and templates
--+--
 Reporter:  emmapeel  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30027| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by emmapeel):

 * Attachment "Captura0.cleaned.PNG" added.

 example submitted by translator

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32247 [Applications/Tor Browser]: give New Identity button a page action

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32247: give New Identity button a page action
--+--
 Reporter:  Thorin|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by Thorin):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 nvm, I see in a new profile there's a prompt for "never ask me again", so
 I must have checked that at some stage.

 Closing as invalid, but I think we could do better than a modal dialog
 that is set and forget (and users don't know how to unset it). Feel free
 to re-open

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32251 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Using Tor Browser 9.0, websites using cloudflare loads but not subresources

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32251: Using Tor Browser 9.0, websites using cloudflare loads but not 
subresources
-+-
 Reporter:  tor_bug_report321|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Component:  Applications/Tor
 |  Browser
  Version:   |   Severity:  Major
 Keywords:  cloudflare,  |  Actual Points:
  subresources   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
 For example:
 [https://www.namecheap.com/] loads, but the subresources failed to load.
 By going to "Inspect Elements" --> "Network" tab, I saw a lot of 403
 errors. By clicking on one of the requests with 403, it was stopped by
 Cloudflare's CAPTCHA check.

 Another example is [https://pincong.rocks/], the main site loads fine, but
 the avatars does not load due to 403 errors.

 Never had this issue with Tor Browser 8.5.5. Please fix.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32238 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Some websites not loading pictures after upgrade to Tor Browser 9.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32238: Some websites not loading pictures after upgrade to Tor Browser 9.0
--+--
 Reporter:  AxBnO3|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 There's Croatian version:

 
http://searxes.nmqnkngye4ct7bgss4bmv5ca3wpa55yugvxen5kz2bbq67lwy6ps54yd.onion/?lg
 =hr-HR&ul=hr

 Bottom = -> "Stop cloudflare"

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32232 [Core Tor/Tor]: CI: Try --disable-dependency-tracking to speed up builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32232: CI: Try --disable-dependency-tracking to speed up builds
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, 029-backport, 035-backport,  |  Actual Points:  0.1
  040-backport, 041-backport, 042-backport,  |
  consider-backport-immediately  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 It actually seems to make things slower, at least on Linux. I'll try a
 rebuild to use the cache.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32238 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Some websites not loading pictures after upgrade to Tor Browser 9.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32238: Some websites not loading pictures after upgrade to Tor Browser 9.0
--+--
 Reporter:  AxBnO3|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 >>  Avatars and other pictures on the forum of index.hr news portal.
 >> http://www.index.hr/indexforum/postovi/266533/kad-putin-da-erdoganupo-
 prstima-/1

 Uh dude, the link you posted is Cloudflare.

 Read https://codeberg.org/crimeflare/cloudflare-tor

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31919 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a check-local target that runs our coccinelle parsing problems script

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31919: Add a check-local target that runs our coccinelle parsing problems 
script
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-can   |  Actual Points:  0.8
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * actualpoints:  0.3 => 0.8


Comment:

 This was slightly more complicated than I expected, we needed Ubuntu
 Bionic for a recent spatch, and spatch is so slow that we can only check
 modified files.

 See my PR:
 * master: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1462

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32210 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Hide the "Tor" section in preferences when TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH=1 is set

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32210: Hide the "Tor" section in preferences when TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH=1 is set
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201910R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 http://ea5faa5po25cf7fb.onion/projects/tor/ticket/32224#comment:5

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32210 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Hide the "Tor" section in preferences when TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH=1 is set

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32210: Hide the "Tor" section in preferences when TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH=1 is set
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201910R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > The TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH=1 variable does that.

 How exactly?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32250 [Applications/Tor Browser]: letterboxing: backport bugzilla 1546832

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32250: letterboxing: backport bugzilla 1546832
-+-
 Reporter:  Thorin   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-
 Severity:  Normal   |  fingerprinting-resolution
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1546832

 Docked dev tools does not trigger letterboxing resize. Open TZP [1] on
 desktop and toggle the inspector on/off. Manually resize the inspector.
 The screen measurements are real-time.

 Mozilla's patch also added the findbar, but that seems to already be
 applied in TB9

 [1] https://ghacksuserjs.github.io/TorZillaPrint/TorZillaPrint.html

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32249 [Core Tor/Tor]: Speed up practracker, by passing it a list of modified file names

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32249: Speed up practracker, by passing it a list of modified file names
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  043-can
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.5|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 After #31919, the git hooks will know which files have been modified in
 the commit/push. We should pass those files to practracker.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30552 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Android - Clean up torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30552: Android - Clean up torrc
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201910  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by sisbell):

 * cc: gk (added)
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 I made the following changes to tor-onion-proxy-library. If the changes
 look good, I will need to make it compatible with tor-android-service.

 * StrictNodes, UseBridges, SafeSocks, TestSocks will not be included in
 the torrc if they have a 0 value
 * DnsPort, HttpTunnelPort, TransparentProxyPort are now all Integers. I
 also added an associated host field for each one.
 * ProxyPort, ProxySocks5ServerPort are now an Integers rather than
 Strings.
 * HttpTunnelPort and TransPort values are set to null so it won't appear
 in torrc by default.
 * AutomapHostsOnResolve is set to false so won't appear in torrc by
 default

 The remaining field VirtualAddrNetwork will need to be removed in tor-
 android-service

 
https://github.com/sisbell/Tor_Onion_Proxy_Library/commit/73aeed144259a66930e605c7804946c9f6041b59

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32247 [Applications/Tor Browser]: give New Identity button a page action

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32247: give New Identity button a page action
--+
 Reporter:  Thorin|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues,
  |  ux-team
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/284706#comment-284706

 > ... New Identity. It just deletes your session without warning ...

 I actually did this myself twice. Once when I first used it: I guess I
 kind of expected a page action or menu (a la the old onion button). The
 second time I clicked it accidentally because of it's proximity to the
 hamburger menu.

 I don't know what the answer is, because a confirmation/action-check would
 mean an extra click and look silly for something that only has one
 option/function.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30552 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Android - Clean up torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30552: Android - Clean up torrc
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201910  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sisbell):

 From investigating, we don't need the following since 0 is the default
 value

  * StrictNodes 0
  * UseBridges 0
  * SafeSocks 0
  * TestSocks 0

 The following also don't need to be set as far as I can tell (they are
 their specifically for Orbot support)

  * AutomapHostsOnResolve 1
  * HTTPTunnelPort 8218
  * TransPort 9140
  * VirtualAddrNetwork 10.192.0.0/10

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30552 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Android - Clean up torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30552: Android - Clean up torrc
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201910  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by sisbell):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile => tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201910
 * points:  0.25 => 0.5


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32246 [- Select a component]: Ubunutu, Tor icon won't launch Browser after update

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32246: Ubunutu, Tor icon won't launch Browser after update
+--
 Reporter:  MrPaz   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 Ubuntu 18.04.3.  After updating Tor Browser via the check for updates
 feature inside the browser to v9.0, and rebooting computer, Tor browser
 would not launch by clicking on icons, either in the favorites bar or in
 the applications menu screen.

 Summary of problem and the fix that worked for me here (except it didn't
 launch for me even after a long delay):
 https://askubuntu.com/questions/1159863/after-updating-tor-browser-it-
 only-opens-after-a-15-minute-delay

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31851 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow Tor to be compiled without support for relay mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31851: Allow Tor to be compiled without support for relay mode
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-design, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:  0.2
  october|
Parent ID:   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 I opened #32244 and #32245 for Phase 1, and also labelled #32213 as Phase
 1.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32245 [Core Tor/Tor]: Phase 1: Disable the relay_sys.c entry point in --disable-module-relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32245: Phase 1: Disable the relay_sys.c entry point in --disable-module-relay
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:   | Status:  new
  enhancement|
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-design, network-team-roadmap-
 Severity:  Normal   |  october
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #31851
   Points:  1|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 When compiling with --disable-module-relay, we should disable the
 relay_sys.c entry point.

 At each stage, we should work to minimize layer-violations: there should
 generally not be calls from src/core/ into relay-specific code, and we
 should plan to refactor as needed to minimize them. We can reduce layer
 violations in parallel with the above.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32244 [Core Tor/Tor]: Phase 1: Disable the relay_periodic.c entry point in --disable-module-relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32244: Phase 1: Disable the relay_periodic.c entry point in 
--disable-module-relay
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:   | Status:  new
  enhancement|
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-design, network-team-roadmap-
 Severity:  Normal   |  october
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #31851
   Points:  1|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 When compiling with --disable-module-relay, we should disable the
 relay_periodic.c entry point.

 At each stage, we should work to minimize layer-violations: there should
 generally not be calls from src/core/ into relay-specific code, and we
 should plan to refactor as needed to minimize them. We can reduce layer
 violations in parallel with the above.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32213 [Core Tor/Tor]: Phase 1: Disable minimal dirauth and relay options when those modules are disabled (was: Disable minimal dirauth and relay options when those modules are disabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32213: Phase 1: Disable minimal dirauth and relay options when those modules 
are
disabled
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-design, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  october|
Parent ID:  #31851   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32232 [Core Tor/Tor]: CI: Try --disable-dependency-tracking to speed up builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32232: CI: Try --disable-dependency-tracking to speed up builds
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, 029-backport, 035-backport,  |  Actual Points:  0.1
  040-backport, 041-backport, 042-backport,  |
  consider-backport-immediately  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_revision


Comment:

 And then backport Travis to 0.2.9 and Appveyor to 0.3.5.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32232 [Core Tor/Tor]: CI: Try --disable-dependency-tracking to speed up builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32232: CI: Try --disable-dependency-tracking to speed up builds
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, 029-backport, 035-backport,  |  Actual Points:  0.1
  040-backport, 041-backport, 042-backport,  |
  consider-backport-immediately  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  tor-ci =>
 tor-ci, 029-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport, 041-backport,
 042-backport, consider-backport-immediately
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 I have a draft branch at ticket32232, we need to check if it actually
 improves build times.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32241 [Core Tor/Tor]: Travis: Use a newer macOS image

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32241: Travis: Use a newer macOS image
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-should, tor-ci, macos,   |  Actual Points:  0.2
  029-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport,  |
  041-backport, 042-backport, consider-  |
  backport-immediately   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * keywords:  043-should, tor-ci, macos =>
 043-should, tor-ci, macos, 029-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport,
 041-backport, 042-backport, consider-backport-immediately


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32241 [Core Tor/Tor]: Travis: Use a newer macOS image

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32241: Travis: Use a newer macOS image
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-should, tor-ci, macos  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID: | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  (none) => teor
 * status:  new => assigned
 * actualpoints:   => 0.2


Comment:

 Replying to [ticket:32241 teor]:
 > I tried some newer images, here's what I found:
 > ...
 > Xcode 11.2:
 > * https://github.com/teor2345/tor/tree/macos_image_11_2
 > * build took 12 minutes, vs 9 minutes for the current image

 With caching, 7 minutes.

 So let's use 11.2:
 * 0.2.9: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1460

 Clean merges, test branches at:
 * https://travis-ci.org/teor2345/tor/branches

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31874 [Circumvention]: Automatically test the PTs of bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31874: Automatically test the PTs of bridges
---+
 Reporter:  phw|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s30-o23a3  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31280 | Points:  10
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor30-must
---+
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 I pushed a work-in-progress version of my code to this repository:
 https://dip.torproject.org/phw/bridgestrap

 Here's what remains to be done:
 * Add tests.
 * Clean up code and make it more robust.
 * Strip down the torrc (in tor.go) to its bare minimum.
 * Improve the way we're spawning tor and interacting with it.
 * Improve log messages.
 * Write BridgeDB code that interacts with this service.
 * Figure out what to do with the Web frontend, to prevent abuse.

 It's still work-in-progress but I would appreciate a preliminary review of
 the code.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32243 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Extensions not functioning after upgrade

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32243: Extensions not functioning after upgrade
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Someone in #tor said all of the extensions in their tor browser instance
 stopped working after the upgrade to 9.0. They had non-standard extensions
 installed (so I assume this is part of the cause). When they go to
 about:debugging, they see the below warnings:

 {{{
 Reading manifest: Error processing hidden: An unexpected property was
 found in the WebExtension manifest
 }}}
 {{{
 Reading manifest: Error processing
 chrome_settings_overrides.search_provider.search_url_post_params:
 Unsupported on Firefox at this time
 }}}

 I do not see these warnings, but apparently Firefox emitted them for every
 extension (including noscript and https-e). The about:debugging UI
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/tree/devtools/client/aboutdebugging/components/addons/Target.js?h
 =tor-browser-68.2.0esr-9.0-1#n135 shows] these messages between the
 extension name and the "Extension ID" lines.

 I don't know if we'll be able to reproduce this, but it'll be good to know
 if more people are having this problem.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31573 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Uncaught exception in SessionStore.jsm with Tor Browser based on ESR 68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31573: Uncaught exception in SessionStore.jsm with Tor Browser based on ESR 68
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-   |  Actual Points:
  regression, tbb-9.0.1-can  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pospeselr):

 So this is happening because the {{{dom.push.enabled}}} pref is false, so
 {{{PushComponents.jsm}}} throws {{{NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE}}} when trying
 to access the {{{PushService}}} singleton. I *think* we can solve this by
 just swallowing the exception, but I need to look through the code a bit
 more to be sure.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31919 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a check-local target that runs our coccinelle parsing problems script

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31919: Add a check-local target that runs our coccinelle parsing problems 
script
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-can   |  Actual Points:  0.3
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:  #31705 =>


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31705 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add sufficient coccinelle tooling to run coccinelle without stress

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31705: Add sufficient coccinelle tooling to run coccinelle without stress
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  042-should|  Actual Points:  1.5
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 CI runs fine in #31919, just tweaking the performance now.

 Merged to master.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31919 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a check-local target that runs our coccinelle parsing problems script

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31919: Add a check-local target that runs our coccinelle parsing problems 
script
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-can   |  Actual Points:  0.3
Parent ID:  #31705| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:5 nickm]:
 > Quick comment on patch:
 >
 > I'm not 100% sure about requiring everybody to install coccinelle for
 them to be able to run the pre-commit hook.

 If spatch is not installed, the script logs a message and exits without
 error:
 
https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1454/commits/616bc21859c50f75e0f1092cab0dca0de62f47b9
 #diff-e4d63afb05764cd8a5149d2f09edd87dR21

 I'm not entirely happy with the speed of spatch, but let's see how it
 goes. Maybe there's some nice way to do it in parallel.

 I'm making progress on this, just doing performance checks now.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32210 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Hide the "Tor" section in preferences when TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH=1 is set

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32210: Hide the "Tor" section in preferences when TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH=1 is set
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201910R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > Just add a checkbox or about:config to completely disable Tor and allow
 user to use their own proxy configuration(socks/http/pac) like in 8.5.

 The `TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH=1` variable does that. This is also irrelevant to
 this ticket.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32242 [Core Tor/Tor]: Travis: Enable zstd

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32242: Travis: Enable zstd
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, 043-should, 035-backport,|  Actual Points:
  040-backport, 041-backport, 042-backport   |
Parent ID:  #32240   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Old description:

> When we make chutney work on Bionic or Xenial (#32240), we can enable
> zstd on Travis.
>
> We could have a different package list for Bionic and Trusty, but that
> kind of duplication is buggy.

New description:

 When we make chutney work on Bionic or Xenial (#32240), we can enable zstd
 on Travis.

 We could have a different package list for Bionic and Trusty, but that
 kind of duplication is error-prone.

--

Comment (by teor):

 See my PR:
 * 0.3.5: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1459

 It will need merging forward, and possibly some conflict resolution.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32242 [Core Tor/Tor]: Travis: Enable zstd

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32242: Travis: Enable zstd
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:   | Status:  new
  enhancement|
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-ci, 043-should, 035-backport,
 Severity:  Normal   |  040-backport, 041-backport, 042-backport
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #32240
   Points:  0.1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 When we make chutney work on Bionic or Xenial (#32240), we can enable zstd
 on Travis.

 We could have a different package list for Bionic and Trusty, but that
 kind of duplication is buggy.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32241 [Core Tor/Tor]: Travis: Use a newer macOS image

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32241: Travis: Use a newer macOS image
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  043-should, tor-ci, macos
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.2   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 I tried some newer images, here's what I found:

 Xcode 10.1:
 * https://github.com/teor2345/tor/tree/macos_image_10_1
 * build took longer than 50 minutes

 Xcode 10.3:
 * https://github.com/teor2345/tor/tree/macos_image_10_3
 * build took 19 minutes, vs 9 minutes for the current image

 Xcode 11.2:
 * https://github.com/teor2345/tor/tree/macos_image_11_2
 * build took 12 minutes, vs 9 minutes for the current image

 Let's revisit in a few months.

 We could try older images, and see if they are faster. But I don't think
 macOS is limiting our builds right now.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32237 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a Python script to replace C identifiers and generate commit messages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32237: Add a Python script to replace C identifiers and generate commit 
messages
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * reviewer:   => teor


Comment:

 Where is the changes file?

 There are also a few comments on the PR, I left some, pastly left some.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32224 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add extensions.torbutton.use_nontor_proxy back to Tor Browser 9!!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32224: Add extensions.torbutton.use_nontor_proxy back to Tor Browser 9!!
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 1. Install 8.5 and launch it. It forcefully connect to Tor.

 2. Set use-nontor value to true in about-config.

 3. Disable Tor add-ons in about-addons.

 4. Close browser.

 5. Open browser. (TB works just like normal browser and YOU CAN edit proxy
 settings)

 6. Click Check update and update your fucking browser

 7. TB9 forcefully connect to Tor and completely ignoring your PAC/HTTP
 proxy settings

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32221 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor launcher extension intergation into browser is not for everyone

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32221: tor launcher extension intergation into browser is not for everyone
--+--
 Reporter:  mfD1TuzasD32GvaI3mh6  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  laucher browser   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 In Windows + 8.5, disabing tor was SUPER EASY.

 Above comment 2,

 What the hell guys?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32221 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor launcher extension intergation into browser is not for everyone

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32221: tor launcher extension intergation into browser is not for everyone
--+--
 Reporter:  mfD1TuzasD32GvaI3mh6  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  laucher browser   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  invalid =>


Comment:

 How do I do that in Windows?

 And I don't want to edit OS's default values.

 Why don't you respect about:config's values anymore?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32210 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Hide the "Tor" section in preferences when TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH=1 is set

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32210: Hide the "Tor" section in preferences when TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH=1 is set
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201910R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Just add a checkbox or about:config to completely disable Tor and allow
 user to use their own proxy configuration(socks/http/pac) like in 8.5.

 I had to downgrade TB9 to TB8.5.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32224 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add extensions.torbutton.use_nontor_proxy back to Tor Browser 9!!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32224: Add extensions.torbutton.use_nontor_proxy back to Tor Browser 9!!
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 And why there's no option to set proxy configuration? I need to use my PAC
 or HTTP proxy.

 Why remove user's choice?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32224 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add extensions.torbutton.use_nontor_proxy back to Tor Browser 9!!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32224: Add extensions.torbutton.use_nontor_proxy back to Tor Browser 9!!
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  invalid =>


Comment:

 Excuse me but did you actually tried? This thing broke in TB9.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32240 [Core Tor/Tor]: Travis: Make chutney work on Xenial and Bionic images

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32240: Travis: Make chutney work on Xenial and Bionic images
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-ci, chutney, 043-should,
 Severity:  Normal   |  029-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport,
 |  041-backport, 042-backport
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:  1|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We get weird permissions errors like this:
 {{{
 FAIL: basic-min
 Detail: chutney/tools/warnings.sh
 /home/travis/build/teor2345/tor/chutney/net/nodes.1571845015
 Warning: Can't create/check datadirectory
 /home/travis/build/teor2345/tor/chutney/net/nodes/002r Number: 1
 Warning: Could not open
 "/home/travis/build/teor2345/tor/chutney/net/nodes/000a/key-pinning-
 journal" for mmap(): Permission denied Number: 1
 Warning: Could not open
 "/home/travis/build/teor2345/tor/chutney/net/nodes/001a/key-pinning-
 journal" for mmap(): Permission denied Number: 1
 Warning: Could not open
 "/home/travis/build/teor2345/tor/chutney/net/nodes/003c/cached-certs":
 Permission denied Number: 1
 Warning: Could not open
 "/home/travis/build/teor2345/tor/chutney/net/nodes/003c/cached-consensus"
 for mmap(): Permission denied Number: 1
 Warning: Could not open
 "/home/travis/build/teor2345/tor/chutney/net/nodes/003c/cached-
 descriptors" for mmap(): Permission denied Number: 1
 Warning: Could not open
 "/home/travis/build/teor2345/tor/chutney/net/nodes/003c/cached-extrainfo"
 for mmap(): Permission denied Number: 1
 Warning: Could not open
 "/home/travis/build/teor2345/tor/chutney/net/nodes/003c/cached-microdesc-
 consensus" for mmap(): Permission denied Number: 1
 Warning: Could not open
 "/home/travis/build/teor2345/tor/chutney/net/nodes/003c/cached-microdescs"
 for mmap(): Permission denied Number: 1
 Warning: Could not open
 "/home/travis/build/teor2345/tor/chutney/net/nodes/003c/cached-
 microdescs.new": Permission denied Number: 1
 Warning: Could not open
 "/home/travis/build/teor2345/tor/chutney/net/nodes/003c/unverified-
 consensus" for mmap(): Permission denied Number: 1
 Warning: Could not open
 "/home/travis/build/teor2345/tor/chutney/net/nodes/003c/unverified-
 microdesc-consensus" for mmap(): Permission denied Number: 1
 Warning: Directory /home/travis/build/teor2345/tor/chutney/net/nodes/002r
 cannot be read: Permission denied Number: 1
 Warning: Error initializing keys; exiting Number: 1
 Warning: Error loading key-pinning journal: Permission denied Number: 2
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32191 [Core Tor/Tor]: when cross-compiling, lzma and zstd will be detected on build system

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32191: when cross-compiling, lzma and zstd will be detected on build system
--+
 Reporter:  eighthave |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  Android 042-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by eighthave):

 PKG_CONFIG_SYSROOT_DIR doesn't seem right because it includes the prefix
 e.g. `/usr`. Here's the snipped from the docs:

 "Modify -I and -L to use the directories located in target sysroot. this
 option is usefull when crosscompiling package that use pkg-config to
 determine CFLAGS anf LDFLAGS. -I and -L are modified to point to the new
 system root. this means that a -I/usr/include/libfoo will become
 -I/var/target/usr/include/libfoo with a PKG_CONFIG_SYSROOT_DIR equal to
 /var/target (same rule apply to -L)"

 `export PKG_CONFIG_PATH=$EXTERNAL_ROOT/lib/pkgconfig` has been working in
 the tor-android project.

 About gitlab-ci, I have the `.gitlab-ci.yml` updates already done.  And
 they don't have to be monitored by the network team to be useful.  They'll
 take affect on anyone who has a tor fork in a gitlab instance.  That said,
 gitlab-ci can be set up like Travis-CI and Appveyor in GitHub pull
 requests.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28970 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_client.c:624: setup_intro_circ_auth_key: Non-fatal assertion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28970: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_client.c:624:
setup_intro_circ_auth_key: Non-fatal assertion
-+-
 Reporter:  torcrash |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-backport, 041-backport,  |  Actual Points:  0.1
  040-backport, 035-backport, tor-client, tor-   |
  hs, postfreeze-ok, 040-unreached-must, |
  network-team-roadmap-august, regression?, 041  |
  -unreached-must, 042-should|
Parent ID:  #29995   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 tor-client, tor-hs, postfreeze-ok, 040-unreached-must, network-team-
 roadmap-august, regression?, 041-unreached-must, 042-should
 =>
 042-backport, 041-backport, 040-backport, 035-backport, tor-client,
 tor-hs, postfreeze-ok, 040-unreached-must, network-team-roadmap-
 august, regression?, 041-unreached-must, 042-should
 * reviewer:  asn => teor


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29206 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: New design for client -- server protocol for Snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29206: New design for client -- server protocol for Snowflake
---+---
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task   | Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake|Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-september  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  dcf|Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor28-must
---+---
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:28 dcf]:

 Thanks! This feedback was very helpful. I made several changes to the
 implementation. [https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/tree/sequencing2
 Here] are a series of commits on top of the old branch, and
 [https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/tree/sequencing2_squashed here] is a
 newly squashed version. The main changes are:
 - I restructured the protocol a bit to only send the session ID at the
 start. This work as long as we're using the WebRTC datachannel with full
 reliability, and I think it's worth doing for this very simple precursor
 to Turbo Tunnel. The reason for the change was to simplify the calls to
 `NewSnowflake` so we don't have to pass in the header we read in order to
 determine which `SnowflakeConn` the snowflake belongs to. The drawback to
 this is that the server has to remember to call ReadSessionID before
 calling Read (which should be straightforward because Read should only be
 called on a `SnowflakeConn` and at the start, the WebRTC connection
 doesn't belong to a `SnowflakeConn` yet.

  Basically, throughout writing this, I've tried to keep the client and
 server as symmetric as possible so that we share most of the code. This is
 a bit different from the approach taken in Turbo Tunnel.

 - I fixed the race conditions and found a bug that was causing a seg
 fault. The server now seems to be running consistently well without
 crashing.

 To address specific comments:
 > Could `Flurry.conn` be a plain `net.Conn`, and `Flurry.or` also? Or do
 they need the specialization to `*proto.Snowflake.Conn` and
 `*net.TCPConn`?
 Not the way I've written in right now because of the calls to
 `Flurry.conn.NewSnowflake`
 
[https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/blob/sequencing_squashed/server/server.go#L186
 here]. I don't think generalizing this at the expense of complexity at the
 client is desirable, since Flurries are specific to Snowflake connections.
 > > I see some motivation for another feature that allows us to set some
 kind of FIN or RST flag to notify the client that the OR port has been
 closed and the server that the client has closed the connection.
 >
 > Yes, but in the Tor model, it essentially never happens that a
 relay/bridge closes an ORPort connection, right? It's usually the client
 that decides when to disconnect.
 The exception to this is if there is the client is giving the bridge bad
 data. Of course that '''shouldn't''' happen unless there is a bug in the
 client so maybe that's ok to just let time out. I think you're right here
 that this feature is unnecessary.
 >
 > > Perhaps 10s is too long a timeout?
 >
 > I don't understand this. Do you mean too ''short'' a timeout? As a
 retransmission timer, 10 s doesn't seem short, but as a timer that
 terminates the whole end-to-end connection, it does seem short. Since in
 this design, there's no retransmission except when kicked off by a
 `NewSnowflake` transition, it might be worth increasing the timeout.

 You're right that 10s is short for a network connection timeout. This
 brings us to what remains to be a tricky engineering challenge here. The
 goal of the sequencing layer is to allow the client to recover from a
 faulty snowflake. However, it takes 30s for the connection to go stale in
 the client's `checkForStaleness` function. So it takes 30s for a client to
 request a new snowflake and start se nding data through it. In all of my
 tests, the SOCKS connection timed out well before the client connected to
 a new snowflake. Since a new SOCKS connection means a new snowflake
 session and new OR connection anyway, this means the client never actually
 recovers and the browser reports a connection error.

 So my thought was that if we lowered it to 10s, we have a chance to
 recover before the SOCKS connection goes stale. However in practice this
 is still a bit too long and I'm still seeing SOCKS timeouts.

 So, I'm wondering if it's ok if we make this even shorter. All it means is
 that the client will abandon the proxy connection for a better one with
 less 

Re: [tor-bugs] #28970 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_client.c:624: setup_intro_circ_auth_key: Non-fatal assertion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28970: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/hs_client.c:624:
setup_intro_circ_auth_key: Non-fatal assertion
-+-
 Reporter:  torcrash |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, tor-hs, postfreeze-ok,   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  040-unreached-must, network-team-roadmap-  |
  august, regression?, 041-unreached-must,   |
  042-should |
Parent ID:  #29995   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 This looks fine, but do you want to backport it to 0.3.5 and later?
 If we don't fix it back to 0.3.5, people will send us bug reports.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31241 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor config validation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31241: Refactor config validation
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I've got a WIP branch called `ticket31241_v2` with a PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1458 .  Not yet ready for review;
 it needs more testing and documentation first. The PR is just so I can see
 what coveralls says.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32191 [Core Tor/Tor]: when cross-compiling, lzma and zstd will be detected on build system

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32191: when cross-compiling, lzma and zstd will be detected on build system
--+
 Reporter:  eighthave |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  Android 042-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:6 eighthave]:
 > It would not be too much work for me to setup a cross-compiling test CI
 job in gitlab-ci if you would use it.  I don't really know how to do that
 in travis, since you can start with a plain base image, AFAIK.

 As far as I know, the network team monitors Jenkins, Travis, and Appveyor
 CI. That's enough for now. We might move to GitLab after the ticket
 tracker transition. Or a few people might be using GitLab for their own
 builds.

 If you want to contribute GitLab configs, that's fine, but you should also
 find someone to run and monitor them.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32191 [Core Tor/Tor]: when cross-compiling, lzma and zstd will be detected on build system

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32191: when cross-compiling, lzma and zstd will be detected on build system
--+
 Reporter:  eighthave |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  Android 042-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Ok, then try these env vars, and let us know how you go:
 * PKG_CONFIG_SYSROOT_DIR=external

 If that doesn't work:
 * PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR=
 * PKG_CONFIG_PATH=

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31573 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Uncaught exception in SessionStore.jsm with Tor Browser based on ESR 68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31573: Uncaught exception in SessionStore.jsm with Tor Browser based on ESR 68
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-   |  Actual Points:
  regression, tbb-9.0.1-can  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * owner:  tbb-team => pospeselr
 * status:  new => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: The "Security Level" text is hard to read in dark mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31658: The "Security Level" text is hard to read in dark mode
-+-
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf|  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201910R, |  Actual Points:  0.1
  tbb-security-slider, tbb-9.0-issues,   |
  tbb-9.0.1-can  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * owner:  tbb-team => pospeselr
 * status:  needs_review => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: The "Security Level" text is hard to read in dark mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31658: The "Security Level" text is hard to read in dark mode
-+-
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201910R, |  Actual Points:  0.1
  tbb-security-slider, tbb-9.0-issues,   |
  tbb-9.0.1-can  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * keywords:
 ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201910, tbb-security-slider, tbb-9.0-issues,
 tbb-9.0.1-can
 =>
 ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201910R, tbb-security-slider, tbb-9.0-issues,
 tbb-9.0.1-can
 * status:  new => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 Switched the color to --panel-disabled-color to match the rest of
 'disabled/dark' text in the Firefox UI.

 tor-browser: https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/richard/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_31658

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32239 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: setup a cache frontend for the blog

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32239: setup a cache frontend for the blog
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32090   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 TODO:

  * firewall
  * DNS? /etc/hosts?
  * install and config
  * basic hits to see if it works
  * eval benchmark tools
  * do benchmark (from a new test machine?)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32239 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: setup a cache frontend for the blog

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32239: setup a cache frontend for the blog
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32090   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Description changed by anarcat:

Old description:

> design docs in https://help.torproject.org/tsa/howto/cache/
>
> launch checklist:
>
>  1. alternatives listing and comparison (done)
>  2. deploy a test virtual machine by hand, say `cache-01.tpo` (done)
>  3. benchmark the different alternatives
>  4. setup secondary node with Puppet, say `cache-02.tpo`
>  4. validation benchmark against both nodes
>  5. lower DNS to 300 seconds, wait an hour
>  6. flip DNS to the cache node, wait and monitor for 5 minutes
>  7. raise DNS back to 1h if all goes well.

New description:

 design docs in https://help.torproject.org/tsa/howto/cache/

 launch checklist:

  1. alternatives listing and comparison (done)
  2. deploy a test virtual machine by hand, say `cache-01.tpo` (done)
  3. benchmark the different alternatives
  4. setup secondary node with Puppet, say `cache-02.tpo`
  4. validation benchmark against both nodes
  5. lower DNS to 300 seconds, wait an hour
  6. flip DNS to the cache node, wait and monitor for 5 minutes
  7. raise DNS back to 1h if all goes well.

 Disaster recovery:

  1. flip DNS back to pantheon

--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32239 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: setup a cache frontend for the blog

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32239: setup a cache frontend for the blog
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32090   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  assigned => accepted


Old description:

> design docs in https://help.torproject.org/tsa/howto/cache/

New description:

 design docs in https://help.torproject.org/tsa/howto/cache/

 launch checklist:

  1. alternatives listing and comparison (done)
  2. deploy a test virtual machine by hand, say `cache-01.tpo` (done)
  3. benchmark the different alternatives
  4. setup secondary node with Puppet, say `cache-02.tpo`
  4. validation benchmark against both nodes
  5. lower DNS to 300 seconds, wait an hour
  6. flip DNS to the cache node, wait and monitor for 5 minutes
  7. raise DNS back to 1h if all goes well.

--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20218 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix and refactor and redocument routerstatus_has_changed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20218: Fix and refactor and redocument routerstatus_has_changed
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, 029-proposed, tor-control, |  Actual Points:  0.5
  easy, spec-conformance, review-group-31,   |
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by maurice_pibouin):

 * cc: maurice_pibouin (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32239 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: setup a cache frontend for the blog

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32239: setup a cache frontend for the blog
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin   |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #32090
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 design docs in https://help.torproject.org/tsa/howto/cache/

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32210 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Hide the "Tor" section in preferences when TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH=1 is set

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32210: Hide the "Tor" section in preferences when TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH=1 is set
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201910R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * cc: tbb-team (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32210 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Hide the "Tor" section in preferences when TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH=1 is set

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32210: Hide the "Tor" section in preferences when TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH=1 is set
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201910R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can => tbb-9.0-issues,
 tbb-9.0.1-can, TorBrowserTeam201910R
 * cc: tbb-team (removed)
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Small patch to hide/disable the tor page in about:preferences when tor-
 launcher does not own the tor daemon (ie when using system tor)

 tor-browser: https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/richard/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_32210

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32238 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Some websites not loading pictures after upgrade to Tor Browser 9.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32238: Some websites not loading pictures after upgrade to Tor Browser 9.0
--+--
 Reporter:  AxBnO3|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 I wonder if this is related to the subresources (including images) coming
 from Cloudflare.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31851 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow Tor to be compiled without support for relay mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31851: Allow Tor to be compiled without support for relay mode
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-design, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:  0.2
  october|
Parent ID:   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Here's my attempt to list the parts of the relay code that could be
 modularized, in rough order of operation.  Within the phases, things could
 be done in any order.  I've tried to handle things on a roughly "top down"
 basis, removing each thing before removing the things that it depends on.

 PHASE 0.

 1. The relay_periodic.c entry point.
 2. The relay_sys.c entry point.

 PHASE 1.

 1. Acting as a directory cache.
 2. Responding to CREATE and EXTEND cells
 3. Responding to BEGIN cells
 4. Listening for OR connections
 5. Accounting
 6. Generating and uploading descriptors.
 7. Self-testing
 8. Responding to introduce/establish_intro/establish_rend cells.

 PHASE 2.

 1. Server-side DNS
 2. Key management.
 3. Statistics backend code.
 4. TLS responder code.

 PHASE 3.

 1. Whatever is left.

 At each stage, we should work to minimize layer-violations: there should
 generally not be calls from src/core/ into relay-specific code, and we
 should plan to refactor as needed to minimize them.  We can reduce layer
 violations in parallel with the above.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32236 [Applications/Tor Browser]: White borders in Tor Browser 9

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32236: White borders in Tor Browser 9
--+-
 Reporter:  thefuckisthepointanymore  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by gk):

 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32200 [Applications/Tor Browser]: only include required bits of OpenSSL in Android builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32200: only include required bits of OpenSSL in Android builds
--+--
 Reporter:  eighthave |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28704| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  Android, tbb-mobile => tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm
 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser
 * parent:   => #28704


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32238 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Some websites not loading pictures after upgrade to Tor Browser 9.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32238: Some websites not loading pictures after upgrade to Tor Browser 9.0
--+--
 Reporter:  AxBnO3|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-9.0-issues
 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  Applications => Applications/Tor Browser


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32238 [Applications]: Some websites not loading pictures after upgrade to Tor Browser 9.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32238: Some websites not loading pictures after upgrade to Tor Browser 9.0
--+
 Reporter:  AxBnO3|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 I think I might have experienced this too. I did some reload clicks, and
 some shift-reload clicks, and they didn't help. Then I did a 'new circuit
 for this site' click and the problem went away. That is alas my only hint
 for now; I'll add more details if I hit it again.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32238 [Applications]: Some websites not loading pictures after upgrade to Tor Browser 9.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32238: Some websites not loading pictures after upgrade to Tor Browser 9.0
--+
 Reporter:  AxBnO3|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by AxBnO3):

 * Attachment "scrreenshot" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32238 [Applications]: Some websites not loading pictures after upgrade to Tor Browser 9.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32238: Some websites not loading pictures after upgrade to Tor Browser 9.0
+--
 Reporter:  AxBnO3  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  Applications
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 On some websites pictures are not loading after update to  Tor Browser 9.0

 Examples:

 Avatars and other pictures on the forum of index.hr news portal.

 http://www.index.hr/indexforum/postovi/266533/kad-putin-da-erdoganupo-
 prstima-/1


 User on Reddit complaining that pictures are not loading on wallhaven.cc.

 
https://www.reddit.com/r/TOR/comments/dlvw6g/tor_browser_90_cant_load_any_images_in_wallhavencc/

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30783 [Applications/Tor Browser]: End of Year Fundraising Campaign - about:tor (was: End of Year Fundraising Campaign Banner)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30783: End of Year Fundraising Campaign - about:tor
-+-
 Reporter:  pili |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-9.0,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201910   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Description changed by pili:

Old description:

> Let's include a banner in Tor Browser 9.0 stable in time for the End of
> Year Campaign.
>
> There will be 2 rounds of banners:
>
> - First round will happen around 2019-10-22 (9.0 stable release)
> - Second round will happen around 2019-12-10 (9.0 first security release)

New description:

 Let's update about:tor in Tor Browser 9.0 stable for the End of Year
 Campaign.

 There will (potentially) be 2 rounds of updates:

 - First round will happen around 2019-11-04 (9.0.1  release)
 - Second round will happen around 2019-12-03 (9.0.2 first security
 release)

--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32210 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Hide the "Tor" section in preferences when TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH=1 is set

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32210: Hide the "Tor" section in preferences when TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH=1 is set
---+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by boklm):

 * cc: tbb-team (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31130 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use Debian 10 for our Android container images

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31130: Use Debian 10 for our Android container images
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31127| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by boklm):

 apt can be configured with `Acquire::Check-Valid-Until "false"` to ignore
 this expiration.

 But in this case, it's probably better to not use apt to install openjdk,
 and instead manually download the 3 openjdk packages we need, and install
 them with dpkg.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32210 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Hide the "Tor" section in preferences when TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH=1 is set

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32210: Hide the "Tor" section in preferences when TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH=1 is set
---+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * owner:  tbb-team => pospeselr
 * status:  new => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30783 [Applications/Tor Browser]: End of Year Fundraising Campaign Banner

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30783: End of Year Fundraising Campaign Banner
-+-
 Reporter:  pili |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-9.0,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201910   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sstevenson):

 Can we use the following redirects so that we can track the hits to the
 donate page?

 /donate/donate-tbi-tb1  --- about:tor donate button (english)
 /donate/donate-tbi-tb2  --- about:tor donate button (language2)
 /donate/donate-tbi-tb3  --- about:tor donate button (language3)
 /donate/donate-tbi-tb4  --- about:tor donate button (language4)
 /donate/donate-tbi-tb5  --- about:tor donate button (language5)
 /donate/donate-tbi-tb6  --- about:tor donate button (language6)
 /donate/donate-tbi-tb7  --- about:tor donate button (language7)
 /donate/donate-tbi-tb8  --- about:tor donate button (language8)
 /donate/donate-tbi-tb9  --- about:tor donate button (language10)
 /donate/donate-tbi-tb10 --- about:tor donate button (language10)
 etc...for each localized language

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31130 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use Debian 10 for our Android container images

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31130: Use Debian 10 for our Android container images
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31127| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by sisbell):

 When I try to apply an older snapshot, it says expired. So I'm wondering
 if specifying a specific snapshot release is really the the way to go (and
 if it isn't ,the snapshots and dependencies will change).


 {{{
 Running hooks in /etc/ca-certificates/update.d...
 done.
 Hit:1 http://deb.debian.org/debian buster InRelease
 Get:2 http://deb.debian.org/debian buster/main Translation-en [5967 kB]
 Get:3 https://snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian/20190930T204642Z unstable
 InRelease [139 kB]
 Reading package lists...
 E: Release file for
 
https://snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian/20190930T204642Z/dists/unstable/InRelease
 is expired (invalid since 15d 22h 9min 17s). Updates for this repository
 will not be applied.

 }}}


 My pinning specifies release. I'll look into if this is an issue with
 snapshots /InRelease expiration

 {{{
 Package: openjdk-8-jdk
 Pin: origin snapshot.debian.org
 Pin: release a=unstable
 Pin-Priority: 600

 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32187 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clean up options_validate() interface

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32187: Clean up options_validate() interface
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  #31241| Points:  .3
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 > Seems fine, where will we make options const?

 Making the "options" argument const will have to happen piece by piece.
 There are a bunch of places where we change it inside options_validate().

 My plan here is: The parent ticket will change the behavior of the
 callbacks, so that the options argument is only non-const in a "legacy"
 verify callback.  As we move verify logic into the new system, we can move
 pieces of it into non-legacy callbacks.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32236 [- Select a component]: White borders in Tor Browser 9 (was: White boarders - not like Trump intended)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32236: White borders in Tor Browser 9
--+-
 Reporter:  thefuckisthepointanymore  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31919 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a check-local target that runs our coccinelle parsing problems script

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31919: Add a check-local target that runs our coccinelle parsing problems 
script
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-can   |  Actual Points:  0.3
Parent ID:  #31705| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Quick comment on patch:

 I'm not 100% sure about requiring everybody to install coccinelle for them
 to be able to run the pre-commit hook.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31130 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use Debian 10 for our Android container images

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31130: Use Debian 10 for our Android container images
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31127| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:12 sisbell]:
 > I still get missing dependencies like below so I'm assuming I need to
 specify the entire dependency chain (and versions) here to get openjdk-8
 installed? Or is there a simpler way?
 >
 > {{{
 > The following packages have unmet dependencies:
 >  openjdk-8-jre-headless : Depends: libc6 (>= 2.29) but 2.28-10 is to be
 installed
 > E: Unable to correct problems, you have held broken packages.
 > }}}

 It looks like openjdk-8-jre-headless version `8u222-b10-1` from September
 still depends on libc6 2.28, so we could use that version instead to avoid
 updating the libc.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32210 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Hide the "Tor" section in preferences when TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH=1 is set

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32210: Hide the "Tor" section in preferences when TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH=1 is set
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > Someone help I cannnot read any website!
 >
 > extensions.torbutton.use_nontor_proxy true not workingg

 I don't see how this is at all relevant to this ticket.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32236 [- Select a component]: White boarders - not like Trump intended

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32236: White boarders - not like Trump intended
--+
 Reporter:  thefuckisthepointanymore  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by PROTechThor):

 This is not a defect, but a feature. It aims to reduce your fingerprint.
 The technique is called "letterboxing". You can read more here:
 https://support.torproject.org/tbb/maximized-torbrowser-window/.

 It's not recommended to disable this feature, as it will decrease your
 anonymity. But if it bothers you, then you can go to about:config and set
 privacy.resistFingerprinting.letterboxing to false. Not recommended
 though!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32200 [- Select a component]: only include required bits of OpenSSL in Android builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32200: only include required bits of OpenSSL in Android builds
--+
 Reporter:  eighthave |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  Android, tbb-mobile   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 For what it's worth, I believe that OpenSSL is pretty good about disabling
 identifiers in the headers when you disable them.  If Tor compiles with
 it, you probably didn't disable anything crucial.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27604 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Relocating the Tor Browser directory is broken with Tor Browser 8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27604: Relocating the Tor Browser directory is broken with Tor Browser 8
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:  0.6
  tbb-8.0.1-can, TorBrowserTeam201910|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by morar):

 I made some test:
 1) Relocating the Tor Browser 7.5.6 and {{{torrc}}} not updated.

 2) Relocating the Tor Browser 8.5.5 after delete {{{extensions.json}}} and
 {{{torrc}}} not updated.

 3) Relocating the Tor Browser 9.0 and {{{torrc}}} not updated.

 In all three cases

 {{{
 DataDirectory C:\XXX\Tor Browser\Browser\TorBrowser\Data\Tor
 GeoIPFile C:\XXX\Tor Browser\Browser\TorBrowser\Data\Tor\geoip
 GeoIPv6File C:\XXX\Tor Browser\Browser\TorBrowser\Data\Tor\geoip6
 }}}

 are not updated with the new folder.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30552 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Android - Clean up torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30552: Android - Clean up torrc
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sisbell):

 From what I can tell, we have a bunch of entries with 0 value (the
 defaults for those fields). I'll remove those. It requires switching from
 primitive int to class Integer so we can detect if the value is null and
 shouldn't be set.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31130 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use Debian 10 for our Android container images

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31130: Use Debian 10 for our Android container images
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31127| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by sisbell):

 Replying to [comment:11 boklm]:
 > Replying to [comment:10 sisbell]:
 > > I try to install ca-certificates but still get the same error
 regarding Certificate failed.  I'll need to investigate more. Its
 installing from the following location
 > >
 > > {{{
 > > Get:3 http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu eoan/main amd64 ca-certificates
 all 20190110 [146 kB]
 > > }}}
 >
 > It needs to be installed in the debian buster container as this is where
 the apt using snapshot.debian.org is run, not the ubuntu one which we only
 use to run debootstrap.

 Ok so the installation of ca-certificates works from container image. I'm
 using a specific version of the snapshot, which I think we would want to
 do to keep the packages pegged to a single snapshot.

 {{{
 https://snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian/20191022T222828Z/
 }}}

 Apt pinning also is working.

 I still get missing dependencies like below so I'm assuming I need to
 specify the entire dependency chain (and versions) here to get openjdk-8
 installed? Or is there a simpler way?

 {{{
 The following packages have unmet dependencies:
  openjdk-8-jre-headless : Depends: libc6 (>= 2.29) but 2.28-10 is to be
 installed
 E: Unable to correct problems, you have held broken packages.
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31371 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: Add DoS defense counter to DoS heartbeat message

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31371: hs: Add DoS defense counter to DoS heartbeat message
---+---
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, 042-deferred-20190918  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor27-must
---+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * owner:  (none) => dgoulet
 * status:  new => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31958 [Core Tor/Tor]: connection_dir_is_anonymous: Non-fatal assertion !(CONST_TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_chan == NULL) failed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31958: connection_dir_is_anonymous: Non-fatal assertion
!(CONST_TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_chan == NULL) failed
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, 042-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30344| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 Nope... still there in 042! :(

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31958 [Core Tor/Tor]: connection_dir_is_anonymous: Non-fatal assertion !(CONST_TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_chan == NULL) failed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31958: connection_dir_is_anonymous: Non-fatal assertion
!(CONST_TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_chan == NULL) failed
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, 042-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30344| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  reopened => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32237 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a Python script to replace C identifiers and generate commit messages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32237: Add a Python script to replace C identifiers and generate commit 
messages
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 See branch `rename_c_identifier` with PR in
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1457

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32237 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a Python script to replace C identifiers and generate commit messages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32237: Add a Python script to replace C identifiers and generate commit 
messages
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
 * actualpoints:   => .1


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32237 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a Python script to replace C identifiers and generate commit messages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32237: Add a Python script to replace C identifiers and generate commit 
messages
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 I sometimes want to replace identifiers in the source code.  When I do
 that, I wind up writing a little perl script, then a shell script to apply
 that perl script to all the code, and then I write a commit message.  But
 if I'm feeling lazy, I might skip a step, or mix other stuff in with the
 automated commit.  That's not so great.

 I've got a script to automate this process.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31632 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: Service doesn't re-upload descriptor on circuit failure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31632: hs-v3: Service doesn't re-upload descriptor on circuit failure
---+---
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, 042-deferred-20190918  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30200 | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  asn|Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor27-must
---+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => dgoulet


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs