Re: [tor-bugs] #32310 [Circumvention]: ExcludeNodes{} Tor Browser Bundle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32310: ExcludeNodes{} Tor Browser Bundle
+
 Reporter:  ExcludeNodeEnhancement  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Select node
 From nodelist
 Where node='Nodeid';

 Possible custom path and circuit automation by collective of node ids or
 stick to random as default.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32310 [Circumvention]: ExcludeNodes{} Tor Browser Bundle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32310: ExcludeNodes{} Tor Browser Bundle
+
 Reporter:  ExcludeNodeEnhancement  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Agreed, bumping for review.

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[tor-bugs] #32310 [Circumvention]: ExcludeNodes{} Tor Browser Bundle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32310: ExcludeNodes{} Tor Browser Bundle
+---
 Reporter:  ExcludeNodeEnhancement  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Component:  Circumvention
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---
 Given potential rouge nodes or adversaries, add exclude node option in GUI
 of TBB. Although anonymity by plausible deniability is the goal, certain
 users may want to exclude US or GB nodes due to NSA or GCHQ actors or
 simply customize their path through the tor network to avoid having a
 circuit created and thus routed by an actor.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19859 [Core Tor/Tor]: Expose stream isolation information to controllers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19859: Expose stream isolation information to controllers
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs tor-control dns isolation |  Actual Points:
  needs-spec needs-design term-project   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 It would be very nice to refactor, but it isn't an absolute requirement.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32309 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Search Engines on Tor Browser bundle for all platforms.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32309: Search Engines on Tor Browser bundle for all platforms.
--+--
 Reporter:  whatisusername|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arma):

 * cc: dcf (removed)


Comment:

 (and un-cc'ing dcf on the theory that he is fully capable of adding
 himself back to the cc line if he likes :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32309 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Search Engines on Tor Browser bundle for all platforms.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32309: Search Engines on Tor Browser bundle for all platforms.
--+--
 Reporter:  whatisusername|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arma):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  Circumvention/Censorship analysis => Applications/Tor Browser


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[tor-bugs] #32309 [Circumvention/Censorship analysis]: Search Engines on Tor Browser bundle for all platforms.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32309: Search Engines on Tor Browser bundle for all platforms.
-+-
 Reporter:   |  Owner:  (none)
  whatisusername |
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Circumvention/Censorship
 |  analysis
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
 Is there a reason why google wikipedia, twiter etc are included? None of
 these are privacy respecting and yet you only include duckduckgo. Please
 add alternatives such as 5-10 additional choices for the user. FW'ed to
 Dev. please

 Qwant
 Searx
 Yippy
 Baidu
 Yandex
 Startpage

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19859 [Core Tor/Tor]: Expose stream isolation information to controllers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19859: Expose stream isolation information to controllers
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs tor-control dns isolation |  Actual Points:
  needs-spec needs-design term-project   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by JeremyRand):

 My tor patch is triggering a build warning `problem function-size` for
 `control_event_stream_status`.  It looks like there's already an exception
 for this function.  The standard threshold for triggering a warning is
 100; the status quo for that function (as listed in `exceptions.txt`) is
 118; my patch increases it to 124.  Should I just modify the exception to
 allow 124, or am I going to need to do some refactoring of that function
 as a prerequisite to merging?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #14977 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB with -allow-remote conflict with Firefox and leak opened pages to it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14977: TBB with -allow-remote conflict with Firefox and leak opened pages to it
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-stoppoint-navigation,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-usability-stoppoint-app|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 It does appears again en 9.00
 I have to downgrade to 8.5.5

 How to reproduce:
 - Platform: Windows 10
 - Install Mozilla Firefox 70.0 (64-bit)
 - Install Tor Browser 9.0
 - Open a Mozilla Firefox window
 - Run: "C:\path\to\Tor Browser\Browser\firefox.exe" --allow-remote
 https://check.torproject.org/
 - It opens https://check.torproject.org/ in Firefox instead Tor Browser

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32305 [Applications/Tor Browser]: DownThemAll cannot start downloads in Tor browsers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32305: DownThemAll cannot start downloads in Tor browsers
--+--
 Reporter:  Dragonrider   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Thorin):

 Replying to [comment:1 arma]:
 > I guess the question is...

 The problem seems to be PB mode due to a lack of indexedDB
  - https://github.com/downthemall/downthemall/issues/159

 So I would consider this an upstream issue

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32053 [Applications/Tor Browser]: macOS bundles for Tor Browser 9.0a8 are not reproducible

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32053: macOS bundles for Tor Browser 9.0a8 are not reproducible
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910, tbb-9.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression, tbb-9.0.1-can  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Okay, time to give an update here. `bug_32053_v2`
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/log/?h=bug_32053_v2) contains two commits that reduce the build
 time while still being able to reproduce the bug. First of all, I am not
 100% yet that LTO is not introducing a second reproducibility issue here
 but disabling it does not solve the bug I am hunting. It has the nice
 side-effect, though, that without LTO the build time of `libgkrust.a` goes
 down another approx. 2 minutes on my faster machine.

 I don't blow the whole obj dir away anymore. Rather, I build everything
 the first time and if it's matching I just remove `libstyle-*.rlib`. After
 a while I get different Stylo .rlib files. Keeping those .rlib files and
 trying to check whether `geckoservo` or even `gkrust` builds trigger the
 bug (by just deleting their respective artifacts and checking whether
 `libgkrust.a` changes) is negative. So, I am fairly confident that
 building Stylo is the problem here.

 That moves me to phase 2 in this exciting process: I'll start bisecting
 the Rust compiler to figure out where this bug started (while avoiding
 #26475 :) ) and I'll try to save even a bit more build time by not caring
 about `libgkrust.a` but doing the SHA-256 check against the Stylo .rlib
 directly.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32224 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add extensions.torbutton.use_nontor_proxy back to Tor Browser 9!!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32224: Add extensions.torbutton.use_nontor_proxy back to Tor Browser 9!!
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 Thanks for getting back to us and investigating. Seems this is working.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32224 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add extensions.torbutton.use_nontor_proxy back to Tor Browser 9!!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32224: Add extensions.torbutton.use_nontor_proxy back to Tor Browser 9!!
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by blueOrigin):

 Tor Browser 9.0

 I managed to revert to using a manual proxy as follows:

 In about:config
   extensions.torbutton.use_nontor_proxy = true
   extensions.torlauncher.start_tor = false
   network.proxy.share_proxy_settings = true
   network.proxy.ftp = 
   network.proxy.http = 
   network.proxy.ssl = 
   network.proxy.ftp_port = 
   network.proxy.http_port = 
   network.proxy.ssl_port = 

 Thanks guys!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26345 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable tracking protection UI in FF67-esr

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26345: Disable tracking protection UI in FF67-esr
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:  1
  TorBrowserTeam201909R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-
Changes (by ghfsdhsdgsdgs):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 >With respect to that, Firefox moved the UI for changing cookie blocking
 preference (network.cookie.cookieBehavior) to the new content blocking
 section in about:preferences. If we hide that (as the patch currently
 does), there is no way that users can change it via UI. I'm not sure if
 that's so bad, since this would only be for advanced users that know what
 they are doing, and still is possible to modify it via about:config.

 Hello.

 As you know, the current patch makes it impossible for normal users to
 disable cookies.

 Disabling the tracking protection ui option is essential to prevent
 damaging fingerprinting.

 But forcing users to accept cookies on their computer by hiding the ui
 button is a breach of trust and depending on the user/website usage
 pattern could compromise a users privacy.

 There is legitimate reasons for users to want to block all cookies.
 There is legitimate reasons for users to want to
 manage/whitelist/blacklist cookies.

 Telling normal users to disable cookies via about:config is unrealistic.

 I do not ask for the patch that hides dangerous options to be reverted.
 But can you please move the cookie blocking preference back out of the
 hidden section?
 Or can you hide all other dangerous options in the new tracking protection
 section except the cookie blocking preference?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32303 [Applications/Tor Browser]: obfs4proxy incompatibility on Android Q

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32303: obfs4proxy incompatibility on Android Q
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201910,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201911, tbb-9.0-issues => tbb-rbm,
 TorBrowserTeam201910, tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13469 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Windows 32bit installer is missing many languages from the NSIS file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13469: Windows 32bit installer is missing many languages from the NSIS file
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  l10n  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * priority:  Medium => High


Comment:

 We have actually [https://blog.torproject.org/comment/284874#comment-
 284874reports reports] that the situation for 32bit installer users have
 gone worse due to the changes in #23561 which solved this bug for Windows
 users. Let's raise the priority then.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32286 [Applications/Tor Browser]: The 32bit Windows installer seems to only give 2 installer locales as a choice (sometimes?)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32286: The 32bit Windows installer seems to only give 2 installer locales as a
choice (sometimes?)
--+---
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 It seems like this is #13469 but things have gone worse for some users
 since we fixed the issue for 64bit installers. Let's track the problem
 there.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32027 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Bump version of Go to 1.13+

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32027: Bump version of Go to 1.13+
--+--
 Reporter:  cohosh|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31688| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: JeremyRand (added)
 * parent:   => #31688


Comment:

 #31689 is a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31689 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Upgrade go to 1.13+

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31689: Upgrade go to 1.13+
--+---
 Reporter:  JeremyRand|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31688| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:4 sysrqb]:
 > Can this be closed as a duplicate of #32027? (I realize this ticket came
 first, but that ticket has more info).

 Sounds good.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32178 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor adds trailing space character to log events

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32178: Tor adds trailing space character to log events
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy intro|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.3.x-final


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[tor-bugs] #32308 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Stop inner letterbox jiggling as border is dragged

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32308: Stop inner letterbox jiggling as border is dragged
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 TBB 9.0
 Linux 64
 Cinnamon

 The inner content area of the letterbox jiggles violently as the Tor
 Browser window border is dragged to resize.  The effect is worse on
 horizontal (width) than vertical (height).  Ideally, the content area
 would crisply snap as the border shrinks or grows.

 SEO: shakes, vibrates, spazm

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32303 [Applications/Tor Browser]: obfs4proxy incompatibility on Android Q

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32303: obfs4proxy incompatibility on Android Q
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201911,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-issues |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 The patch applies cleanly onto 1.12.9 - I haven't built and tested it yet.

 
https://github.com/golang/go/commit/90a3ce02dc25adcf1598faf11a66b151ada3f637.patch

 `patch -p1 < 90a3ce02dc25adcf1598faf11a66b151ada3f637.patch`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32307 [Core Tor/Tor]: Most every C file needs a doxygen @file declaration

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32307: Most every C file needs a doxygen @file declaration
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november,   |  Actual Points:  .1
  s31-docs   |
Parent ID:  #32306   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => .1


Comment:

 This is a comments-only set of changes, affecting doxygen output.  There
 were about 130 files that doxygen was ignoring!

 See branch `ticket32308` with PR in
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1476 .

 I'm not sure whether this meets the threshold for what I might merge
 without review; it does seem a little larger than is intended by
 "editorial fixes" on our merge policy.

 Some of the per-file documentation I added here could stand to be more
 verbose.  If it's okay with the reviewer, I'd like to have a separate
 tickets about that.  Without this minimal per-file documentation, all of
 the member documentation in each file remains ignored by Doxygen.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32178 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor adds trailing space character to log events

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32178: Tor adds trailing space character to log events
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy intro|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by lord_deush):

 Created PR: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1475

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32305 [Applications/Tor Browser]: DownThemAll cannot start downloads in Tor browsers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32305: DownThemAll cannot start downloads in Tor browsers
--+--
 Reporter:  Dragonrider   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arma):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  Applications => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 I guess the question is whether (a) some new change in Tor Browser broke
 this behavior, (b) some new change in Firefox broke it, or I guess (c) all
 of the above.

 If it's 'b', then it's a problem that the extension will need to solve,
 e.g. by getting Firefox to fix itself, or by changing the extension.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32307 [Core Tor/Tor]: Most every C file needs a doxygen @file declaration

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32307: Most every C file needs a doxygen @file declaration
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november,   |  Actual Points:
  s31-docs   |
Parent ID:  #32306   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 See #32306 for a ticket about writing rules to enforce this.

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[tor-bugs] #32307 [Core Tor/Tor]: Most every C file needs a doxygen @file declaration

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32307: Most every C file needs a doxygen @file declaration
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november,
 Severity:  Normal   |  s31-docs
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #32306
   Points:  .1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  Sponsor31-can  |
-+-
 Doxygen does not generate any documentation for files that do not say
 @file or \file.  We have dozens of those right now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32306 [Core Tor/Tor]: check-local target to enforce doxygen-correctness

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32306: check-local target to enforce doxygen-correctness
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november,   |  Actual Points:
  s31-docs   |
Parent ID:  #29214   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Description changed by nickm:

Old description:

> We should have a check-local target that makes sure we haven't regressed
> anything in Doxygen.  I'm going to compile a list of what that means
> here, and then make the target later in November.
>
> Current properties are:
>   * Every C and H file (outside of ext, trunnel, and test) should have a
> @file or \file declaration.
>   * There should be no doxygen warnings (except for missing
> documentation).

New description:

 We should have a check-local target that makes sure we haven't regressed
 anything in Doxygen.  I'm going to compile a list of what that means here,
 and then make the target later in November.

 Current properties are:
   * Every C and H file (outside of ext, trunnel, and test) should have a
 @file or \file declaration.
   * @file or \file declarations should match the actual name of the file.
   * There should be no doxygen warnings (except for missing
 documentation).

--

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[tor-bugs] #32306 [Core Tor/Tor]: check-local target to enforce doxygen-correctness

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32306: check-local target to enforce doxygen-correctness
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november,
 Severity:  Normal   |  s31-docs
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #29214
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  Sponsor31-can  |
-+-
 We should have a check-local target that makes sure we haven't regressed
 anything in Doxygen.  I'm going to compile a list of what that means here,
 and then make the target later in November.

 Current properties are:
   * Every C and H file (outside of ext, trunnel, and test) should have a
 @file or \file declaration.
   * There should be no doxygen warnings (except for missing
 documentation).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32304 [Core Tor/Tor]: Preliminary movement and renaming for confmgt.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32304: Preliminary movement and renaming for confmgt.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => 0


Comment:

 Branch is `ticket32304` with PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1474 .  Should be trivial; it's all
 movement and renaming.

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[tor-bugs] #32305 [Applications]: DownThemAll cannot start downloads in Tor browsers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32305: DownThemAll cannot start downloads in Tor browsers
-+--
 Reporter:  Dragonrider  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Applications
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 For other functions of DTA, like recognize images, vedioes and their urls,
 They work properly. However for the final click of the download button, no
 reaction, no warning, the box just persist or disappear.
 As I tested, the DTA use the browser's download function in current
 Firefox; and classic DTA is supported in the old Tor. So, is there any new
 policy of Tor that ban the access of the extension to start the browser's
 own download module?
 I have issue this to the developer of DTA,but I want to make sure if any
 modifications of tor may cause this dysfunction.

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[tor-bugs] #32304 [Core Tor/Tor]: Preliminary movement and renaming for confmgt.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32304: Preliminary movement and renaming for confmgt.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #29211
   Points:  0.1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Before I get too far in the last stages of 29211, there is some
 preliminary work I want to do.  The first item is to move the
 config_format_t type and related definitions out of confparse.h and into
 conftypes.h

 The second item is to rename confparse.[ch] to confmgt.[ch].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32303 [Applications/Tor Browser]: obfs4proxy incompatibility on Android Q

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32303: obfs4proxy incompatibility on Android Q
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201911,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-issues |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm => tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201911, tbb-9.0-issues


Comment:

 As mentioned in ticket:32027#comment:3, this is not an obfs4proxy bug, but
 a golang-older-than-`1.13` bug. We'll likely run into this problem with
 any go program/library on Android Q that was compiled older than `v1.13`.
 Other Android projects ran into this bug, as well (see #32027).

 We can try backporting the patch onto `1.12.9`.

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[tor-bugs] #32303 [Applications/Tor Browser]: obfs4proxy incompatibility on Android Q

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32303: obfs4proxy incompatibility on Android Q
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 We received a report that obfs4proxy doesn't run on Android Q due to a
 run-time linker error.

 {{{
 WARN: Managed proxy at '/data/app/org.torproject.torbrowser-
 ==/lib/arm64/libObfs4proxy.so' reported: error:
 "/data/app/org.torproject.torbrowser-
 ==/lib/arm64/libObfs4proxy.so": executable's TLS segment is
 underaligned: alignment is 8, needs to be at least 64 for ARM64 Bionic
 }}}

 This is a [https://github.com/golang/go/issues/29674 bug] that was [https
 ://go-
 review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/169618/4/src/cmd/link/internal/ld/lib.go
 fixed] in Golang 1.13

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32027 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Bump version of Go to 1.13+

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32027: Bump version of Go to 1.13+
--+--
 Reporter:  cohosh|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:   => snowflake
 * actualpoints:  snowflake =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31689 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Upgrade go to 1.13+

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31689: Upgrade go to 1.13+
--+--
 Reporter:  JeremyRand|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31688| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Can this be closed as a duplicate of #32027? (I realize this ticket came
 first, but that ticket has more info).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32027 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Bump version of Go to 1.13+

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32027: Bump version of Go to 1.13+
--+---
 Reporter:  cohosh|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  snowflake
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by sysrqb):

 It looks like we need for this for supporting obfs4proxy on Android Q (and
 likely any golang project, for that matter), so that is very exciting.

 The fix for https://github.com/golang/go/issues/29674 landed in 1.13 which
 is the cause of:

 {{{
 WARN: Managed proxy at '/data/app/org.torproject.torbrowser-
 ==/lib/arm64/libObfs4proxy.so' reported: error:
 "/data/app/org.torproject.torbrowser-
 ==/lib/arm64/libObfs4proxy.so": executable's TLS segment is
 underaligned: alignment is 8, needs to be at least 64 for ARM64 Bionic
 }}}

 Multiple other project ran into this problem, too (just for reference):
 https://github.com/shadowsocks/v2ray-plugin-android/issues/6
 https://github.com/termux/termux-packages/issues/3619
 https://github.com/Catfriend1/syncthing-android/issues/370

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32287 [Applications/Tor Browser]: bookmark save a screenshoot for bookmarked page?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32287: bookmark save a screenshoot for bookmarked page?
--+--
 Reporter:  rexkzhfbhgyc  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by Thorin):

 * Attachment "bookmarking.png" added.

 I don't see this (temp? memeory only?) thumb being stored anywhere in the
 profile, although places-sqlite-wal grew massively after the fact

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27604 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Relocating the Tor Browser directory is broken with Tor Browser 8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27604: Relocating the Tor Browser directory is broken with Tor Browser 8
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:  0.6
  tbb-8.0.1-can, TorBrowserTeam201910|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by Thorin):

 #32302 is a duplicate

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32302 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Extensions do not load in Tor Browser 9.0 when directory path changes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32302: Extensions do not load in Tor Browser 9.0 when directory path changes
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32243| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by Thorin):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Duplicate of #27604

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32287 [Applications/Tor Browser]: bookmark save a screenshoot for bookmarked page?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32287: bookmark save a screenshoot for bookmarked page?
--+--
 Reporter:  rexkzhfbhgyc  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by rexkzhfbhgyc):

 I'm can't post one screenshot for security reason.
 I found out one similar(maybe same) question:[https://support.mozilla.org
 /en-US/questions/1232360]
 But the solution just focus on hide such screenshot in UI rather than
 avoid leak such screenshot to disk(if any).

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[tor-bugs] #32302 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Extensions do not load in Tor Browser 9.0 when directory path changes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32302: Extensions do not load in Tor Browser 9.0 when directory path changes
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32243  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 Following upgrade to Tor Browser 9.0, extensions fail to load if Tor
 Browser is used as a portable application i.e. when launch directory path
 changes. Event occurs on Windows 10 1903 update with all extensions,
 including NoScript and EFF-HTTPS Everywhere. Disabling/Enabling extensions
 has no effect. Extensions can be re-added under new path; extension
 settings do not carry over, and extensions fail again upon subsequent path
 change.

 Issue tested on separate Windows 10 device with 1903, extensions also fail
 to load. When path is changed back to original setting from before
 upgrade, extensions load normally again.

 about:debugging displays the Extension ID for all previously installed
 extensions, but no other information is available. Issue cannot be
 recreated in Tor Browser 8.5.5.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32253 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Zooming and letterboxing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32253: Zooming and letterboxing
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by Thorin):

 Upstream: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1591337

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32253 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Zooming and letterboxing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32253: Zooming and letterboxing
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:11 Thorin]:
 > What I think we could do is
 > - treat screen, available screen (and associated @media) differently to
 inner/outer/chrome etc
 > - e.g. for Desktop return three or four screen really common resolutions
 only
 >   - i.e not tie it to the inner window

 I like this idea a lot. If many scripts in the wild really do go for the
 screen size and not inner window then this would be a massive improvement.

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