Re: [tor-bugs] #32328 [Applications/Tor Browser]: red screen of death

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32328: red screen of death
--+---
 Reporter:  qwertyu   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by pili):

 Seems like a duplicate of #32384

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32384 [Applications/Tor Browser]: trouble loading browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32384: trouble loading browser
--+---
 Reporter:  litjoh|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by pili):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 seems like a duplicate of #32328

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23719 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure WebExtensions are spared from JIT disabling in higher security settings (Medium-High)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23719: Make sure WebExtensions are spared from JIT disabling in higher security
settings (Medium-High)
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-performance, GeorgKoppen201911,  |  Actual Points:  0.5
  TorBrowserTeam201911R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Do we have a good test making sure the WASM part is actually working as
 expected?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27307 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript marks HTTP Onion as insecure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27307: NoScript marks HTTP Onion as insecure
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks3|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Minor   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  noscript, TorBrowserTeam201910  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21728  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:12 gk]:
 > Okay, I managed to reproduce my other issue as well: the start-up of
 rc15 is extremely slow on higher security levels. E.g. on my machine there
 is a gap of almost 10 seconds between the first two messages:
 > {{{
 > [10-29 14:15:22] Torbutton INFO: Message received from NoScript:
 
[{"__meta":{"name":"collect","recipientInfo":{"tabId":1,"frameId":0}},"_messageName":"collect"},{"id":"{73a6fe31
 -595d-460b-a920-fcc0f8843232}","url":"moz-
 
extension://07d31867-b62c-4014-aa90-56981c414124/_generated_background_page.html","envType":"addon_child","extensionId":"{73a6fe31
 -595d-460b-a920-fcc0f8843232}","contextId":274877906946},null]
 > }}}
 > and
 > {{{
 > [10-29 14:15:31] Torbutton INFO: Message received from NoScript:
 
[{"__meta":{"name":"started","recipientInfo":null},"_messageName":"started"},{"id":"{73a6fe31
 -595d-460b-a920-fcc0f8843232}","url":"moz-
 
extension://07d31867-b62c-4014-aa90-56981c414124/_generated_background_page.html","envType":"addon_child","extensionId":"{73a6fe31
 -595d-460b-a920-fcc0f8843232}","contextId":274877906946},null]
 > }}}
 > which makes me a bit nervous given that the user can meanwhile surf the
 web but the security settings are set only after the `started` or
 pageshow` one.
 >
 > I suspect that's because of #23719, actually. I wonder whether stable
 users would be hitting the bug on the standard mode, too, given that WASM
 is disabled there as well. ma1: What kind of JIT/WASM parts are you using
 for the initial loading of NoScript's state that could cause this?

 Actually that issue is solved with 11.0.7 for me. However, the options
 button is still behaving funky. Part of that is #23719 but other parts
 not. I've opened #32403 for the latter.

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[tor-bugs] #32403 [Applications/Tor Browser]: CLicking on NoScript button is showing JavaScript error after updating to 11.0.7

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32403: CLicking on NoScript button is showing JavaScript error after updating 
to
11.0.7
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  noscript
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 After updating to 11.0.7 I can see the following error after starting Tor
 Browser by clicking on the NoScript options button (interestingly this
 error seems to show up on the second click only)
 {{{
 JavaScript error: resource://gre/modules/ExtensionContent.jsm, line 554:
 TypeError: Argument 1 of PrecompiledScript.executeInGlobal is not an
 object.
 }}}
 That's happening on the default security level as well and is thus not
 related to #23719.

 It might be related, though, to comment:11:ticket:27307

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32354 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support "Cache Directory Tagging Standard" (already implemented e.g. in GNU tar)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32354: Support "Cache Directory Tagging Standard" (already implemented e.g. in 
GNU
tar)
--+--
 Reporter:  rm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by rm):

 Oh and currently it will also actively fight the user trying to manually
 add such file:

 -
 Nov 06 09:43:10.000 [warn] Found misformatted file "CACHEDIR.TAG" in
 consensus cache; removing it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23719 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure WebExtensions are spared from JIT disabling in higher security settings (Medium-High)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23719: Make sure WebExtensions are spared from JIT disabling in higher security
settings (Medium-High)
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-performance, GeorgKoppen201911,  |  Actual Points:  0.5
  TorBrowserTeam201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-performance, GeorgKoppen201911, TorBrowserTeam201911R =>
 tbb-performance, GeorgKoppen201911, TorBrowserTeam201911
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:19 gk]:
 > Do we have a good test making sure the WASM part is actually working as
 expected?

 I found some "test": On mobile I get a warning now due to an unresponsive
 WASM script. That's pretty bad because users can start surfing while
 HTTPS-E is not ready yet and it gets our fundraising banner in a weird
 shape (not everything is positioned correctly). I am afraid we can't ship
 this as-is.

 Interestingly, though, we *do have* WASM enabled on the standard level in
 our alpha and nightly builds and I don't have that issue on that level on
 that device. Thus, the problem here is not wasm-on-android per se.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32400 [Community/Tor Support]: Cannot obtain GPG keys

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32400: Cannot obtain GPG keys
---+--
 Reporter:  amgems |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gpg|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by ggus):

 * component:  Community => Community/Tor Support


Comment:

 Hello, have you tried our instructions to download and verify Tor Browser?

 https://support.torproject.org/tbb/how-to-verify-signature/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32402 [Core Tor/Tor]: Actually check most shell scripts for errors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32402: Actually check most shell scripts for errors
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  shellcheck|  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  #32397| Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final => Tor: 0.4.2.x-final


Comment:

 Merged to 0.4.2 and later.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32397 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add lzma, nss, and zstd support to test_parseconf.sh

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32397: Add lzma, nss, and zstd support to test_parseconf.sh
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november  |  Actual Points:  0.3
Parent ID:  #29211 | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
---+---

Comment (by teor):

 CI failed due to shellcheck, that shouldn't happen now that #32402 is
 merged.
 (My debian has a newer shellcheck than our CI, so I might find a few more
 shellcheck issues.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32396 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add state file support to test_parseconf.sh

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32396: Add state file support to test_parseconf.sh
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-?  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
+

Comment (by teor):

 I was hoping to have an option that parses and dumps config and state at
 the same time. There are lots of interactions between state and config.

 So in that case, we'd need to allow `--verify-config --verify-state` and
 `--dump-config --dump-state`?

 (The standard state paths should be enough if we set a DataDir. So we
 won't need more options to set state paths.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32295 [Core Tor/Tor]: "Skipping obsolete configuration option." doesn't say which one

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32295: "Skipping obsolete configuration option." doesn't say which one
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november,   |  Actual Points:
  042-backport   |
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  nickm => teor


Comment:

 It's a serious ux issue for people upgrading from a much earlier version
 to 0.4.2.
 I'll work out some way to pass the name or config line down.

 And I'll open another ticket for the proper fix in 0.4.3.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32399 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix "make test-stem" after merging #32339 and #32344

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32399: Fix "make test-stem" after merging #32339 and #32344
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-regression, network-team-|  Actual Points:
  roadmap-november   |
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 I did not get to it today, I was doing #32397.

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[tor-bugs] #32404 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a CFLG_OBSOLETE flag, and handle it at the confvar layer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32404: Add a CFLG_OBSOLETE flag, and handle it at the confvar layer
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.4.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #29211
   Points:  1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
  Sponsor31-must   |
---+---
 Follow up to #32295 for 0.4.3.

 nickm says:

 My suggestion would be to change how OBSOLETE is implemented: it doesn't
 really make sense as a type. Instead, there should be an "empty" type for
 fields that can't be read or written, and a CFLG_OBSOLETE flag that causes
 these warnings. The CFLG_OBSOLETE flag should be handled at the confvar
 layer, I think.

 This is a bug caused by sponsor 31, so it's a must-have.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32295 [Core Tor/Tor]: "Skipping obsolete configuration option." doesn't say which one

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32295: "Skipping obsolete configuration option." doesn't say which one
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november,   |  Actual Points:
  042-backport   |
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 The 0.4.3 ticket is #32404.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23719 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure WebExtensions are spared from JIT disabling in higher security settings (Medium-High)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23719: Make sure WebExtensions are spared from JIT disabling in higher security
settings (Medium-High)
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-performance, GeorgKoppen201911,  |  Actual Points:  0.5
  TorBrowserTeam201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 FWIW: the `aarch64` bundle I used was:

 https://people.torproject.org/~gk/testbuilds/tor-browser-tbb-nightly-
 android-aarch64-multi-qa_23719.apk
 https://people.torproject.org/~gk/testbuilds/tor-browser-tbb-nightly-
 android-aarch64-multi-qa_23719.apk.asc

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #32347, #32193

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #32347, #32193 by dgoulet:
reviewer to dgoulet

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32385 [Core Tor/Tor]: doxygen: respect --enable-fatal-warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32385: doxygen: respect --enable-fatal-warnings
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  doxygen   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:   => catalyst


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32315 [Core Tor/Tor]: Can't perform reverse DNS lookup for a (binary) IPv6 address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32315: Can't perform reverse DNS lookup for a (binary) IPv6 address
--+
 Reporter:  liberat   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, dns |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:   => ipv6, dns
 * reviewer:   => teor


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32386 [Core Tor/Tor]: Doxygen: Make output more C-like

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32386: Doxygen: Make output more C-like
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:| Points:  0
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:   => ahf


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32387 [Core Tor/Tor]: Doxygen: enable source code browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32387: Doxygen: enable source code browser
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:   => asn


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31371 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: Add DoS defense counter to DoS heartbeat message

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31371: hs: Add DoS defense counter to DoS heartbeat message
---+---
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, 042-deferred-20190918  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn|Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor27-must
---+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready


Comment:

 Well that is embarrassing... I didn't even know we had a test to look at
 the DoS heartbeat...

 Fixed! Once the CI passes, I'll merged. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32399 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix "make test-stem" after merging #32339 and #32344

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32399: Fix "make test-stem" after merging #32339 and #32344
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-regression, network-team-|  Actual Points:  0
  roadmap-november   |
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32399 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix "make test-stem" after merging #32339 and #32344

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32399: Fix "make test-stem" after merging #32339 and #32344
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-regression, network-team-|  Actual Points:  0
  roadmap-november   |
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * actualpoints:   => 0


Comment:

 This turned out to be pretty easy: I should have marked
 "OwningControllerFD" as immutable, but by mistake I marked
 "OwningControllerProcess" as immutable.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32399 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix "make test-stem" after merging #32339 and #32344

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32399: Fix "make test-stem" after merging #32339 and #32344
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-regression, network-team-|  Actual Points:  0
  roadmap-november   |
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 See branch `bug32399` with PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1512.  It fixes test-stem for me.

 I'm going to go through the list of immutable fields now to make sure I
 didn't make any other mistakes here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32399 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix "make test-stem" after merging #32339 and #32344

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32399: Fix "make test-stem" after merging #32339 and #32344
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-regression, network-team-|  Actual Points:  0
  roadmap-november   |
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Replying to [comment:6 nickm]:
 > I'm going to go through the list of immutable fields now to make sure I
 didn't make any other mistakes here.

 I did not find any other descrepencies on the current list as compared to
 maint-0.4.2.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32397 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add lzma, nss, and zstd support to test_parseconf.sh

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32397: Add lzma, nss, and zstd support to test_parseconf.sh
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november  |  Actual Points:  0.3
Parent ID:  #29211 | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Looks good to me.  Merging.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32020 [Core Tor/Tor]: hsv3: Client do not report failing circuit back into HS subsystem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32020: hsv3: Client do not report failing circuit back into HS subsystem
+
 Reporter:  dgoulet |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-client  |  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:  #30200  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:7 asn]:
 > Great branch! Review submitted!

 I replied. Would be great to get your feedback on my answers before I jump
 in and provide a new version of the branch. Thanks!!

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[tor-bugs] #32405 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Crash immediately after bootstrap on Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32405: Crash immediately after bootstrap on Android
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201911
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 On Android, when bootstrapping completes we call an `onFinish` method.
 Unfortunately, in this method we assume a tab was already created.
 Apparently this is a bad assumption and the app crashes.

 {{{
 java.lang.NullPointerException:
   at org.mozilla.gecko.BrowserApp$34.onFinish (BrowserApp.java:3021)
   at org.mozilla.gecko.torbootstrap.TorBootstrapAnimationContainer.hide
 (TorBootstrapAnimationContainer.java:61)
   at
 org.mozilla.gecko.torbootstrap.TorBootstrapAnimationContainer$1.onFinish
 (TorBootstrapAnimationContainer.java:53)
   at org.mozilla.gecko.torbootstrap.TorBootstrapPager$1.finish
 (TorBootstrapPager.java:64)
   at org.mozilla.gecko.firstrun.FirstrunPanel.close
 (FirstrunPanel.java:83)
   at org.mozilla.gecko.torbootstrap.TorBootstrapPanel.updateStatus
 (TorBootstrapPanel.java:365)
   at org.mozilla.gecko.torbootstrap.TorLogEventListener$2.handleMessage
 (TorLogEventListener.java:123)
   at android.os.Handler.dispatchMessage (Handler.java:106)
   at android.os.Looper.loop (Looper.java:216)
   at android.app.ActivityThread.main (ActivityThread.java:7188)
   at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke (Native Method)
   at com.android.internal.os.RuntimeInit$MethodAndArgsCaller.run
 (RuntimeInit.java:494)
   at com.android.internal.os.ZygoteInit.main (ZygoteInit.java:975)
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32394 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Progress Bar doesn't use translations (was: Update Progress Bar doesn't use MK translations)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32394: Update Progress Bar doesn't use translations
--+--
 Reporter:  Zarko_Gjurov  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 This is not specific to any one locale. The updater reads its UI strings
 from a file named `updater.ini` but that file does not contain translated
 strings in our Tor Browser builds. Unless I am mistaken, this bug has
 existed in Tor Browser for a long time: the method we use to create
 language-specific packages relies on including the correct Firefox ESR
 language pack, but that is not used by the updater.

 I am not sure how to obtain the correct updater.ini files; we will need to
 look at how those are generated during Firefox's localized builds.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32191 [Core Tor/Tor]: when cross-compiling, lzma and zstd will be detected on build system

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32191: when cross-compiling, lzma and zstd will be detected on build system
-+-
 Reporter:  eighthave|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  Android, 042-backport, BugSmashFund  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final => Tor: 0.4.2.x-final


Comment:

 Merged to 0.4.2 and forward.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30683 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Properties in dom/locales/$lang/chrome/ allow detecting user locale

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30683: Properties in dom/locales/$lang/chrome/ allow detecting user locale
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-locale|  Actual Points:  1
  TorBrowserTeam201911R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:26 acat]:
 > Backported in https://github.com/acatarineu/tor-
 browser/commits/30683_backport.

 Looks mostly good. I am a bit confused why we need the
 `FormatMaybeLocalizedString()` version with `const nsTArray&
 aParamArray`. As far as I can see none of the changed code is using that
 one. The patch is already large, thus, could you trim it accordingly if I
 am not being wrong here?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32394 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Progress Bar doesn't use translations

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32394: Update Progress Bar doesn't use translations
--+--
 Reporter:  Zarko_Gjurov  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-update|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-update


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29698 [Core Tor/Tor]: Edge case that causes improper circuit prioritization for one scheduling run

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29698: Edge case that causes improper circuit prioritization for one scheduling
run
-+-
 Reporter:  pastly   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-sched, tor-cmux, kist,   |  Actual Points:  0.2
  041-deferred-20190530, 042-deferred,   |
  BugSmashFund   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32394 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Progress Bar doesn't use translations

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32394: Update Progress Bar doesn't use translations
--+--
 Reporter:  Zarko_Gjurov  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-update|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 It looks like `updater.ini` is translated directly in Mozilla's Pontoon
 system. See:
 
https://pontoon.mozilla.org/mk/firefox/browser/updater/updater.ini/?string=79133

 Doe anyone know how resources "flow" from Pontoon into Firefox? Maybe
 there is some intermediate place between Pontoon and the final packages
 where we could obtain the correct `updater.ini` files.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32403 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clicking on NoScript button is showing JavaScript error after updating to 11.0.7 (was: CLicking on NoScript button is showing JavaScript error after u

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32403: Clicking on NoScript button is showing JavaScript error after updating 
to
11.0.7
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32405 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Crash immediately after bootstrap on Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32405: Crash immediately after bootstrap on Android
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash, tbb-9.0-issues,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, TorBrowserTeam201911 => tbb-crash,
 tbb-9.0-issues, TorBrowserTeam201911


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19859 [Core Tor/Tor]: Expose stream isolation information to controllers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19859: Expose stream isolation information to controllers
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs tor-control dns isolation |  Actual Points:
  needs-spec needs-design term-project   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30683 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Properties in dom/locales/$lang/chrome/ allow detecting user locale

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30683: Properties in dom/locales/$lang/chrome/ allow detecting user locale
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-locale|  Actual Points:  1
  TorBrowserTeam201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-locale TorBrowserTeam201911R => tbb-
 fingerprinting-locale TorBrowserTeam201911


Comment:

 acat thinks I am right, marking this as `needs_revision` then.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21549 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Investigate wasm for linkability/fingerprintability/disk avoidance issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21549: Investigate wasm for linkability/fingerprintability/disk avoidance 
issues
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0,   |  Actual Points:  1.5
  TorBrowserTeam201910R, tbb-backport|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * actualpoints:   => 1.5


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32097 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix conflicts in mobile onbarding while rebasing to esr68.2.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32097: Fix conflicts in mobile onbarding while rebasing to esr68.2.0
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910R, tbb-9.0-must  |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * actualpoints:   => 0.5


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31144 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ESR68 Network Code Review

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31144: ESR68 Network Code Review
-+-
 Reporter:  pili |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910R, tbb-9.0   |  Actual Points:  1.25
  -must-alpha, tbb-proxy-bypass  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * actualpoints:   => 1.25


Comment:

 Adding my points.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32228 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Bookmark TPO support domains in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32228: Bookmark TPO support domains in Tor Browser
---+--
 Reporter:  ggus   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201912  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  ux-team => ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201912


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 clash]:
 > I was wondering if it's possible to have a folder with the extra links
 instead of each link occupying their own individual space. The latter
 would feel a tad spammy imo. A folder with all those links would be
 perfect!

 Yes, we can. We can use something like:
 {{{
 
 Bookmarks
 Toolbar Folder
 Add bookmarks to this folder to see them displayed on the Bookmarks
 Toolbar
 The Tor Project Information
 
 https://www.torproject.org/";
 
ICON="
 
8AMwANFFxMU/9WQEr/PgAMKf///wD///8AAP///wD///8AAP///wD///8AAP///wD///8AAD4AFyFWUln/OW5Y/wCobmQAqnEJAP///wD///8AAP///wD///8AAP///wD///8AAP///wCZAGYFQpF3hQteOv8AiVGpGb2BbP///wD///8AAP///wD///8AAP///wD///8AAP///wD///8AAAD//wMAjF2oB35N8gClYpcAuHEkAP///wD///8AAP///wD///8AAP///wD///8AAP///wD///8AANOEHQCvdn8ArGipALJshwC4ezb///8AAP///wD///8AAP///wD///8AAP///wD///8AAP///wAA/78IANmXNgDFgyMAv4AMAP///wD///8A//8AAPAPAADgBwAA4AcAAOAHAADgBwAA8AcAAPgPAAD8HwAA/j8AAP5/AAD+fwAA/38AAP//AAD//wAA//8AAA=="
 LAST_CHARSET="ISO-8859-1" ID="rdf:#$0gnTO1">Learn more about Tor
 https://blog.torproject.org/";
 
ICON="
 
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 LAST_CHARSET="ISO-8859-1" ID="rdf:#$0gnTO1">The Tor Blog
 
 
 }}}

 Where the "folder" is declared with a `` tag and the new bookmarks are
 nested inside another `` tag.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30683 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Properties in dom/locales/$lang/chrome/ allow detecting user locale

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30683: Properties in dom/locales/$lang/chrome/ allow detecting user locale
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-locale|  Actual Points:  1
  TorBrowserTeam201911R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by acat):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-locale TorBrowserTeam201911 => tbb-
 fingerprinting-locale TorBrowserTeam201911R


Comment:

 Revised: https://github.com/acatarineu/tor-
 browser/commits/30683_backport+1.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32328 [Applications/Tor Browser]: red screen of death

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32328: red screen of death
-+-
 Reporter:  qwertyu  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * priority:  Immediate => Medium
 * keywords:   => tbb-9.0-issues, TorBrowserTeam201911
 * severity:  Critical => Normal


Comment:

 Can you provide answers for the other questions gk asked, as well? Thanks.
 > Do you get this every time you open Tor Browser? How did you set up Tor
 Browser? Is it the default version downloaded from our website,
 unmodified?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32394 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Progress Bar doesn't use translations

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32394: Update Progress Bar doesn't use translations
--+--
 Reporter:  Zarko_Gjurov  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-update, TorBrowserTeam201912  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-update => tbb-update, TorBrowserTeam201912


Comment:

 It looks like these come from `l10n-central`. https://hg.mozilla.org/l10n-
 central/mk/file/tip/browser/updater/updater.ini

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32362 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript TRUSTED setting doesn't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32362: NoScript TRUSTED setting doesn't work
-+-
 Reporter:  nDe15o   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201912   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:   => tbb-9.0-issues, TorBrowserTeam201912
 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Thanks. Please let us know the result and please tell us if there is a url
 we can use for investigating and testing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23719 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure WebExtensions are spared from JIT disabling in higher security settings (Medium-High)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23719: Make sure WebExtensions are spared from JIT disabling in higher security
settings (Medium-High)
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-performance, GeorgKoppen201911,  |  Actual Points:  0.5
  TorBrowserTeam201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by tom):

 I tested it by making a web extension and outputting ('WebAssembly' in
 this) in a web page and in an extension page.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31371 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: Add DoS defense counter to DoS heartbeat message

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31371: hs: Add DoS defense counter to DoS heartbeat message
---+---
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-hs, 042-deferred-20190918  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #2 | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  asn|Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor27-must
---+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * points:   => 0.1
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * parent:   => #2
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 Merged!

 (I added a changes file commit that I forgot! It passes make check-
 changes).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31669 [Core Tor/Tor]: Invalid signature for service descriptor signing key: expired

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31669: Invalid signature for service descriptor signing key: expired
--+---
 Reporter:  a_p   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.5
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, log   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by dgoulet):

 I've been seeing it recently quite a bit on my relays.

 There are a lot of warnings in the descriptor decoding code that anyone
 out there could trigger on HSDirs... It seems a bit "messy" to have a
 `is_remote` flag on all those functions... But I also don't have a better
 answer.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32119 [Applications/Tor Browser]: onboarding for "Goodbye Onion Button" could be better

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32119: onboarding for "Goodbye Onion Button" could be better
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-onboarding, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.1.0-can, |
  TorBrowserTeam201912   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  ux-team, tbb-onboarding, tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can =>
 ux-team, tbb-onboarding, tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.1.0-can,
 TorBrowserTeam201912


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32138 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clicking the 'new Identity' button in full screen on macOS causes the top and bottom of the browser to show white bars that do not go away

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32138: Clicking the 'new Identity' button in full screen on macOS causes the 
top
and bottom of the browser to show white bars that do not go away
-+-
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-parity,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201912   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-parity => tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-parity,
 TorBrowserTeam201912


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32297 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Version 9 problem (regular and alpha) when some Exit Nodes are blocked by a website firewall

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32297: Version 9 problem (regular and alpha) when some Exit Nodes are blocked 
by a
website firewall
-+-
 Reporter:  mwolfe   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression => tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-
 regression, TorBrowserTeam201911


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32333 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript remembers settings on browser quit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32333: NoScript remembers settings on browser quit
-+-
 Reporter:  kromek   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, noscript,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowser201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  assigned => needs_information


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32333 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript remembers settings on browser quit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32333: NoScript remembers settings on browser quit
-+-
 Reporter:  kromek   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, noscript,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowser201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:   => tbb-9.0-issues, noscript, TorBrowser201911
 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * status:  needs_information => assigned
 * severity:  Major => Normal


Comment:

 Did this only begin in Tor Browser 9? Did you upgrade from Tor Browser 8.5
 or is this a new installation?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32333 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript remembers settings on browser quit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32333: NoScript remembers settings on browser quit
-+-
 Reporter:  kromek   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, noscript,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, noscript, TorBrowser201911 => tbb-9.0-issues,
 noscript, TorBrowserTeam201911


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32220 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Change letterboxing color when dark theme is enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32220: Change letterboxing color when dark theme is enabled
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can, ux-   |  Actual Points:  5
  team, TorBrowserTeam201911R|
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by tom):

 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1594455

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30866 [Core Tor/Tor]: Teach config.c to work with options configured in other modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30866: Teach config.c to work with options configured in other modules
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  2
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 I've run into a hitch with "nickm will add some tests for crypto NSS using
 test_parseconf.sh".  There is no way to make crypto_openssl_late_init()
 fail.  When it gets a nonexistent engine, it warns, but does not consider
 it an error.  This behavior is probably reasonable, so I don't think we
 should change it.

 I've added the test nonetheless, but I don't think the behavior will
 change for NSS: it is a success in both cases.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30866 [Core Tor/Tor]: Teach config.c to work with options configured in other modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30866: Teach config.c to work with options configured in other modules
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  2
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21483 [Applications/Tor Browser]: DuckDuckGo Onion should be the default instead of DuckDuckGo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21483: DuckDuckGo Onion should be the default instead of DuckDuckGo
--+
 Reporter:  lolscreen |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, TorBrowserTeam202001  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * keywords:  tor-hs => tor-hs, TorBrowserTeam202001


Comment:

 Do we know if DDG are using a SOS or anonymous circuits? We should discuss
 this with them before we make a change like this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32327 [Applications/Tor Browser]: apt-win-crt*dll files are missing on some Windows 8 and Windows 7 systems

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32327: apt-win-crt*dll files are missing on some Windows 8 and Windows 7 
systems
-+-
 Reporter:  bob121   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201912   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression => tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-
 regression, TorBrowserTeam201912


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32038 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor-browser-build license is unclear

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32038: tor-browser-build license is unclear
--+--
 Reporter:  JeremyRand|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201911
 * cc: boklm (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32330 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Think about providing a UI for global cookie settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32330: Think about providing a UI for global cookie settings
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, ux-team, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202001   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, ux-team => tbb-9.0-issues, ux-team,
 TorBrowserTeam202001


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[tor-bugs] #32406 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add ability to make an accelname required.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32406: Add ability to make an accelname required.
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #30866
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 This will help test #30866.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19119 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Repurpose block-malicious-sites-checkbox on TLS error page in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19119: Repurpose block-malicious-sites-checkbox on TLS error page in Tor 
Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-health,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202002   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  network-health => network-health, TorBrowserTeam202002


Comment:

 Setting this at some time in the future. I can see us prioritizing this as
 it could leak onion addresses in self-signed certs (if I'm understanding
 this error case correctly). The exit-node-mitm situation is an interesting
 case, and Tor Browser providing a mechanism for people to report this is a
 neat idea.

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[tor-bugs] #32407 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix crash when calling --dump-config with failing set_options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32407: Fix crash when calling --dump-config with failing set_options
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #30866
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 It appears that our cleanup code hits an assertion failure when we have
 been called with --dump-config and a set of options that fails in
 set_options().

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32331 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 9 on Lineage OS 14.1 stalls during start-up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32331: Tor Browser 9 on Lineage OS 14.1 stalls during start-up
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.1.0-can, TorBrowserTeam201912|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression, tbb-9.0.1-can =>
 tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression, tbb-9.1.0-can, TorBrowserTeam201912
 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 There's a new orbot release candidate upgrading the tor version to
 `0.4.1.6` with the hope this fixes it. We can try picking this up, too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32220 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Change letterboxing color when dark theme is enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32220: Change letterboxing color when dark theme is enabled
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can, ux-   |  Actual Points:  5
  team, TorBrowserTeam201911R|
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Ok I've updated the patch with a fixup commit which makes the tabpanel
 color change conditional to letterboxing being enabled, and I've removed
 the redundant addition of "letterboxing" to the browser element class list
 and am now only doing it on one place.

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/richard/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_32220_v2&id=b0bd271086e6d727d74d63dddaf13cc73f456ecb

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[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32329: After upgrading Tor Browser 8.5.1 -> 9.0, history contains
place:sort=8&maxResults=10
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-update, TorBrowserTeam202002  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-update => tbb-update, TorBrowserTeam202002


Comment:

 I agree. I see this in the Tor Browser installation I am using, as well.
 It upgraded from `8.5.5`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32325 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Allow Letterboxing opt-in/out

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32325: Allow Letterboxing opt-in/out
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-9.0-issues, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202001   |
Parent ID:  #32324   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  ux-team, tbb-9.0-issues => ux-team, tbb-9.0-issues,
 TorBrowserTeam202001


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31899 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Hook .onion with URI_IS_POTENTIALLY_TRUSTWORTHY?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31899: Hook .onion with URI_IS_POTENTIALLY_TRUSTWORTHY?
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202001  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21728| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam202001


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30678 [Webpages/Website]: remove hardcoded capitalization from tpo css and templates

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30678: remove hardcoded capitalization from tpo css and templates
--+--
 Reporter:  emmapeel  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  l10n  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30027| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by emmapeel):

 * cc: emmapeel (added)
 * keywords:   => l10n
 * status:  new => assigned


Comment:

 passing it to hiro so she does her css mojo

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32407 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix crash when calling --dump-config with failing set_options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32407: Fix crash when calling --dump-config with failing set_options
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport 040-backport|  Actual Points:  .1
  041-backport 042-backport  |
Parent ID:  #30866   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => 035-backport 040-backport 041-backport 042-backport
 * actualpoints:   => .1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32407 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix crash when calling --dump-config with failing set_options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32407: Fix crash when calling --dump-config with failing set_options
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport 040-backport|  Actual Points:  .1
  041-backport 042-backport  |
Parent ID:  #30866   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => teor


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21961 [Applications/Tor Browser]: should torbrowser enable network.IDN_show_punycode by default?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21961: should torbrowser enable network.IDN_show_punycode by default?
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201912
 * priority:  Immediate => High
 * status:  needs_review => needs_information
 * severity:  Major => Normal
 * cc: ux-team (added)


Comment:

 We should think about and understand the usability implications of simply
 flipping the pref. How do other browsers handle this and what should the
 user do when they see the url rewritten? How do we make sure people
 actually notice something is (possibly) wrong while not scaring them or
 confusing them when it is a false-positive?

 (To be clear, I haven't investigated this at all, these are simply
 questions I have from skimming this ticket)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32407 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix crash when calling --dump-config with failing set_options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32407: Fix crash when calling --dump-config with failing set_options
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport 040-backport|  Actual Points:  .1
  041-backport 042-backport  |
Parent ID:  #30866   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Branch is `bug32407` with PR in
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1513. It merges forward cleanly to
 master.  Let's take it in master as part of #30866, which needs it to fix
 its tests.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19251 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser might want to have an error page specific to when .onion links fail

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19251: TorBrowser might want to have an error page specific to when .onion 
links
fail
---+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam202001  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30025 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor27-must
---+---
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  ux-team => ux-team, TorBrowserTeam202001


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31992 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove apktool workaround in #31564

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31992: Remove apktool workaround in #31564
---+--
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201911  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm => tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201911


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32308 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Stop inner letterbox jiggling as border is dragged

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32308: Stop inner letterbox jiggling as border is dragged
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-fingerprinting-  |  Actual Points:
  resolution TorBrowserTeam201912|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-fingerprinting-resolution =>
 tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-fingerprinting-resolution TorBrowserTeam201912


Comment:

 Maybe next month.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30866 [Core Tor/Tor]: Teach config.c to work with options configured in other modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30866: Teach config.c to work with options configured in other modules
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  2
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Okay, I've done some more work here to make it better.  I've done #32406
 so that we can mark an accelerator as required, which lets us test
 failures in options_set().

 And wouldn't you know it, there was a bug in options_set()!  If
 options_act() failed while we did not have an event loop initialized, we
 would crash in tor_shutdown_event_loop_and_exit(). That's #32407: I've
 done a separate branch for that against 0.3.5.

 I've squashed the fixups on the branch, rebased it on master, and added
 the #32407 fix.  The new branch is `config_subsys_v3`. Its PR is
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1514.

 I'm going to wait for CI to pass here, at least.  I think that #32406 and
 #32407 are enough of a change that I should wait for review on them before
 I merge.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32324 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Introduce Letterboxing to users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32324: Introduce Letterboxing to users
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-9.0-issues, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201912   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  ux-team, tbb-9.0-issues => ux-team, tbb-9.0-issues,
 TorBrowserTeam201912


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32289 [Applications/Tor Browser]: feedback on a website‏

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32289: feedback on a website‏
-+-
 Reporter:  superislam   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  linkability, TorBrowserTeam201912  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-usability-website, tbb-linkability => tbb-usability-
 website, tbb-linkability, TorBrowserTeam201912
 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Do you know if this recently broke? Do you know if it worked in older
 versions of Tor Browser?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32287 [Applications/Tor Browser]: bookmark save a screenshoot for bookmarked page?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32287: bookmark save a screenshoot for bookmarked page?
--+---
 Reporter:  rexkzhfbhgyc  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 I'm not sure this is a bug (or that we should fix it). Bookmarks are
 already tagged with the date they were last modified. We can go down the
 rabbit-hole of scrubbing all timestamps associated with bookmarks and any
 other information that may indicate when the bookmark was created/updated
 - but that is a much larger issue.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30866 [Core Tor/Tor]: Teach config.c to work with options configured in other modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30866: Teach config.c to work with options configured in other modules
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  4
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  2
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * actualpoints:   => 4


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[tor-bugs] #32408 [Core Tor/Tor]: Handle options_act_reversible() in new config system.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32408: Handle options_act_reversible() in new config system.
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #29211
   Points:  1.5|   Reviewer:  teor
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 Our new configuration system needs to handle options_act_reversible too.

 But on further examination, there are only two actual "reversible" pieces
 of options_act_reversible:

* Adjusting the logs.
* Adjusting the listeners.

 The remainder of the function is all about handling "irreversible",
 immutable options that need to be handled before we can mess with the logs
 or listeners.

 I think this means that we want to split this function into two pieces:
 one part that handles startup-only initialization, and one that handles
 truly reversible option changes.

 I think that the callback for the startup-only initialization should be
 called options_set_init(), options_set_onece(), options_set_early(), or
 something like that.

 The callbacks for truly reversible options should look something like
 this:
 {{{
 int act_reversible(const void *old_options, void *new_options, void
 **transaction_state_out);
 int commit(const void *old_options, void *new_options, void
 *transaction_state);
 int rollback(const void *old_options, void *rejected_options, void
 *transaction_state);
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32408 [Core Tor/Tor]: Handle options_act_reversible() in new config system.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32408: Handle options_act_reversible() in new config system.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  1.5
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 I'd like a general design review on the ideas and names in this ticket's
 description before I get too far ahead on this work.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32259 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser fails to start on some Linux systems without libatomic being installed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32259: Tor Browser fails to start on some Linux systems without libatomic being
installed
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201912   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can => tbb-9.0-issues,
 tbb-9.0.1-can, TorBrowserTeam201912


Comment:

 It seems Icecat is still on 60esr, so any older systems that only have
 Icecat (or similar) installed won't have libatomic installed as a
 dependency yet (sigh).

 https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/gnuzilla.git

 `build/autoconf/toolchain.m4`:
 {{{
  92 AC_DEFUN([MOZ_CXX11],
  93 [
  94 dnl Updates to the test below should be duplicated further below for
 the
  95 dnl cross-compiling case.
  96 AC_LANG_CPLUSPLUS
  97 if test "$GNU_CXX"; then
  98 AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether 64-bits std::atomic requires -latomic],
  99 ac_cv_needs_atomic,
 100 dnl x86 with clang is a little peculiar.  std::atomic does not
 require
 101 dnl linking with libatomic, but using atomic intrinsics does,
 so we
 102 dnl force the setting on for such systems.
 103 if test "$CC_TYPE" = "clang" -a "$CPU_ARCH" = "x86" -a
 "$OS_ARCH" = "Linux"; then
 104 ac_cv_needs_atomic=yes
 }}}

 I guess we can either bundle it (as a fallback) or try detecting this at
 run-time and notify the user they should install it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32053 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM optimization issue)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32053: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM
optimization issue)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911, tbb-9.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,|
  tbb-9.0.1-can, GeorgKoppen201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by alexcrichton):

 The bug seems to be in the `-jump-threading` pass which I suspect is
 included in the O1 optimizations, yeah, but this technically only arose
 during O3 when presumably enough inlining had happened to then trigger the
 bug. I'm not really sure what the best way to avoid this bug would be
 unfortunately, but I suspect that an `-O1` build should be reproducible
 (albeit slow).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32409 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Add giantrabbit devs to donate repository

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32409: Add giantrabbit devs to donate repository
-+
 Reporter:  hiro |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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[tor-bugs] #32409 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Add giantrabbit devs to donate repository

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32409: Add giantrabbit devs to donate repository
-+--
 Reporter:  hiro |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 All the people who we want to give access to the Tor repository already
 have LDAP accounts. It's three people: resgue...@giantrabbit.com,
 skirti...@giantrabbit.com, and j...@giantrabbit.com.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32152 [Webpages/Website]: https://support.torproject.org/mk/tbb/tbb-2/ is giving a 404

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32152: https://support.torproject.org/mk/tbb/tbb-2/ is giving a 404
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Zarko_Gjurov):

 The problem still exist in Tor Browser version 9.0.1.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32333 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript remembers settings on browser quit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32333: NoScript remembers settings on browser quit
-+-
 Reporter:  kromek   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, noscript,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by kromek):

 Replying to [comment:5 sysrqb]:
 > Did this only begin in Tor Browser 9? Did you upgrade from Tor Browser
 8.5 or is this a new installation?
 Yes, it began in Tor Browser 9. Previously the issue was non-existent. It
 remains a bug in 9.0.1.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32331 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 9 on Lineage OS 14.1 stalls during start-up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32331: Tor Browser 9 on Lineage OS 14.1 stalls during start-up
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.1.0-can, TorBrowserTeam201912|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 Replying to [comment:1 sysrqb]:
 > There's a new orbot release candidate upgrading the tor version to
 `0.4.1.6` with the hope this fixes it. We can try picking this up, too.

 Are we looking at adding this to tor-android-service as a binary or using
 the newest build for Android tor in the browser build?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31130 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use Debian 10 for our Android container images

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31130: Use Debian 10 for our Android container images
---+---
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201911  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31127 | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by sisbell):

 Replying to [comment:33 boklm]:
 > Replying to [comment:30 sisbell]:
 >
 > > It looks very close, I'm still investigating why I get the following
 error in tor-browser project when using apksigner.
 > >
 > > {{{
 > >   inflating: tmp/removed-files
 > > Error: Unable to access jarfile /usr/share/apksigner/apksigner.jar
 > >
 > > }}}
 >
 > The path to apksigner in buster is `/usr/lib/android-sdk/build-
 tools/debian/apksigner.jar`.

 So I think removing the install_jdk and getting the apksigner path updated
 should do the trick to get everything building. I'll get this building
 today and test out.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32303 [Applications/Tor Browser]: obfs4proxy incompatibility on Android Q

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32303: obfs4proxy incompatibility on Android Q
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-9.0-issues, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0.1-can, TorBrowserTeam201911|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * cc: boklm (added)
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Okay, this is working well (it seems). I tested `aarch64`. Unfortunately,
 it seems the `runtime/cgo: pthread_key_create failed` error is only
 triggered on Android Q emulators, so real devices are the only way we can
 test this right now, I think.

 I split it into two patches: part 1 builds obfs4proxy for Android, and
 part 2 backports the patch for go.

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[tor-bugs] #32410 [Core Tor/Tor]: --disable-module-relay causes us to reject default options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32410: --disable-module-relay causes us to reject default options
+
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-must  |
+
 The default value for DirCache is 1.  But when we build with --disable-
 module-relay, we reject that default, and so reject our default
 configuration.

 I think it is reasonable to allow DirCache 1 in this case.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30866 [Core Tor/Tor]: Teach config.c to work with options configured in other modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30866: Teach config.c to work with options configured in other modules
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  4
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  2
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 FWIW, one of the CI tests is failing, but I think that isn't caused by
 this.  It's caused by the fact that we reject `DirCache 1` when running
 with the relay module disabled, but DirCache 1 is the default.
 I've opened #32410 for this issue.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31916 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: reliability issues with hetzner-nbg1-01

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31916: reliability issues with hetzner-nbg1-01
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 just turned off ipsec on that host to see if that affects it.

 before, ping:

 {{{
 --- hetzner-hel1-01.torproject.org ping statistics ---
 1296649 packets transmitted, 1261574 received, 2% packet loss, time
 1299266373ms
 rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 23.358/24.190/7731.164/37.891 ms, pipe 8
 }}}

 noping:

 {{{
 --- hetzner-hel1-01.torproject.org ping statistics ---
 1298788 packets transmitted, 1262968 received, 2,76% packet loss, time
 30172995,2ms
 RTT[ms]: min = 23, median = 24, p(95) = 24, max = 34

 --- macrum.torproject.org ping statistics ---
 1298788 packets transmitted, 1258030 received, 3,14% packet loss, time
 3645717,0ms
 RTT[ms]: min = 3, median = 3, p(95) = 3, max = 10

 --- bungei.torproject.org ping statistics ---
 1298788 packets transmitted, 1298338 received, 0,03% packet loss, time
 30554619,0ms
 RTT[ms]: min = 23, median = 24, p(95) = 24, max = 33
 }}}

 restarted both pings after the change, just now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31916 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: reliability issues with hetzner-nbg1-01

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31916: reliability issues with hetzner-nbg1-01
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * Attachment "snap-2019.11.06-15.13.06.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31916 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: reliability issues with hetzner-nbg1-01

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31916: reliability issues with hetzner-nbg1-01
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 results already look quite promising:

 [[Image(snap-2019.11.06-15.13.06.png​)]]

 the three hosts down are the three ARM build boxes that live behind ipsec,
 so that's normal and should go away after #32383.

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