Re: [tor-bugs] #30636 [Metrics/Analysis]: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 1M+

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30636: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 
1M+
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ir|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:33 dcf]:
 > In the recent past, I've seen two large but brief spikes of users from
 IP addresses located in Iran, on two of my vanilla bridges. (In the second
 case, the bridge is actually supposed to be a meek bridge, but the Iranian
 IP addresses were connecting to one of its exposed ORPorts.)

 Since 2019-11-26, it has been happening again: a sudden large number of
 users from IP addresses in Iran directly accessing the ORPort of what is
 normally a meek bridge. This time it is more sustained, more than a week
 now and counting.

 There are three meek bridges running on the same IP address. They each use
 a different ORPort. Two of the three are affected by the recent Iran-
 related activity; one is not. The non-meek bridge
 (272EB44C8992B8088BD8E8A12DB23B56478EB885) mentioned in comment:33 is not
 affected this time.

 
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/AA033EEB61601B2B7312D89B62AAA23DC3ED8A34
 This is the same bridge as the second graph in comment:33; notice the
 sudden increase this time is even more marked than it was 3 months ago.
 [[Image(history-starman-20191207.png)]]

 
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/C20658946DD706A7A2181159A1A04CD838570D04
 [[Image(history-maenad-20191207.png)]]

 
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/D36B0328969EC57AB3085A4470882D99A09C0492
 [[Image(history-GAEuploader-20191207.png)]]

 You can use the hashed bridge fingerprints to look up the source
 measurements for the above graphs. For example, from
 https://collector.torproject.org/archive/bridge-descriptors/extra-infos
 /bridge-extra-infos-2019-11.tar.xz, here are descriptors from before and
 after the sudden increase.

 bridge-extra-infos-2019-11/2/7/27412c87fc1edd16cc2aa86512d6b1b644245f92
 {{{#!html
 
 @type bridge-extra-info 1.3
 extra-info maenad C20658946DD706A7A2181159A1A04CD838570D04
 master-key-ed25519 QnVpQ5ji4W6utd8W5keg8GZfKsr5Zn4LjB9iipjzJPg
 published 2019-11-27 08:59:09
 transport meek
 write-history 2019-11-26 23:40:17 (86400 s)
 1986285568,1133027328,1322062848,756112384,3282477056
 read-history 2019-11-26 23:40:17 (86400 s)
 2157205504,1290130432,1488071680,867490816,3426599936
 dirreq-write-history 2019-11-26 19:40:17 (86400 s)
 21617664,23964672,27646976,31479808,34509824
 dirreq-read-history 2019-11-26 19:40:17 (86400 s)
 1432576,1847296,2151424,2553856,2288640
 geoip-db-digest A131E1F283F4AD307248B03A70B0413E81ADF2A4
 geoip6-db-digest 0EFF3EE1E22927EC9A77BFFAFD703F3A5B32FA79
 dirreq-stats-end 2019-11-27 04:16:01 (86400 s)
 dirreq-v3-ips ir=32,by=8,de=8,mx=8,ru=8,ua=8,us=8
 dirreq-v3-reqs ir=56,ru=16,by=8,de=8,mx=8,ua=8,us=8
 dirreq-v3-resp ok=80,not-enough-sigs=0,unavailable=0,not-found=0,not-
 modified=32,busy=0
 dirreq-v3-direct-dl complete=0,timeout=0,running=0
 dirreq-v3-tunneled-dl
 
complete=68,timeout=8,running=0,min=14872,d1=31578,d2=69803,q1=86947,d3=104322,d4=121244,md=141232,d6=155268,d7=187619,q3=212539,d8=248890,d9=337787,max=1051412
 hidserv-stats-end 2019-11-27 04:16:01 (86400 s)
 hidserv-rend-relayed-cells 9975 delta_f=2048 epsilon=0.30 bin_size=1024
 hidserv-dir-onions-seen 11 delta_f=8 epsilon=0.30 bin_size=8
 padding-counts 2019-11-27 04:16:27 (86400 s) bin-size=1 write-drop=0
 write-pad=2 write-total=174 read-drop=0 read-pad=28 read-
 total=196 enabled-read-pad=28 enabled-read-total=187 enabled-
 write-pad=2 enabled-write-total=113 max-chanpad-timers=63
 bridge-stats-end 2019-11-27 04:16:27 (86400 s)
 bridge-ips ir=136,ru=16,us=16,??=8,be=8,br=8,by=8,de=8,fi=8,gb=8,mx=8,ua=8
 bridge-ip-versions v4=184,v6=0
 bridge-ip-transports =184
 router-digest-sha256 MnN83BPZD3TxNkGqLsSSTV3yg7X2NqWAFv4a8P2WIfc
 router-digest 27412C87FC1EDD16CC2AA86512D6B1B644245F92
 
 }}}

 bridge-extra-infos-2019-11/8/c/8c72e0590bb39cf43bb139a75d75cae1210cbc51
 {{{#!html
 
 @type bridge-extra-info 1.3
 extra-info maenad C20658946DD706A7A2181159A1A04CD838570D04
 master-key-ed25519 QnVpQ5ji4W6utd8W5keg8GZfKsr5Zn4LjB9iipjzJPg
 published 2019-11-30 06:42:12
 transport meek
 write-history 2019-11-29 23:40:17 (86400 s)
 756112384,3282477056,55211226112,225877932032,284260692992
 read-history 2019-11-29 23:40:17 (86400 s)
 867490816,3426599936,54093441024,220877935616,279221173248
 dirreq-write-history 2019-11-29 19:40:17 (86400 s)
 31479808,34509824,1802655744,10318318592,11527681024
 dirreq-read

Re: [tor-bugs] #30636 [Metrics/Analysis]: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 1M+

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30636: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 
1M+
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ir|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "history-starman-20191207.png" added.

 bw_months
 
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/AA033EEB61601B2B7312D89B62AAA23DC3ED8A34

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30636 [Metrics/Analysis]: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 1M+

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30636: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 
1M+
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ir|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "history-maenad-20191207.png" added.

 bw_months
 
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/C20658946DD706A7A2181159A1A04CD838570D04

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30636 [Metrics/Analysis]: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 1M+

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30636: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 
1M+
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ir|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "history-GAEuploader-20191207.png" added.

 bw_months
 
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/D36B0328969EC57AB3085A4470882D99A09C0492

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32676 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider publishing a tarball with all Tor Browser langpacks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32676: Consider publishing a tarball with all Tor Browser langpacks
-+-
 Reporter:  intrigeri|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, tbb-rbm,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201912R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  gk   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > Should I try to update the patch to only trigger on release builds?
 Yes.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30558 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30558: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser
--+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  JeremyRand
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  gk|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by JeremyRand):

 Did I say a day?  I must have meant 37 minutes.  :)

 Updated branch at https://notabug.org/JeremyRand/tor-browser-
 build/src/namecoin-v3 (Git commit hash
 `400bf48791c508afe8014c0fb949f61a7224b33a`).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30558 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30558: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser
--+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  JeremyRand
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  gk|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by JeremyRand):

 Thanks for the review @gk.

 > a)

 No objection here; I'll make the change.

 > b)
 > Do we really need to change the dir back and forth here?

 I think it's necessary, because otherwise `--parents` will pick up other
 parts of the path (i.e. ancestor directories).

 > c)

 No objection here; I'll make the change.

 New branch should be ready within a day.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32499 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Add a build step / documentation for code reuse in Cupcake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32499: Add a build step / documentation for code reuse in Cupcake
-+--
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 > I'll follow up with additional work here in a bit.

 Here's a commit for that,
 
https://github.com/keroserene/snowflake/commit/1e45d48a3c4ef05434916d963f0c00d8c0246ac9

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32499 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Add a build step / documentation for code reuse in Cupcake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32499: Add a build step / documentation for code reuse in Cupcake
-+--
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  merge_ready => assigned


Comment:

 Merged as https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/commit/?id=af4cc52dc2eb46585d5f0da3ecc285c914e22414

 I'll follow up with additional work here in a bit.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31157 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Collect metrics about what type of proxies are running

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31157: Collect metrics about what type of proxies are running
-+---
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-october  |  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  karsten  |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+---

Comment (by cohosh):

 Thanks! I just ran the same command and the update works now. After I
 uploaded these changes, I looked at the groups again:
 {{{
 $ find . -not -group snowflake | xargs ls -ld
 -rw-rw-r-- 1 cohosh cohosh 3309 Dec  6 21:47 ./_locales/nl/messages.json
 }}}

 So it looks like whenever we upload new files their group gets assigned to
 us as well. I had to chgrp the new files after the update to fix this.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32691 [Core Tor/Tor]: Image broken in 'src-ref' documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32691: Image broken in 'src-ref' documentation
--+
 Reporter:  opara |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * cc: catalyst (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32676 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider publishing a tarball with all Tor Browser langpacks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32676: Consider publishing a tarball with all Tor Browser langpacks
-+-
 Reporter:  intrigeri|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, tbb-rbm,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201912R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  gk   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by intrigeri):

 Replying to [comment:6 gk]:
 > So, how about scoping that feature to only release builds? Or if that's
 really necessary to alpha builds in addition to that?

 As far as I'm concerned, I think it's totally fine to start with release
 builds only: it'll give us the expected benefits in the cases when it
 matters most.

 Then we'll see how much we miss it in the rarer cases when we include an
 alpha, and we can get back to you if needed; meanwhile you'll also have
 data/feelings about the cost of this extra tarball on your side. So I
 prefer postponing this discussion about alphas to a time when we'll have
 less hypothetical info to reason about :)

 Should I try to update the patch to only trigger on release builds? Or is
 it cheaper for you to do it yourself than to review an untested fixup
 patch from me?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32657 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Investigate Snowflake blocking in China

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32657: Investigate Snowflake blocking in China
-+---
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  blocking, china  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+---

Comment (by cohosh):

 I've updated the bridgetest scripts used in #30368 to consolidate the
 different kinds of tests we've been running and hopefully collect enough
 information to figure out what's going on here:
 https://github.com/cohosh/bridgetest

 I have a test running in north america and in china on a VPS at the
 moment.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32670 [Core Tor/Tor]: Provide and use higher resolution padding callback timers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32670: Provide and use higher resolution padding callback timers
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad circpad-researchers-want  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Step one here is diagnosis.  Is this happening because of Libevent's
 choices of how to interact with the kernel, because of our timing-wheel
 settings, or something else?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31653 [Core Tor/Tor]: Padding cells sent with 0ms delay cause circuit failures

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31653: Padding cells sent with 0ms delay cause circuit failures
-+-
 Reporter:  pulls|  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.5
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad circpad-researchers-want |  Actual Points:
  042-should |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final => Tor: 0.4.3.x-final


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32676 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider publishing a tarball with all Tor Browser langpacks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32676: Consider publishing a tarball with all Tor Browser langpacks
-+-
 Reporter:  intrigeri|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, tbb-rbm,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201912R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  gk   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 Looks mostly good to me. I am struggling a bit with the scope of the
 patch. Right now we'd publish the tarball for every nightly build and
 alpha + stable release. At least the nightly part seems to be excessive to
 me as this is a Tails feature for the release process. IIRC Tails would
 only need stable tarballs for that. So, how about scoping that feature to
 only release builds? Or if that's really necessary to alpha builds in
 addition to that?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32685 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update to December GeoIP2 database

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32685: Update to December GeoIP2 database
--+
 Reporter:  karsten   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Merged to 0.2.9 and forward!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32678 [Core Tor/Tor]: Exit relay DNS cache leaks information

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32678: Exit relay DNS cache leaks information
---+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal? backport?  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  needs-proposal? => needs-proposal? backport?


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32678 [Core Tor/Tor]: Exit relay DNS cache leaks information

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32678: Exit relay DNS cache leaks information
-+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal?  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => needs-proposal?
 * priority:  Medium => High
 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 I'm in favor here. Does anybody want to make the caching algorithm
 concrete and write a short proposal for it?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32691 [Core Tor/Tor]: Image broken in 'src-ref' documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32691: Image broken in 'src-ref' documentation
--+
 Reporter:  opara |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 This is not hard to ifx, but we should figure out what part of the
 toolchain we want here, and how much we want to ship with Tor.  The old
 diagrams were generated from `dia` files, which I'm not sure we still want
 to be involved with.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32691 [Core Tor/Tor]: Image broken in 'src-ref' documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32691: Image broken in 'src-ref' documentation
--+--
 Reporter:  opara |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * owner:  (none) => nickm


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32691 [Core Tor/Tor]: Image broken in 'src-ref' documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32691: Image broken in 'src-ref' documentation
--+
 Reporter:  opara |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.3.x-final


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32691 [Core Tor/Tor]: Image broken in 'src-ref' documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32691: Image broken in 'src-ref' documentation
--+
 Reporter:  opara |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by arma):

 * component:  Webpages => Core Tor/Tor


Comment:

 Moving into the Tor component, on the theory that they're in the best
 position to diagnose and fix it.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32691 [Webpages]: Image broken in 'src-ref' documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32691: Image broken in 'src-ref' documentation
+--
 Reporter:  opara   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  Webpages
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 For example if you visit https://src-
 ref.docs.torproject.org/tor/dataflow.html, the "structure hierarchy for
 connection types" image is missing (the img tag has a 404). There are
 possibly other missing images as well, but I can't find the markdown files
 to check (there were the original versions, then they were moved to the
 tor git repo and edited iirc, but now they're gone).

 There's also another image missing on the same page, but has no  tag
 (compare the top of the https://people.torproject.org/~nickm/tor-
 auto/internal/02-dataflow.html and https://src-
 ref.docs.torproject.org/tor/dataflow.html pages). But it may have been
 removed on purpose.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32135 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Write BridgeDB metrics parser and analyse existing data

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32135: Write BridgeDB metrics parser and analyse existing data
+--
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s30-o21a1   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31274  | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by phw):

 Replying to [comment:3 karsten]:
 > phw, you asked about adding any of these graphs to the metrics website.
 It does involve some coding and some documenting, but I think that having
 these graphs would be very useful, so let's talk.
 [[br]]
 How can we help with the coding or documenting?
 [[br]]
 > I guess my first question would be how many graphs you'd like to see on
 the metrics website. Ideally, we would be able to compress these graphs
 above into one or two. Unlike these one-off graphs the ones on the metrics
 website would be somewhat configurable with the parameters we're using for
 other graphs (or new ones, if really needed). So, can you think about your
 one or two most important graphs for the metrics website?
 [[br]]
 I would choose "requests per bridge type" and "requests per distribution
 mechanism" (and possibly exclude "Tor requests over HTTPS" or, even
 better, make it configurable):

 [[Image(bridge-types-nontor.png, 600px)]]
 [[Image(distribution-mechanisms-notor.png, 600px)]]

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24527 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Inform users in Tor Launcher of which settings are best for them based on their country

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24527: Inform users in Tor Launcher of which settings are best for them based 
on
their country
---+---
 Reporter:  hellais|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, s32-o32a2 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31283 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor30-can
---+---

Comment (by phw):

 This ticket is similar to #28531, in which we're trying to publish a
 snapshot of how one can get Tor to work in different countries. Tor
 Browser could use this snapshot to decide that's best for the user.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31874 [Circumvention]: Automatically test the PTs of bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31874: Automatically test the PTs of bridges
---+
 Reporter:  phw|  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s30-o23a3  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31280 | Points:  10
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor30-must
---+

Comment (by phw):

 [https://github.com/measurement-kit/measurement-
 kit/issues/86#issuecomment-399925444 Teor mentioned] on OONI's bug tracker
 that there's a
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/feature/api/tor_api.h?id=39bb283fca95648aeb58d9e8927de6e1530c6015
 tor_api.h] that makes it possible to start tor as a library. This may be
 helpful for bridgestrap, which currently uses golang's
 `exec.CommandContext` to start the tor binary.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32681 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please refresh PGP key

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32681: Please refresh PGP key
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 this change has been propagated to the WKD server, LDAP and so on:

 {{{
 commit bc083e0b427dacc5ab4de90c79d9c86b80f0ca3c (HEAD -> master,
 origin/master, origin/HEAD, alberti/master)
 Author: Antoine Beaupré 
 Date:   Fri Dec 6 12:49:03 2019 -0500

 update sysrqb's key (#32681)

 diff --git a/torproject-keyring/sysrqb-
 CE1782624600EE98764C6D9CCB8FC772D1AA1D30.gpg b/torproject-keyring/sysrqb-
 CE1782624600EE98764C6D9CCB8FC772D1AA1D30.gpg
 index ea45ce2..e807150 100644
 --- a/torproject-keyring/sysrqb-
 CE1782624600EE98764C6D9CCB8FC772D1AA1D30.gpg
 +++ b/torproject-keyring/sysrqb-
 CE1782624600EE98764C6D9CCB8FC772D1AA1D30.gpg
 @@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 -pub   rsa4096/CB8FC772D1AA1D30 2014-06-26 [SC] [expire : 2019-12-18]
 +pub   rsa4096/CB8FC772D1AA1D30 2014-06-26 [SC] [expire : 2020-06-21]
CE1782624600EE98764C6D9CCB8FC772D1AA1D30
 -uidMatthew Finkel 
 -sig 3CB8FC772D1AA1D30 2018-12-18  Matthew Finkel
 
  uidMatthew Finkel 
 -sig 3CB8FC772D1AA1D30 2018-12-18  Matthew Finkel
 
 +sig 3CB8FC772D1AA1D30 2019-12-06  Matthew Finkel
 
 +uidMatthew Finkel 
 +sig 3CB8FC772D1AA1D30 2019-12-06  Matthew Finkel
 
  uidMatthew Finkel 
 -sig 3CB8FC772D1AA1D30 2018-12-18  Matthew Finkel
 
 +sig 3CB8FC772D1AA1D30 2019-12-06  Matthew Finkel
 
  uidMatthew Finkel 
 -sig 3CB8FC772D1AA1D30 2018-12-18  Matthew Finkel
 
 +sig 3CB8FC772D1AA1D30 2019-12-06  Matthew Finkel
 
  sub   rsa4096/66FD446DFD98273F 2017-07-14 [S] [révoquée : 2017-07-14]
  rev  CB8FC772D1AA1D30 2017-07-14  Matthew Finkel
 
cause de révocation : La clef a été remplacée
 @@ -35,8 +35,16 @@ rev  CB8FC772D1AA1D30 2017-07-14  Matthew
 Finkel 
   commentaire de révocation : Created new subkey
  sub   rsa4096/1A3DF1597131E052 2019-06-25 [S] [expire : 2019-12-22]
  sig  CB8FC772D1AA1D30 2019-06-25  Matthew Finkel
 
 -sub   rsa4096/3EA7385D6E4828BB 2019-06-25 [E] [expire : 2019-12-22]
 +sub   rsa4096/3EA7385D6E4828BB 2019-06-25 [E] [révoquée : 2019-12-06]
  sig  CB8FC772D1AA1D30 2019-06-25  Matthew Finkel
 
 +rev  CB8FC772D1AA1D30 2019-12-06  Matthew Finkel
 
 +  cause de révocation : La clef a été remplacée
  sub   rsa4096/BEB48FEB9284DB98 2019-06-25 [A] [expire : 2019-12-22]
  sig  CB8FC772D1AA1D30 2019-06-25  Matthew Finkel
 
 +sub   rsa2048/F66B6B45F0F7D36D 2019-12-06 [E] [expire : 2020-06-21]
 +sig  CB8FC772D1AA1D30 2019-12-06  Matthew Finkel
 
 +sub   rsa2048/1E9D36F4C6BD754E 2019-12-06 [S] [expire : 2020-06-21]
 +sig  CB8FC772D1AA1D30 2019-12-06  Matthew Finkel
 
 +sub   rsa2048/8CDE513CB5553620 2019-12-06 [A] [expire : 2020-06-21]
 +sig  CB8FC772D1AA1D30 2019-12-06  Matthew Finkel
 

 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32681 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please refresh PGP key

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32681: Please refresh PGP key
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * owner:  tpa => anarcat
 * status:  new => accepted


Comment:

 checking

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32660 [Metrics/Onionoo]: onionoo-backend is killing the ganeti cluster

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32660: onionoo-backend is killing the ganeti cluster
-+--
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Old description:

> hello!
>
> today i noticed that, since last friday (UTC) morning, there has been
> pretty big spikes on the internal network between the ganeti nodes, every
> hour. it looks like this, in grafana:
>
> [[Image(snap-2019.12.02-16.06.11.png​)]]
>
> We can clearly see a correlation between the two node's traffic, in
> reverse. This was confirmed using `iftop` and `tcpdump` on the nodes
> during a surge.
>
> It seems this is due to onionoo-backend-01 blasting the disk and CPU for
> some reason. This is the disk I/O graphs for that host, which correlate
> pretty cleanly with the above graphs:
>
> [[Image(snap-2019.12.02-16.30.33.png​)]]
>
> This was confirmed by an inspection of `drbd`, the mechanisms that
> synchronizes the disks across the network. It seems there's a huge surge
> of "writes" on the network every hour which lasts anywhere between 20 and
> 30 minutes. This was (somewhat) confirmed by running:
>
> {{{
> watch -n 0.1 -d cat /proc/drbd
> }}}
>
> on the nodes. The device IDs 4, 13 and 17 trigger a lot of changes in
> DRBD. 13 and 17 are the web nodes, so that's expected - probably log
> writes? But device ID 4 is onionoo-backend, which is what led me to the
> big traffic graph.
>
> could someone from metrics investigate?
>
> can i just turn off this machine altogether, considering it's basically
> trying to murder the cluster every hour? :)

New description:

 hello!

 today i noticed that, since last friday (UTC) morning, there has been
 pretty big spikes on the internal network between the ganeti nodes, every
 hour. it looks like this, in grafana:

 [[Image(snap-2019.12.02-16.06.11.png, 700​)]]

 We can clearly see a correlation between the two node's traffic, in
 reverse. This was confirmed using `iftop` and `tcpdump` on the nodes
 during a surge.

 It seems this is due to onionoo-backend-01 blasting the disk and CPU for
 some reason. This is the disk I/O graphs for that host, which correlate
 pretty cleanly with the above graphs:

 [[Image(snap-2019.12.02-16.30.33.png​)]]

 This was confirmed by an inspection of `drbd`, the mechanisms that
 synchronizes the disks across the network. It seems there's a huge surge
 of "writes" on the network every hour which lasts anywhere between 20 and
 30 minutes. This was (somewhat) confirmed by running:

 {{{
 watch -n 0.1 -d cat /proc/drbd
 }}}

 on the nodes. The device IDs 4, 13 and 17 trigger a lot of changes in
 DRBD. 13 and 17 are the web nodes, so that's expected - probably log
 writes? But device ID 4 is onionoo-backend, which is what led me to the
 big traffic graph.

 could someone from metrics investigate?

 can i just turn off this machine altogether, considering it's basically
 trying to murder the cluster every hour? :)

--

Comment:

 wow, that *is* a huge improvement! check this out:

 https://grafana.torproject.org/d/ER3U2cqmk/node-exporter-server-
 metrics?orgId=1&from=1575563766753&to=1575650166753&var-
 node=omeiense.torproject.org:9100&var-node=oo-hetzner-03.torproject.org

 in particular:

 [[Image(snap-2019.12.06-11.36.33.png, 700)]]

 large reduction in CPU and memory usage, significant reduction in load!

 [[Image(snap-2019.12.06-11.43.28.png, 700)]]

 also a *dramatic* reduction in disk utilization! especially: all that
 writing was significantly reduced... but what i find the most interesting
 is this:

 [[Image(snap-2019.12.06-11.49.27.png, 700)]]

 ie. we write less, but we don't read more! even though we're computing all
 those checksums, we don't impose extra load on the disks because of that
 reading, which is one thing I was worried about.

 but even if we would read more (which we don't) it would still be a
 worthwhile tradeoffs because (1) we can cache those and (2) we (obviously)
 don't need to replicate reads across the cluster.

 i can't confirm the effect on the actual ganeti cluster because irl
 (thankfully! :) has turned off those jobs on onionoo-backend-01. but i'm
 not confident the cluster will be happier with this work if/when we turn
 it back on.

 thank you so much for taking the extra time in fixing this and taking care
 of our hardware. sometimes it's easier to throw hardware at a problem, but
 this seemed like a case where we could improve our algos a little, and I'm
 glad it worked out. :)

 all in all, i think this can be marked as fix

Re: [tor-bugs] #32660 [Metrics/Onionoo]: onionoo-backend is killing the ganeti cluster

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32660: onionoo-backend is killing the ganeti cluster
-+--
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by anarcat):

 * Attachment "snap-2019.12.06-11.49.27.png" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32660 [Metrics/Onionoo]: onionoo-backend is killing the ganeti cluster

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32660: onionoo-backend is killing the ganeti cluster
-+--
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by anarcat):

 * Attachment "snap-2019.12.06-11.43.28.png" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29259 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Ensure high test coverage for Snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29259: Ensure high test coverage for Snowflake
---+---
 Reporter:  ahf|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake|Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-september  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor28-must
---+---
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29259 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Ensure high test coverage for Snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29259: Ensure high test coverage for Snowflake
---+---
 Reporter:  ahf|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task   | Status:
   |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake|Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-september  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor28-must
---+---

Comment (by cohosh):

 Merged at `3bdcc3408ea`: https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/commit/?id=3bdcc3408ea2e5946dd27699e0f77e3f0f3816b2

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32300 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Improve snowflake server test coverage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32300: Improve snowflake server test coverage
-+
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:  .5
Parent ID:  #29259   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged at `dabdd847ce`: https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/commit/?id=dabdd847cefa0988af14584d98965c5af838325e

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32660 [Metrics/Onionoo]: onionoo-backend is killing the ganeti cluster

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32660: onionoo-backend is killing the ganeti cluster
-+--
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by anarcat):

 * Attachment "snap-2019.12.06-11.38.52.png" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32660 [Metrics/Onionoo]: onionoo-backend is killing the ganeti cluster

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32660: onionoo-backend is killing the ganeti cluster
-+--
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by anarcat):

 * Attachment "snap-2019.12.06-11.36.33.png" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32351 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: review our ssl ciphers suite

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32351: review our ssl ciphers suite
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 another list

 https://cipherli.st/

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30558 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30558: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser
--+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  JeremyRand
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  gk|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912R => TorBrowserTeam201912
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:32 JeremyRand]:
 > Sorry this revision took so long; there was quite a bit of tinkering
 required, given various quirks in how the Python libs are built.  But, the
 good news is that yes, building without `sdist` works fine AFAICT.  I've
 removed the conditional variables from electrum-nmc and certifi.  There
 were also 2 conditional variables in the ncdns and ncprop279 projects,
 which I've removed as well.
 >
 > Updated branch at https://notabug.org/JeremyRand/tor-browser-
 build/src/namecoin-v2 (Git commit hash
 `111d7d1447b47e5290fd0234174a7c29c1351a7b`).

 Thanks looks better now. commit 84888715acfda26e2735805e970ec77dd2d1f56e:

 a)

 You create the project dir with
 {{{
 +mkdir -p /var/tmp/dist/[% project %]
 }}}
 but then often create another project dir you then you like so
 {{{
 +mkdir ./[% project %]
 +cp -a $rootdir/[% project %]*/[% project %]/*.py ./[% project %]/
 }}}
 This `[% project %]/[% project %]/` setup is essentially happening in
 every project. Could you avoid that and just do a
 {{{
 +mkdir -p /var/tmp/dist/[% project %]
 +cd /var/tmp/dist/
 }}}
 (note: you are no changing into the project dir here)
 Then there is no need to create yet another project dir but you can just
 use that one you already created with `mkdir -p`.

 b)

 {{{
 +cd /var/tmp/dist/[% project %]
 +
 +mkdir ./[% project %]
 +cd $rootdir/dnspython*/[% project %]
 +cp --parents **/*.py /var/tmp/dist/[% project %]/[% project %]/
 +
 +cd /var/tmp/dist/[% project %]
 }}}
 Do we really need to change the dir back and forth here?

 c)
 {{{
 +tar xvf [% project %]-[% c('version') %].tar.gz
 +
 +mkdir -p /var/tmp/dist/[% project %]
 +cd /var/tmp/dist/[% project %]
 +
 +cp -a $rootdir/[% project %]*/[% project %].py ./[% project %].py
 }}}
 For the projects that use snippets like the above it's not clear to me why
 you create the `[% project %]` dir at all if you are just using that
 single file directly. So, just `mkdir -p /var/tmp/dist` etc. should be
 enough.

 (Again, when you make those changes, please adjust subsequent commits,
 too, in case they are affected)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32597 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Hello, currently, in China, Tor Browser 9.5a2 still can't connect to Tor network through snowflake bridge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32597: Hello, currently, in China, Tor Browser 9.5a2 still can't connect to Tor
network through snowflake bridge
-+
 Reporter:  amiableclarity2011   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by amiableclarity2011):

 nping -d --udp -p 3478 stun.ekiga.net --data
 00012112a442

 Starting Nping 0.7.60 ( https://nmap.org/nping ) at 2019-12-06 23:27 CST
 SENT (0.0611s) UDP packet with 20 bytes to stun.ekiga.net:3478
 (216.93.246.18:3478)
 RCVD (0.4164s) UDP packet with 92 bytes from stun.ekiga.net:3478
 (216.93.246.18:3478)
 SENT (1.0620s) UDP packet with 20 bytes to stun.ekiga.net:3478
 (216.93.246.18:3478)
 RCVD (1.4242s) UDP packet with 92 bytes from stun.ekiga.net:3478
 (216.93.246.18:3478)
 SENT (2.0624s) UDP packet with 20 bytes to stun.ekiga.net:3478
 (216.93.246.18:3478)
 SENT (3.0640s) UDP packet with 20 bytes to stun.ekiga.net:3478
 (216.93.246.18:3478)
 RCVD (3.4487s) UDP packet with 92 bytes from stun.ekiga.net:3478
 (216.93.246.18:3478)
 SENT (4.0658s) UDP packet with 20 bytes to stun.ekiga.net:3478
 (216.93.246.18:3478)
 RCVD (4.4412s) UDP packet with 92 bytes from stun.ekiga.net:3478
 (216.93.246.18:3478)

 Max rtt: 384.721ms | Min rtt: 355.242ms | Avg rtt: 369.368ms
 UDP packets sent: 5 | Rcvd: 4 | Lost: 1 (20.00%)
 Tx time: 4.00601s | Tx bytes/s: 24.96 | Tx pkts/s: 1.25
 Rx time: 4.38143s | Rx bytes/s: 83.99 | Rx pkts/s: 0.91
 Nping done: 1 IP address pinged in 4.44 seconds

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32604 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add HiddenServiceExportRendPoint and HiddenServiceExportInstanceID directive

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32604: Add HiddenServiceExportRendPoint and HiddenServiceExportInstanceID
directive
-+-
 Reporter:  moonsikpark  |  Owner:  moonsikpark
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs tor-dos extra-review  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32511   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet, ahf, teor   |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
-+-
Changes (by moonsikpark):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32604 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add HiddenServiceExportRendPoint and HiddenServiceExportInstanceID directive

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32604: Add HiddenServiceExportRendPoint and HiddenServiceExportInstanceID
directive
-+-
 Reporter:  moonsikpark  |  Owner:  moonsikpark
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs tor-dos extra-review  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32511   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet, ahf, teor   |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
-+-
Changes (by moonsikpark):

 * owner:  (none) => moonsikpark
 * status:  needs_review => accepted


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32690 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create new directive HiddenServiceExportStats.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32690: Create new directive HiddenServiceExportStats.
--+-
 Reporter:  moonsikpark   |  Owner:  moonsikpark
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32511| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by moonsikpark):

 * type:  defect => enhancement


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32690 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create new directive HiddenServiceExportStats.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32690: Create new directive HiddenServiceExportStats.
-+--
 Reporter:  moonsikpark  |  Owner:  moonsikpark
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  tor-hs   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32511   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 Currently `HiddenServiceExportCircuitID` specifies the protocol. As we
 move towards exporting as much stats as we can, I think it's better to
 create a new directive(`HiddenServiceExportStats`) for the protocol only.

 Also, I need some opinions on the directives.

 1. Create directive per stat(`HiddenServiceExport*`), make all of them
 bound to the hidden service (in `hs_service_config_t`).
 2. Create directive per stat, only `HiddenServiceExportStats` bounds to
 the hidden service and others are global (in `or_options_st`).
 3. Don't create directive per stat, Only one directrive
 `HiddenServiceExportStats`, bound to the hidden service, exports all.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32689 [Core Tor/Stem]: control.py self.msg() calls try to join lists with strings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32689: control.py self.msg() calls try to join lists with strings
---+--
 Reporter:  kamin07|  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.6
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by pastly):

 * owner:  (none) => atagar
 * component:  Applications => Core Tor/Stem


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32689 [Applications]: control.py self.msg() calls try to join lists with strings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32689: control.py self.msg() calls try to join lists with strings
--+--
 Reporter:  kamin07   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by kamin07):

 * Attachment "Traceback.txt" added.

 Python Traceback

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32689 [Applications]: control.py self.msg() calls try to join lists with strings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32689: control.py self.msg() calls try to join lists with strings
--+--
 Reporter:  kamin07   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  Applications
  Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.6  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 In control.py, at the following instances, str is being concatenated with
 a list, which raises an exception:
 1. line 3129
 2. line 3557
 3. line 3952
 4. line 3972

 Example: line 3129:
 raise stem.ProtocolError('SETEVENTS rejected %s' % ',
 '.join(failed_events))

 raises exception. Can be fixed by using:
 raise stem.ProtocolError('SETEVENTS rejected %s' % ', '.join(str(v) for v
 in failed_events))

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31820 [Core Tor/Tor]: Drop support for OpenSSL < 1.1.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31820: Drop support for OpenSSL < 1.1.1
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  .2
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I've fixed the issues on the review and pushed a new version of the
 branch.

 The usage of OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) in the tests is intentional: I've
 added a comment about it, and I've opened #32688 for repairing the API.

 We _probably_ shouldn't merge this till we have the CI fix worked out,
 though.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32688 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes() work again

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32688: Make tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes() work again
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  openssl, ram, oom-dos?
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Where supported, Tor uses OpenSSL skulduggery to find out how much RAM
 openssl has allocated and/or is using for buffers in each SSL object, and
 .  This information is only used for logging right now (in `dumpstats()`),
 but it has potential use in our OOM/DOS prevention code.

 The tricks that we used up till now no longer actually work with OpenSSL
 1.1.0, however, since the relevant structures are now opaque.  We'll
 either need to find another way to get their sizes, or add some API to
 OpenSSL to expose them.

 This is low-priority, unless we actually have time to use this information
 in OOM calculation.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32687 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Please delete tor-launcher branch master-68.3.0esr-9.5

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32687: Please delete tor-launcher branch master-68.3.0esr-9.5
-+
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 I accidentally pushed this branch. Please delete it.

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-launcher.git/log/?h=master-68.3.0esr-9.5

 Thank you.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32686 [Core Tor/Nyx]: Show TOR Dns port status from controller

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32686: Show TOR Dns port status from controller
-+--
 Reporter:  bounteous17  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Core Tor/Nyx
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 My branch:
 https://github.com/bounteous/nyx/tree/dns_port

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32685 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update to December GeoIP2 database

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32685: Update to December GeoIP2 database
--+
 Reporter:  karsten   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32685 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update to December GeoIP2 database

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32685: Update to December GeoIP2 database
--+
 Reporter:  karsten   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 ​[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/tor.git/log/?h=geoip-2019-12-03
 My geoip-2019-12-03 branch] contains the updated `geoip` and `geoip6`
 files with IPv4 and IPv6 ranges and is supposed to be merged into
 maint-0.2.9 and other branches that are still maintained.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32660 [Metrics/Onionoo]: onionoo-backend is killing the ganeti cluster

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32660: onionoo-backend is killing the ganeti cluster
-+--
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Patch is merged, released, and deployed on both backends. Hourly updates
 are much faster now. Does this show in the graphs?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32684 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Release Onionoo 7.0-1.23.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32684: Release Onionoo 7.0-1.23.0
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Release: https://dist.torproject.org/onionoo/7.0-1.23.0/

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32684 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Release Onionoo 7.0-1.23.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32684: Release Onionoo 7.0-1.23.0
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 I created a new Onionoo release this morning to deploy #32660. This ticket
 documents this effort.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32604 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add HiddenServiceExportRendPoint and HiddenServiceExportInstanceID directive

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32604: Add HiddenServiceExportRendPoint and HiddenServiceExportInstanceID
directive
-+-
 Reporter:  moonsikpark  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs tor-dos extra-review  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32511   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet, ahf, teor   |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
-+-
Changes (by moonsikpark):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 OK, I think I did all I can do within the ticket's scope.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32492 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Unexpected NoScript behavior when security level is pinned using user.js

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32492: Unexpected NoScript behavior when security level is pinned using user.js
--+--
 Reporter:  kj|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by kj):

 I experienced this issue even without pinning the security level:
 1. I launched Tor Browser. The security level was at "Safer" (the last
 used level).
 2. I changed the security level from "Safer" to "Safest".
 3. I fetched some websites.
 4. I see that JavaScript is running on all of them.
 5. NoScript options has a per-site permission "http:" (blocking non-HTTPS
 JavaScript).
 I can't give further details at this stage because I wasn't performing a
 test and it's the first time I experienced this issue with security level
 pinning.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23116 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor stops responding to Ctrl-C and circuits while in infinite descriptor download loop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23116: tor stops responding to Ctrl-C and circuits while in infinite descriptor
download loop
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-insight, needs-analysis,   |  Actual Points:
  033-triage-20180320, 033-removed-20180320  |
Parent ID:  #16844   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 Do we call this one a duplicate of #23470? Or teor, was there something
 you wanted to test still?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs