Re: [tor-bugs] #32700 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No need to disable GeckoDriver in Windows mozconfig files

2019-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#32700: No need to disable GeckoDriver in Windows mozconfig files
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912R,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201912  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912, GeorgKoppen201912 =>
 TorBrowserTeam201912R, GeorgKoppen201912


Comment:

 `bug_32700` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_32700=40502c9d0abb4e2c6b732162536fd2ea26bfe35b)
 has the patch for review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32660 [Metrics/Onionoo]: onionoo-backend is killing the ganeti cluster

2019-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#32660: onionoo-backend is killing the ganeti cluster
-+--
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Thanks for checking, and glad to hear that things worked out this well!
 We'll take care of coordinating new backend instances. Thanks again!

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[tor-bugs] #32700 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No need to disable GeckoDriver in Windows mozconfig files

2019-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#32700: No need to disable GeckoDriver in Windows mozconfig files
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912,
 Severity:  Normal   |  GeorgKoppen201912
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We compile with `--disable-tests` on Windows which [https://searchfox.org
 /mozilla-esr68/source/toolkit/moz.configure#1006 automatically disables
 GeckoDriver]. Thus, we can clean up our mozconfig files a bit.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30984 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make a key-value line abstraction to output control replies

2019-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30984: Make a key-value line abstraction to output control replies
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-deferred-20190918, early-review  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29210   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks good to me, but we can't merge until after the pending releases.

 Also, please remember to fill in actual points!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32672 [Core Tor/Tor]: Reject 0.2.9 and 0.4.0 in dirserv_rejects_tor_version()

2019-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#32672: Reject 0.2.9 and 0.4.0 in dirserv_rejects_tor_version()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-should, 041-backport,|  Actual Points:
  042-backport, consider-backport-after- |
  authority-test, fast-fix, network-health   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:7 neel]:
 > About blocking 0.4.1 alphas/rc, I would be against it unless there is a
 crippling bug on the 0.4.1 alphas/rc releases. For instance, 0.2.9.5-rc is
 allowed on the network because it "works" (may not be the most secure, but
 technically works), whereas 0.2.9.4 and below have a consensus bug.

 Yes, we decided to keep 0.2.9.5-rc, when we made a decision about 0.2.9.

 But recently, when we made a decision about 0.3.5, we rejected unstable
 versions of 0.3.5 because those versions are not supported. (And there
 were not many relays on those versions.)
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1588/files#diff-
 c535b81e06d7fed27d5d3cdaabf1c4b8R331

 Unless there is some compelling reason to keep 0.4.0 unstable relays, we
 should encourage their operators to upgrade.

 > The changes are posted to both the original PR based off master and the
 0.4.1 PR here: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1588
 >
 > I don't know if two PRs will work for you, but here it is.

 We normally do backports with multiple PRs. Because of the way that git
 does merges, the best way to get a good merge is to do the common changes
 in one commit, and the extra changes for later versions in other commits.
 You won't need to do that here, this patch is small enough that we can
 resolve any merge conflicts ourselves.

 To move forward with this ticket, we need to:
 * find out how many relays are on unstable 0.4.0 versions
 * decide if we want to reject those versions

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32500 [Core Tor/Tor]: consider clang -std=gnu99 in Travis for better C99 portability

2019-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#32500: consider clang -std=gnu99 in Travis for better C99 portability
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  portability, tor-ci, 029-backport,   |  Actual Points:  0.5
  035-backport, 040-backport, 041-backport,  |
  042-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32699 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Rename the fallback input list to an "offer list"

2019-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#32699: Rename the fallback input list to an "offer list"
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24839 | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 See my code change:
 * fallback-scripts master: https://github.com/torproject/fallback-
 scripts/pull/10

 And spec change:
 * torspec master: https://github.com/torproject/torspec/pull/99

 The spec change also includes a spec for part of #24839, because I wanted
 to do the breaking changes all at once.

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[tor-bugs] #32699 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Rename the fallback input list to an "offer list"

2019-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#32699: Rename the fallback input list to an "offer list"
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  fallback
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #24839
   Points:  0.5|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 In #24839, we want to replace the list of relay operators who have offered
 their relays as fallbacks, with signed statements in descriptors via a
 torrc option.

 As part of that transition, we should rename the internal variables in the
 script, and the file in the repository. I suggest we use "fallback offer
 list".

 We should also delete any remaining references to the blacklist, because
 it is obsolete, and the actual list was removed from the repository some
 time ago.

 This change also has the benefit of avoiding the "white = good" metaphor,
 which can be confusing and problematic. For more details, see:
 https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-knodel-terminology-00.html

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[tor-bugs] #32698 [Core Tor/Tor]: Require client protocol versions based on 0.3.5.7

2019-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#32698: Require client protocol versions based on 0.3.5.7
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core   |Version:
  Tor/Tor  |
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  046-can, 047-should, teor-backlog
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.5|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 Assuming #32696 is deployed between March and June 2020, we should make
 the 0.3.5.7 protocol versions required for clients some time in 2021.

 See:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/303-protover-
 removal-policy.txt#n49

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[tor-bugs] #32697 [Core Tor/Tor]: Require supported relay protocol versions based on 0.3.5.7

2019-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#32697: Require supported relay protocol versions based on 0.3.5.7
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core   |Version:
  Tor/Tor  |
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  044-can, 045-should, teor-backlog
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.5|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 Like #32696, we should make the 0.3.5.7 protocol versions required for
 relays some time between April and December 2020.

 See:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/303-protover-
 removal-policy.txt#n36

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30984 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make a key-value line abstraction to output control replies

2019-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30984: Make a key-value line abstraction to output control replies
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-deferred-20190918, early-review  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29210   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:13 teor]:
 > Looks fine to me as a design, I suggested a few tweaks.
 > Are there any specific things you would like me to look at?
 Thanks! I've addressed your comments, and improved the Doxygen formatting
 a little as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31874 [Circumvention]: Automatically test the PTs of bridges

2019-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31874: Automatically test the PTs of bridges
---+
 Reporter:  phw|  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s30-o23a3  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31280 | Points:  10
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor30-must
---+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:7 phw]:
 > [https://github.com/measurement-kit/measurement-
 kit/issues/86#issuecomment-399925444 Teor mentioned] on OONI's bug tracker
 that there's a
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/feature/api/tor_api.h?id=39bb283fca95648aeb58d9e8927de6e1530c6015
 tor_api.h] that makes it possible to start tor as a library. This may be
 helpful for bridgestrap, which currently uses golang's
 `exec.CommandContext` to start the tor binary.

 There are probably still a few relaunch issues in tor_api.h, but it seems
 to work pretty well. Let us know if you find any bugs, and we'll fix them
 :-)

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[tor-bugs] #32696 [Core Tor/Tor]: Recommend supported protocol versions based on 0.3.5.7

2019-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#32696: Recommend supported protocol versions based on 0.3.5.7
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  043-can, auth-deploy-Feb-2020,
 Severity:  Normal   |  teor-backlog
Actual Points:  0.1  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.5  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 According to proposal 303, we recommend some protocol versions every time
 an LTS release is no longer supported:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/303-protover-
 removal-policy.txt#n18

 0.2.9.8 supported these protocol versions:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/or/protover.c?h=tor-0.2.9.8#n283

 When 0.2.9 is no longer supported, the earliest stable LTS will be
 0.3.5.7, which supports these protocol versions:
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/core/or/protover.c?h=tor-0.3.5.7#n379

 Therefore, we should recommend these protocol versions for clients and
 relays:
 Cons=2
 Desc=2
 DirCache=2 *
 HSDir=2 *
 HSIntro=4 *
 HSRend=2
 Link=5 *
 LinkAuth=3 *
 Microdesc=2
 Relay=2

 The starred protovers are not supported by 0.2.9, so it will warn on
 bootstrap / consensus download.

 We can make that change in master here:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.c#n4630

 The required protocols must stay the same, I'll open another ticket for
 them.

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[tor-bugs] #32695 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove consensus methods 25-27

2019-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#32695: Remove consensus methods 25-27
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  043-should, teor-backlog
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.5   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 According to proposal 290, we remove some consensus methods every time an
 LTS release is no longer supported:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/290-deprecate-
 consensus-methods.txt

 When 0.2.9 is no longer supported, the earliest stable LTS will be
 0.3.5.7, which supports consensus methods 25-28. Therefore, we can remove
 all consensus methods less than 28:
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.h?h=tor-0.3.5.7#n60

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32691 [Core Tor/Tor]: Image broken in 'src-ref' documentation

2019-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#32691: Image broken in 'src-ref' documentation
--+
 Reporter:  opara |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by catalyst):

 Replying to [comment:4 nickm]:
 > This is not hard to ifx, but we should figure out what part of the
 toolchain we want here, and how much we want to ship with Tor.  The old
 diagrams were generated from `dia` files, which I'm not sure we still want
 to be involved with.
 If we are still willing to use `dia`,
 http://www.doxygen.nl/manual/commands.html#cmddiafile is a thing.
 Alternatively, there is
 http://www.doxygen.nl/manual/commands.html#cmddotfile

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32690 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create new directive HiddenServiceExportStats.

2019-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#32690: Create new directive HiddenServiceExportStats.
--+---
 Reporter:  moonsikpark   |  Owner:  moonsikpark
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32511| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_information


Comment:

 Here's some context for this question:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/32604#comment:22

 How do you expect people to use this feature? It's hard for me to decide
 between these options, when I don't know how they will be used.

 Unless there is some compelling use case for per-service or per-field
 options, I'd prefer this design:
 4. Only one directrive HiddenServiceExportStats, global, exports all
 fields, for all hidden services.

 I also don't think it's helpful to call this data "Stats", because Tor
 already has a statistics system, on relays, that works via extra-info
 descriptors.

 Let's say "HIddenServiceExportCircuitInfo" ir something similar.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32604 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add HiddenServiceExportRendPoint and HiddenServiceExportInstanceID directive

2019-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#32604: Add HiddenServiceExportRendPoint and HiddenServiceExportInstanceID
directive
-+-
 Reporter:  moonsikpark  |  Owner:
 |  moonsikpark
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs tor-dos extra-review needs-   |  Actual Points:
  proposal   |
Parent ID:  #32511   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet, ahf, teor   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * keywords:  tor-hs tor-dos extra-review => tor-hs tor-dos extra-review
 needs-proposal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32604 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add HiddenServiceExportRendPoint and HiddenServiceExportInstanceID directive

2019-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#32604: Add HiddenServiceExportRendPoint and HiddenServiceExportInstanceID
directive
-+-
 Reporter:  moonsikpark  |  Owner:  moonsikpark
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs tor-dos extra-review  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32511   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet, ahf, teor   |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 You can write a proposal using this process:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/001-process.txt#n39

 Here are two good example proposals:

 Specifying data formats:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/284-hsv3-control-
 port.txt

 Adding a new option:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/309-optimistic-
 socks-in-tor.txt

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32240 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor Travis: Make chutney work on Xenial and Bionic images

2019-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#32240: Tor Travis: Make chutney work on Xenial and Bionic images
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, chutney, 043-should, |  Actual Points:
  029-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport,  |
  041-backport, 042-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 I checked the permissions on those directories, and they seemed fine.
 Here's what I'd like to try next:
 * try a different directory
 * disable the sandbox in the build, in chutney's torrcs, or just for this
 CI job
 * turn off mmap() to see if that's the issue

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31820 [Core Tor/Tor]: Drop support for OpenSSL < 1.1.1

2019-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31820: Drop support for OpenSSL < 1.1.1
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  .2
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 This looks good, but we need to fix #32240 before merging.

 I don't know what status we should use for "Merge ready, but blocked on
 another ticket".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23116 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor stops responding to Ctrl-C and circuits while in infinite descriptor download loop

2019-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#23116: tor stops responding to Ctrl-C and circuits while in infinite descriptor
download loop
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-insight, needs-analysis,   |  Actual Points:
  033-triage-20180320, 033-removed-20180320  |
Parent ID:  #21789   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:  #16844 => #21789


Comment:

 I don't have time to reproduce this issue right now.
 Let's close it after we close #21789.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32629 [Core Tor/Tor]: Re-enable 1 or 2 more macOS jobs in Travis

2019-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#32629: Re-enable 1 or 2 more macOS jobs in Travis
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consider-backport-immediately, tor-  |  Actual Points:  0.3
  ci, ipv6, macos, 029-backport, 035-backport,   |
  040-backport, 041-backport, 042-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 I'm going to wait until the pending releases are out, then merge,

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32686 [Core Tor/Nyx]: Show TOR Dns port status from controller

2019-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#32686: Show TOR Dns port status from controller
--+
 Reporter:  bounteous17   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Nyx  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by atagar):

 > I wanted to follow the same logic as the control_port.

 Gotcha. That is correct (control_port is the logic to pattern this after),
 but that checked for None rather than zero...

 {{{
   if vals.control_port:
 if width >= x + 19 + len(vals.control_port) + len(vals.auth_type):
   auth_color = RED if vals.auth_type == 'open' else GREEN
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32694 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Problem logging in to Disqus on OSX in Tor 9

2019-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#32694: Problem logging in to Disqus on OSX in Tor 9
--+--
 Reporter:  mwolfe|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arma):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


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[tor-bugs] #32694 [- Select a component]: Problem logging in to Disqus on OSX in Tor 9

2019-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#32694: Problem logging in to Disqus on OSX in Tor 9
+--
 Reporter:  mwolfe  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 In Disqus, one must log in on a separate log-in tab. In 8.0, I had to set
 Security & Privacy to Accept Third Party Cookies and Site Data Always, or
 the log in on the separate tab was not communicated to the comment tab.

 In Windows 10 1903 under Bootcamp, 9.x Communicates without any problem, I
 don't have to make any change to the preferences, and I can log in on the
 log in tab and this is then recognised by the comment tab; however, on OSX
 10.11.6, El Capitan, the log in tab cannot communicate with the comment
 tab on Tor 9.x, but communicates on 8.0 with the Security and Privacy
 change.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32297 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Version 9 problem (regular and alpha) when some Exit Nodes are blocked by a website firewall

2019-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#32297: Version 9 problem (regular and alpha) when some Exit Nodes are blocked 
by a
website firewall
-+-
 Reporter:  mwolfe   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201912   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mwolfe):

 Replying to [comment:16 mwolfe]:
 Finally managed to get a clean copy of Tor 9.0 on OSX10.11.6 El Capitan
 and no problem of the New Circuit for the Site. Problem is only on my
 version of Windows, 10 1903.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30558 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser

2019-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30558: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser
--+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  JeremyRand
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  gk|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by JeremyRand):

 Updated branch at https://notabug.org/JeremyRand/tor-browser-
 build/src/namecoin-v4 (Git commit hash
 `a37eb03fc88f192aa02f4694468effa47de53a49`).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32686 [Core Tor/Nyx]: Show TOR Dns port status from controller

2019-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#32686: Show TOR Dns port status from controller
--+
 Reporter:  bounteous17   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Nyx  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by bounteous17):

 Replying to [comment:1 atagar]:
 > Hi bounteous17, did you try running this without a DNS listener? It
 looks like you default the value to None, but then present it unless it's
 zero.

 I wanted to follow the same logic as the control_port. It is true that if
 None is shown, it can be understood that it is a non-optional parameter
 and that it is not configured.

 I will modify it so that the 'DNS Port' is not displayed if it is not
 configured.

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