Re: [tor-bugs] #23875 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Facebook's onion site is a single hop onion, but clicking on the Tor onion icon shows that it is a 6 hop circuit.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23875: Facebook's onion site is a single hop onion, but clicking on the Tor 
onion
icon shows that it is a 6 hop circuit.
--+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-circuit-display, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 btw `https://facebookcorewwwi.onion` is down it seems

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32777 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Weird things happening in Tor Browser (some websites change Tor circuit paths rapidly)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32777: Weird things happening in Tor Browser (some websites change Tor circuit
paths rapidly)
--+--
 Reporter:  Tor235|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [ticket:32777 Tor235]:
 > While using Tor Browser recently, I've noticed that several websites
 change their Tor circuit path many times in a matter of just a few seconds
 (for no apparent reason).
 >
 > One of these websites is ipchicken.com (a website which shows one's
 current IP address). When visiting ipchicken.com, the Tor circuit path
 changes many times in a few seconds. At first, the "current IP address" on
 ipchicken.com is a regular Tor exit node. But when the page is reloaded,
 the "current IP address" becomes an odd IPv6 address.

 1. since https://ipchicken.com/ does not contain any  records, it is
 not possible, it reports a ipv6 to you.

 >Reloading the page a 2nd time shows a similar IPv6 address (with the same
 starting digits, but different >ending digits). This is one of the IPv6
 addresses it displayed:
 >
 > 2405:8100:8000:5ca1::27f:e187

 this is a cloudflare ip
 https://www.cloudflare.com/ips/
 >
 > I checked this IP address in the Tor ExoneraTor
 (metrics.torproject.org/exonerator.html), and this IPv6 address does not
 appear to be in the Tor database.
 yes, because this is a cloudflare ip
 2. ipchicken.com IS cloudflared.

 > The 2nd IP-checking website said that the origin of the IPv6 address is
 "CloudFlare Hong Kong".
 >
 correct, as the website is behind cloudflare.

 > I tried accessing ipchicken.com and other IP-checking websites on a
 different computer, and the same thing happened (weird IPv6 address
 appeared).

 yes, because the website does not check your browser used ip but from
 cloudflare.

 > So multiple websites are, for no apparent reason, changing their Tor
 circuit paths many times in just a few seconds, AND displaying strange
 IPv6 address as the "current IP address". Other websites, such as
 Wikipedia, are normal.
 >
 > Is this just a Tor Browser bug, or could it be some other kind of
 problem?
 not a Tor Browser bug. it  is the website reporting the CDN ip that is
 serving to you.
 > Note that on websites in which the Tor circuit path changed many times
 for no apparent reason, the entry node (guard node) generally stayed the
 same.

 Yes, the guard should stay always the same, even if the malicous website
 forces you into 1000's new circuits. otherwise you could be deanomisized.
 what you should care about is guard rotation attacks, not if it stays the
 same.

 > The Tor Browser used is version 9.0.2.
 false positive.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32778 [Core Tor/Tor]: pubsub_pub_

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32778: pubsub_pub_
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.2.5
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 platform windows/mingw64

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32693 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB Android: startup crash when opened from external link - void org.mozilla.gecko.Tab.doReload(boolean)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32693: TBB Android: startup crash when opened from external link - void
org.mozilla.gecko.Tab.doReload(boolean)
-+-
 Reporter:  ilf  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TBB, Android, crash, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202002   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ilf):

 confirmed: still present in 68.3.0

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32779 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add documentation about building a tag file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32779: Add documentation about building a tag file
--+
 Reporter:  opara |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.3.x-final


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32779 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add documentation about building a tag file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32779: Add documentation about building a tag file
--+
 Reporter:  opara |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by opara):

 * Attachment "32779.patch" added.

 Documentation patch

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32779 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add documentation about building a tag file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32779: Add documentation about building a tag file
-+--
 Reporter:  opara|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 A documentation update to describe building a tag file (emacs or vim).
 I'll post a patch after I have a ticket number.

 I haven't explicitly tested the emacs version, but the vim version works.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32778 [Core Tor/Tor]: pubsub_pub_

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32778: pubsub_pub_
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.2.5
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Hm. What platform is this on?  Do you have anything unusual in your
 configuration?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32778 [Core Tor/Tor]: pubsub_pub_

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32778: pubsub_pub_
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.2.5
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Medium => High
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.2.x-final


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32220 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Change letterboxing color when dark theme is enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32220: Change letterboxing color when dark theme is enabled
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can, ux-   |  Actual Points:  5
  team, TorBrowserTeam201911R, tbb-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by Thorin):

 Replying to [comment:23 opara]:
 > Since these settings may also enable the CSS prefers-color-scheme
 feature, these settings may make you fingerprintable.

 RFP covers prefers-color-scheme in FF67+ , so we are good here:
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1540726

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32744 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbrowser on Android crashes on visiting a page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32744: Torbrowser on Android crashes on visiting a page
--+---
 Reporter:  WerHaus   |  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by Thorin):

 and.. WerHaus, if you can reproduce the crash again, does it also happen
 in Firefox on Android (which is also the same release: ESR68)? Thanks

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32777 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Weird things happening in Tor Browser (some websites change Tor circuit paths rapidly)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32777: Weird things happening in Tor Browser (some websites change Tor circuit
paths rapidly)
--+--
 Reporter:  Tor235|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  Core Tor/Tor => Applications/Tor Browser


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32764 [Core Tor/Tor]: Solve code issues that block running clang-format on our code.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32764: Solve code issues that block running clang-format on our code.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:  #29226| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Good catch, and thanks for the super quick response!  I've pushed a fixup
 commit there.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32158 [Core Tor/Tor]: vanguards: 'exit circ' always only '(length 3', 'internal circ' fine with '(length 4' and 5

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32158: vanguards: 'exit circ' always only '(length 3', 'internal circ' fine 
with
'(length 4' and 5
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  vanguards |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 vanguards will not be used for this purpose. only for onion service
 related connections

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29154 [Core Tor/Tor]: My tor does not work anymore!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29154: My tor does not work anymore!
--+--
 Reporter:  killerbee |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:10 killerbee]:
 > Tor Chrome extension with Chromium

 What is this?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32778 [Core Tor/Tor]: pubsub_pub_

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32778: pubsub_pub_
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:  Tor: 0.4.2.5  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 i don't know what this error is about. Seen in logs many thousands of many
 of this log lines (650k), even if they tell to not warn about it again.
 {{{
 Dec 17 01:17:40.000 [warn] {HANDSHAKE} 20190 connections have failed:
 Dec 17 01:17:40.000 [warn] {HANDSHAKE}  20190 connections died in state
 connect()ing with SSL state (No SSL object)
 Dec 17 01:17:40.000 [warn] {BUG} tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug:
 pubsub_publish.c:37: pubsub_pub_: Non-fatal assertion !(! d) failed.
 (Future instances of this warning will be silenced.) (on Tor 0.4.2.5 )
 Dec 17 01:17:40.000 [warn] {BUG} Bug: Tor 0.4.2.5: Non-fatal assertion !(!
 d) failed in pubsub_pub_ at pubsub_publish.c:37. (Stack trace not
 available) (on Tor 0.4.2.5 )
 Dec 17 01:17:40.000 [warn] {BUG} tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug:
 pubsub_publish.c:37: pubsub_pub_: Non-fatal assertion !(! d) failed.
 (Future instances of this warning will be silenced.) (on Tor 0.4.2.5 )
 Dec 17 01:17:40.000 [warn] {BUG} Bug: Tor 0.4.2.5: Non-fatal assertion !(!
 d) failed in pubsub_pub_ at pubsub_publish.c:37. (Stack trace not
 available) (on Tor 0.4.2.5 )
 Dec 17 01:17:40.000 [warn] {CONTROL} Problem bootstrapping. Stuck at 0%
 (starting): Starting. (Connection timed out [WSAETIMEDOUT ]; TIMEOUT;
 count 20192; recommendation warn; host
 CE3FE883C6C9EF475EA097DC3E33A6F32B852DA1 at 78.129.218.56:443)
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #5915 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write patch to make socks handshakes succeed instantly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5915: Write patch to make socks handshakes succeed instantly
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal, tor-client, intro,   |  Actual Points:
  performance, application, experiment, tbb- |
  wants?, performance?, ux,  |
  042-deferred-20190918  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 patch for 4.1.6 is still compatible with tor-0.4.2.5 stable

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #16682 [Core Tor/Tor]: Deploy TCP Fast Open at exits (and maybe inter-node?)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16682: Deploy TCP Fast Open at exits (and maybe inter-node?)
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  performance tor-relay exit needs-|  Actual Points:
  analysis term-project  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 the question is not, what platforms do support but which ones does not
 make use of TFO yet? all known that tor can run on are supported to date.

 enabling TFO usage into alpha for all roles but exit first, should give
 good results with no known side effects and be good to go experienced
 further with later enabling exiting TLS connection ?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30558 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30558: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser
--+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  JeremyRand
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  gk|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by JeremyRand):

 I can confirm that the v8 branch fixes both issues for me.  With regards
 to (1), it now takes circa 10 seconds for a .bit site to load if I type it
 into the address bar as soon as Tor Browser starts.  Previously it was
 closer to 30 seconds.  We can probably do better by having Electrum-NMC
 launch its connections as soon as the control port indicates Tor is
 connected, but for now I think v8 is "good enough" (and avoids making the
 invasive changes that would be needed for using the control port).  I'll
 definitely look into using the control port for a later release though.

 @gk feel free to test for more oddities.  :)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32777 [Core Tor/Tor]: Weird things happening in Tor Browser (some websites change Tor circuit paths rapidly)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32777: Weird things happening in Tor Browser (some websites change Tor circuit
paths rapidly)
--+--
 Reporter:  Tor235|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:  Tor: unspecified  |   Severity:  Major
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 While using Tor Browser recently, I've noticed that several websites
 change their Tor circuit path many times in a matter of just a few seconds
 (for no apparent reason).

 One of these websites is ipchicken.com (a website which shows one's
 current IP address). When visiting ipchicken.com, the Tor circuit path
 changes many times in a few seconds. At first, the "current IP address" on
 ipchicken.com is a regular Tor exit node. But when the page is reloaded,
 the "current IP address" becomes an odd IPv6 address. Reloading the page a
 2nd time shows a similar IPv6 address (with the same starting digits, but
 different ending digits). This is one of the IPv6 addresses it displayed:

 2405:8100:8000:5ca1::27f:e187

 I checked this IP address in the Tor ExoneraTor
 (metrics.torproject.org/exonerator.html), and this IPv6 address does not
 appear to be in the Tor database.

 Also, the exact same thing that happened on ipchicken.com happened on a
 completely different IP-checking website -- the IP address displayed was
 (at first) the Tor exit node, but then when the page was reloaded, it
 became an IPv6 address beginning with "2405:8100:8000:5ca1..." (That
 website changed its Tor circuit path many times in a matter of seconds as
 well).

 The 2nd IP-checking website said that the origin of the IPv6 address is
 "CloudFlare Hong Kong".

 I tried accessing ipchicken.com and other IP-checking websites on a
 different computer, and the same thing happened (weird IPv6 address
 appeared).

 So multiple websites are, for no apparent reason, changing their Tor
 circuit paths many times in just a few seconds, AND displaying strange
 IPv6 address as the "current IP address". Other websites, such as
 Wikipedia, are normal.

 Is this just a Tor Browser bug, or could it be some other kind of problem?

 Note that on websites in which the Tor circuit path changed many times for
 no apparent reason, the entry node (guard node) generally stayed the same.

 The Tor Browser used is version 9.0.2.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29801 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write a proposal for IPv6 "Happy Eyeballs" on Tor clients

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29801: Write a proposal for IPv6 "Happy Eyeballs" on Tor clients
-+-
 Reporter:  neel |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop299,   |  Actual Points:
  042-deferred-20190918  |
Parent ID:  #17835   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm, asn, teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * reviewer:  nickm, asn => nickm, asn, teor


Comment:

 The proposal is large, and it has a lot of different changes. Some of
 these changes are not required.

 It's really important that we tell developers which changes are necessary,
 important, optional, and experimental/alternative. Optional, and
 experimental/alternative changes should be moved to an appendix, or
 deleted.

 See my email:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2019-December/014110.html

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32708 [Core Tor/Tor]: manpage: alphabetize General Options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32708: manpage: alphabetize General Options
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  documentation tor-client manpage |  Actual Points:  1
  easy gsod  |
Parent ID:  #4310| Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * actualpoints:   => 1


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #5304 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Obfsproxy should respect OutboundBindAddress in torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5304: Obfsproxy should respect OutboundBindAddress in torrc
-+-
 Reporter:  korobkov |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-spec-change needs-tor-change,  |  Actual Points:  1.25
  anti-censorship-roadmap-july   |
Parent ID:  #30471   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  phw  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-must
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_revision


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #5304 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Obfsproxy should respect OutboundBindAddress in torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5304: Obfsproxy should respect OutboundBindAddress in torrc
-+-
 Reporter:  korobkov |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-spec-change needs-tor-change,  |  Actual Points:  1.25
  anti-censorship-roadmap-july   |
Parent ID:  #30471   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  phw  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-must
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => ahf


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #5304 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Obfsproxy should respect OutboundBindAddress in torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5304: Obfsproxy should respect OutboundBindAddress in torrc
-+-
 Reporter:  korobkov |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-spec-change needs-tor-change,  |  Actual Points:  1.25
  anti-censorship-roadmap-july   |
Parent ID:  #30471   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  phw  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-must
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_revision
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.3.x-final


Comment:

 Sorry, we didn't look at this ticket until now, because it wasn't in a Tor
 milestone.

 Replying to [comment:29 ahf]:
 > Added implementation for Tor in
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1164
 >
 > This implementation should reflect the spec changes that have already
 been reviewed by phw and teor in
 https://github.com/ahf/torspec/compare/bugs/5304

 Here's what we still need to do:
 * resolve conflicts with the current tor master
 * revise the patch based on the review at:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1164#pullrequestreview-257045293
 * wait for tor's CI to finish
 * review the changes since "Expose TOR_PT_OUTBOUND_BIND_ADDRESS..."
 * squash if needed
 * merge

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32708 [Core Tor/Tor]: manpage: alphabetize General Options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32708: manpage: alphabetize General Options
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  documentation tor-client manpage |  Actual Points:
  easy gsod  |
Parent ID:  #4310| Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged to master.

 The fixup didn't apply, so I modified its commit message to get around our
 "no fixups" rules.

 Please remember to fill in actual points!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32776 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove 0.2.9 from the jenkins builders

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32776: Remove 0.2.9 from the jenkins builders
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 I don't know how to change jenkins configs, but I think we need to make a
 patch, then  put it in the jenkins component?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31413 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check for internal IPv6 connects and extends

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31413: Check for internal IPv6 connects and extends
-+--
 Reporter:  neel |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, tor-relay  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24403   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  assigned => new


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31413 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check for internal IPv6 connects and extends

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31413: Check for internal IPv6 connects and extends
-+--
 Reporter:  neel |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, tor-relay  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24403   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by neel):

 * owner:  neel => (none)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32775 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Remove 0.2.9 from chutney's CI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32775: Remove 0.2.9 from chutney's CI
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  chutney-ci, teor-backlog
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #30067
   Points:  0.1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 On 1 January 2020, we won't be supporting 0.2.9 any more.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32764 [Core Tor/Tor]: Solve code issues that block running clang-format on our code.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32764: Solve code issues that block running clang-format on our code.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:  #29226| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:1 nickm]:
 > See branch `pre_formatter_cleanups`, with PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1610
 >
 > I'll put this in needs_review once CI passes.
 Thanks!  I skimmed it.  It mostly looks good, but I didn't do extensive
 verification.  I commented on the pull request about a few places where a
 now-undefined macro remained referenced.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32774 [Core Tor/DirAuth]: Set the sendme_emit_min_version=1 consensus parameter

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32774: Set the sendme_emit_min_version=1 consensus parameter
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/DirAuth  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We decided to set the sendme_emit_min_version=1 consensus parameter when
 0.4.1 was released:
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/NetworkTeam/ReleaseParameters#a0.4.1stableshippedinTorBrowser

 But it isn't currently set in the consensus:
 https://consensus-health.torproject.org/#consensusparams

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32762 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: major networking issues on moly, affects: majus, fallax, web-cymru-01, build-x86-05, build-x86-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32762: major networking issues on moly, affects: majus, fallax, web-cymru-01,
build-x86-05, build-x86-06
-+-
 Reporter:  emmapeel |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  translation, l10n, majus, moly   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 network has returned, but the MTU problem remains.

 i've temporarily lowered the MTU to 1474 after bisecting to see what
 actually works, on both moly and majus.

 i've turned off the other VMs back again after realizing all those VMs
 would also need to be tweaked and I don't have to do so right now.

 @emmapeel: majus should be back online now, for what that's worth. please
 consider speeding up the cleanup work on that box or whatever is required
 to migrate over to the new cluster, now that we have access again.

 backups should again run tonight and get us a fresh copy.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31413 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check for internal IPv6 connects and extends

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31413: Check for internal IPv6 connects and extends
-+--
 Reporter:  neel |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, tor-relay  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24403   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => neel


Comment:

 Assigning to myself.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29770 [Internal Services/Service - lists]: mails relayed from lists.tpo to gmail.com bounces

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29770: mails relayed from lists.tpo to gmail.com bounces
---+--
 Reporter:  anarcat|  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by anarcat):

 note, related even if old: #19914

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32532 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Install ZNC on Chives, make pastly admin it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32532: Install ZNC on Chives, make pastly admin it
-+-
 Reporter:  pastly   |  Owner:  pastly
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 @pastly - is there anything else you need from us here? how is it going?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32735 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please remove my access to staticiforme and ability to push Tor Browser releases and add sysrqb instead

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32735: Please remove my access to staticiforme and ability to push Tor Browser
releases and add sysrqb instead
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 >  gk should be removed from torwww and sysrqb added

 done as well. gk still has those groups:

 {{{
 supplementaryGid: tb-crashes
 supplementaryGid: torextratpo
 supplementaryGid: torproject
 supplementaryGid: torrbm
 }}}

 do those look alright?

 >  Part of our release process involves changing group ownership of the
 files we copy onto the server, setting the group as torwww. I just tested
 this and it is failing.

 That's because you were not part of the torwww group. I just made the
 change in LDAP and it should propagate to staticiforme shortly.

 Let me know if there's anything else here...

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32679 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Create VM to run monitoring software for anti-censorship team

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32679: Create VM to run monitoring software for anti-censorship team
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30152   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 i still feel this ticket is a duplicate of #31159, could we close one of
 them so i get a little peace of mind? :)

 i might not have time to look into this before the holidays, but we'll
 see...

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32763 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please provision an onionoo-backend-02 and add to the varnish configuration

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32763: Please provision an onionoo-backend-02 and add to the varnish 
configuration
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 i'm confused: how is this not a duplicate of #32268? or is this just an
 oversight?

 in either case, what's the procedure to follow here?

 thanks!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32158 [Core Tor/Tor]: vanguards: 'exit circ' always only '(length 3', 'internal circ' fine with '(length 4' and 5

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32158: vanguards: 'exit circ' always only '(length 3', 'internal circ' fine 
with
'(length 4' and 5
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  vanguards |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by catalyst):

 * component:  Internal Services => Core Tor/Tor


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32281 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: set up new IRC box to replace iranicum

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32281: set up new IRC box to replace iranicum
-+-
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31686   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 now we only haev erinn and nima left here.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32421 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Add ahf to git team mail aliases

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32421: Add ahf to git team mail aliases
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 done

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32421 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Add ahf to git team mail aliases

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32421: Add ahf to git team mail aliases
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 done:

 {{{
 commit b33575b44c4fe1e2d0839f15c1c9b5310b0c489b (HEAD -> master,
 origin/master, origin/HEAD)
 Author: Antoine Beaupré 
 Date:   Mon Dec 16 17:30:55 2019 -0500

 add ahf to gitolite group (closes #32421)

 diff --git a/modules/postfix/files/virtual b/modules/postfix/files/virtual
 index 61ba385a..841fdf3a 100644
 --- a/modules/postfix/files/virtual
 +++ b/modules/postfix/files/virtual
 @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ roger-deleg...@torproject.org   g...@torproject.org
 p...@torproject.org isabela@
  # sync this with LDAP when either changes
  tor-archive-gr...@torproject.org   bo...@torproject.org
 kars...@torproject.org anar...@torproject.org mikepe...@torproject.org
 d...@torproject.org
  tor-collector-gr...@torproject.org kars...@torproject.org
 -tor-gitolite-gr...@torproject.org  ni...@torproject.org
 sebast...@torproject.org i...@torproject.org h...@torproject.org
 +tor-gitolite-gr...@torproject.org  ni...@torproject.org
 sebast...@torproject.org i...@torproject.org h...@torproject.org
 a...@torproject.org

  # Members of the tor-gitolite-group alias are also git-admins.
  git-ad...@torproject.org   tor-gitolite-gr...@torproject.org
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32421 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Add ahf to git team mail aliases

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32421: Add ahf to git team mail aliases
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * owner:  tpa => anarcat


Comment:

 checking

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31855 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove End of Year Fundraising Campaign from about:tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31855: Remove End of Year Fundraising Campaign from about:tor
--+--
 Reporter:  pili  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912 => TorBrowserTeam201912R


Comment:

 Rebased tor-button master and dropped:

 - 1b10bf33beac6bdaad744adc3318c6d7ccdb8c72
 - 5e80a7f316bea85e6c01af96fea05ba57a367f06
 - b75147e1d866ebe1c2be4100ba54fe2e4b7bf321
 - c0438bdcd48215fb73425f448ee1e5e9f5e4dbe3
 - 9ea41dcdc38c79368a0909f4a64fcb865bd39af2
 - ce795172f37ee2a43a8e7de0c0d06816143880ad

 Created a diff of that, and applied to master, then went back and brought
 back various translation updates unrelated to the EOY campaign. As a
 result, the dtd changes should include just the {{{}}} blocks. This change also removes the embedded
 fonts and the license update needed by the fonts.

 Made a fresh build and can confirm, we're back to the usual purple
 about:tor and we don't get any errors or complaints in the debug log when
 loading the page.

 tor-button:
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/richard/torbutton.git/commit/?h=bug_31855=e04d02cc9346cb7d5f72c11cc9b9526e0aaf0ee9

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32133 [Internal Services/Service - git]: gitweb.tpo performance problems

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32133: gitweb.tpo performance problems
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 looks like we're happy again (for now), but i suspect we'll go through
 this misery again soon. as long as the git repos keep growing, we'll have
 to face this problem.

 next step is probably look at git-specific optimizations like the commit
 graph stuff...

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30608 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Have a SMTP out only server

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30608: Have a SMTP out only server
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 i will unfortunately have to postpone the rest of this work to january.
 various emergencies came up and I don't want to start down the critical
 path (ud-ldap patches) right before the holidays - it's too risky.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32636 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Clean up locales shipped with Tor Launcher

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32636: Clean up locales shipped with Tor Launcher
---+--
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  task   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912R  |  Actual Points:  0.4
Parent ID: | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912 => TorBrowserTeam201912R
 * actualpoints:   => 0.4


Comment:

 Here is a patch for review:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 launcher.git/commit/?h=bug32636-01=d95b8fa0448623bdd47b32b8b3ce60274bc3c540

 Unfortunately, the patch is somewhat large due to all of the locale
 updates (including removal of a bunch of old locales). The good news is
 that after this is merged we will ship a lot fewer locales within the Tor
 Launcher part of Tor Browser.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32762 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: major networking issues on moly, affects: majus, fallax, web-cymru-01, build-x86-05, build-x86-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32762: major networking issues on moly, affects: majus, fallax, web-cymru-01,
build-x86-05, build-x86-06
-+-
 Reporter:  emmapeel |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  translation, l10n, majus, moly   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 cymru responded and explained there was a networking change on their end
 that changed the MTU, which I suspected. at 20:40UTC, they said they
 implemented a workaround, but 4 minutes later, at 20:44UTC, they said the
 investigation was still ongoing.

 and now the *entire* cymru network is unreachable, at least as seen from
 nagios:

 {{{
 15:42:40  tor-nagios: [mini-nag/auto-dns] moly.torproject.org is
 considered BAD (ping-check (50.00%)) @ 20:42:31 +.
 15:46:50  tor-nagios: [gw-cymru] gw-cymru is DOWN: Date/Time: Mon Dec
 16 20:46:39 UTC 2019
 }}}

 above times UTC-5. so i'm not sure what's up with cymru, but clearly
 there's a huge outage going on there.

 now i'm really happy to have moved those other services off of that box...

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23875 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Facebook's onion site is a single hop onion, but clicking on the Tor onion icon shows that it is a 6 hop circuit.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23875: Facebook's onion site is a single hop onion, but clicking on the Tor 
onion
icon shows that it is a 6 hop circuit.
--+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-circuit-display, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
--+---

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:13 arma]:
 > Replying to [comment:9 teor]:
 > > That's not quite true: the service will advertise that it *tries* to
 make one-hop circuits. But some circuits will be 3-hops if the rendezvous
 point is unreachable or fails.
 >
 > teor has a great point here: we can't actually know how many hops the
 service side circuit uses. So anything that we visualize for the user will
 be a metaphor, not an accurate depiction of the onion service's circuit.
 We don't know what the onion service is doing, and we can't know for sure,
 and that's one of the security properties.
 >
 > So my vote remains for leaving it as it is, or if we want to change it,
 to change it to some sort of "cloudy" thing that makes it clear we don't
 have good visibility on that half of the path.

 What does Tor browser currently do if an exit circuit uses 4 hops?

 I think it's ok to:
 * change it to something that symbolises the uncertainly: it could be a
 direct connection, it could be 3-4 hops
 * add a link to a "what is an onion service" doc that explains what we
 can't know
 * do nothing

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29645 [Core Tor/Tor]: test.exe hangs on Appveyor CI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29645: test.exe hangs on Appveyor CI
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  asn-merge, tor-ci, tor-windows,  |  Actual Points:  0.4
  tor-test, hang, 041-should |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  worksforme =>


Comment:

 This issue happened again in:
 
https://ci.appveyor.com/project/teor2345/tor/builds/29555353/job/gpfctv9csgpp7k9s

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32135 [Metrics/Statistics]: Write BridgeDB metrics parser and analyse existing data

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32135: Write BridgeDB metrics parser and analyse existing data
+
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  task| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s30-o21a1   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31274  | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by karsten):

 Thanks for your comments! A couple questions before I continue putting
 your suggestions in:

  - The change from "transport" to "bridge type" is a tricky one. We're
 using "transport" where you'd use "bridge type" for other graphs, like
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-transport.html this one].
 I guess part of the rationale was that even with the default OR protocol,
 messages are being ''transported'' between client and bridge, just not
 using one of the ''pluggable'' transports but using the built-in one. But
 we're using this term for almost a decade now, so it's well possible that
 it's merely the result of me convincing myself that it must be a good
 idea. That being said, part of me would prefer keeping the "transport"
 term here. However, if you think this is too confusing, let's consider
 making this change. What do you prefer?

  - "Distribution" vs. "distribution method" is another case like this.
 We're not using this term on Tor Metrics yet. But we should be sure to
 pick the term that is most common in the Tor universe. I vaguely recall
 the term "distributor" from when I wrote the BridgeDB spec, but that term
 might be too technical for this purpose. Anyway, what's the term you would
 want us to use here?

  - Regarding your suggestions to graph titles, keep in mind that short
 titles work better on the website (and on graph images) than long ones. At
 the same time they need to be meaningful in the context of all other
 graphs/tables on the Metrics website.

  - You wrote in several places that "unsuccessful requests (e.g., invalid
 emails or incorrect CAPTCHAs) are not included in these numbers." But is
 this true in your code and in mine? What would I have to do to filter out
 these requests?

  - The "unbin" part is about the `-bin_size/2`, yes. I already made that
 change in the code locally, and we should document it.

 Would you want to provide your changes as a Git-formatted patch (or Git
 branch) based on mine? That would make it a bit easier for me to include
 your changes (and harder to miss out good suggestions).

 I'll work more on this tomorrow. Thanks!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25101 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Generate incremental mar files for nightly builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25101: Generate incremental mar files for nightly builds
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-update, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201912R  |
Parent ID:  #18867   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 There are new patches for review, in branch `bug_25101_v12`:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_25101_v12=608fbb6f06237c0e0786b650433ca0c4cc203f72

 With the new patches, instead of using the `prune-old-builds` script which
 was included in the testsuite repository as a git submodule, we copy it to
 tor-browser-build. And we then modify it to handle the new directory names
 based on the nightly version numbers.

 In `tor-browser-bundle-testsuite.git` I added a patch to branch
 `bug_25101_v2`, removing the `tools/prune-old-builds` git submodule:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-bundle-
 
testsuite.git/commit/?h=bug_25101_v2=ea0942f9da2bdbaf3f140f3baaed1bb56ee9af69

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32773 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove Jenkins tor master jobs which don't have OpenSSL 1.1.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32773: Remove Jenkins tor master jobs which don't have OpenSSL 1.1.1
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-ci, openssl
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #31820
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 These jenkins tor master builds will fail after #31820 merges:
 * jessie: OpenSSL 1.0.1t
 * stretch: OpenSSL 1.1.0
 * xenial: OpenSSL 1.0.2g

 I don't know how to change jenkins configs. We may need a jenkins patch
 before we put this task in the jenkins component.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32764 [Core Tor/Tor]: Solve code issues that block running clang-format on our code.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32764: Solve code issues that block running clang-format on our code.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:  #29226| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32552 [Core Tor/Nyx]: stem says "dictionary keys changed during iteration" with python 3.8 (was: stem says "dictionary keys changed during iteration" with new python)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32552: stem says "dictionary keys changed during iteration" with python 3.8
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Nyx  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32220 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Change letterboxing color when dark theme is enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32220: Change letterboxing color when dark theme is enabled
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can, ux-   |  Actual Points:  5
  team, TorBrowserTeam201911R, tbb-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by opara):

 * Attachment "about-config-dark-theme.png" added.

 dark theme with settings in about:config

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32660 [Metrics/Onionoo]: onionoo-backend is killing the ganeti cluster

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32660: onionoo-backend is killing the ganeti cluster
-+--
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Replying to [comment:17 irl]:
 > Is this code released now, if so we should update metrics-cloud with
 this version ready for deployment in January. A second backend host is
 requested in #32763.

 Yes, this code is released, see #32684. Deploying this version to two
 backends in January sounds fine to me!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32220 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Change letterboxing color when dark theme is enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32220: Change letterboxing color when dark theme is enabled
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can, ux-   |  Actual Points:  5
  team, TorBrowserTeam201911R, tbb-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by opara):

 Just wanted to mention here that setting {{{ui.systemUsesDarkTheme: 1}}}
 and {{{browser.in-content.dark-mode: true}}} in {{{about:config}}} will
 change the latest Tor Browser to use a dark letterbox border (as well as
 dark Preferences page, Add-ons page, etc). Since these settings may also
 enable the CSS prefers-color-scheme feature, these settings may make you
 fingerprintable.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32240 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor Travis: Make chutney work on Xenial and Bionic images

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32240: Tor Travis: Make chutney work on Xenial and Bionic images
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, chutney, 043-should, |  Actual Points:  0.2
  029-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport,  |
  041-backport, 042-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 LGTM; I think this should be mergeable.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32630 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Chutney Travis: Make chutney work on Bionic images

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32630: Chutney Travis: Make chutney work on Bionic images
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  chutney-ci|  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #32240| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nickm):

 Otherwise, all the changes here look okay to me.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32630 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Chutney Travis: Make chutney work on Bionic images

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32630: Chutney Travis: Make chutney work on Bionic images
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  chutney-ci|  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #32240| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nickm):

 CI seems to be failing here; is that expected?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30558 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30558: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser
--+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  JeremyRand
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  gk|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by JeremyRand):

 Updated branch at ​https://notabug.org/JeremyRand/tor-browser-
 build/src/namecoin-v8 (Git commit hash
 `47abcfadb4025e9f43730ce00f116cab491039e5`).  This decreases the initial
 Electrum-NMC connection timeout from 45 to 15 seconds, and fixes the
 NXDOMAIN detection in both Electrum-NMC and ncdns.  I've tested the
 modified commits manually, but haven't yet finished building the new
 binaries with rbm.  In the interest of allowing faster testing, I'm
 posting the tor-browser-build branch here before my rbm build finishes.
 I'll report back once my rbm build has finished and I've verified that the
 fixes function as expected when built with rbm -- but feel free to start
 an rbm build and/or test the changes before I do so if you like.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32771 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bad tor_assertf() in structvar.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32771: Bad tor_assertf() in structvar.c
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-backport  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:| Points:  0
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => 042-backport
 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => 0


Comment:

 See branch `bug32771_042` with PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1612

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32772 [Core Tor/Tor]: Delete maint and release 0.2.9 from the git scripts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32772: Delete maint and release 0.2.9 from the git scripts
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  git-scripts
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Tor 0.2.9 becomes unsupported on 1 January 2020. We should remove it from
 the git scripts in the next few weeks.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32751 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Setting var/sign_build to 1 should sign the sha256sums-unsigned-build.incrementals.txt file too

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32751: Setting var/sign_build to 1 should sign the sha256sums-unsigned-
build.incrementals.txt file too
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-update, |  Actual Points:  .1
  TorBrowserTeam201912R  |
Parent ID:  #32750   | Points:
 Reviewer:  gk   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  reopened => needs_review


Comment:

 There is a patch for review in branch `bug_32751_v4`:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_32751_v4=468293139775704884fe36eb19970fb968fa80a0

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32751 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Setting var/sign_build to 1 should sign the sha256sums-unsigned-build.incrementals.txt file too

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32751: Setting var/sign_build to 1 should sign the sha256sums-unsigned-
build.incrementals.txt file too
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-update, |  Actual Points:  .1
  TorBrowserTeam201912R  |
Parent ID:  #32750   | Points:
 Reviewer:  gk   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 With `var/set_default_env` we change $HOME, causing gpg to be unable to
 find its keys in the default ~/.gnupg directory:
 http://f4amtbsowhix7rrf.onion/reports/r/tor-browser-2019-12-16/results-
 tor-browser_build/incrementals-nightly-linux-i686.build.txt

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32771 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bad tor_assertf() in structvar.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32771: Bad tor_assertf() in structvar.c
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Found with #32765: struct_check_magic() has the wrong number of arguments.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32765 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use CHECK_PRINTF with tor_assertion_failed_() and tor_bug_occurred_().

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32765: Use CHECK_PRINTF with tor_assertion_failed_() and tor_bug_occurred_().
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-backport 042-backport|  Actual Points:  .1
  bugsmashfund   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  backport => 041-backport 042-backport bugsmashfund
 * points:   => .1
 * actualpoints:   => .1


Comment:

 See branch `bug32765_041` with PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1611 .

 This turned up a bug in 0.4.2; I'll open another ticket for that.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30558 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30558: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser
--+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  JeremyRand
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  gk|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by JeremyRand):

 I think I have fixes for both (1) and (2).  For (1), decreasing the
 relevant timeout from 45 seconds to 15 seconds seems to improve the
 initial connection delay quite a lot without causing timeouts when a Tor
 circuit is bad.  I haven't tried with pluggable transports enabled though;
 I wonder if the public PT bridges will be slow enough to cause 15 seconds
 to be too short to open a TCP connection.  For (2), I applied a similar
 change to the one I suggested in the upstream Electrum bug.
 Interestingly, I just found a bug in ncdns that also causes (2) even once
 the Electrum-NMC JSON-RPC error code is correct.  The fixes will be pushed
 shortly.

 Thanks for catching these issues!

 As an aside, note that even once the fix for (2) is applied, Electrum-NMC
 will try 3 times, using a different server each time, before deciding that
 a name doesn't exist.  It does this so that a single malicious server
 can't hide the existence of names.  (The SPV proofs returned by a server
 only prove inclusion, not non-inclusion; adding non-inclusion SPV proofs
 is something that's on our to-do list; once that's implemented, then we'll
 be able to drop the multiple-server lookups for nonexistent names.)  This
 doesn't cause a significant delay on its own though.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32744 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbrowser on Android crashes on visiting a page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32744: Torbrowser on Android crashes on visiting a page
--+---
 Reporter:  WerHaus   |  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  assigned => needs_information


Comment:

 Thanks Thorin! I've tried reproducing this on two different devices
 running Android 7.1 (7.1.1 and 7.1.2), but I still haven't had any luck.
 This includes loading Morgenjournal from "Fr 13" and "Mo 16".

 WerHaus, you said "Between 8:00 and 8:15 CET", is this important? Do you
 only experience the crash during that time? If you visit the webpage now,
 does the app crash? Thanks.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28804 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add circuit padding to padding-spec.txt and write a doc for researchers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28804: Add circuit padding to padding-spec.txt and write a doc for researchers
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, tor-spec, 041-proposed, network-  |
  team-roadmap-august, scalability-roadmap   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged! Thanks!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32764 [Core Tor/Tor]: Solve code issues that block running clang-format on our code.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32764: Solve code issues that block running clang-format on our code.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:  #29226| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * actualpoints:   => 1


Comment:

 See branch `pre_formatter_cleanups`, with PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1610

 I'll put this in needs_review once CI passes.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32770 [Core Tor/Tor]: Compact lines in test_e2e_rend_circuit_setup()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32770: Compact lines in test_e2e_rend_circuit_setup()
--+--
 Reporter:  neel  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1609

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32770 [Core Tor/Tor]: Compact lines in test_e2e_rend_circuit_setup()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32770: Compact lines in test_e2e_rend_circuit_setup()
--+--
 Reporter:  neel  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32769 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove extra space from helper_get_circ_and_stream_for_test() call in test_e2e_rend_circuit_setup() (test_hs_client.c) (was: Remove extra space in test_e2e_rend_c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32769: Remove extra space from helper_get_circ_and_stream_for_test() call in
test_e2e_rend_circuit_setup() (test_hs_client.c)
--+--
 Reporter:  neel  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 PR: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1608

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32769 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove extra space in test_e2e_rend_circuit_setup() (test_hs_client.c)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32769: Remove extra space in test_e2e_rend_circuit_setup() (test_hs_client.c)
--+--
 Reporter:  neel  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32614 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: Consider flagging an intro point as bad if rendezvous fails multiple times

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32614: hs-v3: Consider flagging an intro point as bad if rendezvous fails 
multiple
times
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-circuit, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
-+
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32547 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Set up default bridge at the University of Minnesota

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32547: Set up default bridge at the University of Minnesota
--+--
 Reporter:  phw   |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-bridges   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor30
--+--
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:9 jvsg]:
 > Thanks for pointing that out. I've Corrected the config for the Bridge.
 [[br]]
 Thanks! For what it's worth, this was a usability issue and Roger filed
 #32753 to get it fixed. Everything's looking good now, so let's add your
 bridge to Tor Browser.

 Tor Browser Team:
 * My task/32547 branch ​[https://github.com/NullHypothesis/tor-browser-
 build/commit/00f4ea3a18f1cbce16f256ca2b7c1c90ad3b1daf has a patch] for
 tor-browser-build.
 * My task/32547 branch [https://github.com/NullHypothesis/tor-android-
 service/commit/4a81e5806f36e7d0bf9492437d824599ecf4ff43 ​has a patch] for
 tor-android-service.

 For the record, I also
 
[https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorBrowser/DefaultBridges?sfp_email=_mail==diff=40_version=39_email=_mail=
 updated our list of default bridges] and added our new bridge to our
 [https://dip.torproject.org/torproject/anti-censorship/sysmon-
 configuration/commit/9e66ec55680b26d4fa39702c470408038bff0999 sysmon
 config].

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30558 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30558: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser
--+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  JeremyRand
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  gk|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by JeremyRand):

 For reference, (2) is https://github.com/namecoin/electrum-nmc/issues/153

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30558 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30558: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser
--+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  JeremyRand
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  gk|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by JeremyRand):

 Good to hear that the previously reported issues were related to the
 Ctrl+C killing.

 Regarding (1): I suspect that this is because Electrum-NMC has tried to
 open a connection to a server while Tor was still connecting, and the
 result is that the server isn't reachable, so the TCP connection times
 out.  It's possible that we could decrease the timeout period in Electrum-
 NMC, which might improve the behavior here.  However, decreasing it too
 far might cause it to prematurely give up on low-quality Tor circuits.
 I'll get back to you on this later today.  (Longer-term, it might be
 productive to have Electrum-NMC talk to the Tor control port so that it
 knows when the network is up, which would allow it to avoid trying to make
 connections while Tor is still connecting.  This would be a more
 complicated fix than fiddling with the timeouts though, so I'd prefer not
 to attempt this prior to a Nightly merge unless further testing indicates
 that it's absolutely necessary.)

 Regarding (2): StemNS will retry a lookup that failed with SERVFAIL for up
 to 1 minute before giving up completely on that lookup.  This is because a
 SERVFAIL error is often an indication of a temporary network issue, and it
 will usually fix itself if retried a few times.  Unfortunately, there's a
 bug in upstream Electrum that causes errors that should be detected as
 NXDOMAIN (which won't be retried) to instead be detected as SERVFAIL
 (specifically, Electrum doesn't properly set the JSON-RPC error variables
 in responses).  AFAIK upstream Electrum fixed this in their master branch
 sometime after 3.3.8 was tagged (due to me sending in a bug report).  I'm
 pretty sure that directly backporting Electrum's fix to 3.3.8 would be
 prohibitively difficult (their fix was part of a large refactor of the
 JSON-RPC code which will almost definitely produce merge conflicts if
 cherry-picked to 3.3.8), but I might be able to do a much simpler fix to
 the 3.3.8 branch of Electrum-NMC.  Again, I'll get back to you on this
 later today.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32708 [Core Tor/Tor]: manpage: alphabetize General Options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32708: manpage: alphabetize General Options
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  documentation tor-client manpage |  Actual Points:
  easy gsod  |
Parent ID:  #4310| Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I pushed a fixup commit that moves `LogMessageDomains` and adds comments
 about alphabetical order (and exceptions).  Please let me know if you
 would like me to force-push a squashed version.

 I think this pull request is a net improvement on the existing situation,
 and doesn't introduce any long-term problems.  Right now swati's work is
 blocked on getting this merged so if we could get it merged soon, that
 would be great.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31855 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove End of Year Fundraising Campaign from about:tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31855: Remove End of Year Fundraising Campaign from about:tor
--+---
 Reporter:  pili  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * owner:  mcs => pospeselr


Comment:

 #30783 added this

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32614 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: Consider flagging an intro point as bad if rendezvous fails multiple times

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32614: hs-v3: Consider flagging an intro point as bad if rendezvous fails 
multiple
times
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-circuit, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
-+
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32135 [Metrics/Statistics]: Write BridgeDB metrics parser and analyse existing data

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32135: Write BridgeDB metrics parser and analyse existing data
+
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  task| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s30-o21a1   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31274  | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Thanks for your work on this!

 Replying to [comment:6 karsten]:
 > Okay, I finished a first [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten
 /metrics-
 web.git/commit/?h=task-32135=93f2500cabf22fdf03d109bb7855445b18afd62d
 patch] that processes BridgeDB metrics once per day to produce a .csv file
 and that adds two graphs to Tor Metrics. Can you please take a look at
 that patch, not regarding the Java/R code, but regarding user-facing
 documentation of the two new graphs? In particular, please take a look at
 the `TODO`s in that patch. (irl, I'll ask you to review a revised branch
 for the code portions once the documentation parts are all set.)
 [[br]]
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/metrics-
 
web.git/diff/src/main/resources/web/json/metrics.json?h=task-32135=93f2500cabf22fdf03d109bb7855445b18afd62d
 Commit 93f2500c]:

 For bridgedb-transport, I would change the title to:
 {{{
 "BridgeDB requests for each bridge type"
 }}}
 ...and the description to:
 {{{
 "This graph shows the number BridgeDB requests for each bridge type.
 BridgeDB requests over Tor and unsuccessful requests (e.g., invalid emails
 or incorrect CAPTCHAs) are not included in these numbers."
 }}}

 For bridgedb-distribution, I would change the title to:
 {{{
 "BridgeDB requests for each distribution method"
 }}}
 ...and the description to:
 {{{
 "This graph shows the number of BridgeDB requests for each distribution
 method. HTTPS requests over Tor and unsuccessful requests (e.g., invalid
 emails or incorrect CAPTCHAs) are not included in these numbers."
 }}}

 Here are my changes to [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten
 /metrics-web.git/diff/src/main/resources/web/jsps/reproducible-
 metrics.jsp?h=task-32135=93f2500cabf22fdf03d109bb7855445b18afd62d
 commit 93f2500c]:

 {{{
 BridgeDB requests
 #
 

 BridgeDB metrics contain aggregated information about requests to the
 BridgeDB service.  BridgeDB keeps track of each request per distribution
 method
 (HTTPS, moat, email), per bridge type (e.g., vanilla or obfs4) per country
 code
 or email provider (e.g., "ru" or "gmail") per request success ("success"
 or
 "fail"). Every 24 hours, BridgeDB writes these metrics to disk and then
 begins
 a new measurement interval.

 The following description applies to the following graph and
 tables:

 
 BridgeDB requests by bridge type graph
 BridgeDB requests by distribution  graph
 

 Step 1: Parse BridgeDB metrics to obtain reported request numbers

 Obtain BridgeDB metrics from CollecTor.
 Refer to the https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git/tree/doc
 /bridgedb-metrics-spec.txt">BridgeDB metrics specification for details
 on the descriptor format.

 Step 2: Skip requests coming in over Tor exits

 Skip any request counts with zz as their
 CC/EMAIL metrics key part.  We use the zz pseudo
 country code for requests originating from Tor exit relays.  We're
 discarding
 these requests because https://bugs.torproject.org/32117;>bots
 use the
 Tor network to crawl BridgeDB and including bot requests would provide
 a
 false sense of how users interact with BridgeDB.  Note that BridgeDB
 maintains
 a separate distribution pool for requests coming from Tor exit relays.

 Step 3: Aggregate requests by date, distribution method, and bridge
 type

 BridgeDB metrics contain request numbers broken down by distribution
 method,
 bridge type, and a few more dimensions.  For our purposes we only care
 about
 total request numbers by date and either distribution method or bridge
 type.
 We're using request sums by these three dimensions as aggregates.  As date
 we're using the date of the BridgeDB metrics interval end.  If we
 encounter
 more than one BridgeDB metrics interval end on the same UTC date (which
 shouldn't be possible with an interval length of 24 hours), we arbitrarily
 keep
 whichever we process first.

 

 
 }}}
 I wasn't sure what `TODO If we're supposed to "unbin" numbers, this is
 probably where we should say that.` meant, so I deleted the line. Is this
 about the `bin_size/2` modification you mentioned above?

 In [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/metrics-
 
web.git/diff/src/main/resources/web/jsps/stats.jsp?h=task-32135=93f2500cabf22fdf03d109bb7855445b18afd62d
 commit 93f2500c], I would replace "transport" with "bridge type" (because
 

Re: [tor-bugs] #32766 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Data leak on Tor Browser on Linux via middle mouse paste

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32766: Data leak on Tor Browser on Linux via middle mouse paste
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  data leak |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Thorin):

 Do you mean this one?
 - https://github.com/ghacksuserjs/ghacks-user.js/issues/735
 - https://github.com/ghacksuserjs/ghacks-
 user.js/blob/master/user.js#L1034-L1037
 - upstream: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/1528289
 - note: clipboard events (`dom.event.clipboardevents.enabled` referenced
 as 2402 below) are enabled in TB Windows but I'm not sure about Linux

 {{{
 /* 2403: disable middlemouse paste leaking clipboard content on Linux
 after autoscroll
  * Defense in depth if clipboard events are enabled (see 2402)
  * [1] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/1528289 */
 user_pref("middlemouse.paste", false); // [DEFAULT: false on Windows]
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25101 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Generate incremental mar files for nightly builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25101: Generate incremental mar files for nightly builds
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-update, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201912R  |
Parent ID:  #18867   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:17 boklm]:

 > The incrementals were only generated for the linux64 build, but the
 others should be fixed by #32738.

 On the build from 2019-12-14, all incrementals were generated:
 http://f4amtbsowhix7rrf.onion/reports/r/tor-browser-2019-12-14/tor-
 browser_build.html

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32663 [Core Tor/Tor]: Require coccinelle 1.0.4 in check_cocci_parse.sh

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32663: Require coccinelle 1.0.4 in check_cocci_parse.sh
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-must, tor-test  |  Actual Points:  0.3
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  ahf |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
+
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Ah, good catch.

 The new branch looks fine, too, and very good we print the version during
 execution.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25102 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add script to sign nightly build mar files, generate update-responses xml and publish the new version

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25102: Add script to sign nightly build mar files, generate update-responses 
xml
and publish the new version
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-update, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201912   |
Parent ID:  #18867   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 I started working on a script for this:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_25102_v2=96b6ad08832c965590597b3b8551580afd488552

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32768 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create a build-infos.json file containing firefox platform_version and buildid

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32768: Create a build-infos.json file containing firefox platform_version and
buildid
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-update, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201912   |
Parent ID:  #25102   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 I started a patch for this:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_25102_v2=8f6907d6620a949e1357d11d8bd51eda76bedc4d

 But did not try to do a build with it yet.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32768 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create a build-infos.json file containing firefox platform_version and buildid

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32768: Create a build-infos.json file containing firefox platform_version and
buildid
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-update,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201912
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #25102
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 To generate the update-responses xml, we need to know the firefox
 `platformVersion` and `buildID`.

 In standard releases we generate a `config.yml` from
 `projects/release/update_responses_config.yml` which includes the
 `platformVersion` it gets from the rbm config. To get the `buildID` the
 `update_responses` script will extract a mar file to get it from
 `application.ini`.

 While generating updates-responses xml for nightly builds (in #25102), we
 don't have easy access to the `platformVersion`. I think we could add it
 in a `build-infos.json` file. At the same time we can also include the
 `buildID` in that same file which removes the need to have mar-tools
 available to extract a mar file.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32767 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove Disconnect search as it is discontinued

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32767: Remove Disconnect search as it is discontinued
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 It just forwards to DuckDuckGo, so it is useless.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32766 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Data leak on Tor Browser on Linux via middle mouse paste

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32766: Data leak on Tor Browser on Linux via middle mouse paste
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:   |   Severity:  Major
 Keywords:  data leak|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 "middlemouse.paste" is enabled on TBB on Linux.

 It can be triggered accidentally, and is disabled on TBB on Windows
 (instead middle mouse click is for autoScroll on Windows)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25102 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add script to sign nightly build mar files, generate update-responses xml and publish the new version (was: Add script to sign nightly build mar files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25102: Add script to sign nightly build mar files, generate update-responses 
xml
and publish the new version
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-update, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201912   |
Parent ID:  #18867   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 I think the same script can be used to generate the update-responses xml,
 and publish both the mar files and update-responses xml.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32762 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: major networking issues on moly, affects: majus, fallax, web-cymru-01, build-x86-05, build-x86-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32762: major networking issues on moly, affects: majus, fallax, web-cymru-01,
build-x86-05, build-x86-06
-+-
 Reporter:  emmapeel |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  translation, l10n, majus, moly   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 also commented out ud-replicate on peninsulare, which suffers from the
 same networking issue.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32614 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: Consider flagging an intro point as bad if rendezvous fails multiple times

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32614: hs-v3: Consider flagging an intro point as bad if rendezvous fails 
multiple
times
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-circuit, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
-+
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Made the changes. Setting as needs review.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32762 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: major networking issues on moly, affects: majus, fallax, web-cymru-01, build-x86-05, build-x86-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32762: major networking issues on moly, affects: majus, fallax, web-cymru-01,
build-x86-05, build-x86-06
-+-
 Reporter:  emmapeel |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  translation, l10n, majus, moly   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 all VMs shutdown on moly. commented out the ud-replicate job on
 `/etc/cron.d/ud-replicate` to keep it from locking ud-ldap for all the
 other machines.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31784 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: move majus off of moly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31784: move majus off of moly
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  l10n |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29974   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 this might need to be done urgently after all, because moly is having
 serious networking issues (in #32762), stay tuned.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32762 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: major networking issues on moly, affects: majus, fallax, web-cymru-01, build-x86-05, build-x86-06 (was: majus cannot connect to internet wi

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32762: major networking issues on moly, affects: majus, fallax, web-cymru-01,
build-x86-05, build-x86-06
-+-
 Reporter:  emmapeel |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  translation, l10n, majus, moly   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * priority:  High => Very High
 * severity:  Normal => Major


Comment:

 this is a larger issue than just moly. I've filed the following ticket
 with cymru (upstream):

 > Hi!
 >
 > Since around  2019-12-15 23:55:01 UTC, we have started seeing some weird
 > networking issues with moly.torproject.org. I can reach the machine okay
 > and it pings properly, but some TCP connexions do not work
 > correctly. For example, this works:
 >
 > root@moly:~# curl -I https://www.google.com/
 > HTTP/2 200
 > date: Mon, 16 Dec 2019 16:43:16 GMT
 > [...]
 >
 > But this hangs:
 >
 > root@moly:~# curl -v -I https://github.com/
 > *   Trying 140.82.113.3...
 > * TCP_NODELAY set
 > * Connected to github.com (140.82.113.3) port 443 (#0)
 > * ALPN, offering h2
 > * ALPN, offering http/1.1
 > * Cipher selection:
 ALL:!EXPORT:!EXPORT40:!EXPORT56:!aNULL:!LOW:!RC4:@STRENGTH
 > * successfully set certificate verify locations:
 > *   CAfile: /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
 >   CApath: /etc/ssl/certs
 > * TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS header, Certificate Status (22):
 > * TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS handshake, Client hello (1):
 >
 > We similarly have trouble running rsync to our other servers, running
 > security upgrades with "apt update", or cloning git repositories from
 > github.
 >
 > I'm puzzled by this - I can't quite figure out this discrepancy.
 >
 > This was first reported as a bug against our translation server:
 >
 > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/32762
 >
 > .. but it also affects a DNS server (fallax), a build box and a web
 > mirror. It would be great if you could look into this promptly because
 > it's a bit of a show stopper for us.
 >
 > Thanks!
 >
 > a.
 >
 > --
 > Antoine Beaupré
 > torproject.org system administration

 I'll try to do more network diagnostics after lunch, with the hope this
 can be resolved in the more short term. But we have started a mitigation
 strategy that involves restoring majus from backups.

 {{{
 12:03:19 <+anarcat> this is the last backup that ran:
 12:03:22 <+anarcat>
 
+-+---+--+---+-+---+
 12:03:22 <+anarcat> | jobid   | level | jobfiles | jobbytes  |
 starttime   | volumename
 |
 12:03:22 <+anarcat>
 
+-+---+--+---+-+---+
 12:03:26 <+anarcat> | 118,333 | I |1,510 |42,379,972 |
 2019-12-15 10:27:15 | torproject-majus.torproject.org-inc.2019-12-15_10:27
 |
 12:03:26 <+anarcat>
 
+-+---+--+---+-+---+
 }}}

 We've been meaning to move majus to the ganeti cluster (#31784 as part of
 #29974), exactly for this kind of scenario. Thankfully, we migrated the
 director and getulum already, so this problem is not as bad as it would
 have been.

 But it will still take some time (days?) to restore the service, if Cymru
 doesn't figure it out in time.

 Sorry about this trouble everyone! Hopefully we'll be able to get back on
 track soon... I'm just happy it's happening this week, instead of during
 the holidays. :p

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32735 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please remove my access to staticiforme and ability to push Tor Browser releases and add sysrqb instead

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32735: Please remove my access to staticiforme and ability to push Tor Browser
releases and add sysrqb instead
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:6 irl]:
 > gk should be removed from torwww and sysrqb added

 Part of our release process involves changing group ownership of the files
 we copy onto the server, setting the group as `torwww`. I just tested this
 and it is failing.

 {{{
 $ chown :torwww /srv/dist-master.torproject.org/htdocs/torbrowser/9.5a3
 /tor-browser-linux64-9.5a3_ka.mar
 chown: changing group of '/srv/dist-
 master.torproject.org/htdocs/torbrowser/9.5a3/tor-browser-
 linux64-9.5a3_ka.mar': Operation not permitted
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs