Re: [tor-bugs] #32705 [Core Tor/Tor]: test_practracker.sh python issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32705: test_practracker.sh python issues
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fixed-fail jenkins python |  Actual Points:  0.5
  network-team-roadmap-2020Q1 043-should |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * actualpoints:  0.2 => 0.5


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:16 catalyst]:
 > Replying to [comment:15 nickm]:
 > > Here is a small patch to never set TOR_DISABLE_PRACTRACKER in the
 test:
 > >
 > > Branch: no_skip_test_practracker_042
 > > PR: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1658
 > Looks reasonable at first glance. Maybe we should also make
 practracker.py write a notice or warning to stderr when it exits early due
 to TOR_DISABLE_PRACTRACKER, to make this sort of situation easier to
 troubleshoot in the future?

 I merged nickm's PR 1658 to 0.4.2 and later, and added catalyst's
 suggested stderr notice.

 I also fixed up my PR for master, which improves the practracker tests:
 * master: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1599

 My PR makes the tests:
 * capture stderr output (including exceptions)
 * canonicalise paths, so that logged paths are the same, even in out-of-
 tree builds
 * fail the test if any process exits unexpectedly
 * check the practracker exit status as part of the tests

 I think dgoulet is right, and we shouldn't worry about Python 2 failures.
 (Unless someone really wants to fix them.) I updated our supported
 platforms policy to include Python:
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/NetworkTeam/SupportedPlatforms#Python

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32945 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Add new sponsor 55 to trac

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32945: Add new sponsor 55 to trac
--+
 Reporter:  gaba  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by qbi):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32939 [Core Tor/sbws]: Python stack in sbws

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32939: Python stack in sbws
---+
 Reporter:  tom|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by juga):

 > It seems like sometimes tor does not respond to a controller message and
 that causes sbws to crash...

 In concrete, when sending `GETCONF`.

 Could you look which versions of stem and tor you have?.

 This looks like a duplicate of #32897, i'd copy these lines there and
 close this one.

 Thanks!

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[tor-bugs] #32945 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Add new sponsor 55 to trac

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32945: Add new sponsor 55 to trac
--+-
 Reporter:  gaba  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Add a new sponsor to trac:

 sponsor55-must
 sponsor55-can
 sponsor55

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32944 [Core Tor/Tor]: where are we still excessively strict about clock skew? pluggable transports?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32944: where are we still excessively strict about clock skew? pluggable
transports?
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, clock-skew, network-team-|  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2020Q1 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  4
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 #32439 seems to be summarize this for obfs4.  Unclear whether we should
 make it a child of this ticket, because it's in a different component.

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[tor-bugs] #32944 [Core Tor/Tor]: where are we still excessively strict about clock skew? pluggable transports?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32944: where are we still excessively strict about clock skew? pluggable
transports?
-+-
 Reporter:   |  Owner:  (none)
  catalyst   |
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-pt, clock-skew, network-team-
 Severity:  Normal   |  roadmap-2020Q1
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:  4|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Right now core tor should tolerate +/- 24 hours of clock skew.  It seems
 like some pluggable transports are stricter.  We should characterize these
 and possibly work on solutions if necessary.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32943 [Core Tor/Tor]: factor out supporting shell scripts from CI configs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32943: factor out supporting shell scripts from CI configs
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, technical-debt, network- |  Actual Points:
  team-roadmap-2020Q1|
Parent ID:   | Points:  4
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * points:   => 4


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[tor-bugs] #32943 [Core Tor/Tor]: factor out supporting shell scripts from CI configs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32943: factor out supporting shell scripts from CI configs
-+-
 Reporter:   |  Owner:  (none)
  catalyst   |
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-ci, technical-debt, network-
 Severity:  Normal   |  team-roadmap-2020Q1
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We should create some support shell scripts that factor out shared command
 sequences from our CI configs.  This will make it easier to keep
 configurations for different CI platforms in sync.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32942 [Core Tor/Tor]: Deprecate the ClientAutoIPv6ORPort option (was: Deprecate the ClientAutoIPv6ORPort)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32942: Deprecate the ClientAutoIPv6ORPort option
--+--
 Reporter:  neel  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32905| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 PR: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1659

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32705 [Core Tor/Tor]: test_practracker.sh python issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32705: test_practracker.sh python issues
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fixed-fail jenkins python |  Actual Points:  0.2
  network-team-roadmap-2020Q1 043-should |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 Replying to [comment:15 nickm]:
 > Here is a small patch to never set TOR_DISABLE_PRACTRACKER in the test:
 >
 > Branch: no_skip_test_practracker_042
 > PR: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1658
 Looks reasonable at first glance. Maybe we should also make practracker.py
 write a notice or warning to stderr when it exits early due to
 TOR_DISABLE_PRACTRACKER, to make this sort of situation easier to
 troubleshoot in the future?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32938 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Have a way to test throughput of snowflake proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32938: Have a way to test throughput of snowflake proxy
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension, ux-team, |  Actual Points:
  anti-censorship-roadmap-october|
Parent ID:  #31109   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:1 cohosh]:
 > - Measure throughput of real traffic that passes through the proxy. This
 has a potential impact on client privacy and we should be careful of how
 we do this.

 Another thing to consider here is that measuring throughput from real
 traffic won't give a good idea of the maximum throughput, just the amount
 of data any particular client is pushing through it.

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[tor-bugs] #32942 [Core Tor/Tor]: Deprecate the ClientAutoIPv6ORPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32942: Deprecate the ClientAutoIPv6ORPort
--+--
 Reporter:  neel  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #32905
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32800 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Creating some space to host Tor Browser nightly updates

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32800: Creating some space to host Tor Browser nightly updates
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-update, TorBrowserTeam202001 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18867   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 gotcha, pili. i talked about this with weasel quickly today and we might
 be able to accomodate you on the new static-master infrastructure he
 deployed a few months ago.

 the checklist is:

  1. create a role in LDAP, if missing
  2. create a (new?) static-source host instead of shoving everyone in the
 static-master
  3. give the role group access to the role user.  create authorized_keys
 file writable by role user.
  4. add a authorized_keys file restricted to resync to a certain place
 (managed by users?)
  5. add a static component, publishing to the web-fsn-* mirrors

 I'm not exactly sure how step 4 works here, but we'll see...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31899 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Hook .onion with URI_IS_POTENTIALLY_TRUSTWORTHY?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31899: Hook .onion with URI_IS_POTENTIALLY_TRUSTWORTHY?
--+---
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202001  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21728| Points:  2.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27
--+---

Comment (by sysrqb):

 For context, the [https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-secure-contexts/ spec]
 describes this as "A potentially trustworthy origin is one which a user
 agent can generally trust as delivering data securely".

 This includes authenticated and encrypted channels, such as schemes
 `https` and `wss`. This also includes "internal" channels such as local
 `resource`, `file`, and `about`.

 Considering our work on elevating the security of URLs with the `.onion`
 TLD within the browser, I think we can reasonably argue loading a `.onion`
 URL as a secure context (and therefore adding the URI flag).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32705 [Core Tor/Tor]: test_practracker.sh python issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32705: test_practracker.sh python issues
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fixed-fail jenkins python |  Actual Points:  0.2
  network-team-roadmap-2020Q1 043-should |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Here is a small patch to never set TOR_DISABLE_PRACTRACKER in the test:

 Branch: no_skip_test_practracker_042
 PR: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1658

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22089 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add Decentraleyes to slighten off a bit Exit traffic and work around some CDNs blocking of Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22089: Add Decentraleyes to slighten off a bit Exit traffic and work around 
some
CDNs blocking of Tor
-+-
 Reporter:  imageverif   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  performance|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mikeperry):

 This was mentioned in the website oracles blog post comments as a way to
 cut down on traffic to popular CDNs (https://blog.torproject.org/new-low-
 cost-traffic-analysis-attacks-mitigations). Probably not comprehensive but
 the perf win is also compelling.

 I don't see any obvious downsides, assuming the components stay up to date
 and compatible with whatever versions sites use.

 I've installed this in my TBB to test (warning: this is a yolo move that
 will change the request browser's fingerprint in ways that are obvious to
 anyone who looks; and ahf also pointed out that it may have unknown
 interactions with NoScripts attempts to block scripts). I'll see if I
 notice anything.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32709 [Core Tor/Tor]: hsv3: Support onionbalance keys when handling INTRO2 cells

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32709: hsv3: Support onionbalance keys when handling INTRO2 cells
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs scaling onionbalance tor- |  Actual Points:
  spec network-team-roadmap-2020Q1 043-must  |
Parent ID:  #26768   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Hi!  I'm going to take a look at the code in detail, but for now, some
 top-level things, some of which we already talked about on IRC:
* It needs unit tests
* CI needs to pass: it looks like practracker is telling us to break up
 config_service_v3() into manageable pieces
* I think we need a corresponding patch to rend-spec-v3.txt
* We should talk a bit about whether we want to accept both possible
 subcredentials or only one.

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[tor-bugs] #32941 [Applications]: snowflake-webextension "WebRTC feature is not detected."

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32941: snowflake-webextension "WebRTC feature is not detected."
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Applications
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 After the Firefox 69.4.1(esr) 32 bit update on RPi Buster Snowflake says
 WebRTC feature is not detected.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32938 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Have a way to test throughput of snowflake proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32938: Have a way to test throughput of snowflake proxy
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension, ux-team, |  Actual Points:
  anti-censorship-roadmap-october|
Parent ID:  #31109   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cohosh):

 The first question to answer is where to do the bandwidth test from. Here
 are some options:

 - Have the broker do it. This would require adding WebRTC libraries to the
 broker which would significantly impact the size

 - Have a different endpoint do it and either hardcode this endpoint at the
 proxies or have the broker facilitate communicating with the probe point.
 This way, the endpoint could be behind a NAT.

 - Measure throughput of real traffic that passes through the proxy. This
 has a potential impact on client privacy and we should be careful of how
 we do this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32705 [Core Tor/Tor]: test_practracker.sh python issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32705: test_practracker.sh python issues
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fixed-fail jenkins python |  Actual Points:  0.2
  network-team-roadmap-2020Q1 043-should |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 `TOR_DISABLE_PRACTRACKER=1` was the culprit

 Without it, I get a stacktrace with python2 and works with python3. But I
 assume python3 is what is used anyway so seems all good on my side.

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[tor-bugs] #32940 [Internal Services/Service - git]: git: Give GeKo access to dirauth-conf.git

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32940: git: Give GeKo access to dirauth-conf.git
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 Note: This is a private repository.

 GeKo is leading the network health team and thus access to that repository
 will be instrumental to his work.

 I do have access on it so I'm signing off on his requests by filling this
 request :).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25429 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Need something better than client's `checkForStaleness`

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25429: Need something better than client's `checkForStaleness`
---+---
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake|Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-september  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29206 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor28-must
---+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * parent:   => #29206


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32937 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: install a new node in the gnt-fsn cluster (fsn-node-03)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32937: install a new node in the gnt-fsn cluster (fsn-node-03)
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  assigned => accepted


Comment:

 created the server at hetzner, awaiting shell.

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[tor-bugs] #32939 [Core Tor/sbws]: Python stack in sbws

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32939: Python stack in sbws
---+
 Reporter:  tom|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 {{{
 Jan 10 18:23:16 WARNING MainThread heartbeat.py:67 -
 print_heartbeat_message - There is no progress measuring new unique
 relays.
 Jan 10 18:23:16 DEBUG MainThread scanner.py:548 - main_loop - Attempted to
 measure 317 relays in 7.899018947283427 minutes
 Jan 10 18:23:16 CRITICAL MainThread scanner.py:707 - run_speedtest -
 Something went wrong.
 Please create a ticket in https://trac.torproject.org with this traceback.
 Jan 10 18:23:16 ERROR MainThread scanner.py:708 - run_speedtest -
 Traceback (most recent call last):
   File "/home/tom/sbws-venv/lib/python3.7/site-
 packages/sbws/core/scanner.py", line 700, in run_speedtest
 max_pending_results, pool)
   File "/home/tom/sbws-venv/lib/python3.7/site-
 packages/sbws/core/scanner.py", line 550, in main_loop
 if controller.get_conf('TestingTorNetwork') == '1':
   File "/home/tom/sbws-venv/lib/python3.7/site-packages/stem/control.py",
 line 2170, in get_conf
 entries = self.get_conf_map(param, default, multiple)
   File "/home/tom/sbws-venv/lib/python3.7/site-packages/stem/control.py",
 line 2254, in get_conf_map
 response = self.msg('GETCONF %s' % ' '.join(lookup_params))
   File "/home/tom/sbws-venv/lib/python3.7/site-packages/stem/control.py",
 line 651, in msg
 self._socket.send(message)
   File "/home/tom/sbws-venv/lib/python3.7/site-packages/stem/socket.py",
 line 450, in send
 self._send(message, lambda s, sf, msg: send_message(sf, msg))
   File "/home/tom/sbws-venv/lib/python3.7/site-packages/stem/socket.py",
 line 247, in _send
 raise stem.SocketClosed()
 stem.SocketClosed
 }}}

 It seems like sometimes tor does not respond to a controller message and
 that causes sbws to crash...

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[tor-bugs] #32938 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Have a way to test throughput of snowflake proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32938: Have a way to test throughput of snowflake proxy
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:   |Version:
  Circumvention/Snowflake|   Keywords:  snowflake-webextension,
 Severity:  Normal   |  ux-team, anti-censorship-roadmap-
 |  october
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #31109
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 A common question from snowflake proxy volunteers is whether or not their
 proxy is working (see comment 11 on #31109). It would be great to have
 some kind of bandwidth test for proxy owners to see whether or not their
 proxy is reachable from a remote probe point. This might also help us find
 and diagnose problems with existing proxies.

 Some notes:
 - we can't ask the broker to assign us a specific proxy at the moment so
 this test would likely be separate from the broker (unless we add an
 entirely new feature which I'm hesitant to do)

 - we'll have to protect this service from abuse somehow, probably by rate-
 limiting. See some discussion on #31874. It would be best to engineer a
 way so that only a proxy owner can run the test on their proxy.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32391 [Internal Services/Service - nextcloud]: Purge test accounts and data from riseup in February 4, 2020

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32391: Purge test accounts and data from riseup in February 4, 2020
-+-
 Reporter:  gaba |  Owner:
 |  nextcloud-admin@…
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service -  |Version:
  nextcloud  |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32267   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 another thing that we might want to do as part of this process is to
 update the internal Nextcloud documentation to follow the move:

 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/operations/services/nextcloud

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[tor-bugs] #32937 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: install a new node in the gnt-fsn cluster (fsn-node-03)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32937: install a new node in the gnt-fsn cluster (fsn-node-03)
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  project  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin   |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 we decided to use the part of the emergency budget allocated to a new
 Ganeti node to create such a node now. if we follow the current order, the
 new node would be named `fsn-node-03`.

 our new FSN Ganeti cluster (`gnt-fsn`) is full. when it reboots, the load
 goes through the roof and it can barely keep up when one node is missing.

 plus we need extra capacity to cover the various decommissioning process
 we have under way (#32802, #31686, #29974). it's now essential to have
 that extra capacity to cover for those retirements.

 the retirement of the kvm* boxes, in particular, might give us the extra
 budget required to pop another node (which would be fsn-node-04, but let's
 not get ahead of ourselves).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32936 [Internal Services/Service - nextcloud]: create a Nextcloud account for mcs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32936: create a Nextcloud account for mcs
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:
 |  nextcloud-admin@…
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service -  |Version:
  nextcloud  |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Sorry that I forgot about creating your account.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29672 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: trac gets overwhelmed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29672: trac gets overwhelmed
--+
 Reporter:  anarcat   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by anarcat):

 we just had a problem again where trac was overwhelmed. I noticed an IP
 that was hogging ~30 apache threads all on its own, thanks to this magic
 command:

 {{{
 ss -t -n 'dport = 80 or sport = 80 or dport = 443 or sport = 443' | awk
 '{print $NF}' | sed 's/:[0-9]*$//'  | sort | uniq -c | sort
 }}}

 That showed a single IP that was taking up most of the threads. I killed
 the IP with:

 {{{
 iptables -I INPUT -s $IPADDRESS -j REJECT
 }}}

 ... and restarted apache (to kill old sockets). Load has returned to
 normal and things seem generally happier.

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[tor-bugs] #32936 [Internal Services/Service - nextcloud]: create a Nextcloud account for mcs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32936: create a Nextcloud account for mcs
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  nextcloud-
 |  admin@…
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service -  |Version:
  nextcloud  |
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 As far as I can tell, I do not have an account on
 https://nc.torproject.net/ (at least, all of my attempts to reset the
 password have not led to me receiving any email). Please create an account
 for me or let me know what username or email I have on that service. My
 preference:
   Username: mcs
   Email:mcs (at) pearlcrescent.com

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32586 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Your capcha is as stupid as 99% of them on the Intenet1!!!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32586: Your capcha is as stupid as 99% of them on the Intenet1!!!
--+---
 Reporter:  iyyov@…   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 this seems to be a duplicate of #32183, closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32627 [Core Tor/Tor]: deploy torspec as HTML to GitLab Pages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32627: deploy torspec as HTML to GitLab Pages
-+-
 Reporter:  eighthave|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 |  implemented
 Keywords:  torspec, doc, extra-review, 043-can  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf, nickm   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32846 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor Manual: Alphabetize Client Options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32846: Tor Manual: Alphabetize Client Options
-+-
 Reporter:  swati|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  documentation, tor-client, manpage,  |  implemented
  gsod, extra-review |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #4310| Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst, teor   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 I'm told it does.  Closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32846 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor Manual: Alphabetize Client Options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32846: Tor Manual: Alphabetize Client Options
-+-
 Reporter:  swati|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  documentation, tor-client, manpage,  |  Actual Points:
  gsod, extra-review |
Parent ID:  #4310| Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst, teor   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Squashed and merged.  Does this ticket close now?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32705 [Core Tor/Tor]: test_practracker.sh python issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32705: test_practracker.sh python issues
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fixed-fail jenkins python |  Actual Points:  0.2
  network-team-roadmap-2020Q1 043-should |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Replying to [comment:10 teor]:
 > That's really strange. Either the OS or the Python process should
 produce some kind of output. But you're getting an empty file.
 >
 > Can you please run:

 I assume that by `$PYTHON` you mean "my python" because it is just not
 set.

 > * `"$PYTHON" --version`

 Python 2.7.17


 > * "${PYTHON:-python}" "scripts/maint/practracker/practracker.py"

 No idea how to do that ^

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32709 [Core Tor/Tor]: hsv3: Support onionbalance keys when handling INTRO2 cells

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32709: hsv3: Support onionbalance keys when handling INTRO2 cells
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs scaling onionbalance tor- |  Actual Points:
  spec network-team-roadmap-2020Q1 043-must  |
Parent ID:  #26768   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  tor-hs scaling onionbalance tor-spec network-team-roadmap-
 2020Q1 =>
 tor-hs scaling onionbalance tor-spec network-team-roadmap-2020Q1
 043-must


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30642 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add an ed25519_identity file to the data directory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30642: Add an ed25519_identity file to the data directory
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay easy 043-can  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay easy => tor-relay easy 043-can
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29801 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write a proposal for IPv6 "Happy Eyeballs" on Tor clients

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29801: Write a proposal for IPv6 "Happy Eyeballs" on Tor clients
-+-
 Reporter:  neel |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop299,   |  Actual Points:  1
  042-deferred-20190918  |
Parent ID:  #17835   | Points:
 Reviewer:  neel |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32847 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.4.3.0-alpha-dev asserts when quitting while visiting an onion service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32847: Tor 0.4.3.0-alpha-dev asserts when quitting while visiting an onion 
service
-+-
 Reporter:  rex4539  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-must regression tbb-wants crash  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 LGTM! Unfortunately, it's missing a changes file to be mergeable. Putting
 in needs_revision until changes file appears.

 (Also reviewed during pairing session with dgoulet)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32935 [Internal Services/Service - nextcloud]: Give qbi an account at Nextcloud

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32935: Give qbi an account at Nextcloud
-+-
 Reporter:  qbi  |  Owner:
 |  nextcloud-admin@…
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service -  |Version:
  nextcloud  |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by qbi):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32456 [Community/Tor Support]: Add a question about anti-virus reporting a virus in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32456: Add a question about anti-virus reporting a virus in Tor Browser
---+--
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by ggus):

 Hello, Cleo worked on this issue, you can read here:
 https://github.com/torproject/support/pull/109/files

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32935 [Internal Services/Service - nextcloud]: Give qbi an account at Nextcloud (was: Invite qbi to tpa section at nextcloud)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32935: Give qbi an account at Nextcloud
-+-
 Reporter:  qbi  |  Owner:
 |  nextcloud-admin@…
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service -  |Version:
  nextcloud  |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Description changed by qbi:

Old description:

> Qbi has a nextcloud account: q...@nc.riseup.net and needs access to the
> tpa files. Please invite me to it.

New description:

 Qbi had a nextcloud test account at riseup, but none at nc.tpo. Could you
 please create an account and invite him to the tpa files?

--

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[tor-bugs] #32935 [Internal Services/Service - nextcloud]: Invite qbi to tpa section at nextcloud

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32935: Invite qbi to tpa section at nextcloud
-+-
 Reporter:  qbi  |  Owner:  nextcloud-
 |  admin@…
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service -  |Version:
  nextcloud  |
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Qbi has a nextcloud account: q...@nc.riseup.net and needs access to the tpa
 files. Please invite me to it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29801 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write a proposal for IPv6 "Happy Eyeballs" on Tor clients

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29801: Write a proposal for IPv6 "Happy Eyeballs" on Tor clients
-+-
 Reporter:  neel |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop299,   |  Actual Points:  1
  042-deferred-20190918  |
Parent ID:  #17835   | Points:
 Reviewer:  neel |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 The new proposal looks good.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32847 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.4.3.0-alpha-dev asserts when quitting while visiting an onion service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32847: Tor 0.4.3.0-alpha-dev asserts when quitting while visiting an onion 
service
-+-
 Reporter:  rex4539  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-must regression tbb-wants crash  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by rex4539):

 I'm unable to reproduce after the fix.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29770 [Internal Services/Service - lists]: mails relayed from lists.tpo to gmail.com bounces

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29770: mails relayed from lists.tpo to gmail.com bounces
---+--
 Reporter:  anarcat|  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by anarcat):

 * owner:  anarcat => qbi


Comment:

 qbi has some cycles to handle this, reassigning.

 i think the next step is to re-delegate this to the individual list admins
 and show them how to deploy those mitigations.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28174 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Block non-.onion subresources on .onion websites?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28174: Block non-.onion subresources on .onion websites?
--+---
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202002  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
--+---
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202001 => TorBrowserTeam202002
 * sponsor:  Sponsor27 => Sponsor27-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28174 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Block non-.onion subresources on .onion websites?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28174: Block non-.onion subresources on .onion websites?
--+---
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202001  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27
--+---
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Replying to [ticket:28174 arthuredelstein]:
 > Right now, .onion sites can load HTTP or HTTPS subresources (scripts,
 images, etc.).
 >
 > But is this safe? Loading non-.onion subresources means we are
 potentially leaking information including:
 > * the .onion domain
 > * the full top-level .onion URL
 > * other information about the content of the page
 > * the list of subresources requested by a .onion page
 >
 > Leaks might happen by referer, fetch request, query string, etc. (I
 haven't tested these yet and I'm not sure what leaks happen in practice.)
 Such leaks would be particularly bad for "stealth" onion sites.
 >
 > Even worse, some of the non-.onion subresources may leak the onion
 site's IP address. For example, a .onion website improperly configured may
 accidentally include URLs pointing to their own server's non-.onion IP
 address. Loading those subresources leaks the IP address not just to the
 user but to anyone watching connections outside the Tor network.
 >

 I'm not sure I understand the goal of this. In the simple case, a web
 developer has complete control over which subresources are used on the web
 site. As such, they accept any risks associated with using non-onion
 subresources. Maybe we should provide more training/support for explaining
 these risks, but I do not see the browser as a place where these
 restrictions should be imposed.

 I begin seeing the benefit of blocking resources from clearnet addresses
 on more complicated websites, such as those sites where user-generated
 content is published. However, in this case, it seems like the
 website/server should implement sanitization or filtering in their
 software, instead of expecting this functionality in the browser.

 As a user, it is possible I may only want to load resources from .onion
 addresses. This wouldn't be related to leaking onion addresses. There is a
 torrc option (`OnionTrafficOnly`) which accomplishes this, and we could
 expose a UI preference for this - but as gk mentioned, this sound like
 #13747.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32934 [Community/Relays]: EFF Legal FAQ review - 2020 edition

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32934: EFF Legal FAQ review - 2020 edition
--+--
 Reporter:  ggus  |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-health|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => network-health
 * cc: gk (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32934 [Community/Relays]: EFF Legal FAQ review - 2020 edition

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32934: EFF Legal FAQ review - 2020 edition
--+--
 Reporter:  ggus  |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by ggus):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * cc: nusenu (removed)
 * owner:  Nusenu => ggus


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[tor-bugs] #32934 [Community/Relays]: EFF Legal FAQ review - 2020 edition

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32934: EFF Legal FAQ review - 2020 edition
--+
 Reporter:  ggus  |  Owner:  Nusenu
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Since we're reviewing EFF Legal FAQ document, we should:

 a) Compile a list of common legal questions from Frontdesk, reddit, tor-
 relays@ and others forums

 b) Add comments about the main document, so EFF can answer our doubts

 2014 - https://www.eff.org/torchallenge/faq.html

 https://2019.www.torproject.org/eff/tor-legal-faq
 Maintained here: https://community.torproject.org/relay/community-
 resources/eff-tor-legal-faq/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32137 [Core Tor/Tor]: Split {feature, core, app}/*/include.am out of core/include.am

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32137: Split {feature,core,app}/*/include.am out of core/include.am
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-design|  Actual Points:  .2
Parent ID:  #31851| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32137 [Core Tor/Tor]: Split {feature, core, app}/*/include.am out of core/include.am

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32137: Split {feature,core,app}/*/include.am out of core/include.am
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-design|  Actual Points:  .2
Parent ID:  #31851| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => .2


Comment:

 See branch `ticket32137` with PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1657 . I anticipate some conflicts
 with #32487, but they should be tractable.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32256 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser should advertise Onion Networking capability in the User-Agent: string

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32256: TorBrowser should advertise Onion Networking capability in the 
User-Agent:
string
--+---
 Reporter:  alecmuffett   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202001  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30024| Points:  1.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
--+---

Comment (by sysrqb):

 As I said previously, I like this idea in theory. However, we should think
 hard about it and the repercussions it could have.
 [https://vivaldi.com/press/releases/vivaldi-2-10-no-strings-attached/
 Vivaldi]'s experience (No "strings" attached) seems relevant as we
 consider modifying the UAS.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32847 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.4.3.0-alpha-dev asserts when quitting while visiting an onion service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32847: Tor 0.4.3.0-alpha-dev asserts when quitting while visiting an onion 
service
-+-
 Reporter:  rex4539  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-must regression tbb-wants crash  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32847 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.4.3.0-alpha-dev asserts when quitting while visiting an onion service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32847: Tor 0.4.3.0-alpha-dev asserts when quitting while visiting an onion 
service
-+-
 Reporter:  rex4539  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-must regression tbb-wants crash  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * priority:  High => Very High
 * status:  new => accepted
 * points:   => 0.1
 * owner:  tbb-team => dgoulet
 * cc: dgoulet (removed)


Comment:

 Branch: `ticket32847_043_01`
 PR: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1656

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32137 [Core Tor/Tor]: Split {feature, core, app}/*/include.am out of core/include.am (was: Split feature/include.am out of core/include.am)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32137: Split {feature,core,app}/*/include.am out of core/include.am
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-design|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31851| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+--

Comment (by nickm):

 Update title to reflect desired layout.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32137 [Core Tor/Tor]: Split {feature, core, app}/*/include.am out of core/include.am

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32137: Split {feature,core,app}/*/include.am out of core/include.am
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-design|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31851| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28005 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Officially support onions in HTTPS-Everywhere

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28005: Officially support onions in HTTPS-Everywhere
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  legind
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs https-everywhere tor-ux   |  Actual Points:
  network-team-roadmap-november  |
  TorBrowserTeam202001   |
Parent ID:  #30029   | Points:  20
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tor-hs https-everywhere tor-ux network-team-roadmap-november
 =>
 tor-hs https-everywhere tor-ux network-team-roadmap-november
 TorBrowserTeam202001


Comment:

 Putting this on the browser team's plate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32711 [Applications/GetTor]: Gitlab repository is full and can't be updated

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32711: Gitlab repository is full and can't be updated
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gitlab   |  Actual Points:  3
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 FWIW, I also tested it on some of my own repositories:
 https://gitlab.com/dashboard/projects
 https://github.com/cohosh/releases/releases

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32933 [Webpages/Website]: Please adapt GeKo's core people entry

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32933: Please adapt GeKo's core people entry
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by ggus):

 Hello, could you submit a pull request?

 You just need to edit this file:
 
https://github.com/torproject/tpo/blob/master/content/about/people/geko/contents.lr

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[tor-bugs] #32933 [Webpages/Website]: Please adapt GeKo's core people entry

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32933: Please adapt GeKo's core people entry
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 My current entry [https://www.torproject.org/about/people/ on our core
 people page] says: "Currently lead of the Tor Browser team." That's no
 longer true. Please change that to "Works on network health."

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25021 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Tor Browser spec for 9.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25021: Update Tor Browser spec for 9.0
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-spec, TorBrowserTeam202001,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen202001  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-spec, TorBrowserTeam202001 => tbb-spec,
 TorBrowserTeam202001, GeorgKoppen202001


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32931 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Prevent Find (Ctrl+F) resizing letterbox on other tabs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32931: Prevent Find (Ctrl+F) resizing letterbox on other tabs
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Thorin):

 upstream
 - https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1591054 - part 1
 - https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1593585 - part 2

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[tor-bugs] #32932 [Webpages/Support]: Allow browser Find (Ctrl+F) on support.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32932: Allow browser Find (Ctrl+F) on support.torproject.org
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Webpages/Support
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 (Recreating ticket #29963 because Trac does not allow me to add a comment
 or reopen it: "Warning: The ticket field parent is invalid: The parent
 ticket (#24129) is not an active ticket (status: closed).")

 Original description:
 > I used to be able to Find (Ctrl+F) for keywords on the long FAQ pages,
 but the new support.* page prevents searching the answers text unless
 javascript is disabled (Safest).
 >
 > Your site's useful content is mainly informational text and rightly so.
 Accept it. If you had wanted to redesign for mobile and localization, I
 wish you would have taken lessons from Wikipedia. Parts of it could be
 expressed in descriptive images, but on the whole, it's text, and
 hypertext should be extensively linked and searchable.

 My addendum:

 Tor Browser 9.0.2, Linux64
 Safer security level

 1. Open https://support.torproject.org/ The answers are hidden one by one
 behind every question.
 2. Find (Ctrl+F) for "gpg". Result: "Phrase not found"
 3. Read every question (over 140 of them so far) until you stumble upon
 "How can I verify Tor Browser's signature?" Click on it to reveal its
 answer.
 4. Find (Ctrl+F) for "gpg". Result: "1 of 14 matches"

 The page's text cannot be quickly searched unless every answer is visible.
 One possible solution is something like the layout of the old FAQs (
 https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en ) that listed questions
 at the top that linked to anchors lower on the page. Another solution is a
 search box built into the page -- a search that doesn't require JavaScript
 or third parties and that reindexes the text of the answers as often as
 they change.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32800 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Creating some space to host Tor Browser nightly updates

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32800: Creating some space to host Tor Browser nightly updates
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-update, TorBrowserTeam202001 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18867   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pili):

 bumping this one :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24532 [Metrics/Statistics]: Make metrics-web runs independent of server locale

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24532: Make metrics-web runs independent of server locale
+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * cc: metrics-team (added)
 * reviewer:   => irl
 * status:  new => needs_review
 * component:  Metrics/Website => Metrics/Statistics


Comment:

 This is as simple as setting the default locale for the instance of the
 JVM at the beginning of the `main` method. For metrics-web that's the
 patch below:

 {{{
 diff --git a/src/main/java/org/torproject/metrics/stats/main/Main.java
 b/src/main/java/org/torproject/metrics/stats/main/Main.java
 index 4ea15b46..3a4baf75 100644
 --- a/src/main/java/org/torproject/metrics/stats/main/Main.java
 +++ b/src/main/java/org/torproject/metrics/stats/main/Main.java
 @@ -8,10 +8,11 @@ import java.io.IOException;
  import java.lang.reflect.InvocationTargetException;
  import java.nio.file.Files;
  import java.nio.file.StandardCopyOption;
  import java.util.ArrayList;
  import java.util.List;
 +import java.util.Locale;

  public class Main {

private static final Logger log = LoggerFactory.getLogger(Main.class);

 @@ -27,10 +28,12 @@ public class Main {
/** Start the metrics update run. */
public static void main(String[] args) {

  log.info("Starting metrics update run.");

 +Locale.setDefault(Locale.US);
 +
  File[] outputDirs = new File[] { modulesDir, statsDir };
  for (File outputDir : outputDirs) {
if (outputDir.exists()) {
  continue;
}
 }}}

 That `main` method invokes all the other `main` methods of data-processing
 modules. But setting the locale in this first `main` method is sufficient
 for all subsequent module runs in the same JVM.

 I tested this line in a throw-away EC2 instance, and it worked just fine.

 If this fix looks good, we should apply the same fix to all other `main`
 methods of our various code bases:

 {{{
 org.torproject.metrics.collector.Main
 org.torproject.metrics.exonerator.ExoneraTorDatabaseImporter
 org.torproject.metrics.exonerator.ServerMain
 org.torproject.metrics.onionoo.cron.Main
 org.torproject.metrics.onionoo.server.ServerMain
 org.torproject.metrics.web.ServerMain
 org.torproject.metrics.web.UpdateNews
 }}}

 In case of Onionoo we can then simplify all `String.format` invocations
 containing a locale, like `String.format(Locale.US, "%.12f",
 weights[i]));`. It will be sufficient to specify the locale once at the
 beginning of the execution. Doesn't hurt to keep it there, but having less
 code wouldn't hurt, either.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Setting ORPort [ipv6]:auto mistakenly advertises port 94

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32588: Setting ORPort [ipv6]:auto mistakenly advertises port 94
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.9-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-should, ipv6, memory-safety, |  Actual Points:  0.6
  security-low, 035-backport, 040-backport,  |
  041-backport, 042-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * keywords:
 ipv6, memory-safety, security-low, 035-backport, 040-backport,
 041-backport, 042-backport
 =>
 043-should, ipv6, memory-safety, security-low, 035-backport,
 040-backport, 041-backport, 042-backport


Comment:

 I made some fixes, but I still need to do unit tests, so I'm leaving it in
 needs_revision.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32822 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make authorities add their own IPv6 address to trusted dir servers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32822: Make authorities add their own IPv6 address to trusted dir servers
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6  |  Actual Points:  0.3
Parent ID:| Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 I made some fixes, but I still need to do unit tests, so I'm leaving it in
 needs_revision.

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[tor-bugs] #32931 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Prevent Find (Ctrl+F) resizing letterbox on other tabs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32931: Prevent Find (Ctrl+F) resizing letterbox on other tabs
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 Steps to reproduce:
 1. At the default window size, open two tabs.
 2. In one tab, open a domain/website.
 3. In the other tab, physically type a different, unrelated
 domain/website, and open it. Physically type it so that the two tabs are
 as identifiably separate as they can be in one session. No referers or
 variables passed in click-through URLs.
 4. Notice that each page's area fills the default window size to its edges
 as they are supposed to.
 5. In the first tab, open the browser's Find box (Ctrl+F) as if you were
 searching for text on that page. Notice the vertical size of its
 letterboxed page area shrink as it's supposed to.
 6. Click on the second tab to view the different, unrelated domain. Notice
 its tab does NOT have a Find box at the bottom, but its letterboxed page
 area shrunk nonetheless.
 7. On the first tab, close the Find box. Notice the page area grow to its
 original size.
 8. Click on the second tab that never had a Find box. Notice its page area
 has also grown to its original size.

 Thus, opening Find on one tab passes the indication of its opened state to
 all tabs.

 Expected result:
 Opening Find in one tab would not affect the letterboxes of other tabs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29801 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write a proposal for IPv6 "Happy Eyeballs" on Tor clients

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29801: Write a proposal for IPv6 "Happy Eyeballs" on Tor clients
-+-
 Reporter:  neel |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop299,   |  Actual Points:  1
  042-deferred-20190918  |
Parent ID:  #17835   | Points:
 Reviewer:  neel |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * actualpoints:   => 1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29801 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write a proposal for IPv6 "Happy Eyeballs" on Tor clients

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29801: Write a proposal for IPv6 "Happy Eyeballs" on Tor clients
-+-
 Reporter:  neel |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop299,   |  Actual Points:
  042-deferred-20190918  |
Parent ID:  #17835   | Points:
 Reviewer:  neel |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => assigned
 * reviewer:  teor => neel
 * owner:  neel => teor


Comment:

 Hi Neel, I did a review, and made some changes to the proposal here:
 * https://github.com/torproject/torspec/pull/100

 The major changes include:
 * adding a bootstrap section
 * adding load balancing calculations (and changes)
 * simplifying the ConnectionAttemptDelay design
 * minor changes to match tor's typical design patterns

 If you're happy with these changes, we can send a copy to tor-dev, and
 then merge it to the torspec repository.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29801 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write a proposal for IPv6 "Happy Eyeballs" on Tor clients

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29801: Write a proposal for IPv6 "Happy Eyeballs" on Tor clients
-+-
 Reporter:  neel |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop299,   |  Actual Points:
  042-deferred-20190918  |
Parent ID:  #17835   | Points:
 Reviewer:  neel |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #5294 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make human summary of Tor Browser design doc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5294: Make human summary of Tor Browser design doc
--+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorO, ux-team |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pili):

 * cc: ggus (added)


Comment:

 I wonder if this is a session we could brainstorm/crowdsource/test-drive
 at IFF this year with attendees?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32930 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Hello, currently, in China, Tor Browser 9.5a4 still can't connect to Tor network through snowflake bridge.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32930: Hello, currently, in China, Tor Browser 9.5a4 still can't connect to Tor
network through snowflake bridge.
-+
 Reporter:  amiableclarity2011   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by amiableclarity2011):

 * Attachment "state" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32930 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Hello, currently, in China, Tor Browser 9.5a4 still can't connect to Tor network through snowflake bridge.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32930: Hello, currently, in China, Tor Browser 9.5a4 still can't connect to Tor
network through snowflake bridge.
-+
 Reporter:  amiableclarity2011   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by amiableclarity2011):

 * Attachment "control_auth_cookie" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32930 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Hello, currently, in China, Tor Browser 9.5a4 still can't connect to Tor network through snowflake bridge.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32930: Hello, currently, in China, Tor Browser 9.5a4 still can't connect to Tor
network through snowflake bridge.
-+
 Reporter:  amiableclarity2011   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by amiableclarity2011):

 * Attachment "torrc-defaults" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32930 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Hello, currently, in China, Tor Browser 9.5a4 still can't connect to Tor network through snowflake bridge.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32930: Hello, currently, in China, Tor Browser 9.5a4 still can't connect to Tor
network through snowflake bridge.
-+
 Reporter:  amiableclarity2011   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by amiableclarity2011):

 * Attachment "torrc" added.


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[tor-bugs] #32930 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Hello, currently, in China, Tor Browser 9.5a4 still can't connect to Tor network through snowflake bridge.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32930: Hello, currently, in China, Tor Browser 9.5a4 still can't connect to Tor
network through snowflake bridge.
+-
 Reporter:  amiableclarity2011  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate   |  Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
 Hello, currently, in China, Tor Browser 9.5a4 still can't connect to Tor
 network through snowflake bridge.

 Below are Tor log messages



 1/13/20, 09:19:32.686 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 1/13/20, 09:19:32.686 [NOTICE] Switching to guard context "bridges" (was
 using "default")
 1/13/20, 09:19:32.686 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 1/13/20, 09:19:32.686 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 1/13/20, 09:19:32.686 [NOTICE] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 1/13/20, 09:19:32.686 [NOTICE] Opened Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 1/13/20, 09:19:32.686 [NOTICE] Renaming old configuration file to
 "/home/scientist/tor-browser-linux64-9.5a4_en-US.tar.xz 2020 1 13/tor-
 browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/torrc.orig.1"
 1/13/20, 09:19:33.209 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 1% (conn_pt): Connecting to
 pluggable transport
 1/13/20, 09:19:33.212 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 2% (conn_done_pt): Connected
 to pluggable transport
 1/13/20, 09:19:57.607 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 10% (conn_done): Connected to
 a relay
 1/13/20, 09:20:27.651 [WARN] Problem bootstrapping. Stuck at 10%
 (conn_done): Connected to a relay. (DONE; DONE; count 1; recommendation
 warn; host 2B280B23E1107BB62ABFC40DDCC8824814F80A72 at 0.0.3.0:1)
 1/13/20, 09:20:27.651 [WARN] 1 connections have failed:
 1/13/20, 09:20:27.652 [WARN] 1 connections died in state handshaking (TLS)
 with SSL state SSLv3/TLS write client hello in HANDSHAKE
 1/13/20, 09:20:27.675 [NOTICE] Closing no-longer-configured Socks listener
 on 127.0.0.1:9150
 1/13/20, 09:20:27.675 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 1/13/20, 09:20:27.676 [WARN] Pluggable Transport process terminated with
 status code 0


 I upload my state file. Thank you very much for your help. I really
 appreciate it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31873 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Create new bridge distribution mechanisms

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31873: Create new bridge distribution mechanisms
+---
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s30-o23a1   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31280  | Points:  20
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor30-can
+---

Comment (by phw):

 Replying to [comment:3 sigvids]:
 > I speculate that Tor is seen as foreign and more threatening, and
 therefore more resolutely and consistently blocked.
 [[br]]
 I agree. New default bridges are blocked before they're even in Tor
 Browser – presumably because our adversaries read our bug tracker, which
 will make it very difficult to distribute bridges through public groups.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25110 [Core Tor/Tor]: Warn operators who set MyFamily that they must also set ContactInfo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25110: Warn operators who set MyFamily that they must also set ContactInfo
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  easy, intro, 034-triage-20180328,|  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328, 031-unreached-backport-  |
  maybe, 032-unreached-backport-maybe, network-  |
  health |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:
 easy, intro, 034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328, 031-unreached-
 backport-maybe, 032-unreached-backport-maybe
 =>
 easy, intro, 034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328, 031-unreached-
 backport-maybe, 032-unreached-backport-maybe, network-health


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25170 [Core Tor/Tor]: explicitly mention email address to contact for rejected relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25170: explicitly mention email address to contact for rejected relays
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Minor   | Resolution:
|  implemented
 Keywords:  032-backport-maybe, network-health  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  032-backport-maybe => 032-backport-maybe, network-health


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24497 [Webpages/Website]: Improve documentation for tor relay operators

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24497: Improve documentation for tor relay operators
--+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24526 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make it clear that multi-relay operators are expected to set a working ContactInfo and proper MyFamily

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24526: Make it clear that multi-relay operators are expected to set a working
ContactInfo and proper MyFamily
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-doc, man, review-group-28,   |  Actual Points:
  security-low, 032-backport, network-health |
Parent ID:  #24497   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tor-doc, man, review-group-28, security-low, 032-backport =>
 tor-doc, man, review-group-28, security-low, 032-backport, network-
 health


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24497 [Webpages/Website]: Improve documentation for tor relay operators

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24497: Improve documentation for tor relay operators
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24222 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Improve onionoo's war structure and startup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24222: Improve onionoo's war structure and startup
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Onionoo 2.0.0
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  metrics-2018 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I just pushed two trivial commits, one to metrics-web and one to Onionoo,
 so that Jetty host and port are now configurable in all our code bases. I
 don't see anything else that needs to be streamlined regarding Jetty, so
 I'll close this ticket now.

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