Re: [tor-bugs] #22919 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Form tracking and OS fingerprinting (only Windows, but without Javascript)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22919: Form tracking and OS fingerprinting (only Windows, but without 
Javascript)
-+-
 Reporter:  basvd|  Owner:  acat
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting,  |  Actual Points:  0.5
  TorBrowserTeam202001   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  tom  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, TorBrowserTeam202001R => tbb-
 fingerprinting, TorBrowserTeam202001
 * status:  needs_review => new


Comment:

 Okay, this landed. We should probably backport the patch to test it in our
 alpha series. Does that make sense, acat?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10980 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Build the Tor Browser User Manual when building Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10980: Build the Tor Browser User Manual when building Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  lunar |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorO, tbb-rbm |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * status:  new => assigned


Comment:

 Seems still like a good thing to have in geneal.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #11106 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Additional protections for browsing hidden websites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11106: Additional protections for browsing hidden websites
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 We fixed #9623 but I think not enabling JavaScript by default for onion
 services is not the right way to go. Users have security settings for that
 now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10952 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser leaves developer windows open after New Identity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10952: Tor Browser leaves developer windows open after New Identity
---+--
 Reporter:  anon   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-newnym, tbb-torbutton  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  reopened => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10980 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Build the Tor Browser User Manual when building Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10980: Build the Tor Browser User Manual when building Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  lunar |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorO, tbb-rbm |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #11154 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable TLS 1.0 (and 1.1) by default (was: Tor TLS and Security Cipher)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11154: Disable TLS 1.0 (and 1.1) by default
--+--
 Reporter:  ZeroCool  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff78-esr-will-have|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  needs-triage => ff78-esr-will-have


Comment:

 We have everything this bug complains about apart from the tls min
 version. However, a fix for that landed recently: https://hg.mozilla.org
 /mozilla-central/rev/1d07ac23cc5a, so it seems Mozilla is confident this
 sticks and is not impacting usability too much. We could probably think
 about backporting that fix into our alpha series. Dunno what the real
 browser devs think about that, though. :)

 Either way, this will be fixed in esr78.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #11294 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Users are not able to log into https://unseen.is

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11294: Users are not able to log into https://unseen.is
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-usability-website, needs-triage => tbb-usability-website
 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 Works for me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #11293 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Users are not able to log into http://www.bouyguestelecom.fr/mon-compte/

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11293: Users are not able to log into http://www.bouyguestelecom.fr/mon-compte/
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-usability-website, needs-triage => tbb-usability-website
 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 I don't see anything to log in anymore, closing as worksforme. Please
 reopen if I am wrong.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #11268 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Encourage webroot antivirus to scan TBB releases

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11268: Encourage webroot antivirus to scan TBB releases
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  needs-triage =>
 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:4 arma]:
 > boklm, what's the current state of our "submit new tor browser releases
 to the antivirus companies so they aren't surprised when we release"
 plans? Do we auto submit stuff to virustotal? Does that autosubmit reach
 everybody, or are there places like Webroot that aren't reached?

 We don't do it yet but have a ticket for it: #28175. That said, I don't
 think Webroot is not much of a problem nowadays from what I've seen over
 the last months and years in our blog comments and elsewhere. Closing this
 ticket for now. We should open a new one in case we get newer evidence
 that Webroot is still problematic.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #11258 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Toggling permissions.memory_only causes crash of Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11258: Toggling permissions.memory_only causes crash of Tor Browser
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tbb-crash, tbb-firefox-patch  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 I've not been hitting this in ages. I guess at least the upstreaming in
 Mozilla's bug 967812 solved this.

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[tor-bugs] #32983 [Applications/Tor Browser]: browser.sessionhistory.max_entries has no effect

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32983: browser.sessionhistory.max_entries has no effect
-+-
 Reporter:  pf.team  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Component:  Applications/Tor
 |  Browser
  Version:   |   Severity:  Major
 Keywords:  tabs history tbb-|  Actual Points:
  usability tbb-fingerprinting   |
  tbb-9.0-issues |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
 Prior to version 9.* users could change browser.sessionhistory.max_entries
 to restrict history length for every separate browser tab, by setting a
 value lower than the default 50.
 This allowed, on one hand, to prevent additional data being collected
 about the user - namely, how many pages they visited in this particular
 tab -  and on the other, somewhat cut down on memory consumption.

 Tor Browser version 9 and higher ignore all
 browser.sessionhistory.max_entries values below 50.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #11214 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Gmail talkgadget/hangouts/chat infinite loop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11214: Gmail talkgadget/hangouts/chat infinite loop
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-usability-website, needs-triage => tbb-usability-website
 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Is that still an issue with Tor Browser 9? If so, please provide steps to
 reproduce.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #11511 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Investigate why TorLauncher is sometimes not loaded when starting TBB

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11511: Investigate why TorLauncher is sometimes not loaded when starting TBB
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-security  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 We don't ship Tor Launcher as a separate extension anymore. Thus, nothing
 to fix here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #11517 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ukrainian Tor Browser Bundle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11517: Ukrainian Tor Browser Bundle
--+--
 Reporter:  phoul |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: emmapeel (added)


Comment:

 Not sure where we are here, adding localization folks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #11751 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add documentation for using TBB with Windows Tor expert bundle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11751: Add documentation for using TBB with Windows Tor expert bundle
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #11751 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add documentation for using TBB with Windows Tor expert bundle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11751: Add documentation for using TBB with Windows Tor expert bundle
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => new
 * cc: pili (added)


Comment:

 Putting on pili's radar for documentation purposes. Not sure where this
 should actually live.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #11751 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add documentation for using TBB with Windows Tor expert bundle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11751: Add documentation for using TBB with Windows Tor expert bundle
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #11803 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser Bundle suggests installing flash

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11803: Tor Browser Bundle suggests installing flash
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


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Re: [tor-bugs] #11935 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Strange fallback font behavior on Mac and Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11935: Strange fallback font behavior on Mac and Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  mt2014   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-fonts, tbb-   |  Actual Points:
  firefox-patch  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 We redid our font fingerprinting defense which should render this bug
 report moot.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #11949 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Randomize Tor Browser Fingerprint

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11949: Randomize Tor Browser Fingerprint
--+--
 Reporter:  mt2014|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-firefox-patch |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 I think this ticket could still be useful to investigate

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Re: [tor-bugs] #11949 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Randomize Tor Browser Fingerprint

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11949: Randomize Tor Browser Fingerprint
--+--
 Reporter:  mt2014|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-firefox-patch |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 (Before we actually go that route we should have some hard data showing
 that randomizing is superior for our use-case)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12113 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Building libevent/openssl on Windows without exception handling would reduce dependencies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12113: Building libevent/openssl on Windows without exception handling would
reduce dependencies
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  erinn => tbb-team
 * severity:  Blocker => Normal


Comment:

 We should revisit that ticket once we start to use mingw-w64/clang here,
 too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12113 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Building libevent/openssl on Windows without exception handling would reduce dependencies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12113: Building libevent/openssl on Windows without exception handling would
reduce dependencies
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #12387 [Applications/Tor Browser]: (Some) Pluggable Transport binaries are not stripped

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12387: (Some) Pluggable Transport binaries are not stripped
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-testcase, tbb-rbm |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team


Comment:

 I think we are good here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12387 [Applications/Tor Browser]: (Some) Pluggable Transport binaries are not stripped

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12387: (Some) Pluggable Transport binaries are not stripped
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tbb-testcase, tbb-rbm |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


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Re: [tor-bugs] #12094 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disappearing bookmarks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12094: Disappearing bookmarks
--+
 Reporter:  ulv   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32983 [Applications/Tor Browser]: browser.sessionhistory.max_entries has no effect

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32983: browser.sessionhistory.max_entries has no effect
-+-
 Reporter:  pf.team  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tabs history tbb-usability tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  fingerprintingtbb-9.0-issues   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by Thorin):

 @gk ... duplicate of #8213 ?

 @pf.team - see
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8213#comment:5 : this has
 been broken since Firefox 61 .. and, IMO, this is not a FPing vector
 (history per tab will always be between 1 and 50: it's not a stable or
 meaningful metric) nor can the History API leak anything about the tab's
 history

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32983 [Applications/Tor Browser]: browser.sessionhistory.max_entries has no effect

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32983: browser.sessionhistory.max_entries has no effect
-+--
 Reporter:  pf.team  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, tbb-9.0-issues  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by Thorin):

 * keywords:  tabs history tbb-usability tbb-fingerprinting
 tbb-9.0-issues => tbb-linkability, tbb-9.0-issues


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Re: [tor-bugs] #11254 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser bundle v3.5 fails to clean up cancelled downloads in Temp folder

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11254: Tor Browser bundle v3.5 fails to clean up cancelled downloads in Temp
folder
--+
 Reporter:  ericlaw   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak, tbb-torbutton  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #7449 | Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 This is working now for me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #11949 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Randomize Tor Browser Fingerprint

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11949: Randomize Tor Browser Fingerprint
--+--
 Reporter:  mt2014|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-firefox-patch |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Thorin):

 Replying to [comment:7 gk]:
 > (Before we actually go that route we should have some hard data showing
 that randomizing is superior for our use-case)

 IMO, you don't **need** hard data - math alone can illustrate it perfectly
 :) You only need hard data to know how "bad" an existing metric is, and
 maybe experiments after. As long as the entropy is high enough, it's
 actually more effective IMO.

 The question/problem is that the anti-fingerprinting measure taken needs
 to be decided based on what is being protected: e.g it would be silly to
 randomize language/locale (too complex, not very user friendly, etc) or to
 randomize the UA/platform (because these are already obtainable other
 ways, breakage, the entropy is too small). But randomizing something like
 canvas is arguably better than returning a white canvas - it produces less
 breakage and removes the tell-tale white canvas hash (not that TB is
 trying to hide that it's TB).

 Generally speaking, spoofing to lower by using the most common value (or
 one value per platform) is the simplest fix, whereas randomizing is much
 more complex - and the implementation can lead to unintended leaks,
 information paradoxes, breakage etc.

 That said: tor project has always taken the lower entropy route, but I
 just want to point out that randomizing should be considered in some
 cases. Because non-random means a stable metric can always be used
 **against** you (even where no entropy exists: e.g. oh, a white canvas, no
 service for you then), whereas randomizing should completely ruin it
  - take for example the script at #32861 where any change to the window
 size caused a hash change (I'm not saying to randomize window sizes - just
 showing how that script becomes unreliable)

 It really depends on what is being protected and the pros/cons weight up
 (especially the maintenance and complexity), but imagine if canvas, audio,
 clientrects and screen (not inner) were always randomized - this would
 really wreck almost every script out there, and I'm all for that :)

 One area I think randomizing should be considered is in clientrects: all
 those high precision measurements which keep coming up in FP PoCs

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32973 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Display real/starting IP address in the Tor Circuit information

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32973: Display real/starting IP address in the Tor Circuit information
--+--
 Reporter:  PROTechThor   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-circuit-display  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * keywords:   => ux-team, tbb-circuit-display
 * owner:  antonela => tbb-team
 * component:  UX => Applications/Tor Browser


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Re: [tor-bugs] #11466 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Only blank PNG files are visible in thumbnails folder after disabling private browsing mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11466: Only blank PNG files are visible in thumbnails folder after disabling
private browsing mode
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * keywords:  needs-triage =>
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 Works for me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8213 [Applications/Tor Browser]: spoof history.length - browser.sessionhistory.max_entries

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8213: spoof history.length - browser.sessionhistory.max_entries
+--
 Reporter:  proper  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, tbb-torbutton  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: pf.team (added)


Comment:

 #32983 is a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32983 [Applications/Tor Browser]: browser.sessionhistory.max_entries has no effect

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32983: browser.sessionhistory.max_entries has no effect
-+---
 Reporter:  pf.team  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, tbb-9.0-issues  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Thanks, Thorin. Agreed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32470 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport fix for bug 1590538

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32470: Backport fix for bug 1590538
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202001R,   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  GeorgKoppen202001  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202001, GeorgKoppen202001 =>
 TorBrowserTeam202001R, GeorgKoppen202001
 * status:  new => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 `bug_32470` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_32470&id=b2f474aa84ee6768f02b9b1fe8b454119383db51)
 has a cleanly applying backport. I could not test the resulting build yet,
 though.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32487 [Core Tor/Tor]: Phase 1: Stop compiling "acting as a directory cache" in --disable-module-relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32487: Phase 1: Stop compiling "acting as a directory cache" in 
--disable-module-
relay
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-design, network-team-roadmap-|  implemented
  november, 043-can  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  #31851   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Merged it!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create new MAR signing key for Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32658: Create new MAR signing key for Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-sign, TorBrowserTeam202002R, |  Actual Points:  0.2
  GeorgKoppen202001  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * keywords:  tbb-sign, TorBrowserTeam202001, GeorgKoppen202001 => tbb-sign,
 TorBrowserTeam202002R, GeorgKoppen202001
 * actualpoints:   => 0.2


Comment:

 So, I went down into my dungeon today and minted a new MAR signing key.
 `bug_32658` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_32658) has the resulting key rotation. We should
 probably merge that after the next regular release in February got out.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32806 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move "easy" dirauth-only options to dirauth module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32806: Move "easy" dirauth-only options to dirauth module
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-design, 043-can  |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:  #32139   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 yeah -- moria has to be the testing plan here; we usually get good testing
 there during our alpha series once we merge dirauth stuff.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32979 [Applications/Tor Browser]: `make clean` fails with missing package not mentioned in README

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32979: `make clean` fails with missing package not mentioned in README
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202001R,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen202001  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm => tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202001R, GeorgKoppen202001
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 `bug_32979` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_32979&id=b13a6010cd7ab59839c2a9a11c483c678cb9847e)
 has the small fix up for review

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32979 [Applications/Tor Browser]: `make clean` fails with missing package not mentioned in README

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32979: `make clean` fails with missing package not mentioned in README
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202001R,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen202001  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:2 gk]:
 > `bug_32979` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_32979&id=b13a6010cd7ab59839c2a9a11c483c678cb9847e)
 has the small fix up for review

 There are two other places where we should add it:
 - in the list of perl modules to install in the README file (for those not
 using Debian)
 - in the list of packages in `tools/ansible/roles/tbb-
 builder/tasks/main.yml`

 I have a patch in my branch `bug_32979_v2` doing that:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_32979_v2&id=14bb4de90418ce84b8bf603e0f7392c0a08dfbd1

 After looking at git lgos, it seems we had it in the README in the past,
 but removed it with #24361 (when rbm switched to `Path::Tiny` instead of
 `File::Slurp`).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32806 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move "easy" dirauth-only options to dirauth module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32806: Move "easy" dirauth-only options to dirauth module
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  tor-design, 043-can  |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:  #32139   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Merged!

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[tor-bugs] #32984 [Core Tor/Tor]: Revert #32883 for now and apply #32778

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32984: Revert #32883 for now and apply #32778
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #32883
   Points:  .1|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32984 [Core Tor/Tor]: Revert #32883 for now and apply #32778

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32984: Revert #32883 for now and apply #32778
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  nt-service regression 043-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32883  | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => nt-service regression 043-must


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32984 [Core Tor/Tor]: Revert #32883 for now and apply #32778 (so nt services can work in 0.4.3) (was: Revert #32883 for now and apply #32778)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32984: Revert #32883 for now and apply #32778 (so nt services can work in 
0.4.3)
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  nt-service regression 043-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32883  | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Description changed by nickm:

Old description:



New description:

 In theory, #32883 was a better solution for the problem that #32778 was
 supposed to solve.  In practice, it seems to break nt services on master.
 We should revert it for now until we have time to debug it in a later
 alpha series.

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32883 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use tor_api.h entry points for ntmain.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32883: Use tor_api.h entry points for ntmain.c
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  .2
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 I've made a child ticket to revert the change here.  We can try to figure
 out more about making this approach work in 0.4.4

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32984 [Core Tor/Tor]: Revert #32883 for now and apply #32778 (so nt services can work in 0.4.3)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32984: Revert #32883 for now and apply #32778 (so nt services can work in 
0.4.3)
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  nt-service regression 043-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32883  | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * priority:  Medium => High


Comment:

 On #32883, teor says:
 >  Let's revert this change.
 >
 > The revert might be complicated. I did an "ours" merge of #32778 to
 avoid conflicts with the code in this ticket, which we now want to revert.
 Let's make sure that #32778 ends up in master for 0.4.3, and this code
 does not.
 >
 > Let's make a new PR that reverts PR 1635, and merges PR 1634.

 I've made a new branch here, `ticket32984` with PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1671 . It is made of two `git
 revert`s, and one `git cherry-pick`.

 I have not reverted b6f099672b90cb6 ("Make ntmain.h functions stubs when
 NT_SERVICE not enabled."), since that's a harmless code cleanup. (famous
 last words?)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32984 [Core Tor/Tor]: Revert #32883 for now and apply #32778 (so nt services can work in 0.4.3)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32984: Revert #32883 for now and apply #32778 (so nt services can work in 
0.4.3)
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  nt-service regression 043-must  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  #32883  | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * actualpoints:   => .1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32315 [Core Tor/Tor]: Can't perform reverse DNS lookup for a (binary) IPv6 address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32315: Can't perform reverse DNS lookup for a (binary) IPv6 address
-+-
 Reporter:  liberat  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, dns, BugSmashFund, consider-   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  backport-after-043-stable, 035-backport,   |
  040-backport, 041-backport, 042-backport   |
  043-can|
Parent ID:  #26664   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final => Tor: 0.4.2.x-final


Comment:

 Agreed; this is a solid patch.  I've merged it to master, and am marking
 it for backport.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32315 [Core Tor/Tor]: Can't perform reverse DNS lookup for a (binary) IPv6 address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32315: Can't perform reverse DNS lookup for a (binary) IPv6 address
-+-
 Reporter:  liberat  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, dns, BugSmashFund, consider-   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  backport-after-043-stable, 035-backport,   |
  040-backport, 041-backport, 042-backport   |
  043-can|
Parent ID:  #26664   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Note that if/when we backport we'll also want to cherry-pick
 4f88eb849c8f85c7cd70fc20250270401e986efd so that lint-changes passes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32979 [Applications/Tor Browser]: `make clean` fails with missing package not mentioned in README

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32979: `make clean` fails with missing package not mentioned in README
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202001R,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen202001  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks better, thanks. Merged to `master` (commit
 14bb4de90418ce84b8bf603e0f7392c0a08dfbd1).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32984 [Core Tor/Tor]: Revert #32883 for now and apply #32778 (so nt services can work in 0.4.3)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32984: Revert #32883 for now and apply #32778 (so nt services can work in 
0.4.3)
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  nt-service regression 043-must  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  #32883  | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by Vort):

 4f88eb84 + c8b6392b looks good (except for "Please upgrade!" message).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20218 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix and refactor and redocument routerstatus_has_changed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20218: Fix and refactor and redocument routerstatus_has_changed
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, 029-proposed, tor-control, |  Actual Points:  0.5
  easy, spec-conformance, review-group-31,   |
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
  043-can|
Parent ID:   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Okay -- I've changed the comments, updated the tests to verify that
 routerstatus_format_entry() actually changed (or hasn't), and renamed the
 identifier.  I went with "visibly" instead of "control", but I'm open to
 suggestions for other identifiers that aren't even longer.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32984 [Core Tor/Tor]: Revert #32883 for now and apply #32778 (so nt services can work in 0.4.3)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32984: Revert #32883 for now and apply #32778 (so nt services can work in 
0.4.3)
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  nt-service regression 043-must  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  #32883  | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by nickm):

 Thanks for testing!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32709 [Core Tor/Tor]: hsv3: Support onionbalance keys when handling INTRO2 cells

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32709: hsv3: Support onionbalance keys when handling INTRO2 cells
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs scaling onionbalance tor- |  Actual Points:
  spec network-team-roadmap-2020Q1 044-must  |
Parent ID:  #26768   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I have done (a) and (b) above; I'll get to (c) before Wednesday.

 I'm putting my work in progress at `ticket32709_044_01` with PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1672 in case you want to take a
 look.  It conflicts with the merged #32137, so CI isn't running on it for
 the moment.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32980 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: set cpu_type in the ganeti cluster

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32980: set cpu_type in the ganeti cluster
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * Attachment "snap-2020.01.17-10.36.49.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30237 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30237: Tor Browser: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-september,  |  Actual Points:  16
  TorBrowserTeam202001R  |
Parent ID:  #3   | Points:  17
 Reviewer:  pospeselr, sysrqb|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Kathy and I rebased the patches to the `tor-browser-68.4.1esr-9.5-1`
 branch. The patch is here:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug30237-04&id=6cac185d0c10e4f26ca7eaf000c31fae36d13bfc

 We also rebased the Tor Launcher change so it is based off current master:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 launcher.git/commit/?h=bug30237-04&id=8726dc9a06524edc03d053a3258652dd9337ef78

 Finally, we made a couple of small improvements to the control port module
 in Torbutton; these are new changes that should be reviewed:
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/torbutton.git/commit/?h=bug30237-04&id=9dbc7d20a0efbe6d6d085950c937ed223176e6fa

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19757 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make a menu to add onion and auth-cookie to TB

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19757: Make a menu to add onion and auth-cookie to TB
-+-
 Reporter:  mrphs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-usability, tor-hs,  |  Actual Points:  5
  TorBrowserTeam202001R  |
Parent ID:  #3   | Points:  8
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * keywords:  ux-team, tbb-usability, tor-hs, TorBrowserTeam202001 => ux-
 team, tbb-usability, tor-hs, TorBrowserTeam202001R
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Our patches are ready for review. These build upon the #30237 changes, so
 you will need those patches too (the `bug19757-01` branches in the various
 brade repos are branched from our `bug30237-04` branches and therefore
 include all of the v3 client auth changes).

 Torbutton strings:
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/torbutton.git/commit/?h=bug19757-01&id=8409822132a2dd092e181ac32ef128861d303107

 Torbutton control port module enhancements:
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/torbutton.git/commit/?h=bug19757-01&id=d265163919b310ce90e2672712867de4e87085f6

 Tor Launcher string:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 launcher.git/commit/?h=bug19757-01&id=044166fa62424e351d6a6a22a3aa1c44e5b7fee8

 Tor Launcher enhancement to create an `onion-auth` directory for storage
 of the keys:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 launcher.git/commit/?h=bug19757-01&id=c3f062c5888074cd6e2c3801353106d04f22e95a

 Tor Browser changes ("Remember this key" checkbox plus about:preferences
 changes):
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug19757-01&id=fb12d169bfe97b5a71a9135ad1efe25d39a1c097

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19757 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make a menu to add onion and auth-cookie to TB

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19757: Make a menu to add onion and auth-cookie to TB
-+-
 Reporter:  mrphs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-usability, tor-hs,  |  Actual Points:  5
  TorBrowserTeam202001R  |
Parent ID:  #3   | Points:  8
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Test builds that include all of our v3 client authentication changes
 (i.e., the changes from this ticket and from #30237) are available here:
  https://people.torproject.org/~mcs/volatile/v3-auth/

 The bundled `tor` was built from tor master as of two days ago.

 Standard disclaimer: Don't use these builds to run your nuclear power
 plant, etc.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32980 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: set cpu_type in the ganeti cluster

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32980: set cpu_type in the ganeti cluster
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 at first glance, the cpu_type change did not impact load on the ganeti
 servers.

 [[Image(snap-2020.01.17-10.36.49.png)]]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22919 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Form tracking and OS fingerprinting (only Windows, but without Javascript)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22919: Form tracking and OS fingerprinting (only Windows, but without 
Javascript)
-+-
 Reporter:  basvd|  Owner:  acat
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting,  |  Actual Points:  0.5
  TorBrowserTeam202001   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  tom  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by acat):

 Makes sense, thanks. I'll use this ticket for that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32949 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Migrate dip from gitlab-01 to gitlab-02

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32949: Migrate dip from gitlab-01 to gitlab-02
-+--
 Reporter:  hiro |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gitlab   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32197   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => gitlab
 * parent:   => #32197


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32198 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: upgrade CRM* machines to buster

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32198: upgrade CRM* machines to buster
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Services Admin |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 i haven't worked on snapshotting in the ganeti cluster yet, but Riseup
 have interesting documentation on how to clone VMs that might be
 interesting for us:

 https://we.riseup.net/riseup+tech/ganeti#cloning-an-instance

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32802 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: decomission kvm4

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32802: decomission kvm4
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 we don't have docs on how to move instances just yet, but i added a
 section in our ganeti manual that should be filled in when we do. for now
 it has references to external manuals that could be used:

 https://help.torproject.org/tsa/howto/ganeti/#index14h2

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32568 [Internal Services/Service - nextcloud]: nextcloud collaborative "pad" synchronization breaks down with multiple users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32568: nextcloud collaborative "pad" synchronization breaks down with multiple
users
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:
 |  nextcloud-admin@…
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service -  |Version:
  nextcloud  |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gaba):

 We are using nextcloud to archive documents, to save list of ideas for
 grants, for keeping track of broad goals for sponsors and I'm using it for
 calendar. We are not wasting anything setting up nextcloud. About grant
 writing it is ok if people use google doc until onlyoffice is usable.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32390 [Internal Services/Service - sandstorm]: decomission storm / bracteata on February 4, 2020

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32390: decomission storm / bracteata on February 4, 2020
---+--
 Reporter:  gaba   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - sandstorm  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gaba   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32267 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by gaba):

 I sent it a few days ago.

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[tor-bugs] #32985 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: make ikiwiki show proper headings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32985: make ikiwiki show proper headings
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin   |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Minor|   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Our documentation pages are getting increasingly long in the ikiwiki. So I
 sometimes need to link to specific sections. For example, this link:

 https://help.torproject.org/tsa/howto/ganeti/#index4h2

 currently points at "Adding a new instance". Yet there are a few problems
 with that link:

  1. it's not human-readable: it's hard to understand what it refers to
 just by looking at it
  2. it's not stable: if another heading is added or remove before it, its
 number is going to change and the link will point elsewhere

 There's a plugin called [https://ikiwiki.info/plugins/headinganchors/
 headinganchors] which adds better identifiers, but it has some limitations
 with non-ASCII characters. I wrote a
 [https://ikiwiki.info/plugins/contrib/i18nheadinganchors/ replacement
 plugin] but it's not shipped in ikiwiki by default.

 I'm not "just doing this" right now because it's friday and I don't want
 to break the wiki before the weekend.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32980 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: set cpu_type in the ganeti cluster

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32980: set cpu_type in the ganeti cluster
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 after further reflexion, i wonder if the best approach might not be to use
 `-cpu host` here, considering all machines *are* identical. that might
 yield real performance benefits, when compared to pinning a CPU family...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29650 [Metrics/Exit Scanner]: Rewrite exit scanner to produce exit lists according to new format

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29650: Rewrite exit scanner to produce exit lists according to new format
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:
 |  metrics-team
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Exit Scanner |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-roadmap-2019-q2 exitscanner  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29399   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 >  update: gaba told me they were still on course for the "end of
 december" timeline, thanks!

 I'm working on the yearly roadmap here and I would love to have a timeline
 of when we can turn off that host indefinitely. As a reminder, the
 operating system on chiwui is running Debian 8 "jessie" which has been
 officially unsupported by the Debian project since june 2018. It's been
 under life support since, under the unofficial LTS project, which will
 end, for that release, in June 2020.

 We were given a March 2019 deadline first, and this was pushed back twice.
 I would love to have this finished before the hard deadline of June 2020,
 but failing that, I *will* be forced to shutdown that server in June 2020,
 otherwise we'll face more serious issues as the entire platform will be
 unsupported for security issues.

 TL;DR: please, give us a timeline. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29399 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Retire host and services for tordnsel and check (chiwui)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29399: Retire host and services for tordnsel and check (chiwui)
-+-
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31686   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 we have a hard deadline of june 2020 here, at which point this host *will*
 be shutdown, along with the services hosted on it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32977 [Applications/GetTor]: Move GetTor github repository to torproject/torbrowser-releases

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32977: Move GetTor github repository to torproject/torbrowser-releases
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 The old credential worked, and I've run the `update_github` script to
 upload tor browser binaries to this repository:
 https://github.com/torproject/torbrowser-releases/releases

 All that's left is to update the database so that links point to the new
 repository. Here's a patch for that:
 https://dip.torproject.org/cohosh/gettor/compare/master...ticket%2F32977

 There's no rush on this, since the old repo is still up and working.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32787 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Delete tb-crashes role

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32787: Delete tb-crashes role
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202001 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 we are usually wary of removing users, because that might leave un-owned
 files on the servers. are you sure the role doesn't own anything anywhere?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32763 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please provision an onionoo-backend-02 and add to the varnish configuration

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32763: Please provision an onionoo-backend-02 and add to the varnish 
configuration
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 @irl ping, what's going on here? i am confused by this set of tickets.
 please clarify! :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32532 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Install ZNC on Chives, make pastly admin it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32532: Install ZNC on Chives, make pastly admin it
-+-
 Reporter:  pastly   |  Owner:  pastly
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 >  I just need to go through the motions of adding a user so I can
 document it.

 Any update on that?

 >  How do you feel about the existing contents of tsa/howto/irc.mdwn?
 Would it be appropriate for me to delete them entirely? Anything I should
 keep?

 er, you mean https://help.torproject.org/tsa/howto/irc/ here? I definitely
 want to keep *that*. :) or do you mean your patch? if the latter, then i'm
 happy to just merge it in, but I would then need to integrate it with the
 current document structure, as it looks like it's just slapped at the end
 right now. :)

 i would suggest splitting it between the Tutorial (for things that end-
 users can do easily without prior knowledge) Howto (for things that
 require a bit more knowledge, maybe only the sysadmin/commandline-level
 stuff) and Reference (for the "how to configure/install this thing" bits).

 makes sense?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32457 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Give cohosh and phw access to gettor-01

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32457: Give cohosh and phw access to gettor-01
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 what's the status here? looks like cohosh has access now, can this be
 closed?

 please document. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32457 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Give cohosh and phw access to gettor-01

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32457: Give cohosh and phw access to gettor-01
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  assigned => needs_information


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32827 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: archive.tpo's rsync logs ip addresses (and it shouldn't)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32827: archive.tpo's rsync logs ip addresses (and it shouldn't)
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Services Admin |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 this probably affects other components, as I just reused existing code
 when i set that up. we also need to track that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32532 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Install ZNC on Chives, make pastly admin it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32532: Install ZNC on Chives, make pastly admin it
-+-
 Reporter:  pastly   |  Owner:  pastly
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * cc: anarcat (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31785 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: move getulum off moly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31785: move getulum off moly
-+
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29974   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by anarcat):

 i removed getulum from the spreadsheet, for some reason it was still
 there, but it's definitely not running on moly anymore.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30753 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Think about using DNS over HTTPS for Tor Browser 9

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30753: Think about using DNS over HTTPS for Tor Browser 9
--+---
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor44-can
--+---

Comment (by dkg):

 Replying to [comment:14 arma]:
 > I think there is no need for such a ticket until we live in a world
 where there are many diverse DoH servers.

 One useful talking point to convince a diverse set of DoH servers to exist
 is to point out that the Tor project is ready to use DoH to do DNS
 resolution, but isn't recommending it yet because they want to see more
 operators.

 If we could get #7829 resolved, then we'd have a more viable story to tell
 about why DoH wasn't necessary, but for now, DoH or DoT over Tor looks
 likely to provide the least-leaky form of DNS resolution possible for full
 anonymous DNS queries.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32778 [Core Tor/Tor]: pubsub_pub_

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32778: pubsub_pub_
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consider-backport-after-043-stable,  |  Actual Points:  .2
  041-backport 042-backport extra-review crash   |
  regression 043-must|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Hello privacy friends!
 I'm the opener. I was slow to respond on ticket.
 Replying to [comment:26 catalyst]:

 > wait a week to see if there's any more feedback on the smaller patch.
 >

 I now compiled the linked minimal patch "Initialize  publish/subscribe
 code when running as an NT service.
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1634"; applied against tor-0.4.2.5
 running MINGW64_NT-10.0-18363 and run tor x64 as NT Service mode.

 No more log message appears for me so far. Looks good. :)

 This is no review in any way. Just a short feedback.

 Replying to [comment:12 catalyst]:

 > because it seems like a less-common use case.

 Thanks for carrying anyway!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30753 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Think about using DNS over HTTPS for Tor Browser 9

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30753: Think about using DNS over HTTPS for Tor Browser 9
--+---
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor44-can
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:17 dkg]:


 > Replying to [comment:14 arma]:
 >
 > > I think there is no need for such a ticket until we live in a world
 where there are many diverse DoH servers.

 There a coming more and more public DoH Resolvers.

 Here is a list of currently **115** public ones:

 [https://dnscrypt.info/public-servers]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32973 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Display real/starting IP address in the Tor Circuit information

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32973: Display real/starting IP address in the Tor Circuit information
--+--
 Reporter:  PROTechThor   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-circuit-display  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 could be parsed from dirserver answer X_ADDRESS_HEADER

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