Re: [tor-bugs] #28081 [Core Tor/Tor]: rust protover discards all votes if one is not UTF-8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28081: rust protover discards all votes if one is not UTF-8
-+-
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, protover,  |  Actual Points:
  035-deferred-20190115, 041-proposed, 033   |
  -unreached-backport|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:5 teor]:
 > #27741 has been merged.
 > Which branch do you want us to review?

 Branch here:

 https://gitgud.io/onionk/tor/compare/master...rust-protover-unicode

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33304 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Chutney tries to convert empty pid string to integer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33304: Chutney tries to convert empty pid string to integer
--+---
 Reporter:  opara |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  technical-debt|  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #33050| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor55-can
--+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * parent:   => #33050
 * points:   => 0.1
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor55-can
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1
 * keywords:   => technical-debt
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:1 opara]:
 > Pull request is here: https://github.com/torproject/chutney/pull/52

 Thanks!

 I merged the PR to master, and fixed some old code that might not expect
 the extra Nones we've just added.

 > I don't seem to have the ability to change to 'needs_review'.

 I've added you to GRP_user, let me know if that doesn't work.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33192 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop assuming that /usr/bin/python exists

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33192: Stop assuming that /usr/bin/python exists
-+
 Reporter:  alwayslivid  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  extra-review 044-should  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33193   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by alwayslivid):

 Will work on it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33304 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Chutney tries to convert empty pid string to integer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33304: Chutney tries to convert empty pid string to integer
--+
 Reporter:  opara |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by opara):

 Pull request is here: https://github.com/torproject/chutney/pull/52

 I don't seem to have the ability to change to 'needs_review'.

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[tor-bugs] #33304 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Chutney tries to convert empty pid string to integer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33304: Chutney tries to convert empty pid string to integer
+--
 Reporter:  opara   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  Core Tor/Chutney
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 In the {{{getPid()}}} function, Chutney reads the pid from a file and
 converts it to an integer.

 {{{
 if not os.path.exists(pidfile):
 return None

 with open(pidfile, 'r') as f:
 return int(f.read())
 }}}

 This can result in the following error:

 {{{
 ValueError: invalid literal for int() with base 10: ''
 }}}

 PR incoming...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33303 [Core Tor/Tor]: Travis: Only run IPv6 chutney tests on macOS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33303: Travis: Only run IPv6 chutney tests on macOS
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-ci, chutney  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33050   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor55-must
-+
Changes (by teor):

 * points:  0.1 =>
 * parent:  #33195 => #33050


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33194 [Core Tor/Tor]: Sort Travis jobs in speed order

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33194: Sort Travis jobs in speed order
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-ci, chutney  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33050   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor55-must
-+
Changes (by teor):

 * points:  0.1 =>
 * parent:  #33195 => #33050


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33300 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a basic IPv6 test to "make test-network"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33300: Add a basic IPv6 test to "make test-network"
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-ci, chutney  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33050   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor55-must
-+
Changes (by teor):

 * points:  0.1 =>
 * parent:  #33280 => #33050


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33280 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a "make test-network-ipv6" target, which runs IPv6 chutney networks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33280: Add a "make test-network-ipv6" target, which runs IPv6 chutney networks
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-ci, chutney, ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33050 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor55-must
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * points:  0.1 =>
 * parent:  #33195 => #33050


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28208 [Core Tor/Tor]: Run bridges+hs-v23 for make test-network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28208: Run bridges+hs-v23 for make test-network
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-ci|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33050| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor55-must
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * points:  0.2 =>
 * parent:  #33280 => #33050


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33195 [Core Tor/Tor]: Require IPv6 tests in Travis CI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33195: Require IPv6 tests in Travis CI
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consider-backport-immediately, tor-  |  Actual Points:  0.6
  ci, chutney, ipv6  |
Parent ID:  #33050   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-must
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 There is also a master test branch, without #33280:
 * https://github.com/teor2345/tor/branches/all?query=33195

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33195 [Core Tor/Tor]: Require IPv6 tests in Travis CI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33195: Require IPv6 tests in Travis CI
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consider-backport-immediately, tor-  |  Actual Points:  0.6
  ci, chutney, ipv6  |
Parent ID:  #33050   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-must
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  tor-ci, chutney => consider-backport-immediately, tor-ci,
 chutney, ipv6
 * cc: nickm (added)
 * reviewer:   => nickm
 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => 0.6


Comment:

 See my PRs:

 Backport require IPv6 chutney to pass, remove a redundant job, reorder
 jobs (#33194 and #33195):
 * 0.3.5: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1732
 * 0.4.1: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1733
 * 0.4.2: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1734
 * 0.4.3: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1735

 Split IPv4 and IPv6 chutney tests, and only run IPv6 on macOS (#33280 and
 #33303):
 * master: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1731

 I think it's worth backporting these changes, they are travis-only, and
 should make a significant difference to CI speeds during backport merges.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33301 [Applications/Tor Browser]: It takes too a long time for Tor Browser to close and be ready for a next start

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33301: It takes too a long time for Tor Browser to close and be ready for a 
next
start
+--
 Reporter:  JKLjkl  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  processes Firefox and -childID  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by JKLjkl):

 The problem was even in 9.0.4

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33194 [Core Tor/Tor]: Sort Travis jobs in speed order

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33194: Sort Travis jobs in speed order
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-ci, chutney  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33195   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor55-must
-+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Old description:

> We try to put the slowest Travis jobs first, so CI finishes as early as
> possible.
>
> But we put the optional macOS chutney / IPv6 job last, because it's very
> very slow, so we don't wait for it to finish.
>
> This ticket is required for Sponsor 55, because we need to do it to make
> IPv6 tests mandatory.

New description:

 And remove a redundant job.

 We try to put the slowest Travis jobs first, so CI finishes as early as
 possible.

 But we put the optional macOS chutney / IPv6 job last, because it's very
 very slow, so we don't wait for it to finish.

 This ticket is required for Sponsor 55, because we need to do it to make
 IPv6 tests mandatory.

--

Comment:

 Points and reviews in #33195.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33280 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a "make test-network-ipv6" target, which runs IPv6 chutney networks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33280: Add a "make test-network-ipv6" target, which runs IPv6 chutney networks
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-ci, chutney, ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33195 | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor55-must
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Reviews and points in #33195.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33303 [Core Tor/Tor]: Travis: Only run IPv6 chutney tests on macOS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33303: Travis: Only run IPv6 chutney tests on macOS
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-ci, chutney  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33195   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor55-must
-+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * actualpoints:  0.1 =>


Comment:

 Reviews and code in #33195.

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[tor-bugs] #33303 [Core Tor/Tor]: Travis: Only run IPv6 chutney tests on macOS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33303: Travis: Only run IPv6 chutney tests on macOS
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:  tor-ci, chutney
Actual Points:  0.1 |  Parent ID:  #33195
   Points:  0.1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor55-must  |
+
 To speed up the macOS chutney job, we only want to run IPv6 tests.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33302 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Run bridges+hs-v23 as Chutney's default network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33302: Run bridges+hs-v23 as Chutney's default network
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, chutney   |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #33050| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:  Sponsor55-must
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * cc: nickm (added)
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final =>
 * parent:  #33195 => #33050
 * reviewer:   => nickm


Comment:

 See my PR:
 * chutney: https://github.com/torproject/chutney/pull/51

 I'm going to merge the bugfix commit now, because it's required for
 #33280.

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[tor-bugs] #33302 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Run bridges+hs-v23 as Chutney's default network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33302: Run bridges+hs-v23 as Chutney's default network
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-ci, chutney
Actual Points:  0.1   |  Parent ID:  #33195
   Points:  0.1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor55-must|
--+
 Now that 0.2.9 is obsolete, we can upgrade chutney's defaults.

 Users who want to run unsupported tor versions < 0.3.2 can choose a legacy
 flavour, like `basic-min` or `bridges+hs-v2`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33075 [Core Tor/Tor]: Travis: Remove stem from the list of allow_failure jobs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33075: Travis: Remove stem from the list of allow_failure jobs
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-ci, consider-backport-   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  after-0432, 035-backport, 040-backport,|
  041-backport, 042-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:  #33195 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28208 [Core Tor/Tor]: Run bridges+hs-v23 for make test-network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28208: Run bridges+hs-v23 for make test-network
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-ci|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33280| Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor55-must
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * parent:  #33195 => #33280


Comment:

 Implemented in #33280, points and reviews in that ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33300 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a basic IPv6 test to "make test-network"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33300: Add a basic IPv6 test to "make test-network"
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-ci, chutney  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33280   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor55-must
-+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * parent:  #33195 => #33280


Comment:

 Implemented in #33280, points and reviews in that ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33301 [Applications/Tor Browser]: It takes too a long time for Tor Browser to close and be ready for a next start

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33301: It takes too a long time for Tor Browser to close and be ready for a 
next
start
+--
 Reporter:  JKLjkl  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  processes Firefox and -childID  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by arma):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 So to clarify, the problem is new in 9.0.5, or new in 9.0.4?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33301 [- Select a component]: It takes too a long time for Tor Browser to close and be ready for a next start

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33301: It takes too a long time for Tor Browser to close and be ready for a 
next
start
+
 Reporter:  JKLjkl  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  processes Firefox and -childID  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by JKLjkl):

 My processor is old, but there was no such problem with previous versions
 (as far as i can remember, versions before 9.0.4)

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[tor-bugs] #33301 [- Select a component]: It takes too a long time for Tor Browser to close and be ready for a next start

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33301: It takes too a long time for Tor Browser to close and be ready for a 
next
start
-+-
 Reporter:  JKLjkl   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  - Select a
 |  component
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  processes Firefox and|  Actual Points:
  -childID   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
 It takes too a long time for Tor Browser to close and be ready for a next
 start

 Operating System: Ubuntu 18.04 64bit
 Tor Browser ver: 9.0.5 64bit

 When closing Tor Browser i have to wait about 70 seconds for it to close
 completely.
 For instance, when i start the browser and do nothing (but leave it on the
 initial page "about tor") and then close it, it takes a while for
 processes "-childID 1" and "-childID 2" to close, but the process
 "-childID 3" (or, in the case of surfing, usually the last in number) as
 well as "Firefox" remain in the background of processes for nearly 70
 seconds (or 1 minute and 10 seconds) - in that time the process "Firefox"
 is working intensively taking most of the processor resource (over 98%)
 (i.e. for all that time - about 70 seconds - until it is completely
 closed).

 It is impossible to start the browser during those 70 seconds (you know
 the message "Tor Browser is already running, but is not responding. To
 open a new window, you must first close the existing Tor Browser process,
 or restart your system.")

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33299 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Remove retired pluggable transports

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33299: Remove retired pluggable transports
+---
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  task| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s30-o22a2   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31279  | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  cohosh  |Sponsor:  Sponsor30-can
+---
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => cohosh


Comment:

 Here's a patch for BridgeDB:
 https://github.com/NullHypothesis/bridgedb/compare/develop...task/33299

 ...and for the bridgedb-admin repository (which contains our deployed
 bridgedb.conf):
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/phw/bridgedb-
 admin.git/commit/?h=task/33299&id=b38dfde34bdf962e63d09241f242d73e785c95e1

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32622 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix misleading STATUS_CLIENT warning message

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32622: Fix misleading STATUS_CLIENT warning message
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anticensorship-wants 043-should  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * keywords:  fast-fix anticensorship-wants 043-should => anticensorship-
 wants 043-should


Comment:

 Deleting "fast-fix" because the it's not very obvious to me how this is
 going wrong.  Anyone else have suggestions?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33091 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove redundant checks in ip_address_changed()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33091: Remove redundant checks in ip_address_changed()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ipv6, tor-relay, technical-debt  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #33049   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:  #5940 => #33049


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33073 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write a proposal for Tor Relays to Automatically Find their IPv6 Address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33073: Write a proposal for Tor Relays to Automatically Find their IPv6 Address
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ipv6, tor-relay  |  Actual Points:  3.5
Parent ID:  #33049   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor55-must
-+
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:  #5940 => #33049


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[tor-bugs] #33300 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a basic IPv6 test to "make test-network"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33300: Add a basic IPv6 test to "make test-network"
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:  tor-ci, chutney
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:  #33195
   Points:  0.1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor55-must  |
+
 We need to test IPv6 during Sponsor 55.

 (If it's available on the local machine.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28208 [Core Tor/Tor]: Run bridges+hs-v23 for make test-network (was: Run bridges+hs-v23 for make test-network in 0.4.2 and later)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28208: Run bridges+hs-v23 for make test-network
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33195| Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor55-must
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:  #29267 => #33195
 * keywords:  test, fast-fix, teor-backlog-ci => tor-ci
 * points:   => 0.2
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor55-must
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
 * owner:  (none) => teor
 * type:  defect => enhancement


Comment:

 We don't want to break hsv3 during Sponsor 55, so we should also make this
 CI change.

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[tor-bugs] #33299 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Remove retired pluggable transports

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33299: Remove retired pluggable transports
+---
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:  s30-o22a2
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:  #31279
   Points:  0.5 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor30-can   |
+---
 BridgeDB still hands out obfs3, ScrambleSuit, and FTE bridges. Tor Browser
 no longer supports FTE (see #29319), so we should remove it. I suggest
 also removing obfs3 and ScrambleSuit because these transports don't offer
 anything that obfs4 doesn't already provide.

 As of today, BridgeDB knows about 1,316 bridges. Among these:
 * 31 support FTE. 29 of these wouldn't be handed out because they also
 support obfs4 (see #28655). The remaining two bridges run FTE/obfs3 and
 ScrambleSuit/obfs3/FTE.

 * 34 support ScrambleSuit. 32 of these also support obfs4 and only two
 don't. Instead, they run obfs3/ScrambleSuit and ScrambleSuit/obfs3/FTE.

 * 106 support obfs3. Only seven of these don't support obfs4.

 Considering the above, I think it's safe to retire FTE, ScrambleSuit, and
 obfs3.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32645 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update URL bar onion indicators

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32645: Update URL bar onion indicators
+--
 Reporter:  antonela|  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam202002R  |  Actual Points:  3
Parent ID:  #30025  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor27-must
+--
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * actualpoints:   => 3


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[tor-bugs] #33298 [Applications/Tor Browser]: HTTP onion sites do not give a popup warning when submiting form data to non-onion HTTP sites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33298: HTTP onion sites do not give a popup warning when submiting form data to
non-onion HTTP sites
--+
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
  |  TorBrowserTeam202002
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #30025
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must|
--+
 In vanilla firefox, HTTPS site with a form that submits to an HTTP site
 will put up a pop-up box warning the user they are about to send their
 data unencrypted across the network. Tor Browser follows this behaviour,
 but it also needs to do so when submitting data from an HTTP onionsite to
 a vanilla HTTP site.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32645 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update URL bar onion indicators

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32645: Update URL bar onion indicators
+--
 Reporter:  antonela|  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam202002R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30025  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor27-must
+--
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Ok, once again implemented as a fixup commit on
 7d3475febd37ae2b35432105f5e4c0da30852bc6. We needed to add the Onion+Slash
 icon for Onion firstparty and HTTP active content (javascript). I also
 simplified things a bit as there is no reason to have special logic or css
 rules for self-signed onion sites.

 -

 This patch alone is not sufficient for all scenarios.

 We need to rework when the user-override screen comes up, as currently
 self-signed HTTPS onionsites and HTTPS onionsites with unknown certificate
 authorities will pop a warning page that the user has to manually click
 through (basically the behaviour on the clearnet for these pages: https
 ://self-signed.badssl.com/ and https://untrusted-root.badssl.com/ ). I'm
 intending to fix this problem in a separate patch for #13410.

 HTTP Onion sites with clearnet HTTP forms do not currently trigger a popup
 warning on form submission (see clearnet version here: https://mixed-
 form.badssl.com/ ). It seems firefox only does this on HTTPS pages so we
 need to make it so it does this on HTTP onionsites as well. I'll file a
 new bug for this issue and parent it to #30005.

 I'm currently testing this patch with the following onionsite scenarios
 and all is working as expected apart from the previously mentioned issues:

 - HTTP Onion
 - HTTPS Onion Self-Signed
 - HTTPS Onion Unknown CA
 - HTTPS Onion EV
 - HTTPS Onion Wrong Domain
 - HTTP(S) Onion + HTTP Script
 - HTTP(S) Onion + HTTP Content
 - HTTP(S) Onion + HTTPS Content
 - HTTP(S) Onion + HTTP Form

 If you can think of any weird scenarios I nee to think about do let me
 know!

 tor-browser: https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/richard/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_32645_v2

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31159 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Monitor anti-censorship www services with prometheus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31159: Monitor anti-censorship www services with prometheus
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-february tpa-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  march  |
Parent ID:  #30152   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Old description:

> In the anti-censorship team we currently monitor
> [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/AntiCensorshipTeam/InfrastructureMonitoring
> several services] with sysmon.  We recently discovered that sysmon
> doesn't seem to follow HTTP 301 redirects. This means that if a web
> service dies but the 301 redirect still works (e.g., BridgeDB is dead but
> its apache reverse proxy still works), sysmon won't notice.
>
> Now that prometheus is running, we should fill this monitoring gap by
> testing the following web sites:
>
> * https://bridges.torproject.org
> * https://snowflake.torproject.org
> * https://gettor.torproject.org
>
> Our test should ensure that these sites serve the content we expect,
> e.g., make sure that bridges.tp.o contains the string "BridgeDB" in its
> HTML. Testing the HTTP status code does not suffice: if BridgeDB is down,
> the reverse proxy may still respond.
>
> I wonder if prometheus could also help us with #12802 by sending an email
> to bridges@tp.o and making sure that it responds with at least one
> bridge?
>
> Checklist:
>
>  1. [ ] monitor services in Nagios: BridgeDB, Snowflake, and GetTor
>  2. [ ] deploy Prometheus's "​blackbox exporter" for default bridges,
> which are external services
>  3. [ ] delegate to (and train) the anti-censorship team the blackbox
> exporter configuration
>  3. [ ] experiment with Prometheus's "alertmanager", which can send
> notifications if a monitoring target goes offline
>  4. [ ] grant the anti-censorship team access to Prometheus's grafana
> dashboard.

New description:

 In the anti-censorship team we currently monitor
 
[https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/AntiCensorshipTeam/InfrastructureMonitoring
 several services] with sysmon.  We recently discovered that sysmon doesn't
 seem to follow HTTP 301 redirects. This means that if a web service dies
 but the 301 redirect still works (e.g., BridgeDB is dead but its apache
 reverse proxy still works), sysmon won't notice.

 Now that prometheus is running, we should fill this monitoring gap by
 testing the following web sites:

 * https://bridges.torproject.org
 * https://snowflake.torproject.org
 * https://gettor.torproject.org

 Our test should ensure that these sites serve the content we expect, e.g.,
 make sure that bridges.tp.o contains the string "BridgeDB" in its HTML.
 Testing the HTTP status code does not suffice: if BridgeDB is down, the
 reverse proxy may still respond.

 I wonder if prometheus could also help us with #12802 by sending an email
 to bridges@tp.o and making sure that it responds with at least one bridge?

 Checklist:

  1. [ ] monitor services in Nagios: BridgeDB, Snowflake, and GetTor
  2. [ ] deploy Prometheus's "​blackbox exporter" for default bridges,
 which are external services
  3. [ ] delegate to (and train) the anti-censorship team the blackbox
 exporter configuration
  3. [ ] experiment with Prometheus's "alertmanager", which can send
 notifications if a monitoring target goes offline
  4. [X] grant the anti-censorship team access to Prometheus's grafana
 dashboard.

--

Comment (by phw):

 Replying to [comment:8 hiro]:
 > Hi,
 > This is now available here: https://prometheus2.torproject.org/targets
 > Grafana: https://grafana2.torproject.org/d/NgEq8C0Zz/blackbox-
 exporter?orgId=1
 > I'll share the password separately.
 [[br]]
 Thanks! I checked the grafana box on our todo list in the ticket
 description because we now have access to it.

 I see that BridgeDB is already being monitored. Are we able to add our own
 targets to Prometheus?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32921 [Core Tor/Tor]: Code and script changes to run clang-format without breaking checkSpaces or coccinelle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32921: Code and script changes to run clang-format without breaking 
checkSpaces or
coccinelle
+
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  style, 043-can  |  Actual Points:  1.5
Parent ID:  #29226  | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst|Sponsor:
+
Description changed by nickm:

Old description:

> I've been working to make changes to our code and our scripts to improve
> our clang-format output.  I think they are mature enough that we can
> merge them now.
>
> I also think it may be time to merge a .clang-format file and a script to
> run it.  We'll want to tweak it a bunch before we actually run it on our
> code, but getting it into our version control will help us refine our way
> towards a reasonable target.

New description:

 I've been working to make changes to our code and our scripts to improve
 our clang-format output.  I think they are mature enough that we can merge
 them now.

 I also think it may be time to merge a .clang-format file and a script to
 run it.  We'll want to tweak it a bunch before we actually run it on our
 code, but getting it into our version control will help us refine our way
 towards a reasonable target.

 '''Edited to clarify''': Neither the .clang-format file, the script, or
 the post-processing tool are meant to be a final version.  This branch
 does not mean that our style choices are final.  The goal here is just to
 land initial versions that we can start experimenting with.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12547 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Get analysed data from bridge reachability tests to tor-devs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12547: Get analysed data from bridge reachability tests to tor-devs
---+---
 Reporter:  hellais|  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  task   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ooni, bridge-reachability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by phw):

 This seems like a duplicate of #32126?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33283 [Applications/rbm]: Add caching for the exec function in rbm

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33283: Add caching for the exec function in rbm
+--
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/rbm|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202002R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:3 boklm]:
 > In branch `bug_33283_v2`, I added two patches.

 I did another profiler run using these two patches.
 https://people.torproject.org/~dcf/graphs/nytprof-rbm-20200212-e4f12abe/
 It looks like the number of calls to `RBM::config_p` are
 [https://people.torproject.org/~dcf/graphs/nytprof-
 rbm-20200212-e4f12abe/#subs_table down a little], from 89 million to 87.5
 million. Still about half of the calls come from `RBM::get_target`.

 I tried to match the conditions of the first profiler run as closely as
 possible. I started after running a full `make testbuild` at
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/dcf/tor-browser-build.git/commit/?h
 =snowflake-turbotunnel&id=b46fd762e0866fe01707e469eb997040f37c16a2
 b46fd762e0866fe01707e469eb997040f37c16a2]. Then I removed only the
 snowflake output: `mv out/snowflake out.snowflake.bak`. Then I ran
 {{{
 # time perl -d:NYTProf rbm/rbm build snowflake --target testbuild --target
 torbrowser-linux-x86_64
 Created /root/tor-browser-build/tmp/rbm-kPAVL/snowflake-
 5eff0f3ba406.tar.gz
 Using file /root/tor-browser-build/out/container-image/container-
 image_wheezy-amd64-f2bcf2cde274.tar.gz
 Using file /root/tor-browser-build/out/go/go-1.12.13-6f6dc9.tar.gz
 Using file /root/tor-browser-build/out/uniuri/uniuri-8902c56451e9-linux-
 x86_64-952cce.tar.gz
 Using file /root/tor-browser-build/out/goptlib/goptlib-v1.1.0-linux-
 x86_64-b9f8dc.tar.gz
 Using file /root/tor-browser-build/out/pion-webrtc/pion-webrtc-
 77c6e3b827e4-linux-x86_64-b7f872.tar.gz
 Using file /root/tor-browser-build/out/quic-go/quic-go-907071221cf9-linux-
 x86_64-7136df.tar.gz
 Build log: /root/tor-browser-build/logs/snowflake-linux-x86_64.log

 real46m42.061s
 user43m9.134s
 sys 3m43.336s
 }}}

 I'll re-do the experiment without the two bug_33283_v2 patches, to verify
 that it's a fair comparison.

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[tor-bugs] #33297 [Metrics/Cloud]: Tune Onionperf Nagios alerts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33297: Tune Onionperf Nagios alerts
---+--
 Reporter:  acute  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Cloud  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 Ensure we have sensible warning and critical levels, and that we rate
 limit notifications.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33279 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser cannot bind SOCKS port 9050: How to change browser settings? (not torrc)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33279: Tor Browser cannot bind SOCKS port 9050: How to change browser settings?
(not torrc)
--+---
 Reporter:  psisis|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by psisis):

 Replying to [comment:6 mcs]:
 > Replying to [comment:5 psisis]:
 > > And besides the problem not making much sense, is there a possible way
 to change Tor Browser settings from files or sqlite? It seems to behave
 somewhat differently from standard FF.
 >
 > It is difficult to understand your setup, but the default SOCKS port
 used by Tor Browser when it starts tor is 9150, not 9050. That is
 configured by the browser via args passed when starting tor.exe, e.g.,
 `__SocksPort 127.0.0.1:9150 IPv6Traffic PreferIPv6
 KeepAliveIsolateSOCKSAuth`. It will not normally be stored in `torrc`.
 >
 > You should not need to add any `SocksPort` lines to your `torrc` file.
 In the absence of any other unusual configuration, the SOCKS port is
 derived from the `network.proxy.socks_port` preference value. You can
 change it by editing `prefs.js` within the Tor Browser profile.


 I don’t know why you guys give me such a hard time. I outlined the problem
 clearly, posted my tor.exe output log, and said what I’ve tried. You keep
 assuming the real issue is deep within my system. A fresh bundle will not
 start either, and it’s impossible Tor is already running, since it’s on a
 drive not mounted at startup.

 I put `user_pref("network.proxy.socks_port", 443);` in my `prefs.js`. And
 Tor starts now, thank you very much.

 Fwiw, Resource Mon says tor.exe is also using port `9151` but that was
 allowed and never restricted. And inspecting the packets, tor is having
 TCP/socks traffic from ports `~5470-5700` (tor was completely dead before
 changing prefs.js)


 For clarification, Tor worked literally for years until two days ago. Two
 days ago I removed my router and hooked up to WAN, nothing else happened,
 I promise

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32622 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix misleading STATUS_CLIENT warning message

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32622: Fix misleading STATUS_CLIENT warning message
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix anticensorship-wants|  Actual Points:
  043-should |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by phw):

 Replying to [comment:6 catalyst]:
 > Replying to [ticket:32622 phw]:
 > > After Tor 0.4.3.0-alpha-dev successfully established a TCP connection
 with a bridge but failed to finish its handshake, it sends the following
 `STATUS_CLIENT` message to the controller:
 > > {{{
 > > 650 STATUS_CLIENT WARN BOOTSTRAP PROGRESS=10 TAG=handshake_dir
 SUMMARY="Finishing handshake with directory server" WARNING="DONE"
 REASON=DONE COUNT=1 RECOMMENDATION=warn
 HOSTID="" HOSTADDR="[scrubbed]"
 > > }}}
 >
 > Also, could you please confirm the affected tor versions?  I'm pretty
 sure the `handshake_dir` and `conn_dir` tags predate the bootstrap phase
 rename in 0.4.0 and no longer exist after that.
 >
 > I do see a similar problem on master, though, so it's worth further
 investigation in any case.
 [[br]]
 I can confirm that I'm seeing this with 0.4.3.0-alpha-dev. I just checked
 out master (currently 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev) and I'm seeing the same issue.

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[tor-bugs] #33296 [Metrics/Cloud]: Add Prometheus Node Exporter checks to Nagios

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33296: Add Prometheus Node Exporter checks to Nagios
---+--
 Reporter:  acute  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Cloud  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 In addition to standard CPU/RAM/Disk monitoring this could also check tgen
 processes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16364 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add an option to resize the browser window to the "safe default"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16364: Add an option to resize the browser window to the "safe default"
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-fingerprinting-   |  Actual Points:
  resolution |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Moving a tab to a new window also works on macOS.

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[tor-bugs] #33295 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Install Python 3-related packages on polyanthum

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33295: Install Python 3-related packages on polyanthum
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 The anti-censorship team is currently porting BridgeDB to Python 3 and we
 need a bunch of new packages to make this happen.

 Can you please install `libpython3.7-dev` on polyanthum?

 Once this is done, I suggest leaving this ticket open because we're
 probably going to need more packages installed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33291 [Core Tor/Tor]: making the tor library size smaller

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33291: making the tor library size smaller
--+
 Reporter:  gaba  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Description changed by gaba:

Old description:

> Goal:  To reduce the size of the tor library so that applications that
> are sensitive to download size can link it easily.
>
> Information from The Guardian Project on data from their "Orbot mini"
> app:
>
> {{{
> The Android APK for the arm 32-bit build is about 5MB. An APK is a JAR
> file, which is basically a ZIP file. This means everything gets
> compressed.
>
> Below, then you can see the version of Tor built into this (this is the
> old 0.4.0.4 without any of the more recent size optimizations) is almost
> 7MB. However, it is compressed 67%, ending up somewhere closer to 2.2MB
> in actual distribution form.
>
> Archive:
> Orbot-mini-mini-1.0.0-BETA-1-tor-0.4.0.4-rc-mini-armeabi-v7a-release.apk
> Zip file size: 4998235 bytes, number of entries: 623
>
> -rw 2.4 fat  6911768 b- 67% defN 80-000-00 00:00 lib/armeabi-
> v7a/tor.so
>
> Now, distribution size is thing for sure, the second is amount of space
> on disk when it is unpacked and running. Users of inexpensive phones
> with limited storage will often scroll through installed apps and look at
> actual storage size being used, and uninstall apps based on that. This
> means we should be concerned with both distribution size an runtime total
> storage use.
>

>
> }}}
> '''Possible routes'''
>
>  1. making different parts of tor more optional/modular (like relay mode,
> dirauth mode) . Did we try this before? Is this possible?
>
>  2. Is there a TLS stack you can link on android? Only in Java
>
>  3. A maybe sketchy possibility is to let google to optimize code in the
> cloud...
>
>  4. A small java implementation of core onion routing. Would applications
> be able to run it?
>
>  * java ones, easily
>  * other ones with some (considerable?) effort. JNI makes it possible,
> but not necessarily so easy.
>
>  5. libssl - 600kb is the shared library. The Guardian Project's
> experiments on making a smaller binary:
> __[https://github.com/guardianproject/tor-android/issues/18
> https://github.com/guardianproject/tor-android/issues/18]__
>
> Anything else?

New description:

 Goal:  To reduce the size of the tor library so that applications that are
 sensitive to download size can link it easily.

 Information from The Guardian Project on data from their "Orbot mini" app:


 {{{
 The Android APK for the arm 32-bit build is about 5MB. An APK is a JAR
 file, which is basically a ZIP file. This means everything gets
 compressed.

 Below, then you can see the version of Tor built into this (this is the
 old 0.4.0.4 without any of the more recent size optimizations) is almost
 7MB. However, it is compressed 67%, ending up somewhere closer to 2.2MB
 in actual distribution form.

 Archive:
 Orbot-mini-mini-1.0.0-BETA-1-tor-0.4.0.4-rc-mini-armeabi-v7a-release.apk
 Zip file size: 4998235 bytes, number of entries: 623

 -rw 2.4 fat  6911768 b- 67% defN 80-000-00 00:00 lib/armeabi-
 v7a/tor.so

 Now, distribution size is thing for sure, the second is amount of space on
 disk when
 it is unpacked and running. Users of inexpensive phones  with limited
 storage will often
 scroll through installed apps and look at actual storage size being used,
 and uninstall
 apps based on that. This means we should be concerned with both
 distribution size an
 runtime total storage use.
 }}}



 '''Possible routes'''

  1. making different parts of tor more optional/modular (like relay mode,
 dirauth mode) . Did we try this before? Is this possible?

  2. Is there a TLS stack you can link on android? Only in Java

  3. A maybe sketchy possibility is to let google to optimize code in the
 cloud...

  4. A small java implementation of core onion routing. Would applications
 be able to run it?

  * java ones, easily
  * other ones with some (considerable?) effort. JNI makes it possible, but
 not necessarily so easy.

  5. libssl - 600kb is the shared library. The Guardian Project's
 experiments on making a smaller binary:
 __[https://github.com/guardianproject/tor-android/issues/18
 https://github.com/guardianproject/tor-android/issues/18]__

 Anything else?

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33291 [Core Tor/Tor]: making the tor library size smaller

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33291: making the tor library size smaller
--+
 Reporter:  gaba  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Description changed by gaba:

Old description:

> Goal:  To reduce the size of the tor library so that applications that
> are sensitive to download size can link it easily.
>
> '''Possible routes'''
>
> 1. making different parts of tor more optional/modular (like relay mode,
> dirauth mode) . Did we try this before? Is this possible?
>
> 2. Is there a TLS stack you can link on android? Only in Java
>
> 3. A maybe sketchy possibility is to let google to optimize code in the
> cloud...
>
> 4. A small java implementation of core onion routing. Would applications
> be able to run it?
>
>  * java ones, easily
>  * other ones with some (considerable?) effort. JNI makes it possible,
> but not necessarily so easy.
>
> 5. libssl - 600kb is the shared library. The Guardian Project's
> experiments on making a smaller binary:
> __[https://github.com/guardianproject/tor-android/issues/18
> https://github.com/guardianproject/tor-android/issues/18]__
>
> Anything else?

New description:

 Goal:  To reduce the size of the tor library so that applications that are
 sensitive to download size can link it easily.

 Information from The Guardian Project on data from their "Orbot mini" app:

 {{{
 The Android APK for the arm 32-bit build is about 5MB. An APK is a JAR
 file, which is basically a ZIP file. This means everything gets
 compressed.

 Below, then you can see the version of Tor built into this (this is the
 old 0.4.0.4 without any of the more recent size optimizations) is almost
 7MB. However, it is compressed 67%, ending up somewhere closer to 2.2MB
 in actual distribution form.

 Archive:
 Orbot-mini-mini-1.0.0-BETA-1-tor-0.4.0.4-rc-mini-armeabi-v7a-release.apk
 Zip file size: 4998235 bytes, number of entries: 623

 -rw 2.4 fat  6911768 b- 67% defN 80-000-00 00:00 lib/armeabi-
 v7a/tor.so

 Now, distribution size is thing for sure, the second is amount of space on
 disk when it is unpacked and running. Users of inexpensive phones  with
 limited storage will often scroll through installed apps and look at
 actual storage size being used, and uninstall apps based on that. This
 means we should be concerned with both distribution size an runtime total
 storage use.



 }}}
 '''Possible routes'''

  1. making different parts of tor more optional/modular (like relay mode,
 dirauth mode) . Did we try this before? Is this possible?

  2. Is there a TLS stack you can link on android? Only in Java

  3. A maybe sketchy possibility is to let google to optimize code in the
 cloud...

  4. A small java implementation of core onion routing. Would applications
 be able to run it?

  * java ones, easily
  * other ones with some (considerable?) effort. JNI makes it possible, but
 not necessarily so easy.

  5. libssl - 600kb is the shared library. The Guardian Project's
 experiments on making a smaller binary:
 __[https://github.com/guardianproject/tor-android/issues/18
 https://github.com/guardianproject/tor-android/issues/18]__

 Anything else?

--

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[tor-bugs] #33294 [Metrics/Cloud]: Update existing Nagios plugin for OnionPerf monitoring

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33294: Update existing Nagios plugin for OnionPerf monitoring
---+--
 Reporter:  acute  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Cloud  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 The plugin should alert if any of the following are true:

 - The web server does not exist or does not have sane responses
 - There are excessive failures in the logs
 - The onion services used for measurement are not reachable

 In addition, the plugin should use stem where appropriate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31239 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: automate installs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31239: automate installs
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-february |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 removed two more steps: the /etc/aliases junk (#32283) and the portmap/etc
 package removal (also done in puppet).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32283 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: fix up /etc/aliases with puppet

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32283: fix up /etc/aliases with puppet
-+-
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-february |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #31239   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * points:   => 0.5
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 done through a bunch of commits in puppet and update the procedure to
 remove that stage.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32473 [Metrics/Exit Scanner]: Evaluate the results from the exitmap based scanner compared to the current exit lists system

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32473: Evaluate the results from the exitmap based scanner compared to the 
current
exit lists system
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Exit Scanner  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I am now ready to ask TPA for a machine, so I guess this is done.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29624 [Metrics/Exit Scanner]: New version of exit list format

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29624: New version of exit list format
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Exit Scanner  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  irl   |Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by irl):

 * keywords:  metrics-roadmap-2019-q2 =>
 * parent:  #29650 =>


Comment:

 We would like to do this one day, but it was too ambitious to have this in
 the roadmap now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30570 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Implement per-site security settings support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30570: Implement per-site security settings support
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-9.5,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202006   |
Parent ID:  #25658   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor9
-+-

Comment (by ma1):

 Replying to [comment:22 sysrqb]:
 > Hi ma1, just FYI, we're delaying any Tor Browser work on this until
 June. We can still help with testing NoScript patches or providing
 feedback if that will be helpful until then. I'm not sure of the timeframe
 you planned for implementing the necessary changes in NoScript.

 Thank you  very much for the update. I'm confident to have my side ready
 well before June. I'll ping here as soon as there's something to check.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29654 [Metrics/Exit Scanner]: Initial MVP for new exit scanner

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29654: Initial MVP for new exit scanner
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:
 |  metrics-team
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Exit Scanner |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  metrics-roadmap-2019-q2 exitscanner  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29650   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This initial MVP is completed, and has been checked against results
 produced by the current scanner. Remainder of this work is to see it
 documented and deployed which will happen in metrics-cloud.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32265 [Metrics/Exit Scanner]: MS: Format an exit list from a previous exit list and exitmap output

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32265: MS: Format an exit list from a previous exit list and exitmap output
--+
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Exit Scanner  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29654| Points:
 Reviewer:  karsten   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This is completed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32264 [Metrics/Exit Scanner]: MS: Perform fetches of check.tpo in an exitmap plugin

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32264: MS: Perform fetches of check.tpo in an exitmap plugin
--+
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Exit Scanner  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29654| Points:
 Reviewer:  karsten   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This is completed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32262 [Metrics/Exit Scanner]: MS: Implement an ExitSpider class

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32262: MS: Implement an ExitSpider class
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Exit Scanner  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  exitscanner   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29654| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 We took an alternative approach so this task is no longer necessary.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32263 [Metrics/Exit Scanner]: MS: Implement a Tor HTTPS connection helper

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32263: MS: Implement a Tor HTTPS connection helper
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Exit Scanner  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29654| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 We took a different approach, so this task is no longer necessary.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33293 [Metrics/Exit Scanner]: Write a PowerDNS backend that serves data from a Tor Exit List

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33293: Write a PowerDNS backend that serves data from a Tor Exit List
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  task  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Exit Scanner  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by irl):

 * owner:  metrics-team => irl
 * status:  new => accepted


Comment:

 I am currently working on this.

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[tor-bugs] #33293 [Metrics/Exit Scanner]: Write a PowerDNS backend that serves data from a Tor Exit List

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33293: Write a PowerDNS backend that serves data from a Tor Exit List
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Exit Scanner  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Using one of the backends from
 https://doc.powerdns.com/authoritative/backends/index.html we will write a
 simple replacement for the TorDNSEL DNSBL service that consumes Tor Exit
 Lists and is not tightly coupled to the exit scanner service.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32391 [Internal Services/Service - nextcloud]: Purge test accounts and data from riseup in February 4, 2020

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32391: Purge test accounts and data from riseup in February 4, 2020
-+-
 Reporter:  gaba |  Owner:  micah
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service -  |Version:
  nextcloud  |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-march|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32267   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by micah):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Ok, I've disabled all the above listed users. I'll close this issue, but
 feel free to re-open it if necessary!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33132 [Community/Translations]: Swedish translation has not been added

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33132: Swedish translation has not been added
+--
 Reporter:  jony08  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Translations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  translation |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 This is quite a significant improvement. This will add new translations
 for the following locales:
 `ar`, `bn`, `en_GB`, `eu`, `id`, `is`, `ja`, `ml`, `pl`, `ro`, `ru`, `sk`,
 `ta`, `zh_TW`. And also the following updates.

 What's weird is some "existing" translations like `sv` were in the
 completed branch but all the messages were still in English.

 {{{
 For locale ca:
 For locale cs:
 24c24
 < "message": "Could not connect to the bridge."
 ---
 > "message": "Nelze se připojit k mostu."
 30c30
 < "message": "Cookies are not enabled."
 ---
 > "message": "Cookies nejsou povoleny."
 33c33
 < "message": "Snowflake is a system to defeat internet censorship.
 People who are censored can use Snowflake to access the internet. Their
 connection goes through Snowflake proxies, which are run by volunteers.
 For more detailed information about how Snowflake works see our https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/Snowflake/\";
 data-msgid=\"__MSG_docWiki__\">documentation wiki."
 ---
 > "message": "Snowflake je systém pro obcházení internetové cenzury.
 Lidé jej mohou použít pro přístup k internetu bez cenzury tak, že je
 jejich spojení vedeno přes proxy servery Snowflaku, které jsou provozované
 dobrovolníky. Podrobnější informace, jak Snowflake funguje, najdete na
 naší https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/Snowflake/\";
 data-msgid=\"__MSG_docWiki__\">wiki."
 36c36
 < "message": "documentation wiki"
 ---
 > "message": "wiki"
 42c42
 < "message": "If your internet access is censored, you should download
 https://www.torproject.org/download/\";>Tor Browser."
 ---
 > "message": "Pokud je váš přístup k internetu cenzurován, stáhněte
 si\nhttps://www.torproject.org/download/\";>Prohlížeč Tor."
 48c48
 < "message": "If your internet access is not
 censored, you should consider installing the Snowflake extension to help
 users in censored networks. There is no need to worry about which websites
 people are accessing through your proxy. Their visible browsing IP address
 will match their Tor exit node, not yours."
 ---
 > "message": "Pokud vaše připojení k internetu není
 cenzurované, zvažte instalaci rozšíření Snowflake, které pomůže
 uživatelům, kteří s cenzurou bojovat musí. Nemusíte se strachovat, jaké
 stránky lidé skrze Snowflake navštěvují. IP adresa, kterou servery uvidí,
 bude odpovídat IP adrese koncového uzlu, nikoliv vaší."
 51c51
 < "message": "Install in Firefox"
 ---
 > "message": "Nainstalovat do Firefoxu"
 54c54
 < "message": "Install in Chrome"
 ---
 > "message": "Nainstalovat do Chromu"
 57c57
 < "message": "Reporting Bugs"
 ---
 > "message": "Hlášení chyb"
 60c60
 < "message": "If you encounter problems with Snowflake as a client or
 a proxy, please consider filing a bug.  To do so, you will have to,"
 ---
 > "message": "Pokud narazíte se Snowflakem na nějaký problém, ať už
 jako klient nebo proxy, nahlaste nám ho prosím."
 63c63
 < "message": "Either https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/register\";>create an
 account or https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/login\";>log in using
 the shared cypherpunks account with password writecode."
 ---
 > "message": "Stačí si https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/register\";>založit
 účet nebo se https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/login\";>přihlásit
 sdíleným účtem cypherpunks účtem a heslem writecode."
 66c66
 < "message": "https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/newticket?component=Circumvention%2FSnowflake\";>File
 a ticket using our bug tracker."
 ---
 > "message": "https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/newticket?component=Circumvention%2FSnowflake\";>Zadat
 ticket v našem systému."
 69c69
 < "message": "Please try to be as descriptive as possible with your
 ticket and if possible include log messages that will help us reproduce
 the bug. Consider adding keywords snowflake-webextension or snowflake-client to let us know how which part of the Snowflake
 system is experiencing problems."
 ---
 > "message": "Popište prosím podrobně svůj problém a pokud je to
 možné, vložte také zprávy z protokolu, které nám pomohou chybu
 zreprodukovat. Přidejte také klíčová slova snowflake-webextension
 nebo snowflake-client abychom věděli, ve které části Snowflaku
 problém nastává."
 72c72
 <

Re: [tor-bugs] #33282 [Applications/Tor Browser]: new window: increase max width

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33282: new window: increase max width
-+-
 Reporter:  Thorin   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-fingerprinting-   |  Actual Points:
  resolution |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by Thorin):

 It would also allow extra space on the urlbar to add a button to reset
 window size to default (see #16364)

 Are you guys seeing a theme here? Or do you want MOAR reasons? :)

 ---

 Even if increasing the width to 1200 or 1400 created 3 or 6 new buckets of
 'w'x'h', those buckets still wouldn't be unique - they would be populated
 with more than enough users. In other words, it's still useless as a FPing
 measure.

 Would you like me to do an analysis on the top 300 screen resolutions? Are
 there even that many for laptops/desktops? Yes, I know factors such as
 task bars should be taken into account. If you want, I'll do one.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32283 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: fix up /etc/aliases with puppet

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32283: fix up /etc/aliases with puppet
-+-
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-february |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31239   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * owner:  tpa => anarcat
 * status:  new => accepted
 * keywords:   => tpa-roadmap-february


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32914 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: review the puppet bootstrapping process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32914: review the puppet bootstrapping process
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-february |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31239   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 >  The other part I am a bit unsure about was cloning the tsa repository.
 I rather copied over the script. It would be nice if the script could part
 of the install image.

 We need to do that for other things in the install procedure, I'd argue
 that problem is not specific to puppet, but more generally a problem with
 our install procedure in general (so part of #31239).

 That said, I'm heading towards implementing this installer as a client-
 side SSH wrapper of some sort, which talks to everything magically. In
 that sense, the puppet bootstrap script would indeed be copied onto the
 server an ran from there.

 But I think this can be considered separate from this specific procedure.

 In my mind, the only thing left to check now is to see if we really need
 this step of the new-machine installer:

 > 10. do more puppet runs, and run a ud-replicate to get ldap users, then
 more puppet runs since we now have more users:
 >
 > {{{
 > puppet agent -t
 > ud-replicate
 > puppet agent -t
 > puppet agent -t
 > }}}

 Could we possibly let this converge on its own? Maybe we could try just
 skipping that step on the next install?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33282 [Applications/Tor Browser]: new window: increase max width

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33282: new window: increase max width
-+-
 Reporter:  Thorin   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-fingerprinting-   |  Actual Points:
  resolution |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by Thorin):

 Mozilla released a study back in Jan 2018:
 https://blog.mozilla.org/data/2018/01/26/improving-privacy-without-
 breaking-the-web/

 Here is the presentation:
 
https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1OVtXAnyeBLX2N1yyZoTMP9AV_6HnI3mnXwIFlOL7yOA/
 - slide 15: 2100 users in the RFP branch (9 branches total, equal sized
 branches)
 - slide 30: look at the color strips on the RFP column (pretty sure the
 blue one is `screen`)
 - slide 32: `screen` issues was the top deal breaker .. `layout` is up
 there too
 - slide 33: **screen** is only in RFP (1 of 9 branches) and yet it was the
 top deal breaker for the entire study (see slide 32)
 - slide 41: RFP was the third highest cause of users leaving the study

 I don't exactly know what `screen` entails: could be lack of real estate:
 i.e forced new window being too small, or the browser not starting
 maximized. Look at the brouhaha that ensued when LBing was turned on.
 People are very picky about "how" things should "look" (size, position,
 etc)

 I don't browser the clearnet much in TB: but I see scrollbars a lot: for
 example a google search at 1000 wide causes a horizontal scrollbar, and
 buttons are off screen. At 1200px no scrollbar, and buttons are visible.
 - slide 26: don't break top sites (look at the email ones: this ties in
 with workflow below)

 More width helps workflow (well, to be more precise: from a tiny square to
 having some reasonable width - am I being biased here?)
 - slides 28 + 53: messing with workflow is a no-no!!

 Anyway: enjoy. Class, discuss!

 I still don't think 1200 as max is enough. I think 1400 is better. And one
 key to entropy outliers is to get more users

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32267 [Internal Services/Service - nextcloud]: move to a private nextcloud instance

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32267: move to a private nextcloud instance
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  ln5
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service -  |Version:
  nextcloud  |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 storm was decom'd, i think the only step left to finalize the launch here
 is to purge old stuff from nc.riseup.net, in #32391. that's currently
 assigned to micah but i suspect gaba will handle it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32390 [Internal Services/Service - sandstorm]: decomission storm / bracteata on February 11, 2020

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32390: decomission storm / bracteata on February 11, 2020
-+-
 Reporter:  gaba |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service -  |Version:
  sandstorm  |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-february |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32267   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 machine shutdown and data will be automatically removed from server in 7
 days, backups in 30.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32622 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix misleading STATUS_CLIENT warning message

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32622: Fix misleading STATUS_CLIENT warning message
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix anticensorship-wants|  Actual Points:
  043-should |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 Also confirmed that this happens on 0.3.5, so it's been around a while.
 So not a regression in 0.4.3.

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[tor-bugs] #33292 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Difficult Change Site Circuit After Redirect

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33292: Difficult Change Site Circuit After Redirect
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  TorBrowserTeamTriaged,
 Severity:  Normal   |  tbb-usability
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 I've hit a problem a few times over the last month a site (my intended
 destination) decides it should block my connection and then redirects me
 to another domain. In this situation, it's difficult to get a "New Circuit
 for this Site" because the browser doesn't remain on the current domain
 long enough to change the circuit.

 My assumption is that this is due to abuse coming from a specific exit
 node, and by switching circuits I'll avoid the (temporal) blocking.

 There is a not-user-friendly hack where you change `network.http
 .redirection-limit` and prevent being redirected off of the intended first
 party. However, this is not a general solution, and I don't have any
 particular better solution, either.

 As an example of this, the situation I've experienced is
 https://www.youtube.com redirecting to https://www.google.com where a
 block message is displayed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33283 [Applications/rbm]: Add caching for the exec function in rbm

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33283: Add caching for the exec function in rbm
+--
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/rbm|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202002R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:3 boklm]:
 > When running the command `rbm/rbm showconf tor-browser filename --target
 torbrowser-linux-x86_64 --target alpha` on my machine, without those
 patches it takes 3m25. With the first patch, it now takes 2m49, and 1m59
 with both patches.

 For me the times are 5m28s with no patches, and 3m50s with both patches.
 This is with having run `make fetch` beforehand.

 {{{
 # git log --oneline | head -n 1
 c27a4f7 Pick up tor-browser -build2
 # time rbm/rbm showconf tor-browser filename --target torbrowser-linux-
 x86_64 --target alpha
 tor-browser-9.5a5-linux-x86_64-0e25a4

 real5m28.603s
 user4m53.818s
 sys 0m38.330s
 # cd rbm
 # git remote add boklm https://git.torproject.org/user/boklm/rbm.git
 # git fetch boklm
 # git checkout bug_33283_v2
 # cd ..
 # time rbm/rbm showconf tor-browser filename --target torbrowser-linux-
 x86_64 --target alpha
 tor-browser-9.5a5-linux-x86_64-0e25a4

 real3m50.601s
 user3m38.372s
 sys 0m13.379s
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #33291 [Core Tor/Tor]: making the tor library size smaller

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33291: making the tor library size smaller
--+
 Reporter:  gaba  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Goal:  To reduce the size of the tor library so that applications that are
 sensitive to download size can link it easily.

 '''Possible routes'''

 1. making different parts of tor more optional/modular (like relay mode,
 dirauth mode) . Did we try this before? Is this possible?

 2. Is there a TLS stack you can link on android? Only in Java

 3. A maybe sketchy possibility is to let google to optimize code in the
 cloud...

 4. A small java implementation of core onion routing. Would applications
 be able to run it?

  * java ones, easily
  * other ones with some (considerable?) effort. JNI makes it possible, but
 not necessarily so easy.

 5. libssl - 600kb is the shared library. The Guardian Project's
 experiments on making a smaller binary:
 __[https://github.com/guardianproject/tor-android/issues/18
 https://github.com/guardianproject/tor-android/issues/18]__

 Anything else?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33287 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Bug on Tor for Android on bridge settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33287: Bug on Tor for Android on bridge settings
---+---
 Reporter:  angrilymushroom|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTriaged, tbb-mobile  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  bridge, bug, android, ip, address => TorBrowserTriaged, tbb-
 mobile
 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Hi,

 Thanks for reporting this! Do you see this happen every time you edit the
 text fields and press Enter or Back buttons?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31179 [Core Tor/Tor]: Eliminate non tor_queue.h linked lists.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31179: Eliminate non tor_queue.h linked lists.
--+---
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  8
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 duplicate of #7479

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7479 [Core Tor/Tor]: Replace more linked lists with queue.h implementations

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7479: Replace more linked lists with queue.h implementations
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay refactoring easy intro |  Actual Points:
  technical-debt |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * keywords:  tor-relay refactoring easy intro => tor-relay refactoring easy
 intro technical-debt


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Re: [tor-bugs] #7479 [Core Tor/Tor]: Replace more linked lists with queue.h implementations

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7479: Replace more linked lists with queue.h implementations
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay refactoring easy intro  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * cc: teor (added)


Comment:

 #31179 is a duplicate

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31074 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use tor_queue.h macros in config_line_t

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31074: Use tor_queue.h macros in config_line_t
--+--
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  refactor, technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #7479 | Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by catalyst):

 * parent:  #31179 => #7479


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33288 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: forrestii/fpcentral still has stretch packages (mongodb)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33288: forrestii/fpcentral still has stretch packages (mongodb)
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:
 |  cypherpunks
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance and   |Version:
  Testing|
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * cc: tbb-team, boklm (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #7030 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: build automation for custom tbb build process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7030: build automation for custom tbb build process
-+-
 Reporter:  phobos   |  Owner:
 |  cypherpunks
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance and   |Version:
  Testing|
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  SponsorJ, needs-triage   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 I think this is something about old tbb build process (from 7 years ago),
 so not relevant anymore.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19251 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser might want to have an error page specific to when .onion links fail

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19251: TorBrowser might want to have an error page specific to when .onion 
links
fail
---+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam202002  |  Actual Points:  3.9
Parent ID:  #30025 | Points:  6
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor27-must
---+---

Comment (by mcs):

 It seems that the error pages (about:netError) do not currently support a
 dark theme; at least on macOS, the colors used on that page do not change
 when in dark mode. Kathy and I cannot find a Bugzilla bug for that issue,
 but we think we should skip dark theme support for now.

 We tried using the `Grey 90 a80` color, but we need to avoid transparency.
 With transparency, the Browser/Network/Onionsite images show through the
 circles that surround the checkmark and (x) icons, and the Onionsite image
 is not a consistent color (apparently, some of the paths within the SVG
 overlap). Here is what it looks like with `Grey 70` (no transparency);
 Kathy and I think the result is close to your mockup:

 [[Image(https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/raw-
 attachment/ticket/19251/error-0xF0-rev2.png, 700px)]]

 What do you think?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32390 [Internal Services/Service - sandstorm]: decomission storm / bracteata on February 11, 2020

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32390: decomission storm / bracteata on February 11, 2020
-+-
 Reporter:  gaba |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service -  |Version:
  sandstorm  |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-february |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32267   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 host retirement checklist:

  1. announced long ago, here
  2. shutdown scheduled for now +5min
  3. undefined
  4. done:
 {{{
 root@unifolium:~# echo rm -r /srv/vmstore/bracteata.torproject.org | at
 now + 7 days
 warning: commands will be executed using /bin/sh
 job 1 at Wed Feb 19 20:04:00 2020
 }}}
  5. TODO

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28145 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: Add support/Tor Browser Manual links and mission statement

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28145: TBA: Add support/Tor Browser Manual links and mission statement
-+-
 Reporter:  pili |  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-parity, tbb-9.5a6,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202002   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-parity, tbb-9.5a5, TorBrowserTeam202002 =>
 tbb-mobile, tbb-parity, tbb-9.5a6, TorBrowserTeam202002
 * owner:  tbb-team => sysrqb
 * status:  new => assigned
 * cc: tbb-team (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19251 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser might want to have an error page specific to when .onion links fail

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19251: TorBrowser might want to have an error page specific to when .onion 
links
fail
---+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam202002  |  Actual Points:  3.9
Parent ID:  #30025 | Points:  6
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor27-must
---+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * Attachment "error-0xF0-rev2.png" added.

 0xF0 error page (WIP)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32391 [Internal Services/Service - nextcloud]: Purge test accounts and data from riseup in February 4, 2020

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32391: Purge test accounts and data from riseup in February 4, 2020
-+-
 Reporter:  gaba |  Owner:  micah
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service -  |Version:
  nextcloud  |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-march|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32267   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * owner:  gaba => micah


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32391 [Internal Services/Service - nextcloud]: Purge test accounts and data from riseup in February 4, 2020

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32391: Purge test accounts and data from riseup in February 4, 2020
-+-
 Reporter:  gaba |  Owner:  gaba
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service -  |Version:
  nextcloud  |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-march|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32267   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gaba):

 micah: you can remove Tor users from nc.riseup.net whenever you can/want.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31074 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use tor_queue.h macros in config_line_t

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31074: Use tor_queue.h macros in config_line_t
--+--
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  refactor, technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31179| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by catalyst):

 * parent:   => #31179


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33277 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: adopt puppetlabs apt module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33277: adopt puppetlabs apt module
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-february |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  reopened => merge_ready


Comment:

 pushed all our code upstream and merged it in my master branch. we should
 be good insofar as upstream will hopefully merge our stuff.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32390 [Internal Services/Service - sandstorm]: decomission storm / bracteata on February 11, 2020

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32390: decomission storm / bracteata on February 11, 2020
-+-
 Reporter:  gaba |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service -  |Version:
  sandstorm  |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-february |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32267   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * owner:  hiro => anarcat
 * status:  new => accepted


Comment:

 taking this on now, storm is going down!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32978 [Metrics]: Find a working alternative to using MaxMind's GeoLite2 databases

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32978: Find a working alternative to using MaxMind's GeoLite2 databases
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 What is the new geoip source? I am dumping a much larger quantity of IP's
 through a differ and alt source check. Thanks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33290 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add diagnostics for confusing corruption issue #32564 in ewma

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33290: Add diagnostics for confusing corruption issue #32564 in ewma
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-should backport?  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  #32564| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:1 nickm]:
 > Branches are ticket33290_{041,042,043,master}.  I am recommending that
 we try this out in 043 first, so here is an 043 PR:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1729 .

 Is there a way to stop the compiler from optimizing away the dead store to
 `pol->base_.magic = 0xDEAD901C;` right before it gets freed?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28704 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Compile Tor and dependencies on our own for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28704: Compile Tor and dependencies on our own for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  sisbell
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202002R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 Replying to [comment:24 eighthave]:


 > One thought that recently struck me is that loading shared libraries
 works easily in Java space.  The LD_LIBRARY_PATH stuff is automatically
 handled when loading using `System.load()`, or you can load using the full
 path using `System.loadLibrary()`.  But that means running all bits that
 need that shared library via Android/Java methods, e.g. not as daemons.
 IMHO that's the right direction for the future anyway.

 Yes, I agree. After getting this initial version in, I think we should
 start looking at JNI, which will give us the option of loading the shared
 libraries through Java.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #32537, #21404, #27105, #30432, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #32537, #21404, #27105, #30432, #28876, #27137, #30431, 
#30340, #28665, #30339, #30333, #28798, #22854, #23386, #27120, #28520, #17662, 
#26149, #22058, #20149, #20254, #6585, #20443 by sysrqb:


Comment:
Release Train Migration.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32564 [Core Tor/Tor]: Assertion pol->magic failed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32564: Assertion pol->magic failed
+--
 Reporter:  Logforme|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  assert crash backport 043-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_information


Comment:

 Unless somebody else has insight here, I'm going to have to hope that the
 diagnostic patch in #33290 finds something.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32564 [Core Tor/Tor]: Assertion pol->magic failed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32564: Assertion pol->magic failed
+--
 Reporter:  Logforme|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  assert crash backport 043-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  nickm => (none)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #7030 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: build automation for custom tbb build process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7030: build automation for custom tbb build process
-+-
 Reporter:  phobos   |  Owner:
 |  cypherpunks
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance and   |Version:
  Testing|
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorJ, needs-triage   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Is this still relevant?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33290 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add diagnostics for confusing corruption issue #32564 in ewma

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33290: Add diagnostics for confusing corruption issue #32564 in ewma
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-should backport?  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  #32564| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Branches are ticket33290_{041,042,043,master}.  I am recommending that we
 try this out in 043 first, so here is an 043 PR:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1729 .

 Note that there was a merge conflict on the 043 merge.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32360 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rethink fix for #31564

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32360: Rethink fix for #31564
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202006,|  Actual Points:
  fenixmigration |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202006, ReleaseTrainMigration =>
 TorBrowserTeam202006, fenixmigration


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32360 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rethink fix for #31564

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32360: Rethink fix for #31564
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202006,|  Actual Points:
  ReleaseTrainMigration  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202006 => TorBrowserTeam202006,
 ReleaseTrainMigration


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[tor-bugs] #33290 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add diagnostics for confusing corruption issue #32564 in ewma

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33290: Add diagnostics for confusing corruption issue #32564 in ewma
--+--
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  043-should backport?
Actual Points:  .1|  Parent ID:  #32564
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 I haven't been able to figure out why we might be hitting #32564, so the
 logical solution is to try to make the diagnosis better if it happens.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32564 [Core Tor/Tor]: Assertion pol->magic failed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32564: Assertion pol->magic failed
+--
 Reporter:  Logforme|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  assert crash backport 043-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by nickm):

 So, there is only one kind of `circuitmux_policy_circ_data_t` in 0.4.1.x,
 so we don't need to worry about the case where this is another kind of
 data.  The pointer here is either:

   * An invalid pointer that is not pointing to an ewma_policy_circ_data_t.
   * A stale pointer that used to point to an ewma_policy_circ_data_t which
 has been freed.
   * A pointer that points to an ewma_policy_circ_data_t which has gotten
 corrupt.

 But I can't find plausible vectors for any of these things to happen.
 Because of the infrequency of this bug, I am almost tempted to suspect
 faulty memory, but that should always be a last-resort hypothesis.

 The best I can figure out here right now is to add a diagnostic patch.
 I'll open a child ticket.

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