Re: [tor-bugs] #32434 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Get build changes needed for RLBox into tor-browser-build

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32434: Get build changes needed for RLBox into tor-browser-build
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-security, GeorgKoppen202001, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202002R  |
Parent ID:  #32389   | Points:
 Reviewer:  boklm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * parent:  #32379 => #32389


Comment:

 I think we are done here. The remaining bits for the build changes will be
 handled in #32389.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32389 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Sandbox Graphite using RLBox for Linux (was: Sandbox Graphite using RLBox)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32389: Sandbox Graphite using RLBox for Linux
-+--
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, GeorgKoppen202002  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32379   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32389 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Sandbox Graphite using RLBox for Linux

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32389: Sandbox Graphite using RLBox for Linux
-+--
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, GeorgKoppen202002  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32379   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gk):

 * owner:  tbb-team => gk
 * cc: tbb-team (added)
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32380 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Get current Tor Browser code ready for RLBox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32380: Get current Tor Browser code ready for RLBox
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, GeorgKoppen202002, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202002R  |
Parent ID:  #32379   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * owner:  tbb-team => gk
 * cc: tbb-team (added)
 * status:  needs_review => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32380 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Get current Tor Browser code ready for RLBox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32380: Get current Tor Browser code ready for RLBox
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, GeorgKoppen202002, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202002R  |
Parent ID:  #32379   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33478 [Applications/Tor Browser]: DisableNetwork is set

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33478: DisableNetwork is set
--+--
 Reporter:  nomadslaw1|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  DisableNetwork is set |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pili):

 * owner:  ggus => tbb-team
 * version:  Tor: unspecified =>
 * component:  Community/Tor Support => Applications/Tor Browser


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25713 [Core Tor/Tor]: "DisableNetwork is set" log message in Tor Browser scares/confuses users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25713: "DisableNetwork is set" log message in Tor Browser scares/confuses users
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, 040-deferred-20190220, ex-  |  Actual Points:
  sponsor-19, ex-sponsor19   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pili):

 #33478 has this issue also

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33478 [Applications/Tor Browser]: DisableNetwork is set

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33478: DisableNetwork is set
--+--
 Reporter:  nomadslaw1|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  DisableNetwork is set |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by pili):

 Hi,

 I think the DisableNetwork message is misleading (see #25713)

 It sounds like access to the tor network is censored where you are. If you
 are already using bridges and these are not working you may want to
 request new ones. You will find more information about this at
 https://bridges.torproject.org/ or by emailing brid...@torproject.org

 You can also find more details in our [https://tb-
 manual.torproject.org/circumvention/ Tor Browser Manual]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26505 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "Prevent accessibility services from accessing your browser" should = true

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26505: "Prevent accessibility services from accessing your browser" should = 
true
--+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:  ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Related comment on Tor Browser 9.0 blog post:
 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/284760#comment-284760

 https://www.mozilla.org/en-
 US/security/advisories/mfsa2019-33/#CVE-2019-11758

 The blog comment suggests adding an option on first start or install.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30556 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Re-evaluate letterboxing dimension choices

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30556: Re-evaluate letterboxing dimension choices
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Many comments about this are in the blog posts for 9.0.x and alphas. For
 example, https://blog.torproject.org/comment/285096#comment-285096

 https://blog.torproject.org/aggregation-feed-types/tbb-90

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32324 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Introduce Letterboxing to users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32324: Introduce Letterboxing to users
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-9.0-issues, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202006   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 TB previously displayed a yellow bar warning after maximizing the window.

 From comment:22:ticket:7255:
 > "Maximizing Tor Browser can allow websites to determine information
 about your monitor size, which can be used to track you. We recommend you
 leave Tor Browser windows in their original default size. [OK]"

 It was disabled in #31598.

 Why not bring that back but have a letterboxing message? It could pop up
 once per New Identity if the letterbox border is displayed or is larger
 than the web content dimensions. It could have an internal preference
 count to display it once per New Identity up to 3 times, similar to what
 the yellow bar did.

 See also:
 * https://blog.torproject.org/comment/284674#comment-284674
 * https://blog.torproject.org/comment/283036#comment-283036
 * https://blog.torproject.org/comment/284915#comment-284915 (last
 paragraph)
 * But watch out for:
 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/283040#comment-283040

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33035 [Applications/Tor Browser]: create strings for onion service error pages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33035: create strings for onion service error pages
--+
 Reporter:  brade |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:  0.25
Parent ID:  #19251| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+

Comment (by antonela):

 I'm sorry the NC file glitched :( Thanks for putting it back mcs, brade!

 Looks good for me. Let's see what asn says.

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[tor-bugs] #33479 [Applications/Tor Browser]: PDF fullscreen Presentation Mode doesn't letterbox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33479: PDF fullscreen Presentation Mode doesn't letterbox
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 1. Open a PDF file in a new tab so it opens in the browser's internal PDF
 viewer. Here's one.
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/company/policies.git/plain/corpdocs/IRS-
 Determination-Letter.pdf
 2. Click the 4-outward-arrows (fullscreen?) icon on the PDF toolbar. Its
 tooltip when you hover on it says, "Switch to Presentation Mode"
 3. Observe that Presentation Mode is not letterboxed.

 PDF Presentation Mode is distinct from browser full screen (F11 key) and
 from maximize.

 Is this exploitable at all?  Is the internal PDF API fingerprintable?  Tor
 Browser warns when downloading to not open files in external viewers that
 could circumvent Tor.

 Similar vectors:
 * #32713, Letterboxing doesn't work when fullscreening videos
 * #12609, HTML5 fullscreen API makes TB fingerprintable

 Inspired by:
 * https://blog.torproject.org/comment/286752#comment-286752

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[tor-bugs] #33480 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create a plan for releasing an update when Apple's notarization service is not available

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33480: Create a plan for releasing an update when Apple's notarization service 
is
not available
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Last year Apple introduced "notarization" into their app-signing process.
 We integrated this into our release process in #30126. However, our
 current process assumes Apple's notarization service is highly-available.
 This is not always true, and in our experience it has frequent outages or
 slowness (but maybe we just have really bad timing).

 In our current release flow, as a result of our release process assuming
 notarization is "quick", we wait for Apple to notarize each package and
 then "staple" the notarization into each dmg. After this is completed, we
 regenerate the macOS mar files and then compute the hash of all of the
 signed packages (and then sign all of the individual files).

 I wonder if we can think about these last three steps again, particularly
 in a situation where we must get out an update as quickly as possible (I'm
 thinking like a chemspill).

 1. If we don't staple the notarization, then we can code-sign (gatekeeper)
 the packages and then continue with the remaining release steps (recreate
 mars and incrementals, signmars, hash, gpg sign) in parallel with waiting
 for notarization from Apple.
 1. We split the release between Windows/Linux/Android and macOS, where we
 release updates for the former platforms initially and we release updates
 for macOS when the packages are ready. This would require "teaching" some
 of our scripts if they should operate over al platforms or only a subset
 of them.

 The main disadvantage of (1) is that all macOS users will query Apple for
 checking the update's notarization. We want to limit the amount of
 information Apple learns about our users, and this enumeration is not
 good.

 The main disadvantage of (2) is additional complexity in our build/release
 process. Maybe the webserver's config needs changing, too?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32380 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Get current Tor Browser code ready for RLBox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32380: Get current Tor Browser code ready for RLBox
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, GeorgKoppen202002, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202002R  |
Parent ID:  #32379   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 I just pushed `bug_32380_v13` which contains an additional patch (the one
 for bug 1607278), which I forgot and I think we should have.

 Taking the list of commits from above it is placed between the ones for
 bug 1606625 and 1606739, like so:
 {{{
 1606625 (d98002172b0fa3d3a9dd7f458d39c385f84d91e8) x
 1607278 (b0977482bc37d5c703bda5df5e72fd1e15b95a20) x
 1606739 (a95697631f69fdb1cd2ca8a5024a14099a6668eb) x
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33479 [Applications/Tor Browser]: PDF fullscreen Presentation Mode doesn't letterbox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33479: PDF fullscreen Presentation Mode doesn't letterbox
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by tom):

 I don't think it's exploitable but I'm not certain.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33014 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor hs configuration parsing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33014: Refactor hs configuration parsing
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, scaling, onionbalance, tor-  |  Actual Points:  .3
  spec, network-team-roadmap-2020Q1, 044-must|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * actualpoints:   => .3


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33014 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor hs configuration parsing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33014: Refactor hs configuration parsing
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, scaling, onionbalance, tor-  |  Actual Points:
  spec, network-team-roadmap-2020Q1, 044-must|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I've got `hs_options_modernize` working, and it makes the hs config
 functions far less loop-driven. I'll want to rebase it on #33460 once that
 is merged, however, so that there isn't a usability regression.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19251 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser might want to have an error page specific to when .onion links fail

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19251: TorBrowser might want to have an error page specific to when .onion 
links
fail
---+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  enhancement| Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam202002  |  Actual Points:  5
Parent ID:  #30025 | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  acat,pospeselr |Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor27-must
---+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam202002R => ux-team,
   TorBrowserTeam202002


Comment:

 I am taking this out of review for now because Kathy and I found a bug in
 the browser patch (in
 `browser/components/onionservices/content/authUtil.jsm` the reference to
 `this.string.clientAuthMissingTopic` needs to be replaced with
 `this.topic.clientAuthMissingTopic`). Hopefully we will have the English
 strings soon (from #33035) so we can put them in a revised patch as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32389 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Sandbox Graphite using RLBox for Linux

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32389: Sandbox Graphite using RLBox for Linux
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, GeorgKoppen202002, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202002R  |
Parent ID:  #32379   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * keywords:  tbb-security, GeorgKoppen202002 => tbb-security,
 GeorgKoppen202002, TorBrowserTeam202002R


Comment:

 `bug_32389_v8` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_32389_v8&id=6402b4ce975647e263611c49183456930dae461b)
 has the patch for review which is enabling RLBox for Graphite on Linux
 x86_64.

 As we talked on IRC I've included all the patches I backported in #32380
 into a separate directory, `rlbox-patches`, in the `firefox` project. The
 commit message explains a bit why.

 An additional thing to note: I had to install `git` to apply the one huge
 patch for a couple of reasons. For one, `patch` on Wheezy does not cope
 with `git` renaming patches. That feature is only starting with version
 2.7 but the one on Wheezy 2.6.1 (backports did not seem to change that
 story). Then I thought, okay, let's do `git format-patch --no-renames`
 instead and use the larger patch with `patch`. The problem now is that
 `patch` does not deal with empty files (it does not create them) which
 breaks the build. I then decided to resort to `git apply` and just added
 `git` as a dependency to all the other ones for Linux x86_64 to not just
 create a container for RLBox and have further container inflation.

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[tor-bugs] #33481 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update lucetc for RLBox on macOS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33481: Update lucetc for RLBox on macOS
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-security,
 Severity:  Normal   |  GeorgKoppen202002
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #33410
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We need to update our `lucetc` project for RLBox on macOS. We'll bump the
 version to what Mozilla is using for their `lucetc` build on taskcluster

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[tor-bugs] #33482 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update about:tor donate string

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33482: Update about:tor donate string
--+--
 Reporter:  antonela  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ux-team
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Sarah suggested:
 "On about:Tor instead of “Keep Tor Strong” how about something like, “Tor
 is free to use because of donations from people like you. Donate Now.”?"
 [i like it! -steph]

 I attached a mockup.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33482 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update about:tor donate string

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33482: Update about:tor donate string
--+--
 Reporter:  antonela  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "about_tor_95.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33035 [Applications/Tor Browser]: create strings for onion service error pages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33035: create strings for onion service error pages
--+
 Reporter:  brade |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:  0.25
Parent ID:  #19251| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:17 antonela]:
 > So, when we started to work on this task, we talked about to offer
 recovery paths for users who were experiencing the less happy user flow by
 getting any of these errors.
 >
 > Our main call to action here is `Try Again`. Can we verify if `Try
 Again` is the best recovery path for all these errors? Should any of those
 problems encourage another more successful path for recovery?

 Kathy and I did some thinking about this, and we do not think it makes
 sense to offer a `Try Again` button for 0xF6 (typo in .onion address). We
 are unsure about 0xF1 and would appreciate input from the network team.
 For all of the other errors it makes sense to provide a `Try Again`
 button.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30726 [Core Tor/sbws]: Missing relay keys in bandwidth file spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30726: Missing relay keys in bandwidth file spec
-+---
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-spec, sbws-roadmap  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33121   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  ahf, gk  |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => ahf, gk


Comment:

 putting this ticket to needs review because i've some questions.

 i realized that there are keys in the spec like `desc_bw_average`, that
 was never named like that in sbws, it was named `desc_bw_avg`, that's why
 the last one is missing in the spec, it was a mistake when writing the
 spec.

 Should we leave them as they are for version 1.2 and add the correct names
 in version 1.5? ,and remove `desc_bw_average` from the sbws examples in
 the Annexes?

 and the keys that were missing, should we also say that we add them in
 version 1.5 even if they were in sbws time ago?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30726 [Core Tor/Tor]: Missing relay keys in bandwidth file spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30726: Missing relay keys in bandwidth file spec
-+---
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-spec, sbws-roadmap  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33121   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  ahf, gk  |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by juga):

 * component:  Core Tor/sbws => Core Tor/Tor


Comment:

 This is about the spec, so component is Tor

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30899 [Core Tor/sbws]: Include the commit hash in the sbws version

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30899: Include the commit hash in the sbws version
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  sbws-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  ahf|Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32532 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Install ZNC on Chives, make pastly admin it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32532: Install ZNC on Chives, make pastly admin it
-+
 Reporter:  pastly   |  Owner:  pastly
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I finally went through the motions of adding a user so I could document
 it. I did. I pushed it to project/help/wiki.git on the master branch and
 the page has automatically updated.

 I added the bouncer to the services page like arma suggested.

 I am going to open a new ticket about the bouncer going down.

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[tor-bugs] #33483 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Why did ZNC go down? How to prevent in future?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33483: Why did ZNC go down? How to prevent in future?
-+-
 Reporter:  pastly   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 ZNC went down last week. Luckily people knew to contact me so I could log
 in and bring it back.

 As far as I can tell, it should have come back up; the word "enabled" on
 the Loaded line tells me that.

 {{{
 ircbouncer@chives:~$ systemctl --user status znc
 ● znc.service - ZNC IRC bouncer service
Loaded: loaded (/home/ircbouncer/.config/systemd/user/znc.service;
 enabled; vendor preset: enabled)
Active: active (running) since Fri 2020-02-21 14:51:10 UTC; 1 weeks 0
 days ago
  Main PID: 32354 (znc)
CGroup: /user.slice/user-1579.slice/user@1579.service/znc.service
└─32354 /usr/bin/znc --foreground
 }}}

 I think I should be able to do the following in order to access ZNC's logs
 myself, but can't. I do not know enough about systemd to know if I'm
 making a silly mistake/assumption or otherwise missing something obvious.

 {{{
 # This is how I'd normally do it on my own servers, but as root.
 # Not surprised this doesn't work
 ircbouncer@chives:~$ journalctl -eu znc.service
 Hint: You are currently not seeing messages from other users and the
 system.
   Users in the 'systemd-journal' group can see all messages. Pass -q
 to
   turn off this notice.
 No journal files were opened due to insufficient permissions.

 # But after a skim of the man page, I would assume something like
 # the following commands to work. None of them do.
 # They all output the same as above.

 ircbouncer@chives:~$ journalctl --user-unit znc
 ircbouncer@chives:~$ journalctl --user
 ircbouncer@chives:~$ journalctl --user --user-unit znc

 }}}

 Here is the znc.service file

 {{{
 [Unit]
 Description=ZNC IRC bouncer service

 [Service]
 Type=simple
 ExecStart=/usr/bin/znc --foreground

 [Install]
 WantedBy=multi-user.target
 }}}

 Maybe it needs to depend on networking to be up already?

 I'm at a loss and have no logs to help me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33369 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor Manual:Add TOC and Cross-Reference links

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33369: Tor Manual:Add TOC and Cross-Reference links
-+-
 Reporter:  swati|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  documentation, tor-client, manpage,  |  implemented
  gsod   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst, nickm  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * keywords:  documentation, tor-client, manpage => documentation, tor-
 client, manpage, gsod


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[tor-bugs] #33484 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Update expired PGP key in LDAP

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33484: Update expired PGP key in LDAP
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Hello!

 I messed up and forgot to update my PGP key before it expired. I have
 bumped the expiry date with 6 months and pushed the key to the keyservers.
 I haven't had a chance to get some signatures on my new key that I'm
 trying to transition to so I will wait with moving to that until I have
 some TPO folks that have signed it.

 Would it be possible to have the current key refreshed in LDAP? :-)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33481 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update lucetc for RLBox on macOS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33481: Update lucetc for RLBox on macOS
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, GeorgKoppen202002, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202002R  |
Parent ID:  #33410   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * keywords:  tbb-security, GeorgKoppen202002 => tbb-security,
 GeorgKoppen202002, TorBrowserTeam202002R


Comment:

 `bug_33481_v2` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_33481_v2&id=9518bdec20bb0a9ca5e028ca57614dc43e7ef7be)
 has a patch for review. The Linux bundle I am testing is not exploding,
 thus I think this looks good to go.

 The patch is on top of my `bug_32389_v8`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33481 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update lucetc for RLBox on macOS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33481: Update lucetc for RLBox on macOS
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, GeorgKoppen202002, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202002R  |
Parent ID:  #33410   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 A sightly better patch (the same as before but this time the commit is
 signed) is on my `bug_33410_v3` branch
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_33410_v3&id=c4491d3f3cf9d971eaba041e50647921cb3c0892).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33410 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use RLBox for sandboxing Graphite on macOS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33410: Use RLBox for sandboxing Graphite on macOS
-+--
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, GeorgKoppen202002  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32379   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by gk):

 Similarly to what I did in #32380 here come the commits/Mozilla bugs I
 considered according to when they landed on `mozilla-central` (oldest
 first):
 {{{
 1610994 (77d72088ad9a86b3942d64f4d77d3e9460e00baf) (x)
 1615201 (5e113e2cf961f76fd42a09e80c05eb7d21778e5c) (okay to leave out)
 1610991 (4fbd7a0f7c66b8b1356b3ba337658b0222acda77) (can skip)
 1610986 (a3d8f9303d2d859785409cc285022c104b2a17d9) (okay to leave out)
 (part 1)
 1610986 (9df9f90a4ac17db7a0a8f2edc201fb644e99e738) (x) (part 2)
 1610986 (3f2d9684cba9974a7b0554fe7f6e346ea63a90ea) (x) (part 3)
 1610986 (b5ec5b84be405ef930aec26cec4d9453deef34ff) (x) (part 4)
 1615595 (543b59831b33e7b7aab0f268e21b22d5493a9cd9) (okay to leave out)
 1615786 (826acb823b21570c9ee4dd45d7a3fe9a732cfe4e) (x)
 1610149 (017d4d5cdf2a8013f373528b989bb38acc8f0581) (x) (part 1)
 1610149 (9871aad8ea0fca48b4a9dc297beaca9b3db89429) (x) (part 2)
 1610149 (4cbe8542acee1486bdcc11d0b1593894dc1574d6) (okay to leave out)
 }}}
 As before I just picked the ones with "x" and the other were strictly
 speaking no *browser* patches we needed (e.g. I bumped the `lucetc`
 version in our `tor-browser-build` repo in #33410). The result is on
 `bug_33410_v2` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/log/?h=bug_33410_v2) up for review.

 I leave the ticket state as-is for now as I hope I can put up the final
 patch for our `tor-browser-build` repo, too, in this ticket, so that we
 have everything in one ticket this time.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28005 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Officially support onions in HTTPS-Everywhere

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28005: Officially support onions in HTTPS-Everywhere
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, https-everywhere, network-   |  Actual Points:  15
  team-roadmap-november, network-team-roadmap-   |
  2020Q1, TorBrowserTeam202002, ux-team  |
Parent ID:  #30029   | Points:  20
 Reviewer:  mcs, sysrqb, antonela|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by legind):

 https://github.com/EFForg/https-everywhere/pull/18994 creates a
 `get_simple_rules_ending_with` message handle returns an array of simple
 rules, which Tor can use to reverse-lookup `.tor.onion` addresses.

 Example from Chrome HTTPSE popup console with the above update channel
 installed:

 {{{
 chrome.runtime.sendMessage({type: "get_simple_rules_ending_with", object:
 ".tor.onion"}, rules => console.log(rules));

 undefined
 VM51:1 [{…}]0: from_regex:
 "/^http[s]?:\/\/nytimes.securedrop.tor.onion\//"host:
 "nytimes.securedrop.tor.onion"scope_regex:
 "/^https?:\/\/[a-z0-9-]+(?:\.[a-z0-9-]+)*\.securedrop\.tor\.onion\//"to:
 "https://nyttips4bmquxfzw.onion/"__proto__: Objectlength: 1__proto__:
 Array(0)
 }}}

 This works currently in the pure JS implementation of the RuleSets, and
 I've also added it to the WASM code so that when/if Tor Browser enables
 WASM in extensions this will not cause breakage.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33346 [Core Tor/Tor]: Seccomp soft fail (no write) in 0.4.2.6

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33346: Seccomp soft fail (no write) in 0.4.2.6
-+-
 Reporter:  subjectfrosting  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  0.4.2.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy? 035-backport 041-backport  |  Actual Points:  .1
  042-backport 043-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by subjectfrosting):

 Hi nickm, thanks for the response!

 Good news: the crash is fixed.

 Bad news: other issues came up: Tor can't write to its data directory
 /var/lib/tor/data.
 Runs fine still with Sandbox 0.

 Let me know if I need to do more experimentation :)


 Tor log:
 {{{
 Tor[4561]: Parsing GEOIP IPv4 file /usr/share/tor/geoip.
 Tor[4561]: Parsing GEOIP IPv6 file /usr/share/tor/geoip6.
 Tor[4561]: Bootstrapped 0% (starting): Starting
 Tor[4561]: Could not open "/var/lib/tor/data/cached-certs": Operation not
 permitted
 Tor[4561]: Could not open "/var/lib/tor/data/cached-consensus" for mmap():
 Operation not permitted
 Tor[4561]: Could not open "/var/lib/tor/data/unverified-consensus" for
 mmap(): Operation not permitted
 Tor[4561]: Could not open "/var/lib/tor/data/cached-microdesc-consensus"
 for mmap(): Operation not permitted
 Tor[4561]: Could not open "/var/lib/tor/data/unverified-microdesc-
 consensus" for mmap(): Operation not permitted
 Tor[4561]: Could not open "/var/lib/tor/data/cached-microdescs" for
 mmap(): Operation not permitted
 Tor[4561]: Could not open "/var/lib/tor/data/cached-microdescs.new":
 Operation not permitted
 Tor[4561]: Could not open "/var/lib/tor/data/cached-descriptors" for
 mmap(): Operation not permitted
 Tor[4561]: Could not open "/var/lib/tor/data/cached-extrainfo" for mmap():
 Operation not permitted
 Tor[4561]: Starting with guard context "default"
 Tor[4561]: Couldn't open "/var/lib/tor/data/state.tmp"
 (/var/lib/tor/data/state) for writing: Operation not permitted
 Tor[4561]: Unable to write state to file "/var/lib/tor/data/state"; will
 try again later
 Tor[4561]: Bootstrapped 5% (conn): Connecting to a relay
 Tor[4561]: Bootstrapped 10% (conn_done): Connected to a relay
 Tor[4561]: Bootstrapped 14% (handshake): Handshaking with a relay
 Tor[4561]: Bootstrapped 15% (handshake_done): Handshake with a relay done
 Tor[4561]: Bootstrapped 20% (onehop_create): Establishing an encrypted
 directory connection
 Tor[4561]: Bootstrapped 25% (requesting_status): Asking for networkstatus
 consensus
 Tor[4561]: Bootstrapped 30% (loading_status): Loading networkstatus
 consensus
 Tor[4561]: Couldn't open "/var/lib/tor/data/unverified-microdesc-
 consensus.tmp" (/var/lib/tor/data/unverified-microdesc-consensus) for
 writing: Operation not permitted
 Tor[4561]: I learned some more directory information, but not enough to
 build a circuit: We have no usable consensus.
 Tor[4561]: Bootstrapped 40% (loading_keys): Loading authority key certs
 Tor[4561]: Couldn't open "/var/lib/tor/data/cached-certs.tmp"
 (/var/lib/tor/data/cached-certs) for writing: Operation not permitted
 Tor[4561]: Error writing certificates to disk.
 Tor[4561]: Could not open "/var/lib/tor/data/unverified-microdesc-
 consensus" for mmap(): Operation not permitted
 Tor[4561]: I learned some more directory information, but not enough to
 build a circuit: We have no usable consensus.
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33189 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Plan for increase in CiviCRM email send rate

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33189: Plan for increase in CiviCRM email send rate
-+-
 Reporter:  richarde |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by richarde):

 We're starting shortly. Thank you!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33448 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Migrate IP address of polyanthum.torproject.org (BridgeDB)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33448: Migrate IP address of polyanthum.torproject.org (BridgeDB)
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-february |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33085   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dcf):

 I don't expect there will be any problems with Moat, as long as the
 bridges.torproject.org DNS record is updated to match. The CDN looks up
 the origin server using the DNS name bridges.torproject.org.

 I'm not involved with any of the Moat domain fronting setup, but here are
 some related tickets: #27469, #27392, #16650.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33355 [Metrics]: Release Onionoo 8.0-1.25.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33355: Release Onionoo 8.0-1.25.0
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by starlight):

 did 1-month rs history graph start working as a result?  excellent
 feature, ty!

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