Re: [tor-bugs] #30726 [Core Tor/Tor]: Missing relay keys in bandwidth file spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30726: Missing relay keys in bandwidth file spec
-+---
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-spec, sbws-roadmap  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33121   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  ahf, gk  |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:9 juga]:
 > Replying to [comment:7 gk]:
 >
 > > So, all of those examples look to me like spec bugs: the right thing
 happened in the code, but the spec does not reflect that and thus needs to
 get updated.
 >
 > Yes.
 > And i think the source of true for the version and when the KeyValues
 appeared should be the bandwidth files published by the bwauths, because
 with sbws happens that:
 > - we change KeyValues
 > - we change the specification version in sbws
 > - we make a new sbws release (and usually bwauths have run only
 releases, except longclaw a couple of times)
 > - the new version spec and the KeyValues start to appear in the
 bandwidth files
 > - we change some more KeyValues (if there's no bwauth running a non-
 released version, they're still publishing the last specification version
 > - new specification change, new sbws release, bwauths update sbws
 version (and therefore KeyValues and specification version)...
 >
 > So i should check the collector to be sure about the which keys were in
 which versions

 Sounds good.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33131 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: buf->datalen >= 0x7fffffff

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33131: Bug: buf->datalen >= 0x7fff
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.2.5
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 The `at_most` value might be way too high. Initial patch here:

 https://gitgud.io/onionk/tor/compare/master...inbufoverflow1

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28081 [Core Tor/Tor]: rust protover discards all votes if one is not UTF-8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28081: rust protover discards all votes if one is not UTF-8
-+-
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, protover,  |  Actual Points:
  035-deferred-20190115, 041-proposed, 033   |
  -unreached-backport|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:16 teor]:
 > Ideally, the votes should be rejected when they are uploaded, so that
 the remote authority also gets a log.

 That rejection is added as part of #27194.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28081 [Core Tor/Tor]: rust protover discards all votes if one is not UTF-8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28081: rust protover discards all votes if one is not UTF-8
-+-
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, protover,  |  Actual Points:
  035-deferred-20190115, 041-proposed, 033   |
  -unreached-backport|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:15 ahf]:
 > Is skipping "bad" entries in the Smartlist, silently, really a good
 option here?

 It's definitely a much better option than the current behavior of silently
 discarding all entries, isn't it?

 This was just supposed to be a simple bugfix, without going into the weeds
 of more extensive improvements and refactoring this area of the code.
 (Adding logging really requires refactoring.)

 If you prefer to do them all at once instead, added logging and other
 improvements here:

 https://gitgud.io/onionk/tor/compare/master...rust-protover-unicode3

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18361 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18361: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance
--+--
 Reporter:  ioerror   |  Owner:  cypherpunks
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1000 light years
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Open Privacy Research Society(openprivacy.ca), Sarah Jamie Lewis deleted
 stop_cloudflare without any warning.


 = THE END

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33189 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Plan for increase in CiviCRM email send rate

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33189: Plan for increase in CiviCRM email send rate
-+-
 Reporter:  richarde |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by richarde):

 Thank you for monitoring and circling back. It went well! With the current
 configuration, we think this is probably close to the fastest possible
 performance by strictly adjusting this send rate option in CiviCRM.

 > do you track bounces?

 We don't have a bounce calculation for this send. (I believe we need to
 investigate and make another configuration change to address that.)

 > can we close this ticket? :)

 Close away, and thank you!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33446 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: migrate cupani/git-rw to the ganeti cluster, triggering an IP address change

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33446: migrate cupani/git-rw to the ganeti cluster, triggering an IP address
change
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-february |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33085   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 managed to boot the box. turns out disk order matters so i'll have to
 improve my inventory routine to list disks in the right order.

 the other problem is that it's not finding /srv, but that might not be the
 migration script's fault, because the disk is available in the right order
 in the vm now. crypto?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32645 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update URL bar onion indicators

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32645: Update URL bar onion indicators
+--
 Reporter:  antonela|  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam202003R  |  Actual Points:  3.25
Parent ID:  #30025  | Points:
 Reviewer:  mcs |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor27-must
+--

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:24 pospeselr]:
 > fixup! commit over my bug_32645_v2 branch with tweaked icons
 >
 > tor-browser: https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/richard/tor-
 browser.git/log/?h=bug_32645_v3

 r=brade,r=mcs
 Looks good to us.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33482 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update about:tor donate string

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33482: Update about:tor donate string
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam202003R,  |  Actual Points:
  l10n   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam202003, l10n => ux-team,
 TorBrowserTeam202003R, l10n
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Here is a patch for review:
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/torbutton.git/commit/?h=bug33482-01&id=01366d7b04b5e1d17ddd499f9ddcb24418a8dede

 The other locales should get updated during the translation import
 process.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33482 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update about:tor donate string

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33482: Update about:tor donate string
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam202003, l10n  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * owner:  tbb-team => mcs
 * status:  needs_information => assigned
 * cc: tbb-team (added)


Comment:

 Kathy and I will take this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33491 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_bug_occurred_: Bug: src/core/or/dos.c:697: dos_new_client_conn: Non-fatal assertion !(entry == NULL) failed. (Future instances of this warning will be silence

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33491: tor_bug_occurred_: Bug: src/core/or/dos.c:697: dos_new_client_conn: Non-
fatal assertion !(entry == NULL) failed. (Future instances of this warning
will be silenced.) (on Tor 0.4.2.6 )
---+---
 Reporter:  sjcjonker  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  0.4.2.6
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  FreeBSD 043-backport 042-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  FreeBSD => FreeBSD 043-backport 042-backport
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.4.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32418 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbrowser tells on every start, that it can't update although it is newest

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32418: Torbrowser tells on every start, that it can't update although it is 
newest
--+---
 Reporter:  Yeti  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-update|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: tbb-team (added)


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:7 Yeti]:
 > Status "needs_information"... which information is needed exactly?

 I believe I changed the status to `needs_information` after I posted
 comment:4. We discussed this ticket during our Tor Browser meeting on
 25-November-2019. The consensus was that we should avoid creating and
 maintaining a patch for this if we can possibly avoid doing so (we know
 Mozilla will not accept such a patch). Some suggestions were made during
 the meeting which we have now investigated:

 Idea 1: Tell users to set `app.update.url` to a value that will not cause
 an update prompt. Unfortunately, end-users cannot do this in a way that
 persists across browser restarts (this is by design; Mozilla does not want
 malware to be able to easily disable updates).

 Idea 2: Learn from what Tails did to address this issue (see
 
https://redmine.tails.boum.org/code/projects/tails/repository/revisions/e43247dd2558dd391342855796e18c3186a43807).
 Tails uses a multi-faceted approach:
 1. Permanently point the `app.update.url` preference to a non-existent
 place. Tails accomplishes this by modifying one of the `omni.ja` files
 within the Tor Browser package, which is not a solution we can recommend
 to end-users.
 2. Set `app.update.disabledForTesting` to `true`. Unfortunately, that
 preference has no effect outside of test runs, i.e., it is ignored unless
 the browser is running under Marionette control.
 3. Set `app.update.doorhanger` to `false`. This will suppress most of the
 update-related prompts. However, the  older update UI will be used which
 means that eventually a windowed prompt will be shown to tell users that
 their browser may be out of date. Also, this is not a long term solution
 because Mozilla removed support for this pref from recent versions of
 Firefox. However, it is something that end-users can experiment with in
 Tor Browser 9.x.
 4. Set `app.update.auto` to `false`. This will prevent automatic updates
 but won't suppress prompts or prevent download attempts. Tails sets this
 as a "defense in depth" measure to avoid any chance of an automatic
 update. I don't think this will be helpful for the scenario covered by
 this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33491 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_bug_occurred_: Bug: src/core/or/dos.c:697: dos_new_client_conn: Non-fatal assertion !(entry == NULL) failed. (Future instances of this warning will be silence

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33491: tor_bug_occurred_: Bug: src/core/or/dos.c:697: dos_new_client_conn: Non-
fatal assertion !(entry == NULL) failed. (Future instances of this warning
will be silenced.) (on Tor 0.4.2.6 )
--+-
 Reporter:  sjcjonker |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  0.4.2.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  FreeBSD   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by sjcjonker):

 Checking matters further it seems the trigger happens when the connection
 comes from / via obfs4proxy.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33413 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: ida.org can't mail torproject.org ("Connection reset by peer")

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33413: ida.org can't mail torproject.org ("Connection reset by peer")
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 i wrote postmas...@ida.org about this problem, we'll see if they find
 anything more.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30726 [Core Tor/Tor]: Missing relay keys in bandwidth file spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30726: Missing relay keys in bandwidth file spec
-+---
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-spec, sbws-roadmap  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33121   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  ahf, gk  |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by juga):

 Replying to [comment:7 gk]:

 > So, all of those examples look to me like spec bugs: the right thing
 happened in the code, but the spec does not reflect that and thus needs to
 get updated.

 Yes.
 And i think the source of true for the version and when the KeyValues
 appeared should be the bandwidth files published by the bwauths, because
 with sbws happens that:
 - we change KeyValues
 - we change the specification version
 - we make a new sbws release (and usually bwauths have run only releases,
 except longclaw a couple of times)
 - the new version spec and the KeyValues start to appear in the bandwidth
 files
 - we change some more KeyValues (if there's no bwauth running a non-
 released version, they're still publishing the last specification version
 - new specification change, new sbws release, bwauths update sbws version
 (and therefore KeyValues and specification version)...

 So i should check the collector to be sure about the which keys were in
 which versions

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30735 [Core Tor/sbws]: Work out which relays are ignored by all sbws instances

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30735: Work out which relays are ignored by all sbws instances
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  must-keep-3-torflow-blocker, sbws-   |  Actual Points:
  majority-blocker, sbws-roadmap |
Parent ID:  #33121   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * owner:  (none) => juga
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30726 [Core Tor/Tor]: Missing relay keys in bandwidth file spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30726: Missing relay keys in bandwidth file spec
-+---
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-spec, sbws-roadmap  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33121   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  ahf, gk  |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Let's change this to revision until i create a PR

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33330 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Use Go modules for Snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#0: Use Go modules for Snowflake
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * owner:  (none) => cohosh
 * status:  new => assigned


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[tor-bugs] #33505 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser nightly build on Android fails due to an error uploading a .pom file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33505: Tor Browser nightly build on Android fails due to an error uploading a 
.pom
file
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 I got a weird error while building the `armv7` nightly which breaks my
 build:
 {{{
 Build log: /home/gk/tor-browser-build/logs/firefox-android-armv7.log
 Error: Error uploading gradle-dependencies-6/org/slf4j/slf4j-
 android/1.7.25/slf4j-android-1.7.25.pom
 Makefile:117: recipe for target 'testbuild-android-armv7' failed
 make: *** [testbuild-android-armv7] Error 1
 }}}
 This is with latest `master` (commit
 e96c9adc8857312871349cf5cfa3dcead71a3ff6) doing `make testbuild-android-
 armv7` (and the testbuild being configure to build nightly builds).

 The `firefox-android-armv7.log` is essentially empty just showing the
 start date of the build.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32992 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB Project for LZMA

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32992: TBB Project for LZMA
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, |  Actual Points:  1
  TorBrowserTeam202003R  |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sisbell):

 * actualpoints:   => 1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32991 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB Project For ZSTD

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32991: TBB Project For ZSTD
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, |  Actual Points:  1
  TorBrowserTeam202003R  |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sisbell):

 * actualpoints:   => 1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33216 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add Android Host and ABI Info to RBM.conf

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33216: Add Android Host and ABI Info to RBM.conf
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, |  Actual Points:  .5
  TorBrowserTeam202003R  |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:
 Reviewer:  boklm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sisbell):

 * actualpoints:   => .5


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33215 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Android Toolchain: Add NDK bin path to system path

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33215: Android Toolchain: Add NDK bin path to system path
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202002R  |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:  .25
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sisbell):

 * points:   => .25


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32614 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: Consider flagging an intro point as bad if rendezvous fails multiple times

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32614: hs-v3: Consider flagging an intro point as bad if rendezvous fails 
multiple
times
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-circuit, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
-+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32650 [Community/Translations]: Check translations for bogus characters

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32650: Check translations for bogus characters
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  emmapeel
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Translations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:2 emmapeel]:
 > maybe it could use i18nspector like in tails:
 >
 > https://git-tails.immerda.ch/jenkins-tools/tree/slaves/lint_po

 It seems this script is only for checking po file. But the issue with
 #31886 and #31929 was in dtd files.

 In the script to import translations, maybe we can try to parse the dtd
 files before we commit them?

 Maybe `dtdinst` is a tool we can use for that: XML DTD to XML instance
 format converter
 https://packages.debian.org/buster/dtdinst

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33485 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use LibreSSL by default in the Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33485: Use LibreSSL by default in the Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  cyperpunks|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Thanks for ticket!

 Hrm. Yeah, I don't think this is going to happen. It is maybe a good idea
 in general, especially for relay diversity, but the only place Tor Browser
 uses openssl is with tor. We are much more likely to use #28156 (and we
 should get there soon).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27241 [Core Tor/Tor]: Extract information from more kinds of wedged directory connections.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27241: Extract information from more kinds of wedged directory connections.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, 035-deferred-20180930, |  Actual Points:
  040-deferred-201915|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_revision


Comment:

 Also setting this as needs_revision, because my questions were answered,
 except for the handing edge conn one, which I am pretty sure remains an
 actual problem.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27241 [Core Tor/Tor]: Extract information from more kinds of wedged directory connections.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27241: Extract information from more kinds of wedged directory connections.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, 035-deferred-20180930, |  Actual Points:
  040-deferred-201915|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mikeperry):

 FTR - this ticket could be merged, but if so I think we should file a new
 ticket to add some logic to always close underlying edge connections if
 their dir connections are closed first. We maybe should do that anyway, as
 that may be one of the things causing #8387.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33035 [Applications/Tor Browser]: create strings for onion service error pages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33035: create strings for onion service error pages
---+---
 Reporter:  brade  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam202003  |  Actual Points:  0.25
Parent ID:  #19251 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor27-must
---+---

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:25 mcs]:
 > Replying to [comment:17 antonela]:
 > > So, when we started to work on this task, we talked about to offer
 recovery paths for users who were experiencing the less happy user flow by
 getting any of these errors.
 > >
 > > Our main call to action here is `Try Again`. Can we verify if `Try
 Again` is the best recovery path for all these errors? Should any of those
 problems encourage another more successful path for recovery?
 >
 > Kathy and I did some thinking about this, and we do not think it makes
 sense to offer a `Try Again` button for 0xF6 (typo in .onion address).

 When we first started discussing this, we had the idea that we could
 *force* tor to bypass it's checksum verification and try connecting to the
 onion service regardless of checksum failure. This could be useful in the
 (off chance) there is a typo within the checksum (portion) of the address
 and not the public key portion. Overall, this has a pretty low probability
 of helping, because it is much more likely that the public key has a typo.
 Honestly, I don't have a strong opinion on this.

 On the one hand, I would like us to have usable/useful/smart "recovery"
 features. On the other hand, if the onion service is offline, then it is
 offline and we have absolutely no control over that. If the onion service
 address has a typo in the public key, then we don't have many recovery
 options. We could present a list of alternative (similar) valid onion
 addresses, but that is not something we can implement right now (it will
 take too much time, and I don't know how to create that list in a
 smart/efficient way).

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #7478, #24456, #24943, #25355, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #7478, #24456, #24943, #25355, #16824, #25152, #27241, 
#4363, #22926 by gaba:
reviewer to 

Comment:
Remove MikePerry from reviewer from all this old tickets. 

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33035 [Applications/Tor Browser]: create strings for onion service error pages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33035: create strings for onion service error pages
---+---
 Reporter:  brade  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam202003  |  Actual Points:  0.25
Parent ID:  #19251 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor27-must
---+---
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  ux-team => ux-team, TorBrowserTeam202003


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19251 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser might want to have an error page specific to when .onion links fail

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19251: TorBrowser might want to have an error page specific to when .onion 
links
fail
---+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  enhancement| Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam202003  |  Actual Points:  6.3
Parent ID:  #30025 | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  acat,pospeselr |Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor27-must
---+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * actualpoints:  5 => 6.3


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[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33504: Metrics Q&A
+--
 Reporter:  ggus|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  |Version:
  Webpages/Support  |
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:  docshackathon, documentation
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+--
 We should migrate metrics Q&A to support.tpo/metrics so we have this
 resource translated.

 Source: https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics-
 web.git/tree/src/main/resources/doc/users-q-and-a.txt

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28516 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: tb-manual: add alt attributes to the images for accessibility

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28516: tb-manual: add alt attributes to the images for accessibility
--+---
 Reporter:  emmapeel  |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  docshackathon, documentation  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by ggus):

 * keywords:   => docshackathon, documentation


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32523 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider building tor-browser-build containers with Bitcoin Core's Guix-based system

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32523: Consider building tor-browser-build containers with Bitcoin Core's Guix-
based system
-+-
 Reporter:  JeremyRand   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-security,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeamTriaged  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dongcarl):

 I'd be happy to answer questions and offer assistance if anyone wants to
 take the lead here. From my understanding this was proposed as a GSoC
 candidate?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33340 [Webpages/Support]: Typo in letterboxing page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33340: Typo in letterboxing page
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  docshackathon, documentation  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by ggus):

 * keywords:   => docshackathon, documentation


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33431 [Webpages/Support]: Link directly to https://webchat.oftc.net/?channels=tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33431: Link directly to https://webchat.oftc.net/?channels=tor
--+--
 Reporter:  myon  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  docshackathon, documentation  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by ggus):

 * keywords:   => docshackathon, documentation


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33423 [Webpages/Support]: Add question about exporting/importing bookmarks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33423: Add question about exporting/importing bookmarks
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  docshackathon, documentation  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by ggus):

 * keywords:   => docshackathon, documentation


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33503 [Core Tor/Tor]: LeakSanitizer detected memory leak with Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev (git-6472d9cfdf1198cf)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33503: LeakSanitizer detected memory leak with Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev (git-
6472d9cfdf1198cf)
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: asn, dgoulet (added)


Comment:

 Could this be related to the new onionbalance-helper code?  Adding dgoulet
 and asn in case.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33482 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update about:tor donate string

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33482: Update about:tor donate string
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam202003, l10n  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by antonela):

 * keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam202003 => ux-team,
 TorBrowserTeam202003, l10n


Comment:

 I think the next plausible release is good enough. We will need l10n for
 that new string. Adding l10n to give visibility to emmapeel.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33503 [Core Tor/Tor]: LeakSanitizer detected memory leak with Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev (git-6472d9cfdf1198cf)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33503: LeakSanitizer detected memory leak with Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev (git-
6472d9cfdf1198cf)
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.4.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31975 [Applications/Orbot]: Orbot on Kitkat stuck at "Orbot is starting..." after update. Device overheating.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31975: Orbot on Kitkat stuck at "Orbot is starting..." after update. Device
overheating.
+---
 Reporter:  torlove |  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---

Comment (by torlove):

 Hello Guardian Project Team,

 Today I attempted to update to the latest release of Orbot for my Kitkat,
 again using F-Droid.

 Regretably I have the same problem as above (log never moves beyond "Orbot
 is starting..."), although the device doesn't overheat and drain the
 battery as dramatically as it did previously.

 A point that might be of interest:
 - there doesn't appear to be any network access available to Orbot. There
 is no outgoing flashes in the top right traffic icon as I'd normally
 expect to see.

 Please help so Kitkat users can use the Tor Network.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32938 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Have a way to test throughput of snowflake proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32938: Have a way to test throughput of snowflake proxy
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension, ux-team, |  Actual Points:  3
  anti-censorship-roadmap-2020Q1 |
Parent ID:  #31109   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Okay this is ready for a partial review. This only implements the
 throughput test for proxy-go and right now doesn't do anything with the
 results except log them.

 Here's the changes to proxy-go:
 https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/pull/19

 And the changes to bridgestrap, which I'm using for the probe point:
 https://dip.torproject.org/cohosh/bridgestrap/merge_requests/1

 === To test locally ===
 Start the probe point: `./bridgestrap -addr :`
 Start a proxy: `./proxy-go -probe http://localhost:`

 === Notes ===

 - The reported latencies are quite high, not sure whether this is a result
 of the webrtc library or if the latency calculation is too slow because of
 locks and the select call

 - We have the same concerns as #31874 with rate limiting and preventing
 abuse

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33503 [Core Tor/Tor]: LeakSanitizer detected memory leak with Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev (git-6472d9cfdf1198cf)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33503: LeakSanitizer detected memory leak with Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev (git-
6472d9cfdf1198cf)
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * Attachment "33503_leaks" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33482 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update about:tor donate string

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33482: Update about:tor donate string
---+---
 Reporter:  antonela   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam202003  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * points:   => 0.5


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33482 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update about:tor donate string

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33482: Update about:tor donate string
---+---
 Reporter:  antonela   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam202003  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  assigned => needs_information
 * keywords:  ux-team => ux-team, TorBrowserTeam202003


Comment:

 We have a lot on our plate, but this is a small/easy change. Should we
 update this "as soon as possible" or should we plan a specific release?

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[tor-bugs] #33503 [Core Tor/Tor]: LeakSanitizer detected memory leak with Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev (git-6472d9cfdf1198cf)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33503: LeakSanitizer detected memory leak with Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev (git-
6472d9cfdf1198cf)
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 I hit a memory leak with the latest `tor` code from `master` when using it
 in Tor Browser.
 {{{
 Direct leak of 112 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from:
 #0 0x7fdee552d628 in malloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libasan.so.5+0x107628)
 #1 0x55e7f567b5fa in tor_malloc_ ../src/lib/malloc/malloc.c:45
 #2 0x55e7f567b690 in tor_malloc_zero_ ../src/lib/malloc/malloc.c:71
 #3 0x55e7f5478339 in cache_client_desc_new
 ../src/feature/hs/hs_cache.c:429
 #4 0x55e7f5478339 in hs_cache_store_as_client
 ../src/feature/hs/hs_cache.c:830
 #5 0x55e7f5487e50 in client_dir_fetch_200
 ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:1372
 #6 0x55e7f5487e50 in hs_client_dir_fetch_done
 ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:2264
 #7 0x55e7f54445fa in handle_response_fetch_hsdesc_v3
 ../src/feature/dirclient/dirclient.c:2776
 #8 0x55e7f54445fa in connection_dir_client_reached_eof
 ../src/feature/dirclient/dirclient.c:2202
 #9 0x55e7f54445fa in connection_dir_reached_eof
 ../src/feature/dirclient/dirclient.c:2989
 #10 0x55e7f52e5505 in connection_reached_eof
 ../src/core/mainloop/connection.c:5029
 #11 0x55e7f52e5505 in connection_handle_read_impl
 ../src/core/mainloop/connection.c:3776
 #12 0x55e7f52e5505 in connection_handle_read
 ../src/core/mainloop/connection.c:3788
 #13 0x55e7f52f18e0 in conn_read_callback
 ../src/core/mainloop/mainloop.c:892
 #14 0x7fdee528eb0e  (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7+0x23b0e)
 }}}
 I've attached all the direct/indirect leaks that LeakSanitizer gave me, in
 case there is more lurking.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26844 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: Investigate/Setup Fastlane

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26844: TBA: Investigate/Setup Fastlane
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-9.5, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202006   |
Parent ID:  #26782   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-9.5, TorBrowserTeam202003 => tbb-mobile,
 tbb-9.5, TorBrowserTeam202006


Comment:

 Deferring this to June

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33206 [Metrics/Library]: Parse recently added lines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33206: Parse recently added lines
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 It's indeed a `TreeSet`, but yes, let's discuss serialization issues
 another day. We can still change the internal data structure for
 serialization reasons and convert that data structure to a `SortedSet`
 when the user asks for that. Yay, encapsulation.

 Cool, merged to master and closing. Thanks!

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[tor-bugs] #33502 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Do not let appended descriptor files grow too large

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33502: Do not let appended descriptor files grow too large
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 I revisited #20395 last week. The issue is that metrics-lib cannot handle
 large descriptor files, because it first reads the entire file into memory
 before splitting it into single descriptors and parsing them. While it
 would be possible to parse large descriptor files after making some major
 code changes (using `FileChannel` and doing lazy parsing), I don't think
 that we have to do that. After all, we're writing these large descriptor
 files ourselves in CollecTor, and it's up to us to stop doing that.

 Going back in time, the original reason for concatenating multiple
 descriptors into a single file was that rsyncing many tiny files from one
 host to another host was just slow. So we appended server descriptors and
 extra-info descriptors into a single file. This works well with server
 descriptors or extra-info descriptors published within 1 hour or even 10
 hours. It does not work that well anymore with all server descriptors or
 extra-info descriptors synced from another CollecTor instance when
 starting a new instance (#20335). It works even less well when importing
 one or more monthly tarballs containing server descriptors or extra-info
 descriptors (#27716).

 My suggestion is that we define a configurable limit for appended
 descriptor files of, say, 20 MiB. And when storing a descriptor, we check
 whether appending a descriptor to an existing descriptor file would exceed
 this limit and start a new descriptor file in that case.

 There are some technical details to work out, but I think they can be
 solved. I also don't expect this to produce a lot of code, not even
 complex code changes. The benefit would be that we could resolve #20395
 and #27716 by implementing this.

 Thoughts on the general idea?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33502 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Do not let appended descriptor files grow too large

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33502: Do not let appended descriptor files grow too large
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33375 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop advertising an IPv6 exit policy when DNS is broken for IPv6

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33375: Stop advertising an IPv6 exit policy when DNS is broken for IPv6
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.14
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  security-review-dos-risk, extra- |  Actual Points:
  review, no-backport, ipv6, tor-exit, tor-dns   |
Parent ID:  #24833   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * cc: nickm (added)
 * keywords:  ipv6, tor-client, tor-exit, tor-dns, extra-review, no-backport
 =>
 security-review-dos-risk, extra-review, no-backport, ipv6, tor-exit,
 tor-dns


Comment:

 (Sorry for multiple comments, I kept thinking about this ticket today.)

 Can you describe the design of this new feature?

 The code doesn't match the rough design in the ticket description. That's
 ok, but without a design, I can't tell the difference between a bug and a
 feature. In particular, I wonder why we need separate "was_disabled" and
 "is_disabled" variables.

 This IPv6 DNS code is currently unused, so it has never been tested. So I
 want to make sure we have the design right.

 Here are some issues I noticed when reading the code:
 * the code only counts DNS errors on timeout, but there are actually 11
 different DNS errors. We should consider which errors we want to track,
 and which ones we want to ignore. See
 http://www.wangafu.net/~nickm/libevent-2.1/doxygen/html/dns_8h.html
 * the minimum number of queries before failure is 10. But that could
 happen by chance, on server startup. Let's make the minimum something more
 reasonable. We can make it at least 1000. But maybe we should set it to 1
 when TestingTorNetwork is set. That way, broken IPv6 exits will fail
 quickly in chutney.

 We should find out which DNS errors can be triggered by tor clients, and
 ignore them. Otherwise, a client that floods an exit with bad DNS queries
 could disable IPv6 exiting on that relay. I think Nick might be able to
 help here.

 I think it's ok to fail thousands of client circuits, before an IPv6 exit
 disables IPv6. Because getting the new descriptor to clients can take an
 hour or two. There's also a tradeoff here: we want quiet exits to disable
 IPv6 eventually. But we want busy exits to survive a momentary glitch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33492 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please update GPG key for irl

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33492: Please update GPG key for irl
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * owner:  tpa => anarcat


Comment:

 checking

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33492 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please update GPG key for irl

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33492: Please update GPG key for irl
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 done in commit 0425adc

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33189 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Plan for increase in CiviCRM email send rate

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33189: Plan for increase in CiviCRM email send rate
-+-
 Reporter:  richarde |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 how did that go? from our perspective, we saw a small blip on the CPU
 usage, but nothing on disk space and things seem to have gone smoothly.

 do you track bounces?

 can we close this ticket? :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33484 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Update expired PGP key in LDAP

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33484: Update expired PGP key in LDAP
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 could you attach your pubkey here instead? keyservers are less and less
 reliable and we prefer people send key material in-band in general.

 i'll go hunting, when i find time, in the meantime. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33483 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Why did ZNC go down? How to prevent in future?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33483: Why did ZNC go down? How to prevent in future?
-+-
 Reporter:  pastly   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  new => needs_revision


Comment:

 user-level systemd logging is a mystery to me right now, sorry. maybe
 admins would be able to look at the logs when the thing fails the next
 time?

 one thing does strike me as problematic, however:

 > {{{
 > [Install]
 > WantedBy=multi-user.target
 > }}}

 That looks wrong. There's no `multi-user.target` in `systemd --user` runs.
 Here i use `default.target` to make sure the service starts properly.

 That was an error in our documentation, and I just fixed it. Could you try
 patching the service file and re-enabling it?

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32532 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Install ZNC on Chives, make pastly admin it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32532: Install ZNC on Chives, make pastly admin it
-+
 Reporter:  pastly   |  Owner:  pastly
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by anarcat):

 thanks for the docs! i linked the service page to the irc docs. i've also
 split the install and user docs between the reference and howto sections,
 to respect the existing document structure, but otherwise didn't touch it.

 i'll followup with the downtime in that other ticket, thank you for that
 too! :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30726 [Core Tor/Tor]: Missing relay keys in bandwidth file spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30726: Missing relay keys in bandwidth file spec
-+---
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-spec, sbws-roadmap  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33121   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  ahf, gk  |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:4 juga]:
 > putting this ticket to needs review because i've some questions.
 >
 > i realized that there are keys in the spec like `desc_bw_average`, that
 was never named like that in sbws, it was named `desc_bw_avg`, that's why
 the last one is missing in the spec, it was a mistake when writing the
 spec.
 >
 > Should we leave them as they are for version 1.2 and add the correct
 names in version 1.5? ,and remove `desc_bw_average` from the sbws examples
 in the Annexes?
 >
 > and the keys that were missing, should we also say that we add them in
 version 1.5 even if they were in sbws time ago?

 So, all of those examples look to me like spec bugs: the right thing
 happened in the code, but the spec does not reflect that and thus needs to
 get updated. If that's the case we should just fix the spec without the
 need for bumping the version. That goes both for missing as well as
 wrongly spelled keys. The missing ones, too, should get added to the spec
 with the first version in which they appeared (as all the other ones that
 we did not forget).

 Re: the examples. Yes, if we change `desc_bw_average` to `desc_bw_avg`
 (and do not say the bug is actually `desc_bw_avg` in the code which should
 be `desc_bw_average` as it is written in the spec) then we should fix up
 the examples as well in the Annexes (I don't know where those are but even
 without looking at them in detail it makes sense to fix the examples :)).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32991 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB Project For ZSTD

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32991: TBB Project For ZSTD
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202003R  |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This looks good to me. I cherry-picked the patch on master as commit
 `e96c9adc8857312871349cf5cfa3dcead71a3ff6`.

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[tor-bugs] #33501 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tba fails to reattach window

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33501: tba fails to reattach window
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Tor Browser Alpha (Android) 68.5.0 sometimes without clear pattern fails
 to reattach window and gets black after some seconds.

 - `WindowManager: Failed to create surface control` and
 `mDrawState=NO_SURFACE` stick out
 - if `avc:  denied` means and `untrusted_app` are related it could be
 about permissions?

 {{{
 03-02 13:13:14.266  1749  1749 I UiThreadMonitor: setAwake 14371 4505 66
 03-02 13:13:14.539  1267  1287 D ApplicationPolicy:
 isStatusBarNotificationAllowedAsUser: packageName =
 org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha,userId = 0
 03-02 13:13:14.540  1267  1287 D ApplicationPolicy:
 isStatusBarNotificationAllowedAsUser: packageName =
 org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha,userId = 0
 03-02 13:13:14.540  1267  1287 E NotificationService: Suppressing
 notification by user request. key =
 0|org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha|1|null|10334
 03-02 13:13:14.675   658   658 E audit   : type=1400
 audit(1583154794.660:42723): avc:  denied  { ioctl } for  pid=29406
 comm="libTor.so" path="socket:[1656816]" dev="sockfs" ino=1656816
 ioctlcmd=894b scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c78,c257,c512,c768
 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c78,c257,c512,c768 tclass=tcp_socket
 permissive=0 SEPF_SM-J610FN_9_0011 audit_filtered
 03-02 13:13:14.728  1267  2116 V WindowManager: Relayout Window{10553b7 u0
 org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha/org.mozilla.gecko.BrowserApp}:
 viewVisibility=0 req=720x1480 {(0,0)(fillxfill) sim={adjust=resize
 forwardNavigation} ty=BASE_APPLICATION fmt=TRANSLUCENT wanim=0x10302fe
 03-02 13:13:14.741  1267  2116 E SurfaceComposerClient:
 SurfaceComposerClient::createSurface error No such file or directory
 03-02 13:13:14.742  1267  2116 D WindowManager: createSurfaceLocked,
 exception occurs, mWin=Window{10553b7 u0
 org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha/org.mozilla.gecko.BrowserApp},
 surface(parent)=Surface(name=10553b7
 org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha/org.mozilla.gecko.BrowserApp)/@0x17c31c1,
 caller=com.android.server.wm.WindowManagerService.createSurfaceControl:2794
 com.android.server.wm.WindowManagerService.relayoutWindow:2479
 com.android.server.wm.Session.relayoutForTranslate:302
 android.view.IWindowSession$Stub.onTransact:518
 com.android.server.wm.Session.onTransact:186
 03-02 13:13:14.744  1267  2116 E WindowManager: at
 
com.android.server.wm.WindowStateAnimator.createSurfaceLocked(WindowStateAnimator.java:634)
 03-02 13:13:14.744  1267  2116 W WindowManager: Failed to create surface
 control for Window{10553b7 u0
 org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha/org.mozilla.gecko.BrowserApp}
 03-02 13:13:14.765  1267  2116 D WindowManager: finishDrawingWindow:
 Window{10553b7 u0
 org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha/org.mozilla.gecko.BrowserApp}
 mDrawState=NO_SURFACE
 03-02 13:13:14.771  1267  1287 D ApplicationPolicy:
 isStatusBarNotificationAllowedAsUser: packageName =
 org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha,userId = 0
 03-02 13:13:14.771  1267  1287 D ApplicationPolicy:
 isStatusBarNotificationAllowedAsUser: packageName =
 org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha,userId = 0
 03-02 13:13:14.771  1267  1287 E NotificationService: Suppressing
 notification by user request. key =
 0|org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha|1|null|10334
 03-02 13:13:15.548  1267  1287 D ApplicationPolicy:
 isStatusBarNotificationAllowedAsUser: packageName =
 org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha,userId = 0
 03-02 13:13:15.549  1267  1287 D ApplicationPolicy:
 isStatusBarNotificationAllowedAsUser: packageName =
 org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha,userId = 0
 03-02 13:13:15.549  1267  1287 E NotificationService: Suppressing
 notification by user request. key =
 0|org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha|1|null|10334
 03-02 13:13:16.542  1267  1287 D ApplicationPolicy:
 isStatusBarNotificationAllowedAsUser: packageName =
 org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha,userId = 0
 03-02 13:13:16.543  1267  1287 D ApplicationPolicy:
 isStatusBarNotificationAllowedAsUser: packageName =
 org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha,userId = 0
 03-02 13:13:16.543  1267  1287 E NotificationService: Suppressing
 notification by user request. key =
 0|org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha|1|null|10334
 03-02 13:13:17.588 11553 11572 D ContactsProvider_EventLog:
 contents_sample_state: [STORAGE Contacts(CE) Profile(CE) SAProfile(CE)
 CallLog(CE)  ]
 03-02 13:13:18.586  1267  1301 V WindowManager: * AppWindowToken{fe2fce
 token=Token{6809cc9 ActivityRecord{86304d0 u0
 org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha/or

[tor-bugs] #33500 [Community/Outreach]: Figure out what we want to learn about the Akamai interface for Tor exit discrimination

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33500: Figure out what we want to learn about the Akamai interface for Tor exit
discrimination
+
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Outreach  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:  network-health
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:  #33499
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+
 Before we try to find the right folks at Akamai to talk to, we should
 gather information and questions regarding their interface for dealing
 with Tor relays.

 As arma said, we should do a bit of work on our side here, so they can see
 easily that we are actually interested in solving this problem.

 Gaba pointed out we might be able to look at the free-trial they offer on
 their website. Either way, this could be a good starting point anyway.

 Questions worth considering (without digging deeper):
 1) Is the option to block Tor connections of by default?
 2) Where does the blacklist come from? How is it powered?
 3) What does the explainer for the Tor blocking option say? (And can we
 get Akamai to make it better?)

 Ultimately, it might be smart to think about the above questions from the
 "how to create a template for akamai users"-angle, so that we could
 approach the owners of the above mentioned websites (and others) with some
 template figuring out how the help them and learn at least why the have
 the Tor option on.

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[tor-bugs] #33499 [Community/Outreach]: Create contact to Tor-friendly folks at Akamai

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33499: Create contact to Tor-friendly folks at Akamai
+
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Outreach  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:  network-health
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:  #33466
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+
 Akamai is using an exit blocklist that affects sites like
 https://www.state.gov/, https://cnbc.com, and https://lufthansa.com. We
 should find someone at Akamai to talk to to help making the life for Tor
 users easier.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33466 [Community/Outreach]: Create contact list of Tor-friendly people at large sites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33466: Create contact list of Tor-friendly people at large sites
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Outreach  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-health  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Description changed by gk:

Old description:

> We often see complaints by users that large sites are blocking Tor
> outright or are making it [#33457 very hard to access] them. We should
> try to find contacts at those sites that are generally Tor-friendly and
> with whom we could try to resolve or mitigate the problems that led to
> Tor blocking in the first place.
>
> It's worth to not just focus on site owners as they often "just" deploy
> things and the actual blocking is done by entities in the middle, like
> Akamai or Cloudflare, or it is enabled in the first place by (random) Tor
> nodes added to a blocklist by entities that are curating those. Thus, it
> is worth reaching out to those groups as well.
>
> This ticket is a parent ticket and we should file child tickets for
> particular sites/parties we want to reach out to.

New description:

 We often see complaints by users that large sites are blocking Tor
 outright or are making it
 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/33457 very hard to
 access] them. We should try to find contacts at those sites that are
 generally Tor-friendly and with whom we could try to resolve or mitigate
 the problems that led to Tor blocking in the first place.

 It's worth to not just focus on site owners as they often "just" deploy
 things and the actual blocking is done by entities in the middle, like
 Akamai or Cloudflare, or it is enabled in the first place by (random) Tor
 nodes added to a blocklist by entities that are curating those. Thus, it
 is worth reaching out to those groups as well.

 This ticket is a parent ticket and we should file child tickets for
 particular sites/parties we want to reach out to.

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27458 [Webpages/Website]: security.txt: Add acknowledgments page to honour our security researches

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27458: security.txt: Add acknowledgments page to honour our security researches
--+--
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25131| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by ggus):

 Hello, we have a pull request here:
 https://github.com/torproject/tpo/pull/85

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33497 [Metrics/Website]: Translation on metrics.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33497: Translation on metrics.torproject.org
---+--
 Reporter:  kuce   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website|Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  Translation, l10n  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by emmapeel):

 Yes, it would be great to have this resource translated.

 It is not many words indeed, and we have translators available, but
 development would be needed to implement internationalization for the
 website.

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[tor-bugs] #33498 [HTTPS Everywhere]: Online dark web porn

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33498: Online dark web porn
---+--
 Reporter:  Crackstixx420  |  Owner:  legind
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Component:  HTTPS Everywhere
  Version:  Tor: 0.4.2.5   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
 /http://pinkmethuylnenlz.onion/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33497 [Metrics/Website]: Translation on metrics.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33497: Translation on metrics.torproject.org
---+--
 Reporter:  kuce   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website|Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  Translation, l10n  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by emmapeel):

 * keywords:  Translation => Translation, l10n
 * cc: emmapeel, gaba (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32992 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB Project for LZMA

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32992: TBB Project for LZMA
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202003R  |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:16 sisbell]:
 > Moved the gpg key to keyring directory
 >
 > Added the configure_opt_project variable that uses common CC and host
 fields.
 >
 > https://github.com/sisbell/tor-browser-build/commits/bug-32992b

 This looks good to me. I cherry-picked the patch to master as commit
 `bd21fef218312e8c64e932de989a848e98e2027a`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28766 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Build for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28766: Tor Build for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  sisbell
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202003R  |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 In ticket:28763#comment:2 gk asked a question about `zlib` support:
 > What about `zlib` support which we currently have on desktop?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33216 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add Android Host and ABI Info to RBM.conf

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33216: Add Android Host and ABI Info to RBM.conf
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202003R  |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:
 Reviewer:  boklm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Ok, this looks good to me, thanks. I merged it to master as commit
 `760178fda1e29256fc63013bc27d798fe3fed999`.

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[tor-bugs] #33497 [Metrics/Website]: Translation on metrics.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33497: Translation on metrics.torproject.org
-+-
 Reporter:  kuce |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Metrics/Website
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  Translation  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
 I think it is necessary to have different translations of
 metrics.torproject.org.
 There is an old closed ticket
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20867 but there are still
 no translations except from https://exonerator.torproject.org/.

 If we could take the content to the 'Tor Project Web' on transifex there
 would be volunteers for many languages which would translate it.

 It's also not that much so i think one could translate the whole content
 in one day.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28765 [Applications/Tor Browser]: LibEvent Build for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28765: LibEvent Build for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  sisbell
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202003   |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:  sysrqb, boklm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, TorBrowserTeam202003R => tbb-
 mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, TorBrowserTeam202003
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:20 sisbell]:
 > This commit now includes using a configure_opt_project variable. I
 verified this is building correctly for android. Again I still need to
 test with #31499 to verify all platforms.

 I think it doesn't work on other platforms: the commit moves the
 `--disable-static` from `projects/libevent/build` to
 `var/configure_opt_project`, but the `var/configure_opt` from other
 platforms does not use `var/configure_opt_project`.

 I think we should update the `var/configure_opt` in `rbm.conf` from all
 platforms to include `var/configure_opt_project`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33496 [- Select a component]: Add proper robots.txt

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33496: Add proper robots.txt
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 https://support.torproject.org/robots.txt NO!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33496 [- Select a component]: Add proper robots.txt

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33496: Add proper robots.txt
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 https://trac.torproject.org/robots.txt OK!

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[tor-bugs] #33496 [- Select a component]: Add proper robots.txt

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33496: Add proper robots.txt
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 Almost all project have one.

 https://www.torproject.org/robots.txt 404

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28704 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Compile Tor and dependencies on our own for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28704: Compile Tor and dependencies on our own for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  sisbell
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202003R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pili):

 * keywords:
 tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, TorBrowserTeam202002R,
 TorBrowserTeam202003
 => tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, TorBrowserTeam202003R


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #18867, #25021, #26844, #28325, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #18867, #25021, #26844, #28325, #28704, #33465, #23545, 
#23719, #25102, #27045, #27502, #27903, #28145, #28763, #29615, #3, #30022, 
#30029, #30199, #31161, #31550, #31588, #31899, #31915, #31918, #31992, #32006, 
#32027, #32038, #32173, #32259, #32274, #32297, #32301, #32331, #32361, #32481, 
#32492, #32518, #32530, #32544, #32574, #32624, #32736, #32881, #33113, #33298, 
#33342, #33356, #33462, #19251, #33274 by pili:


Comment:
We are no longer in February, moving tickets

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #13410, #32534, #21952, #28745, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #13410, #32534, #21952, #28745, #30334, #30501, #30552, 
#31650, #32380, #32389, #32501, #32516, #32645, #32993, #33359, #33402, #33403, 
#33410, #33430, #33481, #33487 by pili:


Comment:
We are no longer in February moving reviews

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #25021, #32379, #32864, #32927, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #25021, #32379, #32864, #32927, #33067 by gk:


Comment:
Moving my tickets.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32088 [Core Tor/Tor]: Proposal 308 - choose guards in sampled order

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32088: Proposal 308 - choose guards in sampled order
--+
 Reporter:  Jaym  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec prop271 prop308  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by Jaym):

 Replying to [comment:11 teor]:
 > I did a small review on this code.
 >
 > I've looked at entry_guard_parse_from_state(), and I can't work out
 where we create a dense set of indexes on load. (But I can see where we do
 it on save.)
 >
 > Creating a dense set of indexes on load is important, because qsort() is
 not stable. Therefore, the first time a legacy state is loaded, the guards
 will be sorted in arbitrary order. And the order may change, every time
 the sort is performed.
 >
 > I also wonder if we need to sort the guard list every time we select a
 guard. Instead, can we keep the list sorted when we add or delete guards?
 > Appending guards to the end of the list is just smartlist_add(). We have
 the smartlist_del_keeporder() to remove guards from the list.

 Yes, so, indeed I forgot to account for existing clients that would load
 states without any sampled_idx the first time they would use that patch. I
 need to workout a "fake" sampling order for those clients, or qsort()
 would not be stable as you mention (I guess taking the confirmed_idx
 ordering would be a good enough heuristic).

 I am going to look closer to your recommendation on ordering. Thanks for
 your thoughtful review!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32850 [Core Tor/Tor]: Channel padding timeout scheduled xxx ms in the past.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32850: Channel padding timeout scheduled xxx ms in the past.
-+-
 Reporter:  computer_freak   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-backport, 042-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  043-deferred   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by computer_freak):

 Replying to [comment:2 computer_freak]:
 > Some of my relays are still on Debian 9 and one is on Ubuntu but i can
 not tell right now if its happening on them too.
 I can confirm now that it is happening on Debian 9 and Ubuntu too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30945 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Port Letterboxing to TB for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30945: Port Letterboxing to TB for Android
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-parity|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Thorin):

 closed #33495 as a duplicate

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33495 [Applications/Tor Browser]: resolution check for small screen

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33495: resolution check for small screen
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by Thorin):

 * keywords:   => tbb-mobile
 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 rounding "new windows" to set stepped sizes is a desktop innovation,
 because, well, it has actual "windows".

 On android, this will be somewhat mitigated when "letterboxing" is applied
 (with probably different stepping sizes). This is ticket #30945 - closing
 as a duplicate

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33010 [Metrics/Ideas]: Monitor cloudflare captcha rate: do a periodic onionperf-like query to a cloudflare-hosted static site

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33010: Monitor cloudflare captcha rate: do a periodic onionperf-like query to a
cloudflare-hosted static site
---+--
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Ideas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-health gsoc-ideas  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [ticket:33010 arma]:

 [snip]

 > One catch is that Cloudflare currently gives alt-svc headers in response
 to fetches from Tor addresses. So that means we need a web client that can
 follow alt-srv headers -- maybe we need a full Selenium like client?

 The alt-svc is not kicking in with the first load. So, if we use a really
 simple static page (that is with nothing dynamic and no sub resources
 being requested subsequently) we should not hit that complicating factor.

 That said using Tor Browser for the case where we actually want to find
 out the Tor Browser experience seems like a thing we should investigate,
 and be it alone for the reason mentioned in comment:4. There is
 [https://github.com/webfp/tor-browser-selenium tor-browser-selenium] and
 various forks that should do the trick in combination with
 [https://stem.torproject.org/ stem].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33494 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Installers Languages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33494: Installers Languages
--+---
 Reporter:  smaragdus |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * status:  new => closed
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Duplicate of #13469.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13469 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Windows 32bit installer is missing many languages from the NSIS file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13469: Windows 32bit installer is missing many languages from the NSIS file
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  l10n  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: smaragdus (added)


Comment:

 #33494 is a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33018 [Core Tor/Tor]: Dir auths using an unsustainable 400+ mbit/s, need to diagnose and fix

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33018: Dir auths using an unsustainable 400+ mbit/s, need to diagnose and fix
---+---
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-health 043-should  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by ln5):

 And here's dizum's numbers.

 {{{
  day rx  | tx  |total|   avg. rate
  +-+-+---
  02/02/202050.36 GiB |2.22 TiB |2.27 TiB |  231.50 Mbit/s
  02/03/202052.95 GiB |2.30 TiB |2.35 TiB |  239.51 Mbit/s
  02/04/202046.97 GiB |1.95 TiB |2.00 TiB |  203.64 Mbit/s
  02/05/202037.35 GiB |1.27 TiB |1.30 TiB |  132.51 Mbit/s
  02/06/202026.98 GiB |  974.02 GiB |0.98 TiB |   99.52 Mbit/s
  02/07/202020.72 GiB |  608.53 GiB |  629.25 GiB |   62.56 Mbit/s
  02/08/202019.12 GiB |  514.00 GiB |  533.12 GiB |   53.00 Mbit/s
  02/09/202017.44 GiB |  473.57 GiB |  491.01 GiB |   48.82 Mbit/s
  02/10/202030.49 GiB |  656.36 GiB |  686.85 GiB |   68.29 Mbit/s
  02/11/202028.25 GiB |  646.54 GiB |  674.78 GiB |   67.09 Mbit/s
  02/12/202015.40 GiB |  536.50 GiB |  551.90 GiB |   54.87 Mbit/s
  02/13/202015.99 GiB |  567.34 GiB |  583.33 GiB |   58.00 Mbit/s
  02/14/202015.39 GiB |  541.78 GiB |  557.17 GiB |   55.39 Mbit/s
  02/15/202013.90 GiB |  443.84 GiB |  457.74 GiB |   45.51 Mbit/s
  02/16/202013.64 GiB |  401.60 GiB |  415.24 GiB |   41.28 Mbit/s
  02/17/202015.20 GiB |  535.51 GiB |  550.70 GiB |   54.75 Mbit/s
  02/18/202010.61 GiB |  183.93 GiB |  194.54 GiB |   19.34 Mbit/s
  02/19/202010.77 GiB |  208.25 GiB |  219.02 GiB |   21.78 Mbit/s
  02/20/202011.70 GiB |  273.64 GiB |  285.35 GiB |   28.37 Mbit/s
  02/21/202011.31 GiB |  230.19 GiB |  241.50 GiB |   24.01 Mbit/s
  02/22/2020 9.76 GiB |  157.14 GiB |  166.89 GiB |   16.59 Mbit/s
  02/23/2020 9.66 GiB |  154.74 GiB |  164.40 GiB |   16.34 Mbit/s
  02/24/202010.21 GiB |  169.80 GiB |  180.01 GiB |   17.90 Mbit/s
  02/25/2020 9.55 GiB |  156.26 GiB |  165.81 GiB |   16.48 Mbit/s
  02/26/2020 9.85 GiB |  157.76 GiB |  167.61 GiB |   16.66 Mbit/s
  02/27/202011.43 GiB |  165.83 GiB |  177.25 GiB |   17.62 Mbit/s
  02/28/202016.74 GiB |  369.09 GiB |  385.84 GiB |   38.36 Mbit/s
  02/29/202028.31 GiB |1.45 TiB |1.48 TiB |  150.25 Mbit/s
  03/01/202031.82 GiB |1.81 TiB |1.84 TiB |  187.09 Mbit/s
  03/02/202012.73 GiB |  763.21 GiB |  775.94 GiB |  211.82 Mbit/s
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30726 [Core Tor/Tor]: Missing relay keys in bandwidth file spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30726: Missing relay keys in bandwidth file spec
-+---
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-spec, sbws-roadmap  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33121   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  ahf, gk  |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: gk (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33018 [Core Tor/Tor]: Dir auths using an unsustainable 400+ mbit/s, need to diagnose and fix

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33018: Dir auths using an unsustainable 400+ mbit/s, need to diagnose and fix
---+---
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-health 043-should  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by ln5):

 Here's the amount of traffic maatuska has seen since 2020-01-21 according
 to vnstat:

 {{{
   dayrx  | tx  |total|   avg. rate
  +-+-+---
  2020-01-21 7.26 GiB |  334.60 GiB |  341.86 GiB |   33.99 Mbit/s
  2020-01-2225.87 GiB |1.02 TiB |1.04 TiB |  105.96 Mbit/s
  2020-01-2320.76 GiB |  725.33 GiB |  746.09 GiB |   74.18 Mbit/s
  2020-01-2428.96 GiB |1.16 TiB |1.19 TiB |  121.02 Mbit/s
  2020-01-2547.43 GiB |2.13 TiB |2.18 TiB |  222.03 Mbit/s
  2020-01-2646.79 GiB |2.13 TiB |2.18 TiB |  221.50 Mbit/s
  2020-01-2749.37 GiB |2.24 TiB |2.29 TiB |  232.67 Mbit/s
  2020-01-2855.66 GiB |2.58 TiB |2.63 TiB |  267.96 Mbit/s
  2020-01-2955.63 GiB |2.47 TiB |2.52 TiB |  256.57 Mbit/s
  2020-01-3059.04 GiB |2.53 TiB |2.59 TiB |  263.87 Mbit/s
  2020-01-3157.38 GiB |2.43 TiB |2.49 TiB |  253.32 Mbit/s
  2020-02-0159.35 GiB |2.29 TiB |2.35 TiB |  239.08 Mbit/s
  2020-02-0262.08 GiB |2.25 TiB |2.31 TiB |  235.25 Mbit/s
  2020-02-0362.58 GiB |2.31 TiB |2.37 TiB |  241.57 Mbit/s
  2020-02-0454.02 GiB |1.94 TiB |1.99 TiB |  202.94 Mbit/s
  2020-02-0542.82 GiB |1.25 TiB |1.29 TiB |  131.31 Mbit/s
  2020-02-0630.12 GiB |  948.48 GiB |  978.60 GiB |   97.29 Mbit/s
  2020-02-0721.90 GiB |  573.29 GiB |  595.18 GiB |   59.17 Mbit/s
  2020-02-0820.29 GiB |  491.28 GiB |  511.57 GiB |   50.86 Mbit/s
  2020-02-0918.50 GiB |  446.70 GiB |  465.20 GiB |   46.25 Mbit/s
  2020-02-1032.86 GiB |  640.45 GiB |  673.31 GiB |   66.94 Mbit/s
  2020-02-1130.74 GiB |  627.65 GiB |  658.39 GiB |   65.46 Mbit/s
  2020-02-1217.11 GiB |  514.04 GiB |  531.15 GiB |   52.81 Mbit/s
  2020-02-1317.23 GiB |  541.86 GiB |  559.09 GiB |   55.58 Mbit/s
  2020-02-1417.12 GiB |  527.92 GiB |  545.05 GiB |   54.19 Mbit/s
  2020-02-1515.40 GiB |  433.57 GiB |  448.97 GiB |   44.64 Mbit/s
  2020-02-1614.84 GiB |  390.59 GiB |  405.43 GiB |   40.31 Mbit/s
  2020-02-1717.35 GiB |  526.00 GiB |  543.36 GiB |   54.02 Mbit/s
  2020-02-1810.97 GiB |  156.47 GiB |  167.44 GiB |   16.65 Mbit/s
  2020-02-1911.46 GiB |  185.11 GiB |  196.57 GiB |   19.54 Mbit/s
  2020-02-2012.69 GiB |  261.25 GiB |  273.94 GiB |   27.24 Mbit/s
  2020-02-2112.25 GiB |  217.21 GiB |  229.46 GiB |   22.81 Mbit/s
  2020-02-2211.21 GiB |  161.49 GiB |  172.70 GiB |   17.17 Mbit/s
  2020-02-2310.98 GiB |  155.61 GiB |  166.59 GiB |   16.56 Mbit/s
  2020-02-2410.96 GiB |  158.25 GiB |  169.21 GiB |   16.82 Mbit/s
  2020-02-2510.21 GiB |  141.04 GiB |  151.26 GiB |   15.04 Mbit/s
  2020-02-2610.51 GiB |  148.31 GiB |  158.82 GiB |   15.79 Mbit/s
  2020-02-2710.83 GiB |  157.55 GiB |  168.38 GiB |   16.74 Mbit/s
  2020-02-2814.19 GiB |  355.08 GiB |  369.27 GiB |   36.71 Mbit/s
  2020-02-2933.92 GiB |1.47 TiB |1.51 TiB |  153.29 Mbit/s
  2020-03-0140.64 GiB |1.84 TiB |1.88 TiB |  191.82 Mbit/s
  2020-03-0216.34 GiB |  796.83 GiB |  813.17 GiB |  215.59 Mbit/s
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33341 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Does not connect or launch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33341: Tor Does not connect or launch
--+
 Reporter:  paulflaherty  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33489 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor is working now the webroot issue is fixed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33489: tor is working now the webroot issue is fixed
--+--
 Reporter:  paulflaherty  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33341| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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