Re: [tor-bugs] #33615 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Wait for at least 60 seconds for 0.3.5 and earlier to bootstrap

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33615: Wait for at least 60 seconds for 0.3.5 and earlier to bootstrap
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311, tor-ci-fail-  |  Actual Points:
  sometimes  |
Parent ID:  #33050   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-must
-+-
Description changed by teor:

Old description:

> The basic-min network is still a bit unstable, but only for 0.3.5. (And
> it's much more unrealiable on macOS than Linux.)
>
> It seems like 0.3.5 needs around 60 seconds to bootstrap and sync
> descriptors. Later versions have microdescriptor download fixes, and they
> can bootstrap and verify in 20 seconds on basic-min.
>
> So let's make the minimum wait time 70 seconds (3 consensuses), if any
> nodes in the network are running 0.3.5 (or earlier).

New description:

 The basic-min network is still a bit unstable, but only for 0.3.5. (And
 it's much more unrealiable on macOS than Linux.)

 It seems like 0.3.5 needs around 60 seconds to bootstrap and sync
 descriptors. Later versions have microdescriptor download fixes, and they
 can bootstrap and verify in just over 20 seconds on basic-min.

 So let's make the minimum wait time 70 seconds (3 consensuses), if any
 nodes in the network are running 0.3.5 (or earlier).

--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33615 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Wait for at least 60 seconds for 0.3.5 and earlier to bootstrap

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33615: Wait for at least 60 seconds for 0.3.5 and earlier to bootstrap
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311, tor-ci-fail-  |  Actual Points:
  sometimes  |
Parent ID:  #33050   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-must
-+-
Description changed by teor:

Old description:

> The basic-min network is still a bit unstable, but only for 0.3.5.
>
> It seems like 0.3.5 needs around 60 seconds to bootstrap and sync
> descriptors. Later versions have microdescriptor download fixes, and they
> can bootstrap and verify in 20 seconds on basic-min.
>
> So let's make the minimum wait time 60 seconds, if any nodes in the
> network are running 0.3.5 (or earlier).

New description:

 The basic-min network is still a bit unstable, but only for 0.3.5. (And
 it's much more unrealiable on macOS than Linux.)

 It seems like 0.3.5 needs around 60 seconds to bootstrap and sync
 descriptors. Later versions have microdescriptor download fixes, and they
 can bootstrap and verify in 20 seconds on basic-min.

 So let's make the minimum wait time 70 seconds (3 consensuses), if any
 nodes in the network are running 0.3.5 (or earlier).

--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32994 [Core Tor/Tor]: Get all flag defaults from port_cfg_new()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32994: Get all flag defaults from port_cfg_new()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  MrSquanchee
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  extra-review, technical-debt, tor-   |  Actual Points:  0.3
  client, easy, intro, outreachy-ipv6|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by MrSquanchee):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32994 [Core Tor/Tor]: Get all flag defaults from port_cfg_new()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32994: Get all flag defaults from port_cfg_new()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  MrSquanchee
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  extra-review, technical-debt, tor-   |  Actual Points:  0.3
  client, easy, intro, outreachy-ipv6|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by MrSquanchee):

 > teor : if you like my changes than we are almost done.

 That's a very clever hack something most of us new programmers are unable
 to.

 Added a changes file and added the irritating space before the label on
 line 6509 config.c

 Let me know if I did the changes file correctly ticket#32994.

 I think it's ready for a final review :)

 I just want to get over my first PR.

 @https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1795

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32672 [Core Tor/Tor]: Reject 0.2.9 and 0.4.0 in dirserv_rejects_tor_version()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32672: Reject 0.2.9 and 0.4.0 in dirserv_rejects_tor_version()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  044-should, 043-backport,|  Actual Points:
  041-backport, 042-backport, consider-  |
  backport-after-authority-test, fast-fix,   |
  network-health |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:42 phw]:
 > Using
 
[https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/32672/old_bridges.py
 this tool] and a bridge-descriptor file from 13 Mar 2020 07:18:51 PM UTC,
 I looked for bridges that run 0.4.0.* or 0.2.9.*. These are the ones we
 should contact, correct?

 This patch also rejects unstable 0.3.5 versions, that is, 0.3.5.6-rc and
 earlier.

 There aren't any relays on those versions, so there might not be any
 bridges, either.

 > The data shows that 96 out of 1,673 (5.7%) bridges run old Tor version.
 Among these 96, only 52 (54.2%) have (mostly) valid contact information.

 Great, let's try to contact them before we merge the patch.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32143 [Core Tor/Tor]: Build some CI jobs with ALL_BUGS_ARE_FATAL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32143: Build some CI jobs with ALL_BUGS_ARE_FATAL
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-should tor-ci  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  teor   |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by teor):

 Oh, and if we're skipping some unit tests when ALL_BUGS_ARE_FATAL, let's
 try to make sure that we still run those tests on some configurations,
 particularly rare configurations (disabled modules, NSS, macOS).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32143 [Core Tor/Tor]: Build some CI jobs with ALL_BUGS_ARE_FATAL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32143: Build some CI jobs with ALL_BUGS_ARE_FATAL
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-should tor-ci  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  teor   |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by teor):

 In general, I'd like to avoid using allow_failure, because it doesn't get
 us much value:
 * it slows down CI, and
 * it slows down developers, because we have to manually check every PR for
 failures, and decide if they are bad or not.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32143 [Core Tor/Tor]: Build some CI jobs with ALL_BUGS_ARE_FATAL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32143: Build some CI jobs with ALL_BUGS_ARE_FATAL
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-should tor-ci  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  teor   |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:7 nickm]:
 > I've added a comment about the way that we're invoking `configure` here,
 and one about CFLAGS is handled.
 >
 > Additionally, I'd like to request additional review from Teor if
 possible, on the question of CI speed.  Teor has done good work recently
 on CI performance, and I'd like their opinion on:
 >* whether this will slow down CI much,
 >* whether there is any sensible workaround for that,
 >* and whether we should try to apply the workaround before or after
 merge.

 Thanks Nick!

 I'd like to avoid adding any extra jobs, if possible. Instead, we could:
 * try to build all existing jobs with ALL_BUGS_ARE_FATAL, unless there's
 some reason we want to turn hardening options off (coverage, distcheck)
 * make ALL_BUGS_ARE_FATAL apply to Appveyor, as well as Travis

 If that causes too many CI failures, we could:
 * add a few jobs on Travis. I recommended a list of jobs we could add,
 without adding too much extra time. (Due to Travis parallelism.)
 * stop using ALL_BUGS_ARE_FATAL on Appveyor.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33615 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Wait for at least 60 seconds for 0.3.5 and earlier to bootstrap

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33615: Wait for at least 60 seconds for 0.3.5 and earlier to bootstrap
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311, tor-ci-fail-  |  Actual Points:
  sometimes  |
Parent ID:  #33050   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-must
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  ipv6, prop311 => ipv6, prop311, tor-ci-fail-sometimes


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32994 [Core Tor/Tor]: Get all flag defaults from port_cfg_new()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32994: Get all flag defaults from port_cfg_new()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  MrSquanchee
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  extra-review, technical-debt, tor-   |  Actual Points:  0.3
  client, easy, intro, outreachy-ipv6|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * actualpoints:  0.2 => 0.3


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32994 [Core Tor/Tor]: Get all flag defaults from port_cfg_new()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32994: Get all flag defaults from port_cfg_new()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  MrSquanchee
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  extra-review, technical-debt, tor-   |  Actual Points:  0.2
  client, easy, intro, outreachy-ipv6|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * reviewer:  teor =>


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:15 MrSquanchee]:
 > I made the changes requested. Travic CI and Appveyor checks are greened.
 > Needs a fresh review :)
 >
 > Additional suggestions and changes are most welcomed.
 >
 > @https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1795

 I think there's a simpler way to free cfg at the end of the function.

 What do you think of:
 
https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1796/commits/3b7b512908e65ad74e672ea846151f31a0b31c97

 (This function is a bit confusing, because it's very big. Over time, we
 want to split big functions into smaller functions, so they are easier to
 understand. But we don't need to do that in this pull request.)

 If you like my change, then we are almost done!

 The final step is to make a changes file:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/doc/HACKING/CodingStandards.md#n95

 I like to copy an existing changes file, and use it as a template.
 Remember to change the ticket number!

 You can also say "Patch by MrSquanchee" at the end of the changes file, if
 you like.

 Here is a good example of a "Code simplification and refactoring" changes
 file:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/blob/master/changes/ticket33349

 Run "make check-changes" after you're done, to check the format of the
 file.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #33615 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Wait for at least 60 seconds for 0.3.5 and earlier to bootstrap

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33615: Wait for at least 60 seconds for 0.3.5 and earlier to bootstrap
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ipv6, prop311
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #33050
   Points:  0.2   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor55-must|
--+---
 The basic-min network is still a bit unstable, but only for 0.3.5.

 It seems like 0.3.5 needs around 60 seconds to bootstrap and sync
 descriptors. Later versions have microdescriptor download fixes, and they
 can bootstrap and verify in 20 seconds on basic-min.

 So let's make the minimum wait time 60 seconds, if any nodes in the
 network are running 0.3.5 (or earlier).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #33614 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Issue with NoScript in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33614: Issue with NoScript in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  Tor235|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:  Tor: unspecified  |   Severity:  Critical
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 While using Tor Browser (set to the "safest" security level), upon
 visiting a website, the NoScript icon stopped having the red "do not
 enter" symbol -- instead, it had a question mark next to the "letter S".

 Normally, with the security level set to "safest" and visiting a website
 that has scripts, the red "do not enter" symbol appears over the NoScript
 icon (i.e. it blocks scripts). This time, when visiting a website with
 scripts, the red "do not enter" symbol did NOT appear. When I clicked the
 NoScript icon, the following message appeared:

 "In order to operate on this tab, NoScript needs to reload it. Proceed?"

 My question is, when this happened, were the scripts blocked or not? Did
 the scripts on the website "leak" (i.e. not get blocked) in spite of the
 fact that I had the browser set to the "safest" security level?

 Is this a known bug with NoScript? Did NoScript fail to block the scripts
 on the website I visited?

 The Tor Browser used is/was version 9.0.6.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33050 [Core Tor/Chutney]: O1.3 - Integration test Tor relays over IPv6 using chutney

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33050: O1.3 - Integration test Tor relays over IPv6 using chutney
--+
 Reporter:  gaba  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33045| Points:  8
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor55-must
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:   => ipv6
 * component:  Core Tor/Tor => Core Tor/Chutney


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33613 [Applications/Tor Browser]: 811786

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33613: 811786
--+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks good to me!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33613 [Applications/Tor Browser]: 811786

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33613: 811786
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 For review:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/sysrqb/torbutton.git/log/?h=bug33613_00

 and backport:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/sysrqb/torbutton.git/log/?h=bug33613_9.0_00

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33093 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use IF_BUG_ONCE in buf_flush_to_tls()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33093: Use IF_BUG_ONCE in buf_flush_to_tls()
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  assert, tor-connection security-low  |  Actual Points:  .1
  consider-backport-after-0433 035-backport  |
  041-backport 042-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This can be destabilizing if/when it triggers, and the fix is very low-
 risk.  On that rationale, I'm merging to 0.3.5 and forward now.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33029 [Core Tor/Tor]: dir-auth: Dir auths should resume sending 503's but never to relays or other dir auths

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33029: dir-auth: Dir auths should resume sending 503's but never to relays or
other dir auths
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth 043-must 042-backport|  implemented
  consider-backport-after-0433   |  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:  #33018   | Points:  0.4
 Reviewer:  nickm, armadev   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33029 [Core Tor/Tor]: dir-auth: Dir auths should resume sending 503's but never to relays or other dir auths

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33029: dir-auth: Dir auths should resume sending 503's but never to relays or
other dir auths
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth 043-must 042-backport|  Actual Points:  1
  consider-backport-after-0433   |
Parent ID:  #33018   | Points:  0.4
 Reviewer:  nickm, armadev   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Merging this to 0.4.2 now; it should help network stability.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #33613 [Applications/Tor Browser]: 811786

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33613: 811786
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Placeholder.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32994 [Core Tor/Tor]: Get all flag defaults from port_cfg_new()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32994: Get all flag defaults from port_cfg_new()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  MrSquanchee
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  extra-review, technical-debt, tor-   |  Actual Points:  0.2
  client, easy, intro, outreachy-ipv6|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by MrSquanchee):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I made the changes requested. Travic CI and Appveyor checks are greened.
 Needs a fresh review :)

 Additional suggestions and changes are most welcomed.

 @https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1795

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32143 [Core Tor/Tor]: Build some CI jobs with ALL_BUGS_ARE_FATAL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32143: Build some CI jobs with ALL_BUGS_ARE_FATAL
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-should tor-ci  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  teor   |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by rl1987):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 The above has been addressed. Test build: https://travis-
 ci.org/github/rl1987/tor/builds/662084047

 The failure on one of the jobs is #33544.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32672 [Core Tor/Tor]: Reject 0.2.9 and 0.4.0 in dirserv_rejects_tor_version()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32672: Reject 0.2.9 and 0.4.0 in dirserv_rejects_tor_version()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  044-should, 043-backport,|  Actual Points:
  041-backport, 042-backport, consider-  |
  backport-after-authority-test, fast-fix,   |
  network-health |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by phw):

 Using
 
[https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/32672/old_bridges.py
 this tool] and a bridge-descriptor file from 13 Mar 2020 07:18:51 PM UTC,
 I looked for bridges that run 0.4.0.* or 0.2.9.*. These are the ones we
 should contact, correct?

 The data shows that 96 out of 1,673 (5.7%) bridges run old Tor version.
 Among these 96, only 52 (54.2%) have (mostly) valid contact information.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33406 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: automate reboots

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33406: automate reboots
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-march|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Old description:

> in #31957 we have worked on automating upgrades, but that's only part of
> the problem. we also need to reboot in some situations.
>
> we have various mechanisms to do so right now:
>
>  * `tsa-misc/reboot-host` - reboot script for kvm boxes, kind of a mess,
> to be removed when we finish the kvm-ganeti migration
>  * `tsa-misc/reboot-guest` - reboot a single host. kind of a hack, but
> useful to reboot a single machine
>  * `misc/multi-tool/torproject-reboot-simple` - iterate over all hosts
> with `rebootPolicy=justdoit` in LDAP and reboot them with `torproject-
> reboot-many`
>  * `misc/multi-tool/torproject-reboot-simple` - iterate over all hosts
> with `rebootPolicy=rotation` in LDAP and reboot them with `torproject-
> reboot-many`, with a 30 minute delay between each host
>  * `ganeti-reboot-cluster` - a tool to reboot the ganeti cluster
>
> There are various problems with all this:
>
>  * the `torproject-reboot-*` scripts do not take care of
> `rebootPolicy=manual` hosts
>  * the `ganeti-reboot-cluster` script has been known to fail if a cluster
> is unbalanced
>  * the `ganeti-reboot-cluster` script currently fails when hosts talk to
> each other over IPv6 somehow (see #33412)
>  * we have 5 different ways of performing reboots, we should have just
> one script that does it all
>  * reboot-{host,guest} do not check if hosts need reboot before rebooting
> (but the multi-tool does)
>
> In short, this is kind of a mess, and we should refactor this. We should
> consider using needrestart, which knows how to reboot individual hosts.
>
> I also added a [https://github.com/xneelo/hetzner-needrestart/issues/23
> feature request to the needrestart puppet module] to expose its knowledge
> as a puppet fact, so we can use that information from PuppetDB instead of
> SSH'ing in each host and calling the dsa-* tools.

New description:

 in #31957 we have worked on automating upgrades, but that's only part of
 the problem. we also need to reboot in some situations.

 we have various mechanisms to do so right now:

  * `tsa-misc/reboot-host` - reboot script for kvm boxes, kind of a mess,
 to be removed when we finish the kvm-ganeti migration
  * `tsa-misc/reboot-guest` - reboot a single host. kind of a hack, but
 useful to reboot a single machine
  * `misc/multi-tool/torproject-reboot-simple` - iterate over all hosts
 with `rebootPolicy=justdoit` in LDAP and reboot them with `torproject-
 reboot-many`
  * `misc/multi-tool/torproject-reboot-rotation` - iterate over all hosts
 with `rebootPolicy=rotation` in LDAP and reboot them with `torproject-
 reboot-many`, with a 30 minute delay between each host
  * `ganeti-reboot-cluster` - a tool to reboot the ganeti cluster

 There are various problems with all this:

  * the `torproject-reboot-*` scripts do not take care of
 `rebootPolicy=manual` hosts
  * the `ganeti-reboot-cluster` script has been known to fail if a cluster
 is unbalanced
  * the `ganeti-reboot-cluster` script currently fails when hosts talk to
 each other over IPv6 somehow (see #33412)
  * we have 5 different ways of performing reboots, we should have just one
 script that does it all
  * reboot-{host,guest} do not check if hosts need reboot before rebooting
 (but the multi-tool does)

 In short, this is kind of a mess, and we should refactor this. We should
 consider using needrestart, which knows how to reboot individual hosts.

 I also added a [https://github.com/xneelo/hetzner-needrestart/issues/23
 feature request to the needrestart puppet module] to expose its knowledge
 as a puppet fact, so we can use that information from PuppetDB instead of
 SSH'ing in each host and calling the dsa-* tools.

--

Comment (by anarcat):

 that prototype is now a library, in https://gitweb.torproject.org/admin
 /tsa-misc.git/tree/fabric_tpa/reboot.py

 it can be called with a wrapper script in
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/admin/tsa-misc.git/tree/reboot

 with something like:

 {{{
 ./reboot -H fsn-node-03.torproject.org,...
 }}}

 it handles ganeti nodes, but not libvirt nodes. it therefore replaces the
 following:

  * `tsa-misc/reboot-guest`
  * `ganeti-reboot-cluster`

 it *could* also replace the following, provided that (a) a host list is
 somewhat generated out of band and (b) the operat

Re: [tor-bugs] #32672 [Core Tor/Tor]: Reject 0.2.9 and 0.4.0 in dirserv_rejects_tor_version()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32672: Reject 0.2.9 and 0.4.0 in dirserv_rejects_tor_version()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  044-should, 043-backport,|  Actual Points:
  041-backport, 042-backport, consider-  |
  backport-after-authority-test, fast-fix,   |
  network-health |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by phw):

 * Attachment "old_bridges.py" added.

 Tool to identify old bridges in bridge-descriptors.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33084 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: decomission kvm5, 9 VMs to migrate

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33084: decomission kvm5, 9 VMs to migrate
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-may  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 once this is done, remove the `reboot-host` script from tsa-misc, see also
 #33406.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #33612 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser Overwrites torrc %include Option with Actual Included Options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33612: Tor Browser Overwrites torrc %include Option with Actual Included 
Options
+--
 Reporter:  werd|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  torrc, include  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 In Tor Browser 9.5a7 there is a problem after it opens and reads the torrc
 file.

 It gets to the line `%include /path/to/folder/` and then rewrites the
 torrc file without the `%include` line, but with all the options it just
 read in.

 This has happened to me in the past, but this time it didn't honor the
 fact I'd already set up a `ClientOnionAuthDir` option. It overwrote my
 path with the default for macOS.

 Taking advantage of
 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/31408#comment:10 another
 person's troubleshooting] I removed all "torrc" holding only comments.

 That didn't fix the problem of the torrc being rewritten without the
 desired `%include`.

 Thank you.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33342 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disconnect search addon causes error at startup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33342: Disconnect search addon causes error at startup
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202003R |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by acat):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202003 => TorBrowserTeam202003R
 * actualpoints:   => 0.5


Comment:

 Patch for review in https://github.com/acatarineu/tor-
 browser/commit/33342.

 Perhaps for the next time, we may want to keep the extension files but
 just remove the engine from `list.json`, and do a migration similar to
 https://searchfox.org/mozilla-
 
esr68/rev/8927c721cdd45f2d692a6f00cc3ce725ff10/browser/components/BrowserGlue.jsm#2950
 for uninstalling the addon manually (while it can be loaded properly).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32493 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider adding MOZ_SERVICES_HEALTHREPORT to mozconfig

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32493: Consider adding MOZ_SERVICES_HEALTHREPORT to mozconfig
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202002R,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.5a6, tbb-backport|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202002R, tbb-9.5a6 => tbb-rbm,
 TorBrowserTeam202002R, tbb-9.5a6, tbb-backport


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33611 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please create email alias/forwarding for cpark

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33611: Please create email alias/forwarding for cpark
-+-
 Reporter:  ewyatt   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by ewyatt):

 * Attachment "(null) (0BE37F1F) – Public.asc" added.

 pgp key cp...@riseup.net

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #33611 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please create email alias/forwarding for cpark

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33611: Please create email alias/forwarding for cpark
-+-
 Reporter:  ewyatt   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA512

 Please create email alias/forwarding for Charly Park (new Executive
 Assistant; announcement soon):

 Name: Charly Park
 Desired uid: cpark
 Forwarding address: cp...@riseup.net
 PGP: 86DD 2652 2354 6424 A2AF  8C44 9F63 4E8C 0BE3 7F1F

 Key verified by video chat and signed; attached.
 Thanks!

 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
 Comment: GPGTools - https://gpgtools.org

 iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEENecqn2ZVRfkstmYkugyUAPgPkc4FAl5rqqEACgkQugyUAPgP
 kc6amg//TaAYOTF+PUeRfxJlG2hYBrmzVpb6K3O8Dl8cEuT1HUfb5UxYYoQnAJZg
 13OE61bgxtKJ1mWOSHiQYe2LPOBGgaLPzCh3geV22RKVfVl4Qv6wCXsLOm+D2vz6
 yVPg+xWQqeX1GfmV8T98iMu7sX3kekE0cKATdgTP1jAIH4kfeaLqwtiwCYbpnSoA
 p1tHeW6UYgIvlquE8QRcqgvxHe+Tv53vrr+T7XOVOxuHG8hbt5MM5ZbwK3MM0l2N
 TQO1Ys9rM/2ak0bQmWs5Aw4qZkUP7Ftm+OT2vW4Adm12m0z/8G0riV9dd4WUZ0uu
 myBDrmW6Pqm0WCMKgXnp9Ly6OuAkR3/C3YNZWPRuovrfNihmiFFI5GvnODTZoQTR
 m2+/Zk0ArL/mF3AIeK5GbDficPhf23ULldPCGS8UecOpP4/YYYIjOPQ3L4QTUJdF
 KBaHMH0O8+kIG9hiGuAAXfIT2yjMsPMBcLjo/ftPcItUIukM4YB5QghTn+L67uqC
 ZQFDArCaNS7QRZ15nn5jJCWc+lV8ZcYiIq1bM1inRRIZYdvcqvANh+xkw8RAmCI+
 SnPlx66AQnGeHQPKoFEqUjbxeSJJ7YPZkYS8lxIHrCzRBG1GJHraSmv5RJ6aG9Tj
 9ByfUb8nMUIj74UE+uTK7BPGj8kvuqZrIoNoEHaInJ3XwlGqj1g=
 =4Lwg
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33085 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: decomission unifolium/kvm2, 6 VMs to migrate

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33085: decomission unifolium/kvm2, 6 VMs to migrate
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-march|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  20
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 1. warned already
 2. removed from nagios
 3. N/A
 4. N/A
 5. scrubbing: TODO
 6. LDAP: TODO
 7. DNS: TODO
 8. Puppet: done along with backups:
{{{
 $ ./retire -v -H unifolium.torproject.org retire-all
 not wiping instance unifolium.torproject.org data: no parent host
 scheduling unifolium.torproject.org backup disks removal on host
 bungei.torproject.org
 checking for path "/srv/backups/bacula/unifolium.torproject.org/" on
 bungei.torproject.org
 scheduling rm -rf "/srv/backups/bacula/unifolium.torproject.org/" to run
 on bungei.torproject.org in 30 days
 warning: commands will be executed using /bin/sh
 job 23 at Sun Apr 12 14:58:00 2020
 Notice: Revoked certificate with serial 71
 Notice: Removing file Puppet::SSL::Certificate unifolium.torproject.org at
 '/var/lib/puppet/ssl/ca/signed/unifolium.torproject.org.pem'
 unifolium.torproject.org
 Submitted 'deactivate node' for unifolium.torproject.org with UUID
 5b467408-c6c4-4623-adf8-d4381d29db9b
 }}}
 9. tor-puppet: TODO
 10. tor-passwords: TODO
 11. let's encrypt: DONE (N/A)
 12. dnswl: DONE (N/A)
 13. backups purge scheduled in step 8: DONE

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33545 [Core Tor/Tor]: assertion failure when "all zero" client auth key provided

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33545: assertion failure when "all zero" client auth key provided
--+
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-should|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33131 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: buf->datalen >= 0x7fffffff

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33131: Bug: buf->datalen >= 0x7fff
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.2.5
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33029 [Core Tor/Tor]: dir-auth: Dir auths should resume sending 503's but never to relays or other dir auths

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33029: dir-auth: Dir auths should resume sending 503's but never to relays or
other dir auths
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth 043-must 042-backport|  Actual Points:  1
  consider-backport-after-0433   |
Parent ID:  #33018   | Points:  0.4
 Reviewer:  nickm, armadev   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I _think_ this should be safe to merge before 0.4.3 alpha, given how much
 testing it has had.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #19409 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Make a deb of snowflake and get into Debian

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19409: Make a deb of snowflake and get into Debian
-+--
 Reporter:  adrelanos|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * owner:  (none) => cohosh
 * status:  new => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33085 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: decomission unifolium/kvm2, 6 VMs to migrate

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33085: decomission unifolium/kvm2, 6 VMs to migrate
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-march|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  20
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  assigned => accepted


Comment:

 starting the decom process now.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33512 [Webpages]: Document Onion Location redirects in portals

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33512: Document Onion Location redirects in portals
--+---
 Reporter:  pili  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tor-hs, tbb-9.5  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21952| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
--+---
Changes (by micah):

 * cc: hacim (removed)
 * cc: micah (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33516 [Webpages]: [Community Portal] Add an article under Onion Services with different options for redirecting to Onion Services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33516: [Community Portal] Add an article under Onion Services with different
options for redirecting to Onion Services
-+-
 Reporter:  pili |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tor-hs, network-team-   |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-november, tbb-9.5, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2020Q1, TorBrowserTeam202003R  |
Parent ID:  #33512   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-
Changes (by micah):

 * cc: hacim (removed)
 * cc: micah (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33515 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: Add Onion Location redirection details to Tor Browser Manual Onion Services Section

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33515: Add Onion Location redirection details to Tor Browser Manual Onion 
Services
Section
--+--
 Reporter:  pili  |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tor-hs,tbb-9.5   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33512| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by micah):

 * cc: hacim (removed)
 * cc: micah (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21952 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Onion-location: increasing the use of onion services through automatic redirects and aliasing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21952: Onion-location: increasing the use of onion services through automatic
redirects and aliasing
-+-
 Reporter:  linda|  Owner:  acat
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tor-hs, network-team-   |  Actual Points:  10
  roadmap-november, tbb-9.5, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2020Q1, TorBrowserTeam202003R  |
Parent ID:  #30024   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  pospeselr, mcs, brade|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by micah):

 * cc: hacim (removed)
 * cc: micah (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #33610 [Webpages/Website]: Incorrect GPG package key on Debian package page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33610: Incorrect GPG package key on Debian package page
+--
 Reporter:  Belisarius  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:
|  Webpages/Website
  Version:  Tor: unspecified|   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  documentation package GPG keys  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 First I just wanted to mention how awesome you all are.

 On the page for installing the Tor package on Ubuntu/Debian
 (https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/debian.html.en#ubuntu), the signing
 GPG key for the Tor Project repo is listed as
 A3C4F0F979CAA22CDBA8F512EE8CBC9E886DDD89.asc, but this seems to be
 incorrect, as GPG doesn't recognize it. I assume this means that either it
 has been signed with a new key since, or that this is no longer the
 recommended path to install the Tor package (instead, maybe using Debian's
 official package is okay, as implied in
 https://community.torproject.org/relay/setup/bridge/debian-ubuntu/).
 Either way, please update the docs!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32994 [Core Tor/Tor]: Get all flag defaults from port_cfg_new()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32994: Get all flag defaults from port_cfg_new()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  MrSquanchee
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  extra-review, technical-debt, tor-   |  Actual Points:  0.2
  client, easy, intro, outreachy-ipv6|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  technical-debt, tor-client, easy, intro, outreachy-ipv6 =>
 extra-review, technical-debt, tor-client, easy, intro, outreachy-ipv6
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
 * reviewer:   => teor
 * actualpoints:   => 0.2


Comment:

 Thanks for this PR, it looks really good!

 It's normal for reviewers to request changes.

 I listed the changes I'd like to see in my review on the pull request:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1795#pullrequestreview-374129928

 I'm also marking this ticket for extra review, to make sure I didn't miss
 anything. Someone else will have a look at it after I'm done reviewing it.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32994 [Core Tor/Tor]: Get all flag defaults from port_cfg_new()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32994: Get all flag defaults from port_cfg_new()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  MrSquanchee
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, tor-client, easy,|  Actual Points:
  intro, outreachy-ipv6  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by MrSquanchee):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 PR @ https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1795

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32672 [Core Tor/Tor]: Reject 0.2.9 and 0.4.0 in dirserv_rejects_tor_version()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32672: Reject 0.2.9 and 0.4.0 in dirserv_rejects_tor_version()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  044-should, 043-backport,|  Actual Points:
  041-backport, 042-backport, consider-  |
  backport-after-authority-test, fast-fix,   |
  network-health |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:40 teor]:
 > So just to confirm, we're waiting for phw to reach out to bridge
 operators, before merging this change?

 Yes. The current plan is to talk about the next steps during the network
 health meeting next Monday.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #33545 [Core Tor/Tor]: assertion failure when "all zero" client auth key provided

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33545: assertion failure when "all zero" client auth key provided
--+
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-should|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 branch here:

 https://gitgud.io/onionk/tor/-/compare/master...hsclientzero1

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs