Re: [tor-bugs] #33798 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please destroy static site atlas.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33798: Please destroy static site atlas.torproject.org
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 I'm a fan!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29413 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Find out who could help maintain storm.tp.o

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29413: Find out who could help maintain storm.tp.o
-+
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29412   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 i *love* closing old tickets, thanks! :p

 (i'll let you close the next one if you like it as much as i do, i promise
 ;)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33399 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Measure static guard nodes with OnionPerf

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33399: Measure static guard nodes with OnionPerf
---+--
 Reporter:  acute  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33325 | Points:  4
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59
---+--

Comment (by acute):

 Currently guards are disabled in OP by setting UseEntryGuards=0 in the
 client torrc file. To enable them, UseEntryGuards should be set to 1, and
 additionally NumEntryGuards should be set to 1 (or a number >1 to test
 multiple guards). I have left an OP test instance running with this set to
 3 to gather some data.

 Purging the state:
 To achieve this, the file called 'state' in the tor_client directory must
 be removed after log rotation. The guards previously measured could be
 extracted from this and added to the analysis output. The Tor process must
 be restarted/reloaded after the logs have rotated. All of this would only
 happen if the measurement mode is 'guard-enabled'.

 Adding a new measurement mode:
 A new mode should be made available to the cli, perhaps allowing the admin
 to specify how many guards to measure at once.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29413 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Find out who could help maintain storm.tp.o

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29413: Find out who could help maintain storm.tp.o
-+-
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29412   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 Time to close this ticket as wont-fix, now that storm is gone?

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[tor-bugs] #33870 [- Select a component]: vanguards: Vanguards silently fail on certain condition

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33870: vanguards: Vanguards silently fail on certain condition
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:   |   Severity:  Major
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 1. Configure torrc file (add some HiddenService lines)

 2. Edit vanguards.conf like below:

 {{{
 # IP address that the Tor control port is listening on:
 control_ip =

 # TCP port the control port is listening on:
 control_port =

 # If set, use this filesystem control socket instead of IP+Port:
 control_socket = /run/tor/control

 # If set, use this as the control port password:
 control_pass =
 }}}

 {{{
 # The current loglevel:
 loglevel = NOTICE

 # If specified, log to this file instead of stdout:
 logfile = /tmp/vandebugger
 }}}

 3. Restart vanguards (service vanguards stop;service vanguards start)

 4. Run 'ps axu|grep pypy' - you'll find vanguards is running

 5. Now wait 1 minute

 ---

 What will happen:
 1. Vanguards silently exit itself. /tmp/vandebugger logged nothing.
 2. However if you read syslog you'll find this line:

 {{{
 Specified config file /meow/vanguards.conf can't be read: invalid literal
 for int() with base 10: ''
 }}}


 How to fix:
 Setting 'control_port = ' to 'control_port = 9876' fixed this.

 What do I want:
 Error should not be raised if the user set 'control_port' empty string.


 #NoGithub #ILikeYourAddon

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17548 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: https://bridges.torproject.org/keys shows outdated keys

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17548: https://bridges.torproject.org/keys shows outdated keys
+---
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ex-sponsor-19   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor30-can
+---
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Here's a patch that rips out PGP support:
 
https://github.com/NullHypothesis/bridgedb/compare/develop...defect/17548?expand=1

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17548 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: https://bridges.torproject.org/keys shows outdated keys

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17548: https://bridges.torproject.org/keys shows outdated keys
+---
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ex-sponsor-19   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor30-can
+---
Changes (by phw):

 * owner:  (none) => phw
 * status:  needs_review => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33609 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Check that onion services have successfully posted descriptors before verifying

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33609: Check that onion services have successfully posted descriptors before
verifying
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  c
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311, outreachy-ipv6, easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33050   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-can
-+-

Comment (by c):

 I made a PR on https://github.com/torproject/chutney/pull/66 as requested.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33745 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Merge a turbotunnel branch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33745: Merge a turbotunnel branch
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  turbotunnel  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19001   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Here's what a dependency-reduction patch for kcp-go looks like:
  * https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/dcf/tor-browser-build.git/commit/?h
 =snowflake-turbotunnel-kcp=6eba497377279bc9d1d7a62f64f5d168c2fbba3f
 It deletes the crypt.go and fec.go files, then introduces a new file with
 shim types for the removed types. My feeling is that this type of patch
 (only add or remove whole files) will be easier to maintain than one that
 makes changes within a file.

 I've made squashed merge branches for snowflake and tor-browser-build.
 I've started a testbuild with them. The snowflake branch uses kcp-go only,
 and removes QUIC support from the server, though the server is still
 compatible with non-turbotunnel clients. The tor-browser-build branch is
 based on [https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-
 build.git/log/?h=tbb-9.5a11-build2 tbb-9.5a11-build2].
  * snowflake [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/dcf/snowflake.git/log/?h
 =turbotunnel-merge=619802d12707baf5aee7091a7f1c02c3dbcaa30c
 turbotunnel-merge],
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/dcf/snowflake.git/diff/?h=turbotunnel-
 
merge=619802d12707baf5aee7091a7f1c02c3dbcaa30c=8eef3b63482deb50d988e3703b7a718802cdd2f1
 cumulative diff]
  * tor-browser-build [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/dcf/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=snowflake-turbotunnel-
 merge=032d66a73b20d46769e5497a5c3caea3ec4e7e23 snowflake-turbotunnel-
 merge]

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[tor-bugs] #33869 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: update spreadsheet after migrations

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33869: update spreadsheet after migrations
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin   |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Trivial  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 i just updated the docs for this, but not before i migrated a bunch of
 machines without updating the spreadsheet, which is probably missing a
 bunch of hosts in the gnt-fsn cluster now.

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[tor-bugs] #33868 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: fabric (incorrectly) asumes User root ssh_config

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33868: fabric (incorrectly) asumes User root ssh_config
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin   |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Major|   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 our fabric code assumes we have a `User root` block for all tpo hosts,
 which is incorrect: i actually deliberately set `User anarcat` on pauli,
 for example, so that I don't push as root.

 this should be fixed with a fabric-specific config.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29399 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Retire host and services for tordnsel and check (chiwui)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29399: Retire host and services for tordnsel and check (chiwui)
-+-
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 == step 4 done

 data removal scheduled everywhere:

 {{{
 anarcat@curie:tsa-misc(master)$ ./retire -v -H chiwui.torproject.org
 retire-all --parent-host=fsn-node-01.torproject.org
 starting tasks at 2020-04-09 16:39:51.630866
 checking for ganeti master on host fsn-node-01.torproject.org
 ganeti node detected with master fsn-node-01.torproject.org
 checking on fsn-node-01.torproject.org if instance chiwui.torproject.org
 is running
 instance chiwui.torproject.org not running, no stop required
 scheduling chiwui.torproject.org instance removal on host fsn-
 node-01.torproject.org
 scheduling gnt-instance remove chiwui.torproject.org to run on fsn-
 node-01.torproject.org in 7 days
 warning: commands will be executed using /bin/sh
 job 10 at Thu Apr 16 20:39:00 2020
 scheduling chiwui.torproject.org backup disks removal on host
 bungei.torproject.org
 checking for path "/srv/backups/bacula/chiwui.torproject.org/" on
 bungei.torproject.org
 scheduling rm -rf "/srv/backups/bacula/chiwui.torproject.org/" to run on
 bungei.torproject.org in 30 days
 warning: commands will be executed using /bin/sh
 job 24 at Sat May  9 20:40:00 2020
 Error: The certificate retrieved from the master does not match the
 agent's private key. Did you forget to run as root?
 Certificate fingerprint:
 
59:C4:A7:B7:3C:DD:A2:04:61:92:5B:35:97:03:66:64:1D:3C:55:85:DF:2E:40:BA:2B:3D:E2:A1:D2:11:2F:F5
 To fix this, remove the certificate from both the master and the agent and
 then start a puppet run, which will automatically regenerate a
 certificate.
 On the master:
   puppet cert clean pauli.torproject.org
 On the agent:
   1a. On most platforms: find /home/anarcat/.puppet/etc/ssl -name
 pauli.torproject.org.pem -delete
   1b. On Windows: del
 "\home\anarcat\.puppet\etc\ssl\certs\pauli.torproject.org.pem" /f
   2. puppet agent -t

 Error: Try 'puppet help node clean' for usage
 failed to revoke instance pauli.torproject.org on host
 chiwui.torproject.org: Encountered a bad command exit code!

 Command: 'puppet node clean chiwui.torproject.org'

 Exit code: 1

 Stdout: already printed

 Stderr: already printed


 completed tasks, elasped: 0:00:12.384885 (user 2.74 system 0.05 chlduser
 0.0 chldsystem 0.0 RSS 34.9 MB)
 anarcat@curie:tsa-misc(master)$ ./retire -v -H chiwui.torproject.org
 retire-all --backup_host=''
 starting tasks at 2020-04-09 16:41:08.346772
 No idea what '--backup_host' is!
 completed tasks, elasped: 0:00:00.002826 (user 0.21 system 0.03 chlduser
 0.0 chldsystem 0.0 RSS 30.8 MB)
 [1]anarcat@curie:tsa-misc(master)$ ./retire -v -H chiwui.torproject.org
 retire-all --backup-host=''
 starting tasks at 2020-04-09 16:41:13.611470
 not wiping instance chiwui.torproject.org data: no parent host
 Notice: Revoked certificate with serial 23
 Notice: Removing file Puppet::SSL::Certificate chiwui.torproject.org at
 '/var/lib/puppet/ssl/ca/signed/chiwui.torproject.org.pem'
 chiwui.torproject.org
 Submitted 'deactivate node' for chiwui.torproject.org with UUID
 84ccf106-f275-4f7e-8571-d414a47a4a3d
 completed tasks, elasped: 0:00:08.504086 (user 3.09 system 0.05 chlduser
 0.0 chldsystem 0.0 RSS 34.2 MB)
 }}}

 note that in the above the puppet run failed because it tried to connect
 using a normal user. this was worked around in 4d025f3 and reran
 correctly.

 == step 5

 removed this block from LDAP:

 {{{
 269 host=chiwui,ou=hosts,dc=torproject,dc=org
 host: chiwui
 hostname: chiwui.torproject.org
 objectClass: top
 objectClass: debianServer
 architecture: amd64
 access: restricted
 admin: torproject-ad...@torproject.org
 sshRSAHostKey: ssh-rsa
 
B3NzaC1yc2EDAQABAAABAQDUKfP+b2Isj3UlWmVRAeXpOcyZslJypugDdunLUWXsx2IjzKzhExqkgiDigsv0Fr7SbFKuJSBmZM/q0X6iLXUAuTPDREhubMcQ9iGONvh26H/ocniXpgtbBzzZ8d6sDK/NLupOXHjfBXN/IWhCdwN/JC6lm1qjLAf5BQ7ukVeVKt7gBXXW4rGUkCw+eWLFS1IjKWASm9ubE9t+uVaoYeUP0PSwSrgIrb9hjCsMHBFTOXvSgrX2Nr85ZUetUPvHyo/GPUIdteK8ouMrRe4yJi6rIyMeze2a7ohtEJ2q1IDaE3Jr5BlzIyXeEK+LN1VykiiChde0pGbInzHWzgk8wi3R
 root@chiwui
 sshRSAHostKey: ssh-ed25519
 C3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5ILDW4yvM1jKFwZpSMHl/+HqPsLA2H58w028TmHQ5Zmqu
 root@chiwui
 distribution: Debian
 allowedGroups: check
 

Re: [tor-bugs] #33507 [Metrics/Exit Scanner]: Deploy new exit scanner and check combo on check-01 using metrics-cloud

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33507: Deploy new exit scanner and check combo on check-01 using metrics-cloud
+--
 Reporter:  irl |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Exit Scanner|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020April  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by anarcat):

 * parent:  #29399 =>


Comment:

 removing parent ticket so i can retire chiwui, as agreed in #29399

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33749 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Stem is Outdated in Tor Browser's Namecoin Support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33749: Stem is Outdated in Tor Browser's Namecoin Support
-+--
 Reporter:  JeremyRand   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  namecoin, TorBrowserTeam202004R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 JeremyRand]:
 > Fix at https://notabug.org/JeremyRand/tor-browser-build/src/stem-1.8.0
 (Git commit hash `d84dcbad93df0427467fb3c63bfef09d1e30eee6`).

 This looks good to me. I merged it to master with commit
 `026dd67289580ff00b31f6c7c26328a9d2ecefed`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12802 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: BridgeDB needs Nagios checks for the Email Distributor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12802: BridgeDB needs Nagios checks for the Email Distributor
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb-email, nagios, anti-|  Actual Points:
  censorship-roadmap-2020Q1  |
Parent ID:  #30152   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-
Changes (by phw):

 * cc: hiro (added)


Comment:

 Is the Nagios check deployed already? Does the email alert work too? Also,
 what's the URL for the new Nagios page? I only have a URL for gettor-01.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33845 [Applications/Tor Browser]: namecoin-torbutton.patch needs to be rebased

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33845: namecoin-torbutton.patch needs to be rebased
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202004R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:6 acat]:
 > Here is a rebased patch: https://github.com/acatarineu/tor-browser-
 build/commit/33845_fix_patch.

 Thanks, the rebased patch looks good to me. I merged it to master with
 commit `ba31ac419a33126882c45c94923614a555e80284` and revert the patch
 disabling namecoin with commit `44a18de3b88d80f6841e21903896a5f957ca8e63`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28765 [Applications/Tor Browser]: LibEvent Build for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28765: LibEvent Build for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  sisbell
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202004R  |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:  sysrqb, boklm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sisbell):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, TorBrowserTeam202004 => tbb-
 mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, TorBrowserTeam202004R
 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I made the changes to #31499 so this is ready for review again.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28766 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Build for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28766: Tor Build for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  sisbell
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202004R  |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  boklm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sisbell):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, TorBrowserTeam202004 => tbb-
 mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, TorBrowserTeam202004R
 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I added the libevent version change for tor in #31499.

 This new commit uses that change, otherwise is the same as before

 https://github.com/sisbell/tor-browser-build/commits/bug-28766-6

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33864 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Nightly Tor Browser updates are broken since at least 4/6/2020

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33864: Nightly Tor Browser updates are broken since at least 4/6/2020
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202004  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 So it seems the issue was caused by downloads from
 http://f4amtbsowhix7rrf.onion/ being extremely slow (less than 10 KB/s).
 After looking at the web server logs, I noticed that something (maybe a
 web crawler) was trying to download every files, starting downloading a
 new every one or two seconds, which I though might be causing the issue.

 To avoid web crawlers trying to download everything, I added some http
 authentication, with username and password `tor-guest`:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_25102_v10=0201edc70f003ed7ffcee0098f752453a87980ba
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_25102_v10=1e1b5600fbdcc510692231905881e18deebba1be

 This removed the many requests in the log. However download was still very
 slow, so this did not solve the issue. I removed `/var/lib/tor/state` and
 restarted tor (changing guards), and now it seems the downloads are back
 to previous speed.

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[tor-bugs] #33867 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable password manager and password generation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33867: Disable password manager and password generation
--+--
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #33534
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor58 |
--+--
 Disable the integrated password manager and password generation feature as
 part of disk avoidance.

 Feature documentation:
 https://wiki.mozilla.org/Toolkit:Password_Manager/Password_Generation

 Set preferences:
  - signon.generation.available=false
  - signon.generation.enabled=false

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31499 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update libevent to 2.1.11-stable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31499: Update libevent to 2.1.11-stable
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  sisbell
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202004R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28704  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  boklm, gk   |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by sisbell):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202004 => tbb-rbm,
   TorBrowserTeam202004R
 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I added the tor project change regarding libevent-2.1.so.7 to this ticket

 https://github.com/sisbell/tor-browser-build/commits/bug-31499d

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31499 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update libevent to 2.1.11-stable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31499: Update libevent to 2.1.11-stable
---+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  sisbell
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202004  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28704 | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  boklm, gk  |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by sisbell):

 * parent:  #28765 => #28704


Comment:

 Changing parent ticket since it says max parent child depth too deep (over
 5) whenever I try to comment

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[tor-bugs] #33866 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add Onion Service info to new cert viewer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33866: Add Onion Service info to new cert viewer
--+--
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #33534
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor58 |
--+--
 when security.aboutcertificate.enabled is true (now the default in
 Firefox) the new cert viewer UI is enabled. As part of #23247 we added
 'Onion Service' string to security/encryption info for onion services, so
 we will need to replicate this change in the new UI.

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[tor-bugs] #33865 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Maybe disable all auto-play

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33865: Maybe disable all auto-play
--+--
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #33534
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor58 |
--+--
 If we set media.autoplay.default=5 audio and video become click to play
 (0> allow all, 1 => block audio, 5 => block audio+video). Seems like a
 good default for tor network in general from a bandwidth perspective?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33832 [Core Tor/sbws]: For relays that change ip, only the measurements with the last ip are kept

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33832: For relays that change ip, only the measurements with the last ip are 
kept
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:  sbws:
 |  1.1.0
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-roadmap, intro, |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen202004  |
Parent ID:  #33121   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => needs_information


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 juga]:
 > To solve this, the function `trim_results_ip_changed` in `resultdump.py`
 should be changed

 What is the intended behavior? Not ignoring previous measurements anymore?
 Do we still need the `trim_results_ip_changed` function in that case (you
 seem to indicate that)?

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[tor-bugs] #33864 [- Select a component]: Nightly Tor Browser updates are broken since at least 4/6/2020

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33864: Nightly Tor Browser updates are broken since at least 4/6/2020
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202004
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 I tried to update my Tor Browser nightly on 04/06/2020 that is still using
 the version from 04/02/2020. It said my Tor Browser is up-to-date.
 However, newer nightly binaries were available, e.g. from 04/06/2020.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33864 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Nightly Tor Browser updates are broken since at least 4/6/2020

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33864: Nightly Tor Browser updates are broken since at least 4/6/2020
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202004  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33832 [Core Tor/sbws]: For relays that change ip, only the measurements with the last ip are kept

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33832: For relays that change ip, only the measurements with the last ip are 
kept
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:  sbws:
 |  1.1.0
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-roadmap, intro, |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen202004  |
Parent ID:  #33121   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  sbws-roadmap, intro => sbws-roadmap, intro, GeorgKoppen202004
 * owner:  (none) => gk
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33675 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Search microdescriptor files for relay ed25519 keys

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33675: Search microdescriptor files for relay ed25519 keys
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  anuradha1904
 Type:  enhancement| Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311, outreachy-ipv6  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  #33428 | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  teor   |Sponsor:  Sponsor55-can
---+---

Comment (by anuradha1904):

 Thank you got the issue now. We have mentioned in the function None as an
 expection, and we don't necessarily want that. I did print the values to
 understand that. Thank you.
 Replying to [comment:28 anuradha1904]:
 > Hey teor, no,they are not. Okay, will move _setEd25519Id() into
 LocalNodeController. I had a doubt though, do we wanted the key to be
 shown instant of "None"?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33630 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Retire noisebridge01 default bridge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33630: Retire noisebridge01 default bridge
+--
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-bridges, TorBrowserTeam202004R  |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:7 dcf]:
 > I was surprised to see that commit
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?id=ac8641d245dadc64f0057231f9e593379e9701fc
 ac8641d245dadc64f0057231f9e593379e9701fc] on the
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-
 build.git/tag/?h=tbb-9.5a11-build1 tbb-9.5a11-build1] tag puts back the
 noisebridge01 bridge. What's the reason for it?
 [[br]]
 Right around the time we removed noisebridge01, we finally got in touch
 with a potential maintainer at noisebridge. I asked sysrqb if it was
 possible to revert the patch, and he did so for the alpha.

 It then turned out that our new maintainer would be setting up a new
 bridge behind a different IP address, so noisebridge01 needs to go after
 all. I may not have communicated this to sysrqb clearly enough. I'm sorry
 for the mess.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33072 [Core Tor/Tor]: When under load, give 503 aggressively for dirport requests without compression

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33072: When under load, give 503 aggressively for dirport requests without
compression
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-health 044-should consider-  |  Actual Points:
  backport-after-0434 042-backport 043-backport  |
Parent ID:  #33018   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Replying to [comment:25 teor]:
 > It looks like the code, function comments, and changes files are out of
 sync in these branches.
 >
 > These lines are only deleted in maint-0.4.3:
 > {{{
 >   if (c_method != NO_METHOD) {
 >   /* Always answer compressed request. */
 >   return false;
 > }
 > }}}
 >
 > Are there tests that give a different result when this code is deleted?
 > (I don't want to block on tests, so maybe we could do them later in
 master.)

 Wait...hmmm ok I will re-assess all 3 branches, this is getting confusing.
 Sorry about that.

 >
 > Also, I'm a bit confused about how you want me to merge here. There's no
 forward merges in these PRs. So when we backport, we'll need to do an
 "ours" merge forward, to avoid conflicts. Is that ok?

 Yeah... What about cherry-picking the commits and being done with it? I
 agree it is not good but the backport is surprisingly non trivial on each
 version :(

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33630 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Retire noisebridge01 default bridge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33630: Retire noisebridge01 default bridge
+--
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-bridges, TorBrowserTeam202004R  |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by dcf):

 I was surprised to see that commit [https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders
 /tor-browser-build.git/commit/?id=ac8641d245dadc64f0057231f9e593379e9701fc
 ac8641d245dadc64f0057231f9e593379e9701fc] on the
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-
 build.git/tag/?h=tbb-9.5a11-build1 tbb-9.5a11-build1] tag puts back the
 noisebridge01 bridge. What's the reason for it?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33391 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Add new metadata fields and definitions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33391: Add new metadata fields and definitions
-+--
 Reporter:  acute|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020Q1  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33323   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  karsten  |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by acute):

 On Monday, irl, karsten and I discussed three ways of identifying data
 coming from different instances of Onionperf:

 1. By source. Here we rely that sources are named in a certain way, or
 come from a certain domain.
 Pros: The easiest method to implement, no changes required in OP.
 Cons: Does not scale, and relies on us/others remembering conventions and
 occasionally even updating metrics-web in the future

 2. Using a fixed field to record whether the data is experimental or not.
 This could be true by default, and we could set this to false for the
 instances we run.
 Pros: Easy to implement, is the field we would rely on in the near future
 Cons: Cannot be changed later on to include other types of measurements,
 does not allow any granularity for the researchers to differentiate
 between their own experiments

 3. The method described in my first comment, using a variable METADATA
 field. This would be populated by the researcher/admin with useful
 information, and then added to the json and tpf outputs when analysis is
 performed.

 Pros: Very flexible, allows the admins/researchers to include a wide
 variety of metadata. Would not put any restrictions on what we can add in
 the future. Simple to implement.
 Cons: Relies on the researcher or admin to populate. It would require
 custom code to parse if used in metrics-web, and then to be useful in
 metrics-web everyone should agree on semantics.

 \\

 >Just one question: What's the point of adding that optional argument to
 the measure mode? Would the >meta data be included in the logs somewhere
 for the analyze mode to extract?
 The default measure mode calls on the analysis function at midnight - the
 analysis function would append the metadata info to the json and tpf
 output, but we need a way to signal that we want this data appended.

 Let me know if I've missed anything!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33700 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: audio- and video-conferencing considerations

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33700: audio- and video-conferencing considerations
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Services Admin |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Old description:

> With the rise of the coronavirus, even Tor, which generally works
> remotely, is affected because we were still having physical meetings from
> time to time, and we'll have to find other ways to deal with this.
>
> This ticket aims at establishing the problem space ("what we're trying to
> solve") and evaluate possible solutions ("what could fix it"). we could
> follow the sysadmin documentation template:
>
> https://help.torproject.org/tsa/howto/template/#Discussion
>
> which establishes the following criterion:
>
> = Goals
> == Must have
>
>  * video/audio communication for a group of people of approx 2-10 people
>  * specifically, work session for teams internal to TPI
>  * chat fallback
>  * have a mobile app
>  * allow people to call in by regular phone
>  * a way for one person to mute themselves
>  * long term maintenance costs covered
>
> == Nice to have
>
>  * Reliable video support. Video chat is nice, but most video chat
> systems usually require all participants to have video off otherwise the
> communication is sensibly lagged.
>  * usable to host a Tor meeting, which means more load (because possibly
> > 20 people) and more tools (like slide sharing or whiteboarding)
>  * respecting our privacy, peer to peer encryption or at least encrypted
> with keys we control
>  * free and open source software
>  * tor support
>
> == Non-goals
>

> = Approvals required
>
> = Proposed solution
>
> = Cost
>
> = Alternatives considered
>
> == mumble
>
> === features
>
>  * audio-only
>  * moderation
>  * multiple rooms
>  * native client for Linux, Windows, Mac, iOS, Android
>  * web interface https://github.com/Johni0702/mumble-web
>  * chat
>
> === installation
>
> there are two different puppet modules to setup mumble:
>
> ​https://github.com/voxpupuli/puppet-mumble
> ​https://0xacab.org/riseup-puppet-recipes/mumble
>
> still need to be evaluated, but i'd be tempted to use the voxpupuli
> module because they tend to be better tested and it's more recent
>
> == jitsi
>
> === installation
>
> ansible roles: ​https://code.immerda.ch/o/ansible-jitsi-meet/
> ​https://github.com/UdelaRInterior/ansible-role-jitsi-meet
>
> puppet module: https://gitlab.com/shared-puppet-modules-group/jitsimeet
>
> there's also a docker container and (messy) debian packages
>
> prometheus exporter: ​https://github.com/systemli/prometheus-jitsi-meet-
> exporter
>
> == Nextcloud
>
> systemli is using this ansible role to install coturn:
> ​https://github.com/systemli/ansible-role-coturn
>
> == BBB
>
> features:
>
>  * audio, video conferencing support
>  * [http://docs.bigbluebutton.org/support/faq.html#accessibility
> accesssible] with live closed captionning and support for screen readers
>  * whiteboarding and "slideshow" mode (to show PDF presentations)
>  * moderation tools
>  * chat box
>  * embedded etherpad
>  * dial-in support with Freeswitch
>  * should scale better than jitsi and NC, at least
> [http://docs.bigbluebutton.org/support/faq.html#how-many-simultaneous-
> users-can-bigbluebutton-support according to their FAQ]: "As a rule of
> thumb, if your BigBlueButton server meets the minimum requirements, the
> server should be able to support 150 simultaneous users, such as 3
> simultaneous sessions of 50 users, 6 x 25, etc. We recommend no single
> sessions exceed one hundred (100) users."
>
> i tested an instance setup by a fellow sysadmin and we had trouble after
> a while, even with two people, doing a screenshare. it's unclear what the
> cause of the problem was: maybe the server was overloaded. more testing
> required.
>
> === installation
>
> [https://docs.bigbluebutton.org/2.2/install.html based on unofficial
> Debian packages], requires Freeswitch for dialin, which doesn't behave
> well under virtualization (so would need a bare metal server).

New description:

 With the rise of the coronavirus, even Tor, which generally works
 remotely, is affected because we were still having physical meetings from
 time to time, and we'll have to find other ways to deal with this.

 This ticket aims at establishing the problem space ("what we're 

Re: [tor-bugs] #5304 [Core Tor/Tor]: Obfsproxy should respect OutboundBindAddress in torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5304: Obfsproxy should respect OutboundBindAddress in torrc
-+-
 Reporter:  korobkov |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-spec-change, needs-tor-|  Actual Points:  1.25
  change, network-team-roadmap-2020Q1,   |
  043-should, network-team-roadmap-2020Q2|
Parent ID:  #30471   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  phw  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-must
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * component:  Circumvention/Obfs4 => Core Tor/Tor


Comment:

 This is mostly a Core Tor ticket now, though maybe there should be a
 separate ticket for obfs4proxy to start honoring the new environment
 variable?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33857 [Webpages]: make zcash live on sponsors page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33857: make zcash live on sponsors page
--+
 Reporter:  bekeela   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by ggus):

 Hi Bekeela, I moved this issue on Gitlab:
 https://gitlab.torproject.org/torproject/web/tpo/-/issues/66

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33857 [Webpages]: make zcash live on sponsors page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33857: make zcash live on sponsors page
--+
 Reporter:  bekeela   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by ggus):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33633 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move extend and reachability code to the relay module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33633: Move extend and reachability code to the relay module
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311, technical-debt,   |  implemented
  network-team-roadmap-2020Q1|  Actual Points:  1.0
Parent ID:  #33220   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Merged to master.  Nice work!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33858 [Webpages]: remove google season of docs from sponsors page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33858: remove google season of docs from sponsors page
--+
 Reporter:  bekeela   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by ggus):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Moving to Gitlab:
 https://gitlab.torproject.org/torproject/web/tpo/-/issues/67

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33633 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move extend and reachability code to the relay module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33633: Move extend and reachability code to the relay module
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311, technical-debt,   |  Actual Points:  1.0
  network-team-roadmap-2020Q1|
Parent ID:  #33220   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 I had a question, but it was a false positive.  This looks good to me, and
 CI is passing.  Github hasn't noticed that CI is passing yet, though, so I
 had to hunt down the coveralls output by hand.  That looks reasonable
 (https://coveralls.io/builds/29955459): Coverage is up, and though
 coveralls is reporting "new uncovered lines", I believe I can confirm that
 they are all lines that moved here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25596 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Configure TURN servers for the proxy and/or client

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25596: Configure TURN servers for the proxy and/or client
-+
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by cohosh):

 I mentioned this a bit in #33666. It looks like we've got quite a few
 proxies and clients behind more restrictive NAT topologies.

 I have some doubts about the usefulness of this solution in a censorship
 circumvention setting. If we run our own TURN servers, they could be
 blocked by a censor. Basically, it's a similar problem that we're having
 with STUN, but since all traffic is also proxies through the TURN servers,
 we're relying on them more heavily. We can't just make a domain-fronted
 connection to the TURN server which we might be able to do for STUN.

 Still, it might be a short term solution for clients behind symmetric NATs
 while we figure out how to do something smarter with matching clients to
 proxies that will work for them.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33609 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Check that onion services have successfully posted descriptors before verifying

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33609: Check that onion services have successfully posted descriptors before
verifying
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  c
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311, outreachy-ipv6, easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33050   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-can
-+-
Changes (by c):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32740 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Implement a feedback loop between BridgeDB and OONI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32740: Implement a feedback loop between BridgeDB and OONI
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s30-o23a2, anti-censorship-roadmap-  |  Actual Points:
  2020Q1 |
Parent ID:  #31280   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:4 phw]:
 > Here are preliminary design considerations:
 > * We want a standalone service (let's call it wolpertinger) that lives
 on polyanthum, alongside BridgeDB. Wolpertinger exposes an API that OONI
 and others (e.g., ICLab) can query to fetch bridges to test. Upon
 receiving a request, wolpertinger uses BridgeDB's SQL database and yet-to-
 be-defined heuristics to find a bridge that's worth testing, and returns
 its bridge line. While we are specifically designing wolpertinger to work
 well with OONI, other censorship measurement platforms should be able to
 use it too.
 >

 Cool! I like the idea of having a standalone service with a general API
 that multiple external measurement platforms can use.

 I'm mostly thinking about this from a bridge enumeration standpoint at the
 moment, since this opens up another vector for attack. I guess my first
 question here, is what are we most interested in learning from this? Is it
 whether specific bridges have been blocked in specific places, or that
 countries X, Y, and Z are very effective at blocking bridges of type A?

 If we want general stats and information about what different censors are
 doing, then I would suggest making another partition of bridges and giving
 out these bridges to the probing services (as well as to users). This will
 limit the damage of a censor that uses an OONI client to figure out what
 OONI is probing.

 If we do want to know when and where each specific bridge is blocked, then
 we should make sure we know how useful this information is to us and what
 we're going to do with it. If it's not useful, perhaps we should re-
 evaluate whether it's worth the exposure. Or if there's a less risky (more
 passive) way to get this information.

 > * Arturo mentioned that OONI probes may not talk to wolpertinger
 directly, but rather proxy their requests over OONI's infrastructure. In
 this case, we don't need to worry about making wolpertinger resistant to
 censorship, but we may still want to make it available over domain
 fronting so we are prepared for a future in which censorship measurement
 probes (which are unlikely to be able to talk to *.torproject.org) connect
 directly.

 Another question for the OONI side of things: are all OONI clients testing
 each bridge? Or just a subset of them? A subset will again limit exposure
 and make it difficult for a censor to be able to enumerate bridges just by
 running an OONI client.

 I like this design for now where OONI gets the bridge information and
 distributes it to probes as opposed to probes asking for it directly. This
 is much easier for us to secure and I'm not sure we'd ever want to the
 latter situation because of the potential for enumeration.

 >- When requesting a bridge to test, a censorship measurement probe should
 tell us the country it's  in. We may also want to know its autonomous
 system. What else do we want to know?
 A timestamp for sure. I think it would be useful for the same probe to try
 multiple times within some time frame (4x/day for 2-3 days).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10831 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Captchas are not accessible for blind users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10831: Captchas are not accessible for blind users
-+-
 Reporter:  PZajda   |  Owner:  juggy
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb-reportbug, bridgedb-ui, |  Actual Points:
  anti-censorship-roadmap-2020Q1 , s30-o22a2 |
Parent ID:  #31279   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-can
-+-
Changes (by juggy):

 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32088 [Core Tor/Tor]: Proposal 310 - choose guards in sampled order

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32088: Proposal 310 - choose guards in sampled order
--+
 Reporter:  Jaym  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec prop271 prop310  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Medium => High
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Hi!  Initial notes here.  Sorry for the delay in the review.

 First thing is, continuous integration isn't passing. It looks like there
 might be a memory leak in the unit tests?  You can test that yourself by
 building with --enable-fragile-hardening and running the tests.

 Also there seems to be a practracker failure:
 {{{
 problem file-size /src/feature/client/entrynodes.h 652
 }}}
 You can suppress this warning by editing the
 scripts/maint/practracker/exceptions.txt file and increasing the number on
 that line.

 The code itself looks well-written and straightforward.  I have some
 suggestions for perhaps making it more robust; I have left them on the
 github request.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33609 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Check that onion services have successfully posted descriptors before verifying

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33609: Check that onion services have successfully posted descriptors before
verifying
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  c
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311, outreachy-ipv6, easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33050   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-can
-+-
Changes (by c):

 * status:  needs_revision => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33609 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Check that onion services have successfully posted descriptors before verifying

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33609: Check that onion services have successfully posted descriptors before
verifying
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  c
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311, outreachy-ipv6, easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33050   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-can
-+-

Comment (by c):

 Ah, yes, that was an oversight on my part. Commit `05d4093e` (just pushed
 to my repo) should address that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33715 [Metrics/Cloud]: Create a metrics-common role and ops doc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33715: Create a metrics-common role and ops doc
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Cloud|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020April,  |  Actual Points:  2.4
  irl-roadmap-2020April  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3.4
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by irl):

 * points:  2 => 3.4
 * actualpoints:  1.2 => 2.4


Comment:

 Revising estimate, logging work so far.

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[tor-bugs] #33863 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Git onion service not working.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33863: Git onion service not working.
-+-
 Reporter:  emmapeel |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  onion
 |  service, git
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 since a couple of days, when i do  git pull to the repo at
  http://dccbbv6cooddgcrq.onion/project/web/support.git

 I get the message:

 fatal: unable to access
 'http://dccbbv6cooddgcrq.onion/project/web/support.git/': Couldn't connect
 to server

 It was working before.

 I can pull from the normal repo address:

 https://git.torproject.org/project/web/support.git

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33545 [Core Tor/Tor]: assertion failure when "all zero" client auth key provided

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33545: assertion failure when "all zero" client auth key provided
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.4.4.0-alpha-
 |  dev
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-must security|  Actual Points:  0.2
  extra-review   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet, nickm   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 See PR for a possible issue. If it is good and I'm confused about that
 bit, lgtm.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33545 [Core Tor/Tor]: assertion failure when "all zero" client auth key provided

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33545: assertion failure when "all zero" client auth key provided
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.4.4.0-alpha-
 |  dev
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-must security|  Actual Points:  0.2
  extra-review   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet, nickm   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 This lgtm; I'll wait for dgoulet to review as well.

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[tor-bugs] #33862 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix usages of createTransport API

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33862: Fix usages of createTransport API
--+
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
  |  TorBrowserTeam202004
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #33533
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 There was a nsISocketTransportService breaking change in
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1558726. We have to fix those
 in torbutton and tor-launcher.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33087 [Core Tor/Tor]: closing stdio fds on exit can interfere with LeakSanitizer, etc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33087: closing stdio fds on exit can interfere with LeakSanitizer, etc
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-log, 043-should, consider-   |  Actual Points:  0.5
  backport-after-0433, 041-backport, |
  042-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final => Tor: 0.4.2.x-final


Comment:

 I've merged this to 0.4.3, and added a small tweak as
 c4da0a5094e21241db8ce0d8b12c2e4272fa49ef. (The tweak is to add fsync to
 the list of syscalls that our sandbox permits. Let's not duplicate the
 drama we had with the dup syscall.)

 Marking for backport. No need to backport the tweak, since the version of
 this branch targeting 0.4.1 doesn't use fsync.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33842 [Core Tor/Chutney]: chutney: Add network template for OBv3 testing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33842: chutney: Add network template for OBv3 testing
--+-
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by asn):

 Thanks for the review! Yep let's merge it!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33853 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable What's New? feature

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33853: Disable What's New? feature
--+---
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33534| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor58
--+---

Comment (by antonela):

 As I commented in
 #[https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/31660#comment:13,
 31660], I don't think we should remove it. Instead, we could link to a
 webpage.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33675 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Search microdescriptor files for relay ed25519 keys

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33675: Search microdescriptor files for relay ed25519 keys
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  anuradha1904
 Type:  enhancement| Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311, outreachy-ipv6  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  #33428 | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  teor   |Sponsor:  Sponsor55-can
---+---

Comment (by anuradha1904):

 Hey teor, no,they are not

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33675 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Search microdescriptor files for relay ed25519 keys

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33675: Search microdescriptor files for relay ed25519 keys
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  anuradha1904
 Type:  enhancement| Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311, outreachy-ipv6  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  #33428 | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  teor   |Sponsor:  Sponsor55-can
---+---

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:25 teor]:
 > Here are the things I need to do when I merge:
 > * squash the commits
 > * document what "None" means in getNodeDirInfoStatusPattern()
 >
 > Here are some things that either of us can do:
 > * check TorNet.py for any other comments about microdescs not being
 implemented
 > * if md is True, print the values of nickname and ed25519_key in
 getNodeDirInfoStatusPattern()
 > * if we are not getting the right value for ed25519_id, move
 _setEd25519Id() into LocalNodeController, so we can use it during
 wait_for_bootstrap()

 Are these the right values for ed25519_id?

 {{{
 test000a
 None
 ...
 test001a
 None
 ...
 test002r
 None
 ...
 test003r
 None
 ...
 test004r
 None
 ...
 test000a
 None
 ...
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33072 [Core Tor/Tor]: When under load, give 503 aggressively for dirport requests without compression

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33072: When under load, give 503 aggressively for dirport requests without
compression
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-health 044-should consider-  |  Actual Points:
  backport-after-0434 042-backport 043-backport  |
Parent ID:  #33018   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 It looks like the code, function comments, and changes files are out of
 sync in these branches.

 These lines are only deleted in maint-0.4.3:
 {{{
   if (c_method != NO_METHOD) {
   /* Always answer compressed request. */
   return false;
 }
 }}}

 Are there tests that give a different result when this code is deleted?
 (I don't want to block on tests, so maybe we could do them later in
 master.)

 Also, I'm a bit confused about how you want me to merge here. There's no
 forward merges in these PRs. So when we backport, we'll need to do an
 "ours" merge forward, to avoid conflicts. Is that ok?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33675 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Search microdescriptor files for relay ed25519 keys

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33675: Search microdescriptor files for relay ed25519 keys
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  anuradha1904
 Type:  enhancement| Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311, outreachy-ipv6  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  #33428 | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  teor   |Sponsor:  Sponsor55-can
---+---

Comment (by anuradha1904):

 Provided below is the log after running the test after making the changes
 in the code.

 {{{
 test-network.sh: $TOR_DIR not set, trying $PWD
 test-network.sh: $CHUTNEY_PATH not valid, trying $TOR_DIR/../chutney
 test-network.sh: Calling newer chutney script
 /home/anuradha/tor/../chutney/tools/test-network.sh
 test-network.sh: using CHUTNEY_DNS_CONF '/dev/null'
 test-network.sh: $TOR_DIR not set, trying $PWD
 test-network.sh: $TOR_DIR is a Tor 0.3.5 or later build directory
 test-network.sh: $CHUTNEY_PATH not valid, trying $TOR_DIR/../chutney
 test-network.sh: Setting $CHUTNEY_TOR and $CHUTNEY_TOR_GENCERT based on
 TOR_DIR: '/home/anuradha/tor'
 test-network.sh: Using $CHUTNEY_TOR: '/home/anuradha/tor/src/app/tor' and
 $CHUTNEY_TOR_GENCERT: '/home/anuradha/tor/src/tools/tor-gencert'
  Running tests: bootstrap attempt 1/1

 Launching chutney using Python 3.7.5
 Sending SIGINT to nodes
 Waiting for nodes to finish.

 Launching chutney using Python 3.7.5
 bootstrap-network.sh: bootstrapping network: single-onion-v23-ipv6-md

 Launching chutney using Python 3.7.5
 NOTE: creating '/home/anuradha/tor/../chutney/net/nodes.1586426206',
 linking to '/home/anuradha/tor/../chutney/net/nodes'
 Creating identity key for test000a with /home/anuradha/tor/src/tools
 /tor-gencert
 Creating identity key for test001a with /home/anuradha/tor/src/tools
 /tor-gencert

 Launching chutney using Python 3.7.5
 Starting nodes

 Launching chutney using Python 3.7.5
 test000a is running with PID 23143: Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev (git-
 00ce25a7206d0914)
 test001a is running with PID 23146: Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev (git-
 00ce25a7206d0914)
 test002r is running with PID 23149: Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev (git-
 00ce25a7206d0914)
 test003r is running with PID 23152: Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev (git-
 00ce25a7206d0914)
 test004r is running with PID 23155: Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev (git-
 00ce25a7206d0914)
 test005c is running with PID 23158: Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev (git-
 00ce25a7206d0914)
 test006c is running with PID 23161: Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev (git-
 00ce25a7206d0914)
 test007h is running with PID 23164: Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev (git-
 00ce25a7206d0914)
 test008h is running with PID 23167: Tor 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev (git-
 00ce25a7206d0914)
 9/9 nodes are running
 Waiting up to 120 seconds for a consensus containing relays to be
 generated...

 Launching chutney using Python 3.7.5
 Waiting for nodes to bootstrap...

 test000a
 None
 test000a
 None
 test001a
 None
 test001a
 None
 test002r
 None
 test002r
 None
 test003r
 None
 test003r
 None
 test004r
 None
 test004r
 None
 test000a
 None
 test000a
 None
 test001a
 None
 test001a
 None
 test002r
 None
 test002r
 None
 test003r
 None
 test003r
 None
 test004r
 None
 test004r
 None
 test000a
 None
 test000a
 None
 test001a
 None
 test001a
 None
 test002r
 None
 test002r
 None
 test003r
 None
 test003r
 None
 test004r
 None
 test004r
 None
 test000a
 None
 test000a
 None
 test001a
 None
 test001a
 None
 test002r
 None
 test002r
 None
 test003r
 None
 test003r
 None
 test004r
 None
 test004r
 None
 test000a
 None
 test000a
 None
 test001a
 None
 test001a
 None
 test002r
 None
 test002r
 None
 test003r
 None
 test003r
 None
 test004r
 None
 test004r
 None
 test000a
 None
 test000a
 None
 test001a
 None
 test001a
 None
 test002r
 None
 test002r
 None
 test003r
 None
 test003r
 None
 test004r
 None
 test004r
 None
 test000a
 None
 test000a
 None
 test001a
 None
 test001a
 None
 test002r
 None
 test002r
 None
 test003r
 None
 test003r
 None
 test004r
 None
 test004r
 None
 test000a
 None
 test000a
 None
 test001a
 None
 test001a
 None
 test002r
 None
 test002r
 None
 test003r
 None
 test003r
 None
 test004r
 None
 test004r
 None
 test000a
 None
 test000a
 None
 test001a
 None
 test001a
 None
 test002r
 None
 test002r
 None
 test003r
 None
 test003r
 None
 test004r
 None
 test004r
 None
 test000a
 None
 test000a
 None
 test001a
 None
 test001a
 None
 test002r
 None
 test002r
 None
 test003r
 None
 test003r
 None
 test004r
 None
 test004r
 None
 Bootstrap in progress: 10 seconds
 Node status:
 test000a :  100, done , Done
 test001a :  

Re: [tor-bugs] #33861 [Core Tor/Tor]: vanguards: circ_max_megabytes applied to all connection

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33861: vanguards: circ_max_megabytes applied to all connection
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > Please stop making assumptions about people's values.

 I didn't attack you. I'm just telling the fact that Github is
 automatically blocking accounts if you create one over Tor.

 And I already know that github URL. I'm just posting here because this is
 Tor related project.


 > I'm just trying to be helpful.

 Yes I know. Carry on.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30589 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser on Windows does not support Hindi or Tamil.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30589: Tor Browser on Windows does not support Hindi or Tamil.
-+-
 Reporter:  clash|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-fonts, tbb-   |  Actual Points:
  fingerprinting-os  |
Parent ID:  #18097   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by Sespahitra):

 > But I myself haven't ever been able to reproduce it.

 Can confirm, Indic script alphabets do not render but their numerals do.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33861 [Core Tor/Tor]: vanguards: circ_max_megabytes applied to all connection

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33861: vanguards: circ_max_megabytes applied to all connection
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:3 cypherpunks]:
 > Hey teor, if you're really Tor user you would notice Github's abusive
 behavior.

 Wow. Please stop making assumptions about people's values. And then
 attacking them based on your assumptions.

 I hope that our gitlab migration project will reduce our dependency on
 GitHub (and Trac):
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-project/2020-March/002794.html

 But migrations take time.

 So don't start your feature requests by attacking people.

 Even if someone agrees with your values, they may make different choices.
 For a whole range of reasons. When that happens, it's best to try to
 negotiate a compromise. Tell people what you don't want to do. And ask for
 alternatives.

 You probably don't realise, but this isn't even my project. I'm just
 trying to be helpful.

 Replying to [comment:4 cypherpunks]:
 > Why not have Application/Vanguards section?

 That's a question for mikeperry and maybe asn.

 You can see mikeperry's previous answer to a similar ticket here:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/33811#comment:3

 I've seen other people submit bugs via tor-...@lists.torproject.org . Is
 that an option for you?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33861 [Core Tor/Tor]: vanguards: circ_max_megabytes applied to all connection

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33861: vanguards: circ_max_megabytes applied to all connection
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Why not have Application/Vanguards section?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33861 [Core Tor/Tor]: vanguards: circ_max_megabytes applied to all connection

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33861: vanguards: circ_max_megabytes applied to all connection
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Hey teor, if you're really Tor user you would notice Github's abusive
 behavior.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33617 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a BandwidthStatistics option and consensus parameter

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33617: Add a BandwidthStatistics option and consensus parameter
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  MrSquanchee
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop313, ipv6, outreachy-ipv6,   |  Actual Points:
  network-team-roadmap-2020Q1|
Parent ID:  #33052   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33861 [Core Tor/Tor]: vanguards: circ_max_megabytes applied to all connection

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33861: vanguards: circ_max_megabytes applied to all connection
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * cc: mikeperry, asn (added)
 * component:  Applications => Core Tor/Tor


Comment:

 Hi, please file vanguards bugs at:
 https://github.com/mikeperry-tor/vanguards/issues/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10416 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor won't start on Windows when path contains non-ascii characters

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10416: Tor won't start on Windows when path contains non-ascii characters
-+-
 Reporter:  iktsuarpok   |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.25
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, windows, unicode,|  Actual Points:
  win32, tbb-needs, 042-should, 043-deferred |
Parent ID:  #25729   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 That article requires post-May 2019 Windows 10.

 But Tor supports Windows 7 and later:
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/NetworkTeam/SupportedPlatforms#OSSupportlevels

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33861 [Applications]: vanguards: circ_max_megabytes applied to all connection

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33861: vanguards: circ_max_megabytes applied to all connection
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 {{{
 # apt update
 Get:1 http://lol.google/what what Release [XX.0 kB]
 Hit:2 http://lol.google/what what Release
 Get:3 http://lol.google/what what/what what Packages [XX.0 MB]
 Ign:3 http://lol.google/what what/what what Packages
 Get:3 http://lol.google/what what/what what Packages [XX.3 MB]
 Ign:3 http://lol.google/what what/what what Packages
 Get:3 http://lol.google/what what/what what Packages [78.1 MB]
 Err:3 http://lol.google/what what/what what Packages
   Undetermined Error [IP: 127.0.0.1 9X5X]
 Fetched XX.0 kB in XX XX
 }}}

 Above is reproducible with apt-transport.

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[tor-bugs] #33861 [Applications]: vanguards: circ_max_megabytes applied to all connection

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33861: vanguards: circ_max_megabytes applied to all connection
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Component:  Applications
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 {{{
 # This means that applications that require large data submission (eg
 # SecureDrop or onionshare) should set this much higher
 # (or set to 0 to disable):
 circ_max_megabytes = 8
 }}}

 My site is less than 4MB so above config is okay.

 I thought vanguards only applies this limit to:
 1. My onion service <--- Tor user (incoming)
 2. My onion service ---> Tor user (outgoing)


 However your vanguards is breaking other connections such as:
 1. apt with Tor[1]
 2. wget download over Tor to clearnet site
 3. curl POST something over Tor to clearnet site


 Problem 1. I don't want to stop vanguards just for apt and other thing.
 Problem 2. I don't want to increase circ_max value just for this.


 So could you please add a switch to limit only my-onion-site related
 connection and ignore else?

 say,

 {{{
 # If true, vanguards will not apply max_mega limit non-onion connections.
 # If false(default) vanguards will apply max_mega limit to all Tor
 connections.
 # If your circ_max_megabytes is already 0, this settings does nothing.
 circ_max_mega_ignore_clearnet_destination = true
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10416 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor won't start on Windows when path contains non-ascii characters

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10416: Tor won't start on Windows when path contains non-ascii characters
-+-
 Reporter:  iktsuarpok   |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.25
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, windows, unicode,|  Actual Points:
  win32, tbb-needs, 042-should, 043-deferred |
Parent ID:  #25729   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 https://alfps.wordpress.com/2020/01/03/a-windows-h-wrapper-for-utf-8
 -windows-apps/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33609 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Check that onion services have successfully posted descriptors before verifying

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33609: Check that onion services have successfully posted descriptors before
verifying
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  c
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311, outreachy-ipv6, easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33050   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:7 c]:
 > I have an in-progress branch on my site:
 >
 > `git clone -b c/check-onion-descriptors
 git://code.chroniko.jp/~c/chutney.git`
 >
 > I'll see if I can make a PR to GitHub once my changes are complete and
 ready for a full review.

 Thanks, this is really good code.

 It looks like you are checking for onion service descriptor uploads for
 all nodes. But you only need to check for onion services.

 The `getOnionService()` function should tell you if the current node is an
 onion service.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #17011, #20068, #26646, #30182, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #17011, #20068, #26646, #30182, #31543 by teor:


Action: reassign

Comment:
We haven't selected a GSOC or Outreachy applicant yet.

To be fair to all applicants, we should only assign tickets to people who are 
actively working on that ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33561 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Upgrade openssl to use Android NDK 21

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33561: Upgrade openssl to use Android NDK 21
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, Android, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202004   |
Parent ID:  #33184   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor58-must
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, Android, TorBrowserTeam202004R => tbb-mobile,
 Android, TorBrowserTeam202004


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 sisbell]:
 > Using the new NDK allows us to remove needing to to reset
 ANDROID_NDK_HOME
 >
 > https://github.com/sisbell/tor-browser-build/commits/bug-33561

 If you remove the if-clause please remove the comment above it as well
 which is explaining said if-clause.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33749 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Stem is Outdated in Tor Browser's Namecoin Support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33749: Stem is Outdated in Tor Browser's Namecoin Support
-+-
 Reporter:  JeremyRand   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  namecoin, TorBrowserTeam202004R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  namecoin => namecoin, TorBrowserTeam202004R
 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33749 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Stem is Outdated in Tor Browser's Namecoin Support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33749: Stem is Outdated in Tor Browser's Namecoin Support
--+--
 Reporter:  JeremyRand|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  namecoin  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by JeremyRand):

 Could some kind person with more Trac privileges than me mark this as
 `needs_review`?  Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33845 [Applications/Tor Browser]: namecoin-torbutton.patch needs to be rebased

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33845: namecoin-torbutton.patch needs to be rebased
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202004R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by JeremyRand):

 > However, I could not test it because namecoin in nightly does not work
 for me. Actually, when running Tor Browser with `TOR_ENABLE_NAMECOIN=1` no
 website loads for me (connection times out). I tried with `tbb-
 nightly.2020.04.02`.

 That's likely to be #33749.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33702 [Core Tor/Tor]: RSA_get0_d could not be located in the dynamic link library tor.exe

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33702: RSA_get0_d could not be located in the dynamic link library tor.exe
--+--
 Reporter:  ner0  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:39 teor]:.
 > It would be more helpful if we had instructions, or git pull requests.
 Otherwise we just have to guess what you want done with the files.
 >
 > Here's my review of what I think you want done:
 > * we can't modify users' registries. Tor doesn't build packages for
 Windows. And Tor Browser doesn't modify the registry: it doesn't have an
 installer.
 > * if you want to script to create the tor.exe manifest, that belongs in
 tor's Makefile. And we should check that mt.exe exists first.
 > * we'll also need a patch for Tor Browser's build scripts, to get the
 manifest in the right place.
 > * Tor Browser builds and packages OpenSSL, tor does not. So you'll need
 to add the OpenSSL manifest to Tor Browser's build scripts.
 >
 > It looks like we need to split this ticket into two tickets, one for
 tor, and another for Tor Browser.
 >
 > We can make that happen, but I need you to confirm my guesses first.

 I can't make progress on this ticket, until we have this information.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23719 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure WebExtensions are spared from JIT disabling in higher security settings (Medium-High)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23719: Make sure WebExtensions are spared from JIT disabling in higher security
settings (Medium-High)
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  acat
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-performance, tbb-9.5a7-want, |  Actual Points:  0.5
  TorBrowserTeam202006   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pili):

 #33840 is a duplicate

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33840 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Threema web not working in TOR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33840: Threema web not working in TOR
--+---
 Reporter:  Kyu   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  threema   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by pili):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 This is a duplicate of #23719 (See also:
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1576254)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33853 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable What's New? feature

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33853: Disable What's New? feature
--+---
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33534| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor58
--+---
Changes (by pili):

 * cc: antonela (added)
 * keywords:   => ux-team


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33812 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add unit tests for bandwidth statistics functions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33812: Add unit tests for bandwidth statistics functions
---+---
 Reporter:  MrSquanchee|  Owner:  MrSquanchee
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop313, ipv6, outreachy-ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33617 | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  ahf|Sponsor:  Sponsor55-can
---+---
Changes (by MrSquanchee):

 * status:  needs_information => assigned


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:5 ahf]:

 > I think these patches are definitely a step in the right direction. The
 overall code seems sound.

 Thanks. After everything is done, I need to make sure that these tests are
 exhaustive.

 > What is the next step here? It sounds you want to do additional work
 here?

 I need to add tests for rep_hist_fill_bandwidth_history and
 rep_hist_get_bandwidth_lines().
 And as [https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1853#discussion_r403786213
 teor said] I have to refactor bandwidth code in a new file bw_array_st.h
 and bw_array_st.c.

 Thanks,

 Suraj Upadhyay (!MrSquanchee).

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