Re: [tor-bugs] #10014 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor browser relies on external glib/dbus installation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10014: tor browser relies on external glib/dbus installation
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:7 rosh]:
 > upstream seems going to fix this issue:
 > * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1532281

 Good. We'll pick it up then when switching to the release that contains
 the fix (FWIW, the ticket alone does not mean that Mozilla is going to do
 anything about the issue). Meanwhile, we won't fix that on our own.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22584 [Applications/Tor Browser]: More RWX memory pages for TBB on some Windows versions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22584: More RWX memory pages for TBB on some Windows versions
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Tor Browser 9.0.9: still RWX pages in the Main Process.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10014 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor browser relies on external glib/dbus installation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10014: tor browser relies on external glib/dbus installation
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by rosh):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  wontfix =>


Comment:

 upstream seems going to fix this issue:
 * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1532281

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22034 [Core Tor/Tor]: GETINFO extra-info/digest/

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22034: GETINFO extra-info/digest/
-+-
 Reporter:  olaf.selke@… |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  regression, control, 029-backport,   |  Actual Points:
  030-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 {{{
 GETINFO extra-info/digest/9695DFC35FFEB861329B9F1AB04C46397020CE31

 552 Unrecognized key "extra-
 info/digest/9695DFC35FFEB861329B9F1AB04C46397020CE31"
 510 Unrecognized command ""
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33871 [Core Tor/sbws]: Scale exactly as torflow does?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33871: Scale exactly as torflow does?
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-majority-blocker, sbws-roadmap  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33775   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by starlight):

 Replying to [ticket:33871 juga]:

 > I think this is because while torflow multiplies the calculated ratio by
 the descriptor observed bandwidth [0], while sbws multiplies the ratio by
 the minimum of all descriptor bandwidth values *and* the consensus, which
 was added in #28598.

 flat wrong, see ticket:28588#comment:4

 > So maybe the new consensus bandwidth should not depend on the previous
 one, or not as the minimum.

 The problems with SBWS are due to poor quality absolute bandwidth
 measurement.

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[tor-bugs] #33939 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Decide which components of Fenix to rip out, disable, or use

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33939: Decide which components of Fenix to rip out, disable, or use
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam202004
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #33184
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 One thing we are struggling with when trying to write proper patches for
 building various parts of Fenix is that it's not clear yet which
 components we want to rip out/disable/use.

 E.g. there are a number of things we might want to rip out of `android-
 components` (comment:4:ticket:33156) or maybe not, it's not clear. We have
 already a separate bug (#33594) to figure out what we should do with
 Glean.

 So, in this ticket we should look over the various components involved and
 decide

 a) which to rip (fully) out at build time
 b) disable at run time

 and document the reasoning (maybe that could be part of our release prep
 process documentation).

 I think by default we should enable everything for usability reasons and
 disable potentially fingerprinting/tracking features where we don't have
 patches (yet) and rip out outright dangerous ones if we don't find a
 better solution. That's a similar method we follow for desktop audits.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32027 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Bump version of Go to 1.13+

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32027: Bump version of Go to 1.13+
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake, tbb-rbm,  |  Actual Points:
  ReleaseTrainMigration, GeorgKoppen202004,  |
  TorBrowserTeam202004   |
Parent ID:  #31688   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  sysrqb   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor58
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:
 snowflake, tbb-rbm, ReleaseTrainMigration, GeorgKoppen202004,
 TorBrowserTeam202004R
 =>
 snowflake, tbb-rbm, ReleaseTrainMigration, GeorgKoppen202004,
 TorBrowserTeam202004
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:18 boklm]:
 > Should we remove the workaround we have in `projects/obfs4/build` and
 `projects/snowflake/build` (removing the files `go.mod` and `go.sum`) if
 setting `GOMODULE111=off` makes that not needed?

 We can do that, good idea. Let me try this tomorrow and push a better
 branch if that works.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33937 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Can't paste text copied outside of Tor Browser into browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33937: Can't paste text copied outside of Tor Browser into browser
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  input clipboard   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 Thanks, closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33184 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Support for Fenix

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33184: Support for Fenix
--+--
 Reporter:  sisbell   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, Android   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:6 sisbell]:
 > I'm working through this using tbb android-components generated
 artifacts as dependencies. I haven't checked in the changes as I'm still
 working through but what I have found its
 >
 > We can modify buildSrc/src/main/java/Dependencies.kt to match android-
 components dependencies we build
 >
 >
 > {{{
 > const val mozilla_android_components = "36.0.0"
 > }}}
 >
 > I removed a number of projects from android-components so those
 references have to be removed from as dependencies in app/build.gradle
 >
 > I also added legacy plugin support, same as in android-components
 >
 > The telemetry can be easily disabled for runtime, will require a simple
 patch. I still will need to verify the impact on compile time, having
 removed the artifact dependencies as well.
 >
 > There's also a number of build variants to we can configure for beta,
 nightly and some others which add debugging builds, etc.
 >
 > fenix uses SDK 28 (while toolchain, android-components uses 29). I'll
 align these.

 I just realized this is not just a meta ticket (as indicated by the
 description). It seems, though, just the one extra patch is not enough
 anymore (just declaring `mavenLocal()` is not making it for me). There are
 issues with aligning the SDKs as well (see comment:13:ticket:33557). Let's
 keep this as meta ticket and use #33927 for the Fenix `tor-browser-build`
 changes?

 If you want to work on the fenix part (again) let me know. I was under the
 assumption you'd focus on the geckoview part currently and picked this up.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33927 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add tor-browser-build project for fenix

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33927: Add tor-browser-build project for fenix
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, Android, |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen202004  |
Parent ID:  #33184   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Okay, let's track some actual beta here as this makes it easier for all
 the version tracking of the sub-components: I pushed a follow-up commit
 bumping the commit used to the latest beta: `v4.3.0beta2` which is
 `v4.3.0` as well and requires `android-components` 38.0.0.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33802 [Applications/Tor Browser]: --enable-secure-api is not supported anymore in mingw-w64

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33802: --enable-secure-api is not supported anymore in mingw-w64
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202004R,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen202004, tbb-rbm |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  boklm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This looks good to me. I merged the patch to master with commit
 `6b60066bddd5d93442fc2d4fe553b779dcf8a045`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33937 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Can't paste text copied outside of Tor Browser into browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33937: Can't paste text copied outside of Tor Browser into browser
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  input clipboard   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Actually, for anyone else with this issue, it might have been a transient
 issue from updating something (part of Gnome?) and not restarting all my
 desktop applications, because now after restarting tilix, tilix > other
 applications does work.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33937 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Can't paste text copied outside of Tor Browser into browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33937: Can't paste text copied outside of Tor Browser into browser
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  input clipboard   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 After more testing, this seems to be a problem with my terminal emulator
 (tilix). Text copied from gnome-terminal pastes as expected, and I have
 the same paste problem going from tilix to gnome-terminal as I have going
 from tilix to Tor (or Firefox). Please close this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33710 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Not possible to create New Circuit for websites with redirects

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33710: Not possible to create New Circuit for websites with redirects
--+---
 Reporter:  alksdjwidmalkszj  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by boklm):

 * keywords:  new circuit redirect 302 301 =>
 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 This is a duplicate of #33292.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33292 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Difficult Change Site Circuit After Redirect

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33292: Difficult Change Site Circuit After Redirect
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeamTriaged, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  usability, ux-team |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * cc: alksdjwidmalkszj (added)


Comment:

 #33710 is a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33621 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Horrible TOr circult observed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33621: Horrible TOr circult observed
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:  tbb-triage-level2-needed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 Tor's path selection algorithm does not take country into account:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/path-spec.txt#n230

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32027 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Bump version of Go to 1.13+

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32027: Bump version of Go to 1.13+
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake, tbb-rbm,  |  Actual Points:
  ReleaseTrainMigration, GeorgKoppen202004,  |
  TorBrowserTeam202004R  |
Parent ID:  #31688   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  sysrqb   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor58
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 Should we remove the workaround we have in `projects/obfs4/build` and
 `projects/snowflake/build` (removing the files `go.mod` and `go.sum`) if
 setting `GOMODULE111=off` makes that not needed?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33938 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tba: Out of memory after "Could not create search engine from name"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33938: tba: Out of memory after "Could not create search engine from name"
--+--
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by traumschule):

 looking deeper i found the JSONException more often, today and some days
 ago so oom is possibly unrelated

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32789 [Applications/Tor Browser]: explain or whitelist internal js libraries (was: Javascript can NOT be disabled)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32789: explain or whitelist internal js libraries
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  javascript disable tbb-mobile  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * keywords:  javascript disable pako inflate => javascript disable tbb-
   mobile
 * priority:  Very High => Medium


Comment:

 saw the same today. i agree, the message is confusing, turns out it is
 actually benign since [https://github.com/nodeca/pako pako] is a zlib
 library. could it be whitelisted?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33556 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add TBB project for android-components

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33556: Add TBB project for android-components
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202004R  |
Parent ID:  #33184   | Points:
 Reviewer:  gk   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor58-must
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, Android, TorBrowserTeam202004R => tbb-mobile, tbb-
 rbm, TorBrowserTeam202004R
 * reviewer:   => gk
 * type:  defect => task


Comment:

 sisbell: Do you have an update for that bug somewhere (the old review
 request is 5 weeks old and there were open questions) or should I still
 look at `bug_33556b`?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33938 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tba: Out of memory after "Could not create search engine from name"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33938: tba: Out of memory after "Could not create search engine from name"
--+--
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * Attachment "tba_ddg_oom.log.xz" added.


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[tor-bugs] #33938 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tba: Out of memory after "Could not create search engine from name"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33938: tba: Out of memory after "Could not create search engine from name"
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Added terms into address bar to search:

 {{{
 04-19 01:00:25.864 30950 31093 D GeckoSearchEngineManager: Found default
 engine name in SharedPreferences: DuckDuckGo
 04-19 01:00:25.864 30950 31093 D GeckoDistribution: Getting file from
 distribution.
 04-19 01:00:25.871 30950 30950 D ViewRootImpl@e57276d[BrowserApp]:
 stopped(false) old=false
 04-19 01:00:25.872 30950 31093 E GeckoDistribution: Distribution directory
 exists, but no file named searchplugins
 04-19 01:00:25.905 30950 31093 I GeckoSearchEngineManager: This is Tor
 Browser. Skipping.
 04-19 01:00:25.914 30950 31093 E GeckoSearchEngineManager: Error getting
 engine list
 04-19 01:00:25.914 30950 31093 E GeckoSearchEngineManager:
 org.json.JSONException: No value for default
 04-19 01:00:25.914 30950 31093 E GeckoSearchEngineManager:  at
 org.json.JSONObject.get(JSONObject.java:392)
 ...
 Adreno-GSL: : sharedmem_gpumem_alloc: mmap
 failed errno 12 Out of memory
 ...
 InputDispatcher: Application is not responding: Window{45797b8 u0
 org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha/org.mozilla.gecko.BrowserApp}.  It has
 been 20008.4ms since event, 20007.5ms since wait started.
 ...
 ActivityManager: Load: 8.13 / 6.9 / 6.31
 ActivityManager: CPU usage from 0ms to 7305ms later (2020-04-19
 01:03:17.314 to 2020-04-19 01:03:24.619):
 ActivityManager:   50% 30950/org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha: 35% user +
 14% kernel / faults: 8641 minor 295 major
 ActivityManager:   48% 1266/system_server: 28% user + 19% kernel / faults:
 6208 minor 601 major
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Circumvention/Censorship analysis]: Allot Communications blocking of vanilla Tor, obfs4, and meek in Kazakhstan, starting 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Allot Communications blocking of vanilla Tor, obfs4, and meek in
Kazakhstan, starting 2016-06
---+--
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block kz|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by DoopPowder112):

 Replying to [comment:143 dcf]:
 > kzblocked provided some more information on IRC.
 > But you can bypass it by putting HTTP-like bytes inside the random
 padding of the obfs4 client handshake. The padding is ordinarily filled
 with random bytes. Filling the padding with zeroes does not bypass as
 reliably.

 I'm pretty confident I know how it works. DPI research papers merely deal
 with theoretical attacks, but Brandon Wiley bought copies of physical DPI
 hardware and knows exactly how it works. The main thing they do is look
 for signatures in the first packet. The second main thing is look for
 packet lengths. In this case I believe it is the third most common attack
 which is to look at how frequently each byte value occurs to measure
 entropy. https://youtu.be/IfLh3tr2amk?t=1334 (start at 18:20 but 22:14 is
 where it gets relevant) The solution is to send more of certain byte
 values than others to decrease entropy. I find it interesting that someone
 on this ticket said FTE worked.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33933 [Metrics/Website]: Bandwidth distribution graph has "0 Gbit/s" for all y axis labels

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33933: Bandwidth distribution graph has "0 Gbit/s" for all y axis labels
-+--
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => closed
 * cc: metrics-team (added)
 * points:   => 0.1
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Yes, it's the same bug. The label-formatting function, which is not our
 own but which comes from the `scales` package, could be smarter about
 deciding how many digital digits to use, but it isn't. Changed both
 advertised bandwidth distribution graphs to always show 2 decimal digits
 which should work for most cases. There are other graphs showing Gbit/s,
 but those show network totals which are typically large enough that
 decimal digits do not matter. Closing. Thanks for the report!

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