Re: [tor-bugs] #34346 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please create email alias/forwarding and LDAP for opara

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34346: Please create email alias/forwarding and LDAP for opara
-+-
 Reporter:  ewyatt   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 Yes please!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25599 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: SOCKS4 failure message

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25599: SOCKS4 failure message
-+
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 Closing this on the assumption that it's obsolete after
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/commit/?id=ee2fb42d33ea105995adfc84d2be47a9d6dfc97f
 ee2fb42d33ea105995adfc84d2be47a9d6dfc97f] and #33519.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34346 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please create email alias/forwarding and LDAP for opara

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34346: Please create email alias/forwarding and LDAP for opara
-+-
 Reporter:  ewyatt   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by ewyatt):

 * Attachment "Steven Engler (B32BD902) – Public.asc" added.

 PGP key

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[tor-bugs] #34346 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please create email alias/forwarding and LDAP for opara

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34346: Please create email alias/forwarding and LDAP for opara
-+-
 Reporter:  ewyatt   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA512

 Please create LDAP and email forwarding for Steven Engler, our new Shadow
 Dev. (Formal intro after email setup.)

 Name: Steven Engler
 uid: opara
 forwarding address: op...@sengler.ca
 PGP sig: A542 6A7C 41FF 8BDE 7D5A  1A9D 876A EB64 B32B D902

 PGP key is attached.

 Thank you.
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
 Comment: GPGTools - https://gpgtools.org

 iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEENecqn2ZVRfkstmYkugyUAPgPkc4FAl7QQu8ACgkQugyUAPgP
 kc7chw/7BPuzBUKc0FLkQHB/CIAiA1MEY2momvLc2abjYtmFCGEJl75/PJ81XDD4
 6RUfYfd4yjTeHOnHaWsKwEeM9fWhFr0LEQZPmdMSol8tS2g11klNY3VApuAHlQXB
 6PFWktLtcfBigzWgSSEx9xtp9K7tQ+DJWN4Cs5/63knht7ROOE6ehCV1nOgrg4NH
 r1/EqB9uP99vUF0WoH/W71XlrdG2L7t30ovAO1819ROzhj4b3Y1MaVlVA8eN8jMH
 0qNHyDfgYBQuvkBbFtwUl4J2gjA9TEOXHKZN2Rm5Sg7mf8uKUL/kqpDClkssG1v6
 rNNz4sykj9oYaKMae7Y6/KMdew9UDJ1++5wWtL819N30Xet8uUC0aeMRkolxLkJW
 HsahkqxC4QX3q27dks007JjEIDQssSsWuWVedSkVlsjdstB8FEqi0eSBxhesg/Vx
 KFH2EfxitU62XtlixMJwca26ZheTiHSSd2xb2AQAocJkGZOI0V9xCjw/FXdaKImw
 DGtOmAzIejp7ujXA0eqp6VB5V6J+CcaJrLmJejrmqdf9YzsbGeWgEL3mVvUV0JCp
 MVppslF94EhQR6kYS/K7mbx1sFOkurb9yE1Dl+orORksh7B1Dggoh1d8ncc0wVN6
 qLQdi2SS4tbFZF7IaxXhF1rnpc6e+osNDWZxIjrKMpvo23WDVeM=
 =6U/T
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-

 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #34345 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "Don't Bootstrap" Startup Mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34345: "Don't Bootstrap" Startup Mode
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #29590
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor30-must|
--+--
 Tor Browser needs a better user experience at start-up, and automatically
 bootstrapping and doing "Smart Things" in the background is the next stage
 in Tor Browser's evolution. But users should be able to launch Tor Browser
 and tell it not to bootstrap (before it starts bootstrapping).

 Roger and I had some ideas including:
  - Add a context menu option for launching but not bootstrap
  - Add a key combination (like pressing spacebar) and Tor Browser what
 that means
  - Tor Browser always waits 5 seconds before bootstrapping, and provides a
 "cancel" button

 None of these are really good options, but maybe use this as a starting
 point and find a better option.

 At the root of this is trying to solve three problems:
   1. Tor Browser usability depends on tor bootstrapping seamlessly and
 hiding this detail from users
   1. The current configuration may be dangerous after moving into a new
 environment
   1. Tor Browser should have a start-up mode where Tor Browser doesn't
 send a single packet on the network before the user has the option of
 configuring tor

 (Most likely) 99.9% of users only need (1), but we shouldn't ignore (2)
 and (3).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29590 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Smarter bootstrapping for Tor Browser taking censorship into account (was: Smarter bootstrapping for Tor Browser on Android taking censorship into acc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29590: Smarter bootstrapping for Tor Browser taking censorship into account
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, s32-o32a1|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31283| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor30-must
--+
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, ux-team, s32-o32a1 => ux-team, s32-o32a1
 * sponsor:  Sponsor30-can => Sponsor30-must


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[tor-bugs] #34344 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Can Firefox's background connections help us detect interference?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34344: Can Firefox's background connections help us detect interference?
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
  |  TorBrowserTeam202009
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #31284
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Firefox connects to pre-defined URL for testing if it is behind a captive
 portal. Tor Browser disables that (#21790).

 Can any of Firefox's background connections be used as a way of probing
 the local network (or ISP) for network interference? If we use them, how
 can we blend in with Firefox?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34343 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Teach Tor Browser How to Test a Bridge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34343: Teach Tor Browser How to Test a Bridge
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202008  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31284| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Description changed by sysrqb:

Old description:

> Roger said it this way:
> {{{
> basically what tor browser needs on the backend is a routine that tries a
> bridge+pt and decides whether it worked. and once we have that building
> block, many things get easier.
> }}}
>
> This is important for creating a smart and usable Tor Browser. In fact,
> Orbot has had a similar feature (but not exactly the same) for
> [https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/commit/df37b8c4a98455c4ac42fb52a6089997fdaa6c0d
> two years].

New description:

 Roger said it this way:
 {{{
 basically what tor browser needs on the backend is a routine that tries a
 bridge+pt and decides whether it worked. and once we have that building
 block, many things get easier.
 }}}
 {{{
 "given a PT and a bridge, try it and decide if bootstrapping worked"
 }}}

 This is important for creating a smart and usable Tor Browser. In fact,
 Orbot has had a similar feature (but not exactly the same) for
 
[https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/commit/df37b8c4a98455c4ac42fb52a6089997fdaa6c0d
 two years].

--

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[tor-bugs] #34343 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Teach Tor Browser How to Test a Bridge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34343: Teach Tor Browser How to Test a Bridge
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
  |  TorBrowserTeam202008
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #31284
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Roger said it this way:
 {{{
 basically what tor browser needs on the backend is a routine that tries a
 bridge+pt and decides whether it worked. and once we have that building
 block, many things get easier.
 }}}

 This is important for creating a smart and usable Tor Browser. In fact,
 Orbot has had a similar feature (but not exactly the same) for
 
[https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/commit/df37b8c4a98455c4ac42fb52a6089997fdaa6c0d
 two years].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33256 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Update CDF-TTFB graph

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33256: Update CDF-TTFB graph
---+
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:  #33327 | Points:  2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59-must
---+
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 With #34215 being merged and #34216 being under review, we're done here.
 In fact, we have already been using this graph type for #34303 using the
 yet unmerged code from those tickets. Closing as duplicate with the
 remaining work being done in #34216.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33257 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Add CDF-DL graph

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33257: Add CDF-DL graph
---+
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33327 | Points:  3
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59-must
---+
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 Please find the attached sample output with new graphs on pages 33 and 34.
 (I tried to extract these two pages as PNGs, but Trac doesn't let me show
 them inline here for whatever reason.)

 Please also find
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/onionperf.git/commit/?h=task-33257=73855c0bf1f1017c21520ef10b8f05be25e4f80a
 commit 73855c0 in my task-33257 branch] which implements this new graph
 type. (This branch is based on my task-34216-2 branch which is still under
 review; if this review goes through first, merging will have to wait for
 the other review to go through, too.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33939 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Decide which components of Fenix to rip out, disable, or use

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33939: Decide which components of Fenix to rip out, disable, or use
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam202004  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33184| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
  |  Sponsor58-must
--+

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Parent ticket is #34324

 Replying to [comment:3 sysrqb]:
 > === Must Audit ===
 > {{{
 > > # An implementation for loading and storing website icons (like
 favicons)
 > > mozilla_browser_icons -> org.mozilla.components:browser-icons
 > }}}
 #34323
 > {{{
 > >
 > > # Maintains the centralized state of a browser engine
 > > mozilla_browser_state -> org.mozilla.components:browser-state
 > }}}
 #34325
 > {{{
 > >
 > > # A syncable implementation of `concept-storage` backed by
 application-services' Places lib
 > > mozilla_browser_storage_sync -> org.mozilla.components:browser-
 storage-sync
 > }}}
 #34326
 > {{{
 > >
 > > # High-level descriptions/contracts of a data synchronization service
 component
 > > mozilla_concept_sync -> org.mozilla.components:concept-sync>
 > }}}
 #34327
 > {{{
 > >
 > > # Provides functionality for scanning QR codes
 > > mozilla_feature_qr -> org.mozilla.components:feature-qr
 > }}}
 #34328
 > {{{
 > >
 > > # Support opening non-browser apps and `intent://` style URLs
 > > mozilla_feature_app_links -> org.mozilla.components:feature-app-links
 > }}}
 #34329
 > {{{
 > >
 > > # Provides intent processing functionality by combining various other
 feature modules
 > > mozilla_feature_intent -> org.mozilla.components:feature-intent
 > }}}
 #34330
 > {{{
 > >
 > > # Implementation for saving and sorting recent apps used for sharing
 > > mozilla_feature_share -> org.mozilla.components:feature-share
 > }}}
 #34331
 > {{{
 > >
 > > # Sends tabs to other devices with a registered FxA Account
 > > mozilla_feature_accounts_push -> org.mozilla.components:feature-
 accounts-push
 > }}}
 #34332
 > {{{
 > >
 > > # Implementation for Progressive Web Apps (PWA)
 > > mozilla_feature_pwa -> org.mozilla.components:feature-pwa
 > }}}
 #34333
 > {{{
 > >
 > > # Website-hotfixing via the Web Compatibility System-Addon
 > > mozilla_feature_webcompat -> org.mozilla.components:feature-webcompat
 > }}}
 #34334
 > {{{
 > >
 > > # Integrating with Firefox Sync - Logins
 > > mozilla_service_sync_logins -> org.mozilla.components:service-sync-
 logins
 > }}}
 #34335
 > {{{
 > >
 > > # Integrating with Firefox Accounts
 > > mozilla_service_firefox_accounts -> org.mozilla.components:service-
 firefox-accounts
 > }}}
 #34336
 > {{{
 > >
 > > # Accessing Mozilla's and other location services
 > > mozilla_service_location -> org.mozilla.components:service-location
 > }}}
 #34337
 > {{{
 > >
 > > # A generic crash reporter component that can report crashes to
 multiple services
 > > mozilla_lib_crash -> org.mozilla.components:lib-crash
 > }}}
 #34338
 > {{{
 > >
 > > # Helper code to migrate from a Fennec-based (Firefox for Android) app
 to an Android Components based app
 > > mozilla_support_migration -> org.mozilla.components:support-migration
 > }}}
 #34339
 > {{{
 > >
 > > # A concept-push implementation using Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM)
 > > mozilla_lib_push_firebase -> org.mozilla.components:lib-push-firebase
 > }}}
 #34340
 > {{{
 > >
 > > # A component using AndroidKeyStore to protect user data
 > > mozilla_lib_dataprotect -> org.mozilla.components:lib-dataprotect
 > }}}
 #34341
 > {{{
 > >
 > > androidx_biometric -> androidx.biometric:biometric
 > }}}
 #34342

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33257 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Add CDF-DL graph

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33257: Add CDF-DL graph
---+
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33327 | Points:  3
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59-must
---+
Changes (by karsten):

 * Attachment "onionperf.viz.2020-05-28_20:49:42-2.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33257 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Add CDF-DL graph

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33257: Add CDF-DL graph
---+
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33327 | Points:  3
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59-must
---+
Changes (by karsten):

 * Attachment "onionperf.viz.2020-05-28_20:49:42-1.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19774 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: bridges.torproject.org could use a favicon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19774: bridges.torproject.org could use a favicon
--+
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB|Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, easy, s30-o22a2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31279| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor30-must
--+
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 I took the favicon from torproject.org and added it to BridgeDB. Here's my
 patch:
 https://github.com/NullHypothesis/bridgedb/compare/enhancement/19774

 And here's what it looks like in the browser:
 [[Image(bridgedb-favicon.png)]]

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[tor-bugs] #34342 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audit androidx_biometric

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34342: Audit androidx_biometric
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam202006
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #34324
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 > androidx_biometric -> androidx.biometric:biometric

 https://developer.android.com/jetpack/androidx/releases/biometric
 https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/support/+/refs/heads
 /androidx-biometric-release/biometric/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19774 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: bridges.torproject.org could use a favicon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19774: bridges.torproject.org could use a favicon
--+
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB|Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, easy, s30-o22a2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31279| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor30-must
--+
Changes (by phw):

 * Attachment "bridgedb-favicon.png" added.

 BridgeDB favicon

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33257 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Add CDF-DL graph

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33257: Add CDF-DL graph
---+
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33327 | Points:  3
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59-must
---+
Changes (by karsten):

 * Attachment "onionperf.viz.2020-05-28_20:49:42.pdf" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #34305 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript inconsistent behaviour in Firefox 77 (currently beta)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34305: NoScript inconsistent behaviour in Firefox 77 (currently beta)
-+-
 Reporter:  acat |  Owner:  acat
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript TorBrowserTeam202005,   |  Actual Points:
  ff78-esr   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ma1):

 Replying to [comment:9 acat]:

 > I think it may be simply because `navigator.userAgent` is spoofed.

 Correct. However what's the point of spoofing in a WebExtension background
 page? Maybe another blocker for
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1450398 ?

 > Maybe you could use `browser.runtime.getBrowserInfo()`, which always
 reports the right version?

 Yes, I had considered this, but I preferred to avoid it in early
 initialization code because it's an asynchronous API. However I've got
 hacks in places to make it a lesser issue, so I guess I can live with
 that. Switching to getBrowserInfo() in rc2.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19774 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: bridges.torproject.org could use a favicon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19774: bridges.torproject.org could use a favicon
--+
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB|Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, easy, s30-o22a2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31279| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor30-must
--+
Changes (by phw):

 * owner:  antonela => phw


Comment:

 I'm snatching this ticket because it's an easy fix.

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[tor-bugs] #34341 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audit mozilla_lib_dataprotect

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34341: Audit mozilla_lib_dataprotect
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam202006
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #34324
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 > # A component using AndroidKeyStore to protect user data
 > mozilla_lib_dataprotect -> org.mozilla.components:lib-dataprotect

 https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/android-
 components/tree/master/components/lib/dataprotect

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34216 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Split visualizations into public server vs. v2 onion server vs. v3 onion server measurements

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34216: Split visualizations into public server vs. v2 onion server vs. v3 onion
server measurements
---+
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33327 | Points:
 Reviewer:  acute  |Sponsor:  Sponsor59-must
---+

Comment (by karsten):

 Or maybe just review the rebased, squashed version which is in
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/onionperf.git/commit/?h=task-34216-2=96cf57f8862b5341d1e0724aecef2c294fe81f3b
 commit 96cf57f in my task-34216-2 branch].

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[tor-bugs] #34340 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audit mozilla_lib_push_firebase

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34340: Audit mozilla_lib_push_firebase
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam202006
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #34324
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 > # A concept-push implementation using Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM)
 > mozilla_lib_push_firebase -> org.mozilla.components:lib-push-firebase

 https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/android-
 components/tree/master/components/lib/push-firebase

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[tor-bugs] #34339 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audit mozilla_support_migration

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34339: Audit mozilla_support_migration
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam202006
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #34324
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 > # Helper code to migrate from a Fennec-based (Firefox for Android) app
 to an Android Components based app
 > mozilla_support_migration -> org.mozilla.components:support-migration

 https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/android-
 components/tree/master/components/support/migration

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[tor-bugs] #34338 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audit mozilla_lib_crash

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34338: Audit mozilla_lib_crash
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam202006
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #34324
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 > # A generic crash reporter component that can report crashes to multiple
 services
 > mozilla_lib_crash -> org.mozilla.components:lib-crash

 https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/android-
 components/tree/master/components/lib/crash

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[tor-bugs] #34337 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audit mozilla_service_location

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34337: Audit mozilla_service_location
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam202006
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #34324
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 > # Accessing Mozilla's and other location services
 > mozilla_service_location -> org.mozilla.components:service-location

 https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/android-
 components/tree/master/components/service/location

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[tor-bugs] #34336 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audit mozilla_service_firefox_accounts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34336: Audit mozilla_service_firefox_accounts
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam202006
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #34324
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 > # Integrating with Firefox Accounts
 > mozilla_service_firefox_accounts -> org.mozilla.components:service-
 firefox-accounts

 https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/android-
 components/tree/master/components/service/firefox-accounts

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[tor-bugs] #34335 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audit mozilla_service_sync_logins

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34335: Audit mozilla_service_sync_logins
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam202006
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #34324
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 > # Integrating with Firefox Sync - Logins
 > mozilla_service_sync_logins -> org.mozilla.components:service-sync-
 logins

 https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/android-
 components/tree/master/components/service/sync-logins

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[tor-bugs] #34334 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audit mozilla_feature_webcompat

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34334: Audit mozilla_feature_webcompat
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam202006
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #34324
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 > # Website-hotfixing via the Web Compatibility System-Addon
 > mozilla_feature_webcompat -> org.mozilla.components:feature-webcompat

 https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/android-
 components/tree/master/components/feature/webcompat

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30477: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, s30-o23a3, network-team- |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2020Q2, anticensorship-wants   |
Parent ID:  #31280   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-
Changes (by phw):

 * keywords:  tor-pt, s30-o23a3, network-team-roadmap-2020Q2 => tor-pt,
 s30-o23a3, network-team-roadmap-2020Q2, anticensorship-wants


Comment:

 Adding the "anticensorship-wants" keyword. This would be very helpful for
 bridge operators.

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[tor-bugs] #34333 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audit mozilla_feature_pwa

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34333: Audit mozilla_feature_pwa
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam202006
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #34324
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 > # Implementation for Progressive Web Apps (PWA)
 > mozilla_feature_pwa -> org.mozilla.components:feature-pwa

 https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/android-
 components/tree/master/components/feature/pwa

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[tor-bugs] #34332 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audit mozilla_feature_accounts_push

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34332: Audit mozilla_feature_accounts_push
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam202006
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #34324
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 > # Sends tabs to other devices with a registered FxA Account
 > mozilla_feature_accounts_push -> org.mozilla.components:feature-
 accounts-push

 https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/android-
 components/tree/master/components/feature/accounts-push

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[tor-bugs] #34331 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audit mozilla_feature_share

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34331: Audit mozilla_feature_share
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam202006
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #34324
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 > # Implementation for saving and sorting recent apps used for sharing
 > mozilla_feature_share -> org.mozilla.components:feature-share

 https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/android-
 components/tree/master/components/feature/share

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[tor-bugs] #34330 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audit mozilla_feature_intent

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34330: Audit mozilla_feature_intent
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam202006
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #34324
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 > # Provides intent processing functionality by combining various other
 feature modules
 > mozilla_feature_intent -> org.mozilla.components:feature-intent

 https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/android-
 components/tree/master/components/feature/intent

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34329 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audit mozilla_feature_app_links

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34329: Audit mozilla_feature_app_links
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam202006  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #34324| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Description changed by sysrqb:

Old description:

> > # Provides intent processing functionality by combining various other
> feature modules
> > mozilla_feature_intent -> org.mozilla.components:feature-intent
>
> https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/android-
> components/tree/master/components/feature/intent

New description:

 > # Support opening non-browser apps and `intent://` style URLs
 > mozilla_feature_app_links -> org.mozilla.components:feature-app-links

 https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/android-
 components/tree/master/components/feature/app-links

--

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[tor-bugs] #34329 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audit mozilla_feature_app_links

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34329: Audit mozilla_feature_app_links
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam202006
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #34324
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 > # Provides intent processing functionality by combining various other
 feature modules
 > mozilla_feature_intent -> org.mozilla.components:feature-intent

 https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/android-
 components/tree/master/components/feature/intent

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34216 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Split visualizations into public server vs. v2 onion server vs. v3 onion server measurements

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34216: Split visualizations into public server vs. v2 onion server vs. v3 onion
server measurements
---+
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33327 | Points:
 Reviewer:  acute  |Sponsor:  Sponsor59-must
---+

Comment (by karsten):

 Please also review
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/onionperf.git/commit/?h=task-34216=8fccbea816bafad75981169fe1704391572ced8b
 fixup commit 8fccbea].

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[tor-bugs] #34328 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audit mozilla_feature_qr

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34328: Audit mozilla_feature_qr
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam202006
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #34324
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 > # Provides functionality for scanning QR codes
 > mozilla_feature_qr -> org.mozilla.components:feature-qr

 https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/android-
 components/tree/master/components/feature/qr

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29277 [Circumvention/Pluggable transport]: Look into getting default Tor bridges scanned by external reachability tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29277: Look into getting default Tor bridges scanned by external reachability
tests
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Pluggable transport|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  augur, measurement, s30-o21a1, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  bridges, anti-censorship-roadmap-2020  |
Parent ID:  #31274   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-

Comment (by phw):

 Brief update: Our colleagues from ICLab sent me a measurement snapshot. I
 took a cursory look at it but need to spend some more time before
 summarising my analysis on this ticket. Please let me know if anyone else
 is interested in taking a look at the data.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34327 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audit mozilla_concept_sync

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34327: Audit mozilla_concept_sync
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam202006  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #34324| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 (This should be an abstract implementation, so this may not have much code
 to audit)

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[tor-bugs] #34327 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audit mozilla_concept_sync

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34327: Audit mozilla_concept_sync
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam202006
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #34324
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 > # High-level descriptions/contracts of a data synchronization service
 component
 > mozilla_concept_sync -> org.mozilla.components:concept-sync>

 https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/android-
 components/tree/master/components/concept/sync

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30152 [Circumvention]: Monitor anti-censorship infrastructure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30152: Monitor anti-censorship infrastructure
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-2020 ,   |  implemented
  s30-o21a1  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31274   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-can
-+-
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 I'm closing this ticket because we are now monitoring our anti-censorship
 infrastructure via [https://mmonit.com monit]. Our monit configuration is
 available [https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/monit-
 configuration here] and explains how one can set up a new instance. Our
 current monit instance runs on my personal VPS. Outage email alerts go to
 our new [https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/anti-
 censorship-alerts anti-censorship-alerts] mailing list.

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[tor-bugs] #34326 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audit mozilla_browser_storage_sync

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34326: Audit mozilla_browser_storage_sync
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam202006
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #34324
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 > # A syncable implementation of `concept-storage` backed by application-
 services' Places lib
 > mozilla_browser_storage_sync -> org.mozilla.components:browser-storage-
 sync

 https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/android-
 components/tree/master/components/browser/storage-sync

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[tor-bugs] #34325 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audit mozilla_browser_state

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34325: Audit mozilla_browser_state
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam202006
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #34324
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 > # Maintains the centralized state of a browser engine
 > mozilla_browser_state -> org.mozilla.components:browser-state

 https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/android-
 components/tree/master/components/browser/state

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34324 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Must Audit Components

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34324: Must Audit Components
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam202006  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33659| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
  |  Sponsor58-must
--+

Comment (by sysrqb):

 This ticket's child tickets should go under #33939, but we reached the
 child-ticket-depth-limit:

 Warning: The ticket field parent is invalid: Parent/Child relationships go
 too deep, 'max_depth' exceeded (5) : #None - #33939 - #33184 - #33659 -
 #33657 - #33664

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[tor-bugs] #34324 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Must Audit Components

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34324: Must Audit Components
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam202006
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #33659
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor58-must   |
-+-
 Components we must audit.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31159 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Monitor anti-censorship www services with prometheus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31159: Monitor anti-censorship www services with prometheus
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-may  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by phw):

 * parent:  #30152 =>


Comment:

 Removing the parent (because we are already monitoring our anti-censorship
 infrastructure).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34323 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audit mozilla_browser_icons

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34323: Audit mozilla_browser_icons
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam202006  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #34324| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * parent:  #33184 => #34324


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29863 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Add disk space monitoring for snowflake infrastructure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29863: Add disk space monitoring for snowflake infrastructure
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap, |  Actual Points:
  budget_needed  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-can
-+-
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  merge_ready => assigned
 * parent:  #30152 =>


Comment:

 Removing the parent (because we are now monitoring anti-censorship
 infrastructure with monit) and setting the status back to assigned
 (because cohosh indicated that this ticket needs more thought).

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[tor-bugs] #34323 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audit mozilla_browser_icons

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34323: Audit mozilla_browser_icons
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam202006
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #33184
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 > # An implementation for loading and storing website icons (like
 favicons)
 > mozilla_browser_icons -> org.mozilla.components:browser-icons

 https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/android-
 components/tree/master/components/browser/icons

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34074 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: [RT-admin] Redirect email alias giving@ and newsletter@ to RT

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34074: [RT-admin] Redirect email alias giving@ and newsletter@ to RT
-+-
 Reporter:  ggus |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Services Admin |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-april|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by alsmith):

 Hi! giving@ isn't redirecting to RT any longer. A couple of emails
 redirected to RT on April 30, but no new emails have redirected there
 since April 30. I'm still getting them in my inbox.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34216 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Split visualizations into public server vs. v2 onion server vs. v3 onion server measurements

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34216: Split visualizations into public server vs. v2 onion server vs. v3 onion
server measurements
---+
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33327 | Points:
 Reviewer:  acute  |Sponsor:  Sponsor59-must
---+

Comment (by karsten):

 Looks like we need to try harder to distinguish public and onion service
 measurements. The current branch above has a bug very similar to I just
 learned that the branch above has a bug very similar to
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics-
 web.git/commit/?id=82aa20a17cb8ff827873e6d0a776b9e2967197bb this one].
 I'll post a fixup commit later today or early tomorrow.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31159 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Monitor anti-censorship www services with prometheus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31159: Monitor anti-censorship www services with prometheus
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-may  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30152   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by phw):

 Replying to [comment:24 hiro]:
 > I think this does it:
 https://grafana2.torproject.org/d/TVZiAIRGz/bridges?orgId=1
 [[br]]
 This looks good, thanks hiro.

 In the meanwhile, we've set up a monit instance on my VPS, which is now
 monitoring all of our anti-censorship infrastructure. Frankly, this works
 better for us than prometheus: it's simple, effective, and we control it.
 There's some merit in having prometheus monitor our infrastructure but
 given that the sysadmin team is stretched thin, I'm inclined to close this
 ticket as a "wontfix".

 Thoughts?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32740 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Implement a feedback loop between BridgeDB and OONI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32740: Implement a feedback loop between BridgeDB and OONI
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s30-o23a2, anti-censorship-  |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2020   |
Parent ID:  #31280   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * cc: gaba (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #34322 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Make BridgeDB's web interface look like torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34322: Make BridgeDB's web interface look like torproject.org
+---
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s30-o22a2   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31279  | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor30-can
+---

Comment (by phw):

 Antonela informed be that our static CSS files are available
 [https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/lego/-/tree/master/assets here].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34286 [Applications/GetTor]: gettor appears to be in an email loop war with a .sk address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34286: gettor appears to be in an email loop war with a .sk address
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  phw  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks good to me! I left a nitpick as comment.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10394 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbrowser's updater updates HTTPS-everywhere

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10394: Torbrowser's updater updates HTTPS-everywhere
-+-
 Reporter:  StrangeCharm |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202005R, https-everywhere|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  gk   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201805, https-everywhere => tbb-
 security, TorBrowserTeam202005R, https-everywhere
 * reviewer:   => gk


Comment:

 Nice, thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10394 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbrowser's updater updates HTTPS-everywhere

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10394: Torbrowser's updater updates HTTPS-everywhere
-+-
 Reporter:  StrangeCharm |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201805,  |  Actual Points:
  https-everywhere   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by rustybird):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10394 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbrowser's updater updates HTTPS-everywhere

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10394: Torbrowser's updater updates HTTPS-everywhere
-+-
 Reporter:  StrangeCharm |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201805,  |  Actual Points:
  https-everywhere   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by rustybird):

 Here's a small patch.

 I tested it on top of TB 9.0.10 (rezipped omni.ja), with
 `extensions.update.interval` set to `60` seconds, by watching requests via
 `SETEVENTS STREAM` on a tor control port: The eff.org version check ping
 is gone. It's even more obvious if the NoScript ID is added to the patch
 as well, then there's no update traffic at all.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10394 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbrowser's updater updates HTTPS-everywhere

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10394: Torbrowser's updater updates HTTPS-everywhere
-+-
 Reporter:  StrangeCharm |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201805,  |  Actual Points:
  https-everywhere   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by rustybird):

 * Attachment "Bug-10394-Disable-HTTPS-Everywhere-addon-updates.patch"
 added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33257 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Add CDF-DL graph

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33257: Add CDF-DL graph
---+
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33327 | Points:  3
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59-must
---+
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * owner:  metrics-team => karsten


Comment:

 I'll start working on this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33939 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Decide which components of Fenix to rip out, disable, or use

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33939: Decide which components of Fenix to rip out, disable, or use
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam202004  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33184| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
  |  Sponsor58-must
--+

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:5 gk]:
 > Thanks, that's a good start. Two thoughts while skimming the list (I did
 not look carefully yet)
 >
 > 1) At least the progressive web apps (PWA) part should probably be in
 the Must Audit section. We even have a ticket for that already: #25845 :)

 That's probably a smart thing, yes. PWA is only available in non-private
 browsing mode in Fennec, but we should audit it in Fenix. Indeed, PWA is
 available in private browsing mode in Fenix...

 >
 > 2) I was wondering how the dependencies those dependencies have would
 influence where we put them category-wise. So, starting with one layer
 seems good to me but I feel we might need to dig deeper to have a final
 assessment. One of the things I am already wary of is getting all the
 application-services parts roped in "for free". Not all components are
 probably needing that (I've not checked) but I bet some would move into
 the Must Audit part alone due to that. And there's probably other stuff
 that is bubbling in this morass, under the quite surface... :)

 Ideally, we should audit everything, but I don't think that is realistic.
 We should quickly look at all components in the `Include` category and
 confirm they do not make any network calls or expose personal/device
 information. I placed them in this category purely based on my assumption
 of how these components are implemented.

 I expect we'll spend a large amount of time auditing components within the
 `Must Audit` category because this includes the complex application
 services, and ripping out any of them will be painful.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34215 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Harmonize TTFB/TTLB definitions with Tor Metrics plots

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34215: Harmonize TTFB/TTLB definitions with Tor Metrics plots
---+---
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #33327 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59
---+---
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 We agreed at today's team meeting that this is a good change. Rebased and
 merged to master. Closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31283 [UX]: O3.2 - Design the flow of how our users can bypass the scenarios of O3.1.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31283: O3.2 - Design the flow of how our users can bypass the scenarios of 
O3.1.
-+
 Reporter:  gaba |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  UX   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31269   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor30-must
-+

Comment (by antonela):

 Some old notes about Tor Launcher
 https://www.notion.so/UX-Tor-Launcher-440a8ea87013480f83ecf1de6b87089b

 Some old notes about Get Tor
 https://www.notion.so/AC-Get-Tor-0f5acdab88704a00a5d8917eb8350b24

 EFF Circumvention guide
 https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/understanding-and-circumventing-network-
 censorship

 Tails ft Tor Launcher
 https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/network_connection/
 https://redmine.tails.boum.org/code/issues/8061#note-33

 OONI Net test
 https://github.com/ooni/spec/blob/master/nettests/ts-023-tor.md

 Connecting to random domains at startup is not crazy, or is it?
 https://www.mikewest.org/2012/02/chrome-connects-to-three-random-domains-
 at-startup/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31283 [UX]: O3.2 - Design the flow of how our users can bypass the scenarios of O3.1.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31283: O3.2 - Design the flow of how our users can bypass the scenarios of 
O3.1.
-+
 Reporter:  gaba |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  UX   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31269   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor30-must
-+

Comment (by antonela):

 **Proposal** - Tor Browser 10

 What if we plan Tor Browser 10 as the "anti-censorship/circumvention"
 release?

 I want to make Tor Browser proactive in detecting censorship. Most of the
 time, users get aware of a kind of network interference when they wish to
 access specific content. But even in those cases, most users are not aware
 of the technical background under that censorship experience.

 Using retroactive OONI data or an OONI vanilla test,  can we make Tor
 Browser proactive on safety detect interference in the user's NAT and act
 upon that?

 With this iteration, I aim to make Tor Browser smart enough to 1. detect
 interference, 2. ask for user consent to use bridges, and 3. open the best
 bridge available. Advanced users will be able to configure custom bridges,
 private bridges, friends bridges, and any tunnel they want via Advanced
 Options.

 Also, this iteration will improve the ''no censored'' users launching
 experience by making it similar to any other browser.

 We thought a bit about this flow back for TBA in #28329.

 Out of scope?
 - Tails use case: people who want to hide the fact that they are
 connecting to Tor

 **User Flow**

 Current flow to access bridges:

 1. Open the browser
 2. User click "Configure"
 3. User click "Tor is censored in my country"
 4. User click "Select a built-in bridge"
 5. User select a bridge from the menu
 6. User repeat 4. until some chosen option works
 7. Gets connected

 **Proposed flow to access the Tor network**
 1. Open the browser
 2. Wait for connecting
 3. If the connection failed, Tor Browser prompts users for consent to
 request a bridge
 4. User gives consent.
 > Does user solve a puzzle? Does user disclose sensitive information eg.
 location?
 5. User gets connected

 [[Image(https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/raw-
 attachment/ticket/31283/S30.png, 700px)]]


 **Wireframes**

 [[Image(https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/raw-
 attachment/ticket/31283/wireframes.png, 700px)]]


 


 **Questions**

 - What do you think? Do you see it doable?
 - Do you see we can plan middle releases in alphas for testing this?
 - If we need to plan middle releases, which are the middle steps you would
 like to take before going to stable?
 - Do you feel comfortable with picking the best bridge for users instead
 of asking them to find one?
 - Given our short capacity for browser development, can this team provide
 the needed patches to tor browser devs for making this happen?
 - Can we still offer Tor Launcher to 3rd parties without an interface?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34305 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript inconsistent behaviour in Firefox 77 (currently beta)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34305: NoScript inconsistent behaviour in Firefox 77 (currently beta)
-+-
 Reporter:  acat |  Owner:  acat
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript TorBrowserTeam202005,   |  Actual Points:
  ff78-esr   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by acat):

 In any case, this would not be an issue for Tor Browser ESR78.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31283 [UX]: O3.2 - Design the flow of how our users can bypass the scenarios of O3.1.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31283: O3.2 - Design the flow of how our users can bypass the scenarios of 
O3.1.
-+
 Reporter:  gaba |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  UX   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31269   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor30-must
-+
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "S30.png" added.

 user-flow

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31283 [UX]: O3.2 - Design the flow of how our users can bypass the scenarios of O3.1.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31283: O3.2 - Design the flow of how our users can bypass the scenarios of 
O3.1.
-+
 Reporter:  gaba |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  UX   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31269   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor30-must
-+
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "wireframes.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #34305 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript inconsistent behaviour in Firefox 77 (currently beta)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34305: NoScript inconsistent behaviour in Firefox 77 (currently beta)
-+-
 Reporter:  acat |  Owner:  acat
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript TorBrowserTeam202005,   |  Actual Points:
  ff78-esr   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by acat):

 Thanks! It now works with the steps I mentioned, but the issue is still
 present with `privacy.resistFingerprinting = true`. More concretely, I can
 reproduce if I enable that pref and restart the browser, and then continue
 with the steps from the ticket description.

 I think it may be simply because `navigator.userAgent` is spoofed. Maybe
 you could use `browser.runtime.getBrowserInfo()`, which always reports the
 right version?

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[tor-bugs] #34322 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Make BridgeDB's web interface look like torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34322: Make BridgeDB's web interface look like torproject.org
+---
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:  s30-o22a2
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:  #31279
   Points:  0.5 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor30-can   |
+---
 BridgeDB's web interface at bridges.torproject.org uses bootstrap, with
 its own look and feel. We should make it look like torproject.org.
 Antonela suggested that this may be as simple as loading torproject.org's
 CSS on top of the existing CSS files.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31282 [UX]: O3.1 - Research different scenarios of how human rights defenders experience censorship.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31282: O3.1 - Research different scenarios of how human rights defenders
experience censorship.
-+
 Reporter:  gaba |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  UX   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31269   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor30-must
-+

Comment (by antonela):

 **Scenarios**

 Based on [https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/understanding-and-circumventing-
 network-censorship](https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/understanding-and-
 circumventing-network-censorship)

 (1) Blocking or filtering on devices

 (2) Local network filtering

 - User cannot access to http://torproject.org to download Tor Browser

 This includes reaching

 - gettor.torproject.org
 Do we have a list of mirrors? can we have a list of mirrors? how
 users access to gettor information if the primary domain is blocked? can
 we optimize search engines to show trusted information?

 - bridges.torproject.org
 Do we have a list of mirrors?
 Should bridges.tpo have TPI branding? should bridges.tpo live
 under www maintenance?

 - torproject.org/download
 Do we have trusted distributors? are app stores up-to-date?

 (3) Blocking or filtering by Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
 - User cannot connect to the Tor network

 Which scenario is missing? What use case is not contemplated?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34321 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add What's New Onboarding Item

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34321: Add What's New Onboarding Item
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-9.5,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202005R, |
Parent ID:  #31660   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 After discussing this on #tor-dev, gk and mcs reviewed the patch.

 I rebased the patch onto tor-browser-68.9.0esr and merged it as commit
 `db3ccb2a11256421f5d8db7caad10a5a2c98def5` on `tor-
 browser-68.9.0esr-9.5-1`. I cherry-picked it as commit
 `d9016507dc5dd4910023b29df339aff63fd5d9a1` onto `tor-
 browser-68.9.0esr-10.0-1`.

 Thanks everyone!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29369 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Fix message logging and filtering

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29369: Fix message logging and filtering
---+
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:  0.4
Parent ID:  #33321 | Points:  1.0
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59-must
---+
Changes (by phw):

 * cc: metrics-team (added)
 * owner:  metrics-team => phw


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Re: [tor-bugs] #34216 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Split visualizations into public server vs. v2 onion server vs. v3 onion server measurements

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34216: Split visualizations into public server vs. v2 onion server vs. v3 onion
server measurements
---+
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33327 | Points:
 Reviewer:  acute  |Sponsor:  Sponsor59-must
---+
Changes (by acute):

 * reviewer:   => acute


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Re: [tor-bugs] #34321 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add What's New Onboarding Item

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34321: Add What's New Onboarding Item
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-9.5,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202005R, |
Parent ID:  #31660   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by acat):

 Works for me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34231 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Document and maybe improve how we're mapping TGen transfers to Tor streams/circuits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34231: Document and maybe improve how we're mapping TGen transfers to Tor
streams/circuits
---+
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33328 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59-must
---+

Comment (by karsten):

 This looks like a very promising approach! Some thoughts:

  - We're currently using TGen 0.0.1. It sounds like we would first have to
 upgrade to 1.0.0 in order to use this feature (#33974).

  - If we're concerned about `tgen` generated SOCKS credentials not being
 long enough to avoid conflicts, we could additionally look at source ports
 to match transfers and streams.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34321 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add What's New Onboarding Item

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34321: Add What's New Onboarding Item
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-9.5,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202005R, |
Parent ID:  #31660   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 For testing the update scenario:
 1) Open `about:config`
 2) Change `browser.onboarding.state` to `default` (if not currently)
 3) Change `browser.onboarding.tour-type` to `update` (it should be `new`)

 `about:tor` should automatically notice these changes and provide the new
 behavior.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31660 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Revise onboarding to take new Firefox experience into account

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31660: Revise onboarding to take new Firefox experience into account
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-9.5,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202005R, ReleaseTrainMigration   |
Parent ID:  #33658   | Points:  4
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor58-can
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  needs_review => new


Comment:

 (Okay. We're 30 comments into this ticket, but it's never too late for
 becoming organized).

 I opened #34321 for the current patch we're working on that is going into
 9.5.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34321 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add What's New Onboarding Item

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34321: Add What's New Onboarding Item
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-9.5,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202005R, |
Parent ID:  #31660   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * cc: gk, mcs, brade (added)


Comment:

 I have a branch for review at:

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/sysrqb/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug31660_02=d8ff33095d73cf7c839c894fcb14ba923b38b957

 testbuilds:
 https://people.torproject.org/~sysrqb/bug34321/tor-browser-linux64
 -testbuild_en-US_01.tar.xz
 https://people.torproject.org/~sysrqb/bug34321/TorBrowser-testbuild-
 osx64_en-US_01.dmg

 I'm not very happy about my choice of strings.

 Based on brade and mcs' suggestions in comments [ticket:31660#comment:24
 24], [ticket:31660#comment:25 25], and [ticket:31660#comment:26 26], the
 Onboarding experience behavior is now different between new installations
 and upgrades. After upgrading, a user should see the Onboarding bubble
 ("See what's new in Tor Browser") and when that is clicked the "Release
 Notes" webpage should open in a separate tab. At the same time, the
 Onboarding tour is marked as completed and the bubble is hidden on
 `about:tor`. The onboarding overlay is never shown to the user.

 With a new installation, the user sees the current onboarding overlay with
 the addition of a "Learn More" tab. The major changes in this situation
 are when the user clicks the "Done" button on the Onion Services tour and
 when the user directly clicks on the "Learn More" tab. In both of these
 cases the "Release Notes" page is opened in a separate tab, the "Learn
 More" item is marked as completed, and the overlay is hidden.

 Continuing to use "Done" as the string on Onion Services button is
 possibly confusing, but the behavior is nearly the same as before.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33533 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser esr68 patches on top of mozilla-central

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33533: Rebase Tor Browser esr68 patches on top of mozilla-central
--+
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  acat
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202005R |  Actual Points:  14
Parent ID:  #33661| Points:
 Reviewer:  sysrqb, gk|Sponsor:  Sponsor58-must
--+

Comment (by mcs):

 Mozilla accepted our patch in
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1588549. That means that
 going forward we no longer need to revert the 1574980 patch (which is done
 in commit 49a05838bf2d97ec22fe300a29e91cd36d59f92a on 33533+5).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30586 [Metrics/Onionperf]: requirements are not included in setup.py

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30586: requirements are not included in setup.py
---+
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:  0.45
Parent ID:  #33321 | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59-must
---+

Comment (by karsten):

 Almost there! Two further questions:

  1. What if I want to run `onionperf` from another directory than
 `onionperf/onionperf`? I tried passing another relative or absolute path
 to `PYTHONPATH=`, but all I get is: `/usr/bin/python3: can't find
 '__main__' module in 'onionperf'`.

  2. Do you mind posting a new branch with phw's branch rebased to current
 master and with your two patches (the one on #33433 and the one above) on
 top? I would do this myself, but I'm having trouble applying your patches,
 and I don't want to claim authorship of these commits.

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34315 [Applications/Tor Browser]: avoid reading policies from /etc/firefox on Linux

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34315: avoid reading policies from /etc/firefox on Linux
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202005R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202006 => TorBrowserTeam202005R
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Here is a patch:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug34315-01=686bbbd739c930ee49f6d4ba3909628c22340385

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34263 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Library selection for using WebRTC for the project.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34263: Library selection for using WebRTC for the project.
-+-
 Reporter:  HashikD  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-mobile |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 We can leave this open for discussion, but I'm good with moving forward
 with this library for now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34254 [Core Tor/Tor]: Jenkins fails with hs_service.c:3118:3: error: comparison of unsigned expression < 0 is always false

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34254: Jenkins fails with hs_service.c:3118:3: error: comparison of unsigned
expression < 0 is always false
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  asn, dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged.

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[tor-bugs] #34321 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add What's New Onboarding Item

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34321: Add What's New Onboarding Item
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-9.5,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam202005R,
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #31660
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/31660#comment:20

 """
 We should have something included in the 9.5 release onboarding for the
 new features. Antonela and I decided we can have one new entry named
 "What's New" (following Mozilla's new onboarding experience). This entry
 simply has a link to a webpage where new features are described.

 The webpage is currently being developed at
 ​https://www.torproject.org/releases/tor-browser-95/
 """

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34303 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Find out why onion service measurements have gotten slower

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34303: Find out why onion service measurements have gotten slower
---+
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59-must
---+

Comment (by karsten):

 Maybe? I don't know that code or the background of #24469 enough to say
 what would be the best fix. I can only say that the patch above got us
 back to measurement results like those from before #24469 was fixed. But I
 wouldn't want to suggest a fix that fixes this issue too well for our use
 case and too much for other use cases.

 Do you want to move this ticket to Core Tor/Something for working on this
 issue? Or do you want to create your own ticket for the Tor part of it?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34303 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Find out why onion service measurements have gotten slower

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34303: Find out why onion service measurements have gotten slower
---+
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59-must
---+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * cc: nickm (added)


Comment:

 >  Here's the patch to current master that I used for measurements:

 Woa... ok that is a _great_ catch there!

 Quickly like that, probably we want `entry_guard_could_succeed()` to
 always return "True" if `UseEntryGuards 0` ?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34320 [Applications/Tor Browser]: fetch-gradle-dependencies should respect tmp_dir

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34320: fetch-gradle-dependencies should respect tmp_dir
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, GeorgKoppen202005,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202005   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, GeorgKoppen202005, TorBrowserTeam202005R => tbb-rbm,
 GeorgKoppen202005, TorBrowserTeam202005
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 The problem with using `tmp_dir` there is that the `var/build_id` of
 projects using `fetch-gradle-dependencies` will now depend on the value of
 `tmp_dir`. So for example moving the path of the `tor-browser-build`
 directory (where the default `tmp_dir` is located) will cause those
 projects to be rebuilt.

 Maybe this can be fixed by resetting `tmp_dir` in `var/build_id`:
 {{{
 diff --git a/rbm.conf b/rbm.conf
 index 628e33dd..c02afb6a 100644
 --- a/rbm.conf
 +++ b/rbm.conf
 @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ var:
# in the same order. In the cases where the installation order is
# important, sort_deps should be set to 0.
sort_deps: 1
 -  build_id: '[% sha256(c("var/build_id_txt", { buildconf => { num_procs
 => 4 } })).substr(0, 6) %]'
 +  build_id: '[% sha256(c("var/build_id_txt", { buildconf => { num_procs
 => 4 }, tmp_dir => "/tmp" })).substr(0, 6) %]'
build_id_txt: |
  [% c("version") %]
  [% IF c("git_hash") || c("hg_hash"); GET c("abbrev"); END; %]
 }}}

 Alternatively, we could patch rbm to always set `$TMPDIR` when running
 scripts. I think this patch would do that (but I have not tested it yet. I
 can make a real patch if you think that's a good idea.):
 {{{
 diff --git a/lib/RBM.pm b/lib/RBM.pm
 index 7cc9e24..50920af 100644
 --- a/lib/RBM.pm
 +++ b/lib/RBM.pm
 @@ -461,8 +461,9 @@ sub run_script {
  my ($project, $cmd, $f) = @_;
  $f //= \_exec;
  my @res;
 +local $ENV{TMPDIR} = get_tmp_dir($project);
  if ($cmd =~ m/^#/) {
 -my (undef, $tmp) = File::Temp::tempfile(DIR =>
 get_tmp_dir($project));
 +my (undef, $tmp) = File::Temp::tempfile(DIR => $ENV{TMPDIR});
  path($tmp)->spew_utf8($cmd);
  chmod 0700, $tmp;
  @res = $f->($tmp);
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31660 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Revise onboarding to take new Firefox experience into account

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31660: Revise onboarding to take new Firefox experience into account
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-9.5,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202005R, ReleaseTrainMigration   |
Parent ID:  #33658   | Points:  4
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor58-can
-+-

Comment (by antonela):

 Thanks for working on this team! What is the final version? Will make the
 alpha? Can I have a build?

 The idea of the webpage was exactly to avoid last-minute changes in Tor
 Browser patches. I think it is good if we open a new tab for existing
 users.

 For new users, we can use "See what's new" link too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34303 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Find out why onion service measurements have gotten slower

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34303: Find out why onion service measurements have gotten slower
---+
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59-must
---+
Changes (by karsten):

 * owner:  metrics-team => karsten
 * status:  new => accepted


Comment:

 Okay, I think I know what the issue is: Tor stopped cannibalizing circuits
 which do not have a current guard as their first hop in 0.3.3.2-alpha
 (#24469). While this seems useful in the common case, it affects us badly,
 because we're setting `"UseEntryGuards 0"` to avoid using guards at all.

 Here are the latest measurement results with various Tor versions to
 narrow down the issue:

 [[Image(onionperf-2020-05-28.png, 700px)]]

 Some observations:
  - There are two classes of measurement results here which we can
 distinguish very clearly at the median. Things get less clear towards the
 worst-case measurements, but that's likely due to the small number of
 measurements.
  - Versions until 0.3.3.1-alpha (brown line) fall into the "fast" class,
 versions starting at 0.3.3.2-alpha (dark gray) fall into the "slow" class.
  - Version 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev (cyan) is current master with the patch below
 to undo the #24469 change. It falls into the "fast" class. While it looks
 like it's the fastest of all measurements, I doubt that it's any different
 from the other "fast" measurements in the worst case.

 Here's the patch to current master that I used for measurements:

 {{{
 diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitlist.c b/src/core/or/circuitlist.c
 index 4c37ef8b41..35057c5176 100644
 --- a/src/core/or/circuitlist.c
 +++ b/src/core/or/circuitlist.c
 @@ -1946,7 +1946,8 @@ circuit_find_to_cannibalize(uint8_t
 purpose_to_produce, extend_info_t *info,
 * that the Guard was removed from the samepled set after the
 circuit
 * was created so avoid using it. */
if (!entry_guard_could_succeed(circ->guard_state)) {
 -goto next;
 +/* Commented out this bugfix of #24469 to work around bug #34303.
 +goto next*/;
}

if ((!need_uptime || circ->build_state->need_uptime) &&
 }}}

 It would be nice to get this analysis confirmed by a network team person.

 If this is indeed the issue, I think we'll need to change Tor to only
 apply this check if `"UseEntryGuards 1"` is set. This doesn't only affect
 us, it also affects other users who run Tor without guards for whatever
 reasons.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34303 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Find out why onion service measurements have gotten slower

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34303: Find out why onion service measurements have gotten slower
---+
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59-must
---+
Changes (by karsten):

 * Attachment "onionperf-2020-05-28.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33617 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a BandwidthStatistics option and consensus parameter

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33617: Add a BandwidthStatistics option and consensus parameter
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  MrSquanchee
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  extra-review, prop313, ipv6, |  Actual Points:
  outreachy-ipv6, network-team-roadmap-2020Q1|
Parent ID:  #33052   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-can
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 Replying to [comment:38 MrSquanchee]:
 > Hii, asn.

 Hello MrSquanchee,

 thanks for showing interest to write these tests. Let me try to help out.

 > 1. `rep_hist_bw_stats_write()` gets called from
 `write_stats_file_callback` in mainloop.c.
 >  This function handles disk write for all the stats produced.
 >  So, do you want exhaustive unit-tests for `write_stats_file_callback`,
 which would test
 >  for all the stats ?? or should I write unit tests for
 `write_stats_file_callback`
 >  pertaining only to the bandwidth statistics ??

 I would like unittests for `write_stats_file_callback` pertaining only to
 the bandwidth statistics.

 In particular, you could call that function with a special `options`
 argument that only activates the bandwidth statistics. As part of this, I
 would like to see that the separation between `BandwidthStatistics` and
 `ExtraInfoStatistics` is clear. That is, how does each of those two
 options influence the other? Given that this is one of the original
 purposes of this ticket (i.e. not having `ExtraInfoStatistics` control
 everything) I would like the test to be able to test that things work as
 expected.

 > 2. Also, `rep_hist_bw_stats_write()` writes the stats to the disk, so
 does many other stat
 >  functions, but I haven't yet seen a unit test that tests for a
 directory and contents of
 >  a file maybe for some reasons I don't know or maybe I am wrong and you
 can point me to
 >  an appropriate test.
 >  Would you like to explain how I can write such a test  ??

 There are a bunch of ways to achieve this. One way would be to actually do
 the file writes; see how `test_config_write_to_data_subdir()` and
 `test_config_check_or_create_data_subdir()` do this. IMO this would be the
 best and most robust way to approach this (also probably simpler).

 The other way, would be to mock the file-writing functions, so that their
 behavior does not happen when they are getting tested. As an example, of a
 test that does mocking check `test_config_resolve_my_address()`.

 Best of luck in this adventure!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30586 [Metrics/Onionperf]: requirements are not included in setup.py

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30586: requirements are not included in setup.py
---+
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:  0.45
Parent ID:  #33321 | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59-must
---+

Comment (by acute):

 Replying to [comment:16 karsten]:

 > However, I'm still having difficulties with building and running
 OnionPerf without using `pip`: The command `python3 setup.py install
 --user` still runs `pip` in the background, and I'm unclear how to set
 `PYTHONPATH` in order to avoid running that command in the first place.
 Once I know how to do that I can merge this branch (and apply the #33433
 patch on top of it).
 Apologies, I should have added this.
 Once all the dependencies are installed for Onionperf, this is as simple
 as:

 {{{
 git clone https://git.torproject.org/onionperf.git
 cd onionperf/onionperf
 PYTHONPATH=.. python3 onionperf
 }}}
 >
 > Another minor issue is that `python3-setuptools` needs to be listed as
 required package in the instructions now. I can add that to `README.md`,
 if that's the only remaining issue.

 I've attached a patch for README.md that includes `python3-setuptools` in
 the instructions, and also includes the instructions above on how to run
 OP without installing it - should be a quick review :)
 >
 > Thanks for your patience! :)
 Thanks very much, sorry for taking longer than anticipated.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30586 [Metrics/Onionperf]: requirements are not included in setup.py

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30586: requirements are not included in setup.py
---+
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:  0.45
Parent ID:  #33321 | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59-must
---+
Changes (by acute):

 * Attachment "0001-Adds-setuptools-and-alternative-installation-
 instruc.patch" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33458 [Core Tor/Tor]: Assertion desc failed in hs_client_close_intro_circuits_from_desc at src/feature/hs/hs_client.c: 2413

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33458: Assertion desc failed in hs_client_close_intro_circuits_from_desc at
src/feature/hs/hs_client.c: 2413
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-hs client-auth assert  043-must  |  Actual Points:  0.3
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged to 043 as well. After the next 043 release, this should not be a
 problem anymore.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31660 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Revise onboarding to take new Firefox experience into account

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31660: Revise onboarding to take new Firefox experience into account
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-9.5,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202005R, ReleaseTrainMigration   |
Parent ID:  #33658   | Points:  4
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor58-can
-+-

Comment (by acat):

 Replying to [comment:31 sysrqb]:
 > Replying to [comment:30 sysrqb]:
 > > Replying to [comment:24 brade]:
 > > > The current onboarding code displays two different "tours" (sets of
 panels):
 > > >  * "newtour" for new users
 > > >  * "updatetour" for users who have upgraded
 > > >
 > > > Should we omit "What's New" from the "newtour" and only have it for
 "updatetour"?
 > > > It is easy to control this via the browser.onboarding.* preferences.
 > > >
 > > >
 > >
 > > For new users should we call it "Additional Features" or "See More"?
 Phrasing that indicates more information is available? Maybe we can use
 "More Information", and re-use the PageInfo string (but that's not exactly
 an ideal string for this use case).
 >
 > "Learn More" ?
 +1 on opening tab directly for existing users.

 For new users, I don't have a strong opinion on the string we should show.
 Maybe I would still just use "See what’s new".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34320 [Applications/Tor Browser]: fetch-gradle-dependencies should respect tmp_dir

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34320: fetch-gradle-dependencies should respect tmp_dir
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, GeorgKoppen202005,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202005R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, GeorgKoppen202005, TorBrowserTeam202005 => tbb-rbm,
 GeorgKoppen202005, TorBrowserTeam202005R
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 `bug_34320` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_34320=69120eb3ac51a1b713f4a64437aa41f4b8972c87)
 has a potential fix for review. I stumbled over this bug while assembling
 the dependencies for `fenix`/`android-components` which involves a bunch
 of large .aar files for `geckoview`. /tmp on the build box we have was
 simply to small for that.

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[tor-bugs] #34320 [Applications/Tor Browser]: fetch-gradle-dependencies should respect tmp_dir

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34320: fetch-gradle-dependencies should respect tmp_dir
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm,
 Severity:  Normal   |  GeorgKoppen202005,
 |  TorBrowserTeam202005
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 `tmp_dir` is set to `[% c("basedir") %]/tmp` in `rbm.conf` and can get
 overriden in a local rbm config file. Sometimes /tmp is too small for
 building projects which motivated both the current default as the option
 to override it.

 However, `fetch-gradle-dependencies` does not respect that by simply doing
 `m2dir="$(mktemp -d)"`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34319 [Applications/Tor Browser]: remove symlink support from the updater

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34319: remove symlink support from the updater
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-update|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-update


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