Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications hardware, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications
hardware, 2016-06
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:145 dcf]:
 > Blocked sites are redirected to !http://92.63.88.128/?NTDzLZ

 Doing a web search for "NTDzLZ" found a few threads with other people
 noticing the blocks. The latest is dated December 25, 2016, which is
 slightly later than the latest injection I saw myself, which was December
 21, 2016 (comment:173).

  * 2016-11-22 http://www.cyberforum.ru/viruses/thread1857039.html
 
([https://web.archive.org/web/20170614212433/http://www.cyberforum.ru/viruses/thread1857039.html
 archive])
  Translated: "Hello, I'm here for the first time. In general, here's
 the problem: I can not go to some sites (xvideos.com, redtube.com) (the
 problem is certainly not in them) but still want to fix them. When I come,
 I throw it at !http://92.63.88.128/?NTDzLZ and there it is empty"
  * 2016-11-25 http://ping-
 admin.ru/free_test/result/148005106722x8h272z9w4y2r3517e7.html
 ([https://web.archive.org/web/20170614213022/http://ping-
 admin.ru/free_test/result/148005106722x8h272z9w4y2r3517e7.html archive])
  Connectivity test. The line for unihost.kz in Alatau refers to the
 URL.
  "rus.porn/videos/14854/
  Казахстан, Алатау При поддержке Unihost.kz. Кол-во редиректов: 1
 !http://92.63.88.128/?NTDzLZ;
  * 2016-12-16 http://www.cyberforum.ru/viruses/thread1880138.html
 
([https://web.archive.org/web/20170614212224/http://www.cyberforum.ru/viruses/thread1880138.html
 archive])
  Translated: "I'm trying to go to the site newgrounds.com, it does not
 enter and I throw it on the link !http://92.63.88.128/?NTDzLZ , but before
 it stopped . Kaspersky swears, writes a virus site, there are no viruses
 on the computer, it was checked by another web, Kaspersky"
  * 2016-12-16 https://prezi.com/vwyiuh9dgbv4/pokemon-bloody-platinum-
 download-free/
 ([https://web.archive.org/web/20170614212749/https://prezi.com/vwyiuh9dgbv4
 /pokemon-bloody-platinum-download-free/ archive])
  Looks like a spam presentation with HTML in the description that
 refers to Kaspersky antivirus. Puts a `=` at the end of the URL, unlike
 other sources.
  "Веб-адрес:http://92.63.88.128/?NTDzLZ=;>!http://92.63.88.128/?NTDzLZ=
 Заблокирован Веб-Антивирусом Причина: опасный веб-
 адрес http://touch.kaspersky.com/kfa_cup_f8f731b4-629f-
 4b7c-923c-495d87bf7e09/1481884315">Нажмите здесь, если считаете, что веб-
 страница заблокирована ошибочно."
  * 2016-12-22 https://vk.com/wall297604842_11
 ([https://web.archive.org/web/20170614212555/https://vk.com/wall297604842_11
 archive])
  A wall post that says only "!http://92.63.88.128/?NTDzLZ;
  * 2016-12-25 http://ping-
 admin.com/free_test/result/14817131651081dy5bl67oc53bs4b1081.html
 ([https://web.archive.org/web/20170614213317/http://ping-
 admin.com/free_test/result/14817131651081dy5bl67oc53bs4b1081.html
 archive])
  Connectivity test. The lines for unihost.kz in Alatau, Internet-
 Kompanii PS in Almaty, and hoster.kz in Karaganda refer to the URL.
  "kissk.ru
  Казахстан, Алатау При поддержке Unihost.kz. Кол-во редиректов: 1
 !http://92.63.88.128/?NTDzLZ
  Казахстан, Алматы При поддержке интернет-компании PS. Кол-во
 редиректов: 1 !http://92.63.88.128/?NTDzLZ
  Казахстан, Караганда При поддержке Hoster.KZ. Кол-во редиректов: 1
 !http://92.63.88.128/?NTDzLZ;

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications hardware, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications
hardware, 2016-06
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dcf):

 I am more and more convinced that what we are dealing with, with respect
 to obfs4 blocking, is mainly a blacklist. It is not just a simple firewall
 rule, because connection are allowed initially but not allowed to persist.
 Perhaps it also takes into account some timing-based features, but
 primarily it seems to be a blacklist.

 See, for example, the graphs for Lisbeth and NX01:443 in comment:193.
 There is a visible change around 2017-01-26 (actually it must have
 occurred during an outage of the VPN, between 2017-01-25 16:33:55 and
 2017-01-27 00:29:43). Before this date the bridges virtually always
 bootstrap 100%; after that they usually reach 25% and occasionally 100%.
 If 2017-01-26 is the date when the bridges were blacklisted, it means that
 Kazakhstan's reaction time is much slower than China's. China blocked
 Lisbeth on 2016-10-19 (22 days after #19838 merged) and NX01:443 on
 2016-12-04 (68 days after #19838 merged, 2 days after #20838 merged).
 Kazakhstan was 100 days slower to block Lisbeth, and 54 days slower to
 block NX01:443.

 Part of the confusion we've had in detecting whether blocking was
 occurring might have been caused by failures on the bridge side. As you
 can see from the graph in comment:193, some of the default bridges were
 down (even from the U.S.) at various times. ndnop3 and ndnop5 (from
 comment:47) are interesting cases, because they have been failing
 connections even from the U.S. about 40% of the time. In communication
 with the bridges' operator, we tracked the problem down to a file
 descriptor limit. This may explain some of the irregular results we were
 seeing early on.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications hardware, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications
hardware, 2016-06
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dcf):

 Using the data from comment:192, here is a visualization of bridge
 bootstrapping from US and KZ over the past few months. For each bridge,
 there is one connection attempt per hour. The dots on the graph show the
 maximum bootstrap percentage reached in each attempt (10% = no
 connectivity, 100% = complete bootstrapping, percentages in the middle
 mean some connectivity but bootstrap didn't complete).

 When the blue dot and the red dot are in the same place, it means that
 there was no extra blocking in KZ. When the blue dot is lower than the red
 dot, it means there was some additional blocking in KZ.

 There are three gaps in the KZ data where there are no measurements: Dec
 28 to January 12, April 8 to April 26, and after May 2.

 [[Image(kz-data-20170605.png)]]

 This table shows the average maximum bootstrap percentage reached during
 the times when ''both'' the US and KZ sites were taking measurements
 (i.e., excluding the gaps mentioned above). What we see from this is that
 the majority of measured bridges are not in fact blocked. The only bridges
 where the KZ rate is lower than the US rate are ndnop3, ndnop5, GreenBelt,
 Lisbeth, and NX01. Bridges that were added more recently, or were never
 used, are not more blocked in KZ. This makes me think that the firewall's
 blocking is based more on a blacklist than on dynamic timing detection.

 {{{#!html
 
 bridgeUS average bootstrap %KZ average bootstrap
 %
 ndnop363.33%20.68%
 ndnop565.75%20.53%
 GreenBelt:8061.21%10.21%
 GreenBelt:44361.21%21.21%
 GreenBelt:588161.24%20.86%
 Lisbeth99.32%42.84%
 NX01:44399.58%43.50%
 cymrubridge30:80100.00%98.93%
 cymrubridge31:80100.00%98.94%
 cymrubridge32:80100.00%99.48%
 cymrubridge33:8098.38%98.97%
 frosty:80100.00%99.04%
 frosty:40035100.00%98.42%
 camille:80100.00%99.26%
 camille:42779100.00%98.68%
 dragon:80100.00%99.26%
 dragon:38224100.00%98.68%
 dimple:80100.00%98.97%
 dimple:44769100.00%99.63%
 unused-cypherpunkskludge99.61%97.70%
 unused-iat099.62%95.60%
 unused-iat199.61%98.31%
 unused-iat247.37%47.92%
 
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications hardware, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications
hardware, 2016-06
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dcf):

 I uploaded several months worth of data of bridge connection attempts from
 the U.S. and Kazakhstan over several months (since December 2016). I
 haven't done much analysis of this yet. For each of the connection
 attempts there is a tor log and for some of them there is additionally a
 pcap. The file bridgetest/bridgetest.csv is probably what you want to look
 at first; it's timestamps of tor connection bootstrap percentages per
 attempt.

 https://www.bamsoftware.com/proxy-probe/kz-data/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications hardware, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications
hardware, 2016-06
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 Don't reopen!
 Your project useless anyway, you kickbans only.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications hardware, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications
hardware, 2016-06
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > applications that are prohibited by law

 dūra lēx, sed lēx? are you sure?
 [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuremberg_Laws Nuremberg Laws]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications hardware, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications
hardware, 2016-06
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Allot posted [https://twitter.com/allotcomms/status/804579667973963776 a
 tweet]
 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170123231823/https://twitter.com/allotcomms/status/804579667973963776
 (archive)] on 2016-12-01 with a screenshot of a presentation slide with
 interesting text:
 > Prevent the use of anonymity and VPN tools (TOR, Psiphon, etc.) and
 applications that are prohibited by law and track subscriber online
 activity.
 [[Image(allot-804579667973963776.jpg,width=600)]]
 [https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CtLs8-WXYAAdZrw.jpg original jpg]

 The tweet links to a [http://www.allot.com/wp-content/uploads
 /WP_Emerging_Market-UseCases_2016-9-26_publish.pdf whitepaper]
 [https://web.archive.org/web/20170123213504/http://www.allot.com/wp-
 content/uploads/WP_Emerging_Market-UseCases_2016-9-26_publish.pdf
 (archive)] and [https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/14183/222661 webinar]
 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20160919141837/https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/14183/222661
 (archive)]; however neither has the same text. Here is a direct link to
 the webinar video, which I haven't watched yet:
 
https://cdn02.brighttalk.com/core/asset/video/222661/mp4/640/video_1476802137.mp4

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications hardware, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications
hardware, 2016-06
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 https://blog.torproject.org/blog/kazakhstan-upgrades-censorship-deep-
 packet-inspection
 > Kazakhstan upgrades censorship to deep packet inspection
 > Posted February 16th, 2012

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications hardware, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications
hardware, 2016-06
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > evidence that Allot hardware is in use

 https://archive.is/imj9g yet

 {{{
 Zhetisu Network Technologies
 November 2010 – July 2012 (1 year 9 months)|Central Asia
 Network Integrator Company. Field: offer services for national ISP
 Kazakhtelecom telecom solutions - Cisco, Acmepacket, Allot, corporate
 networks - Cisco, VOIP solutions (SIP & Cisco), storage networking - Cisco
 Netapp, EMC, data centers and cloud computing - Cisco.
 }}}
 {{{
 Lawful Interception for Kazakhtelecom Core Network
 }}}
 {{{
 January 2012
 Lawful Interception for Kazakhtelecom Core Network. Provisioning, BOM &
 High Level Design
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications hardware, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications
hardware, 2016-06
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > kzblocked, can I restore your deleted comments?

 Yes

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications hardware, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications
hardware, 2016-06
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by dcf):

 kzblocked, can I restore your deleted comments?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications hardware, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications
hardware, 2016-06
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by dcf):

 == Summary of information about Allot Communications ==

 kzblocked found some evidence that at least part of the Kazakh firewall is
 provided by [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allot_Communications Allot
 Communications], which seems to be some firewall/DPI vendor.

 As I understand it, the main evidence that Allot hardware is in use is
 comment:177, import applications (I think that's what they are) dated
 2014-11-07 that show `АО "Казахтелеком"` ([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
 /Joint-stock_company JSC] Kazakhtelekom) asking to import equipment from
 `"Allot Communications LTD"` in Israel.
  *
 [http://www.rep.nca.kz/index.php?mode=r3=4%D2%D1.KZ.1900193.21.01.02407
 4ТС.KZ.1900193.21.01.02407] (https://archive.is/UXbwA): 1 ×
 [https://www.allot.com/products/platforms/service-gateway/#1461143657367
 -91864faf-6cb8 SG-Sigma E6]
  *
 [http://www.rep.nca.kz/index.php?mode=r3=4%D2%D1.KZ.1900193.21.01.02408
 4ТС.KZ.1900193.21.01.02408] (https://archive.is/1vSE6): 3 ×
 [https://www.allot.com/products/platforms/service-gateway/#1461143538377
 -8005dcec-ef24 SG-Tera 14]
  *
 [http://www.rep.nca.kz/index.php?mode=r3=4%D2%D1.KZ.1900193.21.01.02409
 4ТС.KZ.1900193.21.01.02409] (https://archive.is/UdfAf): 2 ×
 [https://www.allot.com/products/platforms/service-gateway/#1461143538377
 -8005dcec-ef24 SG-Tera 14]:
  *
 [http://www.rep.nca.kz/index.php?mode=r3=4%D2%D1.KZ.1900193.21.01.02410
 4ТС.KZ.1900193.21.01.02410] (https://archive.is/2p3Sa): 2 ×
 [https://www.allot.com/products/platforms/service-gateway/#1461143538377
 -8005dcec-ef24 SG-Tera 14]

 The other piece is from comment:175, in which a past 0.209.ru
 blockpage, which [[comment:161|we previously found]] to have the same HTTP
 signature as a Kazakhstan block page, explicitly said "Allot" on it.

 They call their DPI tech [https://www.allot.com/technology/dart-dpi/
 "DART"]. It's unclear how much is their own and how much is integration of
 other companies' such as Sophos and Kaspersky. Their page of
 [https://www.allot.com/products/platforms/supported-
 protocols/#1460974307058-a61550f0-8196 supported protocols]
 (https://archive.is/AuA8b) explicitly mentions Tor, ScrambleSuit, obfs4,
 and meek, among others:
 > === June 13, 2016 ===
 > Private VPN services provided by the Tor project are used by millions
 the world over, including IT professionals, law enforcement, journalists,
 bloggers, business execs, researchers and everyday users who want to
 protect their privacy. A number of applications, like bridges and
 pluggable transports have sprouted up around Tor to improve the privacy
 and the experience. Some Tor browsers provide bridges by default. And if
 not, these tools can be downloaded at any time. A bridge is a tool that
 makes Tor traffic look like any other traffic, such that censors and other
 monitors do not identify it as Tor per se. In Allot’s latest DART Protocol
 Pack, we refined our signature for the Tor obfs4 safe transport, to assure
 accruate identification of this kind of traffic on your network:
 >  * Tor Obfs4
 > === April 4th, 2016 ===
 > Online anonymity is often viewed as counter-productive and there is a
 vigorous and ongoing debate regarding the unprecedented anonymity enabled
 by the Internet. The creators of the Tor project are understandably pro-
 anonymity, arguing in favor of the many positive and productive uses of
 TOR by all kinds of people, including IT professionals, law enforcement,
 journalists, bloggers, business execs, researchers and everyday users who
 want to protect their privacy. In Allot’s latest DART Protocol Pack we
 revisited and refined these TOR transport protocols to assure accurate
 detection of their use:
 >  * TOR ScrambleSuit (pluggable proxy transport protocol)
 >  * TOR Obfs4 (TCP obfuscation layer)
 >  * TOR
 > === February 2nd, 2016 ===
 > TOR is popular anonymizer application that uses the “onion router.”
 Onion Router is a website that takes requests for web-pages and routes
 them through other onion router nodes, until your requested page reaches
 you. Onion routers encrypt the traffic which means no one can see what
 you’re asking for, and the layers of the onion don’t know who they’re
 working for.  In Allot’s latest DART Protocol Pack we added signatures
 that 

Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications hardware, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications
hardware, 2016-06
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by dcf):

 An
 
[https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/OONI/censorshipwiki/CensorshipByCountry/Kazakhstan?action=diff=18
 edit] today of doc/OONI/censorshipwiki/CensorshipByCountry/Kazakhstan
 says:
 > As of 2017-01-17 ''Tor Browser 6.0.8'' works (no need for an obfuscated
 bridge; ISP: ''JSC Kazakhtelecom'')

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications hardware, 2016-06 (was: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4, 2016-06)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications
hardware, 2016-06
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

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