Re: [tor-bugs] #30029 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Objective 2, Activity 5: POC for Human-memorable addresses for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30029: Objective 2, Activity 5: POC for Human-memorable addresses for .onion
services
-+-
 Reporter:  pili |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november,   |  implemented
  network-team-roadmap-2020Q1,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202004   |
Parent ID:  #30281   | Points:  50
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by pili):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 We are done here for now

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30029 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Objective 2, Activity 5: POC for Human-memorable addresses for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30029: Objective 2, Activity 5: POC for Human-memorable addresses for .onion
services
-+-
 Reporter:  pili |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202001 network-team-roadmap- |
  2020Q1 |
Parent ID:  #30281   | Points:  50
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november, TorBrowserTeam202001 =>
 network-team-roadmap-november, TorBrowserTeam202001 network-team-
 roadmap-2020Q1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30029 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Objective 2, Activity 5: POC for Human-memorable addresses for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30029: Objective 2, Activity 5: POC for Human-memorable addresses for .onion
services
-+-
 Reporter:  pili |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201911   |
Parent ID:  #30281   | Points:  50
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by pili):

 * keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november, TorBrowserTeam201910 =>
 network-team-roadmap-november, TorBrowserTeam201911


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30029 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Objective 2, Activity 5: POC for Human-memorable addresses for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30029: Objective 2, Activity 5: POC for Human-memorable addresses for .onion
services
-+-
 Reporter:  pili |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201910   |
Parent ID:  #30281   | Points:  50
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by pili):

 * keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november => network-team-roadmap-
 november, TorBrowserTeam201910


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30029 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Objective 2, Activity 5: POC for Human-memorable addresses for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30029: Objective 2, Activity 5: POC for Human-memorable addresses for .onion
services
---+---
 Reporter:  pili   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30281 | Points:  50
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor27-must
---+---
Changes (by pili):

 * points:   => 50


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30029 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Objective 2, Activity 5: POC for Human-memorable addresses for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30029: Objective 2, Activity 5: POC for Human-memorable addresses for .onion
services
---+---
 Reporter:  pili   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30281 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor27-must
---+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => network-team-roadmap-november


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30029 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Objective 2, Activity 5: POC for Human-memorable addresses for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30029: Objective 2, Activity 5: POC for Human-memorable addresses for .onion
services
--+
 Reporter:  pili  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30281| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+

Comment (by asn):

 I think the mailing list is the right place for these discussions FWIW.
 Also see this https://blog.torproject.org/cooking-onions-names-your-onions
 blog post.

 IMO anyone who advocates for a petname solution (which is just a generic
 term at this point) should provide a precise specification/design plan
 with clear explanation of why it's superior to browser bookmarks or other
 systems. Everything can be considered a petname-like solution, including
 the https-e plan of #28005.

 I'd suggest you take further discussion to the [tor-dev] mailing list, and
 I welcome any concrete proposals on things we can do here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30029 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Objective 2, Activity 5: POC for Human-memorable addresses for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30029: Objective 2, Activity 5: POC for Human-memorable addresses for .onion
services
--+
 Reporter:  pili  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30281| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 dkg, thank you for your reply.

 Briefly, you are certainly right that Tor avoids local storage of data
 that pertain to a user's behaviour, such as cookies and history.  However,
 this is not the case for "Bookmarks", with good reason: "Bookmarks"
 represent conscious choices on the part of the user.  For this argument to
 hold in the case of Petnames, we might want to ensure that the decision to
 associate a long-lived Petname with a particular onion site is always
 conscious, and not the 'default' behaviour resulting from simply visiting
 a site.  User empowerment is key to striking the right balance: for
 example, we might consider creating Petnames by default but having them be
 ephemeral by default, like the browsing history associated with a
 particular tab, so that users would be able to make the conscious decision
 to save the association in their browsers like bookmarks if they plan to
 revisit them.  The implementation would presumably be slightly different
 to Bookmarks since it would (1) only bind onion hostnames rather than
 complete URLs and, optionally, (2) require each Petname to be (locally)
 unique.  But this could be done in addition to Bookmarks, as a similar
 data store.

 You're also right that the existence of a Petname should not affect
 network behaviour.  I am fairly certain that the existence of particular
 Bookmarks does not (non-negligibly, anyway) affect network behaviour.
 Presumably the Tor Browser developers could make sure that the 'hiding' of
 the opaque onion address and replacement with the Petname is only a
 cosmetic (UX) change to the URL bar based upon the existence or non-
 existence of Bookmark-like Petname data for the given hostname.  The Tor
 Browser developers have already decided that Bookmarks do not pose a
 fingerprinting risk; it follows that we can implement Petnames to not be a
 risk also.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30029 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Objective 2, Activity 5: POC for Human-memorable addresses for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30029: Objective 2, Activity 5: POC for Human-memorable addresses for .onion
services
--+
 Reporter:  pili  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30281| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+

Comment (by dkg):

 i agree with cypherpunks that Zooko's triangle is relevant here, and i
 generally really like petnames as the solution to that trilemma.

 But effective petnames depend on persistent local configuration -- the
 user's history with a given site, and their selected petname.  Torbrowser,
 on the other hand, seems to strive to *avoid* persistent local
 configuration, since persistent local configuration has two drawbacks:

  * it leaves records on the local machine of the user's history (a stored
 petname for a particular onion service implies that the user has visited
 that onion service in the past)
  * if network behavior changes at all on the basis of the persistent local
 configuration, it represents a potential tracking/fingerprinting vector
 (not clear that this is an issue for the petname proposal, but it could be
 depending on how the petnames affect torbrowser's user experience).


 For the people advocating petnames, i'd love to see more detail about how
 they plan to balance these tensions.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30029 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Objective 2, Activity 5: POC for Human-memorable addresses for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30029: Objective 2, Activity 5: POC for Human-memorable addresses for .onion
services
--+
 Reporter:  pili  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30281| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Responding to the title of this ticket, which includes 'Human-memorable
 addresses for .onion services': we must be careful to consider Zooko's
 trilemma, which argues that names cannot be human-meaningful, global, and
 secure.  In particular, we must not seek to re-implement something like
 DNS, whose requirement of universality implies the creation of hierarchy,
 authorities, and control points, all of which undermine a salient benefit
 of onion services, the ability for all individuals to create and use them
 freely.  Consider the implicit role for authorities in any
 [https://sockpuppet.org/blog/2015/01/15/against-dnssec/ effort to secure
 DNS].

 As an alternative, we might consider adopting an approach more like
 [http://www.skyhunter.com/marcs/petnames/IntroPetNames.html Petnames],
 which encourages individuals to create and use their own meaningful names
 for opaque identifiers, without requiring everyone to agree.

 We might also want to create tools to help users track the provenance of
 addresses learned via introductions, so that they would be empowered to
 make decisions based upon the trustworthiness of those who provided
 introductions.  We could likewise encourage individual users to establish
 multiple identities for their own services this way and use different
 addresses based upon context.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30029 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Objective 2, Activity 5: POC for Human-memorable addresses for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30029: Objective 2, Activity 5: POC for Human-memorable addresses for .onion
services
--+
 Reporter:  pili  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30281| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * parent:   => #30281


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[tor-bugs] #30029 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Objective 2, Activity 5: POC for Human-memorable addresses for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30029: Objective 2, Activity 5: POC for Human-memorable addresses for .onion
services
--+--
 Reporter:  pili  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor27 |
--+--
 This is the parent ticket to hold any tickets under this activity,
 including:
 - Evaluating using HTTPS-Everywhere.
 - Evaluating using HTTPS-Everywhere’s Update Channels feature to add
 custom onion rulesets that can be updated automatically.
 - Evaluating adding a designated file extension handler in Tor Browser to
 handle HTTPS-Everywhere rulesets.
 - Evaluating enhancing the UI of HTTPS-Everywhere so that it educates
 users on how onion update channels work.

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