Re: [tor-bugs] #30477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30477: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, s30-o23a3, network-team- |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2020Q2, anticensorship-wants   |
Parent ID:  #31280   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-
Changes (by phw):

 * keywords:  tor-pt, s30-o23a3, network-team-roadmap-2020Q2 => tor-pt,
 s30-o23a3, network-team-roadmap-2020Q2, anticensorship-wants


Comment:

 Adding the "anticensorship-wants" keyword. This would be very helpful for
 bridge operators.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30477: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, s30-o23a3, network-team- |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2020Q2 |
Parent ID:  #31280   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  tor-pt, s30-o23a3, network-team-roadmap-2020Q1 => tor-pt,
 s30-o23a3, network-team-roadmap-2020Q2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30477: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, s30-o23a3, network-team- |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2020Q1 |
Parent ID:  #31280   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * cc: catalyst (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30477: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, s30-o23a3, network-team- |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2020Q1 |
Parent ID:  #31280   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:
 tor-pt, network-team-roadmap-november, s30-o23a3, network-team-
 roadmap-2020Q1
 => tor-pt, s30-o23a3, network-team-roadmap-2020Q1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30477: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  november, s30-o23a3, network-team-roadmap- |
  2020Q1 |
Parent ID:  #31280   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * parent:  #30471 => #31280


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30477: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  november, s30-o23a3|
Parent ID:  #30471   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:16 teor]:
 > We haven't implemented bridge guards yet, so bridges also have another
 similar vulnerability: all the middle nodes chosen by bridge clients can
 learn that the previous hop is a bridge. (Client-Bridge-Middle has
 different timings and node selections than Client-Guard, OnionService-
 Guard and SingleOnionService-guard.)

 Good point. A bridge's current guard barely sees anything at all from it,
 other than fetching directory stuff.

 Almost makes me want to propose that bridges should build their path to
 Serge and then extend from there back to themselves. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30477: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  november, s30-o23a3|
Parent ID:  #30471   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:15 arma]:
 > Replying to [comment:12 teor]:
 > > Bridges already do reachability checks via a random relay's ORPort: so
 we have accepted a similar risk in the past.
 >
 > Agreed, we already have that "enumeration by relays" risk with our
 current orport reachability testing.
 >
 > ...
 >
 > Speaking of bridges doing reachability checks via a random relay, thus
 letting relays enumerate bridges: a potential mitigation is for the bridge
 to ask its guard to extend to its ORPort. That way the guard learns that
 it's a bridge, but maybe it could have learned that anyway through timing
 or other characteristics, and nobody else in the network gets to see the
 reachability test. (I could have sworn I had already opened a ticket for
 this idea, but I can't find it. If you find it, please note it here. :)

 We haven't implemented bridge guards yet, so bridges also have another
 similar vulnerability: all the middle nodes chosen by bridge clients can
 learn that the previous hop is a bridge. (Client-Bridge-Middle has
 different timings and node selections than Client-Guard, OnionService-
 Guard and SingleOnionService-guard.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30477: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  november, s30-o23a3|
Parent ID:  #30471   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:12 teor]:
 > Bridges already do reachability checks via a random relay's ORPort: so
 we have accepted a similar risk in the past.

 Agreed, we already have that "enumeration by relays" risk with our current
 orport reachability testing.

 I'm ok with either choice here -- I think we need to get robust testing
 going of both PT ports and ipv6 ports, and whether we get it going first
 on the bridge side, or first on the bridgedb side, I'm ok with either
 choice.

 My first thought is that we eventually want to have the testing happen in
 both places -- on the bridge side for improved usability and quick
 feedback to the operator, and on the bridgedb side so we can control the
 quality of bridges we're giving out. That said, if we have to pick only
 one, I'd pick the bridgedb side, because that's the only logical place to
 do quality control that we can trust. And maybe given that, if we want to
 minimize exposure, it's worth exploring some way for bridgedb to do its
 first check really quickly, and get that feedback back to the bridge
 operator quickly, and then there's no need for the bridge to be doing its
 own checks?

 Speaking of bridges doing reachability checks via a random relay, thus
 letting relays enumerate bridges: a potential mitigation is for the bridge
 to ask its guard to extend to its ORPort. That way the guard learns that
 it's a bridge, but maybe it could have learned that anyway through timing
 or other characteristics, and nobody else in the network gets to see the
 reachability test. (I could have sworn I had already opened a ticket for
 this idea, but I can't find it. If you find it, please note it here. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30477: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  november, s30-o23a3|
Parent ID:  #30471   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Self-testing is really important: lots of relay operators have trouble
 with IPv6, because tor doesn't self-test IPv6 ORPorts.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30477: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  november, s30-o23a3|
Parent ID:  #30471   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-

Comment (by phw):

 Replying to [comment:12 teor]:
 > Replying to [comment:10 nickm]:
 > > > If a transport exposes a TCP port, connect to that TCP port via a
 Tor Exit.
 > >
 > > Question: what if the attacker runs an exit in order find out where PT
 ports are?
 >
 > Bridges already do reachability checks via a random relay's ORPort: so
 we have accepted a similar risk in the past.
 [[br]]
 It may be a good time to re-consider this risk now. Over at #31874, we're
 brainstorming a service that takes as input a bridge line and then tests
 the given bridge. We may want such a service instead of, or in addition to
 Tor self-testing its PT bridge. The downside of this service (which we
 could couple with BridgeDB) doing the testing is that it takes a while
 until the bridge operator learns if their bridge works.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30477: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  november, s30-o23a3|
Parent ID:  #30471   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:10 nickm]:
 > > If a transport exposes a TCP port, connect to that TCP port via a Tor
 Exit.
 >
 > Question: what if the attacker runs an exit in order find out where PT
 ports are?

 Bridges already do reachability checks via a random relay's ORPort: so we
 have accepted a similar risk in the past.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30477: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  november, s30-o23a3|
Parent ID:  #30471   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  tor-pt, network-team-roadmap-november => tor-pt, network-team-
 roadmap-november, s30-o23a3


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30477: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  november   |
Parent ID:  #30471   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 > If a transport exposes a TCP port, connect to that TCP port via a Tor
 Exit.

 Question: what if the attacker runs an exit in order find out where PT
 ports are?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30477: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  november   |
Parent ID:  #30471   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Ok, here's a summary of the steps to move forward:
 1. If a transport exposes a TCP port, connect to that TCP port via a Tor
 Exit
 2. Test the transport protocol by connecting directly to the address and
 port

 Getting the PT to connect to itself via the Tor network might involve some
 really complex code. So let's just do the simplest tests we can.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30477: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  november   |
Parent ID:  #30471   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-

Comment (by phw):

 Replying to [comment:7 teor]:
 > It wouldn't be that hard to teach Tor bridges to self-test their PT
 addresses via an Exit, like we already do with DirPorts. As a bonus step,
 we might even want to test that the port speaks the PT protocol.
 [[br]]
 This sounds great because it's consistent with how a bridge's vanilla port
 is tested and the sooner we can tell an operator that something's wrong,
 the better. The bonus step is helpful in some edge cases: we recently had
 a bridge with an open obfs4 port but obfs4 connections failed. It turned
 out that obfs4proxy was unable to talk to tor because a local security
 policy prevented obfs4proxy from connecting to the ExtORPort.

 The only downside I see is that it won't work for a UDP-based transport –
 if we ever end up deploying one.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30477: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  november   |
Parent ID:  #30471   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 It wouldn't be that hard to teach Tor bridges to self-test their PT
 addresses via an Exit, like we already do with DirPorts. As a bonus step,
 we might even want to test that the port speaks the PT protocol.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30477: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  november   |
Parent ID:  #30471   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 See also #31874 on the anti-censorship side: self-testing is one of the
 options listed in that ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30477: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  november   |
Parent ID:  #30471   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * sponsor:  Sponsor28-must => Sponsor30-must


Comment:

 This is really sponsor 30 and not 28.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30477: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  november   |
Parent ID:  #30471   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-must
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  tor-pt, ex-sponsor19 => tor-pt, network-team-roadmap-november


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30477: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's
--+--
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, ex-sponsor19  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30471| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor28-must
--+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor28-must


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30477: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's
--+--
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30471| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+--
Changes (by phw):

 * parent:  #30472 => #30471


Comment:

 Updating the parent to #30471 because our past parent, #30472, turned into
 a short-term solution that is now deployed.

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[tor-bugs] #30477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30477: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's
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 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-pt
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #30472
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor19 |
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 It would be useful if Tor would do self-test of TCP port reachability for
 bridge listeners and not just the ORPort itself.

 Currently when a bridge operator starts their Bridge Relay, Tor will test
 whether their ORPort is available from the internet, but we do not test
 the reachability of, for example, the obfs4 TCP port.

 We believe that *just* testing for whether the port is available to the
 internet is better than to actually test if the port, for example, is able
 to speak the obfs4 protocol.

 We should probably have a way to disable the warning that is emitted if a
 port is not reachable if, for example, the bridge is actually lying to Tor
 about its port, does not have a port, or the port is exposed via UDP
 instead of TCP.

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