Re: [tor-bugs] #31223 [Core Tor/Tor]: Research approaches for improving the availability of services under DoS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31223: Research approaches for improving the availability of services under DoS
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-dos, network-team-   |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2020Q1, network-health, 043-deferred   |
Parent ID:  #33703   | Points:  15
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 Replying to [comment:13 mikeperry]:
 > Replying to [comment:3 vinay]:
 > > * MTP 1.2 (https://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.03588.pdf)
 >
 > Unfortunately, we only have about 253 bytes max to use if we want to
 send the proof in the intro circuit itself... MTP proofs are ~187KB with
 their recommended L=70 parameter (see Section 4.6). This is far too large
 to use without a secondary validator server that hands out tokens in
 exchange for proofs, which is a lot more complexity :/
 >
 > Other potential ideas from the MTP paper's references:
 >  * https://wwwcn.cs.uni-
 duesseldorf.de/publications/publications/library/Jerschow2010a.pdf
 >  * https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1168.pdf (has a good comparison section
 at the end)

 FWIW, I made child ticket #33712 for more exploration of this particular
 avenue. Let's use this ticket for more brainstorming kind of things, and
 use #33712 to get deeper into pow/anon credentials.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31223 [Core Tor/Tor]: Research approaches for improving the availability of services under DoS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31223: Research approaches for improving the availability of services under DoS
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-dos, network-team-   |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2020Q1, network-health, 043-deferred   |
Parent ID:  #33703   | Points:  15
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Replying to [comment:3 vinay]:
 > * MTP 1.2 (https://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.03588.pdf)

 Unfortunately, we only have about 253 bytes max to use if we want to send
 the proof in the intro circuit itself... MTP proofs are ~187KB with their
 recommended L=70 parameter (see Section 4.6). This is far too large to use
 without a secondary validator server that hands out tokens in exchange for
 proofs, which is a lot more complexity :/

 Other potential ideas from the MTP paper's references:
  * https://wwwcn.cs.uni-
 duesseldorf.de/publications/publications/library/Jerschow2010a.pdf
  * https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1168.pdf (has a good comparison section at
 the end)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31223 [Core Tor/Tor]: Research approaches for improving the availability of services under DoS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31223: Research approaches for improving the availability of services under DoS
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-dos, network-team-   |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2020Q1, network-health, 043-deferred   |
Parent ID:  #33703   | Points:  15
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * parent:   => #33703


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31223 [Core Tor/Tor]: Research approaches for improving the availability of services under DoS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31223: Research approaches for improving the availability of services under DoS
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-dos, network-team-   |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2020Q1, network-health, 043-deferred   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  15
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 Here is another possible improvement with its own tradeoffs (HTTP channel
 for killing circuits): https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 dev/2019-December/014097.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31223 [Core Tor/Tor]: Research approaches for improving the availability of services under DoS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31223: Research approaches for improving the availability of services under DoS
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs tor-dos network-team- |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2020Q1, network-health |
Parent ID:   | Points:  15
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tor-hs tor-dos network-team-roadmap-2020Q1 => tor-hs tor-dos
 network-team-roadmap-2020Q1, network-health


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31223 [Core Tor/Tor]: Research approaches for improving the availability of services under DoS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31223: Research approaches for improving the availability of services under DoS
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs tor-dos network-team- |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2020Q1 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  15
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  tor-hs tor-dos => tor-hs tor-dos network-team-roadmap-2020Q1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31223 [Core Tor/Tor]: Research approaches for improving the availability of services under DoS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31223: Research approaches for improving the availability of services under DoS
+
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs tor-dos  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  15
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
+

Comment (by asn):

 Just to expand on the `Introducing application-layer anonymous tokens that
 allow legit clients to get priority over DoS attacker` from the top post.
 This would be introducing some sort of anonymous credentials system for
 onion services, where onions can give some tokens to their good clients in
 an out-of-band fashion and these tokens are used during the introduction
 protocol to prioritize them over the swarm of unknown clients.

 With regards to primitives that can be used for such anonymous tokens
 there is a whole literature on anonymous credentials that we should look
 into. Here are some more links that have been sent to me and I have noted
 them for future reading: https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/877.pdf
 https://github.com/sipa/bips/blob/bip-schnorr/bip-
 schnorr.mediawiki#Blind_Signatures
 https://github.com/w3f/schnorrkel/blob/master/src/vrf.rs
 https://github.com/w3f/schnorrkel/blob/master/src/vrf.rs

 Further questions is how these tokens will be passed to legit clients in
 the first place, if the onion service is unreachable. And what's the
 difference between this approach and the onion service just making more
 onion addresses for good clients instead of tokens.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31223 [Core Tor/Tor]: Research approaches for improving the availability of services under DoS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31223: Research approaches for improving the availability of services under DoS
+
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs tor-dos  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  15
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
+
Changes (by asn):

 * sponsor:  Sponsor27-must => Sponsor27-can
 * parent:  #2 =>


Comment:

 Moving this to -can for the purposes of sponsor time tracking.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31223 [Core Tor/Tor]: Research approaches for improving the availability of services under DoS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31223: Research approaches for improving the availability of services under DoS
+
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs tor-dos  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #2  | Points:  15
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
+

Comment (by asn):

 Relevant feature #32511.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31223 [Core Tor/Tor]: Research approaches for improving the availability of services under DoS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31223: Research approaches for improving the availability of services under DoS
+
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs tor-dos  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #2  | Points:  15
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
+

Comment (by vinay):

 Things to consider:
 * MTP 1.2
 * Combination of hashing with arbitrary-precision computation as in GMP
 (easiest on general-purpose CPUs)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31223 [Core Tor/Tor]: Research approaches for improving the availability of services under DoS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31223: Research approaches for improving the availability of services under DoS
+
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs tor-dos  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #2  | Points:  15
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
+
Changes (by asn):

 * parent:   => #2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31223 [Core Tor/Tor]: Research approaches for improving the availability of services under DoS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31223: Research approaches for improving the availability of services under DoS
+
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs tor-dos  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  15
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
+

Comment (by asn):

 Also see related thread: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 dev/2019-June/013882.html

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[tor-bugs] #31223 [Core Tor/Tor]: Research approaches for improving the availability of services under DoS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31223: Research approaches for improving the availability of services under DoS
+
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:  tor-hs tor-dos
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  15  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must  |
+
 We've been improving the health of the network during onion service DoS,
 but not the onion service availability. This is a task for looking at this
 angle.

 During the related Stockholm session we looked into various approaches
 that could help us towards that goal. Here are some of them:

 - Introducing application-layer anonymous tokens that allow legit clients
 to get priority over DoS attacker
 - PoW approaches like argon2
 - CAPTCHA approaches like introducing a token server giving reCAPTCHA
 tokens
 - Hiding introduction points by rate limiting how quickly clients can find
 them. Valet nodes?
 - Having intros check that clients don't use the same IP over and over.
 Proof-of-existence?
 - Pay bitcoin to introduce

 Each of the above solutions has problems and this is a ticket to
 investigate at least the most promising of them, and attempt to move
 forward with something.

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