[tor-bugs] #24989 [Core Tor/Tor]: Count hsdir requests against maxcircuitspending

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24989: Count hsdir requests against maxcircuitspending
--+---
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 In #13837, we split off hsdir purposes from general. In the process, it
 means that we stopped counting hsdir circuits towards the global pending
 rate limit in count_pending_general_client_circuits(). That function was
 already trying to avoid counting hs circuits, but since nothing else
 globally limits the number of pending hs circuits, we probably should keep
 rate limiting hsdirs there, too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24946 [Core Tor/Tor]: connection_ap_expire_beginning(): Bug: circuit->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL failed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24946: connection_ap_expire_beginning(): Bug: circuit->purpose ==
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL failed
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Replying to [comment:5 asn]:
 > Mike's fix LGTM too.
 >
 > Mike any chance we should also be checking for `HS_VANGUARD`
 `circ->purpose` in `connection_ap_expire_beginning()` too?

 No, this check is only for circuits that can have attempted streams
 attached. HS_VANGAURD should never have any streams.

 > WRT mike's question on comment:2: I don't think we have inherent rate-
 limiting for hsdir queries on hsv2 or hsv3, but I don't expect Tor clients
 to make many such circuits. Perhaps we should merge the bug fix patch we
 already have, and maybe open a separate ticket about investigating the
 potential issue of `count_pending_general_client_circuits()`?

 Ok. #24989.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24989 [Core Tor/Tor]: Count hsdir requests against maxcircuitspending

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24989: Count hsdir requests against maxcircuitspending
--+---
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by arma):

 See also the discussion in #24973

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24956 [Community/Outreach]: put labs.tp.o on hiatus?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24956: put labs.tp.o on hiatus?
+---
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Outreach  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Ok. In order to use the auto-renewed Let's Encrypt cert, we need to point
 the labs.torproject.org DNS to be a CNAME for live-
 torlabs.pantheonsite.io.

 (Separately, we should also decide if we want Tor Labs to be a thing -- it
 needs a community manager to interface with volunteer projects to showcase
 them on there. I don't really have the cycles for that).

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[tor-bugs] #24990 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write a proposal for a post-quantum lattice KEX

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24990: Write a proposal for a post-quantum lattice KEX
--+
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core  |Version:
  Tor/Tor |
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  proposal cryptography post-quantum
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #24985
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor3  |
--+
 As part of #24985, we'll need a solid, reviewed proposal for which post-
 quantum key exchange we intend concretely to use.

 My current idea for the key exchange is to use q=12289 and n=1024 (the
 lattice parameters from [https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1092 NewHope] and
 other designs), along with the constant-time sampling protections I
 devised while working on
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/270-newhope-
 hybrid-handshake.txt prop#270], ripping out the Voronoi-cell based
 reconciliation mechanism and instead using a variant of the XE5
 reconciliation from the NIST [https://mjos.fi/hila5/ HILA5] submission
 (possibly tuning down the failure probability by increasing the noise,
 which raises the security level, since our key exchange is interactive and
 thus we don't care about having the 2^-128^ failure probability which
 allows HILA5 to be used for public key encryption schemes).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24988 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement prop#269 "Hybrid Handshakes" (ntor2 module)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24988: Implement prop#269 "Hybrid Handshakes" (ntor2 module)
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ntor handshakes tor-circuit  |  Actual Points:
  cryptography   |
Parent ID:  #24985   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor3
-+-

Comment (by isis):

 I had a discussion with Ian at RWC2018 about the changes, and we have a
 meeting scheduled for later this week to discuss (and hopefully come to
 some agreement on) them. Notes and takeaways from the meeting will be
 forthcoming.

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[tor-bugs] #24991 [Core Tor/Tor]: SingleOnion claims "missing descriptors for 1/2 of our primary entry guards", has no guards, makes no sense

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24991: SingleOnion claims "missing descriptors for 1/2 of our primary entry
guards", has no guards, makes no sense
--+-
 Reporter:  alecmuffett   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.9
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  singleonion, guards
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 This is the first of a pair of bugs with the same logfiles, so unless
 requested I'll only attach the logs once, here, unless there's a real need
 to duplicate them.

 I have an EOTK SingleOnion, config attached.

 Per the logfile, it is both HiddenServiceSingleHopMode and
 HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode.

 It's from "dropsafezeahmyho" which is the onion for my personal blog
 (dropsafe.crypticide.com) which is very low traffic as an Onion, in fact
 it exists mostly as a test onion.

 Issue #1 - after an extended period of uptime, tor claims:

 {{{
 Jan 21 08:45:04.000 [notice] Our directory information is no longer up-to-
 date enough to build circuits: We're missing descriptors for 1/2 of our
 primary entry guards (total microdescriptors: 5975/6006).
 Jan 21 08:45:04.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We're missing descriptors for 1/2 of
 our primary entry guards (total microdescriptors: 5975/6006).
 }}}

 ...which should not be happening, because (as a single onion) there are no
 Guards.

 Issue 2 will be described in the next ticket, and linked back to this one.

 Attachments: logfile and configfile.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24991 [Core Tor/Tor]: SingleOnion claims "missing descriptors for 1/2 of our primary entry guards", has no guards, makes no sense

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24991: SingleOnion claims "missing descriptors for 1/2 of our primary entry
guards", has no guards, makes no sense
-+--
 Reporter:  alecmuffett  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  singleonion, guards  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by alecmuffett):

 * Attachment "tor.conf" added.

 config

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24991 [Core Tor/Tor]: SingleOnion claims "missing descriptors for 1/2 of our primary entry guards", has no guards, makes no sense

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24991: SingleOnion claims "missing descriptors for 1/2 of our primary entry
guards", has no guards, makes no sense
-+--
 Reporter:  alecmuffett  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  singleonion, guards  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by alecmuffett):

 * Attachment "tor.log" added.

 log

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24989 [Core Tor/Tor]: Count hsdir requests against maxcircuitspending

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24989: Count hsdir requests against maxcircuitspending
--+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 https://oniongit.eu/mikeperry/tor/commits/bug24989. Note that I only added
 the client-side hsdir fetch purpose to this check. I figure dealing with
 the service side holistically in #24973 is the right way to deal with the
 service rate limiting.

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[tor-bugs] #24992 [Core Tor/Tor]: SingleOnion (and Tor2web?) connections may need better expiry, lots left open

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24992: SingleOnion (and Tor2web?) connections may need better expiry, lots left
open
--+---
 Reporter:  alecmuffett   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.9
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  singleonion, circuits
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 This is a followup to #24991, which has two of the config files (tor
 config, and tor log)

 Expanding on the description in #24991, my blog has a low traffic single
 onion - barely gets hit over Tor at all - yet when I investigated it
 recently I found it claiming to have 6 circuits open for an extended
 period (~days) and also ~50 simultaneous TCP connections.

 I confirmed this with netstat, and then by killing the Tor daemon which
 threw all the connections into simultaneous TIME_WAIT.

 I mentioned this to Teor on IRC, who suggested that I log " a ticket about
 expiring single onion and tor2web connections, please" - because this
 seems really strange, and suggests that SingleOnions are not garbage-
 collecting properly.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24992 [Core Tor/Tor]: SingleOnion (and Tor2web?) connections may need better expiry, lots left open

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24992: SingleOnion (and Tor2web?) connections may need better expiry, lots left
open
---+--
 Reporter:  alecmuffett|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.9
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  singleonion, circuits  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by alecmuffett):

 * Attachment "time-wait.txt" added.

 time-wait connection dump; all these relay connections were open.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24991 [Core Tor/Tor]: SingleOnion claims "missing descriptors for 1/2 of our primary entry guards", has no guards, makes no sense

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24991: SingleOnion claims "missing descriptors for 1/2 of our primary entry
guards", has no guards, makes no sense
-+--
 Reporter:  alecmuffett  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  singleonion, guards  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by alecmuffett):

 Followup is #24992

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[tor-bugs] #24993 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:support option strips TBB down to Firefox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24993: about:support option strips TBB down to Firefox
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  mozilla firefox
 Severity:  Normal   |  branding
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 -go to about:support
 -click "Refresh Tor Browser"
 -now you're fucked

 This option should restore the Tor Browser Bundle to it's default config,
 meantime as the Tor Browser. Instead it "restores" it to more or less
 FIrefox.

 I used it once where I not only didn't have Tor locally installed, but
 didn't have safe access to updates or downloads, and suddenly found myself
 stranded without web access over tor.

 I understand some users may need to manually re-install the Tor Browser
 Button, etc. But at the very least this path needs to be better marked.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23650 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor source code has many typos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23650: Tor source code has many typos
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by fristonio):

 Hey,

 I am new to the tor communtiy and would really like contribute, can I take
 up this ticket, would be a good place to start off with. :)

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[tor-bugs] #24994 [Webpages/Website]: Replace tor-experimental-0.3.0.x with tor-nightly-master on the debian page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24994: Replace tor-experimental-0.3.0.x with tor-nightly-master on the debian 
page
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We tell people to use the Tor 0.3.0 packages for the development branch:
 https://www.torproject.org/docs/debian.html.en#development
 https://www.torproject.org/docs/debian.html.en#source

 But Tor 0.3.0 will not be supported on 1 February 2018.

 To avoid changing this every 6 months, let's use tor-nightly-master-
 DISTRIBUTION instead.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23650 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor source code has many typos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23650: Tor source code has many typos
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 This would be a great place to start!

 Just watch out, some of the suggestions are wrong:
 {{{
 src/or/dns.c:22:38: "rela" is a misspelling of "real"
 src/or/rendcache.c:51:32: "realy" is a misspelling of "really"
 }}}
 These are probably misspellings of "relay".

 Please attach a patch to this ticket, or tell us where your git branch is.

 Once we have fixed all of these, our next step is to work out how to run a
 spelling check regularly as part of "make check".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24967 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: torsocks fails to check SIP if the path itself is a symlink

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24967: torsocks fails to check SIP if the path itself is a symlink
---+--
 Reporter:  Hello71|  Owner:  Hello71
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by ahf):

 As this patch touches some paths that are only executed on macos I'll give
 it a round of testing later today.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23650 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor source code has many typos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23650: Tor source code has many typos
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by fristonio):

 Yeah, that `make check` part would be great. Will try to create the patch
 as soon as possible.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24993 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:support option strips TBB down to Firefox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24993: about:support option strips TBB down to Firefox
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  mozilla firefox branding  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by yawning):

 The Tor Browser developer's views on this particular button of doom is
 somewhat contradictory.

  * It was examined in #13346 (because the now disabled error dialog was
 directing people to click on the "destroy your copy of Tor Browser"
 button) and fixed (Yay).

  * It was also encountered in #14118, because the wonderful safemode
 prompt dialog that the Tor Browser developers didn't disable (Boo),
 includes the button of doom, as an alternative to starting Firefox is safe
 mode.

 The better long term approach would be something like #10760, which will
 make the button actually work.  But in the short/medium term, I'm of the
 opinion that it should probably be patched out.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23650 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor source code has many typos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23650: Tor source code has many typos
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 When we do patches for mass changes like this, we keep the large change
 separate from any ongoing checks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23650 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor source code has many typos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23650: Tor source code has many typos
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by fristonio):

 @teor should I also change spellings in `ChangeLogs` and `ReleaseNotes`,
 aren't they autogenerated?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23650 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor source code has many typos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23650: Tor source code has many typos
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 We use a script to combine changes files into the ChangeLog and
 ReleaseNotes.
 You can fix misspellings in them.

 Oh, and remember to base your branch on our master branch.
 Modifying the ChangeLog and ReleaseNotes in older versions gets messy,

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23650 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor source code has many typos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23650: Tor source code has many typos
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by fristonio):

 OK, also
 * In the file `dnsserv.h` I'm not sure if should change this spelling
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/or/dirserv.h#n126

 * In file `test_extorport.c` the length of the string should be 32 bytes
 so I cannot correct the spelling of `ther` without changing the string,
 what should I do for this.
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/test/test_extorport.c#n246

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20916 [Core Tor/Tor]: Proposal: Put Relay IPv6 Addresses in the microdesc consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20916: Proposal: Put Relay IPv6 Addresses in the microdesc consensus
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop283, ipv6, regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorV-can
---+---

Comment (by teor):

 We just made our first consensus with consensus method 28 in the test
 network.
 The microdesc consensus has IPv6 addresses, the (new) microdescs do not,
 and everything kept working.
 So it looks like the new consensus methods are ok.

 I still need to revise the last child ticket, and then we can close this
 ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23650 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor source code has many typos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23650: Tor source code has many typos
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by fristonio):

 * cc: fristonio (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23650 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor source code has many typos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23650: Tor source code has many typos
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:11 fristonio]:
 > OK, also
 > * In the file `dnsserv.h` I'm not sure if should change this spelling
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/or/dirserv.h#n126

 I would say yes.

 > * In file `test_extorport.c` the length of the string should be 32 bytes
 so I cannot correct the spelling of `ther` without changing the string,
 what should I do for this.
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/test/test_extorport.c#n246

 I'd say no, leave this one as it is. (It appears that there are a bunch of
 strings, split between themselves, being all poetic and stuff.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24672 [Webpages/Website]: The Security Slider manual should reflect the new changes mad to the security slider

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24672: The Security Slider manual should reflect the new changes mad to the
security slider
--+
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gapegas7uftp):

 * priority:  Medium => Low
 * severity:  Normal => Minor


Comment:

 Since upgrade to TBB 7.5.
 Also present in https://tb-manual.torproject.org/es-ES/security-
 slider.html
 (Español / Spanish) and probably other translazions.

 Still eazy for user to see what to do, so I makred it priority - low,
 severity - minor

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20218 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix and refactor and redocument routerstatus_has_changed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20218: Fix and refactor and redocument routerstatus_has_changed
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed, tor-control, easy, |  Actual Points:
  spec-conformance   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by aruna1234):

 Then this check would be the right one, I suppose:

 /* Function to check for new descriptors. Returns 0 if changed, else 1 */

 static int check_tiemstamp(const routerstatus_t *a)
 {
 if(a->published_on == a->now)
 return 1;
 else
 return 0;
 }

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23650 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor source code has many typos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23650: Tor source code has many typos
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by fristonio):

 Ok, I have made almost all the required changes, one thing that I would
 like to know is how can I run all the tests so I can confirm that I
 accidentally didn't break something?

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[tor-bugs] #24995 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Truncated git hash not available in the build for Tor 0.3.2.9

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24995: Truncated git hash not available in the build for Tor 0.3.2.9
--+--
 Reporter:  TheDcoder |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.9
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Hello,

 From latest build of the Expert Bundle (Tor 0.3.2.9) available on the
 website, the `tor.exe` binary doesn't show/have the truncated git hash in
 the version, here is the console output:
 {{{
 E:\Software\ProxAllium\Tor>tor.exe --version
 Tor version 0.3.2.9.
 }}}

 In the previous build/release of the Expert Bundle (Tor 0.3.1.9), there
 used to be a truncated git hash in the version string:
 {{{
 E:\Projects\AutoIt\ProxAllium\Builds\v0.3-beta\ProxAllium\Tor>tor.exe
 --version
 Tor version 0.3.1.9 (git-727d3f1b5e6eeda7).
 }}}

 It might be related to the latest change in Tor Browser's build system
 switch from `gitian/tor-browser-bundle` to `rbm/tor-browser-build`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24995 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Truncated git hash not available in the windows expert bundle build for Tor 0.3.2.9 (was: Truncated git hash not available in the build for Tor 0.3.2.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24995: Truncated git hash not available in the windows expert bundle build for 
Tor
0.3.2.9
--+--
 Reporter:  TheDcoder |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23650 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor source code has many typos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23650: Tor source code has many typos
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 Run "make check"
 You might need to run configure first, see the instructions in INSTALL

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23650 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor source code has many typos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23650: Tor source code has many typos
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by fristonio):

 I'm on it, will upload the patch shortly. :)

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[tor-bugs] #24996 [Metrics/Statistics]: OnionPerf showing >200% timeouts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24996: OnionPerf showing >200% timeouts
+--
 Reporter:  irl |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+--
 https://metrics.torproject.org/torperf-failures.html

 This doesn't make a lot of sense. Either it's incorrect or it's poorly
 explained.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24996 [Metrics/Statistics]: OnionPerf showing >200% timeouts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24996: OnionPerf showing >200% timeouts
+--
 Reporter:  irl |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by irl):

 * Attachment "torperf-failures-public-2017-10-26-2018-01-24-all-50kb.png"
 added.


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[tor-bugs] #24997 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: please add boklm to torextratpo group

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24997: please add boklm to torextratpo group
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA256

 Please add boklm to the torextratpo group, so he can write files there.
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
 Version: GnuPG v1

 iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJaaDiIAAoJEMIYUlgZ94RRTYAP/jiDuIMmFodHi+PdR/a1uqem
 NHm7Yo2EANrWyqPErPIwf72nk9PGx+8UzTfFWzZGUx8etc1xL/pvXIdEBiIc/grF
 rJxpnh44qq3HFm9VSe7II/Ho5BETfA72qXwkj6kdq632w+wsaKtv8OnQfy3/TFCw
 FPE4jFk+BBbBoXRZGg3G2w87q2Yq03xMvWg1nuxw2J/wyPICUvR2KagEv5TbqKno
 FLjpTeQipy6iQWyUDaehO8LhMNKTy2p1nkjH5Fh6hvCsK4LJEic4jVX2RjrcuTKL
 aOGiVGT6lyuatSHi2SelrLMgO456O8OM6WTDYlGgRR3ugX7hRgnFs1016ENlWgRj
 ddrq10lRPR0/u0orx153834zwSGYFuiS/2v/Wyf6j2Vn1WOLevwSitkPmRmP6pm3
 qBZN4clQ2B2LSszN7vSXMClqxqPH+usv0aWavPS/QX/PJ6saIlhhIX2UlPj6YGPS
 RdgbN1EAkZHnN7Dprkdp33exxL0nXGU6BehIDVhj7t7DJPpPQh8dfyvwPKtD60VM
 Fxy819Qz85QrsGtAzs987T1QY7UnLb1fW4MMmkTDfFPNpVnXHfRtcUSV9Xd+5yTd
 WMrHCJJfi6G3DcRqVtuFQvXX4sx86ZKfrTl8+V2ptNuv26HQw2d0qwKUyXRaDDVK
 eZt/t33jt9RHyw9xL4B8
 =BbaD
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

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