commit 324353a993bb69abc3142200feb64cb5e5fa03cf
Author: emma peel <emma.p...@riseup.net>
Date:   Tue May 18 19:29:02 2021 +0200

    add small corrections from translators, thanks!
---
 content/relay/community-resources/tor-exit-guidelines/contents.lr    | 2 +-
 content/relay/community-resources/tor-relay-universities/contents.lr | 2 +-
 content/relay/setup/bridge/contents.lr                               | 2 +-
 content/relay/setup/exit/contents.lr                                 | 2 +-
 content/relay/types-of-relays/contents.lr                            | 2 +-
 5 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/content/relay/community-resources/tor-exit-guidelines/contents.lr 
b/content/relay/community-resources/tor-exit-guidelines/contents.lr
index 61e4084..722e513 100644
--- a/content/relay/community-resources/tor-exit-guidelines/contents.lr
+++ b/content/relay/community-resources/tor-exit-guidelines/contents.lr
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ Another benefit of an association-like structure is that it 
might still work eve
 ### Consider preemptively teaching your local law enforcement about Tor.
 
 "Cybercrime" people actually love it when you offer to [teach them about Tor 
and the 
Internet](https://blog.torproject.org/blog/talking-german-police-stuttgart) -- 
they're typically overwhelmed by their jobs and don't have enough background to 
know where to start.
-Contacting them gives you a chance to teach them why Tor is useful to the 
world (and why it's [not particularly helpful to 
criminals](https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq-abuse#WhatAboutCriminals).
+Contacting them gives you a chance to teach them why Tor is useful to the 
world (and why it's [not particularly helpful to 
criminals](https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq-abuse#WhatAboutCriminals)).
 Also, if they do get a report about your relay, they'll think of you as a 
helpful expert rather than a potential criminal.
 
 ## Handling abuse complaints
diff --git 
a/content/relay/community-resources/tor-relay-universities/contents.lr 
b/content/relay/community-resources/tor-relay-universities/contents.lr
index 6fa5dc9..95a4b52 100644
--- a/content/relay/community-resources/tor-relay-universities/contents.lr
+++ b/content/relay/community-resources/tor-relay-universities/contents.lr
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ In some cases, you should talk to the network security people 
before you talk to
 
 If the authorities contact your university for logs, be pleasant and helpful.
 Tor's default log level doesn't provide much that's useful, so if they want 
copies of your logs, that's fine.
-Be helpful and take the opportunity to explain to them about Tor and why it's 
useful to the world. (If they contact you directly for logs, you should send 
them to your university's lawyers -- acting on it yourself is [almost always a 
poor idea](/relay/community-resources/eff-tor-legal-faq/).
+Be helpful and take the opportunity to explain to them about Tor and why it's 
useful to the world. (If they contact you directly for logs, you should send 
them to your university's lawyers -- acting on it yourself is [almost always a 
poor idea](/relay/community-resources/eff-tor-legal-faq/)).
 
 If there are too many complaints coming in, there are several approaches you 
can take to reduce them. First, you should follow the tips in the [Tor relay 
documentation](https://community.torproject.org/relay), such as picking a 
descriptive hostname or getting your own IP address. If that doesn't work, you 
can scale back the advertised speed of your relay, by using the 
`MaxAdvertisedBandwidth` to attract less traffic from the Tor network. Lastly, 
you can scale back your exit policy.
 
diff --git a/content/relay/setup/bridge/contents.lr 
b/content/relay/setup/bridge/contents.lr
index 9bfaa55..a3650df 100644
--- a/content/relay/setup/bridge/contents.lr
+++ b/content/relay/setup/bridge/contents.lr
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ This guide will help you set up an obfs4 bridge to help 
censored users connect t
 
 Note 1: If you're running a platform that is not listed on this page, you can 
[compile obfs4 from source](https://gitlab.com/yawning/obfs4#installation).
 
-Note 2: If you're planning to turn an existing but non-bridge relay into a 
bridge relay, changing IP address, name and fingerprint is advised to avoid 
easy discovery and blocklisting by ISP or governments.
+Note 2: If you're planning to turn an existing but non-bridge relay into a 
bridge relay, changing IP address, name and fingerprint is advised to avoid 
easy discovery and blocklisting by ISPs or governments.
 
 ---
 html: two-columns-page.html
diff --git a/content/relay/setup/exit/contents.lr 
b/content/relay/setup/exit/contents.lr
index 5b17ec7..df21cb1 100644
--- a/content/relay/setup/exit/contents.lr
+++ b/content/relay/setup/exit/contents.lr
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ Do not mix your own traffic with your exit relay traffic.
 
 ## Reverse DNS and WHOIS record
 
-Before turning your non-exit relay into an exit relay, ensure that you have 
set a reverse DNS record (PTR) to make it more obvious that this is a tor exit 
relay. Something like "tor-exit" it its name is a good start.
+Before turning your non-exit relay into an exit relay, ensure that you have 
set a reverse DNS record (PTR) to make it more obvious that this is a tor exit 
relay. Something like "tor-exit" in its name is a good start.
 
 If your provider offers it, make sure your WHOIS record contains clear 
indications that this is a Tor exit relay.
 
diff --git a/content/relay/types-of-relays/contents.lr 
b/content/relay/types-of-relays/contents.lr
index e2daa10..a92de72 100644
--- a/content/relay/types-of-relays/contents.lr
+++ b/content/relay/types-of-relays/contents.lr
@@ -63,6 +63,6 @@ Several countries, including China and Iran, have found ways 
to detect and block
 [Pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention/), a 
special kind of bridge, address this by adding an additional layer of 
obfuscation.
 
 Bridges are relatively easy, low-risk and low bandwidth Tor nodes to operate, 
but they have a big impact on users.
-A bridge isn't likely to receive any abuse complaints, and since bridges are 
not listed in the public consensus, they are unlikely to be blocked by popular 
services.
+A bridge isn't likely to receive any abuse complaints, and since bridges are 
not listed as public relays, they are unlikely to be blocked by popular 
services.
 
 Bridges are a great option if you can only run a Tor node from your home 
network, have only one static IP, and don't have a huge amount of bandwidth to 
donate -- we recommend giving your bridge at least 1 Mbit/sec.



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