Re: [tor-dev] Proposal 223: Ace: Improved circuit-creation key exchange
On Wed, Nov 20, 2013 at 08:36:30AM -0800, Watson Ladd wrote: Is it just me, or is this protocol MQV with the client generating a fake long term key? Well yeah sort of, but the details are crucial. In Improving efficiency and simplicity of Tor circuit establishment and hidden services (available on www.syverson.org or the anonbib) Lasse and I and presented a similar protocol and explicitly described how the similarity to and basis in MQV was a hopeful indicator that it was sound. But we didn't do a proper security analysis (in any model) in that paper, leaving that for future work. These authors found a vulnerability in that protocol, improved on it, and proved their protocol secure. -Paul ___ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
Re: [tor-dev] Proposal 223: Ace: Improved circuit-creation key exchange
Am 20.11.2013 um 18:19 schrieb Paul Syverson paul.syver...@nrl.navy.mil: These authors found a vulnerability in that protocol, improved on it, and proved their protocol secure. Actually, Ian Goldberg, Douglas Stebila, and Berkant Ustaoglu found the vulnerability in Lasse and Paul's protocol [1], improved it, and proved the resulting protocol ntor secure [2]. We improved the efficiency of ntor and proved the resulting protocol Ace secure [3]. - Esfandiar [1] Lasse Overlier and Paul Syverson. Improving efficiency and simplicity of Tor circuit establishment and hidden services. In Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies, pages 134 - 152, ACM, 2007. [2] Ian Goldberg, Douglas Stebila, and Berkant Ustaoglu. Anonymity and one-way authentication in key exchange protocols. In the journal on Designs, Codes and Cryptography, pages 245-269, Springer, 2012. [3] Michael Backes, Aniket Kate, and Esfandiar Mohammadi. Ace: an efficient key-exchange protocol for onion routing. In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society, pages 55 - 64, ACM, 2012. ___ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
Re: [tor-dev] Apple App Store Redux
Sorry for taking so long to respond to this thread. Responses are (mostly) inline below. At a training event a couple of days ago, a user was sketched out by the warning her Mac gave her -- in spite of the advance notice she'd been given by the trainers. Erinn Clark wrote: Please see Ralf's reply to me elsewhere in the thread -- do you still think this while taking into account what we know about US companies' cooperation the NSA/USG with regards to turning over user data? This is an extremely important point, and I don't want to minimize user risk in this regard. But I think that it needs to be weighed against the probability that it will expand availability to censored users. (Especially if the bundle uploaded is the pluggable transport bundle, hint hint hint). The situation is similar to Orbot's deployment (as Nathan points out). Censor X would have to block the app store in order to block access to Orbot, but the trade-off is that Google gets a list of people interested in anonymity. Part of me feels that if a user is using an Apple device, they're on the hook to do their homework -- responsibility and informed consent and definitely in play there. AFAIK, the last bug submitted was #6540. However, having said all of that, it turns out that Tor doesn't need to distribute it via app store to distribute a signed app [1] (there are two types of certificates). Though the signing situation itself is complicated (eg, Apple would still likely know that you've downloaded Tor). and...@torproject.is wrote: I agree with this method. I don't think The Tor Project should be the one maintaining Tor-something in the App Store. I'd rather a trusted 3rd party who signs a trademark licensing agreement with us be the person who maintains an App Store presence. I really like this idea. My only real concerns are about licensing and whether Apple would consider a Tor-licensing dev to be effectively a proxy of the Tor Project Inc. Also, the tpo site right now indicates that someone could just submit TBB to an app store without a licensing agreement, so that could use clarifying. Other than that, agree with Naif :D To Nathan's point, Macs and Chromebooks subscribe highly to the walled garden model of app accessibility, and more users look to Apple's blessed apps than for independent solutions. This is either a good thing or a bad thing, depending on your outlook (broader userbase vs. better-educated users). abusing his parenthetical privileges, Griffin [1] Page 11 of: https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentation/security/conceptual/CodeSigningGuide/CodeSigningGuide.pdf -- Be kind, for everyone you meet is fighting a hard battle. PGP: 0xD9D4CADEE3B67E7AB2C05717E331FD29AE792C97 OTR: sa...@jabber.ccc.de ___ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
Re: [tor-dev] Proposal 223: Ace: Improved circuit-creation key exchange
On Wed, Nov 20, 2013 at 11:02 AM, Nick Mathewson ni...@torproject.org wrote: Hi, all! Here's Incidentally, the canonical location for proposals is the torspec repository. Since this email went out, I've applied some fixes to the proposal to fix up some mistakes in it, and more mistakes I made. The latest version is https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/proposals/223-ace-handshake.txt ___ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
Re: [tor-dev] Help me guague how full your plate is via regular check-in conversations
Hi Tom, being the admin for groups is a thankless task! I've mentioned a couple of times that the tor project does have availability of a spare VM with unique IPv4 for testing on. This offer has never been taken up. I'm a tester, not a coder, as I already run a relay I'm not sure what else I can do to assist you good people. My kindest regards, Phill. https://metrics.torproject.org/relay-search.html?search=176.31.156.199 On 29 October 2013 18:30, Tom Lowenthal m...@tomlowenthal.com wrote: Hello fighters for freedom, When applying for grants, planning future work, and otherwise thinking about what capacity we have leftover to do things in the future, it's really useful to know who's doing what and how much of it. I get some of this information from our sponsor/project-specific meetings, but it doesn't seem to be the full picture, so I'd like to trot out that old chestnut of regular one-on-one chats. This means that I'd like to spend between thirty and sixty minutes talking with each of you, once every week or two. I'd like to calibrate the frequency so that we can get calls down to 30 minutes each, with room to kvetch and have a conversation that's a little more than just rattling off deliverable status and time assignments. I think that the right group for this is the folks who post to tor-reports. If you post to tor-reports, please get back to me by the end of the week with your availability for a regular weekly check-in, as well as any thoughts you have about medium, format, or anything else. If you're not currently on tor-reports and think you should check in, or vice versa, you should probably drop me a line too. Any questions or suggestions? -Tom ___ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev -- https://wiki.ubuntu.com/phillw ___ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
