Re: [tor-dev] Apple App Store Redux

2013-12-09 Thread coderman
On Sat, Nov 16, 2013 at 3:58 PM, Erinn Clark  wrote:
> ...
> I tried to get the licensing agreements earlier this year and they are, as far
> as I can tell, not available until you actually sign up. If someone reading
> this has put something in the app store (which may or may not be different 
> from
> the app store the iPhone uses? does anyone know?) please send us a copy of any
> agreements you may have!


checked #6540 and did not see any docs.  attached
mac_program_agreement_20130610.pdf and
ios_program_standard_agreement_20130610.pdf to
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/6540/

best regards,
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Re: [tor-dev] InjectSOCKS: 2nd try

2013-12-09 Thread David Goulet
Hi!

On 06 Dec (18:59:33), t...@herr-der-mails.de wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> I've first sent this e-mail to h...@rt.torproject.org and the answer 
> was to send a copy of it to the "tor-dev mailing list". So that's 
> what I do:
> 
> I just wanted to let you know that I've created a small new tool for 
> Windows called InjectSOCKS that can force other Windows software to 
> do TCP connections via SOCKS. This way software not supporting SOCKS 
> can be used together with Tor. You don't need any additional HTTP 
> proxy or other proxies. As an example it works for passive FTP, too.
> Additionally it handles the DNS requests of that other software in a 
> way that while creating the SOCKS connection, Tor gets the textual 
> address - so the exit node can resolve it (which is the way favored 
> by the Tor developers). This way Tor hidden services work as well. 
> And it works per Windows process, so it doesn't influence the whole 
> operating system.

This is really great. I didn't look at the code but getting Windows
support in torsocks would be awesome! Not sure yet how much work it
would require but definitely having it would be amazing.

> In case you're interested in my software, I've put it on sourceforge 
> to make it open source:
> http://sourceforge.net/projects/injectsocks
> The tool is far from being perfect yet, but I think some of the ideas
> are interesting.

Do you think you can put your code into a git repository (github,
gitourious, ...). That would be *very* helpful to review/contribute and
track changes.

Thanks!
David

> 
> By the way, I've also created DNS2SOCKS, which is already listed on 
> Tor's Wiki:
> http://sourceforge.net/projects/dns2socks
> It seems like several people like it, so I hope that some people
> will also like InjectSOCKS.
> 
> Regards,
> ghostmaker
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Re: [tor-dev] [tor-reports] Damian's Status Report - November 2013

2013-12-09 Thread Damian Johnson
> Well, what do you suggest?  Add to metrics-tasks or not?

Personally I don't think it would be worthwhile, but if you'd like to
then the script is on the ticket.
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[tor-dev] Statistics on fraction of connections used uni-/bidirectionally

2013-12-09 Thread Karsten Loesing
Björn, Florian,

a few years back (in 2010, to be precise) we added statistics to
little-t-tor reporting what fraction of connections is used
uni-/bidirectionally.  Quoting dir-spec.txt:

"conn-bi-direct" -MM-DD HH:MM:SS (NSEC s) BELOW,READ,WRITE,BOTH NL
[At most once]

Number of connections, split into 10-second intervals, that are
used uni-directionally or bi-directionally as observed in the NSEC
seconds (usually 86400 seconds) before -MM-DD HH:MM:SS.  Every
10 seconds, we determine for every connection whether we read and
wrote less than a threshold of 20 KiB (BELOW), read at least 10
times more than we wrote (READ), wrote at least 10 times more than
we read (WRITE), or read and wrote more than the threshold, but
not 10 times more in either direction (BOTH).  After classifying a
connection, read and write counters are reset for the next
10-second interval.

These statistics are disabled by default, but when they are enabled,
relays publish them in their extra-info descriptors.  And quite a few
relays do that.  Here's a (bad) visualization (that used to be slightly
less bad when fewer relays published these statistics):

https://metrics.torproject.org/performance.html#connbidirect

Here's the question: Is there still value in having these statistics?  I
recall that they were useful in 2010, but will that still be the case in
2013?

If the answer is "yes", never mind.

If the answer is "no", I'd create a ticket and submit a patch to remove
code parts from little-t-tor, and I'd remove the not-really-useful graph
from the metrics website.

Cc'ing Rob, Aaron, and Roger as the people who typically have an
interest in these kinds of statistics.  If other tor-dev@ people have an
opinion on this, please raise your voice!

All the best,
Karsten
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Re: [tor-dev] [tor-reports] Damian's Status Report - November 2013

2013-12-09 Thread Karsten Loesing
On 12/9/13 5:45 PM, Damian Johnson wrote:
>> Hi Damian,
>>
>> do you want to add the code produced for this analysis to
>> metrics-tasks.git?  This could happen now or when all analysis for this
>> ticket is done.  I'm aware that it may take a bit of time to clean up
>> code (though I haven't looked at your code).  But the advantage is that
>> people who're planning to do a similar analysis can `git grep foo`
>> metrics-tasks.git and find your code.  If the code is only on a Trac
>> ticket, it's very likely lost once the ticket is closed.
>>
>> https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics-tasks.git/blob/HEAD:/README
> 
> You're certainly welcome to. My conclusion from writing it was
> actually that Stem needs some helper methods to better handle the
> prefixed 'private' exit policy...
> 
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10107
> 
> If we had that then the script would have been pretty trivial.

Well, what do you suggest?  Add to metrics-tasks or not?

If you think we should add something, would you mind sending me a
metrics-tasks patch, or a link to your metrics-tasks branch?  I wouldn't
know what files to add and how to describe it accurately in a short
README file.  Thanks!

All the best,
Karsten

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Re: [tor-dev] [tor-reports] Damian's Status Report - November 2013

2013-12-09 Thread Damian Johnson
> Hi Damian,
>
> do you want to add the code produced for this analysis to
> metrics-tasks.git?  This could happen now or when all analysis for this
> ticket is done.  I'm aware that it may take a bit of time to clean up
> code (though I haven't looked at your code).  But the advantage is that
> people who're planning to do a similar analysis can `git grep foo`
> metrics-tasks.git and find your code.  If the code is only on a Trac
> ticket, it's very likely lost once the ticket is closed.
>
> https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics-tasks.git/blob/HEAD:/README

You're certainly welcome to. My conclusion from writing it was
actually that Stem needs some helper methods to better handle the
prefixed 'private' exit policy...

https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10107

If we had that then the script would have been pretty trivial.

Cheers! -Damian
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Re: [tor-dev] Tor project automation work

2013-12-09 Thread Georg Koppen
Hi Nicolas,

some remarks are below.

Nicolas Vigier:
> In order to help me doing that, I'm very interested to receive from
> developers of any tor components :
> 
> - a description or ticket number of bugs that you wish could have been
>   detected earlier with automated tests

https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8143 comes to mind here.

> - any wish or specific needs that you may have

You write: "Tor Browser includes some patches to make the build
reproducible. We could have a test that check the reproducibility of the
build by building the browser twice."

While this is indeed a good idea, it won't be enough as we had bugs in
the past that were only visible when builds on different machines got
compared. So, what I'd like to have (in addition to running browser
builds twice? on different machines?) are tests that cover specific bugs
we avoided (see: the "Remaining Build Reproducibility Issues" in Mike's
blog post covering the technical details of the Gitian build) or tracked
down. See: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10159 for an
example for the latter. (There, one could write a test that automates
the creation of the browser.manifest which would eventually (i.e. if run
a couple of times) show whether this bug still exists or whether not).)

> - anything else that you think might be useful for me to know

You write: "We can produce some packages for Tor Browser, to make
testing of the browser easier."

In which regard is it easier to test the browser if you have packages?
And how should that look like outside of the Tor Browser Bundle? I fear
we create extra bugs if we move the browser outside the environment it
will be used in (i.e. the TBB) just for testing purposes. Even if we
won't create extra bugs this way we might miss some. To be clear,
running the tests you call "Usablility tests" and "Reproducible build
test" outside the bundle, seems fine to me, while my concerns apply to
the fingerprinting and privacy tests.

The test helpers are a good idea. You might want to rename "Cookies
tool" to something like "Identifier tool" matching the Tor Browser
specification more closely (especially as you actually mean "Identifier
tool" as "Later versions could be extended to also use other techniques
for storing informations in the browser" indicates).

Georg



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