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Re: [tor-relays] Huge harrassment by Irdeto and IP-Echelon, 83 mails, in 2 weeks, need your help
Are they threatening any legal action? They're probably just trying to cover their asses. They are likely getting these notices from MPAA and other trolls, and are sending all of them along to you to make sure they are not legally liable for anything. But unless they are threatening legal action, maybe you can just ignore them? I am not a lawyer and have not run an exit node, so my suggestion could be worthless :) Dan On 11/13/2013 05:50 PM, Moritz Bartl wrote: > Hi, > > One idea would be to ask the ISP, and maybe pay them a bit more for the > additional workload in handling the complaints. One of our ISPs has > decided to simply blackhole all complaints coming from Irdeto/IP-Echelon. > > The other choice is to use a more restricted exit policy, like this one: > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/ReducedExitPolicy > > It allows many relevant ports to exit, but will cut down DMCA complaints > to almost zero since it does not allow random ports. > -- http://disman.tl OpenPGP key: http://disman.tl/pgp.asc Fingerprint: 2480 095D 4B16 436F 35AB 7305 F670 74ED BD86 43A9 The general vibe of the 2-pager seems to be to promote OTI through the Commotion project, rather than highlighting/promoting the project itself, at least that's my impression. Not a criticism, just an observation. There are a few things I would tweak, and I would generally stay away from the "Imagine the next Tahrir Square" type language. Dan On 11/13/2013 02:39 PM, Thomas Gideon wrote: -- Dan Staples Open Technology Institute https://commotionwireless.net OpenPGP key: http://disman.tl/pgp.asc Fingerprint: 2480 095D 4B16 436F 35AB 7305 F670 74ED BD86 43A9 Enigmail ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Huge harrassment by Irdeto and IP-Echelon, 83 mails, in 2 weeks, need your help
Hi, One idea would be to ask the ISP, and maybe pay them a bit more for the additional workload in handling the complaints. One of our ISPs has decided to simply blackhole all complaints coming from Irdeto/IP-Echelon. The other choice is to use a more restricted exit policy, like this one: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/ReducedExitPolicy It allows many relevant ports to exit, but will cut down DMCA complaints to almost zero since it does not allow random ports. -- Moritz Bartl https://www.torservers.net/ ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
[tor-relays] Huge harrassment by Irdeto and IP-Echelon, 83 mails, in 2 weeks, need your help
Hello everybody, My 2 exit nodes servers are ArachnideFR35 and ArachnideFR35v2, with respective observed bandwidth of approximately 100Mb/s and 30 Mb/s (12 200 KB/s and 3800 kB/s). They are momentarily down since I have decided today to put them down while I will be trying to solve this enormous Irdeto/IP-Echelon problem. I want to keep my servers alive but I realize that it will not be possible if harassment doesn't stop quickly. My ISP is just transmitting to me a huge amount of abuse complaints every day (and never makes any comment) but they are too many and the incredible patience of my ISP cannot be unlimited. And all this, despite of the fact that my reverse DNS are set, since the first day, to http://digi00277.torproxy-readme-arachnide-fr-35.fr and http://digi00433.torproxy-readme-arachnide-fr-35.fr with the Tor Exit Notice on port 80. And it is this address that appears into the Tor Relay lists. I have decided to temporarily shut down my servers today (November 13, 2013, 14:50 UTC) while I'm trying to solve this enormous Irdeto/IP-Echelon problem, and to send a mail to my ISP to tell them that I will try to fix this problem before to restart my servers. Since August 18, 2013, the two machines that I'm running as Tor Relays are full exit nodes (reject *:25, *:26, *:27, accept *:*) (before it, since May 2013, they was only Relays nodes) because I was thininking that : if there is abuse complaints, I will be able to face them. I'm not the only one in this case (accept *:*), But as I see in this mailing-list it seems that the amount of abuse complaint I'm receiving is completely abnormal. My service provider is Digicube.fr, it's a really little company that doesn't seems to be able of handle everything in time. I not sure if there was no abuse complaints before end of October, but if there was, I never seen them. I have tried everything: by mail or by the Web Interface that figures in the mails, with all these arguments: - Since 08/18/2013, 95.130.10.70 and 95.130.9.89 are dedicated high speed Tor Exit Router, they do not host or share anything, they are just international network routers with empty hard disk drives. - All reports you sent about these permanent IP Addresses (95.130.10.70 and 95.130.9.89) for several weeks are wrong: the IP Address that appears into your reports is the IP Address of the router, not the user. - These routers and his responsible are NOT infringing any copyright. Neither technically nor legally. - You got to understand that the goal of such a network is a way much fair goal than movies on the Internet. In March 2011, the Tor Project was awarded the Free Software Foundation's 2010 Award for Projects of Social Benefit on the following grounds: "Using free software, Tor has enabled roughly 36 million people around the world to experience freedom of access and expression on the Internet while keeping them in control of their privacy and anonymity. Its network has proved pivotal in dissident movements in both Iran and more recently Egypt." But for both Irdeto and IP-Echelon, they don't care, and every day, the harassment procedure continues. I think they don't read my emails, I hope they can receive them; I never had any answers from them. I told them that if there is no answer, I will not have any reason to keep watching their emails... may be I need to ask my ISP to put a spam-filter about that, but I think that such a proposal have no chance to be welcome into an abuse service ! Don't be horrified: here is, below, the list of all abuse complaints I've received from them. You will understand why I love my ISP, and why I need to quickly find a solution! The olders ones are from October, 29 2013. 1 - IP-Echelon part : notices.s...@ip-echelon.com : Unauthorized Distribution of the Copyrighted Motion Picture Entitled "White House Down" - Case ID 131400838 Unauthorized Distribution of the Copyrighted Motion Picture Entitled "White House Down" - Case ID 131396212 Unauthorized Distribution of the Copyrighted Motion Picture Entitled "White House Down" - Case ID 131732460 notices.war...@ip-echelon.com : Notice of Claimed Infringement - Case ID 130362722 Notice of Claimed Infringement - Case ID 130296727 Notice of Claimed Infringement - Case ID 130308292 Notice of Claimed Infringement - Case ID 131314345 Notice of Claimed Infringement - Case ID 131160950 Notice of Claimed Infringement - Case ID 131049815 Notice of Claimed Infringement - Case ID 131044521 Notice of Claimed Infringement - Case ID 130778319 2 - Irdeto part : activis...@copyright-compliance.com : 290-117780660 Notice of Unauthorized Use of Activision Property 290-117744045 Notice of Unauthorized Use of Activision Property 290-117740528 Notice of Unauthorized Use of Activision Property 290-117895342 Notice of Unauthorized Use of Activision Property 290-117877594 Notice of Unauthorized Use of Activision Property 290-117854157 Notice of Unauthorized Use of Activ
Re: [tor-relays] Checking a bridge
On Wed, 13 Nov 2013 12:12:35 +, and...@torproject.is wrote:
...
> The bridge operator cannot find out to which pool you belong.
('you' meaning the 'bridge operator'?) You (as the operator)
can find out the pool you're in; there is an API somewhere
that tells you all the bridges, just without their IP addresses.
Did that for mine, just can't remember the URL offhand.
Andreas
--
"Totally trivial. Famous last words."
From: Linus Torvalds
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2010 07:29:21 -0800
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Re: [tor-relays] Checking a bridge
On Tue, Nov 12, 2013 at 08:37:36AM +, mart...@posteo.de wrote 0.4K bytes in 0 lines about: : When my bridge uses only the same few MBs each day, i guess it isn't : used at all right? Bridges are randomly assigned into one of 5 pools to be given out to clients. The pools are served over https, smtps, instant messaging, human to human social networks, or put in reserve. The bridge operator cannot find out to which pool you belong. Typically, the bridges in the https and smtps pools see usage right away. As an example, I ran a bridge for years passing minimal traffic. I gave out my bridge IP and fingerprint to a few activists at a conference and it seems their entire country used it for the next year. An easy way to test "is my bridge working?" is to use it yourself. -- Andrew http://tpo.is/contact pgp 0x6B4D6475 ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Checking a bridge
Lunar: > Martin Kepplinger: >> I will not send my fingerprint to globe over http. I want to keep it >> secret so I can't check my bridge. I hope it works. obfs-ports are >> forwarded and everything else are standard torrc-settings. >> >> But please make globe accessible over https. > > Unless you are subject to a MITM and the JavaScript code is changed > before reaching your browser, Globe will *not* send the fingerprint of > the bridge to Onionoo (over HTTPS), only the hashed version. But > I understand extra catiousness. > > Maybe there's no need to give my hash to globe. I checked with arm and it sees _outbound_ connections. Is that evidence enough that the bridge is used? My standard-relay doesn't see any outbound connections (though relaying lots of data of course). Would be nice if somebody could confirm that outbound connections in a properly configured bridge mean that it is actually _used_ already. thanks > > ___ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Checking a bridge
Martin Kepplinger: > I will not send my fingerprint to globe over http. I want to keep it > secret so I can't check my bridge. I hope it works. obfs-ports are > forwarded and everything else are standard torrc-settings. > > But please make globe accessible over https. Unless you are subject to a MITM and the JavaScript code is changed before reaching your browser, Globe will *not* send the fingerprint of the bridge to Onionoo (over HTTPS), only the hashed version. But I understand extra catiousness. -- Lunar signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
