Re: [tor-relays] Few questions about relaying

2014-10-17 Thread Blaise Gagnon 
Hey, me again !

After adjusting everything, and waiting a few days, I'm still hibernating
and getting a mere 26Kb measured speed... I watched it closely and it got
peeks up to 75Mb, but then dropped ... went up, then down  etc ...

Any idea ?

2014-10-11 15:40 GMT-04:00 teor teor2...@gmail.com:

 Unless you have a specific need to debug tor (hint: you don't), you should
 remove this line to improve security:

 DisableDebuggerAttachment 0

 And please consider adjusting these lines rather than removing them:

 RelayBandwidthBurst 25 MBytes
 RelayBandwidthRate 20 MBytes

 We've found that relays perform best when given a rate slightly under the
 capacity of the link.

 teor
 pgp 0xABFED1AC
 hkp://pgp.mit.edu/
 https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5

 http://0bin.net/paste/Mu92kPyphK0bqmbA#Zvt3gzMrSCAwDN6GKsUk7Q8G-eG+Y+BLpe7wtmU66Mx

 On 12 Oct 2014, at 01:22 , tor-relays-requ...@lists.torproject.org wrote:

  Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2014 17:21:51 +0300
  From: s7r s...@sky-ip.org
  To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
  Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Few questions about relaying
  Message-ID: 54393cff.5030...@sky-ip.org
  Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
 
  Signed PGP part
  RelayBandwidthBurst 15 MBytes
  RelayBandwidthRate 3 MBytes
  ContactInfo quebecf...@gmail.com - 200Mb dedicated relay
  ControlPort 9052
  CookieAuthentication 1
  DataDirectory /home/blaise/.arm/tor_data
  DirPort 9030
  DisableDebuggerAttachment 0
  ExitPolicy reject *:*
  Log notice file /home/blaise/.arm/tor_log
  Nickname QuebecFibe
  ORPort 27645
  RunAsDaemon 1
 
 
  Use this. You are using the latest Tor?
 
 
  On 10/11/2014 5:11 PM, Blaise Gagnon wrote:
   http://pastebin.com/DQ4k7Fzz
  
   2014-10-11 10:06 GMT-04:00 s7r s...@sky-ip.org
   mailto:s...@sky-ip.org:
  
   Can you please copy/paste your entire torrc to a pastebin and
   provide us the link?
  
   It is hibernating only if you use accounting. Provide us your
   entire complete torrc and we will correct it for you if you don't
   have traffic limits on your server.
  
   On 10/11/2014 4:54 PM, Blaise Gagnon wrote:
   after a few hours, still hibernating, and still wondering why I
   lost Stable, Guard and Named all at the same time (see atlas
   graph)... weird.
  
   2014-10-11 6:03 GMT-04:00 Blaise Gagnon quebecf...@gmail.com
   mailto:quebecf...@gmail.com mailto:quebecf...@gmail.com
   mailto:quebecf...@gmail.com:
  
   no reason for my node to be hibernating, no caps...
  
   2014-10-11 3:31 GMT-04:00 Lunar lu...@torproject.org
   mailto:lu...@torproject.org mailto:lu...@torproject.org
   mailto:lu...@torproject.org:
  
   Blaise Gagnon:
   and ... what is hibernating ?
  
   See AccountingMax and related options in tor manpage:
  
   AccountingMax N
   bytes|KBytes|MBytes|GBytes|KBits|MBits|GBits|TBytes Never send
   more than the specified number of bytes in a given accounting
   period, or receive more than that number in the period. For
   example, with AccountingMax set to 1 GByte, a server could send
   900 MBytes and receive 800 MBytes and continue running. It will
   only hibernate once one of the two reaches 1 GByte. When the
   number of bytes gets low, Tor will stop accepting new connections
   and circuits. When the number of bytes is exhausted, Tor will
   hibernate until some time in the next accounting period. To
   prevent all servers from waking at the same time, Tor will also
   wait until a random point in each period before waking up. If you
   have bandwidth cost issues, enabling hibernation is preferable to
   setting a low bandwidth, since it provides users with a
   collection of fast servers that are up some of the time, which is
   more useful than a set of slow servers that are always
   available.
  
   -- Lunar lu...@torproject.org mailto:lu...@torproject.org
   mailto:lu...@torproject.org mailto:lu...@torproject.org
  
   ___ tor-relays
   mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
   mailto:tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
   mailto:tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
   mailto:tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
   https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
  
  
  
  
  
   ___ tor-relays
   mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
   mailto:tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
   https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
  
  
   ___ tor-relays mailing
   list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
   mailto:tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
   https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
  
  
  
  
   ___ tor-relays mailing
   list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
   https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
  
 
  --
  s7r
  PGP Fingerprint: 7C36 9232 5ABD FB0B 3021 03F1 837F A52C 8126 5B11
  PGP Pubkey:

Re: [tor-relays] Anonbox Project

2014-10-17 Thread Colin Mahns 
It looks like Kickstarter has suspended the project. 

http://www.wired.com/2014/10/kickstarter-suspends-anonabox

Colin

On October 15, 2014 9:47:09 AM EDT, isis i...@torproject.org wrote:
Sven Reissmann transcribed 2.4K bytes:
 Hi there,
 
 I recently read about the anonbox project [1], a small
hardware-router,
 which allows end-users to connect their whole LAN to the Tor network.
 The project is on kickstarter at the moment [2].
 
 Has there already been a discussion on how this might affect the
 performance of the Tor network?

Yes and no.

One of the Anonabox developers, August Germar, posted to their
kickstarter
page that the distributed Anonaboxes would have a checkout option to be
relays/bridges by default. [0] Colin Mahns responded to this, [1]
pointing out
some of my recent discussions with Mike Perry and others on the tor-dev
list
on scaling the Tor network. [2] [3] (And August Germar responded in
their
Reddit AMA. [4])

I agree with Colin that the Anonabox folks seem to be well-intentioned.
However, the network effects, were these routers to be distributed, and
were a
majority of them to be configured as relays by default, would likely be
harmful due to the low bandwidth of most residential connections.

That said, I think that everyone here would welcome the chance for a
pocket-sized FLOSS router which enforces safe Tor usage. If that is
their
goal, and they are able to communicate honestly with users, I'd like to
help
them succeed. Particularly if it means someone else does hardware
development,
since that's not really my jam. :)

[0]:
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/augustgermar/anonabox-a-tor-hardware-router/posts/1017625
[1]:
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/augustgermar/anonabox-a-tor-hardware-router/posts/1017625?cursor=8115567#comment-8115566
[2]:
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-September/007558.html
[3]:
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-September/007560.html
[4]:
https://www.reddit.com/r/anonabox/comments/2ja22g/hi_im_august_germar_a_developer_for_the_anonabox/cl9u17k

-- 
 ♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A3ADB67A2CDB8B35
Current Keys: https://blog.patternsinthevoid.net/isis.txt




___
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
___
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

Re: [tor-relays] Anonbox Project

2014-10-17 Thread grarpamp 
On Fri, Oct 17, 2014 at 3:36 PM, Colin Mahns colinma...@riseup.net wrote:
 It looks like Kickstarter has suspended the project.

Some of this thread seems a bit silly. Tor does one thing, it
anonymizes your IP address. These boxes push everything through
that, which is generally exactly what you want... no leaks. So great,
go sell a million of them.

But some of this thread bashes the boxes for doing simply that. I say NO.
If you want a teacher to handhold and teach you anything safe beyond
how to be an anon IP address (which Tor and boxen already provide)
... such as system administration, session management, how to
actually be contextually, network, and datawise anon... go kickstart
a companion book on that. Don't just bash the boxen about not including
such a book if you are not also willing to write the book... as the
boxen exist to sell 'IP address anonymizers', not books.

Chinese lookalikes, and best interaction with Tor network, are also
separate subjects. To the latter which is relavent, Tor is becoming
very popular, its fundamental design and ops need planned to be
able to scale to many millions of clients, like yesterday perhaps.
___
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays