Re: [tor-relays] Tor Server - DDOS or High Load
Ok, i will reject this as a normal behavior of tor. My flags are actually: HSDir, Running, V2Dir, Valid To point 2.: Nor, the adresses of the inbound traffic were from different adresses. I thought that it is not possible to force the traffic through a defined route because form my knowledge the route is build by the network. Sometimes I'm using my Tor Server as a Proxy for my local http traffic. I think this is the only case where i can force my route to use my server as a entry node. Is it possible to flood the tor port directly with for example syn floods? If yes; is there an iptables rule which will reduce the amount of connection kept in the syn state? My Tor Info: https://globe.torproject.org/#/relay/C54E81EB047D7EC1E05B0AC6E723BE1BF5CAF520 Thanks for the reply > Hey bud, > Your adsl connection has a low advertised bandwidth, and doesn't make many > connections with regards to tor; thus, the CPU usage is correct. Look up > your server's fingerprint or nickname on Tor Globe to see how much of the > tor network travels through your server. > CPU load is usually associated with a lot of bandwidth or a inefficiency > in the server. I've heard that a 100mbit tor server using full 12.5MB/s > up/down will saturate the core dedicated to the Tor process; this is > presumably why a lot of servers run multiple Tor instances on different > cores and IP addresses. However, in your case, it is likely > The large amount of connections is generally caused by a few things: > 1. You've been running a very stable server for a long period of time and > have sufficient bandwidth to provide connectivity for a large number of > clients; additional flags, such as Guard, HSDir, V2Dir, and Exit will > likely result in more connections. This is not likely with your server, > given your advertised bandwidth is only 68.44kb/s. > 2. A single client is using your server for a lot of connections. > 3. An anomaly/attack in the Tor network (somewhat unlikely, I don't know > if any have been documented.) > 4. An attack against your server. This is very hard to do through the Tor > network; an attack against a Tor relay using Tor is an attack against all > Tor relays. HOWEVER, they could be attacking your port which you use to > host your tor server. > Just for reference, here's my tor stats: > Advertised B/W: ~4MB/s > Connections (555 inbound, 5 outbound, 93 exit, 1 socks, 5 circuit, 1 > control) > Tor is averaging 9%-13% CPU usage; 198MB memory. > More info on my server: > https://globe.torproject.org/#/relay/EF84089646304169F439A8F473742D74F027BA1B > https://globe.torproject.org/#/relay/EF84089646304169F439A8F473742D74F027BA1B > I hope this answered your question, if not, send a reply and hopefully > I'll reply sometime. ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
[tor-relays] Why isn't there an announcement of the new Tails?
Why isn't there an announcement immediately a new version of TAILS is released?Rob ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Colocated relay pricing
I'm interested in this as well, please do tell everyone. On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 5:38 PM, grarpamp wrote: > What are you seeing as prices to colocate, in terms of: > 1RU - rent, power, etc > IP's - a few (3, or up to a /29 ie 8-3=5) > Bandwidth - In terms of $US/Mbit > Colocation Country/State. > Company. > ___ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
[tor-relays] Colocated relay pricing
What are you seeing as prices to colocate, in terms of: 1RU - rent, power, etc IP's - a few (3, or up to a /29 ie 8-3=5) Bandwidth - In terms of $US/Mbit Colocation Country/State. Company. ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Tor Server - DDOS or High Load
Also, when a Tor relay goes offline, the traffic is redistributed across the Tor network. It is unlikely you would receive the high speed traffic of a node just because it went offline, unless a few HIGHLY unlikely variables occur. Also, all of the clients will be completely disconnected which were using the Tor server; it is impossible to "re-patch" the connections, given the anonymous nature of Tor. On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 4:07 PM, Austin Bentley wrote: > Hey bud, > > Your adsl connection has a low advertised bandwidth, and doesn't make many > connections with regards to tor; thus, the CPU usage is correct. Look up > your server's fingerprint or nickname on Tor Globe to see how much of the > tor network travels through your server. > > CPU load is usually associated with a lot of bandwidth or a inefficiency > in the server. I've heard that a 100mbit tor server using full 12.5MB/s > up/down will saturate the core dedicated to the Tor process; this is > presumably why a lot of servers run multiple Tor instances on different > cores and IP addresses. However, in your case, it is likely > > The large amount of connections is generally caused by a few things: > 1. You've been running a very stable server for a long period of time and > have sufficient bandwidth to provide connectivity for a large number of > clients; additional flags, such as Guard, HSDir, V2Dir, and Exit will > likely result in more connections. This is not likely with your server, > given your advertised bandwidth is only 68.44kb/s. > 2. A single client is using your server for a lot of connections. > 3. An anomaly/attack in the Tor network (somewhat unlikely, I don't know > if any have been documented.) > 4. An attack against your server. This is very hard to do through the Tor > network; an attack against a Tor relay using Tor is an attack against all > Tor relays. HOWEVER, they could be attacking your port which you use to > host your tor server. > > > Just for reference, here's my tor stats: > Advertised B/W: ~4MB/s > Connections (555 inbound, 5 outbound, 93 exit, 1 socks, 5 circuit, 1 > control) > Tor is averaging 9%-13% CPU usage; 198MB memory. > > More info on my server: > > https://globe.torproject.org/#/relay/EF84089646304169F439A8F473742D74F027BA1B > > > > I hope this answered your question, if not, send a reply and hopefully > I'll reply sometime. > > On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 2:22 PM, webmaster > wrote: > >> >> Am 03.12.2014 um 19:04 schrieb Toralf Förster: >> > On 12/03/2014 06:17 PM, webmaster wrote: >> >> At first I thought: Fuck, someone intruded into my machine. >> >> But after some looking through Arm I found many (>100) INBOUND >> connections. >> > "many" ? >> > >> > I do have usually something like this : >> > Connections (782 inbound, 458 outbound, 245 exit, 1 control): >> > for and advertised bandwidth of 4 MBit, so >100 are quite normal. >> > >> > Probably you should raise the ulimit, I do have for da dedicated server >> (and Gentoo) : >> > >> > tfoerste@tor-relay ~ $ cat /etc/conf.d/tor >> > # >> > # Set the file limit >> > rc_ulimit="-n 3" >> > >> >> I'm running the server through a relatively slow adsl connection >> (6,9 MBit/s down, 733 kBit/s up). Advertised Bandwidth: 68.44 kB/s. >> >> My ulimit is set to 1024 (os default). I will keep the ulimit setting at >> the default value because i see now reason for increasing it. >> >> Actually my server handles 28 inbound, 5 outbound and 14 circuits. The >> load is approx. 2%. >> >> From my point of view this strange behavior isn't common for my tor >> server because usually the cpu load of the tor process is below 10%. >> >> >> What happens to the tor network when a tor server with high bandwidth >> goes off-line? Maybe this could be a reason? >> >> >> -- >> -BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK- >> Version: GnuPG v2.0.17 (MingW32) >> >> mQENBFHMmT8BCAC0smvU7Bq1ABxAhvBRn7d4ekkk95aCE4TTQo4wy1z/rGLhQfdt >> dhiD+Vy61vGrsdK3ei5sW6rBvX2m8+YmBi+8AAgSiZmS0JM3Zz3cmTi5oh0D/yM8 >> 4aDj7wQYfJyzSmYN8InAQ5eA77lwIdqG27kR9wga2szeJwCnWReta0R+7YFkpUW+ >> zUlf4SWcUx5SmBsaiELQpm+Qcn+fyopo12RX6YVmoNPBvN2nDXDnRhUCKGc+0xhD >> UrBpCHrApK6sTnMsD34ClCLTL2L1gckQ0AsQqY3PJlx3R8kIJxlmr6R3WnjPMIG0 >> lqrukB9PcOrHM1MZXK1gK6AtypHBN98lr8Z9ABEBAAG0KndlYm1hc3RlciA8d2Vi >> bWFzdGVyQGRlZmNvbi1jYy5keW5kbnMub3JnPokBPgQTAQIAKAUCUcyZPwIbIwUJ >> CWYBgAYLCQgHAwIGFQgCCQoLBBYCAwECHgECF4AACgkQcN1vxvRQl+0SEwf+KXjf >> YtiSUSVS11uqeQ/8g46NwmNa91P3toZvEd7vhLSbjnL9bi/vApzNnUTGT3VP4/NA >> dg9SbR4qKlSr8T+YikRMV3tiuiVq8m7g00qM9y8MIomwJTounz8VdO/aJXFSOxAK >> Bb6ElREADspCzr2qSZCnozWUzbd+b8owbGeRRq3e33Aa5Nlm/xDRxGDWANbaIA8q >> Gkibvy3vWEwrxiwsakvHGaEZnPEtlNm3M1xcmFAuyl73qzUMkLN0u9E/2igo4EB5 >> EdMb5Ab5hfWdljxBqJr0tsvMfSK4VkzMCbKYkTqHZIRPQnhiSBE6Yo1Q6RCl/Hht >> bkvU4RA0J+NkXMZljrkBDQRRzJk/AQgA0HojJnK0uhEkAnbmszYsf477DV+LD02s >> ZEAlLGhJlf9qYaDiPMPwaZ3nK8/PYKzPpBWfHgRQP97rLHPIVJYl3BHDa/nWeZ2b >> e/HzYhpX0djbK9qe6W/CTfGbXmC/y+4dDGB8dvtTAW3JILm7xEdwiWtywozEVy7V >> lnMK4JQvlfOh+3XO6qv71FXyuRkObvkYzqvxUYHewtvvObcVxXHP0C0
Re: [tor-relays] Tor Server - DDOS or High Load
Hey bud, Your adsl connection has a low advertised bandwidth, and doesn't make many connections with regards to tor; thus, the CPU usage is correct. Look up your server's fingerprint or nickname on Tor Globe to see how much of the tor network travels through your server. CPU load is usually associated with a lot of bandwidth or a inefficiency in the server. I've heard that a 100mbit tor server using full 12.5MB/s up/down will saturate the core dedicated to the Tor process; this is presumably why a lot of servers run multiple Tor instances on different cores and IP addresses. However, in your case, it is likely The large amount of connections is generally caused by a few things: 1. You've been running a very stable server for a long period of time and have sufficient bandwidth to provide connectivity for a large number of clients; additional flags, such as Guard, HSDir, V2Dir, and Exit will likely result in more connections. This is not likely with your server, given your advertised bandwidth is only 68.44kb/s. 2. A single client is using your server for a lot of connections. 3. An anomaly/attack in the Tor network (somewhat unlikely, I don't know if any have been documented.) 4. An attack against your server. This is very hard to do through the Tor network; an attack against a Tor relay using Tor is an attack against all Tor relays. HOWEVER, they could be attacking your port which you use to host your tor server. Just for reference, here's my tor stats: Advertised B/W: ~4MB/s Connections (555 inbound, 5 outbound, 93 exit, 1 socks, 5 circuit, 1 control) Tor is averaging 9%-13% CPU usage; 198MB memory. More info on my server: https://globe.torproject.org/#/relay/EF84089646304169F439A8F473742D74F027BA1B I hope this answered your question, if not, send a reply and hopefully I'll reply sometime. On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 2:22 PM, webmaster wrote: > > Am 03.12.2014 um 19:04 schrieb Toralf Förster: > > On 12/03/2014 06:17 PM, webmaster wrote: > >> At first I thought: Fuck, someone intruded into my machine. > >> But after some looking through Arm I found many (>100) INBOUND > connections. > > "many" ? > > > > I do have usually something like this : > > Connections (782 inbound, 458 outbound, 245 exit, 1 control): > > for and advertised bandwidth of 4 MBit, so >100 are quite normal. > > > > Probably you should raise the ulimit, I do have for da dedicated server > (and Gentoo) : > > > > tfoerste@tor-relay ~ $ cat /etc/conf.d/tor > > # > > # Set the file limit > > rc_ulimit="-n 3" > > > > I'm running the server through a relatively slow adsl connection > (6,9 MBit/s down, 733 kBit/s up). Advertised Bandwidth: 68.44 kB/s. > > My ulimit is set to 1024 (os default). I will keep the ulimit setting at > the default value because i see now reason for increasing it. > > Actually my server handles 28 inbound, 5 outbound and 14 circuits. The > load is approx. 2%. > > From my point of view this strange behavior isn't common for my tor > server because usually the cpu load of the tor process is below 10%. > > > What happens to the tor network when a tor server with high bandwidth > goes off-line? Maybe this could be a reason? > > > -- > -BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK- > Version: GnuPG v2.0.17 (MingW32) > > mQENBFHMmT8BCAC0smvU7Bq1ABxAhvBRn7d4ekkk95aCE4TTQo4wy1z/rGLhQfdt > dhiD+Vy61vGrsdK3ei5sW6rBvX2m8+YmBi+8AAgSiZmS0JM3Zz3cmTi5oh0D/yM8 > 4aDj7wQYfJyzSmYN8InAQ5eA77lwIdqG27kR9wga2szeJwCnWReta0R+7YFkpUW+ > zUlf4SWcUx5SmBsaiELQpm+Qcn+fyopo12RX6YVmoNPBvN2nDXDnRhUCKGc+0xhD > UrBpCHrApK6sTnMsD34ClCLTL2L1gckQ0AsQqY3PJlx3R8kIJxlmr6R3WnjPMIG0 > lqrukB9PcOrHM1MZXK1gK6AtypHBN98lr8Z9ABEBAAG0KndlYm1hc3RlciA8d2Vi > bWFzdGVyQGRlZmNvbi1jYy5keW5kbnMub3JnPokBPgQTAQIAKAUCUcyZPwIbIwUJ > CWYBgAYLCQgHAwIGFQgCCQoLBBYCAwECHgECF4AACgkQcN1vxvRQl+0SEwf+KXjf > YtiSUSVS11uqeQ/8g46NwmNa91P3toZvEd7vhLSbjnL9bi/vApzNnUTGT3VP4/NA > dg9SbR4qKlSr8T+YikRMV3tiuiVq8m7g00qM9y8MIomwJTounz8VdO/aJXFSOxAK > Bb6ElREADspCzr2qSZCnozWUzbd+b8owbGeRRq3e33Aa5Nlm/xDRxGDWANbaIA8q > Gkibvy3vWEwrxiwsakvHGaEZnPEtlNm3M1xcmFAuyl73qzUMkLN0u9E/2igo4EB5 > EdMb5Ab5hfWdljxBqJr0tsvMfSK4VkzMCbKYkTqHZIRPQnhiSBE6Yo1Q6RCl/Hht > bkvU4RA0J+NkXMZljrkBDQRRzJk/AQgA0HojJnK0uhEkAnbmszYsf477DV+LD02s > ZEAlLGhJlf9qYaDiPMPwaZ3nK8/PYKzPpBWfHgRQP97rLHPIVJYl3BHDa/nWeZ2b > e/HzYhpX0djbK9qe6W/CTfGbXmC/y+4dDGB8dvtTAW3JILm7xEdwiWtywozEVy7V > lnMK4JQvlfOh+3XO6qv71FXyuRkObvkYzqvxUYHewtvvObcVxXHP0C0O6LB44iAW > 2boZVVuiHdudnyNAezJajPMUT8SnI0bwL6+0TgnHL4cKNUEPQljIrrvi+9nCkq7V > uBtnsYtyoo2reoxmCbX/Z1zZsxdUcKpeJHlc5AypyN8DUJ+APJ9NnwARAQABiQEl > BBgBAgAPBQJRzJk/AhsMBQkJZgGAAAoJEHDdb8b0UJftOY0H/1TChmQrJC/qzefW > PK7EqFlBg3TIEXdu8JHjF42ZOgzQRfp7E2wWzEx0Y45lNXMs6Yg15hWCEDaUDF6F > 5WZKNrP8xIldyR9Aw7fyKqjZ9UuKovqofHsCiaSO7nWzGM6GF3nBDNI9NcFve/wN > wggyjAbohOJrJGal3N0HlG3cakqjEmjBe1gQEMC0ZPlWstb/cqqr49TNPrRmQc4P > SyGffh8Xqhw94m1LDBXFEaYe7AxjNk1sPAVfO1rOdLF6GOun/UwgbhDQX/Rb9C3t > AhjSgyFEiR/gfrUZ7R6SY51qOUf1lN5ZN85C/x27XoZWYlsNaH3Ei6nG+yeswBMk > ZRMbezQ= > =Med3 > -END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK- >
Re: [tor-relays] Tor Server - DDOS or High Load
Am 03.12.2014 um 19:04 schrieb Toralf Förster: > On 12/03/2014 06:17 PM, webmaster wrote: >> At first I thought: Fuck, someone intruded into my machine. >> But after some looking through Arm I found many (>100) INBOUND connections. > "many" ? > > I do have usually something like this : > Connections (782 inbound, 458 outbound, 245 exit, 1 control): > for and advertised bandwidth of 4 MBit, so >100 are quite normal. > > Probably you should raise the ulimit, I do have for da dedicated server (and > Gentoo) : > > tfoerste@tor-relay ~ $ cat /etc/conf.d/tor > # > # Set the file limit > rc_ulimit="-n 3" > I'm running the server through a relatively slow adsl connection (6,9 MBit/s down, 733 kBit/s up). Advertised Bandwidth: 68.44 kB/s. My ulimit is set to 1024 (os default). I will keep the ulimit setting at the default value because i see now reason for increasing it. Actually my server handles 28 inbound, 5 outbound and 14 circuits. The load is approx. 2%. >From my point of view this strange behavior isn't common for my tor server because usually the cpu load of the tor process is below 10%. What happens to the tor network when a tor server with high bandwidth goes off-line? Maybe this could be a reason? -- -BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK- Version: GnuPG v2.0.17 (MingW32) mQENBFHMmT8BCAC0smvU7Bq1ABxAhvBRn7d4ekkk95aCE4TTQo4wy1z/rGLhQfdt dhiD+Vy61vGrsdK3ei5sW6rBvX2m8+YmBi+8AAgSiZmS0JM3Zz3cmTi5oh0D/yM8 4aDj7wQYfJyzSmYN8InAQ5eA77lwIdqG27kR9wga2szeJwCnWReta0R+7YFkpUW+ zUlf4SWcUx5SmBsaiELQpm+Qcn+fyopo12RX6YVmoNPBvN2nDXDnRhUCKGc+0xhD UrBpCHrApK6sTnMsD34ClCLTL2L1gckQ0AsQqY3PJlx3R8kIJxlmr6R3WnjPMIG0 lqrukB9PcOrHM1MZXK1gK6AtypHBN98lr8Z9ABEBAAG0KndlYm1hc3RlciA8d2Vi bWFzdGVyQGRlZmNvbi1jYy5keW5kbnMub3JnPokBPgQTAQIAKAUCUcyZPwIbIwUJ CWYBgAYLCQgHAwIGFQgCCQoLBBYCAwECHgECF4AACgkQcN1vxvRQl+0SEwf+KXjf YtiSUSVS11uqeQ/8g46NwmNa91P3toZvEd7vhLSbjnL9bi/vApzNnUTGT3VP4/NA dg9SbR4qKlSr8T+YikRMV3tiuiVq8m7g00qM9y8MIomwJTounz8VdO/aJXFSOxAK Bb6ElREADspCzr2qSZCnozWUzbd+b8owbGeRRq3e33Aa5Nlm/xDRxGDWANbaIA8q Gkibvy3vWEwrxiwsakvHGaEZnPEtlNm3M1xcmFAuyl73qzUMkLN0u9E/2igo4EB5 EdMb5Ab5hfWdljxBqJr0tsvMfSK4VkzMCbKYkTqHZIRPQnhiSBE6Yo1Q6RCl/Hht bkvU4RA0J+NkXMZljrkBDQRRzJk/AQgA0HojJnK0uhEkAnbmszYsf477DV+LD02s ZEAlLGhJlf9qYaDiPMPwaZ3nK8/PYKzPpBWfHgRQP97rLHPIVJYl3BHDa/nWeZ2b e/HzYhpX0djbK9qe6W/CTfGbXmC/y+4dDGB8dvtTAW3JILm7xEdwiWtywozEVy7V lnMK4JQvlfOh+3XO6qv71FXyuRkObvkYzqvxUYHewtvvObcVxXHP0C0O6LB44iAW 2boZVVuiHdudnyNAezJajPMUT8SnI0bwL6+0TgnHL4cKNUEPQljIrrvi+9nCkq7V uBtnsYtyoo2reoxmCbX/Z1zZsxdUcKpeJHlc5AypyN8DUJ+APJ9NnwARAQABiQEl BBgBAgAPBQJRzJk/AhsMBQkJZgGAAAoJEHDdb8b0UJftOY0H/1TChmQrJC/qzefW PK7EqFlBg3TIEXdu8JHjF42ZOgzQRfp7E2wWzEx0Y45lNXMs6Yg15hWCEDaUDF6F 5WZKNrP8xIldyR9Aw7fyKqjZ9UuKovqofHsCiaSO7nWzGM6GF3nBDNI9NcFve/wN wggyjAbohOJrJGal3N0HlG3cakqjEmjBe1gQEMC0ZPlWstb/cqqr49TNPrRmQc4P SyGffh8Xqhw94m1LDBXFEaYe7AxjNk1sPAVfO1rOdLF6GOun/UwgbhDQX/Rb9C3t AhjSgyFEiR/gfrUZ7R6SY51qOUf1lN5ZN85C/x27XoZWYlsNaH3Ei6nG+yeswBMk ZRMbezQ= =Med3 -END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK- 0xF45097ED.asc Description: application/pgp-keys ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Tor Server - DDOS or High Load
On 12/03/2014 06:17 PM, webmaster wrote: > At first I thought: Fuck, someone intruded into my machine. > But after some looking through Arm I found many (>100) INBOUND connections. "many" ? I do have usually something like this : Connections (782 inbound, 458 outbound, 245 exit, 1 control): for and advertised bandwidth of 4 MBit, so >100 are quite normal. Probably you should raise the ulimit, I do have for da dedicated server (and Gentoo) : tfoerste@tor-relay ~ $ cat /etc/conf.d/tor # # Set the file limit rc_ulimit="-n 3" -- Toralf pgp key: 0076 E94E ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
[tor-relays] Tor Server - DDOS or High Load
Hello Folks, I'm running a relay tor server since several years. Last week (24 Nov) I noticed a high load on the tor server (cpu load 100%). After some investigation i found out that tor causes the high load. After killing the process the load decreases to a normal level, but after restarting the tor process again the load increases again. Arm log: Could not open "" for writing: To many open files. or Failing because because we have 1017 connections already. Please raise your ulimit -n Tor's file descriptor usage is at 91%. If you run out Tor will be unable to continue functioning. At first I thought: Fuck, someone intruded into my machine. But after some looking through Arm I found many (>100) INBOUND connections. After one hour and some iptables tuning the cpu load decreases. Could the high load caused by an attack on my machine or is this just some small load peak? Hope for some reply -- -BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK- Version: GnuPG v2.0.17 (MingW32) mQENBFHMmT8BCAC0smvU7Bq1ABxAhvBRn7d4ekkk95aCE4TTQo4wy1z/rGLhQfdt dhiD+Vy61vGrsdK3ei5sW6rBvX2m8+YmBi+8AAgSiZmS0JM3Zz3cmTi5oh0D/yM8 4aDj7wQYfJyzSmYN8InAQ5eA77lwIdqG27kR9wga2szeJwCnWReta0R+7YFkpUW+ zUlf4SWcUx5SmBsaiELQpm+Qcn+fyopo12RX6YVmoNPBvN2nDXDnRhUCKGc+0xhD UrBpCHrApK6sTnMsD34ClCLTL2L1gckQ0AsQqY3PJlx3R8kIJxlmr6R3WnjPMIG0 lqrukB9PcOrHM1MZXK1gK6AtypHBN98lr8Z9ABEBAAG0KndlYm1hc3RlciA8d2Vi bWFzdGVyQGRlZmNvbi1jYy5keW5kbnMub3JnPokBPgQTAQIAKAUCUcyZPwIbIwUJ CWYBgAYLCQgHAwIGFQgCCQoLBBYCAwECHgECF4AACgkQcN1vxvRQl+0SEwf+KXjf YtiSUSVS11uqeQ/8g46NwmNa91P3toZvEd7vhLSbjnL9bi/vApzNnUTGT3VP4/NA dg9SbR4qKlSr8T+YikRMV3tiuiVq8m7g00qM9y8MIomwJTounz8VdO/aJXFSOxAK Bb6ElREADspCzr2qSZCnozWUzbd+b8owbGeRRq3e33Aa5Nlm/xDRxGDWANbaIA8q Gkibvy3vWEwrxiwsakvHGaEZnPEtlNm3M1xcmFAuyl73qzUMkLN0u9E/2igo4EB5 EdMb5Ab5hfWdljxBqJr0tsvMfSK4VkzMCbKYkTqHZIRPQnhiSBE6Yo1Q6RCl/Hht bkvU4RA0J+NkXMZljrkBDQRRzJk/AQgA0HojJnK0uhEkAnbmszYsf477DV+LD02s ZEAlLGhJlf9qYaDiPMPwaZ3nK8/PYKzPpBWfHgRQP97rLHPIVJYl3BHDa/nWeZ2b e/HzYhpX0djbK9qe6W/CTfGbXmC/y+4dDGB8dvtTAW3JILm7xEdwiWtywozEVy7V lnMK4JQvlfOh+3XO6qv71FXyuRkObvkYzqvxUYHewtvvObcVxXHP0C0O6LB44iAW 2boZVVuiHdudnyNAezJajPMUT8SnI0bwL6+0TgnHL4cKNUEPQljIrrvi+9nCkq7V uBtnsYtyoo2reoxmCbX/Z1zZsxdUcKpeJHlc5AypyN8DUJ+APJ9NnwARAQABiQEl BBgBAgAPBQJRzJk/AhsMBQkJZgGAAAoJEHDdb8b0UJftOY0H/1TChmQrJC/qzefW PK7EqFlBg3TIEXdu8JHjF42ZOgzQRfp7E2wWzEx0Y45lNXMs6Yg15hWCEDaUDF6F 5WZKNrP8xIldyR9Aw7fyKqjZ9UuKovqofHsCiaSO7nWzGM6GF3nBDNI9NcFve/wN wggyjAbohOJrJGal3N0HlG3cakqjEmjBe1gQEMC0ZPlWstb/cqqr49TNPrRmQc4P SyGffh8Xqhw94m1LDBXFEaYe7AxjNk1sPAVfO1rOdLF6GOun/UwgbhDQX/Rb9C3t AhjSgyFEiR/gfrUZ7R6SY51qOUf1lN5ZN85C/x27XoZWYlsNaH3Ei6nG+yeswBMk ZRMbezQ= =Med3 -END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK- 0xF45097ED.asc Description: application/pgp-keys ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays