Re: [tor-relays] Tor Weather has been discontinued

[I]

Should we stop Tor until Weather's better?{ I notice Jacob is always in a new Tor t-shirt but I will wait for evidence to go further.}Robert
 -Original Message-From: supersluet...@gmail.comSent: Sun, 12 Jun 2016 20:51:30 -0500To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.orgSubject: Re: [tor-relays] Tor Weather has been discontinued
I think you're missing the point of running a Tor relay.

"The Tor network relies on volunteers to donate
bandwidth."

Volunteer: A person who freely offers to undertake a task,
or, freely offer to do something.

Donate: give (money or goods) for a good cause.

The Tor Project doesn't owe you anything.


On 06/12/2016 08:26 PM, I wrote:


  
arisbe@

When did t-shirts become more important than the work we are doing to
keep people safe and anonymous on the internet?

  
  Actually they are.

I haven't bought any shirts for four years because I can get one tshirt for 60 days of a virtual server costing $Aud15-40/year which makes them $2 to $6 each.  None have worn out and they're posted free!

So, with up to 40 VPSs running I have a huge backlog owed so quite a bit of interest in the situation and relatives waiting.

Robert


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Re: [tor-relays] Tor Weather has been discontinued

[SuperSluether]

I think you're missing the point of running a Tor relay.

"The Tor network relies on /volunteers/ to *donate* bandwidth."

Volunteer: A person who /freely/ offers to undertake a task, or, 
/freely/ offer to do something.


Donate: *give* (money or goods) for a good cause.

The Tor Project doesn't owe you anything.


On 06/12/2016 08:26 PM, I wrote:

arisbe@

When did t-shirts become more important than the work we are doing to
keep people safe and anonymous on the internet?

Actually they are.

I haven't bought any shirts for four years because I can get one tshirt for 60 
days of a virtual server costing $Aud15-40/year which makes them $2 to $6 each. 
 None have worn out and they're posted free!

So, with up to 40 VPSs running I have a huge backlog owed so quite a bit of 
interest in the situation and relatives waiting.

Robert


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Re: [tor-relays] Tor Weather has been discontinued

[I]

> arisbe@
> 
> When did t-shirts become more important than the work we are doing to
> keep people safe and anonymous on the internet?

Actually they are.

I haven't bought any shirts for four years because I can get one tshirt for 60 
days of a virtual server costing $Aud15-40/year which makes them $2 to $6 each. 
 None have worn out and they're posted free!

So, with up to 40 VPSs running I have a huge backlog owed so quite a bit of 
interest in the situation and relatives waiting.

Robert


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Re: [tor-relays] Filter Tor Exit Node for blatant attacks on servers

[Xza]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

Abuse will always be there, and isn't bound by Tor exits only.
There is lots of this "malicious" traffic on the internet.
Mainly new/small ISPs will react heavily to abuse complaints because they don't 
wanna end up on certain lists (IP ranges, bad name, w/e you want to call it)
Big ISPs usually are way softer on abuse and they forward it most likely to the 
person and you have to respond within certain amount of time.
And then there are these certain systems that go off if you scan their IP 
ranges or ports( or something else )and they automatically send abuse 
complaints to your ISP.
Good ISPs should never interfere with traffic they should just route and switch.

On June 13, 2016 12:53:04 AM GMT+02:00, Dr Gerard Bulger  
wrote:
>There is a moral problem to know that the service you are running as an
>exit, for the sake of the mythical T-shirt, internet freedom and lack
>of censorship, is being abused to such an extent.   I increased my exit
>speed from 2.5mbs to 5mbs and rose up the exit rankings such that abuse
>emails went from one every two months to 2-3 a day.  Some serious, many
>were automated crap where I wanted to tell the wimps to get a grip and
>welcome to the internet.
>
>
>
>When tapped on the shoulder by the ISP which is pointing out obvious
>abuse and attacks coming from my exit IP, it’s not enough to shrug my
>shoulders and claim overall good of TOR.   All I can do is block the
>offended IP address after the event (without consent).  I can do that
>in TORRC.   If I can do that why is it reprehensible in TOR lore to
>attempt something more subtle and pre-emptive?
>
>
>
>Of course much internet traffic is repugnant, but Tor attracts a higher
>proportion. Tor is being strangled by the abuse. It is the login and
>other attacks on servers that could be blocked of hindered.  Tor is
>getting a bad press and law makers respond impetuously to make bad laws
>making matters worse.
>
>
>
>Gerry
>
>
>
>From: tor-relays [mailto:tor-relays-boun...@lists.torproject.org] On
>Behalf Of Jonathan Baker-Bates
>Sent: 12 June 2016 21:01
>To: tor-relays 
>Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Filter Tor Exit Node for blatant attacks on
>servers
>
>
>
>In the past when I've tried thinking about this it has been too fraught
>with moral hazard for me. Morally, Tor is about keeping private
>communications private, in the hope that more good than bad will come
>of it.
>
>On 12 Jun 2016 8:40 p.m., "Dr Gerard Bulger"  > wrote:
>
>Not sure eavesdrop is the right word, since ISPs throttle all sorts of
>traffic by inspecting it such as torrent, let alone TOR.   I suppose we
>could argue that in signing up for an internet connection, deep in the
>ISP’s small print, we consent to that behaviour.  Is it really true
>that consent has to be sought by every router on the way?
>
>
>
>Inspecting packets for obvious things like denial of service attacks
>and brute force logins would seem very legitimate to me and I doubt
>that the law would be such an ass, since we cannot gain consent.
>
>
>
>I know there is a fine line but looking at how packets are behaving and
>looking for repetitive logins is not the same as watching the content
>and censoring that.  Then an exit node could only inspect what EXITS
>onto the internet.
>
>
>
>Gerry
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>From: tor-relays [mailto:tor-relays-boun...@lists.torproject.org
> ] On Behalf Of Gareth
>Llewellyn
>Sent: 12 June 2016 18:38
>To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
>
>Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Filter Tor Exit Node for blatant attacks on
>servers
>
>
>
>On 12 Jun 2016 5:49 p.m., "Jonathan Baker-Bates"
>mailto:jonat...@bakerbates.com> > wrote:
>> But along the way I asked some others about the legal implications of
>doing what the ISP had asked. The rough consensus was that in the UK at
>least, I would only be able to evesdrop on traffic once consent had
>been given by those being monitored. Otherwise I'd be illegally
>wiretapping and open to prosecution. But it was far from clear what
>would happen if somebody took me a court!
>>
>
>Indeed the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and the
>Investigatory Powers Bill contain offences relating to surveillance of
>traffic without a warrant / permission etc. (Caveats etc apply)
>
>> On 12 June 2016 at 16:12, Dr Gerard Bulger  > wrote:
>>> Once TOR
>>> exits attempts any filtering where would it stop?   It is a slippery
>slope.
>
>FWIW one of the reasons we have the "pirate" blocks (in the UK) is that
>the High Court Judge (Hon. justice Arnold) in the case was informed
>that the ISPs in question had the ability to block sites (e.g.
>Cleanfeed) therefore it was possible for them to block more.
>
>Had this ISP level censorship technology not existed then we wouldn't
>be in *quite* the situation we are now.
>
>>> It is more than embarrassin

Re: [tor-relays] Tor Weather has been discontinued

[Arisbe]

When did t-shirts become more important than the work we are doing to 
keep people safe and anonymous on the internet?

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Re: [tor-relays] Filter Tor Exit Node for blatant attacks on servers

[Tristan]

Some thoughts about "bad press," when was the last time you saw an article
about how awesome Siri is? Or read a review on how good a restaurant is? Or
anything good about anything on the Internet?

People like to complain, and use the Internet to do it. Just look at
Twitter. "Bad press" happens because nobody wants to hear boring news about
people needing Tor because of oppressing government or what have you.

Let's be honest. Gossip is much more fun when you find some dirt. It just
so happens that Tor's services are a good place to attract such dirt.

It takes a single drop of dye to color a glass of water.
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Re: [tor-relays] Tor Weather has been discontinued

[I]

" It's not only about the t-shirt itself (although having one would be
nice, it looks just awesome), it's more about the communication to the
community itself. And isn't it the community that is running Tor? That's
exactly what you said here. "

Well said.


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Re: [tor-relays] Tor Weather has been discontinued

[Michael Armbruster]

On 2016-06-13 at 01:08, Moritz Bartl wrote:
> On 06/13/2016 12:17 AM, Green Dream wrote:
>> As I already said 4 days ago in this thread, all indications are the
>> t-shirt program is no longer active.
> 
> Wrong. It's just being handled by one volunteer at the moment. If you
> want shirts, go into a shop and buy a shirt. If you want to contribute
> to Tor, and be appreciated and have that appreciation being shown to you
> by the community by getting a shirt, wait and magic will happen.
> 
>> If someone here really cares about the false promise of t-shirts, that
>> person could submit a pull request to update the website accordingly. 
> 
> eg. https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/19354
> 

See? That's exactly what I wanted to hear. As you have a torservers.net
e-mail address, you'll know what you are talking about.

So thanks for the explanation. "One volunteer at the moment" is the
explanation many people were searching for and I can happily wait for
the appreciation of a Tor t-shirt. It's just not the same buying or
printing one myself, it's the achievement to get one from the Tor
project, so I will wait until they get to me.

It was just the communication on why people have to wait so long :)

Oh, and thanks for the trac link, it shows a pretty neat IRC log ^^



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Re: [tor-relays] Tor Weather has been discontinued

[Moritz Bartl]

On 06/13/2016 12:17 AM, Green Dream wrote:
> As I already said 4 days ago in this thread, all indications are the
> t-shirt program is no longer active.

Wrong. It's just being handled by one volunteer at the moment. If you
want shirts, go into a shop and buy a shirt. If you want to contribute
to Tor, and be appreciated and have that appreciation being shown to you
by the community by getting a shirt, wait and magic will happen.

> If someone here really cares about the false promise of t-shirts, that
> person could submit a pull request to update the website accordingly. 

eg. https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/19354

-- 
Moritz Bartl
https://www.torservers.net/
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Re: [tor-relays] Filter Tor Exit Node for blatant attacks on servers

[Moritz Bartl]

On 06/13/2016 12:53 AM, Dr Gerard Bulger wrote:
> TORRC.   If I can do that why is it reprehensible in TOR lore to attempt
> something more subtle and pre-emptive?

Because you're introducing defects into the network. A client has no way
of knowing what happens, and there is no way of identifying "malicious
traffic" reliably. What does malicious even mean. Plus the legal
implications, the "you're the network layer passing data because that's
the definition of the Internet" argument, etc etc.

> Of course much internet traffic is repugnant, but Tor attracts a higher
> proportion. 

How do you know that? You don't. When I talk to "regular" ISPs and
access providers, they also see a lot of abuse. It used to be case until
recently that a lot of access providers in Germany did not store which
of their users was using a particular IP, so they also couldn't do much
about it. Same with all the VPN providers.

> Tor is being strangled by the abuse.

You say that. I say it's not. If your ISP does not like that you cannot
do more than block destinations or ports, then find another.

> other attacks on servers that could be blocked of hindered.  Tor is
> getting a bad press and law makers respond impetuously to make bad laws
> making matters worse.   

Tor is getting bad press because it does not have a magic filter that
filters bad traffic. Okay. It does not get bad press because it is not
using any existing filters that you seem to be proposing.

More specifically, which events and types of traffic would you plan to
filter, and how? Have you looked at the capabilities of these types of
systems?

-- 
Moritz Bartl
https://www.torservers.net/
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Re: [tor-relays] Filter Tor Exit Node for blatant attacks on servers

[Dr Gerard Bulger]

There is a moral problem to know that the service you are running as an exit, 
for the sake of the mythical T-shirt, internet freedom and lack of censorship, 
is being abused to such an extent.   I increased my exit speed from 2.5mbs to 
5mbs and rose up the exit rankings such that abuse emails went from one every 
two months to 2-3 a day.  Some serious, many were automated crap where I wanted 
to tell the wimps to get a grip and welcome to the internet.

 

When tapped on the shoulder by the ISP which is pointing out obvious abuse and 
attacks coming from my exit IP, it’s not enough to shrug my shoulders and claim 
overall good of TOR.   All I can do is block the offended IP address after the 
event (without consent).  I can do that in TORRC.   If I can do that why is it 
reprehensible in TOR lore to attempt something more subtle and pre-emptive? 

 

Of course much internet traffic is repugnant, but Tor attracts a higher 
proportion. Tor is being strangled by the abuse. It is the login and other 
attacks on servers that could be blocked of hindered.  Tor is getting a bad 
press and law makers respond impetuously to make bad laws making matters worse. 
  

 

Gerry   

 

From: tor-relays [mailto:tor-relays-boun...@lists.torproject.org] On Behalf Of 
Jonathan Baker-Bates
Sent: 12 June 2016 21:01
To: tor-relays 
Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Filter Tor Exit Node for blatant attacks on servers

 

In the past when I've tried thinking about this it has been too fraught with 
moral hazard for me. Morally, Tor is about keeping private communications 
private, in the hope that more good than bad will come of it. 

On 12 Jun 2016 8:40 p.m., "Dr Gerard Bulger" mailto:ger...@bulger.co.uk> > wrote:

Not sure eavesdrop is the right word, since ISPs throttle all sorts of traffic 
by inspecting it such as torrent, let alone TOR.   I suppose we could argue 
that in signing up for an internet connection, deep in the ISP’s small print, 
we consent to that behaviour.  Is it really true that consent has to be sought 
by every router on the way?

  

Inspecting packets for obvious things like denial of service attacks and brute 
force logins would seem very legitimate to me and I doubt that the law would be 
such an ass, since we cannot gain consent. 

 

I know there is a fine line but looking at how packets are behaving and looking 
for repetitive logins is not the same as watching the content and censoring 
that.  Then an exit node could only inspect what EXITS onto the internet.

 

Gerry  

 

 

 

 

  

  

 

 

 

From: tor-relays [mailto:tor-relays-boun...@lists.torproject.org 
 ] On Behalf Of Gareth Llewellyn
Sent: 12 June 2016 18:38
To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org  
Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Filter Tor Exit Node for blatant attacks on servers

 

On 12 Jun 2016 5:49 p.m., "Jonathan Baker-Bates" mailto:jonat...@bakerbates.com> > wrote:
> But along the way I asked some others about the legal implications of doing 
> what the ISP had asked. The rough consensus was that in the UK at least, I 
> would only be able to evesdrop on traffic once consent had been given by 
> those being monitored. Otherwise I'd be illegally wiretapping and open to 
> prosecution. But it was far from clear what would happen if somebody took me 
> a court!
>

Indeed the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and the Investigatory 
Powers Bill contain offences relating to surveillance of traffic without a 
warrant / permission etc. (Caveats etc apply)

> On 12 June 2016 at 16:12, Dr Gerard Bulger   > wrote:
>> Once TOR
>> exits attempts any filtering where would it stop?   It is a slippery slope.

FWIW one of the reasons we have the "pirate" blocks (in the UK) is that the 
High Court Judge (Hon. justice Arnold) in the case was informed that the ISPs 
in question had the ability to block sites (e.g. Cleanfeed) therefore it was 
possible for them to block more.

Had this ISP level censorship technology not existed then we wouldn't be in 
*quite* the situation we are now.

>> It is more than embarrassing to run an exit node and get abuse complaints
>> about persistent and repeated attacks on an IP. The intent is clearly
>> criminal.  VPS providers in the UK are increasing intolerant in receiving
>> such complaints.  The whole VPS can be closed down by the ISP/VPS provider
>> not forcing a closure of the TOR exit.  Fewer ISPs will allow you to install
>> an exit node at all.

This is one of the reasons why I started a UK ISP (AS28715) - I now run UK 
exits and don't have issues with them getting shutdown because the ISP got cold 
feet / got bored of abuse emails / complaints from other customers (entire /24 
blocked by anti-tor blacklists) etc etc.

Good ISPs don't deploy web filtering, transparent proxies or IDS' that 
interfere with traffic. IMHO well behaved Tor Exits shouldn't either.


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Re: [tor-relays] Tor Weather has been discontinued

[Green Dream]

As I already said 4 days ago in this thread, all indications are the
t-shirt program is no longer active.

It turns out one of the other things that takes time and effort is keeping
the website up to date!

If someone here really cares about the false promise of t-shirts, that
person could submit a pull request to update the website accordingly.
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Re: [tor-relays] Tor Weather has been discontinued

[Markus Koch]

http://imgur.com/4knvU6F

2016-06-12 23:29 GMT+02:00 Green Dream :
> Do you guys really run relays just for the t-shirt? Aren't there more
> important reasons to run a relay, like serving the community, being an
> advocate for privacy, and acting against surveillance and censorship?
>
> Is this t-shirt issue *really* a problem that needs to be solved? The Tor
> Project has many other problems that need attention, and their time is a
> limited resource. Can we please just stop worrying and complaining about the
> damn t-shirts?
>
>
>
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Re: [tor-relays] Tor Weather has been discontinued

[Michael Armbruster]

On 2016-06-12 at 23:29, Green Dream wrote:
> Do you guys really run relays just for the t-shirt? Aren't there more
> important reasons to run a relay, like serving the community, being an
> advocate for privacy, and acting against surveillance and censorship?
> 
> Is this t-shirt issue *really* a problem that needs to be solved? The
> Tor Project has many other problems that need attention, and their time
> is a limited resource. Can we please just stop worrying and complaining
> about the damn t-shirts?
> 
> 
> 
> 
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> 

It's not like I said "give me the damn t-shirt now or I'll quit
providing my exit node". Of course I will run the exit node for a longer
time and I even plan to provide a second one as soon as I have spare
money to afford another cheap server (I already run 3 servers in total
while 2 of them should not have their IP used for TOR unfortunately;
there are reasons for that, but maybe one of them will at least be a
relay soon; the other one does not have enough performance to run Tor
additionally to that what it does now).

It's just that the Tor Project promises t-shirts for exit node owners
and as such, they should at least respond to such questions and request
in a decent time (while I think 1 month is doable and still decent
enough). But some people wait for 7 months for something that is
promised, at least they wait for an answer. Even a simple "Sorry, the
Tor website is wrong. There are not t-shirts for exit nodes anymore"
answer would be great.

It's not only about the t-shirt itself (although having one would be
nice, it looks just awesome), it's more about the communication to the
community itself. And isn't it the community that is running Tor? That's
exactly what you said here.



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Re: [tor-relays] Tor Weather has been discontinued

[Tristan]

+1

Besides, if the T-shirt is that big of a deal, you can just make your own.
On Jun 12, 2016 4:29 PM, "Green Dream"  wrote:

> Do you guys really run relays just for the t-shirt? Aren't there more
> important reasons to run a relay, like serving the community, being an
> advocate for privacy, and acting against surveillance and censorship?
>
> Is this t-shirt issue *really* a problem that needs to be solved? The Tor
> Project has many other problems that need attention, and their time is a
> limited resource. Can we please just stop worrying and complaining about
> the damn t-shirts?
>
>
>
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>
>
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Re: [tor-relays] Tor Weather has been discontinued

[Green Dream]

Do you guys really run relays just for the t-shirt? Aren't there more
important reasons to run a relay, like serving the community, being an
advocate for privacy, and acting against surveillance and censorship?

Is this t-shirt issue *really* a problem that needs to be solved? The Tor
Project has many other problems that need attention, and their time is a
limited resource. Can we please just stop worrying and complaining about
the damn t-shirts?
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Re: [tor-relays] Filter Tor Exit Node for blatant attacks on servers

[Moritz Bartl]

On 06/12/2016 09:39 PM, Dr Gerard Bulger wrote:
> Not sure eavesdrop is the right word, since ISPs throttle all sorts of
> traffic by inspecting it such as torrent, let alone TOR.

Even that is highly controversial, and several countries have tried to
develop "net neutrality" laws to stop it.

And obviously throttling, or prioritization of certain types of data, is
different.

The other difference is that you can detect torrent traffic by looking
at some level of "meta data", whereas most attacks require you to look
at "content", too.

> could argue that in signing up for an internet connection, deep in the
> ISP’s small print, we consent to that behaviour.  Is it really true that
> consent has to be sought by every router on the way?

The customer has a contract relationship with its access provider. And
access providers have contracts with other transit/peering providers.

Also, most "attack prevention" mechanisms that I know of require more
than just "you run it and it will magically filter bad traffic". Also,
what if I want to portscan my own network over Tor? There's a lot of
legitimate research and analysis I can think of that will trigger simple
filter mechanisms.

Yes, it makes finding ISPs for exits harder, but certainly not
impossible. If everyone who on this list has thought about content
filtering and blocking would instead spend some time researching ISPs
and adding options to the GoodBadISPs wiki, there would be enough to
pick from. It does not take too long to find 50 support email addresses
of hosters, and mass mail them to ask whether they offer WHOIS reassignment.

-- 
Moritz Bartl
https://www.torservers.net/
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Re: [tor-relays] Tor Weather has been discontinued

[Michael Armbruster]

On 2016-06-12 at 13:21, Jannis Wiese wrote:
> I’m waiting since 7 months now. I know the guys who are handling the T-shirt 
> requests are busy and I am (was) prepared to wait, but it’s a bit frustrating 
> (if I think about it), to be honest.
> 
>> On 08.06.2016, at 19:34, Markus Koch  wrote:
>>
>> I am waiting since January?
>>
>> Hope has died a long time ago ...
>>
>>
>>
>> 2016-06-08 19:23 GMT+02:00 Michael Armbruster :
>>> On 2016-06-08 at 19:17, Green Dream wrote:
 The T-shirt incentive for relay operators is gone, as far as I know.

 If you donate $100 or more here you can pick a T-shirt as the
 gift: https://www.torproject.org/donate/donate.html.en

 There are many alternative ways to monitor the health and uptime of your
 relay. I like https://www.statuscake.com/ for this and their free plan
 is sufficient. I'm not affiliated with them, I just like their product.





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>>>
>>> As far as I know, the incentive should still be there. At least it is
>>> according to the web page. [1]
>>>
>>> But if it's really gone, it definitely has to be changed on the webpage,
>>> as I myself am thinking right now that I should get a shirt. By the way,
>>> I'm also already waiting for an answer for more than 2 weeks.
>>> Just some time ago I heard somebody has waited 2 months to get an answer.
>>> Well, I'm patient :)
>>>
>>> Best,
>>> Michael
>>>
>>> [1] https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/tshirt.html.en
>>>
>>>
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> 
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Well, then it won't be several weeks for me to wait, but obviously it
will be several months. I of course planned to let the exit node run,
but it should definitely be handled in a better way. Even an automatic
mail once in a month, stating "We will handle it, but we are busy right
now" would give me a better feeling about it. Not even an answer in 2-3
weeks, or in your case 7 months feels a bit uncomfy.





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Re: [tor-relays] Filter Tor Exit Node for blatant attacks on servers

[Jonathan Baker-Bates]

In the past when I've tried thinking about this it has been too fraught
with moral hazard for me. Morally, Tor is about keeping private
communications private, in the hope that more good than bad will come of
it.
On 12 Jun 2016 8:40 p.m., "Dr Gerard Bulger"  wrote:

> Not sure eavesdrop is the right word, since ISPs throttle all sorts of
> traffic by inspecting it such as torrent, let alone TOR.   I suppose we
> could argue that in signing up for an internet connection, deep in the
> ISP’s small print, we consent to that behaviour.  Is it really true that
> consent has to be sought by every router on the way?
>
>
>
> Inspecting packets for obvious things like denial of service attacks and
> brute force logins would seem very legitimate to me and I doubt that the
> law would be such an ass, since we cannot gain consent.
>
>
>
> I know there is a fine line but looking at how packets are behaving and
> looking for repetitive logins is not the same as watching the content and
> censoring that.  Then an exit node could only inspect what EXITS onto the
> internet.
>
>
>
> Gerry
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* tor-relays [mailto:tor-relays-boun...@lists.torproject.org] *On
> Behalf Of *Gareth Llewellyn
> *Sent:* 12 June 2016 18:38
> *To:* tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
> *Subject:* Re: [tor-relays] Filter Tor Exit Node for blatant attacks on
> servers
>
>
>
> On 12 Jun 2016 5:49 p.m., "Jonathan Baker-Bates" 
> wrote:
> > But along the way I asked some others about the legal implications of
> doing what the ISP had asked. The rough consensus was that in the UK at
> least, I would only be able to evesdrop on traffic once consent had been
> given by those being monitored. Otherwise I'd be illegally wiretapping and
> open to prosecution. But it was far from clear what would happen if
> somebody took me a court!
> >
>
> Indeed the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and the
> Investigatory Powers Bill contain offences relating to surveillance of
> traffic without a warrant / permission etc. (Caveats etc apply)
>
> > On 12 June 2016 at 16:12, Dr Gerard Bulger  wrote:
> >> Once TOR
> >> exits attempts any filtering where would it stop?   It is a slippery
> slope.
>
> FWIW one of the reasons we have the "pirate" blocks (in the UK) is that
> the High Court Judge (Hon. justice Arnold) in the case was informed that
> the ISPs in question had the ability to block sites (e.g. Cleanfeed)
> therefore it was possible for them to block more.
>
> Had this ISP level censorship technology not existed then we wouldn't be
> in *quite* the situation we are now.
>
> >> It is more than embarrassing to run an exit node and get abuse
> complaints
> >> about persistent and repeated attacks on an IP. The intent is clearly
> >> criminal.  VPS providers in the UK are increasing intolerant in
> receiving
> >> such complaints.  The whole VPS can be closed down by the ISP/VPS
> provider
> >> not forcing a closure of the TOR exit.  Fewer ISPs will allow you to
> install
> >> an exit node at all.
>
> This is one of the reasons why I started a UK ISP (AS28715) - I now run UK
> exits and don't have issues with them getting shutdown because the ISP got
> cold feet / got bored of abuse emails / complaints from other customers
> (entire /24 blocked by anti-tor blacklists) etc etc.
>
> Good ISPs don't deploy web filtering, transparent proxies or IDS' that
> interfere with traffic. IMHO well behaved Tor Exits shouldn't either.
>
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Re: [tor-relays] Filter Tor Exit Node for blatant attacks on servers

[Dr Gerard Bulger]

Not sure eavesdrop is the right word, since ISPs throttle all sorts of traffic 
by inspecting it such as torrent, let alone TOR.   I suppose we could argue 
that in signing up for an internet connection, deep in the ISP’s small print, 
we consent to that behaviour.  Is it really true that consent has to be sought 
by every router on the way?

  

Inspecting packets for obvious things like denial of service attacks and brute 
force logins would seem very legitimate to me and I doubt that the law would be 
such an ass, since we cannot gain consent. 

 

I know there is a fine line but looking at how packets are behaving and looking 
for repetitive logins is not the same as watching the content and censoring 
that.  Then an exit node could only inspect what EXITS onto the internet.

 

Gerry  

 

 

 

 

  

  

 

 

 

From: tor-relays [mailto:tor-relays-boun...@lists.torproject.org] On Behalf Of 
Gareth Llewellyn
Sent: 12 June 2016 18:38
To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Filter Tor Exit Node for blatant attacks on servers

 

On 12 Jun 2016 5:49 p.m., "Jonathan Baker-Bates" mailto:jonat...@bakerbates.com> > wrote:
> But along the way I asked some others about the legal implications of doing 
> what the ISP had asked. The rough consensus was that in the UK at least, I 
> would only be able to evesdrop on traffic once consent had been given by 
> those being monitored. Otherwise I'd be illegally wiretapping and open to 
> prosecution. But it was far from clear what would happen if somebody took me 
> a court!
>

Indeed the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and the Investigatory 
Powers Bill contain offences relating to surveillance of traffic without a 
warrant / permission etc. (Caveats etc apply)

> On 12 June 2016 at 16:12, Dr Gerard Bulger   > wrote:
>> Once TOR
>> exits attempts any filtering where would it stop?   It is a slippery slope.

FWIW one of the reasons we have the "pirate" blocks (in the UK) is that the 
High Court Judge (Hon. justice Arnold) in the case was informed that the ISPs 
in question had the ability to block sites (e.g. Cleanfeed) therefore it was 
possible for them to block more.

Had this ISP level censorship technology not existed then we wouldn't be in 
*quite* the situation we are now.

>> It is more than embarrassing to run an exit node and get abuse complaints
>> about persistent and repeated attacks on an IP. The intent is clearly
>> criminal.  VPS providers in the UK are increasing intolerant in receiving
>> such complaints.  The whole VPS can be closed down by the ISP/VPS provider
>> not forcing a closure of the TOR exit.  Fewer ISPs will allow you to install
>> an exit node at all.

This is one of the reasons why I started a UK ISP (AS28715) - I now run UK 
exits and don't have issues with them getting shutdown because the ISP got cold 
feet / got bored of abuse emails / complaints from other customers (entire /24 
blocked by anti-tor blacklists) etc etc.

Good ISPs don't deploy web filtering, transparent proxies or IDS' that 
interfere with traffic. IMHO well behaved Tor Exits shouldn't either.

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Re: [tor-relays] Filter Tor Exit Node for blatant attacks on servers

[Gareth Llewellyn]

On 12 Jun 2016 5:49 p.m., "Jonathan Baker-Bates" 
wrote:
> But along the way I asked some others about the legal implications of
doing what the ISP had asked. The rough consensus was that in the UK at
least, I would only be able to evesdrop on traffic once consent had been
given by those being monitored. Otherwise I'd be illegally wiretapping and
open to prosecution. But it was far from clear what would happen if
somebody took me a court!
>

Indeed the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and the
Investigatory Powers Bill contain offences relating to surveillance of
traffic without a warrant / permission etc. (Caveats etc apply)

> On 12 June 2016 at 16:12, Dr Gerard Bulger  wrote:
>> Once TOR
>> exits attempts any filtering where would it stop?   It is a slippery
slope.

FWIW one of the reasons we have the "pirate" blocks (in the UK) is that the
High Court Judge (Hon. justice Arnold) in the case was informed that the
ISPs in question had the ability to block sites (e.g. Cleanfeed) therefore
it was possible for them to block more.

Had this ISP level censorship technology not existed then we wouldn't be in
*quite* the situation we are now.

>> It is more than embarrassing to run an exit node and get abuse complaints
>> about persistent and repeated attacks on an IP. The intent is clearly
>> criminal.  VPS providers in the UK are increasing intolerant in receiving
>> such complaints.  The whole VPS can be closed down by the ISP/VPS
provider
>> not forcing a closure of the TOR exit.  Fewer ISPs will allow you to
install
>> an exit node at all.

This is one of the reasons why I started a UK ISP (AS28715) - I now run UK
exits and don't have issues with them getting shutdown because the ISP got
cold feet / got bored of abuse emails / complaints from other customers
(entire /24 blocked by anti-tor blacklists) etc etc.

Good ISPs don't deploy web filtering, transparent proxies or IDS' that
interfere with traffic. IMHO well behaved Tor Exits shouldn't either.
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Re: [tor-relays] Filter Tor Exit Node for blatant attacks on servers

[Jonathan Baker-Bates]

A while ago I had a lengthy dicussion with my ISP about this. They wanted
me to run Snort on my exit to shut off variuos types of traffic coming from
it. In the end I agreed only to allow encrypted protocols to exit, which
placated them (and a subsequent bandwith limitation booted me out of the
exit pool in any case).

But along the way I asked some others about the legal implications of doing
what the ISP had asked. The rough consensus was that in the UK at least, I
would only be able to evesdrop on traffic once consent had been given by
those being monitored. Otherwise I'd be illegally wiretapping and open to
prosecution. But it was far from clear what would happen if somebody took
me a court!





On 12 June 2016 at 16:12, Dr Gerard Bulger  wrote:

> It is heresy to suggest that Exit relays do anything of a sort, that is
> attempt to reject obvious attackers on an IP?  Tor is neutral. Once TOR
> exits attempts any filtering where would it stop?   It is a slippery slope.
> I think not, as to extend to other areas would far too complex and have
> diminishing returns.  DMCA complaints for example was waste of time, and
> not
> all counties have copyright laws.
>
> I know that everyone on the internet should secure their servers, and take
> their own measures to block attacks, but too often those corporate measures
> include an automated abuse complaint being sent out.  No explaining to ISP
> on what it means helps, as many of their staff are just too dumb and have
> to
> play safe.
>
> It is more than embarrassing to run an exit node and get abuse complaints
> about persistent and repeated attacks on an IP. The intent is clearly
> criminal.  VPS providers in the UK are increasing intolerant in receiving
> such complaints.  The whole VPS can be closed down by the ISP/VPS provider
> not forcing a closure of the TOR exit.  Fewer ISPs will allow you to
> install
> an exit node at all.
>
> I am only wondering about blocking the obvious attacks or mass attacks to
> block.   Is anyone developing such tools?  Is it even possible?  Those of
> us
> who would wish to enact such software, if it could be made, would have a
> flag on Tor Atlas stating that there is such a filter in place.
>
> Gerry
>
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[tor-relays] Filter Tor Exit Node for blatant attacks on servers

[Dr Gerard Bulger]

It is heresy to suggest that Exit relays do anything of a sort, that is
attempt to reject obvious attackers on an IP?  Tor is neutral. Once TOR
exits attempts any filtering where would it stop?   It is a slippery slope.
I think not, as to extend to other areas would far too complex and have
diminishing returns.  DMCA complaints for example was waste of time, and not
all counties have copyright laws.  

I know that everyone on the internet should secure their servers, and take
their own measures to block attacks, but too often those corporate measures
include an automated abuse complaint being sent out.  No explaining to ISP
on what it means helps, as many of their staff are just too dumb and have to
play safe.

It is more than embarrassing to run an exit node and get abuse complaints
about persistent and repeated attacks on an IP. The intent is clearly
criminal.  VPS providers in the UK are increasing intolerant in receiving
such complaints.  The whole VPS can be closed down by the ISP/VPS provider
not forcing a closure of the TOR exit.  Fewer ISPs will allow you to install
an exit node at all.

I am only wondering about blocking the obvious attacks or mass attacks to
block.   Is anyone developing such tools?  Is it even possible?  Those of us
who would wish to enact such software, if it could be made, would have a
flag on Tor Atlas stating that there is such a filter in place.
 
Gerry

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Re: [tor-relays] Tor Weather has been discontinued

[Jannis Wiese]

I’m waiting since 7 months now. I know the guys who are handling the T-shirt 
requests are busy and I am (was) prepared to wait, but it’s a bit frustrating 
(if I think about it), to be honest.

> On 08.06.2016, at 19:34, Markus Koch  wrote:
> 
> I am waiting since January?
> 
> Hope has died a long time ago ...
> 
> 
> 
> 2016-06-08 19:23 GMT+02:00 Michael Armbruster :
>> On 2016-06-08 at 19:17, Green Dream wrote:
>>> The T-shirt incentive for relay operators is gone, as far as I know.
>>> 
>>> If you donate $100 or more here you can pick a T-shirt as the
>>> gift: https://www.torproject.org/donate/donate.html.en
>>> 
>>> There are many alternative ways to monitor the health and uptime of your
>>> relay. I like https://www.statuscake.com/ for this and their free plan
>>> is sufficient. I'm not affiliated with them, I just like their product.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
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>>> 
>> 
>> As far as I know, the incentive should still be there. At least it is
>> according to the web page. [1]
>> 
>> But if it's really gone, it definitely has to be changed on the webpage,
>> as I myself am thinking right now that I should get a shirt. By the way,
>> I'm also already waiting for an answer for more than 2 weeks.
>> Just some time ago I heard somebody has waited 2 months to get an answer.
>> Well, I'm patient :)
>> 
>> Best,
>> Michael
>> 
>> [1] https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/tshirt.html.en
>> 
>> 
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