Re: [tor-relays] Exit friendly ISPs in Australia

2018-09-05 Thread nusenu 


Isaac Grover, Aileron I.T.:
> there are already seven exit nodes in Australia per 
> https://hackertarget.com/tor-exit-node-visualization/ .


site note:

that 3th party site sources its data from another 3th party site, 
maybe it is better to use something closer to to source, you can get the list
of exits in AU via an atlas / RS search:
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/country:au%20flag:exit%20running:true



btw: 
due to the high amount of off-list spam I'm getting in response to emails I'm 
sending to this list
all off-list emails to my -lists address will automatically be marked as read, 
please do not 
send me off-list emails to my -lists address.

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Re: [tor-relays] Possible problem with NYX

2018-09-05 Thread Damian Johnson 
> There are so many edge cases for this check.
>
> Flags are a *recommendation* to clients. They don't force clients
> to behave a certain way.
>
> For example:
> * clients connecting via bridges can use a middle node as their
>   second hop. These middle nodes will leak bridge addresses via nyx.
> * clients and relays can have different consensuses:
>   * if a relay loses the Guard flag, and finds out earlier than its clients,
> nyx will stop protecting those clients
>   * if a client finds out before the relay, nyx won't protect those clients
> * some Tor client versions don't check the guard flag at all. Others
>   keep their guards, even if they lose the flag
> * middle and exit relays can be used as bridges, even if they don't set
>   BridgeRelay
> * older Tor versions have a non-zero probability of choosing any relay
>   as an entry, even if it doesn't have the guard flag
> * various config options make tor clients ignore the Guard flag
>
> Please only show an IP if the relay is already public in the consensus.

Thanks teor, great point. Will do:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/27475
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Re: [tor-relays] new exit relay 4AEBDC4710D2C34FE02AB2A660B62B2A9EE97C5C

2018-09-05 Thread I 
Åh meget godt!



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Re: [tor-relays] new exit relay 4AEBDC4710D2C34FE02AB2A660B62B2A9EE97C5C

2018-09-05 Thread nusenu 


n...@neelc.org:
> Not OP, but to do this, you can set the pkg repository to the "latest" branch 
> instead of the "quarterly".
> 
> To do so

also documented here:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorRelayGuide/FreeBSD

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Re: [tor-relays] new exit relay 4AEBDC4710D2C34FE02AB2A660B62B2A9EE97C5C

2018-09-05 Thread neel 
> consider updating your tor version on your relays.

Not OP, but to do this, you can set the pkg repository to the "latest" branch 
instead of the "quarterly".

To do so, create a file /usr/local/etc/pkg/repos/FreeBSD.conf with the 
following contents:

FreeBSD: {
  url: "pkg+http://pkg.FreeBSD.org/${ABI}/latest;
}

Snippet credit: 
https://forums.freebsd.org/threads/pkg-repository-changed-to-quarterly-in-10-2.52843/#post-296554
 (Needs non-Tor exit IP)

Then update your packages with "pkg upgrade".

Alternatively, you could use Ports if you are willing to compile everything.

Thank You,

Neel Chauhan

===

https://www.neelc.org/
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Re: [tor-relays] new exit relay 4AEBDC4710D2C34FE02AB2A660B62B2A9EE97C5C

2018-09-05 Thread nusenu 
thanks for joining and welcome!

looking forward to see some exits show up on your university network.

consider updating your tor version on your relays.

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[tor-relays] new exit relay 4AEBDC4710D2C34FE02AB2A660B62B2A9EE97C5C

2018-09-05 Thread deep . thought 
Dear fellow relay operators,

we are a loose collective of students inside AS553 (Universität Stuttgart)
running one node there. At the moment, we are not allowed to run any nodes
since two abuse complaints attracted too much attention to the NOC.
The complaints were probably triggered by the well-known DDOS problems a
few months ago.
After all, the cloud operator was not amused at all but we are in the
process of getting back our right to run middle relays in AS553 to support
AS diversity.

However, we are happy to announce a new exit node:
4AEBDC4710D2C34FE02AB2A660B62B2A9EE97C5C (howdoyouturnthison)
in AS24940 (Hetzner) running on FreeBSD with a local DNS cache.

We are aware of the fact that this is not supporting AS diversity but
still better than no relay :)

So far and thanks for all the fish,
Random Person

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[tor-relays] FW: Re: [AusNOG] Dutton decryption bill

2018-09-05 Thread I 






 -Original Message-From: paulwilkins...@gmail.comSent: Wed, 5 Sep 2018 12:23:31 +1000To: aus...@lists.ausnog.netSubject: Re: [AusNOG] Dutton decryption billProvision 28(1) amending the Surveillance Devices Act would already authorise data access for any senior officer of the law enforcement agencies.50 After subsection 28(1)Insert:(1A) A law enforcement officer may apply to an appropriate authorising officer for an emergency authorisation for access to data held in a computer (the target computer) if, in the course of an investigation of a relevant offence, the law enforcement officer reasonably suspects that:(a) an imminent risk of serious violence to a person or substantial damage to property exists; and(b) access to data held in the target computer is immediately necessary for the purpose of dealing with that risk; and(c) the circumstances are so serious and the matter is of such urgency that access to data held in the target computer iswarranted; and(d) it is not practicable in the circumstances to apply for a computer access warrant.I was pretty gob smacked.Kind regardsPaul WilkinsOn Wed, 5 Sep 2018 at 12:04, Narelle Clark  wrote:Paul B - is that agency explicitly referred to or inferable readily in
the legislation?

Otherwise Paul W does have a point, there is the potential for the
thus empowered agencies to proliferate as happened in the data
retention system before it was changed.


Narelle

On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 11:42 AM Paul Brooks
 wrote:
> On 4/09/2018 6:17 PM, Paul Wilkins wrote:
> > I'd encourage others making submissions to raise the same point. Government has
> > clearly not considered this dimension, otherwise the first cab off the rank in the
> > bill's phrasing would be to create a new agency, or identifying a single agency on
> > which to confer these powers.
>
> No new agency is required - there is already the CAC, now sitting in Home Affairs, who
> manages existing lawful interception and metadata activities on behalf of the various
> agencies behind it. I would have thought the CAC would be the 'natural home' for the
> single-point-of-interface, even though they don't currently (that I know of) deal with
> device manufacturers.
>



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Re: [tor-relays] Exit friendly ISPs in Australia

2018-09-05 Thread I 





I’m also unconcerned about the potential Access Bill passing into law. There’s going to be a general election before it’s even debated in both houses, and we may have an entirely new government by that time. An entirely new government might be unrealistic.  They are both competing for the uninformed voter's fear, uncertainty and doubt.It appears to me that relays of any sort are not covered by the bill, anyway.  I'm depending on the concept of them being equal to a router or an exchange.Robert 




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Re: [tor-relays] FreeBSD pkg repo configuration

2018-09-05 Thread nusenu 
>> is the package 'ca_root_nss' installed?
>>
>> does installing it solve the problem?


> I wanted to updated the TorRelayGuide/FreeBSD wiki page, 

ca_root_nss package added:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorRelayGuide/FreeBSD?action=diff=7

> I suppose it is not editable by anyone, is that correct?

some pages are edit-restricted, this is one of them


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