Re: [tor-relays] How to reduce tor CPU load on a single bridge?
On Fri, Mar 04, 2022 at 09:40:01PM +, Gary C. New wrote: > I see that the metrics change has been reverted. > > If/When the metrics change is implemented, will loadbalanced Tor Relay Nodes > need to be uniquely named or will they all be able to use the same nickname? When I made my own combined graphs, I relied on different instances having different nicknames. I don't know an easy way to distinguish the descriptors of different instances otherwise. You could conceivably do it by analyzing the periodicity of different instances' publishing schedules. (Start one instance on the hour, another at :10, another at :20, etc.) But that seems fragile, not to mention annoying to deal with. ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] rdsys was ignoring BridgeDistribution
Hey, stuff like this happens meskio, thanks for the effort! Slightly off topic: I couldn't find my bridges in the files under https://metrics.torproject.org/collector/recent/bridge-pool-assignments/ But they seem to work (although not getting much traffic): Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 16 days 6:00 hours, with 39 circuits open. I've sent 31.25 GB and received 34.24 GB. I've received 9792 connections on IPv4 and 1095 on IPv6. I've made 54819 connections with IPv4 and 16694 with IPv6. While not bootstrapping, fetched this many bytes: 247726854 (server descriptor fetch); 22993 (server descriptor upload); 26840442 (consensus network-status fetch); 1784 (authority cert fetch); 2540630 (microdescriptor fetch) https://bridges.torproject.org/status?id= returns: Bridge advertises: * obfs4: functional Last tested: 2022-03-04 16:28:39.248278403 + UTC (1h26m57.41568s ago) Setting is "BridgeDistribution any" Any ideas why this might be? Thanks, fran On 3/4/22 16:56, meskio wrote: As mentioned before[0] BridgeDB now uses rdsys as backend. I just found out that there was a bug in rdsys and the BridgeDistribution configuration was ignored. Private bridges configured with 'BridgeDistribution none' might have being distributed by bridgedb if they were not configured with 'PublishServerDescriptor 0'. Disabling PublishServerDescriptor stops the bridge from sending it's descriptor to the bridge authority, so rdsys doesn't know it exists. Other bridges configured to be used by an specific distributor might have being distributed by a different one. This has being happening from February 28th ~12:00UTC until today March 4 ~12:00UTC. You can search for your hashed fingerprint in the pool assignments during this period if you want to know to what distributor was your bridge assigned to: https://metrics.torproject.org/collector/recent/bridge-pool-assignments/ Only bridges assigned to moat, email or https might have being distributed, as telegram, settings and reserved bridges are not distributed at the moment. The metrics relay search[1] will take some time to display the new assignments. I'm sorry for the situation. [0] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2022-February/020365.html [1] https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Odd network activity
Hi all, I can now confirm the data has been restored and no relay or bridge should exhibit any bump in traffic due to this but. Cheers, -hiro On 4/3/22 15:11, Silvia/Hiro wrote: On 4/3/22 11:40, Eldalië via tor-relays wrote: Thanks very much. The anomalous peaks disappeared for most of the days indeed, it remained only for 26/02. Yes, working to fix the bump for 26/02. -hiro Eldalië On Fri, 4 Mar 2022 07:26:26 + Georg Koppen wrote: Eldalië via tor-relays: Hello there. I see on every exit node I check on the metrics page, a massive bump in bandwidth used without a change in exit probability. I just checked the metrics page for the relay I operate (791E637A38C715336290E8AC0EB6C99BD02A5F0E) and I noticed a bump similar to the one from FDAA4F76F778215F02B0B02DCE8E8504179BCDC6. However, my relay is not and has never been an exit relay. Also, it looks like the data changed retroactively: I usually check the metrics about once a day and I'm sure I would have noticed the peak of 26/02 the day after - I mean, it is a more than x3 increment from the day before (that also had the highest value ever until then). Should I worry about that? And should I report my own relay to the bad-relays mailing list? No, it's fine. I am not sure yet what the problem is but I suspect it's a bug in one of our recent code changes. See: https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/metrics/onionoo/-/issues/40022#note_2783524 for more details. We've reverted that change for now and things should normalize again assuming the traffic increase you see is indeed related to it. Georg Thanks for the help. Eldalië On Thu, 03 Mar 2022 19:01:37 + awffelwaffels via tor-relays wrote: I see on every exit node I check on the metrics page, a massive bump in bandwidth used without a change in exit probability. Is this perhaps an attacker squeezing the bandwidth of the network so people are more likely to use their malicious nodes? ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Tor Relay Meetup #Fosdem Notes
Hello everyone, On February 7, 2022 9:55:16 PM GMT+01:00, gus wrote: >Our next online meetup will happen on March 5th, 2000 UTC. Friendly reminder, that's tomorrow. :-) Details will follow, most likely by Gus. I'm really busy with private stuff atm... All the best Leibi___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
[tor-relays] Tor Relay Operator Meetup (Saturday, March 5th @ 2000 UTC)
Hello everyone, This Saturday, March 5th @ 2000 UTC, we have a Tor Relay Operator Meetup! We'll share some updates about Tor Network Health, Tor Bridges and the ongoing situation in Russia/Ukraine (Snowflake surge, bridges blocked, BBC and DW onionsites). Everyone is free to bring up additional questions or topics at the meeting itself. Date & Time: March 5, 2022 - 2000 UTC Where: BigBlueButton room - https://tor.meet.coop/gus-og0-x74-dzn No need for a registration or anything else, just use the room-link above. Please share with your friends, social media and other mailing lists! cheers, Gus -- The Tor Project Community Team Lead signature.asc Description: PGP signature ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
[tor-relays] rdsys was ignoring BridgeDistribution
As mentioned before[0] BridgeDB now uses rdsys as backend. I just found out that there was a bug in rdsys and the BridgeDistribution configuration was ignored. Private bridges configured with 'BridgeDistribution none' might have being distributed by bridgedb if they were not configured with 'PublishServerDescriptor 0'. Disabling PublishServerDescriptor stops the bridge from sending it's descriptor to the bridge authority, so rdsys doesn't know it exists. Other bridges configured to be used by an specific distributor might have being distributed by a different one. This has being happening from February 28th ~12:00UTC until today March 4 ~12:00UTC. You can search for your hashed fingerprint in the pool assignments during this period if you want to know to what distributor was your bridge assigned to: https://metrics.torproject.org/collector/recent/bridge-pool-assignments/ Only bridges assigned to moat, email or https might have being distributed, as telegram, settings and reserved bridges are not distributed at the moment. The metrics relay search[1] will take some time to display the new assignments. I'm sorry for the situation. [0] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2022-February/020365.html [1] https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html -- meskio | https://meskio.net/ -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- My contact info: https://meskio.net/crypto.txt -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Nos vamos a Croatan. signature.asc Description: signature ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Odd network activity
On 4/3/22 11:40, Eldalië via tor-relays wrote: Thanks very much. The anomalous peaks disappeared for most of the days indeed, it remained only for 26/02. Yes, working to fix the bump for 26/02. -hiro Eldalië On Fri, 4 Mar 2022 07:26:26 + Georg Koppen wrote: Eldalië via tor-relays: Hello there. I see on every exit node I check on the metrics page, a massive bump in bandwidth used without a change in exit probability. I just checked the metrics page for the relay I operate (791E637A38C715336290E8AC0EB6C99BD02A5F0E) and I noticed a bump similar to the one from FDAA4F76F778215F02B0B02DCE8E8504179BCDC6. However, my relay is not and has never been an exit relay. Also, it looks like the data changed retroactively: I usually check the metrics about once a day and I'm sure I would have noticed the peak of 26/02 the day after - I mean, it is a more than x3 increment from the day before (that also had the highest value ever until then). Should I worry about that? And should I report my own relay to the bad-relays mailing list? No, it's fine. I am not sure yet what the problem is but I suspect it's a bug in one of our recent code changes. See: https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/metrics/onionoo/-/issues/40022#note_2783524 for more details. We've reverted that change for now and things should normalize again assuming the traffic increase you see is indeed related to it. Georg Thanks for the help. Eldalië On Thu, 03 Mar 2022 19:01:37 + awffelwaffels via tor-relays wrote: I see on every exit node I check on the metrics page, a massive bump in bandwidth used without a change in exit probability. Is this perhaps an attacker squeezing the bandwidth of the network so people are more likely to use their malicious nodes? ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Odd network activity
Thanks very much. The anomalous peaks disappeared for most of the days indeed, it remained only for 26/02. Eldalië On Fri, 4 Mar 2022 07:26:26 + Georg Koppen wrote: > Eldalië via tor-relays: > > Hello there. > > > >> I see on every exit node I check on the metrics page, a massive > >> bump in bandwidth used without a change in exit probability. > > > > I just checked the metrics page for the relay I operate > > (791E637A38C715336290E8AC0EB6C99BD02A5F0E) and I noticed a bump > > similar to the one from FDAA4F76F778215F02B0B02DCE8E8504179BCDC6. > > However, my relay is not and has never been an exit relay. Also, it > > looks like the data changed retroactively: I usually check the > > metrics about once a day and I'm sure I would have noticed the peak > > of 26/02 the day after - I mean, it is a more than x3 increment > > from the day before (that also had the highest value ever until > > then). Should I worry about that? And should I report my own relay > > to the bad-relays mailing list? > > No, it's fine. I am not sure yet what the problem is but I suspect > it's a bug in one of our recent code changes. See: > > > https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/metrics/onionoo/-/issues/40022#note_2783524 > > for more details. We've reverted that change for now and things > should normalize again assuming the traffic increase you see is > indeed related to it. > > Georg > > > Thanks for the help. > > > > Eldalië > > > > > > On Thu, 03 Mar 2022 19:01:37 + > > awffelwaffels via tor-relays > > wrote: > > > >> I see on every exit node I check on the metrics page, a massive > >> bump in bandwidth used without a change in exit probability. Is > >> this perhaps an attacker squeezing the bandwidth of the network so > >> people are more likely to use their malicious nodes? > > > > > > > > > > > > ___ > > tor-relays mailing list > > tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > -- Eldalië My private key is attached. Please, use it and provide me yours! -BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK- mQGNBGH654oBDADQ1P39b4l9D5WKgXCialWaXGT2rufuDByTrU9Gm++6+/9W7OEb Je9HLOH8i6ie9VX+J2ul3U2xd8TBiscU+c7RZZJLQwLYtHTKOCneVdzT7Xz8LnHE roaULwWUniLTdfg1oK5FpezvSMgHwysylelY6ZCUnE74IUXL1sT2+txY/kTLNhin Z3r2Eb+/eXkCAxxMqyo26yyYu/KKbBmW07vp3t5oOqxWcATAFbmtUwjlCYxm1JQY QHYVeZEE0gaMsbuDNbSnXYfXB+kNQErY6wUsu88KQsyNpiJGMxHaFWt+2hB34NF2 p+9OJP9m968gzGzXmJFyvwuC5EO54TYaSZm6eN7BuISaFvpXyvuykCsOuk+vtzo3 xlCyxN6bD6xJQvhYkPi29ZzcrHrTI3R02k/DmDjb9wr9xZ59AFyJQlxwAp/g9kGR fEiz8+6XeGF/UpW/hY5JiGttzygXd8AJvPgBbecaXdKBAcTtDQDbb1oOiVzUEz6t WeWEivycarj9tP0AEQEAAbQeRWxkYWxpw6sgPGVsZGFsaWVAZGlzcm9vdC5vcmc+ iQHUBBMBCgA+FiEEfOdXEXShlhKT0M75Hqzxlbjz2SIFAmH654oCGwMFCQBLWQYF CwkIBwIGFQoJCAsCBBYCAwECHgECF4AACgkQHqzxlbjz2SIvAQv/Q/ZfOL9p7yYo tU6wm+E0zaOZfJq96PzcBVjeWLNzXsl3NT2EqW2v8gcsIhlTy5nNkRhkh+rkQvqz SM4UvnZ3dwEgvLYVqG7jQiLQFltl7gy6F7FRlj7bCm78KHUVNAlXXxvABL4zvYSM RzjgnbcRYA4vjM0udxjgBzCKysp7weobaaSRZMpfjrlFaylM8j+n3ih4w0urzjfs +42XXXKJzMHvrotFP7FJDKWcprFtq+HB1SlLpg+ROPgIFUc0YpXNZO3jCVZQ+reu yXf042SThmEFzPJFNyAGpYO8PLxmZfsZ9rGGVEUCtE1nNDtKA34LeYbnUND94TZx 5juBwJj04Ft0hdxkQP8y/jcI3k4tpUD4QWp9FjQ1F59Cd9/sJAsDHl1dzXxTHLNr O30IwQ2XkMneWIUxm0jZI+0C2CHYxJAtEY0G0b74sxz8xCzDeozqiLZrDwIbbcSa /ipmTn+43slZIMQH272U6w41VCBqPnAIE+GuFJZc6yuzk0gGAKsJtBpFbGRhbGnD qyA8ZWxkYWxpZUBkaXNyLml0PokB1AQTAQoAPhYhBHznVxF0oZYSk9DO+R6s8ZW4 89kiBQJh+ug6AhsDBQkAS1kGBQsJCAcCBhUKCQgLAgQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJEB6s 8ZW489kiBl8L/01KZ+5sxjOfamlYskBdb4T8B+qXukKwqXmCCO8xTs7ZJtxgVx1R 4kwLYVmimetKhRSS/mzZvyVOTB6BGx2spu7dD75Iq5sFeg+aEH8/qGg63lSr2vib Ebh9W2RsjSQhsMnHmYKrRXvKntsGFdndgZjWsHZTpZuzT5KhInkNRcHYRBNPPcrn fllJtBf5K90sECJjHsqzji7L7zQeuJViaglYoQRLa/VZJMAvLv2vifPg4p4TThSX qSJ41auEzCcw+MKDBULUgBKBndcwh6N6tg4o62bFfb1Sc+EePW27zqoUYzc/qQ9m X6J7PEiarNAev5jubn6aWx5Akt4AtbM7v9KaS2heg4N404yV3+ZmmwOb3/fx3frg DpRyDtx2SMpV0WNr79ZUbwAdRnTO+nxiDCnezwrpGuFddfjS8XC5Xv0PvqvWJ7V/ zphOKaTZUO/xZiu6H9U0g/J3sv7O9F+CnymX5+Z/JQl97z3yUZcFnpm/wKqEV8OC ufd97gFdtn0B4LkBjQRh+ueKAQwAu69owZa8usUXoNziZW5gGEMzOak/GaFdO/9Q U7Ni22ABhvTEjWxSjyWFnEGi/W358uYLETbjtx6K0l1HV7qdsRnraqMVXW8Qcrgy +dRQI/avF3tPLkawu2VsfmdYRTtqxp6tImkhw6mRWQYIZRWpTLXO3dFOM+nQ8Oge Wn1DbA5PAfK/f5Zt772Mg19zkF4pA6G/RT0GtvkekWYERxsd5aVtT/NXjhMyXzxs 3YJ9zDjKEaMMn50kMHiEFbRtwQPLVsLXV752lmzLl0NNyyaaCwrS/dcG4RV7L2XP WaPT5tXJf3+YeoyRdVCkULgcwYpETcspTWPczST2Kf24BB5COju1m0a50/DH4sI3 KJIFn2rBDLkvYb1qescNiwxHZvuA94/hvdFDj7skCcPaSopoJeCAuE0yxl2qqq/F 1aUBAfGENk5yuPdQWuvJcrbA7UpWq7A75Np9apAhLCeT/zTe63x4ZZ4fxLULfYM5 11lIvn93vdcWyhaGgKvDXIaB2A0tABEBAAGJAbwEGAEKACYWIQR851cRdKGWEpPQ zvkerPGVuPPZIgUCYfrnigIbDAUJAEtZBgAKCRAerPGVuPPZInKWC/4q9eVaXIIh +DKH+JEMcgERxgJcyZMLNv6qxcbKWbtTU1boCVyZbn8eRF3SpOWn0sNLRnVAIYpS enH2wXUiufOro898RwYWz4IuLwAF/sANqsMZT0qv5FMh6671wFaSboNc7FTLRW5t YZ4+iz3KTLxLXiQiEhlUsSwmMYanUkn3ZBGmb+cE3pA5L7mWc4KKHTuiL+ZmlRbF cvgD07kc18UnCMC5RqqsrZ0Ezw1QYqF1tVqBNmR5LoQyYGw3kgQa2u5lIpAhYDJ5 Vv0C1xHIp0o14ljyvUlU8ypvlYoMtX+wfxHmIXz4WQr3BP0b
Re: [tor-relays] Odd network activity
On 3/3/22 20:01, awffelwaffels via tor-relays wrote: I see on every exit node I check on the metrics page, a massive bump in bandwidth used without a change in exit probability. Is this perhaps an attacker squeezing the bandwidth of the network so people are more likely to use their malicious nodes? Hi, This was a bug that was briefly introduced between yesterday afternoon and early morning today (UTC times). I have reverted the commit this morning around 5.00 AM (UTC) so you should start seeing your graphs back to normal. Thanks for noticing and apologies for that. Cheers, -hiro ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
