[tor-relays] AirTor/ATOR continues to pester Tor relay operators, promising donations

[Christian Pietsch via tor-relays]

Dear Tor community,

maybe the notes from the Tor relay operator meetup on March 4 should
have mentioned that a participant called AirTor was kicked from that
BBB conference.

This happened because they were using “Tor” in their name and
continued to make dubious offers like the one below which just arrived
in my NGO's inbox. They did not send it to the e-mail address in the
ContactInfo of our Tor relays but a generic one. In BBB's text chat,
they offered to change their name “if thats best,” but as you can see,
they have not. Instead, the signed as ATOR – but that might be a typo.

I am writing this to let you know that it's best to ignore e-mails
like the one below. In the meetup, Roger made it increasingly clear
that he does not believe that AirTor are acting in good faith.

Cheers,
Christian


- Forwarded message -

From:   AirTor Team 
Message-ID: <1167510526.29240.1678981005...@eu1.myprofessionalmail.com>
Subject:Support for TOR relay associations
X-Mailer:   Open-Xchange Mailer v8.10.73
X-Originating-IP:   24.218.88.76

Hello from ATOR!
We are a community driven initiative that provides recognition rewards to
supporters and operators in the TOR ecosystem.
We would love to recognize your efforts and the efforts of your relay
operators, and hear your opinions on the protocol we have in mind.
Please let us know if this is something of interest to you. We would also like
to donate to help your operation grow and remain active.
Thank you for your time, we hope to hear from you soon!
Sincerely,
ATOR team

- End forwarded message -

-- 
Christian Pietsch | volunteering for
Digitalcourage: https://digitalcourage.de
Mastodon: https://digitalcourage.social/@ChPietsch
BigBrotherAwards Germany: https://bigbrotherawards.de/



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Re: [tor-relays] disable moderation on tor-relays again?

[Christian Pietsch]

I would like to make you aware of a compromise option: Last time I checked, 
Mailman gave moderators the option to allowlist the sender when accepting a 
post.

This feature could be used more often to avoid those frustrating delays for a 
growing number of participants.

C:


Am 14. Februar 2023 09:57:38 MEZ schrieb Georg Koppen :
>nusenu:
>> Hi,
>> 
>> can we try to disable moderation on this list again and see how it goes?
>> 
>> If it gets out of hand you can always move back to a moderated mode or a 
>> mode where
>> the first email of a sender is moderated.
>
>I've no strong opinion but looking over my moderator experience spanning the 
>past months/years I can see some benefit of preventing spam, abusive behavior 
>and mails not intended for the group from reaching the mailing list and thus 
>everyone subscribed to it. There are downsides like the delay of posts 
>arriving on the list but that's a thing we could fix by putting more posters 
>onto our allow list.
>
>But, as mentioned, I'd not be opposed to disable moderation at this point.
>
>Georg
>
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[tor-relays] Is ExoneraTor still alive?

[Christian Pietsch]

Dear all,

ExoneraTor is/was useful for showing law enforcement authorities that
a given IP address acted as a Tor exit relay at a given day.

Unfortunately, ExoneraTor seems to be offline.

This page does not work at all, returning an HTTP 503 error
immediately: https://exonerator.torproject.org/

This page returns the following error whenever I submit an IP address:
https://metrics.torproject.org/exonerator.html
| Server problem
| 
| Unable to connect to the database. Please try again later. If this problem 
persists, please let us know!

Can it be revived? Can I help?

Cheers,
Christian

-- 
Christian Pietsch
volunteering for Digitalcourage e.V. https://digitalcourage.de/
– Swarm support: https://digitalcourage.de/swarm-support
– German BigBrotherAwards: https://bigbrotherawards.de/


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Re: [tor-relays] Tor Relay Operator Meetup (Saturday, March 5th @ 2000 UTC)

[Christian Pietsch]

Thanks, Marco and Frank!

We have added this mirror to our multilingual instructions now.
At least in Germany, downloads are much faster from NetCologne.

Cheers,
Christian

On Sat, Apr 02, 2022 at 06:17:19PM +0200, li...@for-privacy.net wrote:
> On Monday, March 14, 2022 8:46:23 PM CEST Christian Pietsch wrote:
> > I almost put the netcologne mirror into a blog post I co-wrote
> > <https://digitalcourage.de/blog/2022/use-tor> – but then I noticed
> > that the download links do not work.
> 
> The nice admin from NetCologne fixed the links. There is now the subdomain: 
> https://torproject.netcologne.de/
> 
> Download archive is also available directly:
> https://torproject.netcologne.de/dist/


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Re: [tor-relays] Tor Relay Operator Meetup (Saturday, March 5th @ 2000 UTC)

[Christian Pietsch]

I almost put the netcologne mirror into a blog post I co-wrote
 – but then I noticed
that the download links do not work. For example,
https://mirror.netcologne.de/dist/torbrowser/11.0.7/tor-browser-linux64-11.0.7_en-US.tar.xz
→ Error 404

Cheers,
Christian


On Mon, Mar 14, 2022 at 08:37:42PM +0100, li...@for-privacy.net wrote:
> My ISP mirrors the Tor website and Tor Browser can be downloaded from there:
> https://debian.netcologne.de/torproject.org/
> https://mirror.netcologne.de/torproject.org/
> 
> > We have a Telegram bot, which returns some bridges. The anti-censorship 
> > team is testing these bridges from a vantage point in Russia, and if 
> > they're blocked we rotate the bridge to a new address. We have 25k 
> > people connected over the Telegram bot bridges.
> Maybe the link can be spread in the bot with the bridges.


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[tor-relays] announcing new exit relays run by Digitalcourage in Germany

[Christian Pietsch]

Dear Tor friends,

Digitalcourage has launched a cluster of new relays on Sunday, and we
just turned them into exit relays. We hope they will be pretty fast.
They are running on new server metal with a nice connection to the
Internet. Nicknames and their fingerprints are as follows:

Digitalcourage4ip1a – Fingerprint 97F51AF6791AD33981CE25DC7A2618429F25B3B0
Digitalcourage4ip1b – Fingerprint BB034C34ED9E60F7709ED93FB432A9BA12A2F2B6
Digitalcourage4ip2a – Fingerprint 68EC657DC8A587B38D5D7763D5C72E93C2CD456C
Digitalcourage4ip2b – Fingerprint BA9D7FB9AB4ED0FBCA56941DA22CF7770BA1A4BC
Digitalcourage4ip3a – Fingerprint A2DD0EF31813E9B7F6DB435504A406E1AD2B76AB
Digitalcourage4ip3b – Fingerprint 35B503FB546815CC9EDE91022555B5D0ED04E389
Digitalcourage4ip4a – Fingerprint FDCFEA18CC64461455DE5EA3FC31834C6B42FEC7
Digitalcourage4ip4b – Fingerprint 8287DADC415B3E667C617EEFB6E7D654C7AC0C47
Digitalcourage4ip5a – Fingerprint 9AD90317DDA2F898EB0AE0F20976EA97E7AF9012
Digitalcourage4ip5b – Fingerprint 902A13399F14FFC7E2912463300C78A25C1F76B6
Digitalcourage4ip6a – Fingerprint 6B61EFE3AEDEB3351FD3C910443D95556316E01C
Digitalcourage4ip6b – Fingerprint 762213D327B0A76057F4B61CD587ED4238CD900E
Digitalcourage4ip7a – Fingerprint 22296CB6AE56609A96F02FB843AB7B4B0A31CAF4
Digitalcourage4ip7b – Fingerprint D13692D97236C0B8E8E19EA2DD952B5C4F9010BB
Digitalcourage4ip8a – Fingerprint 844DC3890E4D04473D10EE65547491F200A86F89
Digitalcourage4ip8b – Fingerprint E2AE93904308E8EB4F8CAE3784D9424B78A4A596

For details, see https://digitalcourage.de/support/tor#gen4 (German
only for now, sorry).

Heartfelt thanks to everyone who helped us with advice, IP addresses,
connectivity, Tor, ansible-relayor, GNU/Linux, donations or membership
fees!

We will retire our old (generation 3) exit relays by the end of this
year. They served as fallback directory mirrors. I will soon write to
gus to tell him which new fingerprints could replace them.

Cheers,
Christian

-- 
Christian Pietsch | volunteering for Digitalcourage e.V., Germany
Digitalcourage: https://digitalcourage.de/en
BigBrotherAwards Germany: https://bigbrotherawards.de/
Still using Google Docs? Try my CryptPad: https://cryptpad.uber.space


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[tor-relays] Hardware specs for a high-bandwidth Tor exit?

[Christian Pietsch]

Dear Tor friends,

the NGO I am volunteering for (Digitalcourage e.V.) has been running
modest Tor exits for many years. Now we finally have the opportunity
to run a high-bandwidth exit relay because we found a data center with
a nice internet connection (20 Gbit/s) we may use.

My question is: What kind of hardware should we buy to utilize this
bandwith? I am told that we need an SFP+ networking card to connect to
the fibre optics cable, but what CPU and mainboard would you recommend
nowadays? It should fit into a 1 height unit 19" enclosure.

If you prefer to tell me in person: I will attend the Tor meetup in
Brussels on Friday <https://blog.torproject.org/events/tor-meetup-brussels>
and the subsequent Freedom Not Fear event <https://www.freedomnotfear.org/>.

Cheers,
Christian

-- 
Christian Pietsch | volunteering for Digitalcourage e.V., Germany
Digitalcourage e.V.: https://digitalcourage.de/
BigBrotherAwards Germany: https://bigbrotherawards.de/
Betting living without Google: https://pad.foebud.org/google-alternatives


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Re: [tor-relays] german plans on banning TOR

[Christian Pietsch]

prison sentences should also be extended: From three to five years.

# Allow further investigative measures

A further demand concerns the investigative powers that are
connected with the new criminal offence: In contrast to the
original proposal, not only the telecommunication surveillance,
but also, if necessary online searches [by govware trojans],
acoustic monitoring of living space and the collection of traffic
data may be permitted. In order to effectively prevent criminal
offences that are committed by means of internet-based
communication, these investigative measures are deemed necessary
justified considering the gravity of the crime.

The plenary will decide on 15 March which recommendations to follow.
--->8---



-- 
Christian Pietsch | volunteering for Digitalcourage e.V.
Nein zu Uploadfiltern: https://aktion.digitalcourage.de/nein-zu-uploadfiltern
Appell gegen die Polizeigesetzreformen: 
https://aktion.digitalcourage.de/polizeistaat-verhindern
Verfassungsbeschwerde gegen Staatstrojaner: 
https://digitalcourage.de/staatstrojaner-stoppen
Verfassungsbeschwerde gegen Vorratsdatenspeicherung: 
https://digitalcourage.de/weg-mit-vds
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Re: [tor-relays] lets stop using central big DNS resolvers (Google, Level3, OpenDNS, Quad9, Cloudflare)

[Christian Pietsch]

Hi Tyler,
hi all,

On Thu, May 10, 2018 at 10:37:00PM +, Tyler Durden wrote:
> The situation is very unlikely to change unless there is a major player
> on "our side" which offers a free, censorship-free, resilient and stable
> DNS Service.

You are welcome to use our free, censorship-free, resilient and stable
DNS resolver:
$ host dns2.digitalcourage.de
dns2.digitalcourage.de has address 46.182.19.48
dns2.digitalcourage.de has IPv6 address 2a02:2970:1002:0:5054:8aff:fe12:db49

Whether you consider Digitalcourage e.V. a major player is up to you.
Here is some background in English: https://digitalcourage.de/en
(Tyler, I know you know us since we as an EDRi member supported your
organisation's entry application.)

More specific information on our DNS relays is available in German
only <https://digitalcourage.de/support/zensurfreier-dns-server>
but see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digitalcourage for a summary.
This is not a huge machine but it could take some more load. We have
configured DNSSEC and are looking into implementing DNS-over-TLS now.

You might ask what happened to dns.digitalcourage.de. That is our
older open DNS resolver. We have run it since 2009. It has been
overloaded recently, and we recommend that people switch to dns2.

Cheers,
C:

-- 
Christian Pietsch | volunteering for Digitalcourage e.V.
https://digitalcourage.de | https://bigbrotherawards.de
How to avoid Google: https://pad.foebud.org/google-alternatives


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Re: [tor-relays] Fwd: US-CERT Avalanche Notification INC000010

[Christian Pietsch]

Hi Monkey Pet,

On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 05:57:42PM -0800, Monkey Pet wrote:
> I received the following email from my ISP, the IP belongs to the tor exit
> node. I am wondering if the DHS is sending it out to all tor exit nodes?

We receive Avalanche e-mails via our ISP, too. It started in early
December. As our exit relays are in Germany, the sender is not the DHS
but its German counterpart BSI/CERT-Bund .
The English part of these e-mails reads as follows:


==

Dear Sir or Madam,

this is a notification on systems on your network most likely
infected with malware.

With an internationally coordinated operation, law enforcement
agencies took down the 'Avalanche' botnet infrastructure.
The infrastructure was used by cybercriminals for controlling
various botnets. Additional information is available at:


In the course of this operation, domain names used by malware
related to those botnets for contacting command-and-control
servers operated by the criminals have been redirected to
so called 'sinkholes'. Additional information on this technique
is available at:


Any connection to a sinkhole is usually a good indicator for the
host sending the request being infected with an associated malware.
CERT-Bund receives log data from the sinkholes for notification
of the responsible network operators.

Please find below a list of logged requests to the sinkholes from
your networks. Each record includes the IP address, a timestamp
and the name of the corresponding malware family. If available,
the record also includes the source port, target IP, target port
and target hostname for each connection.

A value of 'generic' for the malware family means:
a) The affected system connected to a domain name related to the
   Avalanche botnet infrastructure which could not be mapped to
   a particular malware family yet.
or
b) The HTTP request sent by the affected system did not include
   a domain name. Thus, on the sinkhole it could not be decided
   which domain name the affected system resolved to connect to
   the respective IP address.

Most of the malware families reported here include functions for
identity theft (harvesting of usernames and passwords) and/or
online-banking fraud. Further information on the different
malware families as well as additional help is available at:


We would like to ask you to check the issues reported and to take
appropriate action to get the infected hosts cleaned up or notify
your customers accordingly.

This message is digitally signed using PGP. Information on the
signature key is available at:


Please note:
This is an automatically generated message.
Replying to the sender address is not possible.
In case of questions, please contact .

==


In our understanding, there is nothing we can do. The e-mails do not
even demand that we do anything. It is just a friendly warning that
other people's computers are infected with malware, which we knew
before.

The Tor project offers an RBL containing all current exit relays, so
we would ask the sender of these e-mails to consult that list and stop
bothering people who run Tor exit relays.

Cheers,
Christian

-- 
  Digitalcourage e.V., Marktstr. 18, D-33602 Bielefeld, Germany
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[tor-relays] Is EOMA68 a good platform for Tor relays?

[Christian Pietsch]

[Leaving stuff out that is not directly relevant for tor-relays.]

As far as modular, low power, open hardware is concerned, I set my
hopes on the new EOMA68 architecture. This is a draft standard for
computer cards in the PCMCIA form factor:
http://elinux.org/Embedded_Open_Modular_Architecture/EOMA68

Crowdfunding for the first implementation of this specification
(EOMA68-A20) has been successful: 
https://www.crowdsupply.com/eoma68/micro-desktop
I ordered one, and I convinced Digitalcourage e.V. to order three more
that will be used for trustworthy computing – maybe Tor relays.

The performance of this first implementation will probably be
comparable to the CubieTruck which is based on the same SoC, the
Allwinner A20, which is an ARM Cortex-A8 design. So CPU-wise, it will
be between the Raspberry Pi 2 and 3. Network throughput might be
better because it does not use Raspi's peculiar design.

New implementations with more powerful hardware are in preparation
(see the latest updates on CrowdSupply), but these will still be
smartphone-like systems, not high performance servers.

Last time I checked, Tor did not support the hardware AES acceleration
of the A20 SoC called Security System (SS) <http://sunxi.montjoie.ovh>.
Is this still the case?

Would it be a good idea to encourage Tor relay operators to get one of
these cheap headless computer cards to run secure non-exit relays that
can be left running without consuming a lot of power?

Greetings from Bielefeld, Germany!
Christian


-- 
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[tor-relays] EOMA68 as a platform for trustworthy computing? / was: Exploiting firmware

[Christian Pietsch]

On Thu, Dec 08, 2016 at 10:41:46AM +0500, Roman Mamedov wrote:
> On AMD that's been implemented only after "Family 15h"
> https://libreboot.org/faq/#amdbastards
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_AMD_CPU_microarchitectures
> 
> Family 15h itself is safe.
> 
> It includes FX-series 8-core CPUs at up to 5 GHz supporting DDR3-2133 RAM:
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piledriver_%28microarchitecture%29
> 
> So don't handwave-away AMD with "they are doing that too", today you CAN have
> a non-backdoored modern high-performance CPU -- from AMD.

Interesting, but this microarchitecture entered the market in 2012 and
is probably being phased out now, I guess?

As far as modular, open hardware is concerned, I set my hopes on the
new EOMA68 architecture. This is a draft standard for computer cards
in the PCMCIA form factor: 
http://elinux.org/Embedded_Open_Modular_Architecture/EOMA68

Crowdfunding for the first implementation of this specification
(EOMA68-A20) has been successful: 
https://www.crowdsupply.com/eoma68/micro-desktop
I ordered one, and I convinced Digitalcourage e.V. to order three more
that will be used for trustworthy computing – maybe Tor relays.

The performance of this first implementation will probably be
comparable to the CubieTruck which is based on the same SoC, the
Allwinner A20, which is an ARM Cortex-A8 design. So CPU-wise, it will
be between the Raspberry Pi 2 and 3. Network throughput might be
better because it does not use Raspi's peculiar design.

New implementations with more powerful hardware are in preparation
(see the latest updates on CrowdSupply), but we are still talking
about smartphone-like systems.

Last time I checked, Tor did not support the hardware AES acceleration
of the A20 SoC called Security System (SS) <http://sunxi.montjoie.ovh>.
Is this still the case?

Greetings from Bielefeld, Germany!
Christian


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Vorratsdatenspeicherung? Nicht schon wieder! Unterstützt unsere 
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Re: [tor-relays] Syslog: Kernel TCP: Too many orphaned sockets

[Christian Pietsch]

The exit relay we (Digitalcourage) run gets this warning a lot, but it started 
only recently. I guess it is related to the DDoS attacks (syn flood) we get 
lately.

Debian seems to set /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_max_orphans automatically so that up 
to a quarter of the installed amount of RAM is used for this.
(“Let me remind you again: each orphan eats up to 64K of unswappable memory” – 
https://serverfault.com/questions/624911/what-does-tcp-too-many-orphaned-sockets-mean)

So 262,144 value in Torservers' config will eat up to 16 GiB. I am not sure if 
overriding Debian's setting is a good idea. Any advice? Is this warning more 
than an annoyance?

Cheers,
Christian


On Mon, Aug 01, 2016 at 09:12:12PM -0500, Tristan wrote:
> My default setting was 2048. I changed it to 200,000 for now. I haven't
> really played with sysctl at all. The only change I've ever made in there
> was for swappiness.
> 
> On Mon, Aug 1, 2016 at 8:04 PM, Green Dream  wrote:
> 
> > It's related to /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_max_orphans
> >
> > "Maximal number of TCP sockets not attached to any user file handle, held
> > by system. If this number is exceeded orphaned connections are reset
> > immediately and warning is printed."
> >
> > So, I'd start by checking the value of tcp_max_orphans (with "cat
> > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_max_orphans"). The widely distributed sysctl.conf
> > tweaks for Linux relays suggests a value of 262144. I think the default in
> > many distros may be 4096, perhaps too low for an Exit.
> >
> > Some references:
> >
> >
> > https://serverfault.com/questions/624911/what-does-tcp-too-many-orphaned-sockets-mean
> >
> > https://raw.githubusercontent.com/torservers/server-config-templates/master/sysctl.conf
> >
> > If you need help making the sysctl tweaks let me know.
> >
> >
> > ___
> > tor-relays mailing list
> > tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
> > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
> >
> >
> 
> 


-- 
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  Tel: +49-521-1639 1639 | Fax: +49-521-61172 | m...@digitalcourage.de
  https://digitalcourage.de | https://bigbrotherawards.de

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Re: [tor-relays] IP-Echelon complains about claimed infringement

[Christian Pietsch]

Hi all,

On Sun, Nov 22, 2015 at 10:04:14AM +0100, Martin Kepplinger wrote:
> Those Mails just keep coming. I replied to hundreds of them and never
> heard back. They're a normal part of maintaining my exit relay :)

We also get several e-mails from IP-Echelon every day. When it
started, we replied to the sender address, but that e-mail bounced
with a note from GMail to the effect that too many message for this
account were coming in.

Next time, we additionally sent our reply to the other e-mail address
mentioned in their mailings, copyri...@ip-echelon.com, once more
explaining that we are running a Tor exit node, and what this means.
This is the reply we got:

On Fri, Oct 09, 2015 at 10:51:06AM +, IP-Echelon Support wrote:
> IP-Echelon Support Team, Oct 9, 10:51
> 
> Dear Digitalcourage e.V. Tor Team,
> 
> Thank you for contacting IP-Echelon. We appreciate the steps you
> have taken to ensure your network is not used to facilitate
> copyright infringement. At this time no further action is required.
> 
> 
> Sincerely,
> IP-Echelon Support Team

We did not block anything for them, nor did we say so. So we took this
e-mail as their acceptance of Tor exits.

But why do they continue to send us notices? We can only assume that
they have no control over their spam bot. Or maybe they just want to
advertise the hottest titles from Paramount. We think it is safe to
delete this kind of spam.

The Digitalcourage Tor Team

-- 
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit Node with Onion Pi

[Christian Pietsch]

Dear Alex,

On Wed, Oct 07, 2015 at 02:21:06AM +, Alex Haesche wrote:
> I'm looking to start an exit node using 
> this:https://learn.adafruit.com/onion-pi/overview

Do you realize that the instructions you refer to are for a wireless
access point with a built-in Tor proxy rather than for a Tor relay?

This wireless access point provides a way for users of its wifi
network to use the Tor network without having to install any software
on their devices. Which is nice, but note that a more secure solution
would be to use the Tor Browser Bundle (for desktop computers) or
ORbot (for Android handheld computers) because these programs take
great care not to leak information that would identify its users.

> I have 100 Mbps symmetric uncapped internet.
> What do I need to do to prepare and run an exit node? What can you
> tell me so I can run this well?

A Raspberry Pi (from version 2) is a good choice for running a middle
relay at home. However, I would recommend against using it as an exit
relay for two reasons:

1) The Pi is not very efficient when it comes to handling network
traffic. You may not be able to utilize your full bandwidth.

2) For legal reasons, it is better to run Tor exits in data centers
instead of your home. Misguided police might confiscate all electronic
devices and storage media they find at your home.

Cheers,
Christian

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