Re: [tor-relays] my IP got blocked
Hi, It's not the first time I hear about Non-Exit IP blocked (but may be some people here are more familiar with the subject) : I don't really know what are the most used interfaces/websites from which those administrators are getting the list of IP addresses before blocking them (are they downloading the full consensus list like tor clients or from another website ?). May be websites proposing these lists should split them in 2 distinct lists, and normally show only exit nodes unless something very precise is asked by the user for seeing all tor relays including non exit. For lazy/angry administrators trying to definitely block all Tor IP addresses without considering giving any another time or second chance it would avoid some of these non exit relays blocked ? Of course ideally those administrators are doing some mistake and the problem is coming from them more than from anybody else (or may be bad users, too). But into the facts, when a mistake is repeatedly done, may be changing some things should be considered ? If possible of course (it's not always simple or quick). Best regards, Julien ROBIN Le 14/11/2017 à 13:45, Matt Traudt a écrit : On 11/14/17 07:38, Patrice wrote: Hi everyone, I`ve got an issue with my local IP address. I am running a relay about 1 year and since 3 or 4 weeks I can`t reach some websites like: ebay or ikea. All I get is this message: * * *Access Denied* You don`t have permission to access "Http://www.ebay.com/" on this server. Reference # looong number__ I think I am on some blacklists. After I change my IP address all worked fine for only 2 days. Can I do something about this? Thank you for your help! Kind regards Kalle If you're running an exit, they probably saw abusive traffic, didn't like it, and blocked your IP. You could consider not running an exit relay from home. If you're running a non-exit, then they're being dumb for blocking your IP when it is impossible for abusive traffic to come from your relay. Some webmasters who don't understand Tor do that, but there's not really anything we can do. Best I can suggest is you try talking to them, which isn't a very satisfying suggestion, I know. Matt ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Bandwidth Measurement
Hi, I think that in this case, every existing connection and transfers act as "best effort" (it means that used bandwidth for some connection aren't absolutely reserved), the new transfer is making a place by reducing just a little bit the others connection's available speed. If 50 active connection are using 1 MB/s each at the same time, with a total amount of 50 MB/s which is the maximum of a given server for example, then a new connection trying to get 1 MB/s will make the 50 Megabits divided by 51, then the usable bandwidth for all connection becomes 0,98 MB/s in the place of 1 MB/s When your relay is very overused and severe congestion occurs, then the bandwidth measurement will be very poor, this will reduce the weight of your relay in the consensus in order to reduce the congestion. The algorithm is designed to give the ideal consensus weight for your relay in order to be as close as possible of your maximum available bandwidth, without placing too much users on it (with too much users on it, the total used bandwidth will be at the maximum, but each user get a painful browsing experience because the available bandwidth per user becomes too weak) Bye ! Julien PS : if the advertised bandwidth is incorrect then congestion will occur and the consensus weight of your relay will be decreased because of poor performance during measurements, that's how possible cheating/disturbance is avoided in this case, I think. I think there is some documentation on this subject, by searching if you have some time and want to know more on this subject. Le 20/02/2017 à 18:39, Marcobr a écrit : Hey everyone, as far as I know, the DAs running the bwauth scripts conduct hourly bandwidth measurements. Depending on the advertised bandwidth of the relay node, a smaller/bigger file gets transmitted on a custom 2-hop-circuit and the transmission time determines the actual bandwidth. Now, here is my problem: Assuming that my relay node advertised 50MB/s, and is currently at 98% load (49 MB/s). To conduct the measurement, the bwauth script will send a 8MB file over my relay, but since it can only serve another 1MB/s, how will the bwauth script determine that my advertised 50MB/s is correct? ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Vodafone Italia blocking traffic from IPs that belong to Tor relays
Hi, Apart from the problem of non-exit relays, I also think there is a problem with blocking users from exit nodes. Anyway, whatever the point of view is about Exit Nodes blocking, it's sure that blocking entry and middle nodes is not useful, it's the signature of either something that is misunderstood, or something (bad ?) that is done in a very lazy way (!) ... in both case that's exasperating ! Additionally it's making normal Internet navigation painful and censored for those who operate relays at home. Getting censored while fighting against censorship is really depressing. Even if some webmasters don't care anymore about Tor and online privacy, because in the past they got pissed of by misuses and don't want to talk anymore about "what should be done ideally"; I think that others aren't really aware of possible solutions, and what is at stake about online right and Internet of tomorrow, because it's not always obvious in their position. By blocking fair usages of Tor they are going to make Tor censored and unable for fair navigation and that's the absolute opposite of what should be done ! For everybody. I think that a lot of big websites are aware of this (and it's a chance, otherwise nothing would be available from Tor, and Tor usage would be prohibited everywhere), but unfortunately not all website owners are aware of this. I see 2 things : * For website owners who have big amount of problems with Tor misuses, the good approach could be Captcha, for forums / message boards it can be a moderator approval of first message, in order to make only "fair" usage possible. Finding that kind of ideas maybe is the only possible way to make sysadmins and freedom volunteers to agree on something technically working for everybody. May be we should list everything that makes a sysadmin banning Tor IP addresses and see what technical solution could be suggested. * Also, for raising awareness about this subject at large scale may be some big organisations like Mozilla could do something significant enough, but individually it's complicated to convince somebody who have pretty strong and fixed ideas, and bad experiences in the past. May be some others discussion already discussed this subject in the past and got good conclusions about ideal approach for this problem, and how to ideally handle this kind of situations ? Julien ROBIN On 27/11/2016 11:31, fnordomat wrote: Ah, the unfathomable depths of human stupidity never cease to amaze. fr33d0m4all, you did the right thing. In the absence of negative reinforcement, the persons responsible will continue thinking they are doing the right and sensible thing. Of course, the pessimistic standpoint is that words never convinced anyone, but I for one believe in trying. We are still documenting sites whose wannabe admins discriminate against Tor btw: https://pad.systemli.org/p/noncloudflare-torblocks http://j7652k4sod2azfu6.onion/p/noncloudflare-torblocks I added ricarica.vodafone.it to it. As a Tor-only user, I'm accustomed to seeing this kind of stupidity - fed up with it - but I know for sure that it's hardly going to stop anytime soon. Many trends point in the opposite direction - the apperception that it's OK to discriminate against people who value their privacy and security, the idea that it's OK to paint us as criminals, and tools like Tor as impractical for daily use. The kindest thing I'm prepared to say about Tor blockers is that they're mediocre individuals who never bothered to look behind the FUD. The best thing about Tor blockers is that they're not out there burning actual witches, but sitting somewhere burning virtual ones and jerking off to their own friggin' feeling of comforting normalcy in unnormal times. It's discrimination, pure and simple. But the inconvenience of having to find ways around a block - sometimes after some important transaction fails - is a minor thing: not everyone knows how to do that, or manages quickly to find a proxy that is unblocked. Novice users could very well give up at this point. No one should be comfortable thinking that sabotaging public perception of the practicality of casual anonymity, in times of mass surveillance, is acceptable. And yet here we are - a whole industry offers the snake-oil "security" of Tor blocking lists, or blocking and MitM as an infrastructure. And there's plenty of wannabe webadmins out there who implement such things, mistakenly thinking three things: a) they need that for "security" b) it buys them anything in terms of real security, rather than being a quick fix to temporarily reduce the volume of "suspicious" or fraudulent events c) their classification of traffic into "mostly legit" from outside Tor, and "mostly crooked" from Tor is correct. Reality is more complex and panopticon-style surveillance of course drives any activity tha
Re: [tor-relays] Interrogated by Finnish police for alleged idendity crimes, fraud and attempts of fraud
the meeting is fine. > > Each time, I explain that my servers are rented in my name, and that I > use them for volunteer participation to a free proxies and VPN network > called Tor. I then give some details and explanations about what is Tor, > who created it, what are the goals of the project (about protection of > expression in bad countries and censorship avoidance, by accessing the > same Internet that others do, pricacy protection too), and yes, the > misuses... and that these are discouraging misuse and it is not the > reason why we participate in this network (far from it !). Then I give > the IP of those servers (and one of them is the reason why they called > me). And I explain that they are computers with a very fast bandwidth, > located in datacenters (Rennes, Vitry...) that can be accessed and > configured remotely, like a remote desktop. > > When they ask the question about logs and how to find the author of the > fact, my answer is that (unfortunately in that case), Tor is designed as > it's not possible for anybody to find who is the IP address from where > the traffic originated. It's very secure for those who need to use it. > Of course I tell them that if they have suspects in the entourage of the > victim, they can check if one of them was connected to the Tor network > at the time of the "fact" but as me and others people are using Tor for > online privacy without any intention of misuse against anybody, using > Tor is not a proof of misuse and is most of the time not done for bad > intention. Of course some questioning about a suspect using Tor at the > same hour would be rightful in this particular situation, anyway (like I > was questioned). > > All time I also come with a sheet of paper explaining Tor a little bit > deeply, what are the motivation of the teams and people behind this > project, (even in front of misuses that we are, of course, not proud of > having on the Tor network, even if without the Tor network, those > misuses would have been done by another way). In France I > > Of course sometimes the agent is not very happy about the Tor Network as > the investigations is likely to fail because of the Tor Network > efficiency. When the misuse is real and obviously bad, nobody can be > happy of it ! > > In all those cases, my words are honest and true; as we shouldn't be > ashamed of participating to projects aiming to a better word and more > freedom, but shouldn't be happy of misuses, my personal preference is to > be understanding and true. I also tell them that I'm participating, with > my computers, to others scientific projects like World Community Grid > (explaining it's about cancer research and a lot of others subjects) : > It can be seen as "not related" but it is, as that's the way we are > volunteers to the Tor Network ! > > > Here's for my feedback ! It's very personal of course, I hope nobody > would copy it without feeling it :) I'm just expressing my own feeling > on those situations, if it can help everybody to better understand those > cases. > > Best regards ! > > Julien ROBIN > > > On 31/10/2016 14:25, Juuso Lapinlampi wrote: >> Putting the word out: I was interrogated by the Finnish police today for >> multiple alleged counts (15+) of identity crimes, fraud and attempts of >> fraud. The invitation letter to be interrogated was sent out on >> 2016-10-21 and received by me on 2016-10-25. Today is 2016-10-31. >> >> The police suspects me because of an "IP-address assigned to my name", >> which I can't confirm or deny to have a relation to me. As a suspect, I >> was not told what this aclaimed IP-address was on a specific date to my >> knowledge. It is only speculation if these allegations wrongly against >> me have something to do with my relation with the Tor community or >> activism about digital rights online. >> >> Pending ongoing investigation, I am not allowed by law to share more >> specific details about to the investigation. I'd be glad to reveal more >> details about the case once the investigation is over and share/hear how >> I became a suspect, once I know about it. (Note that my story is at >> least slightly opinionated.) >> >> I had a witness with me and I feel like my rights were being violated >> during the interrogation. The officer (not to be named publicly in >> respect for privacy) didn't want to allow me to write down their badge >> number by taking the badge away from me while trying to write down the >> numbers. The officer looked slightly anxious. >> >> After refusing to comment on few questions (to which I have a legal >> right as a suspect), soon after me and my belonging
Re: [tor-relays] Interrogated by Finnish police for alleged idendity crimes, fraud and attempts of fraud
Hi, With the 3 big exit nodes I had in France (about 30MB/s in both direction for each of them), I got called by police a lot of time (may be 10 times approximately ? I do not really count anymore) on investigations about misdeed that was committed from IP addresses of my Tor relays (95.130.9.190 and 95.130.9.89 mainly, at Digicube, not running anymore since June, 2015). No call about the Online.net one (62.210.206.25, now Relay only since January, 2015), which was as big as the 2 others and Exit too, but the ISP is well known as servers and website big provider in France so I guess they realize it's an exit node before calling me. The "facts" were also, most of the time, fraud and attempts of fraud but also slander one time. I was most of the time called as suspect because IP are related to my name (because I was leasing those servers), as for a home connection in their point of view (not aware that those IP are dedicated servers IP). Then I simply explain this in appropriate terms. After some times, depending on the agent, for new investigations I'm sometimes "heard" as witness. And most of the time the meeting is fine. Each time, I explain that my servers are rented in my name, and that I use them for volunteer participation to a free proxies and VPN network called Tor. I then give some details and explanations about what is Tor, who created it, what are the goals of the project (about protection of expression in bad countries and censorship avoidance, by accessing the same Internet that others do, pricacy protection too), and yes, the misuses... and that these are discouraging misuse and it is not the reason why we participate in this network (far from it !). Then I give the IP of those servers (and one of them is the reason why they called me). And I explain that they are computers with a very fast bandwidth, located in datacenters (Rennes, Vitry...) that can be accessed and configured remotely, like a remote desktop. When they ask the question about logs and how to find the author of the fact, my answer is that (unfortunately in that case), Tor is designed as it's not possible for anybody to find who is the IP address from where the traffic originated. It's very secure for those who need to use it. Of course I tell them that if they have suspects in the entourage of the victim, they can check if one of them was connected to the Tor network at the time of the "fact" but as me and others people are using Tor for online privacy without any intention of misuse against anybody, using Tor is not a proof of misuse and is most of the time not done for bad intention. Of course some questioning about a suspect using Tor at the same hour would be rightful in this particular situation, anyway (like I was questioned). All time I also come with a sheet of paper explaining Tor a little bit deeply, what are the motivation of the teams and people behind this project, (even in front of misuses that we are, of course, not proud of having on the Tor network, even if without the Tor network, those misuses would have been done by another way). In France I Of course sometimes the agent is not very happy about the Tor Network as the investigations is likely to fail because of the Tor Network efficiency. When the misuse is real and obviously bad, nobody can be happy of it ! In all those cases, my words are honest and true; as we shouldn't be ashamed of participating to projects aiming to a better word and more freedom, but shouldn't be happy of misuses, my personal preference is to be understanding and true. I also tell them that I'm participating, with my computers, to others scientific projects like World Community Grid (explaining it's about cancer research and a lot of others subjects) : It can be seen as "not related" but it is, as that's the way we are volunteers to the Tor Network ! Here's for my feedback ! It's very personal of course, I hope nobody would copy it without feeling it :) I'm just expressing my own feeling on those situations, if it can help everybody to better understand those cases. Best regards ! Julien ROBIN On 31/10/2016 14:25, Juuso Lapinlampi wrote: Putting the word out: I was interrogated by the Finnish police today for multiple alleged counts (15+) of identity crimes, fraud and attempts of fraud. The invitation letter to be interrogated was sent out on 2016-10-21 and received by me on 2016-10-25. Today is 2016-10-31. The police suspects me because of an "IP-address assigned to my name", which I can't confirm or deny to have a relation to me. As a suspect, I was not told what this aclaimed IP-address was on a specific date to my knowledge. It is only speculation if these allegations wrongly against me have something to do with my relation with the Tor community or activism about digital rights online. Pending ongoing investigation, I am not allowed by law to share mor
Re: [tor-relays] Really bad ISP
Hi, You can check if there is no physical problem on your line, just in case ! Connect to your modem integrated web ui and check ATM statistics of your DSL line. Of course the first step is to watch the "DSL" signal light when you are disconnected. If it's a loss of DSL signal then it's a physical/local problem ! After some checks you can ask your ISP for maintenance on your line. Or try another ISP if this one is unable to find and repair your line (hoping that the next one will be able to do it fine). But if the DSL connection is running fine when you cannot access anything anymore, then it's your provider's network that is down (then you must probably find another one !). Some useful information : SNR margin should be, for an optimized bandwidth/stability, 6dB (it means that the useful signal is 4 times stronger (in milliwatts) than the noise on your line); it can be moving to 4 to 8 between hours but it's generally supposed to be smooth along hours. Some providers settings are different (10dB target margin, with a small loss of bandwidth). When connected, check your upload/download ATM Speed and the SNR Margin for both upload and download. In electronics 3dB is a good minimal standard, but for telecommunication lines, the standard value is multiplied by two because of environments induced noise that is moving along the day. If the Margin is going under 3dB and is still going down, you're probably going to be disconnected soon, and then reconnected with a lower bandwidth (and may be a new IP address). If SNR margin is moving up and down (like 11db, 2db, 7dB, 9dB, 3dB, and disconnected for example) and a very different bandwidth at each connection, then you have a problem on your physical line ! Useful tip for reparation : a line is not just a conductor, it's a very long conductor like an antenna, capacitor and lot of things. Then "injecting" signal into it needs a certain amount of milliwatts. At the other side of the line, "reading" the signal doesn't really need to consume current. So, when there is a defective contact near your home, your download bandwidth is quite clean. But your upload bandwith is low and changing between each new connection. In that case, check all your connections and cable. At the opposite, when the is a weak contact into the ISP equipments, your upload bandwidth is generally fine and stable, but not your download bandwidth / SNR Margin. Then in that case, it's very easy for your ISP to fix it. Sometimes, it's one of the modem at one side that is defective. Also, if connection problems are occurring at particular events (switching on some device for example) you can try to find what : sometimes there is devices (set top boxes or anything else) that are defective and doing a lot of electronic high frequency noise into cables and electric wires, it's a frequent case that can make your line (and your neighbors lines !) to stop working fine. If so, change/repair the device or his power supply unit ! If it's your neighbors, only an official technician can do the job to find who and what. Good luck ;) Best regards, Julien ROBIN Le 26/10/2016 à 10:11, Lluís a écrit : Hello, I am a relay operator in Spain (or at least I try to). I am just desperate with my ISP, he is just leaving the VDSL2 connection down several times a day, taking the relay with it. Does anyone know a much more stable, tor-friendly, ISP for an Spanish user ? The following record of assigned IPs in a **single** day shows the dimension of the drama: 95.23.157.152 - Tue Oct 25 01:00:02 CEST 2016 95.23.156.52 - Tue Oct 25 07:00:02 CEST 2016 95.23.157.180 - Tue Oct 25 11:54:06 CEST 2016 188.79.227.152 - Tue Oct 25 12:20:52 CEST 2016 95.23.155.112 - Tue Oct 25 13:12:30 CEST 2016 95.23.144.75 - Tue Oct 25 13:15:19 CEST 2016 188.77.208.15 - Tue Oct 25 13:29:02 CEST 2016 95.23.159.249 - Tue Oct 25 14:00:06 CEST 2016 95.23.146.89 - Tue Oct 25 14:12:12 CEST 2016 95.23.159.163 - Tue Oct 25 14:19:21 CEST 2016 188.79.238.188 - Tue Oct 25 14:34:55 CEST 2016 188.79.237.90 - Tue Oct 25 14:36:05 CEST 2016 188.79.229.164 - Tue Oct 25 14:57:30 CEST 2016 95.23.149.124 - Tue Oct 25 15:08:51 CEST 2016 188.79.237.0 - Tue Oct 25 15:10:12 CEST 2016 188.77.213.199 - Tue Oct 25 16:28:47 CEST 2016 95.23.153.98 - Tue Oct 25 16:32:50 CEST 2016 95.23.146.46 - Tue Oct 25 16:49:03 CEST 2016 188.79.235.239 - Tue Oct 25 17:10:03 CEST 2016 188.77.215.232 - Tue Oct 25 17:20:03 CEST 2016 95.23.146.36 - Tue Oct 25 17:30:03 CEST 2016 95.23.148.238 - Tue Oct 25 18:10:03 CEST 2016 95.23.149.136 - Tue Oct 25 18:20:03 CEST 2016 188.77.211.53 - Tue Oct 25 18:50:03 CEST 2016 188.77.211.90 - Tue Oct 25 19:30:03 CEST 2016 188.79.225.153 - Tue Oct 25 20:10:01 CEST 2016 95.23.157.171 - Tue Oct 25 21:00:02 CEST 2016 188.77.212.227 - Tue Oct 25 22:00:02 CEST 2016 95.23.157.179 - Tue Oct 25 22:30:02 CEST 2016 Thanks for your assintance, Lluís
Re: [tor-relays] [WARN]Failing because we have 4063 connections already. Please read doc/TUNING for guidance
Hi, I think it's a problem of amount of file descriptors : depending on the user, you have a limited amount of file descriptor that can be used (inside the tor's code, file descriptors are also used as handle/identifier for all network connections). I think the max amount of it (for a given user) can be checked with the command "ulimit -n" as this user. When I had 2 tor clients running (the second launched manually by a user named "tor2"), I modified the "limits.conf" file, adding those 2 lines at the end : #* softcore0 #roothardcore10 #* hardrss 1 #@studenthardnproc 20 #@facultysoftnproc 20 #@facultyhardnproc 50 #ftp hardnproc 0 #ftp - chroot /ftp #@student- maxlogins 4 tor2 softnofile 10 tor2 hardnofile 10 May be it needs a restart, or it doesn't apply to what have been started by "tor2" user before the modification When tor is launched by /etc/init.d/tor start may be this haven't to be done manually. That's all I know about it, hope it will help you to find and correct the problem ! Best regards, Julien ROBIN - Mail original - De: tor-ad...@torland.me À: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Envoyé: Dimanche 21 Février 2016 12:39:59 Objet: [tor-relays] [WARN]Failing because we have 4063 connections already. Please read doc/TUNING for guidance Hi all, since I upgraded the torland relay from 2.6.7 to 0.2.7.6 I get the following warnings: 09:20:30 [WARN] Failing because we have 4063 connections already. Please read doc/TUNING for guidance. [101144347 similar message(s) suppressed in last 21600 seconds] Google only spits out https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16929 which does not help me. I don't find the mentioned branch bug16929 in git. Can someone please advise what has to be done to avoid the warning, or point me where I find can the file "doc/TUNING". Thanks torland ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Sustained large spike in outbound traffic - what might be going on?
Hi, In fact, this is strange because Upload means that the server is receiving something to send, idem for Downloads : upload and download should be the same if the Tor Process is used as server only (relay or exit). For a Tor process, the only normal way to do this, is to be using the socks port (client side) of the Tor Process ! At least, it's the only normal way I know. Good luck for your investigations Julien ROBIN - Mail original - De: "Tim Wilson-Brown - teor" <teor2...@gmail.com> À: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Envoyé: Mardi 29 Décembre 2015 01:48:02 Objet: Re: [tor-relays] Sustained large spike in outbound traffic - what might be going on? On 23 Dec 2015, at 19:32, David Tomic < da...@tomic.com.au > wrote: Hello everyone, I noticed something a little bit "odd" on one of my exit relays recently, and I just wanted to ask whether anybody might be able to account for what was actually happening, and whether it's likely to warrant any further investigation? TLDR; I noticed a fairly significant spike - in excess of 30MB/s (yes, megabytes) - of outbound traffic compared to inbound. http://s2.postimg.org/cvfzqvrsp/graph.png It persisted steadily for just over an hour, until I noticed what was going on and restarted Tor (not the whole server, only Tor), at which point my traffic appeared to return to normal again. I have this relay running a a dedicated machine, with multiple physical NICs, and the ONLY thing which should be touching this NIC is my Tor traffic. Thoughts? Exit relays can end up with large traffic disparities for two reasons: * small internet server requests can yield large internet server responses, or vice versa * Tor cells are 512 bytes, if a small request or small response is embedded in a cell, the overhead can be quite large This could happen because someone is uploading or downloading a large file. But 30MB/s would probably require more than one client at the same time. Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP 968F094B teor at blah dot im OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] IP-Echelon complains about claimed infringement
Hi, 2 years ago I had the same problem on french exit nodes. Once I set the reduced exit policy it was OK Some providers simply ignore those mails but not all providers: my provider was suddenly (and without any comment) forwading to me hundreds of IP-Echelon mails and I understood that without solutions my 2 servers were going to be stopped by my provider soon or late. IP-Echelon are just stupid robots, even with tens of emails sent to them, they may have no reaction at all. Very frustrating ! The ideal solution is to have a custom RIPE record for your(s) IP with your own abuse@xxx email box, and your own filter :) but you should have somthing like a company/firm number in order to do this. Of course every abuse message should be answered at least once, but once tens of emails have been anwered to a robot without any reaction, it becomes fair to ignore the sender. Good luck ! Best regards, Julien ROBIN - Mail original - De: "Riccardo Mori" <pata...@autistici.org> À: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Envoyé: Samedi 21 Novembre 2015 04:34:34 Objet: [tor-relays] IP-Echelon complains about claimed infringement -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Hi everyone, It's almost a week that I am receiving dozens of "Notices of Claimed Infringement" a day from IP-Echelon, all equals, saying that they "are contacting" me "on behalf of Paramount Pictures Corporation (Paramount)" and asking me to remove the film in question that is being shared via bittorent (the port varies each time). The first time I wrote them that the ip address in question is a Tor exit node, I explained briefly what is Tor and that I can't do anything to help them. I also wrote to MyLoc (the ISP) saying pretty much the same. I wrote to IP-Echelon another time but they never replied. Usually I wouldn't care about them but this time MyLoc told me to "fix the problem or" they "will block" my "server". I modified the exit policy so now I am running the reduced one[1] That (in theory) should fix the problem but I would like to avoid the reduced policy. Is there anyone that had the same issues with IP-Echelon and can help me? Usually how do you handle those annoying auto generated reports? Thanks, patacca [1] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/ReducedExitPolicy -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2 iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJWT+YZAAoJEE1LNuolWAxgl90P/Rq5DCCc4FrrFqqOSKjisJ57 zBVOpzrfDxAG0ArRFWdhUBi8etpvbNtq042mjevVGp3N3p+IPpyl9bKvZWM7ACID BtBnra7WwMEW21BHqKGmzXJ6CG35AdVRUaJMaJXXSaNGNThFh+mXDGm4B8iHUoI3 3vZxiIHG17INY7lZM7RimYA1MKRQAcICldIYaCA2Nwt/n4gbUlZ3OUXmeGbJins/ NZrN98ZOhxeNg93+wk3f5ns1mQk137ZIcsdb+86uyaqDCxGn7fja2/MXBeHBUonM cZcBUSw1SKdY3XbYh6VyHRhRxWfmHeB/e2MLlDiOZbVc5QgGsOkmwmPKFuNA1dvg w5QoXcUSpUh01mxEK0x1IRl5BAD1zya4ZyITxLAr7OXGVx1jifCvkCKq6rDrLzsX XP8hq8w6Hp9GuFr8QrOx08Q6kvAvQjcF59s6/h0P3ehdbLnNaquEgQA86+WDtlNU lON0MnCf5vmZbww0TP5ymhiiZZIy6uilaqfVJry9lXdiXJvu/xeWs1p2VkxlUpaD ySnjFArg8iT5+veZro1ui0tmqseyu2BdEPfAyu86FcrS3wpbvI983aPDZOEpDoJh NaiE5pQCtsxj7moL1pDfHfFfS23aTGerpj9VTXYE9vd/hO8gqZTWCFA7coDZcXQV 0ZdIkA2C4EI7Rd6ui/cS =CxVx -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Windows Tor Server Guide
Hi ! From my memories, I think the Expert Tor installer for Windows is installing, registering and launching Tor as service in a completely automatic way. It must be run as administrator, if not the Tor files cannot be written to Program Files and the service cannot be registered into Windows. This installer could be found into View all downloads on the Download Tor page. You will have to find where is the Tor's DataDir ! But it should not be too complicated. Feel free to try :) I remember it as easy. At the begining, it will not be a Tor Relay, just a Tor proxy client listening on 127.0.0.1:9050 (it will change once you will edit your torrc and restart the Tor service) But the idea of isolating the Tor service with a dedicated user, that cannot touch anything on the system, is a pretty good idea also. I'm not sure the Expert installer does that, but it should not be too much complicated (following the how to should be enough for that part). From the task manager, you can launch the resource manager : into the network tab, you have a view of all listening socket into your system. (You can see if Tor is inside or not, for example by looking if something listens on 9050, or another port you defined on torrc file). You can also see the Tor's log file ! It's usefull as it warns you in case of problems, and it tells you if it's working. Good luck ! PS : Expert Installer should probably not be used for browing the Internet through Tor with a standard browser. TBB is a better solution for Browsing Internet trough Tor (thanks to a secured browser). That's why Expert Installer is a little bit hidden, for avoiding people browing Internet with it. But for a server use, Expert Installer does the job ! - Mail original - De: Ben Serebin b...@reefsolutions.com À: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Envoyé: Dimanche 17 Mai 2015 07:59:14 Objet: Re: [tor-relays] Windows Tor Server Guide Hi there… 1 st post (I figured after years of donating to EFF, I should run a tor relay). I’ve searched and read many posts on tor-relays and the best Windows Tor Server Guide I found was this below one by Rafael Rodriguez. A few questions, and apologies if they seem silly, but there is scant info out there for us Windows admins. - is a web server needed? - the below email post had the slashes stripped from the path entries which makes it tricky to follow (talk about an annoying mail-list process). Overall, throw all the files in a single dir? - before I load it as a service, once all files and config the “torrc” can I just launch the tor.exe and then test it’s working? - is this the only way to run a relay on Windows? Hoping there’s a special approach to simplify the process (now I know why there aren’t more of them). Thanks, -Ben Rafael Rodriguez rafaelr at icctek.com Wed Nov 5 00:47:46 UTC 2014 Previous message: [tor-relays] Windows Tor Server Guide Next message: [tor-relays] Windows Tor Server Guide Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ] Hi, here is it. Please, feel free to contribute to it. RUNNING A TOR SERVER IN WINDOWS - Download latest Tor Browser Bundle. - Install to c:tor - Create a temporary folder on your Desktop and name it server. - Copy all files from C:TorBrowserTorBrowserDataTor to the server folder on the Desktop. - Browse to C:TorBrowserTorBrowserTor; delete the folder PluggableTransports and it content. - Copy all files from C:TorBrowserTorBrowserTor to the server folder on the Desktop. - Browse to C:Tor and delete everything inside that folder. C:Tor should be completely empty at this point. - Move all files from the server folder on your Desktop to C:Tor - Browse to C:Tor and create a new folder named datadir. - Create a new text file in C:Tor named notices (I myself use notices.log but we want to keep it simple for users who may not know how to change the file extension from .txt to .log) - EDIT C:TORTORRC FILE: (this could be the torrc-defaults file and all its comments). Note that the sample below is just for references. Each user needs to define her/his own parameters based on their own needs and that's impossible for me to cover in a single file for everyone. Hence, each parameter should be included in the torrc-defaults with due comments to be used as reference. Also, noted that I'm using IPv4 geoip by default. Users using IPv6 should define geoip6 in their torrc file. Then again, I cannot use a single sample file for all deployments. The defaults file should be used as reference once again. DATADIRECTORY .DATADIR LOG NOTICE FILE .NOTICES.TXT GEOIPFILE .GEOIP AvoidDiskWrites 1 SocksPort 0 ORPort 9001 DirPort 9030 ExitPolicy reject *:* Nickname RelayBandwidthRate RelayBandwidthBurst Up until this point, all I've written is nothing more than using the default Tor Bundle to create a
Re: [tor-relays] simple relay setup
Hi ! You can try a mix between this (ultra simple), from https://www.torproject.org/docs/debian.html.en : You need to add the following entry in /etc/apt/sources.list or a new file in /etc/apt/sources.list.d/: deb http://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org wheezy main deb-src http://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org wheezy main gpg --keyserver keys.gnupg.net --recv 886DDD89 gpg --export A3C4F0F979CAA22CDBA8F512EE8CBC9E886DDD89 | apt-key add - apt-get update apt-get install tor deb.torproject.org-keyring This will make your apt-get using the last table version of Tor from the Tor Project servers, with signatures check making sure that no one car jacked the server before you download from it ;) You will have to find a way to make your apt-get update and apt-get -y upgrade automatic, may be reboot too (when kernel have been updated for example, but here I cannot say precisely how to know if you have to reboot !) And a second link, that can give you a lot of tips also http://www.torservers.net/wiki/setup/server Including disabling password authentification, but if you want to completely lock your server, a good way could be to make /etc/init.d/ssh unable to run (you delete the x permission for example) After the reboot, you will not be able to connect anymore using SSH on your server, and you will have to use tools from your ISP if you want to drive your server again ! Personnaly, I always do a minimalist installation in order to have nothing else than OpenSSH listening (and Tor, of course !). Because if others things that I don't know (rpc bind port 111 etc) are listening I'm not sure that I have everything into control. - Mail original - De: tor-server-crea...@use.startmail.com À: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Envoyé: Samedi 18 Avril 2015 12:06:07 Objet: [tor-relays] simple relay setup I need some help. My dedicated server is running debian and is new, set up by my serverhoster. I want to run a TOR-Relay: - It should always update to latest stable automatically. - It should be save. I will edit the torrc by myself. What i need is simple copy+paste codeline for: - isntall and run functional auto-update for tor (is it libevent?) just simply @root user without user/pgp dealing stuff. pgp stuff is confusing me! - deactivate complete access (ssh disable?) to ensure savety (i have to reinstall the system by serverhoster-website if change needet) i want to lock out even myself. Is this a practical idea to most easy set-up and let run without struggle? Please help, thanks. ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] strange consensus messages in log
PS : I think a defective network equipment could also be the cause of such data corruptions on incoming data ? May be it should be added on the check list ! But if it's the case, it should be the case for every kind of connexion (try to download an unzip some big file, just to be sure ;) - Mail original - De: Julien ROBIN julien.robi...@free.fr À: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Envoyé: Lundi 6 Avril 2015 13:54:38 Objet: Re: [tor-relays] strange consensus messages in log Hi, Very strange ! Data have been corrupted (even the hour), but it seems to be repeated and constant. From my experiences, every newer library contains the older library functionalities (even if improved), it's supposed to be the goal of a library. Can somebody confirm that about OpenSSL ? Data could have been corrupted : - Before reception (strange, it seems to come from several source) - unlikely I would said, but it's not a truth, just my opinion. - After reception (strange also : what is the cause ?) Another remark : Unable to load microdesc consensus directory downloaded from server '194.109.206.212:80'. I'll try again soon. This maybe doesn't need OpenSSL ? Generally, defective memory modules are driving to random errors executing programs (those are located (or working with data located) at the faulty emplacement), and with Windows Kernels, it drives to OS crashes and reboots everywhere (may be it could be the same on Linux ?). But you can check with memtest (http://www.memtest.org/) started in place of your OS. If it's ECC memory module, a slightly defective ECC memory module cannot be the cause of a successful data corruption (the data is saved from corruption in extremis, and you should be warned - but I don't know how). Keep us informed ! And good luck. Best regards, Julien ROBIN - Original mail - From: starlight 2015q2 starlight.201...@binnacle.cx To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Sent: Lundi 6 Avril 2015 06:55:17 Object: Re: [tor-relays] strange consensus messages in log Yesterday built openssl-1.0.1m and dropped it over the top of 1.0.1j. Tor said OpenSSL version from headers does not match the version we're running with. If you get weird crashes, that might be why. (Compiled with 100010af: OpenSSL 1.0.1j 15 Oct 2014; running with 100010df: OpenSSL 1.0.1m 19 Mar 2015). Can't see why this would cause the strange consensus error (identical ABI, right?), but just in case rebuilt tor relay 0.2.4.26 against the rebuilt openssl and restarted. At 22:32 4/5/2015 -0400, you wrote: Does anyone have any idea what this is about? Is it serious? ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Unreachable ORPort - Potential ISP block?
Hi, One thing you have to be sure : - Is you external IP address directly assigned to your Router ? The IP address given by www.whatismyip.com shoud be readable somewhere on your router. If not (like for mobile data Internet access : a kind of local IP address is given to your router device, and it doesn't matches with your external IP address), your router's IP address simply cannot be contacted from the outside :( so it has nothing it could receive and forward, even if well configured. I hope it's not the case for you ! It's the case with my mobile data provider, but I never saw this with a wired line provider. If nothing wrong and your router is connected using your external IP address, a good way to be sure is to try other services (like apache2, on port 80 or another). Things that should work ! As said Robert, if nothing works, check firewall rules into your router. Inside your raspbian too, but I don't remember having anything inside Raspbian telling me no when a process or service successfully opened a listening socket (apart from a non root process trying to listen on a 1024 port) Also, do not hesitate to try with other computers, with a Filezilla Server on Windows for example, in order to be sure that nothing escaped from your vigilance (a kind of double check so different that you cannot repeat 2 times the same error, if there is one) If everything but Tor is reachable, and netstat -n -l -p is showing your Tor process listening on globally (0.0.0.0), may be your ISP is involved in this problem ! But it would be a bit strange, and so disappointing. Good luck ! - Original mail - From: CJ Barlow iamthech...@gmail.com To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Sent: Dimanche 5 Avril 2015 21:31:49 Object: [tor-relays] Unreachable ORPort - Potential ISP block? I'm attempting to run a Relay but I haven't been able to get it the ORPort to be confirm as reachable. I've tried lots of things but I'm hoping there is something I haven't thought of yet that can make this work! I've got a 50Mbps symmetrical connection (without data caps) that I would love to have the Tor network utilize. Hardware info: - Asus RT-N66U running DD-WRT - Raspberry Pi 2 running Raspbian - SanDisk MicroSDHC UHS-I 16GB Here are all the steps I've taken: - Formatted the MicroSDHC with Win32DiskImager. - Followed the Instructables Raspberry Pi Tor Relay configuration guide. - Port forwarded via NAT/QoS then Port Forwarding. Protocol is set to TCP, double-checked IP is what is assigned to Raspberry Pi 2 and enable box is checked. - ORPort set to 9001. Also changed ORPort to 443, did sudo service tor reload and changed the port in the forwarding section of my router. - Tried router DMZ for Raspberry Pi LAN IP. I would really like to get this to work, if possible. I can't run an Exit node on my connection but since my connection sits unused for most of the day it should be put to good relay use. ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] could smoothing/smearing a consensus weights change makes sense
I also think that, once a server is running for weeks (or month(s) ?) it could be usefull if the bandwidth authorithy system is able to lock a good speed based on the server history. Instead of rising, falling, rising, falling, rising, falling in unstable loop, because if it's day or night, too highly loaded and, few hours after, underloaded, every every and every day. It would unlock this value and re-evaluate it only if current test shows that this is really needed (suddenly excessive congestion, or too many consecutive tests that confirms that the server is more overloaded, or more underloaded that before). For example. But may be the Tor Project team already have a lot of work on other subjects ;) - Original mail - From: Toralf Förster toralf.foers...@gmx.de To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Sent: Vendredi 23 Janvier 2015 14:00:13 Object: [tor-relays] could smoothing/smearing a consensus weights change makes sense I am wondering if an adversary would be able to derive useful information due to the fact that the consensus weights are changed abrupt ? (screen shot attached) -- Toralf pgp key: 7B1A 07F4 EC82 0F90 D4C2 8936 872A E508 0076 E94E ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Simulate High Tor Load
Hi, If you are on a dedicated high Bandwidth server you can maybe use your relay as client, an idea could be to open a lot of wget commands. sudo apt-get install torsocks usewithtor wget URL But it's not guaranteed that the selected circuits will be super-fast (first reason to open lot of wgets simultaneously) Of course, doing that you consume some useful bandwidth for users (but if it's quick, after all you're a Tor user like another!) And it's not totally the same that relaying data as server, since it's using the client part of the tor process (but starting from here, I cannot help you anymore since I don't know what is written in the code ;) So if anybody have another better idea Something that would generate a full customized circuit for example, or reduce the amount of used hop for the test. It already exists EntryNodes and ExitNodes commands for your torrc file, but no server can be used as EntryNode if it's not Guard already, and I'm not sure that some MiddleNodes command exists. Last things, you can also make you machine's CPU working hard on a lot of threads simultaneously, and watch if Tor is suffering or not (like too many circuit creation request! in the log). Or make some tests with Iperf for high bandwidth load in parallel (iperf -s on a fast machine, ipers -c Ip -t TimeInSeconds -p port -P ParallelsTcpConnexions on the other machine - this one will send data (chains of 1234567890123...) to the server) Good luck ! By curiosity, I'm interested also, but I would understand if this kind of easiness in creating bandwidth statistics and degraded path (for analysis, for example) is not really sought by developers. Best regards, Julien ROBIN - Mail original - De: webmaster webmas...@defcon-cc.dyndns.org À: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Envoyé: Dimanche 11 Janvier 2015 11:59:12 Objet: [tor-relays] Simulate High Tor Load Hey Folks, is there a common procedure for testing a tor server for a high load? Thanks in advance -- -BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK- Version: GnuPG v2.0.17 (MingW32) mQENBFHMmT8BCAC0smvU7Bq1ABxAhvBRn7d4ekkk95aCE4TTQo4wy1z/rGLhQfdt dhiD+Vy61vGrsdK3ei5sW6rBvX2m8+YmBi+8AAgSiZmS0JM3Zz3cmTi5oh0D/yM8 4aDj7wQYfJyzSmYN8InAQ5eA77lwIdqG27kR9wga2szeJwCnWReta0R+7YFkpUW+ zUlf4SWcUx5SmBsaiELQpm+Qcn+fyopo12RX6YVmoNPBvN2nDXDnRhUCKGc+0xhD UrBpCHrApK6sTnMsD34ClCLTL2L1gckQ0AsQqY3PJlx3R8kIJxlmr6R3WnjPMIG0 lqrukB9PcOrHM1MZXK1gK6AtypHBN98lr8Z9ABEBAAG0KndlYm1hc3RlciA8d2Vi bWFzdGVyQGRlZmNvbi1jYy5keW5kbnMub3JnPokBPgQTAQIAKAUCUcyZPwIbIwUJ CWYBgAYLCQgHAwIGFQgCCQoLBBYCAwECHgECF4AACgkQcN1vxvRQl+0SEwf+KXjf YtiSUSVS11uqeQ/8g46NwmNa91P3toZvEd7vhLSbjnL9bi/vApzNnUTGT3VP4/NA dg9SbR4qKlSr8T+YikRMV3tiuiVq8m7g00qM9y8MIomwJTounz8VdO/aJXFSOxAK Bb6ElREADspCzr2qSZCnozWUzbd+b8owbGeRRq3e33Aa5Nlm/xDRxGDWANbaIA8q Gkibvy3vWEwrxiwsakvHGaEZnPEtlNm3M1xcmFAuyl73qzUMkLN0u9E/2igo4EB5 EdMb5Ab5hfWdljxBqJr0tsvMfSK4VkzMCbKYkTqHZIRPQnhiSBE6Yo1Q6RCl/Hht bkvU4RA0J+NkXMZljrkBDQRRzJk/AQgA0HojJnK0uhEkAnbmszYsf477DV+LD02s ZEAlLGhJlf9qYaDiPMPwaZ3nK8/PYKzPpBWfHgRQP97rLHPIVJYl3BHDa/nWeZ2b e/HzYhpX0djbK9qe6W/CTfGbXmC/y+4dDGB8dvtTAW3JILm7xEdwiWtywozEVy7V lnMK4JQvlfOh+3XO6qv71FXyuRkObvkYzqvxUYHewtvvObcVxXHP0C0O6LB44iAW 2boZVVuiHdudnyNAezJajPMUT8SnI0bwL6+0TgnHL4cKNUEPQljIrrvi+9nCkq7V uBtnsYtyoo2reoxmCbX/Z1zZsxdUcKpeJHlc5AypyN8DUJ+APJ9NnwARAQABiQEl BBgBAgAPBQJRzJk/AhsMBQkJZgGAAAoJEHDdb8b0UJftOY0H/1TChmQrJC/qzefW PK7EqFlBg3TIEXdu8JHjF42ZOgzQRfp7E2wWzEx0Y45lNXMs6Yg15hWCEDaUDF6F 5WZKNrP8xIldyR9Aw7fyKqjZ9UuKovqofHsCiaSO7nWzGM6GF3nBDNI9NcFve/wN wggyjAbohOJrJGal3N0HlG3cakqjEmjBe1gQEMC0ZPlWstb/cqqr49TNPrRmQc4P SyGffh8Xqhw94m1LDBXFEaYe7AxjNk1sPAVfO1rOdLF6GOun/UwgbhDQX/Rb9C3t AhjSgyFEiR/gfrUZ7R6SY51qOUf1lN5ZN85C/x27XoZWYlsNaH3Ei6nG+yeswBMk ZRMbezQ= =Med3 -END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK- ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Possible DDoS
Hi, My advice is to try to ask them is they are OK to let you a second chance to let your relay running. Tell them that if such a big attack happen again so you shut it down and you don't disturb them anymore with it. Also, a Good Point to get if it's not already done, set your reverse DNS to something that hackers will instantly recognize (torproxy.something.readme ...), it reduces the risk of DDoS problems (those who drives DDoS attacks often know what is Tor, may be some of them are using it everyday). Tell you ISP if you do so, in order to say them that you improved somethong to reduce the risk for it to happen again. On one of my relays, enabling that after month without, made a very very big difference (several DDoS per month - nothing now). If your relay have been running for several month now without any problem, and if most of the DDoS attacks should be smaller that the one you got, may be they can be OK for a second chance! Good luck ;) - Mail original - De: Christian Burkert p...@cburkert.de À: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Envoyé: Vendredi 26 Décembre 2014 12:32:19 Objet: [tor-relays] Possible DDoS -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Hi *, I'm running a non-exit Tor node for a few months now on a virtual server hosted in a professional datacenter. That's the node: https://globe.torproject.org/#/relay/4C246EA9C950B872FD77F761CEAAB41D93D9764D Yesterday, December 25th, the support wrote me, that my server is under a DDoS attack with 2GBit/s lasting over more than two hours. So, the hoster black holed my traffic to protect the other customers. The hoster wanted to know which services I'm running and told me that if I continue running Tor and further attacks will happen, then I would have to bear the costs. Eventually, I took down the Tor node to avoid further confrontation. Now I seek for your interpretation of this event: - - Has there been more recent incidents against Tor nodes? - - How can I investigate it? - - How should one react to a hoster? I mean they could have made up the whole thing... Looking forward to your comments Chris -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Icedove - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJUnUdDAAoJEHAzZ6ooPDSy0nMP/1lyHPPFBxpAOvEiWL+ijrvA SPViJvZH/cPUS/11M7qm+bsZa/fbiRk6kY8ADcY8abe1Z8lHzMYPGwZvKaIijiZG M8hjCHtMWLipO6iLmVfFskDtRn37Ga2ibEhGkVesDV53kPcotgg4i7tIqIuNb11X Gnkk+WpYwkrS9nPZjYNLmce093s4lux/N5GyRY/gQii+h9mfDJ++W+1ueNU94UQ0 bvK1wF7MdicWlu0kR49hCgFtDFh7uUjP87MPZmmQYHI82qWhTJxqOuuImrnJew2k pCFSzn03x/hXg1QFNPNLsqHU9OhUob3/z17Azcpbir15mY4/YE7Gq14/LBM+FKh0 LqGjzaVbQo0hs0kE2yFk5sEP0Dsv5aiOUItqFIMTG52FYZ6cUh/eTxMd6vblHwfU ujil0rFCRqtmbF6wIDBuXDxc0fmdaRMWTDfSlPxYGkfUaq1tSea1OAvjFpheOcNM wu9QiTSq9BTLY010iHSYQDknSr+gFkc/ooNLsPV1AAZFyMlG0epLww6tqR7C9hZq RyEX9piqGal7mU56gETxhDrD0Z/aKgXMbS+KvYfZhopGWEVg5vbWPGxAId53nhr6 hjvLyFmy68hBdbOB/pvp8qvw8veQR3niiHIxhxAl+BIQzXX45x0uVCPHFUpbbLp5 POIwpEJ46oaz7+cddAHf =TcPt -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
[tor-relays] OrPort self-testing sometimes fails
Hi everybody, Second time it happen to me so I would like to know if you have ideas about it. Sometimes after a reboot, I haven't the following message into the log : Self-testing indicates your ORPort is reachable from the outside. Excellent. Publishing server descriptor. And after a while (fortunately), I receive a warning (Tor Weather) because my server is shown as offline. So I just type /etc/init.d/tor stop and /etc/init.d/tor start, and it works fine. I would like to know how does the test works, in order to check what can fail during the test. If my server's IP (95.130.9.190) is not reachable by a part of the Internet for example, in order to open a support ticket with my ISP (do you know how I can easily check it ?). Also, since few month now, the bandwith usage seems to keeps far below what I had before (even with a good consensus weight, fresh OS install with new keys and name a month ago) so I now realize that may be there is a problem somewhere with this machine. Thank you in advance for your help and ideas ! Best Regards, Julien ROBIN Please find below the logs of the failed start, followed by the working start Nov 21 11:56:53.000 [notice] Tor 0.2.5.10 (git-43a5f3d91e726291) opening log file. Nov 21 11:56:53.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv4 file /usr/share/tor/geoip. Nov 21 11:56:53.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv6 file /usr/share/tor/geoip6. Nov 21 11:56:53.000 [notice] Configured to measure statistics. Look for the *-stats files that will first be written to the data directory in 24 hours from now. Nov 21 11:56:53.000 [notice] Caching new entry debian-tor for debian-tor Nov 21 11:56:53.000 [notice] Caching new entry debian-tor for debian-tor Nov 21 11:56:53.000 [notice] Your Tor server's identity key fingerprint is 'MagnetronFR1 145AEE9359A8943189500C5451722CAA7EEEC6C3' Nov 21 11:56:53.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 0%: Starting Nov 21 11:56:57.000 [notice] We now have enough directory information to build circuits. Nov 21 11:56:57.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 80%: Connecting to the Tor network Nov 21 11:56:57.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 85%: Finishing handshake with first hop Nov 21 11:56:58.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 90%: Establishing a Tor circuit Nov 21 11:57:00.000 [notice] Tor has successfully opened a circuit. Looks like client functionality is working. Nov 21 11:57:00.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 100%: Done Nov 21 13:56:58.000 [notice] Interrupt: we have stopped accepting new connections, and will shut down in 30 seconds. Interrupt again to exit now. Nov 21 13:57:28.000 [notice] Clean shutdown finished. Exiting. Nov 21 13:57:39.000 [notice] Tor 0.2.5.10 (git-43a5f3d91e726291) opening log file. Nov 21 13:57:39.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv4 file /usr/share/tor/geoip. Nov 21 13:57:39.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv6 file /usr/share/tor/geoip6. Nov 21 13:57:39.000 [notice] Configured to measure statistics. Look for the *-stats files that will first be written to the data directory in 24 hours from now. Nov 21 13:57:39.000 [notice] Caching new entry debian-tor for debian-tor Nov 21 13:57:39.000 [notice] Caching new entry debian-tor for debian-tor Nov 21 13:57:39.000 [notice] Your Tor server's identity key fingerprint is 'MagnetronFR1 145AEE9359A8943189500C5451722CAA7EEEC6C3' Nov 21 13:57:39.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 0%: Starting Nov 21 13:57:39.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 5%: Connecting to directory server Nov 21 13:57:41.000 [notice] We now have enough directory information to build circuits. Nov 21 13:57:41.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 80%: Connecting to the Tor network Nov 21 13:57:41.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 85%: Finishing handshake with first hop Nov 21 13:57:41.000 [notice] Self-testing indicates your ORPort is reachable from the outside. Excellent. Publishing server descriptor. Nov 21 13:57:43.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 90%: Establishing a Tor circuit Nov 21 13:57:44.000 [notice] Tor has successfully opened a circuit. Looks like client functionality is working. Nov 21 13:57:44.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 100%: Done ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Bwauths Measures question, friends.
Wow, it's not very good With an advertised bandwidth raising 1,03MB your consensus weight is now updated to 13 (it's far too low). It means that somethings goes bad when bwauth is testing your relay, so even with a very good advertised bandwidth, your final score keeps ultra-low, and with such a consensus wieght, your relay keeps unused by clients. I have no idea from where can be the problem (and the solution), technically it could be the ISP that blocks bw auth, but in real facts it would be pretty strange. Try to transport your relay (/var/lib/tor/keys and /etc/tor/torrc) to another computer on the same connection (the more different, the better), if it still doesn't works, it means something at your connection make a problem. Double check your upload rate is good (since everything have to be transmitted, the lowest bandwidth (generally upload) applies to the relay). If your relay appears to be online it means that it means that port redirections is well configured, so I'm not sure that something else could be misconfigured into it (if you have several ones, test a different one) Let us know when you find the solution ! This problem is surprising but it cannot be nowhere ;) - Mail original - De: Rafael Rodriguez rafa...@icctek.com À: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Envoyé: Mercredi 5 Novembre 2014 00:13:37 Objet: Re: [tor-relays] Bwauths Measures question, friends. Indeed, Julien. As a matter of fact I saw the server (using the Tor network) pushing up to 8.8MB/s at some point while I was using it as a proxy in my setup. That was yesterday. As soon as I closed the SocksListenAddress I was connecting to, it went back to almost not existent cos' it is weighted 10. Even the Fast flag isn't there. As I said, I'm waiting to see if it picks up relevance in the next day or so. On 2014-11-04 14:26, Julien ROBIN wrote: Hi Rafael, On Tor Atlas after a little time offset, your download seems now to appear into your server stats. https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/48ADFCC561402D7EBB1CDE233F206B01D8FA0765 Your Advertised Bandwidth seems now to be better : 866.83 KB/s But the consensus weight is still at 10 (it's like zero) for now (let's wait less that one day) In the following hours, we will see if the consensus weight value can be better thanks to that (so then true clients will start using the bandwidth and nourish your advertised bandwith). If I remember well what I read before, the consensus weight, when recalculated, is the result of your Advertised Bandwidth multiplied by a coefficient obtained by bw authorites (when periodically testing your server). If it's congestionned, the test gives low result and your consensus weight is reduced. If it's really good, your consensus weight is increased (and your server usage too). If your consensus weight is stuck at 10 and doesn't increase, it would mean that bw authorities cannot test your server and always gives zero as coefficient (if so, you will have to check everything on your network : router, softwares, etc) The answer is near :) - Mail original - De: Rafael Rodriguez rafa...@icctek.com À: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Envoyé: Lundi 3 Novembre 2014 22:04:24 Objet: Re: [tor-relays] Bwauths Measures question, friends. Hi Julien, Thanks for the tip. I did ssh'd tunnel into my Tor server and I can pull downloads at 1-2MB/s as expected. I do not see my server getting any better in measurements though. After 4 days running my Advertised Bandwidth is barely 62kb/s and its Consensus Weight is 10. I wouldn't mind as long as it serves our Tor community but I'm under the impression that something is just not quite right. This box was put in place specifically to put all its bandwidth to good use and help the network. I have the feeling that a Relay measured at such low speeds does more harm than good to the network. I will keep it up there running as it is since I cannot pinpoint a problem at this time and maybe it just needs to stay online for a longer period of time. --- On 2014-11-02 07:29, Julien ROBIN wrote: It strange you still haven't any used bandwidth https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/48ADFCC561402D7EBB1CDE233F206B01D8FA0765 I cannot explain you why but I have an idea for you in order to kickstart your bandwidth usage. A tor process used to relay traffic also have the possibility to be used as client. If it's at home, it's easy (socks v5 at 127.0.0.1:9050 if you haven't changed anything), if your relay isn't at home, use SSH tunnelling to do so (SSH session brings you to localhost on your remote computer, on the port you choose) Try to download something through your relay, if nothing changed, even the client bandwidth will be able to raise your advertised and used bandwidth as server, in order for your server to start having weight on the network. Once started, everything should be automatic but normally, the start is also automatic after 2
Re: [tor-relays] Bwauths Measures question, friends.
Hi Rafael, On Tor Atlas after a little time offset, your download seems now to appear into your server stats. https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/48ADFCC561402D7EBB1CDE233F206B01D8FA0765 Your Advertised Bandwidth seems now to be better : 866.83 KB/s But the consensus weight is still at 10 (it's like zero) for now (let's wait less that one day) In the following hours, we will see if the consensus weight value can be better thanks to that (so then true clients will start using the bandwidth and nourish your advertised bandwith). If I remember well what I read before, the consensus weight, when recalculated, is the result of your Advertised Bandwidth multiplied by a coefficient obtained by bw authorites (when periodically testing your server). If it's congestionned, the test gives low result and your consensus weight is reduced. If it's really good, your consensus weight is increased (and your server usage too). If your consensus weight is stuck at 10 and doesn't increase, it would mean that bw authorities cannot test your server and always gives zero as coefficient (if so, you will have to check everything on your network : router, softwares, etc) The answer is near :) - Mail original - De: Rafael Rodriguez rafa...@icctek.com À: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Envoyé: Lundi 3 Novembre 2014 22:04:24 Objet: Re: [tor-relays] Bwauths Measures question, friends. Hi Julien, Thanks for the tip. I did ssh'd tunnel into my Tor server and I can pull downloads at 1-2MB/s as expected. I do not see my server getting any better in measurements though. After 4 days running my Advertised Bandwidth is barely 62kb/s and its Consensus Weight is 10. I wouldn't mind as long as it serves our Tor community but I'm under the impression that something is just not quite right. This box was put in place specifically to put all its bandwidth to good use and help the network. I have the feeling that a Relay measured at such low speeds does more harm than good to the network. I will keep it up there running as it is since I cannot pinpoint a problem at this time and maybe it just needs to stay online for a longer period of time. --- On 2014-11-02 07:29, Julien ROBIN wrote: It strange you still haven't any used bandwidth https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/48ADFCC561402D7EBB1CDE233F206B01D8FA0765 I cannot explain you why but I have an idea for you in order to kickstart your bandwidth usage. A tor process used to relay traffic also have the possibility to be used as client. If it's at home, it's easy (socks v5 at 127.0.0.1:9050 if you haven't changed anything), if your relay isn't at home, use SSH tunnelling to do so (SSH session brings you to localhost on your remote computer, on the port you choose) Try to download something through your relay, if nothing changed, even the client bandwidth will be able to raise your advertised and used bandwidth as server, in order for your server to start having weight on the network. Once started, everything should be automatic but normally, the start is also automatic after 2 or 3 days, so it is strange. May be it's because of the oversupply of middle nodes on the network (there is so much middle nodes that most of them - the slowers - probably keep totally unused). Without the guard flag (and it needs enough bandwidth) your relay cannot be used as entry guard right now. Good luck ! - Mail original - De: Rafael Rodriguez rafa...@icctek.com À: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Envoyé: Samedi 1 Novembre 2014 16:16:24 Objet: Re: [tor-relays] Bwauths Measures question, friends. Maybe I should just wait longer but the 3 days unmetered has obviously been passed already. That's why I'm asking about bwauths measurements. I was under the impression that after 3 days bwauths adjust your consensus weight and raises your bandwidth estimate. In this case, the server is simply capped at 20kb/s still while my advertise bandwidth is little over 50kb/s. Since I have a 2MB/s relay, I'm expecting to see at least over 100kb/s or 250kb/s measurements to make my relay a usable one. Yet the advertised speed hasn't changed. Is that normal and should I just give it more time? That's what I'm trying to understand. On 2014-11-01 07:00, Krbusek Christian wrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 You may want to read the following, which should make this more clear. https://blog.torproject.org/blog/lifecycle-of-a-new-relay Cheers Am 01.11.2014 um 10:46 schrieb Rafael Rodriguez: Anyone knows how often bwauths measures a relay? I don't understand why directory authorities have not lifted the 20KB cap for my older relay. Now I have doubts if it could be a problem with my server. This is a 2MB/s relay with burst of 4MB/s to start tuning it and increase it later if stable, which is not being used and has been running for over 3 days. Is it normal for Relays to take longer than three days to start getting
Re: [tor-relays] Bwauths Measures question, friends.
It strange you still haven't any used bandwidth https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/48ADFCC561402D7EBB1CDE233F206B01D8FA0765 I cannot explain you why but I have an idea for you in order to kickstart your bandwidth usage. A tor process used to relay traffic also have the possibility to be used as client. If it's at home, it's easy (socks v5 at 127.0.0.1:9050 if you haven't changed anything), if your relay isn't at home, use SSH tunnelling to do so (SSH session brings you to localhost on your remote computer, on the port you choose) Try to download something through your relay, if nothing changed, even the client bandwidth will be able to raise your advertised and used bandwidth as server, in order for your server to start having weight on the network. Once started, everything should be automatic but normally, the start is also automatic after 2 or 3 days, so it is strange. May be it's because of the oversupply of middle nodes on the network (there is so much middle nodes that most of them - the slowers - probably keep totally unused). Without the guard flag (and it needs enough bandwidth) your relay cannot be used as entry guard right now. Good luck ! - Mail original - De: Rafael Rodriguez rafa...@icctek.com À: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Envoyé: Samedi 1 Novembre 2014 16:16:24 Objet: Re: [tor-relays] Bwauths Measures question, friends. Maybe I should just wait longer but the 3 days unmetered has obviously been passed already. That's why I'm asking about bwauths measurements. I was under the impression that after 3 days bwauths adjust your consensus weight and raises your bandwidth estimate. In this case, the server is simply capped at 20kb/s still while my advertise bandwidth is little over 50kb/s. Since I have a 2MB/s relay, I'm expecting to see at least over 100kb/s or 250kb/s measurements to make my relay a usable one. Yet the advertised speed hasn't changed. Is that normal and should I just give it more time? That's what I'm trying to understand. On 2014-11-01 07:00, Krbusek Christian wrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 You may want to read the following, which should make this more clear. https://blog.torproject.org/blog/lifecycle-of-a-new-relay Cheers Am 01.11.2014 um 10:46 schrieb Rafael Rodriguez: Anyone knows how often bwauths measures a relay? I don't understand why directory authorities have not lifted the 20KB cap for my older relay. Now I have doubts if it could be a problem with my server. This is a 2MB/s relay with burst of 4MB/s to start tuning it and increase it later if stable, which is not being used and has been running for over 3 days. Is it normal for Relays to take longer than three days to start getting at least some traffic and for directory authorities to lift the 20KB cap? Fingerprint 48ADFCC561402D7EBB1CDE233F206B01D8FA0765 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2 iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJUVL1GAAoJECgP5Pn8Zk3/cfoQAI9bMRyx8hl3B+V+vSLC7xoJ sfQedgt15LRyJ/+Ru3tQaPDPOkleTKR3rCnKaDiRCmjxibWt4liRUBji2nzDPFJU dcD0kEXqCA/H3jyIJWvKnkxvzUfAjCZ7Y7b16sGsJSgVfZ8UFin52loTDgjSz7zU tgsqsOBIHT72gr/hbxRBzr3ZP8LZqTDA5baoLFAxnYyxIQwK5eRefI6zMP9cuiOA FL4I60Tige+TBp8kDnyKdYosxRJFkkAJN3YCuHuewIgoV0pD/xkScEscYgqp+CWu cMQkj5NDDMP/I5ZXw2a64Etq33Hc4SzEm4HvKquu05pS2QgClXu7pg8z2u1BCdPQ 7uMZRyKfAnOOwITKVxsKXT5XJySFJXskMLgupLtp3iEA24GfLJTax0pa7xmOeEbb nvt2kGdrKvAl3t4PgwvtwuFmfJoqXzjxWMJJRD2s3hXi0TS4WC1y1pccw+INXKsG 7sV+dHhqDPwOHpFleHv4RG207Kx6P8+hbNjdeVI8iEelAhKoPfcUJDM/A4aa2ahd GB+vZrnuInJlZJeg+hL28Xk1pOxwHtq046nhLosVY7YNDW6CHoD5aruWeQdCT1y5 AFZ/xqOP+XPWMYj/UJLhWoBFTjYjSUZuxi5c4nGpKoK/OSc1GCZERx8Ec7mJrN2R lzlnW4uBh7M+pvMrhRWl =rF5K -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Exit Nodes under DDoS attacks
Hello, With my 2 servers at Digicube it's pretty often (every month ?) The ISP's protection system is often disconnecting the server for the network because of this. Sometimes it's just false detection (or packets sended by a Tor user), invisible on bandwidth graphs but causing the network going offline. So it's disconnected serveral times per month (each time it happens, I send them an email and the server is reconnected). Because I'm not annoying at all with them, they aren't annoying with me. The user interface that provides a way to change reverse DNS doesn't work anymore for my second server (digi00666.digicube.fr - 2x 15MB/s), it have much more DDoS problems that the other one (with customised reverse DNS - 2x 12.5MB/s). Once, at Online.net, a DDoS attack (high amount of packet incoming) made my server send back a lot of answers. It was banned several days for sending flood! But as Tor Relay Operators we are strong and combatives ;) - Mail original - De: Tyler Durden vi...@enn.lu À: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Envoyé: Lundi 4 Août 2014 14:53:12 Objet: [tor-relays] Exit Nodes under DDoS attacks -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Hi I just wanted to know from others how often your nodes are being DDoSed? Because this month one of our nodes has been targeted twice. Because DDoS sucks and most providers aren't very happen when this happens often. Greetings virii - enn.lu -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.14 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iF4EAREIAAYFAlPfgjcACgkQzowS8yos8Rt1LQD/Rj2zZJpdmCyQhCmG3enWL6Z5 J0tbnnG2FS1GelACY74BAKIYRK8EVUt/pYfuuRzlBWWI84kuzcOmOiehqm6iyVjS =/ay4 -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Parliamentary inquiry about legal status of running Tor in Austria
Such political event about Tor is critical because a lot of countries could follow Austria about taking (the same ?) static and written position about Tor. With a political and legal complete acknowledgement of Tor, their will be no possible interpretation about is it OK or not to be a Tor Relay operator or Tor user. It can be so useful in front of ISP. And law agents also (sometimes complicated to show that what we do is fair and right, answering to their emails). With a political denial it would be catastrophic : It could be prohibited to be a Tor Relay operator, or to be a Tor user, and their will be no possible interpretation. Sometimes I imagine such a situation... as one of the last barrier crossing to the end of the free, open and real Internet, like it's being forbidden to exist without the proof of some representative's approval stuck on your back and checked everywere, with obligation of saying what you are doing, who do you want to see, and why... Can't help thinking that existence and freedom doesn't desserve anybody's approval ! Let's hope these people will consider Tor as a hope of preserving the Internet, even when freedom has drawback freedom is part of the meaning of our lives (especially on the Internet, network of exchanges and free expression). - Original mail - De: MacLemon t...@maclemon.at À: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org, tor-t...@lists.torproject.org Envoyé: Mercredi 9 Juillet 2014 15:42:39 Objet: [tor-relays] Parliamentary inquiry about legal status of running Tor in Austria Hoi! This is a cross posting tor-talk/tor-relays (Due to the current attention on the recent events in Austria. Thanks for understanding.) Niko Alm (of Austrian political party NEOS) has made an official parliamentary inquiry to the Austrian ministry of justice about the legal status of Tor. Blog posting: http://alm.at/tor/ (in german language) Inquiry: http://neos.eu/klub/20140708_AF-TOR-BMJ.pdf (in german language) In theory running a relay/exit _should_ be covered by Austrian E-Commerce law §13. It's just not legally proven that Tor also falls under the definition of a “communications network” from a legal point of view. Technically everyone would certainly agree that this is the case. From what I understand the goal is to get an official statement by the Austrian ministry of justice that Tor falls under the legal definition of a communications network. Which would mean, that Relay-Ops are not liable for the traffic passing through their relays given they do not initiate the traffic by themselves do not select the recipient of the information do not select or alter the transmitted information This includes caching. Austrian E-Commerce law, §13 legal text (german language) http://www.jusline.at/index.php?cpid=ba688068a8c8a95352ed951ddb88783elawid=116paid=13 Best regards MacLemon ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] CPU usage
Hi, In effect this CPU usage is quite normal : a Tor Relay use a lot of CPU, proportionally with amount of data passing trough the relay. With an Intel Atom D510 I was above 40 Mbps, while CPU was giving everything. The problem with Tor is the single-thread working for encryption/relaying, so if you have a second CPU core available, may be you can open a second Tor instance in order to use the second core capacity. In fact, when your Tor daemon reaches 100% of 1 core usage, you can see what is the current bandwith and set it into your torrc file as maximum. When a Tor instance exceeds 100% it's a little bit like a congestion into your Tor process, so it's better for 100% value to be a limit per Tor process. Your relay may average a little bit under the limit bandwidth of your torrc file, but this give better performance for Tor circuits established through your relay so it's not a bad ;) An interesting webpage here, full of usefull informations that doesn't appear on the official tutorial : https://www.torservers.net/wiki/setup/server Even if what you've done is more simple, or a little bit different, this tutorial will make you aware of a lot of interesting details and possibilities. Good luck ! Julien ROBIN - Mail original - De: kingqueen kingqu...@btnf.tw À: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Envoyé: Lundi 7 Juillet 2014 22:31:02 Objet: [tor-relays] CPU usage Hi, I'm running a Tor relay on a low cost dedicated server. The tor relay is named kingqueen and it's running on an Intel Atom N2700 dual core hyperthreaded CPU with 2gb of memory, in a data centre with a symmetric 100mbps connection. I have found as time goes on and usage of my relay increases (about 3 weeks now) that the Tor process is increasingly using more of the CPU. TOP shows Tor using over 100% of CPU and the load average is 2 or more. I use the dedi for other, less intensive things (OpenVPN, seedbox, also Owncloud though this falls over). I know that this is sub-optimal and ideally the dedi should be for the relay alone. I was wondering if the CPU usage is standard. I guess it could be, given it has decryption work to be done? Is it high? Is there anything I can do to lower it, other than rate limiting, which I don't want to do? Thank you ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] UK Exit Node
In effect, as Moritz said (and Roman also tried to say) it's necessary for navigation over Tor, that every Exit Possibility/Restriction are listed into your Exit Policy. If your Exit Node is not going to connect to a given website, it's fine, but the Tor Client have to know it, in order to automatically choose another Exit to reach the destination. For Tor Exit Node on a residential DSL line, because I love challenges, I've done this in the past, from August 2013 to end of December 2013, with unlimited exit policy ;) on a Raspberry Pi. May be I was lucky but apart from 1 copyright infrigement (French Hadopi the second week), I never had any problem, and in such case the situation is not very comlicated to handle (you simply explain). If you're like me you will have no problem by thinking your Internet connexion have great chance to be looked by your ISP and/or bigger instition : it's part of the challenge, and a challenge is interesting when almost no one is plucky enough to do what you're going to do ;) In order to get your participation to last a long time, it's usefull to run your node on a dedicated machine, while you can focus on your hobbies and use your computer/desktop as before. Best regards, Julien ROBIN - Mail original - De: Moritz Bartl mor...@torservers.net À: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Envoyé: Dimanche 6 Juillet 2014 14:41:23 Objet: Re: [tor-relays] UK Exit Node On 07/06/2014 09:39 AM, Michael Banks wrote: The block lists are very limited, i.e P2P, lists of known blackhats/paedophiles, unallocated IP ranges and most importantly: government-owned address and anti-tor addresses Please do not run PeerGuardian or any other blacklist. These lists are part of the problem, and in no way a solution. As stated earlier in this thread, it will break stuff. These lists are never up to date and always contain false information. It is your exit, you can indeed block IPs, but please do it on the level of ExitPolicy. In your world maybe government-owned addresses are a bad thing. For me and many other Tor users certainly not. You're free to run an exit on a residential line, but I doubt that your ISP will like the abuse complaints. You will likely get kicked off your contract sooner or later. Also, a residential ISP will not forward abuse complaints or even tell you about them, so there is no way for you to explain yourself. -- Moritz Bartl https://www.torservers.net/ ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] NSA knew about Heartbleed
It was so much previsible :) Few days ago the bug was published, few years ago it was already there, and this kind of stuff totally matches with NSA's - and other state security agencies's - full-time work. So in fact there is no more usefull precipitation since Apr 7, but there is also No Way they haven't already found our keys, for a long time already. May be after most part of the network have been updated (and most of the keys changed ?) it would be usefull to kick out of the network every compromised relays ? As I'm better in understanding/avoiding bad habbits, than in using hacking techniques, I'm unable to know if computers that are hosting Tor Relays could have been entirely compromised : without anymore knowledge I decided to completely reinstall them. Do you think this is usefull ? We cannot deny that this kind of well-kept secrets aren't usefull for the world in some conditions (I'm thinking about terrorist threats), but as for lot of similar subject, how many crap things have been done by these these all powerful governments by playing with such a security flaw... So I'm curious about what will happen now that we (are may be thinking that we) remove that opportunity they had in their hands. At my side, waiting for what will happen now, I have completely erased and reinstalled my servers starting from 0, new passwords... let's hope that attention I have for avoiding bad habbits on my personnal computer are enough - for me and for others Tor relays Operators ! Best regards Julien ROBIN - Mail original - De: Jesse Victors jvict...@jessevictors.com À: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Envoyé: Samedi 12 Avril 2014 02:32:07 Objet: [tor-relays] NSA knew about Heartbleed -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Saw this article: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-11/nsa-said-to-have-used-heartbleed-bug-exposing-consumers.html The U.S. National Security Agency knew for at least two years about a flaw in the way that many websites send sensitive information, now dubbed the Heartbleed bug, and regularly used it to gather critical intelligence, two people familiar with the matter said. The NSA said in response to a Bloomberg News article that it wasn?t aware of Heartbleed until the vulnerability was made public by a private security report. The agency?s reported decision to keep the bug secret in pursuit of national security interests threatens to renew the rancorous debate over the role of the government?s top computer experts. Thanks NSA, glad you've got our backs there. If you run a relay and you have been on one of the affected versions of OpenSSL, I would urge you to STRONGLY CONSIDER your relay compromised. Delete your keys per the recommendations and let Tor generate new ones. It's better to cripple the network temporarily while we come back from this, rather than preserving the uptime with possibly compromised keys. Security matters here. Please follow the best practice recommendations. If you run a web server, rekey your SSL certificates. Basically, if you were affected, consider encryption to have been bypassed and passwords and other sensitive information compromised. We cannot afford to take chances here. If the NSA knew it, you can also bet that someone else with a good static analyzer discovered it as well, I'll let you imagine one. Good luck out there everyone, we really need to revoke our keys if we were affected. Seriously, guys. It's worth it. On a lighter note, https://xkcd.com/1354/ Stay safe. Live long and prosper. Jesse V. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.14 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQF8BAEBCgBmBQJTSImHXxSAAC4AKGlzc3Vlci1mcHJAbm90YXRpb25zLm9w ZW5wZ3AuZmlmdGhob3JzZW1hbi5uZXQxMjgyMjhENjEyODQ1OTU1NzBCMjgwRkFB RDk3MzY0RkMyMEJFQzgwAAoJEK2XNk/CC+yA0nIIAKj1lOXRGcwMFd39CxjnymSN FVzrPUa/JomCJHqW/A0xSFdxbVAZIvio6C1phuWHmiiDKhsBuBGwLNzXQMGFltaw BnaTO1lLCvvSbEdmXPg12hR3YqR1d5D7Xnb0iTlSfrjZ7gGDEsXoJG3pU/V/RCFo IOEqxfZtVcI3DdrImlwcR6gPw6ip9JlTo49w8ncy6/K4cHED2liCQ13JvWjaQzSl uB06eWNsNo1IhPCKkZ7gFzharhN/4kAQrytC+ZcTmIrXdPrsd1lUaVICHWK9AEon sciDu5lI77srXWwt77YVAKw6Jrls41N3USgvKBSrxZhfBVQlCPOmoXtTHdwbhks= =pmBQ -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
