Re: [tor-relays] oniontip.com

[Mike Cardwell]

* on the Thu, Aug 28, 2014 at 08:31:36PM -0700, Mike Perry wrote:

 1. It should allow me to select if I want to donate only to nodes that
 have the Exit flag. Running an exit is way more involved (and often more
 expensive) than running a normal node, and I think it would be good to
 give folks the option to target their donation in this way. And perhaps
 encourage it as the default donation mode.
 
 2. It also already seems to have GeoIP information, at least on the
 country level. There are all sorts of interesting selectors that could
 be done with this. You could donate to relays in countries in inverse
 proportion to the number of relays they have, to encourage
 jurisdictional diversity, for example. Or more simply, just pick a
 country. This one is admittedly less cool and more complicated to figure
 out than just the Exit vs non-exit thing, though. (Do you also weight
 countries per-capita? Per internet user? Per Tor user? etc).

You already seem able to do stuff like, filter based on country and
Exit status, and then donate only to those nodes that are listed.

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Re: [tor-relays] OnionTip.com distributes Bitcoin donations to all BTC addresses set in ContactInfo

[Mike Cardwell]

That depends entirely on how much people donate. At the bottom
of their front page it currently states that 335.26 mBTC have
been donated so far. Ie, a third of a bitcoin. It's impossible
to predict how much might be donated in future.

On the other hand. It costs you nothing to stick a bitcoin
address in a config file to find out.

Mike

* on the Wed, Aug 13, 2014 at 05:23:27PM -0700, IceFish wrote:
 How much does it actually pay out? Like is it worth it? I run a fairly slow 
 small node
 
 Sent from my iPhone
 
  On Aug 13, 2014, at 17:05, Mike Patton m_pat...@me.com wrote:
  
  
  On 14 Aug 2014 08:34, Ed Carter ecart...@riseup.net wrote:
  
  Tim Semeijn schreef op 10/08/14 17:33: 
  On 8/10/14, 4:32 PM, b...@unseen.is wrote: 
  Hi, 
  
  apparently this hasn't been discussed here yet. About a month ago, 
  Donncha O'Cearbhaill build https://oniontip.com/ during the Dublin 
  Bitcoin Hackathon. It is a webapp which automatically extracts all 
  Bitcoin addresses set in the ContactInfo variable of the torrc and 
  distributes Bitcoin donations based on the consensus weight. 
  
  There are already 100+ relays listed which represent around 5% of 
  the total consensus weight. In just a few weeks they distributed 
  around 125 US$. 
  
  There are many other theoretical ways to provide compensation to 
  tor relay operators (see 
  https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-incentives-research-roundup-goldstar-par-braids-lira-tears-and-torcoin)
  but I really like this very simple and practical approach. 
  
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  I myself added a bitcoin address to the ContactInfo variable of my 
  nodes when I saw a tweet about this initiative. It is a nice way to 
  offer a way to donate to multiple node running volunteers instead of 
  donating to a specific person or organization. 
  
  My nodes take up 20% of the current donations based on consensus so it 
  would be nice if more relay operators take part in this project to 
  make it resemble the current Tor network better.
  
  I really like this and I've added an address to my exits (4.2% of total 
  exit consensus). However, for this to really kick off I'd recommend 
  adding visibility on how many donations were received and how it was 
  distributed across relays. There should be safeguards to prevent 
  oniontip.com from taking a part of the money, etc. 
  
  Tom 
  
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  Agreed, this is pretty awesome.  It allows independent relay operators to 
  receive donations no matter where they are in the world whether or not 
  they are affiliated with any group. 
  
  The donations are transparent, since the money can be followed on the 
  Bitcoin blockchain to ensure that your donation made it to the individual 
  addresses of the relay operators. 
  
  
  
  
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  I like it! I've already made AUD $0.05!!! ;)
  
  M.
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Re: [tor-relays] Running tor in VPS - keep away snooping eyes

[Mike Cardwell]

* on the Thu, Jul 03, 2014 at 10:02:06AM +0200, Lunar wrote:

 I have done all that, so covered on that aspect. Was wondering if disk 
 encryption and use of something like TRESOR would be useful?
 
 The private keys for the node are sensitive, and even the
 .tor/state file for the guard nodes could be if the attacker
 does not already have that info, same for any non default
 node selection stuff in torrc. Tor presumably validates
 the disk consensus files against its static keys on startup
 so that's probably ok yet all easily under .tor anyway.
 
 Some says that it's better to leave the disk unencrypted because in case
 of seizure by the police, they can easily attest that the system was
 only running Tor and nothing else.

Even if it's encrypted, you can easily attest the exact same thing by
handing over your password... If you choose to do so.
 
 Some disagrees and says that we should always encrypt to make tampering
 and (extra-)legal backdoor installation more difficult.
 
 I believe the best strategy has never been really determined so far.

I know of only two benefits to not encrypting.

1.) On some systems, for some workloads, you might have some level of
improved performance. For a Tor node, I doubt there is any
noticable difference.

2.) You can reboot without having to enter a password.

Encryption gives you choice. The choice to hand over your password/key
or not. As far as I'm concerned, the best strategy *has* been
determined and it's to encrypt...

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